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Swiss Military Operations Abroad: CHALLENGES and Options the Contribution of the Swiss Armed Forces to International Crisis Management So Far Has Been a Limited One

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Swiss Military Operations Abroad: CHALLENGES and Options the Contribution of the Swiss Armed Forces to International Crisis Management So Far Has Been a Limited One CSS Analysis in Security Policy CSS ETH Zurich No. 67 • February 2010 SwiSS Military OPeratiONS abrOad: CHalleNGeS aNd OPtiONS the contribution of the Swiss armed forces to international crisis management so far has been a limited one. the disparity with regard to the efforts of comparable countries such as austria, Sweden, and Finland is considerable. the expansion of military peace support, which has been planned for some time, would serve Switzerland’s security policy interests, but has so far failed to materialise due to a lack of political will. it would be advisable to explore the option of high-value niche contributions that can gain domestic support. Pragmatism is required on the part of the political parties to facilitate compromise solutions. has still only geared its security policy to- wards cooperation and crisis management to a limited extent. “Peace support” as part of the armed forces’ mission statement is not really a priority in everyday politics and has so far failed to make any significant im- pact on the evolution of the armed forces. the shift of emphasis in the “Force devel- opment Step 2008/11” from defence forces to security forces largely relates to domes- tic army tasks. Security and defence are still mainly conceived of in national terms in Switzerland. Swisscoy Super Puma helicopter in Kosovo. Image: Swiss Armed Forces Joint Staff this idiosyncratic Swiss security policy ori- entation is partially due to its non-mem- Swiss military operations abroad have al- similar, being geared towards autonomous bership in the eU. another, more deep- ways been a contentious issue. they are the territorial defence. Since the strategic wa- seated reason can be found in Switzerland’s focus of one of the core controversies in the tershed of 1989, however, Switzerland’s se- traditional role conception that is shaped elaboration of the new Security Policy re- curity policy has differed markedly from the by the country’s specific experience in port. today, the spectrum of opinions rang- strategies of the other states. world war II and the Cold war, and which es from demands for a complete renun- is reflected both in its european policy and ciation of operations abroad to suggestions austria, Sweden, and Finland today are in its security policy. a conception of neu- for expanding them substantially. there is consistently on track with the pan-euro- trality that goes beyond the bare-bones no solid parliamentary majority in sight for pean trend of cooperative security, which definition of the term under international either course; neither is there any consen- is about jointly managing crises and risks. law, a security doctrine based on autono- sus between the heads of the defence and austria and Sweden have considerably re- mous territorial defence, and international foreign affairs departments in this matter, duced their military personnel levels, trans- solidarity that focuses on humanitarian aid which causes additional difficulty for the formed their armed forces into a multi- and civilian services – these continue to be strategic positioning and political steering functional crisis instrument, and elevated important elements of Switzerland’s self- of military peace support. international crisis management to a struc- image. its continued efficacy is seen in the ture-determining task. Finland, due to its security policy positions endorsed by par- the fact is that the Swiss armed forces’ proximity to russia, continues to maintain ties from the left and the right of the po- contribution to international crisis manage- a large force level and remains committed litical spectrum, which are more sceptical ment so far has been a limited one. this to strong territorial defence, but regards in- towards international military operations also becomes clear when the comparison ternational crisis management as an equal- than comparable parties in other countries. is made with other neutral and non-aligned ly important task. due to the system of direct democracy in countries in europe. during the Cold war, Switzerland, this self-image of the country’s the security doctrines of Switzerland, aus- Switzerland, though it has reduced its force role is also reflected in the implementa- tria, Sweden, and Finland were essentially levels and restructured the armed forces, tion of Switzerland’s peace support policy. © 2010 Center for Security Studies (CSS), etH Zurich 1 CSS Analysis in Security Policy No. 67 • February 2010 when they rejected the proposal of creat- Comparison of military crisis management ing a UN peacekeeping battalion in 1994, voters set the country on a course of reti- Switzerland Finland Austria Sweden Troops on foreign cence in military peace support that is still deployments 271 785 1254 893 manifest today. Since then, the legal foun- ∅ 2005–09 dations for participation in international Percentage in Western 90.74% 75.64% 55.85% 39.16% crisis management have been formulated Balkans (Feb. 2009) in a restrictive manner in order to be ac- Contingents (≥20) Feb. 09 Max Feb. 09 Max Feb. 09 Max Feb. 09 Max level * level * level * level * ceptable to a domestic majority. in this con- Kosovo: NATO KFOR 220 220 450 510 623 623 253 650 text, the remarkable expansion of civilian Bosnia: EUFOR Althea 26 27 53 200 103 291 0 77 peace promotion in recent years can also be Chad: EUFOR - - 61 61 175 175 79 200 seen as compensation for the restrictions on military deployments abroad, as civilian Liberia: UNMIL - - - - - - 0 234 assistance is less controversial domestically. Golan: UNDOF - - - - 383 383 - - Lebanon: UNIFIL - - 0 205 - - 0 42 explicable though Switzerland’s limited Afghanistan: NATO ISAF - - 80 100 - - 280 350 political will for military peace support is Sources: IISS Military Balance 2005–9 * relates to years 2005–9 (given its specific historical experience and political system), the question remains years, with force levels for their respective obliged to deploy on international missions. whether the current status quo is in its Kosovo contingents exceeding 500 troops another factor that has made expansion of security policy interests. to be sure, a sig- in all three cases. Contingents of armed international deployments more difficult nificant expansion of Swiss foreign engage- Swiss soldiers have so far only been de- has been the abolition of field experience ments cannot realistically be achieved in ployed in the western balkans, while Fin- in crisis management as a precondition for the short term, especially since the domes- land, Sweden, and austria are additionally promotion to higher professional officer’s tic acceptance of military peace support engaged in the Middle east and africa; the ranks – a provision that was struck off the today is even more questionable in view of two Scandinavian states also have troops Swiss Ordinance on Military Obligations factors such as the increasing complexity of deployed in afghanistan. austria has de- (Verordnung über Militärdienstpflicht) crises, the difficult situation in afghanistan, fined a geographic perimeter for possible again just a few years after its introduction. and growing budgetary constraints. Never- missions that includes not only the regions Unlike in other countries, participation in theless, there is a need to develop a strate- mentioned above, but also the Caucasus, an international mission is still a career ob- gy for raising the profile of Swiss peace sup- the black Sea region, and Central asia. stacle in the Swiss armed forces rather than port. in the following, we will discuss some being conducive to promotion. options for Switzerland’s future military Switzerland also differs from comparable contributions to crisis management, based states when it comes to the level of ambi- at the level of the Military law, it is notice- on an assessment of the status quo and a tion. the latter have already taken on lead able that Switzerland is the only country discussion of the country’s interests. responsibilities in international missions. still to require that peace support mis- Finland, for example, was the first non- sions be mandated by the UN, and thus to Taking stock NATO state to take the lead of a multina- link them to a quorum of the UN Security the quality of the Swiss armed forces’ con- tional brigade in Kosovo. all three states Council. in practice, however, that distinc- tributions to military crisis management so also contribute substantial contingents tion is not overly relevant, since the com- far is undisputed and meets international to the eU’s crisis response forces (battle parable countries, too, would only partici- standards. both the Swiss military contin- groups). there is also a marked difference pate in a non-mandated mission (e.g., one gents and the efforts of military observers in terms of the recommended size for the conducted by the eU) under very specific and specialists are appreciated. However, number of troops in future deployments. circumstances. it is more significant that Switzerland does not match up to compa- while policy-makers set the framework at Switzerland is the only of these countries to rable states in terms of quantity, level of 1,500 troops in austria and 1,700 soldiers in legally restrict the range of tasks by exclud- ambition, and the legislative framework. Sweden (starting in 2014), the Swiss Federal ing “participation in combat operations for Council and parliament have been consid- peace enforcement”. in view of the growing during the past five years, on average, 271 ering for years to double the capabilities complexity of crises and the multilayered members of the armed forces were de- for international operations to 500 soldiers nature of crisis management measures, this ployed on crisis management missions. – however, without making the necessary provision in the Military law is increasingly this is three times less than in the cases of structural and legislative adaptations. restricting the range of options for Swiss Finland and Sweden, and nearly five times participation.
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