Swiss Military Operations Abroad: CHALLENGES and Options the Contribution of the Swiss Armed Forces to International Crisis Management So Far Has Been a Limited One

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CSS Analysis in Security Policy CSS ETH Zurich No. 67 • February 2010

Swiss Military Operations Abroad: CHALLENGES and Options The contribution of the Swiss armed forces to international crisis management so far has been a limited one. The disparity with regard to the efforts of comparable countries such as Austria, Sweden, and Finland is considerable. The expansion of military peace support, which has been planned for some time, would serve Switzerland’s security policy interests, but has so far failed to materialise due to a lack of political will. It would be advisable to explore the option of high-value niche contributions that can gain domestic support. Pragmatism is required on the part of the political parties to facilitate compromise solutions.

has still only geared its security policy towards cooperation and crisis management to a limited extent. “Peace support” as part of the armed forces’ mission statement is not really a priority in everyday politics and has so far failed to make any significant im- pact on the evolution of the armed forces. The shift of emphasis in the “Force Devel- opment Step 2008/11” from defence forces to security forces largely relates to domestic army tasks. Security and defence are still mainly conceived of in national terms in Switzerland.

Swisscoy Super Puma helicopter in Kosovo. Image: Swiss Armed Forces Joint Staff This idiosyncratic Swiss security policy ori- entation is partially due to its non-mem- Swiss military operations abroad have al- similar, being geared towards autonomous bership in the EU. Another, more deep- ways been a contentious issue. They are the territorial defence. Since the strategic wa- seated reason can be found in Switzerland’s focus of one of the core controversies in the tershed of 1989, however, Switzerland’s se- traditional role conception that is shaped elaboration of the new Security Policy Re- curity policy has differed markedly from the by the country’s specific experience in port. Today, the spectrum of opinions rang- strategies of the other states. World War II and the Cold War, and which es from demands for a complete renun- is reflected both in its European policy and ciation of operations abroad to suggestions Austria, Sweden, and Finland today are in its security policy. A conception of neu- for expanding them substantially. There is consistently on track with the pan-Euro- trality that goes beyond the bare-bones no solid parliamentary majority in sight for pean trend of cooperative security, which definition of the term under international either course; neither is there any consen- is about jointly managing crises and risks. law, a security doctrine based on autono- sus between the heads of the defence and Austria and Sweden have considerably re- mous territorial defence, and international foreign affairs departments in this matter, duced their military personnel levels, trans- solidarity that focuses on humanitarian aid which causes additional difficulty for the formed their armed forces into a multi- and civilian services – these continue to be strategic positioning and political steering functional crisis instrument, and elevated important elements of Switzerland’s self- of military peace support. international crisis management to a struc- image. Its continued efficacy is seen in the ture-determining task. Finland, due to its security policy positions endorsed by par- The fact is that the Swiss armed forces’ proximity to Russia, continues to maintain ties from the left and the right of the po- contribution to international crisis manage- a large force level and remains committed litical spectrum, which are more sceptical ment so far has been a limited one. This to strong territorial defence, but regards in- towards international military operations also becomes clear when the comparison ternational crisis management as an equal- than comparable parties in other countries. is made with other neutral and non-aligned ly important task. Due to the system of direct democracy in countries in Europe. During the Cold War, Switzerland, this self-image of the country’s the security doctrines of Switzerland, Aus- Switzerland, though it has reduced its force role is also reflected in the implementa- tria, Sweden, and Finland were essentially levels and restructured the armed forces, tion of Switzerland’s peace support policy.

When they rejected the proposal of creat- Comparison of military crisis management ing a UN peacekeeping battalion in 1994, voters set the country on a course of reti- Switzerland Finland Austria Sweden Troops on foreign cence in military peace support that is still deployments 271 785 1254 893 manifest today. Since then, the legal foun- ∅ 2005–09 dations for participation in international Percentage in Western 90.74% 75.64% 55.85% 39.16% crisis management have been formulated Balkans (Feb. 2009) in a restrictive manner in order to be ac- Contingents (≥20) Feb. 09 Max Feb. 09 Max Feb. 09 Max Feb. 09 Max level * level * level * level * ceptable to a domestic majority. In this con- Kosovo: NATO KFOR 220 220 450 510 623 623 253 650 text, the remarkable expansion of civilian Bosnia: EUFOR Althea 26 27 53 200 103 291 0 77 peace promotion in recent years can also be Chad: EUFOR - - 61 61 175 175 79 200 seen as compensation for the restrictions on military deployments abroad, as civilian Liberia: UNMIL ------0 234 assistance is less controversial domestically. Golan: UNDOF - - - - 383 383 - - Lebanon: UNIFIL - - 0 205 - - 0 42 Explicable though Switzerland’s limited Afghanistan: NATO ISAF - - 80 100 - - 280 350 political will for military peace support is Sources: IISS Military Balance 2005–9 * relates to years 2005–9 (given its specific historical experience and political system), the question remains years, with force levels for their respective obliged to deploy on international missions. whether the current status quo is in its Kosovo contingents exceeding 500 troops Another factor that has made expansion of security policy interests. To be sure, a sig- in all three cases. Contingents of armed international deployments more difficult nificant expansion of Swiss foreign engage- Swiss soldiers have so far only been de- has been the abolition of field experience ments cannot realistically be achieved in ployed in the Western Balkans, while Fin- in crisis management as a precondition for the short term, especially since the domes- land, Sweden, and Austria are additionally promotion to higher professional officer’s tic acceptance of military peace support engaged in the Middle East and Africa; the ranks – a provision that was struck off the today is even more questionable in view of two Scandinavian states also have troops Swiss Ordinance on Military Obligations factors such as the increasing complexity of deployed in Afghanistan. Austria has de- (Verordnung über Militärdienstpflicht) crises, the difficult situation in Afghanistan, fined a geographic perimeter for possible again just a few years after its introduction. and growing budgetary constraints. Never- missions that includes not only the regions Unlike in other countries, participation in theless, there is a need to develop a strate- mentioned above, but also the Caucasus, an international mission is still a career ob- gy for raising the profile of Swiss peace sup- the Black Sea region, and Central Asia. stacle in the Swiss armed forces rather than port. In the following, we will discuss some being conducive to promotion. options for Switzerland’s future military Switzerland also differs from comparable contributions to crisis management, based states when it comes to the level of ambi- At the level of the Military Law, it is notice- on an assessment of the status quo and a tion. The latter have already taken on lead able that Switzerland is the only country discussion of the country’s interests. responsibilities in international missions. still to require that peace support mis- Finland, for example, was the first non- sions be mandated by the UN, and thus to Taking stock NATO state to take the lead of a multina- link them to a quorum of the UN Security The quality of the Swiss armed forces’ con- tional brigade in Kosovo. All three states Council. In practice, however, that distinc- tributions to military crisis management so also contribute substantial contingents tion is not overly relevant, since the com- far is undisputed and meets international to the EU’s crisis response forces (battle parable countries, too, would only partici- standards. Both the Swiss military contin- groups). There is also a marked difference pate in a non-mandated mission (e.g., one gents and the efforts of military observers in terms of the recommended size for the conducted by the EU) under very specific and specialists are appreciated. However, number of troops in future deployments. circumstances. It is more significant that Switzerland does not match up to compa- While policy-makers set the framework at Switzerland is the only of these countries to rable states in terms of quantity, level of 1,500 troops in Austria and 1,700 soldiers in legally restrict the range of tasks by exclud- ambition, and the legislative framework. Sweden (starting in 2014), the Swiss Federal ing “participation in combat operations for Council and parliament have been consid- peace enforcement”. In view of the growing During the past five years, on average, 271 ering for years to double the capabilities complexity of crises and the multilayered members of the armed forces were de- for international operations to 500 soldiers nature of crisis management measures, this ployed on crisis management missions. – however, without making the necessary provision in the Military Law is increasingly This is three times less than in the cases of structural and legislative adaptations. restricting the range of options for Swiss Finland and Sweden, and nearly five times participation. less compared to Austria (see table). It is A key difference where the legislative also remarkable that Switzerland supplies framework is concerned, e.g., in comparison Swiss interests only two contingents of 20 or more sol- to Austria, is the comprehensive volunteer From a security policy point of view, there diers – the Swisscoy Company in Kosovo, principle in effect in Switzerland. In Aus- is much to suggest that Switzerland, too, which numbers up to 220 personnel, and tria, this principle applies to militia soldiers, should do more to ensure domestic support the two liaison and observation teams as which make up about 60 per cent of the for its crisis management operations and well as four staff officers in Bosnia. The contingents in stabilisation operations. The make them more visible to external observ- other three states had deployed between so-called “ready key-personnel units” (Kad- ers. While the country’s immediate security four and six contingents each in recent erpräsenzeinheiten), on the other hand, are environment is marked by strategic stabil-

ity, a number of crisis hotspots can be iden- Options also take charge of security and logistics. tified on the European periphery, in an arc The options for future crisis manage- It is also conceivable, however, that these of crisis ranging from Africa across the Mid- ment participation must be in line with complementary tasks could be outsourced. dle East to South Asia. Due to the effects of what is achievable at the level of domestic There is also a huge demand for intelli- globalisation, manifestations of transna- policy. A significant qualitative expansion gence contributions, for instance in the tional violence such as extremism, organ- would appear to be unrealistic in the short area of situation awareness (intelligence- ised crime, terrorism, and the proliferation term. Nevertheless, the goal of expansion gathering, surveillance, reconnaissance). of weapons of mass destruction today con- should be upheld. A debate is required as Engineer units, too, are in high demand. stitute core challenges for the security of to whether the European trend towards European countries. The migration pressure stronger engagement in Africa is also appli- Deployments of Swiss military observers, emanating from such conflict-ridden states cable for Switzerland for reasons of migra- staff officers, and humanitarian demining may also be considerable. In the context of tion and security policy. teams have resulted in good experiences an increasingly interdependent world, geo- to date. Pursuant to international demand, graphic distance from crisis areas can only In the short term, the extension of the these capabilities could be expanded from offer very limited protection from the at- Swisscoy engagement beyond 2011 will be the current 25 to 40 or 50 staff. However, tendant risks and threats. the main priority. The reduction of KFOR these services do not enjoy a great deal of assets will increase the importance of the visibility. The same applies to the accumula- Increased burden-sharing and division Swiss contribution. However, the countries tion of expertise in areas such as ordnance of responsibilities in preventing and cop- that continue to maintain a presence in Kos- storage and disposal or security sector re- ing with crises on the ground, where they ovo have so far failed to achieve agreement form. Nevertheless, Switzerland could make occur, thus serves the interests of Swit- on how to implement the cutback from the important contributions in these areas. zerland’s security policy. International current force strength of about 10,000 to stabilisation missions are not a Western the intended level of 2,500 troops. Many A one-sided focus on the UN as a recipient neo-colonial project, as has occasionally states wish to remain deployed with larger of Swiss services is not advisable. While the been suggested in the aftermath of the contingents in order to escape pressure to UN has a high demand for high-value con- war in Iraq, which was in violation of in- increase their contributions in Afghanistan. tributions, military cooperation is some- ternational law. Instead, in the age of glo- The shift of focus within KFOR from infan- times more difficult in the framework of balisation, they are a necessary element of try to Liaison and Monitoring Teams, in the UN than in the regional Euro-Atlantic or- security policy that is essential for the pro- analogy to the situation in Bosnia, is funda- ganisations. Furthermore, the close overlap tection of the Swiss population. mentally in line with Switzerland’s interests, of interests with the EU in the framework of as the Swiss militia soldiers have compara- bilateral agreements is a further argument Unless the Swiss armed forces orientate tive advantages in civilian capabilities. Nev- in favour of engagement within European themselves towards the most likely threats, ertheless, Switzerland’s negotiating power crisis management. Finally, irrespective of they may gradually lose their legitimacy. is weak, which makes the performance pro- the concrete shape of future crisis manage- This danger seems all the more real be- file and size of its future contribution im- ment policy, the incentive structures for in- cause the preparatory work on the Security possible to predict at this stage. ternational missions must be reconsidered. Policy Report reveals a persistent scepti- Besides the aspects already mentioned cism of the cantons and the police towards Besides the Kosovo mission, there are sev- above, this would also involve awarding the notion of an increased domestic role for eral niche options for which majority sup- equal credit for military service abroad in the armed forces. Furthermore, the hith- port could be secured in the coming years. calculating the number of days served. erto limited feedback of experience from While these do not allow the same level of international missions into the further de- experience feedback, they still constitute Switzerland does have a range of options velopment of the military, as well as Swit- valued contributions to crisis management. for raising the profile of its contributions to zerland’s abstention from the European De- It is crucial that Switzerland base its deci- crisis management. It will be the task of the fence Agency, threaten to restrict the range sion on a diligent demand analysis. Both Security Policy Report at least to present of options regarding military structures the EU and the UN have identified serious these options for the Swiss armed forces. and capabilities. Even under the unlikely capability gaps in recent years. Switzerland Subsequently, much will depend on wheth- scenario of a military threat to Switzerland, should assess which of these gaps will not er the Federal Council and the security ex- this could be a disadvantage, since effec- be filled even in the medium term, and thus perts of the various parties will be able to tive defence today is only feasible as a col- create an opportunity for a niche policy. agree on the cornerstones of a compromise lective European effort. Many European states are currently con- solution. What is required most is pragma- sidering ways to raise the profile of their tism on the part of the political parties.

From the point of view of fiscal policy, contributions through fostering specialised authors: there is little reason to object to peace sup- capabilities. daniel Möckli and Valentin Misteli port. The direct costs of ongoing missions [email protected] amount to CHF53 million per year. Even One opportunity of particular interest for on the basis of full-cost accounting, this Switzerland for contributing high-value translated from German: amount is unlikely to exceed CHF100 mil- assets might arise in the area of tactical Christopher Findlay lion. Thus, the savings potential from abol- airlift. There is a particular demand for Other CSS policy briefs / Mailinglist: ishing military peace promotion is low, but transport helicopters that can operate even www.sta.ethz.ch its importance for security policy is consid- in difficult terrain. Such a module would German and French versions: erable. be of particular value if Switzerland could www.ssn.ethz.ch