Hypersonic Missile Nonproliferation Hindering the Spread of a New Class of Weapons Richard H. Speier, George Nacouzi, Carrie A. Lee, Richard M. Moore C O R P O R A T I O N For more information on this publication, visit www.rand.org/t/RR2137 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data is available for this publication. ISBN: 978-0-8330-9916-7 Published by the RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, Calif. © Copyright 2017 RAND Corporation R® is a registered trademark. Limited Print and Electronic Distribution Rights This document and trademark(s) contained herein are protected by law. This representation of RAND intellectual property is provided for noncommercial use only. Unauthorized posting of this publication online is prohibited. Permission is given to duplicate this document for personal use only, as long as it is unaltered and complete. Permission is required from RAND to reproduce, or reuse in another form, any of its research documents for commercial use. For information on reprint and linking permissions, please visit www.rand.org/pubs/permissions. The RAND Corporation is a research organization that develops solutions to public policy challenges to help make communities throughout the world safer and more secure, healthier and more prosperous. RAND is nonprofit, nonpartisan, and committed to the public interest. RAND’s publications do not necessarily reflect the opinions of its research clients and sponsors. Support RAND Make a tax-deductible charitable contribution at www.rand.org/giving/contribute www.rand.org Preface Hypersonic missiles—specifically, hypersonic glide vehicles and hyper- sonic cruise missiles—are a new class of threat able to penetrate most missile defenses and to further compress the timelines for a response by a nation under attack. Such missiles are being developed by the United States, Russia, and China. Their proliferation beyond these three nations could result in lesser powers setting their strategic forces on hair-trigger states of readiness and more credibly being able to threaten attacks on major powers. There is probably less than a decade available to substantially hinder the proliferation process. To this end, this report makes specific recommendations for actions by the United States, Russia, and China, as well as by the broader international community. This report was prepared in 2015–2017 under the sponsorship of the Carnegie Corporation of New York for its project “Disruptive Technologies and the Future of Deterrence.” It should be of interest to individuals and organizations concerned with defense technologies, arms control, or nonproliferation. This research was conducted within the International Secu- rity and Defense Policy Center (ISDP) of the RAND National Defense Research Institute. For more information on ISDP, see www.rand.org/nsrd/ndri/centers/isdp or contact the director (contact information is provided on the web page). iii Contents Preface ............................................................................. iii Figures ............................................................................. ix Summary .......................................................................... xi Acknowledgments ...............................................................xv Abbreviations ................................................................... xvii CHAPTER ONE Introduction: What This Report Addresses ................................. 1 CHAPTER TWO Strategic Consequences of Hypersonic Missile Proliferation ............ 7 Principal Characteristics of HGVs ............................................... 8 Principal Characteristics of HCMs .............................................11 Long-Term Planning Perspectives for HGV and HCM Technologies ......15 Strategic Implications of Hypersonic Weapons ................................16 The Broader Picture of Increased Risk ..........................................18 CHAPTER THREE Ongoing Hypersonic Technology Proliferation ...........................21 Committed Governments ....................................................... 22 R&D in Less-Committed Countries .......................................... 28 International Cooperation .......................................................29 Claimed Reasons for Pursuing Hypersonic Technology .....................31 Challenges Posed for Controlling Proliferation ...............................32 Summary .......................................................................... 34 v vi Hypersonic Missile Nonproliferation CHAPTER FOUR Hindering Hypersonic Missile Proliferation ...............................35 Unilateral Measures ..............................................................35 Multilateral Measures ............................................................37 Potential Export Controls ........................................................39 Is the Missile Technology Control Regime Adaptable to Hypersonic Technology? .................................................. 42 Recommended Items to Control .............................................. 44 CHAPTER FIVE Conclusions .......................................................................47 APPENDIX A The Hypersonic Flight Regime ................................................49 Introduction .......................................................................49 APPENDIX B Survey of Foreign Hypersonic Activity ......................................53 European Union .................................................................. 54 Australia ........................................................................... 56 Belgium............................................................................ 60 Brazil ................................................................................62 Canada ............................................................................ 64 France .............................................................................. 64 Germany .......................................................................... 68 India ................................................................................70 Iran..................................................................................76 Israel ............................................................................... 77 Italy .................................................................................79 Japan ................................................................................81 The Netherlands .................................................................. 84 Norway ............................................................................ 86 Pakistan ........................................................................... 87 Singapore .......................................................................... 88 South Korea ........................................................................89 Spain ............................................................................... 90 Sweden..............................................................................91 Contents vii Taiwan ............................................................................. 92 United Kingdom ..................................................................93 APPENDIX C Technical and Economic Barriers to Hypersonic Systems Development ................................................................ 99 Technical Barriers ................................................................ 99 Economic Challenges ........................................................... 106 Summary of Challenges ........................................................ 107 APPENDIX D Suggested Export Control List for Hypersonic Technologies ......... 109 Standard Additions to Export Controls ...................................... 109 Specific Suggestions for Export Controls..................................... 110 References ...................................................................... 117 Figures 1.1. Generic Concept of an HGV ........................................ 2 1.2. Generic Concept of an HCM ....................................... 3 1.3. Ballistic Reentry Vehicle (RV) Versus HGV Trajectories ........ 4 2.1. Typical HGV and MaRV Trajectories ............................. 9 2.2. HGV Versus RV Terrestrial-Based Detection ....................11 2.3. Destructive Power of a High-Speed Mass as a Function of Speed ...............................................................13 3.1. French LEA .......................................................... 23 3.2. Indian-Russian BrahMos II ....................................... 24 3.3. Australian–U.S. HIFiRE Scramjet ............................... 26 3.4. Japanese HyTEx ..................................................... 27 3.5. European LAPCAT II ............................................. 28 3.6. Chinese Mach 4 Missile Exported to Pakistan ...................31 4.1. Illustrative Ranges from Japan .................................... 40 4.2. Illustrative Ranges from India ......................................41 4.3. Illustrative Ranges from Poland ....................................41 A.1. X-15 Hypersonic Test Vehicle ..................................... 50 ix Summary This report examines the implications of the proliferation of hypersonic missiles and possible measures to hinder it. Hypersonic missiles can be maneuverable and travel at approxi- mately 5,000 to 25,000 kilometers per hour, or one to five miles per second. In more