No. 184 Strategic Forum August 2001 Institute for National Strategic Studies National Defense University Do Defense Initiatives Threaten NATO? by Kori N. Schake

Building a capacity for “the eventual multilaterally to ensure that EU choices are Key Points framing of a common defense policy which consistent with U.S. national interests. uropean Security and Defense Policy might in time lead to common defense” has An enormous amount of the work needed (ESDP) is now the main item on Europe’s been a major European Union (EU) preoccu- to translate the St. Malo agreement into prac- Esecurity agenda because of a focus on pation since the in 1991. tice has been done in the European Union and establishing a crisis management force capa- The Amsterdam Treaty in 1997 defined the in national planning staffs to advance the ble of acting independently of the North area for defense coordination as “humanitar- prospects for EU defense policy and capabilities. Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). ian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks, and However, more work has been done to create an Although transatlantic policies will be tasks of combat forces in crisis management, organizational structure than to improve forces colored by issues such as the Kyoto treaty, including peacemaking” (known as the Pe- to carry out the mandate. missile defenses, and relations with Russia, tersburg Tasks). The project gained momen- ESDP is likely to dominate defense debates tum after Prime Minister Tony Blair of Great New Structures as the European Union (EU) tries to meet the Britain and President Jacques Chirac of France agreed at St. Malo in 1998 that “the Union The European Union has agreed on a Helsinki Headline Goal of developing a corps- decisionmaking process and created the nec- sized expeditionary force that can deploy must have the capacity for autonomous ac- tion, backed up by credible military forces, the essary supporting staffs. It established the post military forces capable of ensuring diverse of High Representative for Common Foreign tasks and establish new political and military means to decide to use them and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to international and Security Policy to advise the council on structures that will enable the EU to guide defense issues and gave the job to Javier and direct such operations. crises.” The St. Malo summit agreement com- mitted the two leading military powers in Solana, former Secretary General of the North To meet the Helsinki Goal, the European Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Solana Union must surmount three problems: ensuring Europe to building capabilities and institu- tional structures for a common defense. has two staffs reporting to him: a Policy Unit sufficient forces, building confidence in the and Military Staff. The Policy Unit consists of quality of their performance, and finding Britain’s acceptance of an EU defense role facilitated the consolidation of effort between diplomats assigned by their governments substitutes for critical NATO assets. The (thus who are not EU civil servants) to advise approaches that EU members take to these the European Union and . By gaining an agreement that Euro- member states on potential crises and develop tasks may indicate how serious they are about initiatives to improve crisis management meeting the goal in fact as well as in name. pean defense efforts will remain intergovern- mental—that is, coordinated among members capabilities. The Policy Unit has identified As the Bush administration develops areas in which the European Union can make policies on transatlantic relations, it should in the Council of Ministers rather than the supranational —Britain a contribution to security (for example, creat- move away from efforts to restrict EU devel- ing a civilian police force for crises such as opment. The United States will benefit if EU was assured that it could prevent the European Union from making decisions over British the Balkans to reduce the need for military states are more able and, even more impor- forces to carry out police tasks). The Military tantly, willing to take responsibility for solv- objections. The United States also benefited from the St. Malo approach because it kept Staff under German officer General Rainer ing security problems without relying on U.S. Schuwirth consists of about 80 planners who involvement. The extent of European depend- decisions (which require unanimous approval by member states) at a level that allows consid- advise the EU leaders on development of ence on the United States poses a greater military capabilities, coordinate intelligence threat to U.S. interests than what might erable U.S. influence. That agreement preserves America’s ability to work bilaterally as well as assessments, and plan options for use of force develop if the European Union becomes a in potential crises. more independent actor in defense policy.

No. 184, August 2001 Strategic Forum 1 The European Union envisions the process to work as follows: Helsinki Headline Goal Before any decision is made about whether NATO, the European Union, or any At the December 1999 meeting in Helsinki, participating European Union (EU) nation would intervene in a crisis, the Policy member states agreed that: Unit and Military Staff would report to the High cooperating voluntarily in EU-led operations, member states must be able, by 2003, to deploy Representative and propose options for politi- within 60 days and sustain for at least 1 year military forces of up to 50,000–60,000 persons cal, economic, and military intervention to capable of ensuring humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks, and tasks of combat affect its course. forces in crisis management, including peacemaking (known collectively as the Petersburg Tasks), EU and NATO members will consult and in accordance with article 17 of the EU treaty; make a policy decision on which institution should take the lead in managing the crisis. new political and military bodies and structures will be established within the council to enable the EU to ensure the necessary political guidance and strategic direction to such operations, If it is decided that the European Union will lead with NATO support, the while respecting the single institutional framework. Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe (DSACEUR) will direct military planning efforts inside Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe and other NATO staffs. this Headline Goal was established. The first by members and the requirements to deploy DSACEUR will report through NATO and EU channels to political leaders on detailed stage was inventorying EU forces. The next and sustain military capabilities; and, second, military options and NATO or non-EU military stage was identifying the capabilities needed to a gap between declared capabilities and per- capabilities required and will receive guidance deploy and sustain the corps-sized force; this formance that commanders can expect from throughout the operation. inventory of capabilities is designated the “ideal those forces in terms of training, deployability, force.” The third was negotiating with member and equipment interoperability. Closing these To preserve unity of command, DSACEUR will report both to NATO and EU states on the contributions to the force. Because gaps will require greater candor and discipline leaders but will take orders only from the latter than Europeans (or Americans) have displayed in the case of EU operations. the Headline Goal seems in NATO military planning where gaps have been longstanding, tolerated, and provided If it is decided that the European Union to be a modest standard will lead without NATO support, the EU Council political cover by private consultations without will designate a lead nation to develop plans for nations which have publicly embarrassing members that fail to and provide the core for command and control a combined GDP roughly meet force levels. of the multinational operation. as large as that of the Meeting the Goal United States and nearly Force Levels The political impetus of European gov- two million troops At the Helsinki summit in 1999, the Euro- ernments and the commitment that they pean Union committed itself to creating a force already have made almost guarantee meeting of 60,000 troops (roughly a corps) that could Representative Solana’s staff was not fully in the Helsinki Headline Goal. Whether they be deployed within 60 days of a decision by EU place, teams of national delegations worked on achieve it in a meaningful way, rather than members and that could be sustained for at cataloging existing forces, identifying require- simply declaring that it has been met, remains least 1 year. The aim is to achieve this objective ments, and coordinating potential national to be seen. The Headline Goal seems to be a by 2003. The so-called Helsinki Headline Goal contributions. However, the Policy Unit and modest standard for nations which have a does not specify where this force would be used, Military Staff are now working with defense combined gross domestic product (GDP) although it is generally assumed to mean in staffs in national capitals. At the EU Capabilities roughly as large as that of the United States and around Europe, including the Balkans, Commitment Conference held in November and nearly two million troops. EU members North Africa, or the Caucasus—but there is no 2000, members pledged 100,000 troops to meet spend about $150 billion per year on defense, agreement in the European Union about where the Helsinki Headline Goal. about 40 percent of the U.S. defense budget. the force might or could be deployed. Significant progress must still be achieved Although most militaries in Europe are not Three important initial stages of work before the 2003 deadline. EU and national optimally structured for power projection, the have been completed in the 18 months since defense staffs are addressing two shortfalls: European Union contains armed forces of first, a gap between what has been committed outstanding quality. Establishing the capability to deploy 60,000 troops on 60-day notice and sustain them for at least 365 days should not be demanding for wealthy and militarily This Strategic Forum was prepared by Kori N. Schake, a senior research fellow in the Institute for National capable states. Strategic Studies at the National Defense University. Please direct any questions or comments to Dr. Schake at (202) 685–2227 or forward them via e-mail to [email protected].

2 Strategic Forum No. 184, August 2001 Defense spending varies widely: Britain and on levels of defense spending as the key indica- prospect for wringing more expeditionary France each spend about 3 percent of GDP, tor of EU seriousness. Although important, capability out of their military forces. similar to the level of the United States, while spending might not be the critical index be- Germany is closer to 1.5 percent. In addition to cause member states are unlikely to raise After Helsinki the issue of burdensharing among EU members, budgets substantially, and European capabili- most are undergoing programs to make their ties could be improved greatly even without Three practical problems remain for the forces largely voluntary and more expeditionary, increasing spending. European Union to meet the Helsinki Headline and few have fully funded that transition. The The indicator that might provide the best Goal in a meaningful way: ensuring sufficient European initiative also has helped defense measure of progress toward meeting the Head- forces, building confidence in the quality of ministries in preventing their governments from line Goal is whether the European Union finds their performance, and finding substitutes for continually reducing budgets—in fact, defense credible ways to deploy and sustain a force critical NATO assets. spending by most member states except Ger- within its resource constraints. Member states, Sustaining a force of 60,000 troops for a many appears to have stabilized. The Interna- both individually and collectively, spend enor- year or more will require substantially more tional Institute for Strategic Studies calculates mous amounts on such prestige projects as forces than the roughly 100,000 currently that nearly all members have decreased spend- satellite procurement and development of the committed by EU states. Military planners ing if measured in constant dollars. Future Large Aircraft, and they are considering generally consider the requirement for sus- Some European defense experts want to initiating a European space program. Although tainment to be three times the deployed force, see a system that would increase public ac- these undertakings are worthy, what the Euro- which leaves a gap of about 80,000 additional countability for overall spending and allocat- pean Union needs most are quick, practical, forces that must still be committed to meet ing specific categories such as research and and cost-effective ways of transforming capable the goal by 2003. Given the difficulty of secur- development. However, EU member states do forces into effective expeditionary forces. Meet- ing national commitments for the levels not seem interested in a system that would bind ing requirements with existing resources would declared at the Capabilities Commitment them more tightly than NATO planning. Sub- indicate that military planners are succeeding Conference and the scarcity of troops trained stantially raising spending on defense is proba- in improving capabilities to the level where EU and equipped for expeditionary deployment in bly not feasible at the time when Europe is member states could conduct corps-sized EU militaries, meeting the numerical stan- safer and more secure than in the previous 50 expeditionary operations independently of both dard will pose a serious challenge for the years, especially for capabilities that appear NATO and U.S. support. European Union. elitist to many of its citizens. European govern- Several EU members, particularly the Also, national and EU military planners ments are unwilling to invest the political Netherlands, Denmark, and Germany, are are privately concerned about the suitability capital in changing public opinion to buy a developing creative initiatives for cross-funding and training of some of the forces pledged for way out of dependence on U.S. military capa- procurement and mission requirements. The the missions. The question is not about the bilities. The relevant policy question is what the Dutch air force has arranged to refuel Danish professionalism of soldiers in the European European Union can do within the limits of fighters, and the Netherlands is retrofitting Union—they are some of the world’s best—but existing defense spending. German airlift in return for drawing rights on about whether troops are adequately trained for EU governments may be tempted to that asset. These kinds of collaborative efforts the new missions and whether they have the downgrade requirements and declare victory as among Europeans are likely to be the best necessary equipment for the operational 2003 approaches. Most analysts are focusing

New Structures

At the December 2000 European Council in Nice, the following new permanent political and military bodies were established within the council:

Standing Political and Security Committee (PSC) is the linchpin of the European security and defense policy (ESDP) and of the common foreign and secu- rity policy (CFSP). The PSC has a central role to play in the definition of and follow-up to the EU response to a crisis.

European Union Military Committee (EUMC) is composed of the Chiefs of Defense (CHODs) represented by their military representatives (MILREPs). The EUMC meets at the level of CHODs as necessary. This committee gives military advice and makes recommendations to the PSC, as well as providing military direction to the European Union Military Staff.

European Union Military Staff (EUMS) is the source of EU military expertise. It assures the link between the EUMC and the military resources available to the EU and provides military expertise to EU bodies as directed by the EUMC. It performs ”early warning, situation assessment, and strategic planning for the Petersburg tasks including identification of European national and multinational forces“ and implementation of policies and decisions as directed by the EUMC. The EUMS also contributes to the process of elaboration, assessment, and review of the capability goals; and it monitors, assesses, and makes recommendations regarding the forces and capabilities made available to the EU by the member states on training, exercises, and interoperability.

No. 184, August 2001 Strategic Forum 3 and the European Commission, give the Force Pledges impression that the European Union is being emancipated from overbearing U.S. influence At the November 2000 EU Capabilities Commitment Conference, member states commit- in NATO and building a that ted to 100,000 troops, 400 aircraft, and 100 ships, including the following numbers of will supplant U.S. casualty-averse strategies ground forces:* with a European way of war. Such talk not Germany 13,500 Austria 2,000 only is unhelpful, but it also is untrue. The United Kingdom 12,500 Finland 2,000 European Union is decades away from being able to supplant U.S. military power, and not France 12,000 Sweden 1,500 a single EU government is aiming to do so. Italy 6,000 Belgium 1,000 The overwhelming majority of EU states, Spain 6,000 Ireland 1,000 including France, are not looking to push the Netherlands 5,000 Portugal 1,000 United States out of Europe or undermine NATO. Greece 3,500 Luxembourg 100 But they are urgently seeking ways to work together more effectively if the United States

* Source: Assembly of WEU, ”Implementation of the Nice Summit Decisions in the Operational Area of the European Security and Defense Policy,” chooses not to become involved in crises that Document A/1734, Appendix I, available on www.asemblee-ueo.org/en/documents their governments feel a need to manage. The painful lessons of how little the European states environment. To achieve greater confidence in change if the European Union is to operate achieved in Bosnia before Washington agreed to the quality of forces pledged by nations, the without U.S. support. intervene and how little they could have done European Union will need to establish a meas- In command and control, as well as intelli- during the Kosovo crisis without U.S. engage- ure of merit and evaluate their performance gence, the European Union will need to develop ment are the most important drivers of EU against the standard. NATO does this already in ways of managing without the resources that the defense initiatives. Americans may be uncom- the Integrated Military Structure. The European U.S. Armed Forces bring to NATO. Replicating fortable with their European allies working on Union will need either to rely on NATO evalua- American systems or approaches for such critical defense issues outside NATO, but European allies tions and find a way to extend NATO standards functions would be very costly. Although member have recent experience with the United States and inspections to nonintegrated EU members states could advocate radically redistributing withholding NATO involvement because it did (France, Sweden, Finland, Ireland, and Austria) spending to build U.S.-style C4ISR systems, such not want to intervene. Washington must appre- or to develop and carry out its own evaluations. ciate that its European allies are struggling to Confidence in the quality of troops is a basic EU efforts that divert too take responsibility for managing security prob- building block for coalition military operations, lems—an effort that deserves respect, but also but the high politics of EU–NATO relations are much attention from the one that must be watched carefully to ensure likely to impede progress in ensuring that common work of NATO that EU practices do not impede continued commanders have the requisite knowledge would diminish support cooperation with the United States in NATO. about forces under their command. European Caucus? The idea of a caucus An EU force operating independently of for U.S. engagement in of member states within NATO could be detri- NATO and U.S. support also will be severely Europe and make military mental both to the Alliance and European impaired in some critical ways, most of which cooperation more difficult Security and Defense Policy (ESDP). It would are related to command, control, communica- position the United States, Turkey, Norway, tions, computers, intelligence, surveillance, Canada, Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, and reconnaissance (C4ISR), on which Ameri- an effort is unlikely. The question for the Euro- and possibly Denmark on one side of the table to can and European militaries rely. Secure pean Union is whether they can find less expen- review a position agreed upon by the European communications links for passing orders and sive but militarily adequate and sustainable ways Union. Such division is likely to embolden information depend fundamentally on the U.S. of performing the same tasks. objections and make non-EU members feel they national command and control spine; the are being pulled into policies that they had little European Union will need to figure out how to U.S. Concerns influence in shaping. A caucus also is likely to transmit information reliably and secretly make the United States defend even more ar- among its headquarters and soldiers. EU states The central concern in Washington dently the positions of non-EU NATO states to have superb intelligence collection and assess- about EU defense efforts is the potential for ensure that they get serious consideration by the ment but share little among themselves and do damage to NATO. EU efforts that divert too European Union. A caucus could make consen- not develop common assessments. In NATO, much attention from the common work of sus building more difficult if states were unwill- intelligence tends to be shared in national NATO would diminish support for U.S. en- ing to compromise on elements that represent spokes converging on a U.S. hub rather than gagement in Europe and make military coop- hard-won EU internal consensus. Finally, it among EU states. That system will need to eration more difficult. Some Europeans, could slow the pace of decisions if Alliance especially those from the French Quay d’Orsay consultations were prevented until EU states agreed to a position to present in NATO counsels.

4 Strategic Forum No. 184, August 2001 The United States and other non-EU members European allies of the United States are not States for them to start with the most demand- have experienced the challenge of dealing with on the same path of military innovation. They ing military tasks. such an EU caucus since 1993 in the Organiza- spend much less on research and development, No simple solution exists to the problem of tion for Security and Cooperation in Europe. buy fewer weapons, and favor national compa- divergence of U.S. and European militaries. These potential drawbacks represent legiti- nies (as the United States also does) when Differences have always existed in the profi- mate concerns but give the impression that purchasing their weaponry. As a result, they are ciency of NATO forces, as have divisions of labor Washington is trying to keep Europe unorgan- developing fewer innovations and experiencing in assigning missions that optimize the contri- ized and thus more easily corralled into support- less change. The divergence in high-end capa- butions of national forces. Maintaining interop- ing its position. Whatever the drawbacks of a bilities was apparent in the Kosovo air cam- erability is a challenging job that will become caucus for NATO, the resentment created against paign, in which U.S. forces had to conduct more increasingly so as U.S. forces continue to adapt the United States by this position is more detri- than 80 percent of the intelligence collection at a much faster rate than others. The United mental to our national interests than a caucus and strike sorties. States wants and needs European militaries that would be. America cannot prevent EU states contribute to the leading edge of warfighting. from meeting independently. The United States ESDP is not responsible Interoperability is too important for U.S. na- can veto all NATO decisions (as could any other tional interests to be a problem left for Euro- member), which ensures that the European for the divergence among peans to solve. If Washington wants allies for Union could not initiate action that the United NATO militaries, but it demanding military coalitions, then it needs to States would be obligated to support. Moreover, a could aggravate existing keep generating ideas and including Europeans caucus would place responsibility for building in its developments to ensure that they can NATO consensus with EU states rather than the problems among them remain interoperable and make meaningful United States. contributions. Interoperability with U.S. forces is Diverging Military Policies. The most This is not to say that Europeans are fail- not simply Europe’s problem. Perhaps the Al- pressing transatlantic defense issue is the loom- ing to do their fair share; Europeans have com- liance should be spending more time consider- ing divergence of U.S. and European militaries mitted more than 80 percent of the ground ing how to provide useful niche capabilities or resulting from technological advances and forces that have been deployed in Kosovo and divisions of labor or ways to orchestrate military organizational changes in the U.S. military. are also bearing more than 80 percent of the forces that are less interoperable but still capable Simply put, the American armed forces are reconstruction and assistance costs. However, the of working in coalitions. However, even without becoming irreconcilably different from those of divergence in capabilities highlights the differ- the Headline Goal, maintaining interoperability all other nations. ent emphases in priorities for military forces. would be challenging in coming years. The United States spends 85 percent of The NATO Defense Capabilities Initiative (DCI), Duplicating NATO Assets. Damage to the total world investment in military research designed to identify and fund European capabil- Alliance military functioning is also a para- and development and buys large numbers of ities of the kind seen in U.S. forces in Kosovo, mount concern. The integrated NATO military weapon systems that capitalize on the innova- has not succeeded particularly well: less than command is the foundation on which the ability tions. In the past 10 years, the U.S. ability to half of the force levels identified in DCI have to fight in close coalitions is built. It provides see the battlefield more precisely from greater been funded, and there is little prospect of im- five important functions: distances, transmit information securely to provement despite pressure from the NATO Long-term planning to give visibility into forces more widely dispersed, and acquire Secretary General. defense spending, procurement, and force struc- targets more precisely has increased. Whether ESDP is not responsible for the divergence turing plans this incorporation of advanced technologies among NATO militaries, but it could aggravate Operational planning to piece together produces a revolution in military affairs of the existing problems among them. Although the national forces into coalitions for specific con- magnitude of the invention of the longbow or United States is concentrating on high-technol- tingencies the development of the blitzkrieg can be de- ogy improvements to joint warfighting at the Advising political leaders about using bated, but it is unquestionably changing top of the conflict spectrum and eschewing force American forces. The transition has been peacekeeping, the Helsinki Headline Goal Training to agreed standards to ensure occurring so long that it is beginning to affect grounds European efforts at the lower-tech, reliable knowledge on the availability and how U.S. troops organize, train for, and think lower-intensity end of the conflict spectrum. performance of forces about warfare. The Navy network centric Many U.S. policymakers are concerned that the Building common understanding about warfare, the Army experiment with breaking European Union is perfecting a peacekeeping using force and a degree of comfort in each up tank functions, and the rise of Joint Forces force that will reduce the warfighting capacity others’ judgments through routine interaction Command are only three examples of how of EU militaries. Europeans counter that they among militaries. change that was made possible by advanced have to begin somewhere in building better The U.S. Government and most military weapons is now affecting doctrine. The change forces, and it would be both militarily impracti- advisors from NATO members have concerns appears to be accelerating in U.S. thinking and cal and politically more offensive to the United about duplicating planning structures and force structuring. processes that exist in NATO. The concern most frequently raised is that duplication of NATO

No. 184, August 2001 Strategic Forum 5 planning will divert resources from the Al- Much could be changed to improve the present United States need not damage the Alliance. liance; this already is occurring because of the value of Alliance planning, and U.S. policies The practical problems, even at the extreme of cost of building EU military staffs. However, based on preserving the status quo merit care- EU duplication of NATO planning or the although this use of assets may not be optimal, ful and critical consideration. formation of a caucus within NATO, are man- it should not prohibit support by Washing- The United States tends to underestimate ageable. Europeans continue to want to han- ton—if only because the United States has the attraction of NATO as the vehicle for deliv- dle crises in partnership with the United long had a planning staff separate from NATO ering American attention and military strength States—which means through NATO— in U.S. European Command. and how much that matters in crises. The whenever possible. Having to fight wars with- More problematic in terms of coalitions fundamental attraction of the Alliance for out the overwhelming political and military will be managing competing approaches to Europeans is that it is the only way to ensure advantages brought by American participation military planning that are likely to emerge if is not the purpose of ESDP. But the United the European Union seriously attempts to improving EU capabilities States will not always be interested in Euro- replicate defense and operational planning pean crises or may have higher priority de- done by NATO. If EU and NATO staffs plan in and fostering its willing- mands made on its political attention and different ways to utilize the same forces in ness to take responsi- military assets. managing crises, political leaders are likely to bility for managing crises be faced with competition. Even in the unlikely For the European Union to develop real event that these staffs retain a common ap- with less reliance on the competence in security and defense matters will proach, processes probably will be confusing to United States need not require some changes in the comfortable political leaders and delay decisions. Further- damage the Alliance patterns of transatlantic relations. These more, the staffs are unlikely to maintain a changes could make cooperation more diffi- common approach over time because EU cult, but the status quo is equally problematic. military staffs will assume that they cannot rely U.S. involvement in solving their security American policy on ESDP has focused on on the breadth of U.S. military assets. problems. The United States can afford to be preventing the emergence of a Europe that is The problem of separate planning is thus more relaxed about EU defense initiatives than too strong and assertive in the security arena, a serious one, both politically and militarily. it has been in the past several years. whereas the more likely—and damaging— But it is not insurmountable. It simply requires American policy has been to encourage prospect for U.S. interests is a Europe unwilling careful and dedicated work to determine how to EU security and defense policy only within red or unable to share the burden of common manage the emerging EU decision structures in lines constraining its development of institu- security interests more equitably. The United ways that do not impede the ability of U.S. and tions or practices. The primary concern has States should adopt policies that are based European forces to work together, which they been that ESDP will impair the ability of the more confidently on American strength and are likely to do in most cases. Military planners United States and its European allies to work that encourage more responsibility and leader- manage these kinds of competing demands together in NATO, a critically important con- ship by our European allies. routinely, whether the context is distributing cern for all parties. In fact, the demise of the scarce assets across different contingencies or Alliance would be more damaging to Europe, deconflicting regional plans with drawing given the predominance of American power rights on the same forces. For NATO, the risk of in the world. duplication is probably worth running if it However, improving EU capabilities and produces a European Union more willing and fostering its willingness to take responsibility able to manage crises without relying so heav- for managing crises with less reliance on the ily on the United States. Moreover, the status quo is not entirely satisfactory, from either an American or a European perspective. Many critics of develop- ing EU defense policies overestimate the extent to which existing NATO practices are either sufficient or sustainable. For example, arma- ments directors have been unable in the past 8 The Institute for National Strategic Studies publishes The Strategic Forum series presents original research by books, monographs, and reports on national security members of the National Defense University as well as years to agree on how to meet the top priority strategy, defense policy, and national military strategy. other scholars and specialists in national security affairs of ground surveillance for allied strategic For information on NDU Press visit the Web site at: from this country and abroad. The opinions, conclusions, commanders. The planning process is formu- http://www.ndu.edu/inss/press/ndup2.html. INSS also and recommendations expressed or implied within are produces Joint Force Quarterly for the Chairman of the those of the contributors and do not necessarily reflect laic and not yet attuned to the new challenges. Joint Chiefs of Staff; the journal can be accessed at: the views of the Department of Defense or any other http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/jfq_pubs/index.htm. agency of the Federal Government.

INSTITUTE FOR NATIONAL STRATEGIC STUDIES PUBLICATION DIRECTORATE Stephen J. Flanagan James A. Schear Robert A. Silano William R. Bode Director Director of Research Director of Publications General Editor

6 Strategic Forum No. 184, August 2001