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The Csdp in 2020 MARCH 2020 MARCH THE CSDP IN 2020 The EU’s legacy and ambition in security and defence Edited by Daniel Fiott With contributions from Lucie Béraud-Sudreau, Giovanni Faleg, Ana E. Juncos, Gustav Lindstrom, Claudia Major, Jean-Pierre Maulny, Christian Mölling, Roderick Parkes, Pedro Serrano and Dick Zandee European Union Institute for Security Studies (EUISS) 100, avenue de Suffren 75015 Paris http://www.iss.europa.eu Director: Gustav Lindstrom © EU Institute for Security Studies, 2020. Reproduction is authorised, provided the source is acknowledged, save where otherwise stated. The views expressed in this publication are solely those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the European Union. print ISBN 978-92-9198-859-4 online ISBN 978-92-9198-860-0 CATALOGUE NUMBER QN-01-19-893-EN-C CATALOGUE NUMBER QN-01-19-893-EN-N DOI 10.2815/76429 DOI 10.2815/22734 Published by the EU Institute for Security Studies and printed in Belgium by Bietlot. Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, 2020. Cover image credit: EU NAVFOR/Atalanta THE CSDP IN 2020 The EU’s legacy and ambition in security and defence Edited by Daniel Fiott With contributions from Lucie Béraud-Sudreau, Giovanni Faleg, Ana E. Juncos, Gustav Lindstrom, Claudia Major, Jean-Pierre Maulny, Christian Mölling, Roderick Parkes, Pedro Serrano and Dick Zandee The editor Daniel Fiott is Security and Defence Editor at the EU Institute for Security Studies. Contents Executive Summary 3 Introduction 6 Daniel Fiott TWENTY YEARS ON, WHAT KIND OF LEGACY? 1 Truth and dare 16 A personal reflection on 20 years of CSDP Pedro Serrano 2 The EU’s military legacy 38 Over-institutionalised, under-equipped and strategically divided Claudia Major and Christian Mölling 3 No more shortfalls? 50 European military capabilities 20 years on Dick Zandee 4 Integrated markets? 59 Europe’s defence industry after 20 years Lucie Béraud-Sudreau 5 Beyond civilian power? 74 Civilian CSDP two decades on Ana E. Juncos AN UNCERTAIN FUTURE: WHAT LEVEL OF AMBITION? 6 Emerging security challenges 88 Four futures for CSDP Gustav Lindstrom 7 Reading the runes 97 The future of CSDP and AFSJ Roderick Parkes 8 As you were? 110 The EU as an evolving military actor Daniel Fiott 9 No time like the present 124 Towards a genuine defence industrial base for the CSDP? Jean-Pierre Maulny 10 The ‘Civilian Compact’ 135 Three scenarios for the future Giovanni Faleg ANNEX Abbreviations 148 Notes on the contributors 150 Executive Summary urope has never been so prosperous, so secure nor so free’. The opening line of the 2003 European Security Strategy rings rather ‘Ehollow today. Following a financial crisis in 2008, Russia’s sei- zure of Crimea in 2014 and concerns about the political integrity of the EU, Europeans are having to accept the reality of a vastly deteriorating security landscape. Not only is Europe beset by security challenges near its borders, but structural – geopolitical – shifts are forcing the Union to question and reassess long-standing partnerships. Since the United Kingdom’s decision to leave the EU and the election of Donald Trump as President of the United States in 2016, European leaders have had to grapple with the challenge of maintaining European political unity, ensuring that the transatlantic re- lationship remains on an even keel and building up European security and defence. The EU Global Strategy of 2016 is therefore much nearer the mark when it states that ‘we live in times of existential crisis, within and beyond the European Union’. In response to the challenges it faces, the EU and its member states have invested in a range of policy mechanisms that are designed to pull govern- ments closer together on defence. While it is certainly true that there is noth- ing comparable in the history of EU security and defence to the hyperactivity that has been observed in this domain since 2016, the reality today is that the ‘alphabet soup’ of EU security and defence – CSDP, PESCO, EDF, CARD, CDP, MPCC, NIPs, EPF, etc. – has not yet led to any tangible shift in the Union’s capability base or readiness for deployment. The expectations for EU securi- ty and defence have perhaps never been higher, but neither has the risk that the EU fails to deliver. Expectations certainly have to be put into perspective and there is a danger that developments under the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) since 1999 may be overshadowed by the steps taken in the past few years. Without an appreciation of the historical evolution of EU security and defence since 1999, it is hard to put recent initiatives into perspective. Indeed, after 20 years of the CSDP it is possible to draw a range of conclu- sions, including the fact that with 34 current and past missions and operations (and another two likely in 2020) the EU has clearly proven its ability to de- ploy civilian and military instruments. What is more, since 1999 the Union’s 4 The CSDP in 2020 | The EU’s legacy and ambition in security and defence institutions have displayed their ability to plan for and conduct civilian and military CSDP missions and operations. In some cases, such as the ongoing naval operation off the Horn of Africa or the military operation sent to Chad and the Central African Republic in 2008, the EU has chalked up some notable operational successes. In other cases, it has been difficult to pinpoint the EU’s contribution to security even though the EU continues to fine-tune its com- prehensive and integrated approaches to crisis management. Yet, the past 20 years of CSDP have also surely taught us more about the EU as a security and defence actor. First, the sometimes agonising lack of po- litical unity or will that exists to deploy missions and operations continues to frustrate, despite the very clear need to bolster the EU’s footprint in regions such as the Sahel and the Mediterranean. What is more, even when EU member states have politically agreed to deploy a CSDP mission or operation, this is not always supported with a credible pool of experts or force package. Second, the CSDP today has not entirely lived up to the ambitions set down by European ministers at Helsinki in December 1999. In fact, over the past 20 years we could arguably show how European governments have collectively invested in non-EU frameworks such as NATO or more bilateral and mini-lateral en- deavours, rather than engage in defence cooperation with other EU member states through CSDP. Conversely, the CSDP may have been overtaken by the geopolitical realities that have developed over the past two decades. Therefore, it is perhaps worth asking whether CSDP has outgrown the ‘crisis manage- ment’ paradigm and evolved into something altogether broader. There are other significant questions, such as how EU security and defence has become an important part of the EU integration process and why it might be used by certain governments to hedge against a challenging transatlantic relationship and uncertain future for NATO. In this book, we tackle such questions and more besides, but through a wider definition of the CSDP. Instead of merely analysing the EU’s civilian and military missions and operations, this volume is additionally interested in looking at how the security environment facing the EU has evolved and how this might effect CSDP; whether the Policy has led to any discernible improve- ment in European military and civilian capabilities; and what effect CSDP might have had on Europe’s defence industry. Each of the EUISS analysts, leading think tank and academic representatives and senior policymakers that have contributed to this book have been driven by a desire to assess the first 20 years of civilian and military CSDP and to probe the extent to which the Policy can be re-framed in the coming years. To this end, part one of the book contains five chapters that look back at the military, civilian and industrial Executive Summary 5 legacy of the CSDP since 1999. In part two, five further chapters look forward and weigh up the costs of inaction for EU security and defence, while detailing some of the security and political challenges that CSDP will face in the coming years and decades. Introduction DANIEL FIOTT years ago, on 10-11 December 1999, European leaders met in Helsinki to sketch out the capabilities and institutions they 20 thought were needed for the CSDP that they had launched six months earlier at the Cologne European Council. The 1999 Helsinki meeting underlined European leaders’ ‘determination to develop an autonomous ca- pacity to take decisions and, where NATO as a whole is not engaged, to launch and conduct EU-led military operations in response to international crises’.1 More specifically, the European Council decided that the EU’s level of ambition on defence should be set at an ability to deploy up to 50,000-60,000 personnel within 60 days, and to sustain this deployment for up to a year, by 2003. By the time the Nice European Council convened in December 2000, key CSDP in- stitutions2 were formally established and in 2003 the EU started to undertake missions and operations, as well as operationalising the EU Battlegroups by 2004. To this day, however, the ambition set at Helsinki (the ‘Headline Goal’) has never been fulfilled – even though it remains a target that has not been altered or lowered by European leaders. Of course, in 2020, similar questions about the EU’s level of ambition for se- curity and defence dominate deliberations about the CSDP. Under the Croatian Presidency of the Council of the EU in 2020, leaders and ministers are still de- bating how to ensure that the Union can deploy military and civilian assets as part of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), and how the CSDP can facilitate greater EU strategic autonomy in security and defence.
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