International Conference KNOWLEDGE-BASED ORGANIZATION Vol. XXVII No 1 2021

THE RELEVANCE OF THE BERLIN PLUS AGREEMENTS FOR THE PLANNING PHASE OF THE MILITARY OPERATION EUFOR ALTHEA

Marius PRICOPI, Alexandru BABOȘ

“Nicolae Bălcescu” Land Forces Academy, Sibiu, Romania [email protected], [email protected]

Abstract: Conducted in since 2004, EUFOR Althea still remains the most significant military operation of the . Using the document analysis as a qualitative research tool, this paper examines the usefulness and viability of the Berlin Plus Agreements (established between NATO and the EU) in the initial planning phase of EUFOR Althea.

Keywords: Berlin Plus Agreements, Bosnia and Herzegovina, EUFOR Althea

1. Introduction Europe (DSACEUR), which informs the In the process of European military European Union’s Military Committee on integration, initiated by the Treaty of the major plans and decisions. In his Brussels (1948), the Berlin Plus activity, DSACEUR is assisted by a Agreements hold a considerable Director for EU Operations and a Staff importance. Finalised in March 2003 on the Group, made up of EU officers; the purpose basis of the conclusions of the NATO of this group is to ensure a connection Summit in Washington (1999), they between DSACEUR and the EU Military actually integrate a series of multiple Staff, as well as to implement the SHAPE agreements, mainly regarding [1]: the support in planning and conducting the NATO-EU exchange of classified operation [2]. information; secured access to the planning capabilities of NATO in case of crisis 2. Scientific tool management operations conducted by the In writing this paper, we used the document EU; procedures for sharing, monitoring and analysis as a qualitative research tool, as it returning the employed capabilities. was described in a comprehensive Namely, the Berlin Plus Agreements allow encyclopaedia edited by Bruce Frey [3]. access for the Union to NATO’s military capabilities, in the event of a military 3. Challenges in the planning phase and operation initiated by the Union and in the relevance of the Berlin Plus which NATO does not choose to get Agreements involved. Thus, the Union receives access The idea of a NATO-EU transition in to the Alliance’s European command Bosnia and Herzegovina was first submitted options; operational planning is conducted at the Copenhagen at the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers (December 2002). But the actual planning Europe (SHAPE) level, while the of such an initiative had become possible operational command is provided by the only after the adoption of the Berlin Plus Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Agreements and after the transition Amber

DOI: 10.2478/kbo-2021-0016 © 2015. This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-Non Commercial-No Derivatives 3.0 License.

102 Fox – Concordia proved that these Althea’s Operation Plan, while on the other agreements are functional, if only at a lower side political consultations were initiated, in level. order to prepare the transition between the The possible NATO-EU transition in North Atlantic Council of NATO and the Bosnia and Herzegovina was thus resumed Political and Security Committee of EU. at the end of 2003, when the Ministers of But the debates between experts continued. Foreign Affairs from NATO’s member According to an official involved in the countries announced the intention to planning phase, "while the French insisted complete the SFOR mission by the end of in looking exclusively at NATO’s common 2014 and to hand over its mandate, in the assets, and more particularly the OHQ legal framework created by the Berlin Plus [Operational Headquarters] at SHAPE and Agreements. Only a week after, the the CIS [Communication and Information European Council expressed its readiness to System], other Member States thought that launch a military operation in Bosnia and the Union should lean on the Alliance as Herzegovina, under the auspices of the much as it could. Whereas most aspects of (then) European Security and Defence Berlin Plus were approached by British or Policy and benefiting from the provisions Germans from a practical, procedural, of the Berlin Plus Agreements [4]. commonsense angle, any small detail would Even from the start, numerous challenges be considered by the French of the utmost have been identified in the planning phase political importance” [6]. of the operation. The success of IFOR and Accordingly, the initial terms had to be SFOR in ensuring the peace and the extended; it took no less than six months to objectives of the General Framework get from the Crisis Management Concept to Agreement generated a significant capital the Initiating Military Directive. The of trust of the local population towards the process was also extended by debates NATO forces; their withdrawal was thus surrounding the meaning of the term perceived reservedly, all the more so as „capability”, as well as by ’s some skeptics feared that the future requests to have full access to classified European forces might be as inefficient as information. the UNPROFOR forces; deployed in But once the operational phase was Croatia and in Bosnia and Herzegovina initiated, the contradicting opinions between 1992-1995, the UNPROFOR lessened. The Operational Headquarters forces were still being associated by the professionally generated the Operational locals with the incapacity to prevent the Plan, which it also implemented in the same Srebrenica massacre, in which over 8.000 manner. According to another involved lives were lost. expert, "the (operational) planning process Also, other critics emphasized the essential was very, very comfortable; we had the role that the United States played in the transition plan from SFOR and I had the region, the country being viewed as the whole SHAPE at my disposal; I had only one capable of responding to new Naples, I had the SFOR FHQ [Force threats; in their analysis, the involvement of Headquarters]. It was a piece of cake. the United States further warranted the Berlin Plus works perfectly well, so long as involvement of NATO [5]. you stay within the box, that is. It is perfect Thus, unlike Concordia, the extent and the on the technical side: it is the best planning complexity of Althea made the and conduct option the EU has by far” [7]. implementation of the Berlin Plus Thereby, the progresses scored in the Agreements a more difficult task. The planning phase in the first part of 2004 initial progresses were achieved on two allowed the leaders of the Alliance to tracks: on the one side DSACEUR drafted announce, at the Istanbul Summit (June

103 2004), the decision to complete the SFOR Thus, all these endeavors made possible the mission by the end of 2004 and to support end of the SFOR mission and the official its replacement with and EU-led and UN- launch of the Althea operation, within a mandated force, on the basis of Chapter VII ceremony that took place on 2 December at of the United Nations Charter. According to Camp Butmir. the official Communiqué issued at the end In this entire process of transition SFOR- of the summit, „NATO’s long-term EUFOR Althea, the Berlin Plus political commitment to Bosnia and Agreements proved their helpfulness. Herzegovina remains unchanged” and the Besides the significant contributions General Framework Agreement still brought by SHAPE (directly linked with the constitutes „the basis for peace and deciders from Brussels) and the Alliance’s stability” in this country [8]. Through the planning, command and control same communiqué one affirms the support capabilities, the Berlin Plus Agreements for Bosnia and Herzegovina to enter the offered other benefits on Partnership for Peace, which actually the part of NATO, such as [10]: the happened two years later, in 2006. experience and prestige of DSACEUR, as Significant aspects regarding the planning the operation commander; NATO’s of the future operation (mission, legal Communications and Information System; mandate, participation of partner countries) the Joint Force Command Naples, which were further established in the second half includes the Western Balkans in its area of of 2004, mainly through Resolution 1551 responsibility; Camp Butmir (Sarajevo), and Resolution 1575 of the UN’s Security which hosted the SFOR Headquarters and, Council and the Joint Action subsequently, the EUFOR Althea 2004/570/CFSP of the Council of the Headquarters. European Union. Also, on 15 July, NATO’s Secretary 4. Conclusions General and the High Representative of the The Berlin Plus Agreements represent a Union for Foreign Affairs and Security major success in the NATO-EU Policy together visited the capital of Bosnia cooperation. Thanks to them, the Union and Herzegovina, to personally inform the launched its first military operation: national deciders on the timeline and the Concordia, conducted in Macedonia ways to accomplish the transition. The two between March-December 2003. The had talks with the Presidency of the country success of Concordia determined the Union (a collective leadership body, consisting of to assume a more significant role in three members), the Council of Ministers, ensuring security in the Western Balkans the High Representative for Bosnia and and to embark on a more ambitious Herzegovina and with the SFOR endeavour, by launching operation EUFOR Commander; the Euro-Atlantic leaders also Althea in December 2004. visited Camp Butmir, as well as the Looking back, we can conclude that the Headquarters of the Union’s Police Mission planning phase of operation EUFOR Althea in this country [9]. was a truly complicated one. But the Berlin Finally, on 25 November 2004 the Council Plus Agreements proved their usefulness of the European Union adopted Decision and viability and made possible the 2004/803/CFSP on initiating EUFOR subsequent avoidance of further Althea, starting with 2 December 2004. dissensions, once the execution phase stared.

104 References List

[1] Tim Waugh. . http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2004_2009/documents/dv/berlinplus_/berlinpl us_en.pdf. Accessed 07.04.2021. [2] Gabriele Cascone. ESDP Operations and NATO. https://is.cuni.cz/studium/predmety/index.php?do=download&did=152020&kod=JPM7 28. pp. 151-152. Accessed 08.04.2021. [3] Bruce Frey (ed.). The SAGE Encyclopedia of Educational Research, Measurement, and Evaluation. Sage Publications. 2018. [4] Gabriele Cascone. Op. cit. p. 149. [5] Ibidem. p. 150. [6] Author’s interview with former EUMS official involved in the strategic planning phase of EUFOR Althea. Brussels. May 2009 – apud Luis Simón. Command and control? Planning for EU military operations. Paris: European Union Institute for Security Studies. 2010. pp. 28-29. [7] Author’s interview with former EU Staff Group (EUSG) official involved in the elaboration of Althea’s OPLAN. Brussels. May 2009 – apud Luis Simón. Op. cit. p. 29. [8] NATO. Istanbul Summit Communiqué. 28.06.2004. [9] Council of the European Union. Press Information S0193/04: , EU High Representative for the CFSP, to visit Bosnia and Herzegovina with NATO Secretary- General, Jaap de Hoop Scheffer. Brussels. 14.07.2004. [10] Luis Simón. Op. cit. pp. 29-30.

105