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Do European Union Defense Initiatives Threaten NATO? by Kori N

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Do European Union Defense Initiatives Threaten NATO? by Kori N No. 184 Strategic Forum August 2001 Institute for National Strategic Studies National Defense University Do European Union Defense Initiatives Threaten NATO? by Kori N. Schake Building a capacity for “the eventual multilaterally to ensure that EU choices are Key Points framing of a common defense policy which consistent with U.S. national interests. uropean Security and Defense Policy might in time lead to common defense” has An enormous amount of the work needed (ESDP) is now the main item on Europe’s been a major European Union (EU) preoccu- to translate the St. Malo agreement into prac- Esecurity agenda because of a focus on pation since the Maastricht Treaty in 1991. tice has been done in the European Union and establishing a crisis management force capa- The Amsterdam Treaty in 1997 defined the in national planning staffs to advance the ble of acting independently of the North area for defense coordination as “humanitar- prospects for EU defense policy and capabilities. Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). ian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks, and However, more work has been done to create an Although transatlantic policies will be tasks of combat forces in crisis management, organizational structure than to improve forces colored by issues such as the Kyoto treaty, including peacemaking” (known as the Pe- to carry out the mandate. missile defenses, and relations with Russia, tersburg Tasks). The project gained momen- ESDP is likely to dominate defense debates tum after Prime Minister Tony Blair of Great New Structures as the European Union (EU) tries to meet the Britain and President Jacques Chirac of France agreed at St. Malo in 1998 that “the Union The European Union has agreed on a Helsinki Headline Goal of developing a corps- decisionmaking process and created the nec- sized expeditionary force that can deploy must have the capacity for autonomous ac- tion, backed up by credible military forces, the essary supporting staffs. It established the post military forces capable of ensuring diverse of High Representative for Common Foreign tasks and establish new political and military means to decide to use them and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to international and Security Policy to advise the council on structures that will enable the EU to guide defense issues and gave the job to Javier and direct such operations. crises.” The St. Malo summit agreement com- mitted the two leading military powers in Solana, former Secretary General of the North To meet the Helsinki Goal, the European Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Solana Union must surmount three problems: ensuring Europe to building capabilities and institu- tional structures for a common defense. has two staffs reporting to him: a Policy Unit sufficient forces, building confidence in the and Military Staff. The Policy Unit consists of quality of their performance, and finding Britain’s acceptance of an EU defense role facilitated the consolidation of effort between diplomats assigned by their governments substitutes for critical NATO assets. The (thus who are not EU civil servants) to advise approaches that EU members take to these the European Union and Western European Union. By gaining an agreement that Euro- member states on potential crises and develop tasks may indicate how serious they are about initiatives to improve crisis management meeting the goal in fact as well as in name. pean defense efforts will remain intergovern- mental—that is, coordinated among members capabilities. The Policy Unit has identified As the Bush administration develops areas in which the European Union can make policies on transatlantic relations, it should in the Council of Ministers rather than the supranational European Commission—Britain a contribution to security (for example, creat- move away from efforts to restrict EU devel- ing a civilian police force for crises such as opment. The United States will benefit if EU was assured that it could prevent the European Union from making decisions over British the Balkans to reduce the need for military states are more able and, even more impor- forces to carry out police tasks). The Military tantly, willing to take responsibility for solv- objections. The United States also benefited from the St. Malo approach because it kept Staff under German officer General Rainer ing security problems without relying on U.S. Schuwirth consists of about 80 planners who involvement. The extent of European depend- decisions (which require unanimous approval by member states) at a level that allows consid- advise the EU leaders on development of ence on the United States poses a greater military capabilities, coordinate intelligence threat to U.S. interests than what might erable U.S. influence. That agreement preserves America’s ability to work bilaterally as well as assessments, and plan options for use of force develop if the European Union becomes a in potential crises. more independent actor in defense policy. No. 184, August 2001 Strategic Forum 1 The European Union envisions the process to work as follows: Helsinki Headline Goal I Before any decision is made about whether NATO, the European Union, or any At the December 1999 European Council meeting in Helsinki, participating European Union (EU) nation would intervene in a crisis, the Policy member states agreed that: Unit and Military Staff would report to the High I cooperating voluntarily in EU-led operations, member states must be able, by 2003, to deploy Representative and propose options for politi- within 60 days and sustain for at least 1 year military forces of up to 50,000–60,000 persons cal, economic, and military intervention to capable of ensuring humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks, and tasks of combat affect its course. forces in crisis management, including peacemaking (known collectively as the Petersburg Tasks), I EU and NATO members will consult and in accordance with article 17 of the EU treaty; make a policy decision on which institution should take the lead in managing the crisis. I new political and military bodies and structures will be established within the council to enable the EU to ensure the necessary political guidance and strategic direction to such operations, I If it is decided that the European Union will lead with NATO support, the while respecting the single institutional framework. Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe (DSACEUR) will direct military planning efforts inside Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe and other NATO staffs. this Headline Goal was established. The first by members and the requirements to deploy I DSACEUR will report through NATO and EU channels to political leaders on detailed stage was inventorying EU forces. The next and sustain military capabilities; and, second, military options and NATO or non-EU military stage was identifying the capabilities needed to a gap between declared capabilities and per- capabilities required and will receive guidance deploy and sustain the corps-sized force; this formance that commanders can expect from throughout the operation. inventory of capabilities is designated the “ideal those forces in terms of training, deployability, force.” The third was negotiating with member and equipment interoperability. Closing these I To preserve unity of command, DSACEUR will report both to NATO and EU states on the contributions to the force. Because gaps will require greater candor and discipline leaders but will take orders only from the latter than Europeans (or Americans) have displayed in the case of EU operations. the Headline Goal seems in NATO military planning where gaps have been longstanding, tolerated, and provided I If it is decided that the European Union to be a modest standard will lead without NATO support, the EU Council political cover by private consultations without will designate a lead nation to develop plans for nations which have publicly embarrassing members that fail to and provide the core for command and control a combined GDP roughly meet force levels. of the multinational operation. as large as that of the Meeting the Goal United States and nearly Force Levels The political impetus of European gov- two million troops At the Helsinki summit in 1999, the Euro- ernments and the commitment that they pean Union committed itself to creating a force already have made almost guarantee meeting of 60,000 troops (roughly a corps) that could Representative Solana’s staff was not fully in the Helsinki Headline Goal. Whether they be deployed within 60 days of a decision by EU place, teams of national delegations worked on achieve it in a meaningful way, rather than members and that could be sustained for at cataloging existing forces, identifying require- simply declaring that it has been met, remains least 1 year. The aim is to achieve this objective ments, and coordinating potential national to be seen. The Headline Goal seems to be a by 2003. The so-called Helsinki Headline Goal contributions. However, the Policy Unit and modest standard for nations which have a does not specify where this force would be used, Military Staff are now working with defense combined gross domestic product (GDP) although it is generally assumed to mean in staffs in national capitals. At the EU Capabilities roughly as large as that of the United States and around Europe, including the Balkans, Commitment Conference held in November and nearly two million troops. EU members North Africa, or the Caucasus—but there is no 2000, members pledged 100,000 troops to meet spend about $150 billion per year on defense, agreement in the European Union about where the Helsinki Headline Goal. about 40 percent of the U.S. defense budget. the force might or could be deployed. Significant progress must still be achieved Although most militaries in Europe are not Three important initial stages of work before the 2003 deadline. EU and national optimally structured for power projection, the have been completed in the 18 months since defense staffs are addressing two shortfalls: European Union contains armed forces of first, a gap between what has been committed outstanding quality.
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