Defence Policy and the Armed Forces During the Pandemic Herunterladen

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Defence Policy and the Armed Forces During the Pandemic Herunterladen 1 2 3 2020, Toms Rostoks and Guna Gavrilko In cooperation with the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung With articles by: Thierry Tardy, Michael Jonsson, Dominic Vogel, Elisabeth Braw, Piotr Szyman- ski, Robin Allers, Paal Sigurd Hilde, Jeppe Trautner, Henri Vanhanen and Kalev Stoicesku Language editing: Uldis Brūns Cover design and layout: Ieva Stūre Printed by Jelgavas tipogrāfija Cover photo: Armīns Janiks All rights reserved © Toms Rostoks and Guna Gavrilko © Authors of the articles © Armīns Janiks © Ieva Stūre © Uldis Brūns ISBN 978-9984-9161-8-7 4 Contents Introduction 7 NATO 34 United Kingdom 49 Denmark 62 Germany 80 Poland 95 Latvia 112 Estonia 130 Finland 144 Sweden 160 Norway 173 5 Toms Rostoks is a senior researcher at the Centre for Security and Strategic Research at the National Defence Academy of Latvia. He is also associate professor at the Faculty of Social Sciences, Univer- sity of Latvia. 6 Introduction Toms Rostoks Defence spending was already on the increase in most NATO and EU member states by early 2020, when the coronavirus epi- demic arrived. Most European countries imposed harsh physical distancing measures to save lives, and an economic downturn then ensued. As the countries of Europe and North America were cau- tiously trying to open up their economies in May 2020, there were questions about the short-term and long-term impact of the coro- navirus pandemic, the most important being whether the spread of the virus would intensify after the summer. With the number of Covid-19 cases rapidly increasing in September and October and with no vaccine available yet, governments in Europe began to impose stricter regulations to slow the spread of the virus. Public concern about the spread of the virus was compounded by bleak economic prospects with numerous industries devastated by the virus. Although the effects of the Covid-19 pandemic are manifold, this study looks at its effect on defence policy and the military. Although there are several areas and industries that have suffered immediate consequences from the pandemic, the experience of the defence sector in general and the armed forces in particular is especially interesting. This is because the military has been heav- ily involved in the response to Covid-19. It is also likely that the pandemic may affect the defence sector negatively in the medium term. Doctors, not soldiers have been on the forefront of the battle against the coronavirus, but military organizations have often been 7 enlisted to take part in the effort to stop the virus. The relationship here is complex. The pandemic is a major public health challenge, but it has also become an economic problem, as governments had to borrow heav- ily to deal with the economic consequences of the pandemic. The economic implications of the Covid-19 crisis are likely to be particu- larly stark because of an anticipated economic recession in 2020 and due to potentially lasting negative economic implications. Although a V-shaped recovery is still possible, this will become less likely if the economic recession proves to be lasting. In addition, democratic political systems provide political leaders with incentives to priori- tize social (and related) spending over defence expenditure, unless there is a major external military threat present. The absence of a major war in Europe since 1945 has produced a sense of security that has not been shattered even by increasing international com- petition.1 Thus, military spending may once again fall victim, at the hands of other more pressing crises that have clearly discernible im- plications for human security. There is no shortage of information about the spread of the pan- demic, but there is less clarity about its implications for interna- tional (and national) security. Despite information about the pan- demic and lessons that can be learned from previous pandemics, the consequences of the Covid-19 pandemic are hard to fathom because various factors point in different directions, and their rela- tive weight and interplay is still unknown. The many unknowns about the pandemic include, not only the severity of the spread of Covid-19 throughout the world and whether scientists will be able to develop a vaccine against the virus, but also the reaction of gov- ernments to the pandemic. The consequences of the pandemic will be determined not only by the virus itself, but to an even greater ex- 1 There is a growing sense of unease in the international relations literature about the likelihood of great power military conflict. Braumoeller, B. Only the Dead: The Persistence of War in the Modern Age. Oxford University Press, 2019. See also Layne, C. Coming Storms: The Return of Great Power War. Foreign Affairs 99:6, 2020. 8 tent, by the reactions of governments and society to it. In late-2020, it is clear though that Covid-19 is going to be a consequential event, that is, it will have across-the-board implications. It is possible that historians will refer to the pre- and post-Covid-19 world because of the ripple effects that it is likely to have for international security. The aim of this study is to assess the implications of the Covid- 19 pandemic on national defence policies and armed forces in se- lected NATO and EU member states. There have been variations in terms of how countries have responded to the pandemic, and some countries have been hit harder than others. Thus, it is expected that there will also be variations in terms of the consequences for de- fence policies and the armed forces. Although the overall effects of the pandemic are likely to be detrimental because of expected defence cuts due to the economic recession, the cancellation and suspension of military exercises (such as Defender 2020), countries turning inward in search of solutions to the problems created by the pandemic, and the partial weakening of military organizations because of physical distancing requirements, it is not necessarily all bad. Some countries imposed early lockdowns and thus avoided Covid-19 case numbers spiralling out of control, but in others the response was sluggish. Some were better prepared economically to tackle the Covid-19 crisis because their finances, like the govern- ment debt to GDP ratio, were better than elsewhere. The pandemic can also be regarded as an opportunity, because it may show the utility of the armed forces in responding to civilian emergencies. Rising unemployment may also be an opportunity for military recruitment. And, for countries like the Baltic states which are so close to Russia, the lessons from the Ukraine crisis still loom large, despite strong pressure to divert funds from defence spending. This is a useful reminder that the pandemic is just one of the many driv- ing forces behind decisions on defence policy. This chapter is set out to accomplish three objectives. First, it discusses the potential implications of the Covid-19 pandemic for international security. Much has happened since early 2020, and the impact of the pandemic on international security has been uneven. 9 The potential effects of the pandemic are discussed along three -di mensions: conflict vs cooperation, direct and indirect effects on -in ternational security, and implications for the global distribution of power. Second, this chapter explains the structure of country case studies. Third, it also summarizes the main findings from coun- try case studies. The subsequent chapters offer analyses of NATO, the United Kingdom, Poland, Germany, Sweden, Finland, Norway, Denmark, Estonia and Latvia during times of pandemic. This study does not aim to provide a definitive account of the impact of the Covid-19 pandemic on defence. Although this edited volume fo- cuses mostly on the process and less on outcomes (that are not fully known at the time of writing), it can provide a valuable first draft for subsequent analyses. Covid-19 and the International Security Environment How has the Covid-19 pandemic affected international security and what aftershocks is it likely to create? This general question is addressed through three sub-questions. First, what has been the ef- fect of the pandemic on international conflicts? Second, what are the direct and indirect effects of the pandemic on international se- curity? Third, which countries are likely to be the winners and los- ers from the pandemic? The subsequent paragraphs address these pressing questions. The Pandemic and International Peace and Conflict As to the first question about the effects of the pandemic on peace and conflict dynamics, there is no consensus on the issue. Pandemics can have pacifying effects, but they can also be bad for peace and stability. The argument that the Covid-19 pandemic may exert a pacifying impact on international relations is based on the view that countries that consider the use of military power, have to take the possibility of the outbreak of Covid-19 in their military 10 into consideration, which may significantly affect their morale and battle readiness. This has been demonstrated to a significant extent by the case of the US aircraft carrier USS Theodore Roosevelt where a large number of crew members were diagnosed with Covid-19.2 As a result, the aircraft carrier ended up stuck in Guam until early June when it could finally continue its scheduled deployment in the Indo-Pacific region.3 Similar problems were experienced by the French aircraft carrier, Charles de Gaulle, where almost half of the crew members of the aircraft carrier and its escort frigate Chevalier Paul eventually tested positive for Covid-19.4 The US military has, however, after some initial missteps, managed to maintain training, deployment and recruitment during the Covid-19 pandemic. Infec- tion and fatality rates among service members have also been lower than average in the country, and the military has largely succeeded in keeping the coronavirus out of bases.5 In addition, battling an adversary while dealing with the dam- aging effect of the pandemic may be difficult.
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