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The European Security and Defence Policy

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The European Security and Defence Policy TTHEHE FEDERALFEDERAL TRUSTTRUST foreducation&research enlightening the debate on good governance EuropeanPolicyBrief Apr 2006 • Issue 26 • The Federal Trust, 7 Graphite Square, Vauxhall Walk, London SE11 5EE • www.fedtrust.co.uk The European Security and Defence Policy Introduction Established at the Cologne European Council in June 1999, the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) has, in the 7 years since its inception, given rise to countless debates and discussions. Whereas some commentators regard the ESDP as an overall success story, others voice doubts. The current discussion about whether the EU should send peacekeeping troops to the Democratic Republic of Congo during elections this June seems to crystallise these doubts. Only three EU member states would be capable of leading such a mission, and two of them, France and the United Kingdom, are currently unwilling and unable to mount an international deployment because of their respective involvement in Iraq and the Ivory Coast. After months of discussion, Germany eventually agreed at the EU External Affairs Council on 20 March 2006 to lead the military operation to the Congo from headquarters in Potsdam. Nevertheless, opposition to a Congo mission is still strong in Berlin, with considerable scepticism even within the governing parties. It is still unclear whether the German government will be able muster enough votes in the Bundestag (which has a right of veto on the mission) to send soldiers to Congo. Such uncertainty is not calculated to increase Europe’s standing and military credibility in the world. On the other hand, the European Security and Defence Policy has undoubted successes to its credit. The creation of a Rapid Reaction Force, the gradual evolution of the EU Battlegroups and the European Police Force and the EU’s first major security mission to Bosnia-Herzegovina have exceeded the expectations of the cynics. Political, financial and material problems continue to plague the ESDP, but there has undoubtedly been progress over the past seven years. Background A European Security and Defence Policy has been a European ambition for some decades. However, the legal basis for such a policy was only laid down with the adoption of the Maastricht Treaty in 1991, which instituted the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) ‘including the eventual framework of “a common defence policy, which might in time lead to a common defence’”. In 1997, the Amsterdam Treaty changed this provision to envisage the ‘progressive’ framing of a common European defence policy. The Maastricht and Amsterdam Treaties provided however only the treaty framework for an emerging European Security and Defence Policy. The ultimate launch pad for its establishment was the EU’s dismal performance during the Balkan crises of the 1990s and the Bosnia and Kosovo conflicts in particular, when it was the United States and NATO who contributed decisively to the pacification of a region ‘on the European Union’s doorstep’. This humiliating experience generated increasing frustration from the EU’s member states over Europe’s military impotence and dependence on the US. In particular, it served as a catalyst for bringing the UK and France closer together on defence questions. In December 1998, at a Franco-British summit in Saint Malo, the two member states released a Joint Declaration, in which for the first time it was stressed that the EU must have ‘the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces’. Following this meeting, the Cologne European Council of June 1999 agreed to implement this Joint Declaration and give reality to the concept of a European Security and Defence Policy. CONTINUED OVERLEAF EDITOR’s NOTE This is the twenty-sixth in a series of regular European Policy Briefs produced by the Federal Trust. The aim of the series is to describe and analyse major controversies in the current British debate about the European Union. Other Policy Briefs are available on the Federal Trust’s website www.fedtrust.co.uk/policybriefs. This Policy Brief forms part of a joint project with the European Research Forum at London Metropolitan University on ‘The Future of European Foreign Policy - Governance Structures and Institutional Frameworks’. Helsinki Headline Goal capability across the full range of Petersberg Management Concept by the Council.’3 ‘The tasks, although they acknowledged that the relevant forces should be able to start Prior to the European Council summit in capabilities were limited and constrained, implementing their mission on the ground Helsinki in December 1999, French President particularly in the key areas of rapid no later than 10 days after the EU decision Jacques Chirac and British Prime Minister deployment, sustainability and concurrent to launch the operation.’4 Tony Blair held another meeting, at which operations. For their part, the member states they urged the EU to strive for the capacity recognised failings in the implementation of to deploy rapidly and then sustain combat The battlegroup concept the Action Plan and agreed on improvements forces which could be militarily self- including regular reviews during each Central to the EU’s aspirations under the sufficient up to corps level. These Anglo- Presidency of progress made (or not) towards 2010 Headline Goal is the battlegroup French recommendations were accepted by capability improvement. Critics noted that concept, a British-French-German proposal. the member states at the Helsinki European national governments still retained for In February 2004, the three states jointly Council of 1999, at which it was agreed to submitted a ‘Food for Thought Paper’, which themselves a large measure of discretion in launch the Helsinki Headline Goal, calling suggested producing a ‘catalogue of high the future implementation of the Plan. These for the creation of a functioning Rapid utility force packages that can be tailored critics also pointed out that most of the Reaction Force (RRF) of up to 60,000 troops rapidly to specific missions’.5 These armed forces allocated to the EU can only be with naval and air support by 2003. The ‘packages’ rapidly came to be known as deployed to observer and peacekeeping Rapid Reaction Force should be deployable ‘battlegroups’ and the concept was officially missions of low intensity, with specialised at full strength within 60 days of a launched at the 2004 Capability combat troops being in noticeably short deployment decision and be sustainable in Commitment Conference. Each battlegroup supply. Moreover, strategic lift assets are still the field for at least one year. Furthermore, is based on a combined arms, battalion-size lacking, causing difficulties of deployment the RRF must be able to act upon the full force (1,500 troops) reinforced with combat and sustainability, especially for distant range of the so-called ‘Petersberg tasks’, support and combat service support. Since missions. including humanitarian missions, peace- the battlegroups should be sustainable in keeping, and combat tasks in crisis the field for 30 days, extendable to even management, including the making (not Headline Goal 2010 120 days, they will be capable of stand- merely the maintenance) of peace. Against this background, the Council alone operations or for the initial phase of In order to meet the Helsinki Headline Goal proposed in its ESDP Presidency Report 2003 large operations. Battlegroups will be two catalogues were drawn up in the wake that ‘in addition to the outstanding capability employable across the full range of both the of the Helsinki Council: the first listed the shortfalls against the Helsinki Headline Goal’, Petersberg tasks as listed in the Treaty on capabilities required to achieve the Headline the EU should now ‘set new goals for the the European Union (TEU) Art.17.2 and those Goal, the second the units voluntarily further development of European capabilities identified in the European Security Strategy. earmarked by the member states at a for crisis management with a horizon of They are designed specifically, but not Capability Commitment Conference held in 2010’.2 The new goals should take into exclusively, to be used in response to a Brussels in November 2000. When both lists account the current limitations and request from the UN. Battlegroups can be had been completed, it was clear that an constraints and, more importantly, the new either national or multinational, i.e. enormous gap existed between the required European Security Strategy. The European composed of troops from one or more and the actual offered capabilities. Security Strategy, which was adopted by the member states. Interoperability will be the Accordingly, at a further conference held in European Council in December 2003, was hoped-for key to their military effectiveness. Brussels in November 2001 the EU member designed to show that the EU could become At the Capability Commitment Conference of states adopted a European Capability Action a strategic actor, to promote a common 2004, member states made an initial Plan (ECAP) ‘incorporating all the efforts, understanding within the EU regarding commitment to the formation of 13 investments, developments and security risks the EU is facing today, and to battlegroups. Four member states (UK, France, coordination measures executed or planned provide the means to confront these Italy and Spain) provided their national at both national and multinational level challenges. At the European Council summit battlegroups at an early stage of the with a view to improving existing resources in June 2004, the EU member states agreed programme, and in 2006 a German-French and gradually developing the capabilities to adopt the new Headline Goal 2010, which battlegroup with contributions from Belgium, necessary for the Union’s envisaged should focus on the qualitative aspects of Luxembourg and Spain had achieved partial activities in ESDP’.1 capability development, in particular operational capability for evacuation and interoperability, deployability and When the first phase of the Capability Action extraction. From January 2007, the EU will sustainability.
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