March 2021

THE FUTURE OF IRISH NEUTRALITY

No discussion of Ireland’s defence policy takes place without an assertion of the “traditional policy of military neutrality.” Yet no such policy exists, and even if it did, Ireland has never been in a position to fulfil it barring a short period during the Second World War.

The word “neutrality” as used in the Irish context tends to be informed by the subjective values and beliefs of the speaker rather than by reference to legal and military norms. Yet military neutrality has legal and objective form, understood by other nation states. The rights and responsibilities of neutral states were set out in Article V1 of the Hague Conventions in 1907. Ireland has never enforced these rights, nor complied with our responsibilities as a neutral.

The Hague Conventions were relied upon by smaller European states which declared themselves neutral prior to World War II. Despite formal declarations of neutrality, Germany invaded Denmark, Norway, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg; the UK invaded the Faroe Islands, Iceland and Iran. The Soviet Union invaded Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia and Iran. Their experience in World War II was significant in the post-war decisions of Belgium, Netherland, Denmark and Norway to join NATO.

Membership of, or association with, any military bloc in the West carries with it the suggestion, even by the Department of Foreign Affairs,2 that it would degrade our reputation as a UN peacekeeper. Norway and Canada likely enjoy reputations as peacekeepers (both militarily and diplomatically) at least as high as Ireland’s, and are unafraid of voicing principled positions where our Department of Foreign Affairs appears reluctant.

In the longer run, we must also consider the implications of a United Ireland on the State, and on our declared neutrality. In a United Ireland, what would become of the Royal Irish Regiment of the British Army? Currently, the element posted in Northern Ireland is a reserve element. Would Ireland contemplate its complete disbandment, or would we incorporate it into the Defence Forces? Were the UK to cease to have an “Irish” unit in its establishment, there would be no British unit in which those who identify as Northern Irish could serve. Would an incorporation of an identifiable Royal Irish Regiment into the Defence Forces serve a political as well as military purpose? And what implications for our stated policy of neutrality would this have?

DEMOCRACY IS NOT A GIVEN

Ireland seems burdened by a notion that the advance of democracy is assured, that the world advances progressively towards peaceful, democratic institutions, and that regression from democratisation is unlikely. Yet that is far from evident in the politics of our neighbours. In its “Freedom in the World 2021 Report3 Democracy under Siege,” Freedom House states: “The expansion of authoritarian rule, combined with the fading and inconsistent presence of major democracies on the international stage, has had tangible effects on human life and security, including the frequent resort

1 Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers and Persons in Case of War on Land 2 https://www.dfa.ie/our-role-policies/international-priorities/peace-and-security/neutrality/ 3 https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2021/democracy-under-siege to military force to resolve political disputes.” It suggests that it is 15 years since the number of countries recording an improvement in democratic freedoms exceeded those recording a decline.

This analysis is not unique to Freedom House. The Economist suggests that 2020 was a very bad year for democracy.4 As recent developments in the USA have shown, it is not a given that internal threats to the State will come from a fringe grouping. They can emerge from mainstream political parties.

We need only look at the post-Brexit conduct of our closest neighbour to see a casual disregard for international law and a willingness to leverage the threat of loyalist violence in its challenge to the Northern Ireland protocol, negotiated and agreed to by the UK. The source of and reasons behind the “Dark Money” introduced to the Brexit referendum5 remain unclear.

Ireland is not immune. While successive Governments have been able to govern well in “backs-to-the- wall” mode, we struggle as a society to do necessary, far-sighted things:

• Water charges were overturned despite two thirds of the population paying them compliantly. • There is a failure of political will in extending property tax to tens of thousands of homes built since 2013. • There is political inability to address long-tail risks such as our public service and social welfare pensions deficits; despite every year of delay increasing the pain of resolution. • The political system suffers an effective “Stockholm syndrome” regarding its public services, unable to confront inefficiency, ineffectiveness, or demand value for money. The gap between public and private sector pay is again on the increase.

4 https://www.economist.com/graphic-detail/2021/02/02/global-democracy-has-a-very-bad-year? 5 https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/election-dup-brexit-donations-saudi-arabia-tale-tories-theresa-may-a7782681.html

The State is not yet one century old, and throughout has always faced the existence of at least one armed group or another who deny the legitimacy of the State, its courts, laws, government, police and armed forces. The legitimacy of our Defence Forces has been always challenged by a significant minority since the formal establishment of the State.

A DEFENSIVE MINDSET

The word “contingency” is used six times in the 2015 White Paper, and is not used at all in the 2019 update. The extent to which the Defence Forces maintain a military capability for even some reasonably predictable contingencies is questionable. I am not ashamed to admit that, when I trained as a cadet in 1984-86, my classmates and I regularly considered our Nuclear, Biological and Chemical (NBC) training to be the most superfluous part of the syllabus. Yet, as many of us went overseas for the first time with 68th IRISHBATT in 1990, not only were we fully kitted out to handle a chemical agent attack, we were one of only three contingents at the time who were trained to do so, and we had to train soldiers from several other contingents.

However, the formation training for that unit was compromised by severe shortages of NBC suits and boots, Combipens and NAPS tablets. There was barely enough kit to train one platoon, and it had to be rapidly circulated among the companies during formation for training. When the Defence Forces was attempting to procure this kit on the open market, it was competing against large military formations preparing for war in the Gulf.

We now see some of the peripheral benefits of NBC training in management of pandemic conditions, another contingency that is mentioned in the White Paper.

Ireland’s absence of a holistic defensive mindset is also visible in:

• The absence of a dedicated civilian domestic and counter-intelligence service. • Our very recent establishment of a cyber-security service. • A lethargic vaccine rollout during the Covid-19 pandemic that has been “outsourced” to the EU. • A supine attitude to the defence of our citizenry abroad; e.g. the absence of an aggressive response to what amounts to the commercial kidnap of an Irish national by China, in an aircraft leasing dispute is a gross dereliction of duty by the State.

Appendix I shows our military spending per capita to be one of the lowest in the world. Even correcting for the distortion in using GDP for analysis, our spending would climb no higher than 143rd. This is not to suggest that there is a “right” number for spending on military defence. Indeed, the State could decide to abandon altogether the maintenance of a military, as Costa Rica has done. Theirs is at least a principled stance. However, for a state with pretensions to neutrality and the maintenance of a global footprint in peacekeeping, our stance lacks credibility.

A DEPARTMENT WITHOUT A MISSION

Authority without responsibility is tyranny, and responsibility without authority is impotence.6

-Concept of the Corporation, Peter Drucker 1946

6 ISEAD Working Paper Analysis The White Paper on Defence Update 2019 states: “While the Secretary General is the Minister’s principal policy adviser, the Chief of Staff is his principal military adviser.” Yet it is far from evident that the civil side presents anything meaningful to the Executive in terms of defence policy. To the disinterested outsider, the policy function seems to aspire no higher than administration of a dwindling force. While the Update explains at length the learning and upskilling among the staff, measurable outputs from this are not evident. At a time in the economic cycle when it should be relatively easy to maintain the Defence Forces at establishment strength, this has proven beyond our Department.

While no doubt populated with career civil servants of high integrity and determination to do the right thing, the Department obviously suffers an absence of strategic focus, purpose and vision. Persistent disagreements between Departmental staff and the military command structure have been widely reported in the media and in the Defence Forces Review 2020.7 This begs the question as to what they are arguing about. Differences about remuneration or conditions of service are no more likely than in any other department of state. But if the issues of difference are exclusively or mainly within the domain of military competence, the problems are systemic in nature, and require a comprehensive management of change. To tolerate their continuance would be no less acceptable than permitting line civil servants to interfere in clinical management decisions in the health service, or in crime detection and investigation in An Garda Síochána.

The Defence Review paper rightly focusses on the civilian strength of the Department at a time when the Defence Forces are unable to maintain establishment strength. However, this misses the more important issue of the expansion in the number of senior officials (of General Officer equivalent) in the Department. While the Defence Forces have a standing establishment of nine generals running the three services and DFHQ, the Department has five staff of Sec Gen, Asst Sec Gen and Director level. In the context of a civilian staff of 354, this is extraordinary. It is hardly surprising therefore that conflict between those who are vocationally qualified and responsible (but lack authority) and those who are unqualified (but in authority) takes place. It would be more surprising if there were not conflict in such circumstances. This is a command system structured to fail.

Government should examine whether any other comparable European neighbour structures its defence architecture in the manner Ireland does.

The reported exclusion of the Defence Forces from the negotiation of an air-defence MOU8 with the UK, if true, suggests a near wilful animus by the Department of Defence to exclude the military from high-level engagement concerning its core responsibilities. It is also indicative of a quite profound incomprehension and ignorance among not just Department of Defence officials, but also those of the Department of Foreign Affairs. If the RAF sought the involvement of the Defence Forces in the engagement between HMG and our own Government, this lack of enlightenment by our civil service will not have gone unnoticed by the British.

A FORCE FOR GOOD

Domestically, the Defence Forces has demonstrated its abilities as the bus service of last resort, bin collection of last resort, nursing home management of last resort, vaccinators of last resort, flood relief agency of last resort. In its recruitment of people from disadvantaged backgrounds, it has also given a

7 https://www.military.ie/en/public-information/publications/defence-forces-review/review-2020.pdf 8 https://www.irishexaminer.com/news/arid-20414646.html sense of mission, duty and purpose to thousands of young men (in particular) whose alternative outlets might not have been as productive.

In those countries such as Singapore,9 South Korea,10 Switzerland,11 etc. where conscription or national service still occur, its qualities as a “social leveller” are as valued as the defensive element. For this reason, Germany has periodically considered12 the reintroduction of conscription for its civic and social elements. Eight EU countries currently practice conscription,13 Sweden having reintroduced it in 2017. Russia’s more aggressive stance in Eastern Europe and the Baltics has led to a higher degree of Swedish coordination with NATO.14 These countries are of course regarded seriously by their larger neighbours, while it is not at all clear that such is the case for Ireland.

The Defence Forces are, to some extent, heirs to the traditions of our religious and missionaries in poor or troubled parts of the world. The political dividend we have secured from participation in missions around the world is evident in our current seat on the UN Security Council. Ireland has played a significant part in the maintenance of stability in middle east. This peace dividend has not just benefited Lebanon and the populations around the Golan Heights, it has stopped the spread of those conflicts into Europe. The aftermath of the Arab Spring and civil war in Syria has shown just how disruptive conflict can be thousands of kilometres from the locus of action.

Our ability to make a positive, meaningful contribution domestically and around the world is being severely hampered by a deterioration in our Defence Forces.15 This runs directly counter to the aspirations of a country determined to project a global view and to sit on the UN Security Council.

9 https://www.mfa.gov.sg/Overseas-Mission/Chennai/Consular-Services/National-Service-Obligation 10 https://elaw.klri.re.kr/eng_service/lawView.do?lang=ENG&hseq=25744 11 https://www.ch.ch/en/performing-compulsory-service/ 12 https://www.dw.com/en/conscription-in-germany-merkels-party-mulls-return-of-military-service/a-51456280 13 https://finabel.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/FFT-The-EU-Conscription-Model-W.pdf 14 https://mc.nato.int/media-centre/news/2020/nato-takes-part-in-swedish-naval-exercise 15 https://www.irishtimes.com/news/ireland/irish-news/questions-raised-about-ability-of-defence-forces-to-aid-irish-foreign-policy-goals- 1.4485533

Commission on the Defence Forces Public Consultation Response Template

1. Capabilities – In this regard, you may wish to consider future integrated capability development and the planning and delivery requirements to support a joint force approach in terms of new equipment, professional military education and training, maintenance and development of infrastructure, developments in military doctrine, and transformative concepts, including specialist capabilities, that prepare and support the Defence Forces for future operations.

The absence of a formally established intelligence corps should probably be addressed as the Defence Forces enter their second century of existence.

The fact that the National Cyber Security Centre16 is a part of the Department of the Environment, Climate & Communications is questionable. If not actually a part of the Defence Forces structure, it should have a close alignment with it and formalised linkages to it.

The Naval Service and Air Corps are being more heavily tasked, without the resources evident to tackle those missions. Ships are tied in dock without sufficient crew, despite the fact that Ireland receives EU support17 to police EU fisheries policy. Both are likely to require expansion in their standing numbers.

The Air Corps has no interdiction capability at all, even to intercept a civilian airliner. Six years ago, the White Paper declared that the “Pilatus PC9 aircraft provide a very limited air to air and air to ground capacity and these are due for replacement in 2025.” This is a very ambitious description of what is a training aircraft. We continue to rely on an MOU with the UK18 to police our own airspace, which is a serious breach of the concept of neutrality.

Despite assertions from some quarters that Defence Forces requires a 24/7 air interception capability, even the heavily-equipped Swiss forces do not achieve such a capability.19 We do however require some level of contingent capacity. With the level of re-arming taking place among western nations at present, the acquisition of (at minimum) two squadrons of second-hand jet aircraft of intermediate capability should be easily manageable.

In view of the clear and disruptive risks arising from climate change, increased pandemic likelihood, and retreat of democracy, our specialist units, especially those in engineering,20 ordnance, communications, medicine and transport have arguably declined too far, even in a wholly peacetime setting.

16 https://www.ncsc.gov.ie/ 17 https://afloat.ie/port-news/navy/item/43270-eu-not-yet-informed-of-navy-crisis-which-may-affect-fishery-protection 18 https://www.rte.ie/brainstorm/2020/0318/1123836-russian-military-aircraft-bombers-ireland/ 19 https://www.admin.ch/gov/de/start/dokumentation/medienmitteilungen.msg-id-59711.html 20 https://www.irishtimes.com/news/ireland/army-replace-flood-collapsed-bridge-in-donegal-1.3206044

2. Structures – In this regard, you may wish to consider the most effective high-level Command and Control (C2) structures within the Defence Forces to ensure an agile and balanced approach that can function across all domains at home and overseas.

Additionally, you may wish to address appropriate future force structures for the Army (including its brigade structure), the Air Corps, and the Naval Service, individually as component services and collectively as part of an integrated joint force approach.

Furthermore, you may wish to address the changing nature of reservists, which presents an opportunity for the Reserve Defence Force to further integrate and support the Permanent Defence Force through the provision of enhanced collective and specialist capability across all domains.

There has been significant focus on the number of brigades, without focus on the number and composition of units within that brigade structure. While one can argue whether the Defence Forces should have a two, three, or four structure, the practical effect of reduction to two brigades has been to halve the strength of service support units.

Ireland’s Defence Forces now have just two field engineer companies, two CIS companies, two ordnance companies, two transport companies, and a medical corps of questionable capacity. Surely this is grossly inadequate even for the contingencies faced by a peace-time defensive force.

Our reserves have been allowed to decline to a point where, at a total strength of less than 1,700, they no longer constitute an effective force.21 We have no Air Corps reserve.

Our reserves should at least total the established strength of the standing PDF, and ideally should outnumber them. Reserves represent a cost-effective method to boost PDF numbers on an as- necessary basis, and also maintain an essential link between society and their armed forces. They are also capable of overseas service, and a far greater use could be made of our RDF in overseas service. The UK recently deployed an all-reservists unit to an operation role in UNFICYP.22

We should provide for a reservist element for the ARW.

For highly-sought university courses such as medicine and engineering, Ireland should require (or incentivise) a short-service reservist commitment. The ability to send doctors and engineers to UN or EU missions in Africa and the Middle East would be a worthwhile contribution to our overseas aid commitments.

Lastly, there needs to be a much more fluid movement between full-time and part-time service. Other countries practice this routinely, calling up reserve personnel for service as required; Ireland has not done this since the ending of the “troubles” and has abandoned the First-Line Reserve. This is regressive thinking and lacks regard for efficiency and effectiveness. Ireland should also see reservists as having distinct contributions to make in the private sector, a concept that seems alien at the moment.

21 https://www.oireachtas.ie/en/debates/question/2020-03-05/17/ 22 https://www.inyourarea.co.uk/news/berkshire-reservists-train-for-peacekeeping-mission-in-cyprus/

3. Staffing – In this regard you may wish to consider the HR policies that support the requirement for an agile and adaptive modern military force. You may wish to consider issues such as recruitment and retention, organisational culture and values, gender and diversity, career progression, and industrial relations machinery.

While difficult to generalise across all employment sectors, there is a standard approach to understanding remuneration in the private sector which may be of assistance:

• An organisation without a recruitment problem, or a retention problem, is unlikely to have a remuneration problem. • An organisation which has a recruitment problem, or a retention problem, may have a remuneration problem. • An organisation which has a recruitment problem, and a retention problem, is likely to have a remuneration problem.

There has been considerable focus on Defence Forces recruitment, retention and remuneration in recent years. A significant part of the debate misses the point that Irish military remuneration fails to address the most significant expense for most personnel: housing. This matter was less significant years ago when (a) housing was far cheaper and (b) the Defence Forces maintained a stock of housing for enlisted and commissioned ranks. This is not the case any longer.

Aside from salary review which reflects recruitment and retention needs, the Defence Forces must reconsider the provision of subsidised accommodation, and/or the payment of adequate rent allowances.

Through its Service Family Accommodation program23 the UK provides members of the armed forces with subsidised accommodation at a maximum charge of £795.90 per month (for senior officers) and for a typical charge of £500 per month.

The United States employs a mostly financial model, dependent upon rank and ZIP code. For example, for personnel stationed in Quantico Virginia would be paid a monthly Basic Allowance for Housing (BAH)24 as follows:

With dependents Without dependents Junior enlisted rank: $1,845 $1,521 Senior NCO: $2,226 $1,977 Junior officer: $2,040 $1,893 Senior officer: $2,439 $2,178

Given the increasingly complex technical requirements for enlisted personnel in the Air Corps, Naval Service, and service corps in the Army especially Ordnance, Engineers and CIS, the Defence Forces must consider material improvements in technical pay, and the introduction of a Warrant Officer rank above OR9/E9.

23 https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/913033/SFA-SLA- Accommodation-Charges.pdf 24 https://www.defensetravel.dod.mil/site/bahCalc.cfm

All civilian staff of the Department of Defence should undergo an element of familiarisation with the three services of the Defence Forces.

Finally, the concept of a dedicated pay commission for the Defence Forces has been floated. This would be a disservice to both the Defence Forces and to the wider Public Service. Ireland needs a fully-functional and properly resourced standing commission on the full range of public sector pay, producing annual updates similar to those generated by the Office of Manpower Economics25 in the UK. The Public Service Pay Commission is inadequate in this regard, and essentially constitutes a “partnership” body. In view of the amount of the Exchequer tax take now being spent on the public sector payroll, it is essential that this is considered on a holistic basis.

25 https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/office-of-manpower-economics/about

4. Any other comments you may wish to make in relation to the Defence Forces having regard to the Commission’s Terms of Reference

Appendix