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Joint Theater Missile Defense Strategy

By ROBERT M. SOOFER U.S. Army (Moses M. Mlasko) Patriot in Kuwaiti.

heater ballistic missile (TBM) defense As defined in Joint Pub 3-01.5, joint theater was first used operationally during missile defense (JTMD) is composed of four inte- Desert Storm in response to Iraqi Scud grated operations: T attacks against Saudi Arabia and Israel. ■ passive missile defense—individual and collective Since there was no joint doctrine or concept of measures taken to posture the force to minimize the ef- operations for theater missile defense (TMD), the fects of a theater missile (TM) attack commander in chief (CINC) decided what to pro- ■ active missile defense—measures to intercept, de- tect with limited assets. It was readily apparent, stroy, and/or negate the effects of TMs after launch though, that TMD was a joint mission. Not only ■ attack operations—actions to neutralize or destroy were Army Patriot missiles deployed on land, but an adversary’s ability to produce, deploy, and employ TMs the Air Force flew thousands of sorties in opera- ■ command, control, communications, computers, tions against mobile Scuds as satellites provided and intelligence—capabilities to coordinate and integrate the joint force component capabilities to conduct pas- warning and cuing information, and Navy Aegis- sive defense, active defense, and attack operations. equipped ships tracked enemy ballistic missiles. This treatment of the role of TBM defense in Within the same publication the term theater theater strategy and operational art highlights missile is used for ballistic, air-to-surface, and Joint Pub 3-01.5, Doctrine cruise missiles with targets in a given theater (though short-range, non-nuclear, direct fire mis- ballistic missile threats are of for Joint Theater Missile De- fense.1 However it goes be- siles, bombs, and rockets are not included). For foremost concern yond doctrine by exploring purposes of analysis, and not to minimize other operational considerations threats, this article deals exclusively with ballistic for employing TMD in various phases of combat. missile threats which, according to Joint Pub 3-01.5, Finally, some background is provided on TMD in are of foremost concern. Moreover, the focus is national military strategy.2 primarily on the active defense component of joint TMD operations.

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Soofer

National Military Strategy Theater Strategy The end of the Cold War turned defense The growing ballistic missile threat is well planning from the global Soviet threat to regional documented. In the administration’s judgment, challenges. In a statement delivered to the House as contained in the Bottom-Up Review, regional ag- Armed Services Committee on March 30, 1993, gressors could soon field 100–1,000 Scud-class Secretary of Defense Les Aspin indicated that, ballistic missiles, some armed with nuclear, chem- “With the demise of the Soviet Union, threats to ical, or biological (NBC) warheads.4 There are re- stability in key regions throughout the world ports that today at least 15 nations have ballistic have become America’s principal military con- missiles, a number that could rise to 20 by the cern and a major determinant of our defense bud- year 2000.5 According to Joint Pub 3-01.5, there is get priorities.” a tendency toward increasing range, lethality, ac- Accordingly, the administration advanced a curacy, and sophistication. national military strategy with complementary Theater ballistic missiles may often have objectives: first, promoting stability through re- greater political than military significance. They gional cooperation and constructive interaction, can pose a political threat by weakening the will and second, thwarting aggression by credible de- of defenders when targeted at civilian areas. With terrence and robust warfighting capabilities. They longer-range missiles, aggressors could strike the will be achieved through peacetime engagement, territory of our allies, endangering the coalition. deterrence and conflict prevention, and the ability to A CINC may have to consider TBM operations fight and win. More specifically, the Armed Forces outside his immediate theater in this instance. must be able to: Joint doctrine also indicates that TBMs could ■ deter and defeat aggression in two nearly simul- be used throughout a conflict against tactical, op- taneous major regional contingencies erational, and strategic targets to disrupt offenses, ■ maintain overseas presence of permanently sta- defenses, and support, and to reduce friendly ca- tioned forces by exercises, port calls, et al. pabilities. These targets are political (for example, ■ deter and prevent use of weapons of mass de- cities, cultural sites, non-coalition states, and vul- struction (WMD) and their delivery systems nerabilities with propaganda value) and military ■ support peace enforcement and missions such (for example, lines of communication, logistical as counterterrorism and disaster relief. facilities, counter-TMD activity, countervalue at- Theater missile defenses will play a key role in tacks on population centers, and choke points). implementing this new strategy. Our forces in- It should be noted that regional TBM powers creasingly will be stationed in regions where po- for the most part operate under targeting and em- tential adversaries have theater ballistic missiles. In ployment constraints. This can restrict the vari- support of overseas ground presence, TMD systems ables that CINCs must consider in determining operating with early warning systems can provide the need for TMD protection. For example, TBMs limited- and wide-area defense against theater bal- can be limited by range, suitable deployment listic missiles for forward-deployed and expedi- areas, accuracy, daily sortie rates, and reconnais- tionary forces. They can defend U.S. and local sance and battle damage assessment. Estimates of forces, bases, harbors, airfields, and cities. Similar enemy TBM capabilities would affect TMD de- protection can be afforded to military units sup- ployment decisions. For instance, poor accuracy porting peace enforcement and humanitarian mis- may mean that hardened targets can forgo de- sions. Finally, TMD can contribute to the deterrent fenses, range limitations can put targets out of mission of forward deployed U.S. forces by reduc- reach, and lack of reconnaissance may reduce the ing their vulnerability to ballistic missile attack risk from TBM attack against mobile assets. Spe- and countering the threat or use of WMD. cific targets for theater ballistic missiles might in- The Gulf War illustrated the political and clude air defense artillery sites, command and military value of protection against threatened or control elements, communication nodes, aircraft actual use of ballistic missiles and WMD. Deploy- facilities, seaports and harbors, logistic centers, ing TBM defenses against this threat will allow power and water plants, nuclear delivery systems U.S. leaders to execute campaign plans and main- and storage sites, naval ships and fleet operating tain coalition solidarity.3 areas, ground maneuver forces, amphibious ob- jective areas, cities, industrial complexes, mer- chant shipping, and terrain choke points.

Robert M. Soofer is a member of the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization. He wrote this article based on research conducted while attending the National War College.

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Operational Considerations digenous forces. In some instances, U.S. forces During pre-hostilities, TMD deployment is may be stationed in or near the theater and may intended to deter aggression by demonstrating move to assist defenders. The bulk of forces, how- U.S. resolve and coalition solidarity. Such deploy- ever, is likely to come from the United States. De- ments can dampen incentives for preemption by pending on the type, range, and accuracy of denying an enemy ballistic missile force quick enemy ballistic missiles, targets can be political to and undefended access to key targets. If conflict is demoralize the public and disrupt a coalition or unavoidable joint doctrine states that TMD can military to support an offensive. The latter include 3 protect deployed coalition forces, critical assets, air defenses, air bases, aircraft on the ground, C and vital interests; detect and target TBM plat- nodes, marshalling areas, and logistics facilities. forms; detect, warn, and report TBM launches; co- Chemical warheads may be used against troop ordinate multifaceted responses to attack with concentrations or airfields. Ballistic missile attacks other combat operations; and reduce or minimize can be particularly effective in degrading anti-air- the effects of TBM damage. craft capability and gaining command of the skies. One factor that theater TBM planners must An enemy may have a limited number of ballistic take into account in developing JTMD strategy is missiles which are held in reserve. Additionally, that the assets to be protected almost always out- ballistic missile attacks may occur outside the the- number active defense assets. Offensive attack op- ater as a deterrent against external involvement. erations for TMD are similarly limited and will be During this phase U.S. and coalition assets, further strained by added theater requirements. whose TBM capability may be outnumbered or The following is not an attempt to define a con- nonexistent, are the most vulnerable. If our forces cept of operations for JTMD. Rather, it hopefully are not forward deployed in theater, their only reveals the operational considerations that dictate TMD assets will be offshore or ground-based in JTMD use during the various phases of combat nearby theaters. Assuming that naval assets are in operations.6 The discussion under each phase de- range protection can be afforded to allied popula- scribes the situation during the phase, illustrates tion centers and forces under ballistic missile at- the potential TBM threat, and analyses TMD pri- tack. Depending on the scenario, a priority can be orities and available capabilities. civilian targets, national command authorities, Pre-hostilities. In a crisis U.S. forces may be re- political nodes, or ports where reinforcements ar- quired to deter aggression while reassuring rive. TBM launchers can be attacked by sea-based friends and allies. This may require a demonstra- air or land-based fighters from nearby theaters. If tion of force such as joint exercises; moving land, U.S. forces are already in theater, defending them sea, or air forces into the is an essential priority. TMD gives commanders area; or deploying theater Commanders with limited TMD will have difficulty prioritizing their assets, often having to flexibility in deploying forces ballistic missile defenses as recently seen in South choose between local populations and their own Korea. In some instances, forces. Inaccurate TBMs, however, are far more TMD deployments would be welcome and pro- likely be used against civilian targets since they ceed in the context of alliance or coalition agree- are not as effective against military targets. TMD ments. Ground-based systems could be moved attack operations must be weighed against other into place as a visible sign of U.S. commitment. uses of joint capabilities such as direct attacks on 3 But land force deployments may not be welcome advancing enemy forces, C I nodes, and air de- in other instances or when the United States does fenses. Finally, passive measures can be taken to not wish to make its deployment obtrusive for reduce the vulnerability of in-place U.S. forces to fear of exacerbating the crisis, which makes off- TBM attack. shore TMD preferable. In any event, in crises Phase 2—Build Combat Power. Once an attack where ballistic missile use is possible, TMD gives is halted, a coalition focuses on building combat commanders greater flexibility in deploying and power and logistics while reducing the enemy’s employing forces—whether in theater or poised capability and will to fight. As more land, sea, to react to imminent hostilities. The Patriot bat- and air forces arrive from the United States and talion sent to South Korea last year is an example: allied nations, the emphasis shifts to isolating half of the missiles were positioned to protect de- enemy ground forces and destroying them, neu- ployed U.S. forces (although the bulk remained tralizing air and naval forces and their logistics, unprotected) and others protected a major rein- and attacking targets in the rear. Meanwhile, U.S. forcement area, the port of Pusan. or coalition forces prepare for a counteroffensive. Phase I—Halt the Invasion. Where feasible the Enemy TBMs can be employed against air highest defense priority is to minimize the terri- bases and ports to thwart reinforcements. TBM tory and strategic facilities that can be captured. The responsibility for initial defense rests with in-

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USS Antietam cruising to Arabian Gulf. U.S. Navy (David Lloyd)

strikes can be ex- based TMD can be released to other theaters. pected against troop Highly integrated communications between sur- marshalling areas as veillance and warning assets, active defenses, and well as rear areas. attack operations (that is, cooperative engage- They can also be used ment) should be available to contribute to the to break the will of TMD mission in this phase if not earlier. Special defenders by inflict- operations forces can also be made available to Aftermath of Scud ing casualties that target and destroy enemy TBM launchers behind attack. would otherwise be enemy lines.

U.S. Air Force (LeeU.S. Air Force Corkran) impossible because of Phase 3—Defeat the Enemy. In this phase U.S. U.S. land and air- and allied forces mount a large-scale land, sea, air power in theater. The counteroffensive to destroy enemy war-making most effective use of TBMs, however, may be capability, retake territory, and achieve other striking at the political cohesion of a coalition. strategic or operational objectives including am- Depending on the range of enemy TBMs, they phibious assault landings in an enemy’s rear. By can also be used against targets outside the the- this time allied TMD operations should succeed ater to widen a conflict or fragment coalition in degrading the TBM threat. Most likely, the few partners, as when Iraq launched Scuds against Is- remaining TBM assets are used against strategic rael. If Saddam had possessed Chinese CSS–2s targets to disrupt a coalition through attacks on (now deployed in Saudi Arabia), he could have at- populations or political, economic, or religious tacked targets in Europe. targets. Again, depending on circumstances, an If it takes months for a build-up, protecting enemy can withhold TBM fires in anticipation of the cohesion of a coalition or alliance is a high a counteroffensive and use them to halt ground priority. This can require TMD deployments to advances, channel attacks into more defensive other theaters vulnerable to TBM attack. Civilians positions, repel amphibious assaults, or disrupt and infrastructure must be protected as a coali- the ability of a coalition to sustain the counterof- tion buys time to mount a counteroffensive. The fensive. Facing imminent defeat, an enemy can next priority is protecting theater reinforcement also employ NBC on TBMs. With a shift to offen- areas and lines of communication. With the sive operations, available aircraft for TMD attack build-up of air forces in theater, attacks on TBMs can decline, putting a greater burden on active can increase with active TMD assets protecting defense. TBM must support the advance of front high-priority resources. Mobile ground-based as- lines. With the vulnerability of amphibious oper- sets such as Patriots and, in the future theater ations, the objective and supporting fleet opera- high-altitude area defenses, can protect inland areas previously out of sea-based TMD range. Sea-

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tions areas as well as air bases must be priorities doctrine and a concept of operations, applicable for sea-based TMD. to other combined operations such as NATO air Phase 4—Provide Post-War Stability. Forces re- defense. At very least, the United States should main in theater following an allied victory to en- look at ways to connect TMD with extant re- sure compliance with peace accords or cease-fire gional battle management/C3 systems to take ad- agreements and to help vantage of indigenous capabilities. assets to be defended will reestablish friendly gov- ernments. As with Iraq, In the final analysis, for as long as national exceed active TMD capabilities this can require a sus- military strategy calls for forward deployed U.S. tained presence with the forces and the ability to respond to regional prospect of small-scale hostilities. With an en- crises, there will be an important role for theater emy’s will broken and its armies destroyed, there missile defenses. The ballistic missile threat will is little likelihood of TBM action against military only intensify as various states develop longer- targets. A terrorist threat or possibility of retribu- range missiles with greater accuracy and ability to tion against political targets, however, must not deliver WMD. As the Gulf War demonstrated, an be ruled out unless allied forces maintain com- effective defense must integrate land, sea, and air plete control over enemy territory. Protecting assets operating under joint doctrine. Despite the populations and vital assets within TBM range is necessities of joint doctrine, however, strategies prudent until the threat is nil. Ground-based ac- for using TMD in contingencies will rest with the- tive TMD units can be redeployed for this pur- ater commanders who must wrestle with consid- pose as needed. Surveillance and warning systems erations that are only touched on here. JFQ also must be kept in place. Assets to be defended both inside and out- NOTES side a theater will exceed active TMD capabilities 1 Joint Pub 3-01.5, Doctrine for Joint Theater Missile projected for the next 10–15 years (and for only Defense (Washington: Government Printing Office, one major regional conflict). Given the uncer- March 30, 1994). tainty of the TBM threat and its context, the mis- 2 Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to the President sion will have to rely on joint capabilities and the and the Congress (Washington: Government Printing Of- synergy of integrated active and passive defenses, fice, January 1994), pp. 51–56; Ballistic Missile Defense attack operations, and C4I, all of which must be Organization, 1993 Report to Congress on the Theater Mis- rapidly deployable or employable from the sile Defense Initiative (Washington: Government Printing United States, forward bases, or ships. Office, 1993); and Dennis McDowell, “Theater Missile Defense: A Joint Enterprise,” Joint Force Quarterly, no. 6 Serious choices will have to be made to (Autumn/Winter 1994–95), pp. 80–87. maintain alliance solidarity between the protec- 3 Department of Defense, National Military Strategy of tion of cities and infrastructure and the defense the United States: A Strategy of Flexible Response and Selec- of U.S. and allied forces. The choice may vary tive Engagement (Washington: Government Printing Of- with the operational phase, but active TMD capa- fice, February 1995), pp. 4–6. bilities must defend centers of gravity, despite the 4 According to Les Aspin, “The United States cannot risk of an attack to lower priority assets which are accept a situation in which the threat or use of ballistic not directly defended according to joint doctrine. missiles armed with WMD constrain its ability to pro- One way to maximize limited active defense ject military forces to meet commitments abroad and assets is to develop and deploy land, sea, and air- achieve national security objectives. Once deployed, U.S. forces must have TMD defense capabilities to deal based TMD systems with the ability to detect, with ballistic missile threats.” See, Annual Report, p. 53. track, and control missiles. An example used by 5 By decade’s end, active defense assets could include the Vice Chairman, Admiral William Owens, in nine advanced capability Patriot battalions (six per bat- an article published last year in JFQ, is to deploy talion with eight launchers per battery), two THAAD land-based acquisition and fire control radar in batteries (operational prototypes), and one sea-based theater to control missile interceptors fired off- TMD system on an Aegis-equipped cruiser. By compari- shore by sea-based platforms. Not only would this son, the advanced-capability Patriots can defend four extend the range of sea-based defenses, which are times the area of Patriots employed during the Gulf limited by the line-of-sight radar on Aegis ships, War, while THAAD increases the defensive area ten-fold. but also ease demands on airlift by obviating the The sea-based system will be slightly better than the ad- vanced Patriot. early need for land-based launchers and missiles. 6 See Annual Report, pp. 13–15. Joint Pub 3-0, Doctrine Likewise, sea-based radars can pass acquisition for Joint Operations, identifies these phases as pre-hostili- and tracking information to land-based systems ties, lodgement, decisive combat, follow-through, and already in place. post-hostilities and redeployment. Another way to compensate for limited TMD is to encourage our allies to deploy their own sys- tems. This calls for a joint and coalition TMD

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