Evaluating the Eu's Crisis Missions in the Balkans
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EVALUATING THE EU’S CRISIS MISSIONS IN THE BALKANS MICHAEL EMERSON & EVA GROSS (EDITORS) ISABELLE IOANNIDES ANA E. JUNCOS URSULA C. SCHROEDER The Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS) is an independent policy research institute based in Brussels. Its mission is to produce sound analytical research leading to constructive solutions to the challenges facing Europe today. The views expressed in this report are those of the authors writing in a personal capacity and do not necessarily reflect those of CEPS or any other institution with which the authors are associated. Photo credits. Top cover photo shows Finnish peacekeepers visiting the memorial plaque of Captain Voutilainen, who was killed on duty 2nd February 1995, while working as a military observer near Rogatica. It is reprinted courtesy of EUFOR Forum magazine. The photo at the bottom, kindly provided by the Press Service of the European Council, depicts the launch of the EU ALTHEA military operation in BiH. ISBN 978-92-9079-709-8 © Copyright 2007, Centre for European Policy Studies. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any means – electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise – without the prior permission of the Centre for European Policy Studies. Centre for European Policy Studies Place du Congrès 1, B-1000 Brussels Tel: 32 (0) 2 229.39.11 Fax: 32 (0) 2 219.41.51 e-mail: [email protected] internet: http://www.ceps.be CONTENTS 1. Introduction by Michael Emerson & Eva Gross .........................................1 2. Governance of EU Crisis Management by Ursula C. Schroeder..........17 2.1 Introduction ..........................................................................................17 2.2 Conceptualising innovation and change ..........................................21 2.3 Political solutions: Fostering coordination from above ..................23 2.4 Organisational solutions: Diverging strategies of innovation .......28 2.5 Towards a comprehensive response?................................................34 2.6 Conclusions...........................................................................................39 References .......................................................................................................40 Appendices I. EU budget procedures for crisis management.................................44 II. EU crisis-management architecture...................................................45 3. Police Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina by Ana E. Juncos ..............46 3.1 Introduction ..........................................................................................47 3.2 The planning of the mission ...............................................................48 3.3 The legacy from the International Police Task Force ......................51 3.4 The challenge of coherence.................................................................54 3.5 Effectiveness of the EUPM..................................................................61 3.6 Learning by doing................................................................................74 3.7 Conclusions...........................................................................................77 References .......................................................................................................79 4. Police Mission in Macedonia by Isabelle Ioannides ...............................81 4.1 Introduction ..........................................................................................82 4.2 The EU’s dual-track approach............................................................83 4.3 Assessing inter-pillar coherence ........................................................85 4.4 Evaluating ‘effective multilateralism’ ...............................................99 4.5 Perceptions of EU police reform activities......................................111 4.6 Prospects for the future .....................................................................114 4.7 Conclusions.........................................................................................118 Bibliography .................................................................................................120 5. Civilian and Military Missions in the Western Balkans by Eva Gross .................................................................................................126 5.1 Introduction ........................................................................................126 5.2 ESDP operations in the Western Balkans........................................128 5.3 Macedonia ...........................................................................................132 5.4 Bosnia and Herzegovina ...................................................................139 5.5 Conclusions .........................................................................................145 References......................................................................................................148 Appendix I. Current and completed ESDP missions as of May 2007...152 Glossary...............................................................................................................153 About the Authors.............................................................................................155 1. INTRODUCTION MICHAEL EMERSON & EVA GROSS Crisis management has become a new frontier for the functions of the European Union. It is a vital component of the EU’s European security and defence policy (ESDP), which in turn completes the set of policy instruments available for the broader concept of the common foreign and security policy (CFSP). The potential significance of these developments has reached the point that political scientists are now treating the CFSP and ESDP as a research domain. Accordingly, this book is devoted to the findings of four scholars – Eva Gross, Isabelle Ioannides, Ana E. Juncos and Ursula C. Schroeder – who in the context of their PhD researches have been analysing the EU’s first crisis-management missions. They look in some detail at how these first operations have gone, what lessons are to be drawn, and indeed, whether the lessons have been drawn by the EU institutions themselves. Long preliminaries. The turn of the century saw the EU perhaps finally start to become serious about the remaining major gap in its system – the capacity to project power forcefully beyond its frontiers. The economic and monetary union was more or less complete, with the single market having been in existence since 1992 and the single currency entering circulation with the euro banknotes in 2002. The area called ‘freedom, security and justice’ had had its hard core established in the Schengen provisions since 1990. In the area of climate change, the EU was on track towards its emergence as the world pioneer. But the idea of an autonomous European military capability had long remained taboo for some member states, and so the field had been left reserved for NATO. It is quite usual for major systemic developments of the EU to have long gestation periods, during which ideas are floated but not quickly agreed upon, and token actions are implemented first without real | 1 2 | EVALUATING THE EU’S CRISIS MISSIONS IN THE BALKANS operational significance. Yet the question of a European defence capability took this evolutionary prudence to exceptional lengths, with the Western European Union (WEU) struggling unsuccessfully for half a century, from 1948 until its demise in 1999, to become much more than an empty gesture.1 Military affairs began to creep into the EU with the (Maastricht) Treaty on European Union of 1992, which included vague wording about the EU possibly framing a common defence policy at some future point in time. Nonetheless, also in 1992 WEU ministers, in one of their most significant meetings in Petersberg near Bonn, defined a certain number of missions that the WEU might undertake. These tasks, which came to be known as the Petersberg tasks, involved humanitarian, rescue and peacekeeping activities, along with the deployment of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking.2 There followed a further incremental advance in the Treaty of Amsterdam of 1997, which amended the Maastricht Treaty with slightly more engaging language (see Box 1.1). The real breakthrough for the EU’s role came at the St Malo meeting of President Jacques Chirac and Prime Minister Tony Blair on 4 December 1998, in which these leaders of the EU’s two most militarily capable member states agreed that the EU must acquire a capacity for autonomous military action. This agreement was rapidly followed up. At the European Council meeting of June 1999, Javier Solana was appointed the dual function of Secretary General of the Council and High Representative for the CFSP, and the WEU was considered (euphemistically) to have ‘completed its mandate’, with its assets transferred to the EU. By December 1999, the European Council was able to declare the first Headline Goals for a deployment capacity of 50,000–60,000 military personnel. 1 For detailed accounts, see W. van Eekelen, From Words to Deeds – The Continuing Debate on European Security, CEPS and DCAF, Brussels and Geneva, 2006. 2 See M.E. Smith, “Implementation: Making the EU’s International Relations Work”, in C. Hill and M. Smith, International Relations and the European Union, Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press, 2005. INTRODUCTION| 3 Box 1.1 Steps towards