European Union and NATO

Johannes Varwick*

Partnership, Competition or Rivalry?

Kieler Analysen zur Sicherheitspolitik Nr. 18 Juni 2006

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Institut für Sicherheitspolitik an der Christian-Albrechts-Universität zu Kiel European Union and NATO ISUK.org

Prof. Dr. Johannes Varwick

European Union and NATO. Partnership, Competition or Rivalry? Kieler Analysen zur Sicherheitspolitik Nr. 18 Kiel, Juni 2006.

Impressum: Herausgeber: Direktor des Instituts für Sicherheitspolitik an der Christian-Albrechts-Universität zu Kiel Prof. Dr. Joachim Krause Westring 400

24118 Kiel

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Die veröffentlichten Beiträge mit Verfasserangabe geben die Ansicht der betreffenden Autoren wieder, nicht notwendigerweise die des Heraus gebers oder des Instituts für Sicherheitspolitik.

- 1 - European Union and NATO ISUK.org

1. NATO and the EU: a ´clarified, Secretary General. In March 2003 1 though still undefined` relationship permanent arrangements came into ef-

fect which enable the EU to draw on Transatlantic relations certainly en- NATO assets and capabilities and in compass more than just the relation- May 2003 a “NATO-EU Capability ship between the North Atlantic Treaty Group“ was established. That is, at first Organization (NATO) and the Euro- sight the relationship between both or- pean Union (EU) and there is every in- ganizations seems close, clarified, and dication that the North Atlantic Alliance unproblematic. has become far too narrow to still rep- Yet, according to German commenta- resent the defining transatlantic frame- tors, Washington suspects the EU of work.1 However, there are good rea- attempting to become an independent sons for arguing that the relationship actor in security policy under French between the two most important or- and German leadership. Conversely, ganizations of the political West is cen- the US is supposed to reshape NATO tral to any analysis, for without mean- into an instrument by which it can keep ing to overvalue the role of institutions: the EU´s military ambitions under con- the institutional mechanisms and sub- trol. Since both views might be true in stance of arrangements between principle, “nerves are frayed” (Winter NATO and the EU are among the most 2003). Consequently, it has been ar- decisive factors determining how rela- gued that for open conflict to break out tions between Europe and the United between NATO and the EU or the States will evolve in the future.2 The European Security and Defence Policy two organizations established a net- (ESDP), respectively, nothing else but work of co-operation in the past years, an appropriate trigger would be miss- including arrangements for regular ing (Wernicke 2003). The perceptions consultations at different levels. Since of the involved parties, however, turn 2001, NATO-EU consultations involve out to be different – at least officially. joint meetings at the level of foreign Thus, the North Atlantic Council’s final ministers twice a year, between the communiqués routinely stress the North Atlantic Council and the Political common strategic interests between and Security Committee at least three NATO and the EU (see exemplary: times a year and between both Military NATO 2003) and likewise a declaration Committees biannually. Furthermore, of the European Council states unmis- the EU and NATO Ambassadors meet takably: “The transatlantic relationship every four to six weeks and a broad is irreplaceable. The EU remains fully range of formal and informal contacts committed to a constructive, balanced exists between the EU Secretary Gen- and forward-looking partnership with eral / High Representative and NATO our transatlantic partners” (European Council 2003). Nevertheless, even * Der Verfasser dankt Jennifer Aßmann und Svenja Sinjen für wertvolle Kommentare. high-level officials criticize the current - 2 - European Union and NATO ISUK.org

state of affairs between NATO and the consequences for a renewed NATO- EU. In this sense, the NATO Secretary EU relationship (section 4). General expressed “deep concern” re- garding the evolution of formal rela- 2. A transatlantic controversy: the tions between both organizations Europeanisation of security policy (quoted in FAZ, 3 February 2006: 2) and complained about still “too many” Transatlantic relations are in a phase people “who misunderstand NATO and of fundamental reorientation. In es- the EU as rival organizations and dis- sence, the end of the Cold War pro- play a protectionism in some sort of foundly changed the central parame- zero-sum thinking to safeguard ESDP” ters of the relationship between Europe (De Hoop Scheffer 2005). Likewise, and the US – a challenge which came the German Military Representative to to full effect some fifteen years later. NATO and the EU lamented: “We are Transatlantic relations are far more far away from having finished solutions complex than just being characterized for the final design of a strategic part- by security policy issues and also nership between NATO and the EU, cover cultural, political, and economic though this has been repeatedly as- aspects. Furthermore, they are distin- serted in summit declarations” (Ol- guished by the fact that each of the two shausen 2005: 25). is the most important partner for the other. It is also true that, at the begin- Which position reflects reality most ac- ning of the 21st century, actors on both curately? Do the partners of both sides sides of the Atlantic are brought closer of the Atlantic try to limit the damage together by their interests, culture, and by playing down any conflict between economies as well as advances in both organizations although they in- communication and transportation creasingly pursue divergent policies? technology, but at the same time the Is a disagreement just being brought potential for causes of friction and with on by commentators and political ac- it the possibility of conflict increases. tors which does not actually exist in po- For despite of a close co-operation and litical practice? In sum, there are con- joint institutional arrangements, Europe vincing reasons for an analytical ex- – so far as one might talk already amination of the relationship between about it as a single actor – and the US both organizations. To begin with, this frequently develop divergent ideas article explores the changes within the concerning important questions in in- transatlantic security structure resulting ternational politics. As the former Dep- from a growing Europeanisation of se- uty Secretary of State serving during curity policy (section 2), next outlines the Clinton Administrations second the evolution of relations between term put it: the US does not want to NATO and the EU (section 3), and fi- see an ESDP “that comes into being nally debates possible scenarios and first within NATO but then grows out of - 3 - European Union and NATO ISUK.org

NATO and finally grows away from and where true security and the de- NATO”, as this would inevitably lead to fense and promotion of a liberal order rivalry between both organizations still depend on the possession and use (Talbott 1999).3 of military might” (Kagan 2003: 1). Fur- thermore, US-European differences 2.1. The reorientation of transatlan- over strategies could particularly be tic relations explained by their different capacities for power projection. Kagan concludes Already in summer 2002, US political that “Americans are from Mars and scientist Robert Kagan exposed the Europeans are from Venus”. underlying roots of this debate in a In the same sense, Thomas Risse re- much-noticed essay, which has been gards the debate about the Iraq War as published as a book in an expanded obscuring a threefold controversy version, by arguing that it is about time about “constitutive principles and val- to stop deluding oneself to the illusion ues of the Western security commu- that “Europeans” and “Americans” nity” (Risse 2003: 114ff). This conflict would share a common world view or over world order within the West has even live in the same world. Although three components: firstly, it is about the the differences over the Iraq War relevance of multilateral institutions should not be regarded as a transat- and arrangements under international lantic dispute since Europe did not law; secondly, it concerns the question present itself as a coherent actor op- of the relative importance of democ- posing the US – rather this issue gen- racy and human rights and how to erated rifts within Europe itself – Kagan promote and implement them; and argues more broadly that “[o]n the all thirdly, it is about how to manage the important question of power – the effi- new types of security challenges, that cacy of power, the morality of power, is to say, what role should be assigned the desirability of power – American to the use of force. and European perspectives are diverg- These differences are reflected in the ing. Europe is turning away from relevant strategic documents of both power, [...] it is moving beyond power the EU and US. While the March 2006 into a self-contained world of laws and US National Security Strategy (Na- rules and transnational negotiation and tional Security Strategy 2006) and the cooperation. It is entering a post- December 2003 European Security historical paradise of peace and rela- Strategy (European Security Strategy tive prosperity, the realization of Im- 2003)4, which still remains operative, manuel Kant´s “perpetual peace”. display a high degree of consensus re- Meanwhile, the United States remains garding fundamental policy objectives, mired in history, exercising power in an values, and threat perceptions, they anarchic Hobbesian world where inter- also account for substantial differences national laws and rules are unreliable, concerning security policy priorities - 4 - European Union and NATO ISUK.org

and the means to implement them. How much autonomy can and This becomes further apparent when should Europe afford in security looking at the US´s and EU´s military policy? planning assumptions. While the US Are NATO and the EU actually aims to be in a position to dominate designed in a complementary each kind of conflict with superior mili- way or do they increasingly tary force, the EU is content with mili- evolve into rivals, potentially tary missions along the lines of the so- leading to confrontation one called Petersberg tasks.5 Accordingly, day? both established different financial priorities - or adopted different policies 2.2. The EU on its way to a common resulting from this distinct prioritization, security policy? respectively - and opted for alternative means to further their strategic objec- If ESDP had not displayed such a dy- tives. The US spends about $463 bil- namic evolution, it would not have lion annually (!) for defence, whereas been necessary to worry about the re- all of the EU´s member states spend lations between NATO and the EU as some $186 billion.6 they would be far more simple. How- Such findings, even if in an oversimpli- ever, to begin with, the question needs fied and sharpened form as in Kagan´s to be addressed whether the EU could illustration, could not have been with- already be regarded as a single actor out effect on EU-NATO relations. To in security policy. the extent that the debate set out From the outset, European integration above reflects the underlying dynamics within the framework of the European of current transatlantic differences, it is Community (EC), the Western Euro- also of central importance for the future pean Union (WEU), and today’s Euro- evolution of transatlantic relations. This pean Union served to create a security is the case as disagreements go be- community with a dual purpose: to pro- yond present-day issues and also con- vide both “security of each other” by cern fundamental structural questions economic and political integration and concerning European and international “security with each other” against ex- politics: ternal threats by co-operation in foreign, security, and defence policy is- Does the United States continue sues (Varwick 1998). While initial ef- to exercise hegemonic leader- forts where based on the idea that the ship / regional leadership in 1954 defeated European Defence Europe and what will the future Community (EDC) would serve as a distribution of power look like in starting point for a common defence security policy? policy from which a common security policy would emerge, finally leading to a political union including a common - 5 - European Union and NATO ISUK.org

foreign policy, a quite different logic of each other” could be regarded as prevailed in the course of the Euro- solved. Today, it seems unthinkable pean integration process. For decades, that one of the EU´s member states security and defence policy was pri- could once again pose a military threat marily placed within NATO, whereas to the others – although one should the WEU was a highly limited organiza- never rule out the possibility of political tion in the Alliance’s shadow, rather regressions entirely. That is, war as an providing an additional insurance in instrument of politics has become de case of NATO´s loss of significance. jure and de facto inconceivable within Whilst the member states of the Euro- the EU. However, apart from these pean Community seeked to encourage “old” considerations, “new” thoughts a co-ordination in foreign policy issues emerged. In view of the level of inte- within the framework of the European gration achieved so far, it is not a Political Cooperation (EPC) – though question of whether the EU defines it- as a non-binding commitment in the self as a potent international actor, but first instance – during the 1970s, it took rather how it defines such a role for it- the Single European Act (SEA) and the self. In principle, the EU and its mem- reactivation of the WEU in the 1980s to ber states acknowledged that they put security and military topics back on need to surmount the growing discrep- the agenda of Western European ancy between its significant role as an states. However, it needed a profound international actor in economic, trade, shift in the constellation of world poli- financial, and development policy and tics at the beginning of the 1990s to its comparatively minor role in security cause the EU to establish a European policy in order to be in a position to ef- Security and Defence Policy by the fectively perform the full spectrum of Treaty of Maastricht (1992) and its ac- tasks ranging from conflict prevention companying establishment of the to crisis management in the future. Common Foreign and Security Policy In the light of these findings – which (CFSP), the WEU Petersberg Declara- became further apparent under the im- tion (1992), the Treaty of Amsterdam pression of Europe’s incapacity to act (1997) and the conclusions of the militarily during the Kosovo Conflict – European Council in Cologne (1999) far reaching initiatives were launched, and Helsinki (1999). Finally, with the stimulating further progress in the con- December 2000 Nice decisions the EU ceptual realm in the last decade which understands itself now as a security would have been unthinkable a few community with a common (though not years ago. Since the end of 1998, the single!) foreign, security, and defence EU member states have intensified policy. their efforts towards integration in se- In fact, with such a high degree of eco- curity and defence policy. Thereby, the nomic, political, and military integration major turning point was the reversal of within the EU the problem of “security the UK´s position on the question of an - 6 - European Union and NATO ISUK.org

autonomous European defence capa- European Union Military Committee bility. (EUMC), providing for military recom- This sudden turn resulted in an initia- mendations to the PSC, and the Euro- tive to strengthen European security pean Union Military Staff (EUMS) for efforts at the Anglo-French Saint Malo the planning of military operations and Summit in December 1998. Eventually, exercises. Even though these political at the June 1999 meeting in Cologne, and military structures are in no way the European Council launched ESDP comparable with the long-established as an integral part of the Maastricht NATO structures: by now it is also Treaty’s CFSP. In the “Declaration on taken for granted within the EU that strengthening the common European military expertise is included in the de- policy on security and defence” EU cision-making process. Those having member states declared their determi- fond memories of the EC / EU meticu- nation that the EU should play “its full lously taking care not to debate military role” on the international stage. Fur- aspects of security policy in the 1990s thermore, the EU should be given the are able to realize the profound necessary means and capabilities to changes that have taken place since meet the requirements of ESDP. That then.7 is, to perform the Petersberg tasks as contained in the Amsterdam Treaty, 2.3. The question of the EU´s the EU should have the capacity for military capabilities autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, as well as the Additionally, the EU set itself wide means and readiness to decide to use ranging objectives concerning military them in order to respond to interna- and civilian capabilities. At the Euro- tional crises. To this end, the member pean Council meeting in Helsinki in states committed themselves to de- December 1999, EU member states velop more effective military capabili- elaborated this intention in more detail ties and to strengthen the industrial by defining a military capability target and technological defence base as well to be met by 2003. These decisions as to harmonize military requirements have been supplemented at the sum- and the planning and procurement of mits in Feira (June 2000) and Göte- arms. borg (June 2001) - and more precisely With the Nice Treaty coming into force in 2004 - by a catalogue of measures in February 2003, the EU also has an in the non-military realm of crisis man- institutional structure in place to further agement, especially in the four priority implement ESDP. Apart from the Po- areas police, rule of law, civil admini- litical and Security Committee (PSC), stration, and civil protection. While the which serves as a preparatory body for 1999 established Headline Goal (pro- the Council’s meetings on CFSP / vision of a European Rapid Reaction ESDP issues, these are, inter alia: the Force of up to 60,000 troops to be de- - 7 - European Union and NATO ISUK.org

ployed within 60 days and to be sus- the whole spectrum of their conven- tained for at least one year) has been tional armed forces. Notably, three achieved in quantitative terms in 2003, types of military tasks are mentioned: existing qualitative shortfalls required humanitarian and rescue tasks, peace- the definition of a new “European keeping tasks, and tasks of combat Headline Goal”. Thereby, the military forces in crisis management, including capacity for action shall be enhanced peacemaking. These so-called Peters- by means of an action plan to be im- berg tasks have been incorporated into plemented by 2010. Furthermore, new the Amsterdam Treaty and are ex- instruments such as role specialization panded in the (failed) Constitution and pooling of resources shall be Treaty to include disarmament, military adopted. It is true that wide ranging advice, conflict prevention, and post- proposals like the much debated crea- conflict stabilization (Art I-41.1, II- tion of a European army continue to be 309.1). Further clues are provided by unacceptable to a majority of the EU the EU´s first security strategy which member states. But the creation of the has been adopted by the European European Defence Agency (EDA) aims Council on 12 December 2003 under to improve the European defence the title “A Secure Europe in a Better technological and industrial base and World” (European Security Strategy to harmonize national procurement 2003). This strategy describes for the programs. Moreover, in 2004 the EU first time the EU´s view of the pre- started the built up of up to 13 EU Bat- dominant security threats in the 21st tlegroups, consisting of 1,500 troops century and presents possible re- each, as a specific form of rapid reac- sponses to them. It identifies interna- tion in sophisticated military operational terrorism, the proliferation of tions. However, the record so far re- weapons of mass destruction, regional mains modest. As can be seen from conflicts, the instability of states and the recent “Capability Improvement state failure, and organized crime as Chart”, which is submitted to the the five main threats to European se- Council every six months, the situation curity and reveals basic principles and did not improve in most of the defined approaches for measures to cope with capability areas between 2002 and them. Thereby, it defines three strate- 2005 (European Council 2005). gic goals for the EU: addressing the Besides, it remains an open question threats, building security in the EU´s what kind of military operations the neighbourhood, and an international European Rapid Reaction Force actu- order based on effective multilateral- ally shall conduct. The already men- ism. The strategy advocates a Euro- tioned Petersberg Declaration from pean Union that is more active, coher- June 1992 provides some initial clues. ent and capable in its foreign policy ac- The then WEU member states agreed tions and furthermore, it promotes the to make available military units from strengthening of international institu- - 8 - European Union and NATO ISUK.org

tions and international law. In addition sented for possible crisis response op- to that, it emphasizes the EU´s whole erations over a 10-20 year timeframe: set of instruments for prevention, Firstly, large-scale peace sup- whereby the use of military force as a port operations modelled on the last resort to prevent conflict and to IFOR / SFOR operations in Bos- manage crises is not ruled out (Sinjen / nia and Herzegovina or KFOR Varwick 2005: 104-110). in Kosovo. Thereby, it is as- The November 2004 decision to set up sumed that the EU would be Battlegroups must be viewed in this able to deploy some 30,000 context. From 2007 onwards, the EU troops, 40 combat aircraft, 6 Battlegroups shall be deployable within surface combatant warships the period of five to ten days and be plus some maritime patrol air- sustainable for an initial period of 30 craft within 30 days for a period days (up to 120 with rotation). The of three years and in a distance “Declaration on European Military Ca- of up to 2,000 km from Brussels. pabilities” further states that the Battle- Secondly, high-intensity hu- groups should usually be employed on manitarian interventions mod- the basis of a UN mandate and should elled on Rwanda (1993) and create, inter alia, favourable security East Timor (1999). For these conditions for major UN peace-keeping kind of operations, the EU could operations. Nevertheless, concrete make a contribution of up to “combat scenarios” are not mentioned. 10,000 troops, 105 aircraft, in- A quite different approach has been cluding supporting aircraft, 10 outlined in a proposal of the EU Insti- surface combatant warships, 4 tute for Security Studies for a “Euro- amphibious transport and sup- pean Defence Paper” (EU Institute for port ships, and 10 maritime pa- Security Studies 2004: 67-98). This trol aircraft which could be de- study examines the conditions, means, ployed within 15 days for a pe- and possibilities for implementing the riod of one year (with troop rota- provisions of the European security tion taking place after six strategy. Although the paper has been months) and in a distance of commissioned by the EU´s heads of 5,000 km from Brussels (with state and government, it was not pre- the nearest available seaport in sented as some sort of “White Paper” 300 km from the theatre of op- due to some member state’s concerns. erations). The paper’s main argument is that the Thirdly, regional warfare in the established objectives of the European defence of strategic European security strategy will not be met by ex- interests, like the interruption of isting military capabilities. Five con- oil supplies or massive in- ceivable strategic scenarios are pre- creases in their costs or the dis- ruption of flows in goods and - 9 - European Union and NATO ISUK.org

transport services. In those kind opment of EU-specific military capabili- of operations the EU could de- ties as well as a capacity for autono- ploy an expeditionary force, mous political-military action.8 Though composed of 10 brigades with the EU´s first military operations might 60,000 troops, 360 combat air- be less visionary, they are politically craft, 2 maritime task forces, 4 motivated and practicable for the time aircraft carriers, 16 amphibious being (see section 3.3.). ships, 12 submarines, 40 surface combatant warships, 8 2.4. Interim conclusions supporting ships, and 20 maritime patrol aircraft. Fifty years after the failure of the EDC Fourthly, the prevention of an and six years after launching ESDP at attack with weapons of mass the Cologne summit, the EU developed destruction by the allocation of into a security policy actor of a new 1,500 special operations forces type. With a wide range of political, for clandestine and covert ac- military and civilian options for action at tions, plus a brigade of four bat- its disposal, the EU could potentially talions of special forces, sup- exert enormous influence in interna- ported by 60 combat aircraft, 40 tional politics. However, despite of all support aircrafts and combat achievements so far, the ambivalent helicopters, one aircraft carrier, nature of CFSP / ESDP between inte- 10 surface combatant ships, 3 gration on the one hand and the pres- submarines, and 2 support ervation of national sovereignty on the ships within 15 days and in a other hand, still remains. In that sense, distance of up to 5,000 km from the EU member states could neither Brussels. agree on qualified majority voting in the Fifthly, homeland defence, CFSP / ESDP nor on a common “leit- though this is only marginally motif” for these policy areas. Moreover, discussed in this paper. How- the (provisional) failure of the EU Con- ever, it refers to aspects of civil stitution Treaty – triggered by the ref- protection for the limitation of erenda in France and the Netherlands damage. in spring 2005 – revealed that it is not the time of great visions in European From the Institute’s point of view these politics at the moment. Yet, the fact five scenarios reveal the discrepancy that with the solidarity clause (as in- between the defined threat percep- cluded in the Constitution Treaty) and tions, types of missions and tasks on the establishment of the Defence the one hand and the available military Agency as well as the Battlegroups, capabilities of the EU member states three essential component parts were on the other hand. Therefore, the pa- addressed before the Constitution per pays great attention to the devel- Treaty coming into force, is evidence - 10 - European Union and NATO ISUK.org

for the further pragmatic development – they face each other as separate ac- of ESDP independent of far-reaching tors“ (Heise / Schmidt 2005: 66). This initiatives and plans. does not imply, however, that any decisions are taken at joint meetings; on 3. On the way to a sustainable rela- the contrary “both organizations are tionship: milestones and explana- careful to keep their decision auton- tion attempts omy“ (De Witte / Rademacher 2005: 275). While NATO and the EU are dif- In view of the firm establishment of ferent organizations, each with its own ESDP the question of the relations of origins, functions, and political culture, Europeans to NATO and more funda- they are connected with each other by mentally the question of the role the a largely overlapping membership - US plays in Europe has become even overall 19 states are members in both more important. One of the obstacles organizations, by partly overlapping confronting transatlantic relations con- functions and by roughly the same mili- cerns the membership incongruity be- tary forces (as a result of a “single set tween NATO and the EU. However, of forces”). with NATO´s enlargement to 26 mem- In allusion to the principle of a “single bers in April 2004 and the EU´s set of forces” it has been argued that enlargement to 25 members in May “a further ´set of structures and institu- 2004 a broad congruence of member- tions` has been established which ties ship in both organizations has been up scarce resources. Some processes achieved, which will further increase have become more complex and with the accession of the NATO mem- where redundancies arise, their added bers Rumania and Bulgaria to the value needs being tested over and European Union in 2007. That is, only over again” (Olshausen 2005: 25). six countries (Finland, Ireland, Malta, Austria, Sweden, and Cyprus) are EU 3.1. The evolution of the NATO-EU but not NATO members. Conversely, relationship five states (Iceland, Norway, Canada, the United States, and Turkey) are How a systematic and precise division NATO though not EU members. Con- of labour between NATO and the EU sequently, a peculiar situation arises could look like remains a much de- for co-operation between both organi- bated and still unsolved question. It zations. For “on the one hand EU was former US Secretary of State member states – insofar as they are Madeleine Albright who articulated also members of the North Atlantic Al- what would become known as the liance – quasi co-operate with them- “three D´s” for US approval of an selves in joint NATO-EU working autonomous European security policy: groups. On the other hand – arranged with the development of ESDP there by the institutions of NATO and the EU should be firstly, no decoupling of - 11 - European Union and NATO ISUK.org

North American and European secu- nally. In detail, this compromise pro- rity; secondly, no duplication of NATO vided for: structures and assets; and thirdly, no discrimination against non-EU mem- NATO´s identification of military bers of NATO (Albright 1998). Former capabilities, assets, as well as NATO Secretary General George headquarters which could be Robertson countered these rather ad- made available to the WEU, vising standards for judgment with his subject to decision by the North concept of the “three I´s” which should Atlantic Council. Thereby, serve as basic criteria for a successful NATO secured itself the right to co-operation between both organiza- monitor the use of these assets tions: the indivisibility of the transatlan- and to keep their use under tic security relationship, the inclusive- constant review. ness of all NATO members in EU mili- the elaboration of command tary operations, and the improvement structures within NATO to pre- of European defence capabilities. If pare, command and conduct these were taken into account, NATO WEU-led operations. For that “would have no reason to be afraid of purpose, appropriate NATO ESDP. Rather there would be every personnel are assigned to a reason to support it” (Robertson second WEU-function. 2002:189).9 In this context the so-called After a long period of uncertainties, “Deputy Proposal” – the propo- characterized by US ambivalence sition that the Deputy Supreme about how to cope with European am- Allied Commander Europe bitions in the sphere of security policy, (DSACEUR), traditionally a Brit- a procedure has been invented in 2002 ish or German general, would to form the basis for practical work be- be dual-hatted to be also the tween the two organizations (see operation commander of WEU- Dembinski 2005: 72-78; and De Wille / led operations – became of Rademacher 2005: 272-282). It builds special importance. on the so-called “Berlin-Plus” arrange- the participation of all European ments which have been reaffirmed in NATO members in WEU-led the “NATO-EU Declaration on operations. ESDP”10, as agreed on 16 December However, the “Framework Document 2002. The underlying idea of the “Ber- on the Release, Monitoring, and Re- lin-Plus” agreement in 1996 was the turn or Recall of Assets and Capabili- creation of European military structures ties”, signed in 1999, remained rather according to the “separable but not vague concerning the central issues of separate” principle. Therefore, an release, return, and control of NATO autonomous and permanent EU mili- assets. While France insisted on guar- tary structure was not planned origi- anteed access, NATO was only pre- - 12 - European Union and NATO ISUK.org

pared to offer assured access. In fact, pacity for action dependent on the the December 2002 “Berlin-Plus” ar- North Atlantic Council, and therefore rangements comprise the following as- the United States (see also Meiers surances for EU-led crisis manage- 2005). Already at the summit in Hel- ment operations: sinki in December 1999, the EU declared its intention to enable the EU to • assured EU access to NATO's take autonomous decisions in those planning capabilities; cases, where NATO as a whole is not • presumed availability of NATO engaged. That is, it is indisputable that capabilities and common as- the EU will take action only when sets, such as communication NATO as a whole is not engaged. units and headquarters; However, it is disputable whether the • procedures for release, monitor- EU must ask NATO for permission ing, return, and recall of NATO when launching an EU operation and assets and capabilities; whether NATO (i.e. the US) has some • NATO-EU consultation arrange- sort of veto power. Consequently, it ments in the context of EU-led remains an open question under what operations making use of NATO circumstances such a situation is given assets and capabilities; and who will be the one deciding about • establishment of a “NATO-EU it. Capability Group“. Finally, after Turkish reservations were dispelled and following the conclusion However, there seem to be different in- of a security agreement between terpretations about the actual content NATO and the EU, “Berlin-Plus” came of these arrangements on both sides of into force in March 2003. In any case, the Atlantic. Especially France called recourse to these arrangements pre- into question whether recourse to supposes the approval of the North At- NATO assets and capabilities would lantic Council, in which each state has really be guaranteed. Additionally, it a veto of course. Furthermore, access was feared that a claim to codecision to NATO planning capabilities is only on European operations would hide assured on condition that NATO does behind the demand for more transpar- not need DSACEUR and its planning ency. Furthermore, Paris referred to capabilities for its own military opera- practical and conceptual problems tions. The recourse to prior identified which would be raised by the demand NATO assets and capabilities would be for a right of first refusal for NATO, i.e. released on a case-by-case basis NATO to have first refusal on the anyway. Moreover, NATO reserved the launching of an operation before an right to recall these assets and capa- autonomous operation could be con- bilities in an ongoing EU-led operation ducted by the EU. To give in to this de- if aiming to carry out a military opera- sire would mean to make the EU`s ca- tion itself (see also section 4). - 13 - European Union and NATO ISUK.org

plication of NATO capabilities, and fi- 3.2. Tervuren as a symbol of an un- nally it would undermine the declara- solved dispute tion between NATO and the EU, as agreed under great political efforts in Against this background, especially December 2002.11 France tried and still tries to achieve Consequently, Tervuren not only the set-up of autonomous planning ca- threatened to cause a transatlantic pabilities for the EU. Thereby, the joint split12, but - due to the lack of consent declaration of France, Germany, Bel- to such an initiative among the EU gium, and Luxembourg on ESDP in member states themselves - also Tervuren at the end of April 2003 was within Europe itself. In August 2003 the of particular importance as it ex- United Kingdom launched a distinct ini- pressed the intention of the four states tiative proposing the establishment of a to create European structures for joint permanent EU cell within NATO´s Al- operational planning. In addition, the lied Command Operations (ACO, for- final communiqué proposes, among merly SHAPE), thus avoiding any other things, the concept of a Euro- separate and rival structures to NATO. pean Security and Defence Union Therefore, provisional result of this (ESDU), whereby those states should dispute is that the UK accepted the ne- be brought together that are ready to cessity of an autonomous EU opera- go faster and further in strengthening tional planning capability. That is, the their defence co-operation. In total, EU shall have the capacity to conduct seven initiatives are announced that military operations without recourse to shall be open to all interested EU NATO assets and capabilities. In the member states. Apart from the devel- end, the compromise, as agreed with opment of a European rapid reaction the US, amounts to the solution that capability, the creation of a European military missions across the spectrum command for strategic air transport, of the Petersberg tasks (humanitarian the development of a joint European aid, peace-keeping, and tasks of com- NBC protection unit, the creation of a bat forces) will be conducted with re- European system for emergency hu- course to EU planning capabilities, manitarian aid and of European train- while major and more sophisticated ing centres, it is also announced to es- military operations will rest on NATO tablish a European operational plan- structures and assets (European ning cell that shall be installed in the Council 2003: 23).13 In those cases in Brussels suburb of Tervuren by sum- which the EU is having recourse to mer 2004 (Joint Declaration 2003, part NATO assets and capabilities, the 6 and 7). In fact, this would firstly “Berlin-Plus” agreement remains valid. amount to the creation of an “EU Gen- Additionally, while co-operation be- eral Staff” that would be independent tween NATO and the EU shall be en- of NATO facilities, secondly to the du- hanced by the establishment of a small - 14 - European Union and NATO ISUK.org

EU cell at NATO´s ACO, a further 3.3. EU Operations newly established “civilian / military cell” comprising some 30 officers within In March 2003, the permanent ar- EUMS shall be activated in those rangements between NATO and the cases in which the EU decides to con- EU were put into first practice in Op- duct an autonomous operation. Indeed, eration Concordia, the European Un- the latter is subject to very restrictive ion’s military deployment to take over conditions, for the primary option re- the NATO Operation Allied Harmony in mains the recourse to national head- the Former Yugoslav Republic of Ma- quarters. This means that the “civilian / cedonia. Thereby, in Skopje, the Euro- military cell” within EUMS will only be pean Force Commander was co- activated upon the advice of the EU located with the NATO Senior Military Military Committee, if a civilian / mili- Representative, who had been further tary operation is planned and where no deployed in Macedonia to assist in the national headquarter is available country’s preparations for a possible (Dembinski 2005: 72-78). accession to NATO, and NATO´s Dep- In essence, some kind of division of la- uty SACEUR served as Operation bour between NATO and the EU ap- Commander. Likewise, the EU´s Op- pears in outlines: The Alliance would eration Althea, replacing NATO`s be responsible for the conduct of more SFOR mission in Bosnia and Herzego- robust combat missions where US par- vina in December 2004, was carried ticipation is necessary, while the EU out using NATO assets and capabili- would mainly undertake peace-keeping ties under the “Berlin-Plus” arrange- operations.14 Yet, a division of labour ments. By now (spring 2006), ESDP based on the idea of the US being re- completed all in all four operations sponsible for initiating regime changes (Concordia, Artemis, Proxima, Eujust through military interventions and the Themis), while ten operations (inter subsequent promotion of democracy alia, Althea, EUPM, EUPOL Kinshasa, on the one hand, and the Europeans Eujust Lex, EUSEC DR Congo and criticizing this US policy initially, but fi- AMIS II Darfur) are still ongoing. In do- nally taking part in stabilization opera- ing so, operations covered the spec- tions in the framework of NATO or the trum of small-scale missions in support EU on the other hand, cannot repre- of the rule of law as in Georgia (Eujust sent a model that is conducive to the Themis) and medium-scale operations definition of a joint transatlantic strat- like the taking over of the main peace- egy. On the contrary, what is required stabilization role previously undertaken is a precise co-ordination of NATO´s by NATO´s SFOR mission in Bosnia and the EU´s activities in each phase and Herzegovina (Althea). Overall, EU of a military operation. operations are not only remarkable for their geographical range (e.g. Mace- donia, DR Congo, Georgia, Bosnia, - 15 - European Union and NATO ISUK.org

and Herzegovina), but also for the fact the relationship between NATO and that all of them have to be regarded as the EU. While the United Kingdom – successful.15 for which NATO appears to be the only At the same time, however, it also acceptable pillar in a two-pillar alliance needs to be noted that the “Berlin-Plus” – traditionally prefers a close alignment arrangements have been ignored in a with the US and tries to exert influence number of cases. In December 2002, by pursuing a bandwagoning strategy, for example, the EU announced its traditional French policy aims to create intention to take over the SFOR an equipoise to US power in accor- mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina dance with a balancing approach. without consulting NATO and also the Thereof, Poland tends unequivocally EU´s operation in Congo in June 2003 and unmistakably to the British posi- - as well as in spring 2006 - has not tion. Finally, the German preference been accompanied by prior traditionally was to adopt the role of a consultations with NATO. Notably, an mediator between the extreme posi- open – even if comparatively harmless tions of France and the UK. – conflict came about for the first time in summer 2005 with regard to the 4.1. Scenarios about the future of operation in Darfur. While the US transatlantic security relations pressed for conducting the military operation under the auspices of NATO, In view of the tension between the for- especially France and Germany mation and further development of insisted on an EU mission in the Darfur ESDP on the one hand and the con- region of Sudan. In the end, both tinuing existence of NATO on the other organizations took action with US hand, two scenarios about the future transportation units assigned to NATO evolution of transatlantic security rela- and French and German troops as- tions are principally conceivable: firstly, signed to the EU (NATO´s operation a two-pillar alliance of equal partners, “Assistance to the African Union of and secondly a rivalry between the EU Darfur” and the EU´s operation “AMIS and the US, leading to NATO`s disso- II Supporting Action”). Certainly, such a lution rather sooner than later. “beauty contest” (Wanninger 2005)16 According to the first scenario, a two- between NATO and the EU is less use- pillar alliance – as already thought of in ful and a bad outlook for interinstitu- the 1960s and since then repeatedly t ional co-operation. demanded in numerous documents and strategy papers by the way – with 4. Prospects for NATO-EU relations: the US and Europe as asymmetric scenarios and consequences (because of the different power capa- Obviously, several ideas exist among bilities), but still equal partners will the major actors in transatlantic rela- arise in the future. The European pillar tions concerning the future direction of would be responsible to solve prob- - 16 - European Union and NATO ISUK.org

lems in its own regional security envi- consultation with the US. However, the ronment; yet, US forces would be question remains open whether Wash- available to support Europe if neces- ington would have a codecision power. sary. That is, by arrangement between Or, to put it differently: Will there be the two transatlantic partners, peace- situations in which NATO does not keeping missions like the ones in Kos- want to act and nonetheless the EU ovo or in Bosnia and Herzegovina acts against the will of the US? On the could be undertaken by the European other hand, a further prerequisite is pillar without US participation. In the that the US maintains the ability and event of global security problems, de- willingness to establish and maintain cisions would be made as the cases partnerships, and furthermore ac- arise, based on the existence or non- knowledges that it needs allies to con- existence of a consensus about a joint front today’s security challenges. action.17 The question of which of the While the latest US strategic docu- two organizations – NATO or the EU – ments like the March 2006 National assumes primacy would not be de- Security Strategy and the February cided in principle, but rather pragmati- 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review cally in the spirit of partnership and Report emphasize the importance of solidarity. Nevertheless, a range of international partnerships18, such a points of conflict would also remain in background condition cannot be taken this scenario: How should the Alli- for granted, though. Therefore, it ance’s military structure be designed; seems reasonable to agree to a recent what degree of military co-operation study on the new strategic direction of should exist; how should the division of US defence policy. Therein, it is ar- labour between NATO and the EU pre- gued that although the US will not turn cisely look like; how to guarantee in- away from NATO entirely, at least in teroperability; how to preserve cohe- future combat missions, however, it will sion within the Alliance; and is a UN likely make “a demonstrated political mandate required for joint action (as al- willingness and demonstrable existing ready provided for in the North Atlantic military capabilities a condition for its Treaty of April 1949)? willingness to co-operate. As it does In fact, two requirements would need not expect both of them from all of its to be met to implement this scenario. European allies, future transatlantic co- On the one hand, it is a prerequisite operation will continue to be limited to that the EU is successful with its pro- coalitions of the willing and capable, ject on ESDP and undertakes more ef- instead of being characterized by forts on its own (also in financial re- NATO” (Aßman 2006). spects) to guarantee its own security. The second scenario foresees a rup- Thereby, a duplication of military capa- ture in transatlantic relations in the bilities and decision-making structures medium and long term and NATO is unavoidable, but would take place in gradually eroding or even critically col- - 17 - European Union and NATO ISUK.org

lapsing. That is, in the medium term, question must be regarded as unan- the basic security assumptions and swerable, for on the one hand, today, it threat perceptions would further di- is more uncertain than ever whether verge and in the long term the EU and the EU can manage to become a sin- the US would become strategic rivals. gle political actor and on the other Accordingly, the relative stability of a hand, at present, it remains unsettled world order under the auspices of whether the US wants to remain a American dominance would be re- “European power” and whether it is still placed by a conflicting competition for interested in formal alliances with its supremacy between the world poles. It European partners. is true that Europe is not in the position Overall, three essential consequences to perform such a role as a political ri- for transatlantic security relations arise val for the moment, but assuming that from this analysis of the complex rela- the EU will be able to translate its eco- tions between NATO and the EU: nomic weight into political and military power some day, this scenario could Firstly, EU-Europe will be more become reality sooner than it is feared responsible for its own security by transatlantic Europeans (or Euro- than ever before and therefore, pean transatlanticists, respectively) or European policy must enhance hoped by European autonomists. the EU´s capacity to effectively perform this role. However, in all 4.2. Consequences for NATO-EU probability, the EU´s ability to relations shape its political evolution in the 21st century will turn out very What follows from this analysis? The modest under given conditions degree of European autonomy within of European policy. For neither NATO or of Europeans on the whole, the possibility of a creeping ero- respectively, is one of the most difficult sion of the EU can be ruled out structural questions of security and al- entirely, nor the evolution of a liance policy. In essence, it is about to completely new form of integra- what extent the EU is able and willing tion beyond existing treaties to take over tasks and functions so far (see on this: Varwick 2002). Al- being performed by NATO. Thereby, though the sphere of foreign the central question is whether the EU and security policy almost sug- will become a “branch office” of NATO gests itself for seeking common for particular tasks or whether the bulk solutions like hardly any other of those security policy tasks which lie policy field, it should not be ex- ahead of an EU enriched by ESDP can pected that with 25 or even 30 still be performed much better, much member states that could be faster and more effective by NATO. accomplished, what could not However, as matters stand today, this be achieved with just 15 mem- - 18 - European Union and NATO ISUK.org

bers: that is, to develop and transatlantic relationship, and raise a common European voice not a disruptive factor. And even in international affairs. Thereby, if the rhetoric of the EU some- the Europeans – who are, by times seems a bit too robust, the way, much more perceived NATO can take this in its stride. and requested as a common ac- For NATO remains unique – it tor from the outside world than alone has the United States on this is discernible inside the EU board. And there can't be a sta- itself – are no more allowed to ble world order without the USA” confine themselves to internal (De Hoop Scheffer 2004). self-reflection and quarrelling for Thirdly, despite of all already ex- quite some time now. The diffi- isting statements and formal ar- cult debates about the future of rangements, a debate about a integration as well as about transatlantic division of labour is European foreign and security imperative. For sensible rea- policy still lie ahead of the EU. sons, the EU should strengthen If this analysis is true, then the its focal point in those areas EU and its member states will where priority is given to an ap- secondly be well advised to proach that goes beyond sheer working to the best of its ability military capabilities. That does to ensure that the US remains a not mean to say, however, that “European power” and in devel- the military dimension at EU oping a security policy role to level should be abandoned. Yet, behave in such a manner which for the foreseeable future, the does not further disassociate EU will be, at best, a “civilian the US from Europe.19 Apart power with teeth” (Schmalz from numerous other questions, 2005, 57-59) and should leave this will be one of the central those military operations to challenges facing alliance policy NATO in which escalation in the future. As NATO Secre- dominance and high intensity tary General Jaap de Hoop capabilities are required. It Scheffer put it in fine terms: should be self-evident that “Now I am the first to grant that European capabilities (or more NATO-EU relations could be specifically: contributions of sin- better than they are at present. gle European states) will have But what is not yet can surely to be placed at the disposal of come about. [...] Today nobody the Alliance for this purpose. can dispute the need for the EU to have a security-political role. In essence, also in the future, the rela- An effective EU must be con- tions between NATO and the EU will sidered a normal part of the not be easy and neither will they be - 19 - European Union and NATO ISUK.org

conflict-free. However, in view of the Frankfurter Allgemeine Sonntagszeitung 2003: Interview with Romano Prodi, 23 March, p. broad congruence of membership in 9. both organizations and the fact of a Joint Declaration of Germany, France, Luxem- bourg and Belgium on European defence “single set of forces” as well as the (2003), Brussels, 29 April. demanding international security policy Heise, Volker / Schmidt, Peter (2005): NATO und EU: Auf dem Weg zu einer strategi- agenda, it would be absolutely inade- schen Partnerschaft?, in: Jäger, Thomas / quate, if both were busy with them- Höse, Alexander / Oppermann, Kai (eds.) (2005): Transatlantische Beziehungen. Si- selves in some kind of beauty contest cherheit, Wirtschaft, Öffentlichkeit; Wies- instead of giving effective impetus to baden, pp. 65-84. Kagan, Robert (2003): Of Paradise and Power. the stabilization of the international America and Europe in the New World Or- system and actively contributing to the der, New York. Lindstrom, Gustav (2005): EU-US solution of current and future security Burdensharing. Who does what? Paris policy problems. (Chaillot Paper 82), p. 89. NATO (2003): Press Release 152, issue 15. Meiers, Franz-Josef (2005): Die „NATO Re- Bibliography sponse Force“ und die „European Rapid Reaction Force“: Kooperationspartner oder Albright, Madeleine K. (1998): The Right Bal- Konkurrenten?, in: Varwick (2005), pp. ance will Secure NATO’s Future, in: Finan- 119-138. cial Times, 7 December, p. 22. Missiroli, Antonio (2003): From Copenhagen to Asmus, Ronald (2005): Rethinking EU: Why Brussels. European defence: Core docu- Washington Needs to Support European ments (Chaillot Paper 67) Paris, pp. 283- Integration, in: Survival (3), pp. 93-102. 284. Aßmann, Jennifer (2006): Die neue strategi- Nye, Joseph S. (2002): The Paradox of Ameri- sche Ausrichtung der US- can Power. Why the Worlds only Super- Verteidigungspolitik. Konsequenzen für die power can’t go it alone, Oxford. transatlantische Kooperation, Kiel (Kieler Olshausen, Klaus (2005): Kooperation oder Analysen zur Sicherheitspolitik No. 17). Wettbewerb? Die strategische Partner- Burwell, Frances G. et al. (2006): Transatlantic schaft von NATO und EU, in: Meier- Transformation: Building a NATO-EU Se- Walser, Reinhard C. (ed.) (2005): Deut- curity Architecture, Washington, D.C. sche Sicherheitspolitik. Rückblick, Bilanz Dembinski, Matthias (2005): Die Beziehungen und Perspektiven, Munich 2005, pp. 19-28. zwischen NATO und EU von „Berlin“ zu Quadrennial Defense Review Report 2006, „Berlin plus“: Konzepte und Konfliktlinien, Washington, D.C. in: Varwick (2005), pp. 61-80. Reichard, Martin (2004): Some Legal Issues De Witte, Pol / Rademacher, Fritz (2005): Concerning the EU-NATO Berlin Plus Partnerschaft oder Rivalität? Ein Blick aus Agreement, in: Nordic Journal of Interna- der Praxis, in: Varwick 2005, pp. 271-292. tional Law (1) , pp. 37-67. EU Institute for Security Studies (ed.) (2004): Risse, Thomas (2003): Die neue Weltordnung: European Defence: A Proposal for a White US-amerikanische Hypermacht – europäi- Paper, Paris. sche Ohnmacht? In: WeltTrends, Summer, EU Institute for Security Studies (2001): Chail- pp. 114ff. lot-Papers No. 47 (May), No. 51 (April). Robertson, George (2002): Die NATO und die EU Institute for Security Studies (2003): Chail- EU: Partner oder Rivalen?, in: Hoyer, Wer- lot-Paper No. 67 (December). ner / Kaldrack, Gerd F. (eds.) (2002): Eu- EU Institute for Security Studies (2005): Chail- ropäische Sicherheits- und Verteidigungs- lot-Paper No.75 (February). politik. Der Weg zu integrierten europäi- European Security Strategy (2003): A Secure schen Streitkräften? Baden-Baden, pp. Europe in A Better World, Brussels. 181-189. European Council (2003): Presidency Conclu- Schmalz, Uwe (2005): Die Entwicklung der Eu- sions, Annex, European Council Declara- ropäischen Sicherheits- und Verteidi- tion on Transatlantic Relations, Brussels, gungspolitik 1990-2004, in: Varwick 2005, 13 December. pp. 45-59. European Council (2003a): Presidency Con- Schwarz, Hans-Peter (2003): Von Elefanten clusions, 12 December, Brussels. und Bibern. Die Gleichgewichtsstörung - 20 - European Union and NATO ISUK.org

deutscher Außenpolitik, in: Internationale http://ue.eu.int/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pre Politik (5), pp. 21-28. ssData/en/misc/82761.pdf, accessed on 6 Sinjen, Svenja / Varwick, Johannes (2005): October 2005. NATO und EU im „Broader Middle East“: European Council (2005): Capabilities Im- Möglichkeiten und Grenzen einer transat- provement Chart I, available ate: lantischen Strategie, in: Ehrhart, Hans- http://www.eu2005.lu/en/actualites/docume Georg / Johannsen, Margret (eds.) (2005): nts_travail/2005/05/23pesd/pesd2.pdf, ac- Herausforderung Mittelost: Übernimmt sich cessed on 6 October 2005. der Westen?, Baden-Baden, pp. 95-114. Fischer, Joschka (2003): Europe and the Talbott, Strobe 1999: Das neue Europa und Future of the Transatlantic Relations, die neue NATO, in: Stichworte zur Sicher- Speech by German Foreign Minister heitspolitik (2), pp. 52-57. Joschka Fischer at Princeton University, 19 The National Security Strategy of the United November, available at: www.auswaertiges States of America 2006, Washington, D.C. -amt.de/diplo/en/Infoservice/Presse/reden Varwick, Johannes (1998): Sicherheit und In- /2003/031119-EuropeAndTransatlantic tegration in Europa. Zur Renaissance der Relations.html, accessed on 1 March 2006. Westeuropäischen Union, Opladen. Varwick, Johannes (ed.) (2005): Die Bezie- hungen zwischen NATO und EU. Partner- 1 This argument was also brought forward by schaft, Konkurrenz, Rivalität?, Opladen. the former German Chancellor Gerhard Varwick, Johannes (2006): Finalität ohne En- Schroeder at the Munich Conference on Secu- de. Die EU ist nicht am Ende, aber die al- rity Policy in spring 2005, available at: ten Leitbilder haben ihre Wirksamkeit ver- www.nato.int/germany/reden/2005/s050212a.h loren, in: Internationale Politik (5), pp. 69- tml, accessed on 15 August 2005. 77. 2 The relationship between both organizations Wanninger, Martin (2005): Allianzen im increasingly receives scientific attention. For Schönheitswettbewerb, in: Neue Passauer recent examples of detailed studies see: Var- Presse vom 16 July, p. 4. wick (2005); and Burwell (2006). Weidenfeld, Werner (2006): Rivalität der Part- 3 Emphasis in original. Apart from that, Joseph ner. Die Zukunft der transatlantischen Be- Nye rightly points out that particularly France ziehungen – Die Chance eines Neube- would be afraid of a German hegemony follow- ginns, Guetersloh. ing a US retreat from Europe (Nye 2002: 32). Wernicke, Christian (2003): Gestern Kampfan- 4 For further details see section 2.3. of this arti- zug, heute Zwangsjacke, in: Sueddeutsche cle. Zeitung, 18 August, p. 4. 5 These include: humanitarian tasks, peace- Winter, Martin (2003): Von Weißen Elefanten keeping tasks, and tasks of combat forces. und bitteren Pralinen. In der NATO steht This theme is further elaborated in section 2.3. die offene Schlacht zwischen Washington of this article. For details on the argument und Europas sicherheitspolitischen Auto- above, see: Heise/Schmidt 2005. nomisten bevor, in: Frankfurter Rund- 6 Based on 2004 figures in Lindstrom 2005:89. schau, 2 September, p. 3. 7 For central documents on ESDP and its relationship to NATO, see: EU Institute for Security Internet Resources Studies 2001, 2003 and 2005. De Hoop Scheffer, Jaap (2004): The Future Of 8 A lengthy chapter of this “White Paper“ (EU The Atlantic Alliance, Manfred Wörner Lec- Institute for Security Studies 2004) deals with ture, Berlin, 7 October, available at: the necessary requirements for autonomous http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2004/s041 military actions by the EU and offers numerous 007a.htm, accessed on 1 March 2006. suggestions. However, these cannot be dis- De Hoop Scheffer, Jaap (2005): Perspektiven cussed here in great detail. der Sicherheitspolitik im Zusammenspiel 9 This view was also brought forward by von EU und NATO. Speech by the NATO Ronald Asmus (2005) who argued that the US Secretary General, Berlin, 12 May, avail- would rather need a functioning European Un- able at: ion than an effective NATO. The reason for this www.nato.int/docu/speech/2005/s050512a. was, that a strategic partnership between a htm, accessed on 1 February 2006. functioning EU and the US would be able to EU-NATO Declaration on ESDP (2002), avail- shape the global agenda, while each partner able at: would not be in the position to do so individu- http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2002/p02- ally. 142e.htm, accessed on 1 March 2006. 10 The Declaration is classified and only the European Council (2004): Declaration on broad principles are published, see: European Military Capabilities, available at: - 21 - European Union and NATO ISUK.org

http://www.nato.int/shape/news/2003/shape_e ranean Dialogues of NATO and the EU (Sin- u/se030822a.htm; and for the EU´s view, see: jen/Varwick 2005). ue.eu.int/uedocs/cmsUpload/03-11-11%20 17 In this sense, even the former German For- Berlin%20Plus%20press%20note%20BL.pdf. eign Minister, Joschka Fischer, left no doubt From an international law point of view the about the value of the transatlantic alliance. He declaration “is nothing but a non-binding pointed out that today´s Europe would be agreement”, according to Reinhard (2004). based on the US decision in principle to re- 11 Yet, the former President of the EU Com- main politically and militarily engaged in mission, Romano Prodi, indicated his sympa- Europe after 1945. Even today, Europe and thy for the foray of the four European states. the US would still depend on each other. As he put it: “NATO was a giant, surrounded Fischer continues: “NATO is the key institution by many dwarfs. Now we are in need of two of the transatlantic alliance. No one wants to giants, the European and the American, who call into question its fundamental importance co-operate with each other“ (Frankfurter All- as the guarantor of our security. Rather, an gemeine Sonntagszeitung 2003). ESDP capable of taking effective action will 12 For example, the US NATO Ambassador bring to life the concept of the “European pillar called for a NATO special session when the of NATO” – a concept, by the way, developed UK temporarily signalled its readiness to agree by the US. To achieve this, the EU must also to the German-French-Belgian-Luxembourgian improve its planning and command capabili- proposal of establishing an embryonic Euro- ties. What we want is for ESDP to complement pean planning capability. According to Nicho- NATO, not to compete with it” (Fischer 2003). las Burns, Tervuren represented the most seri- 18 More precisely, the 2006 National Security ous threat to the future of NATO (Burns, cited Strategy states in part VII C4: “NATO must in Sueddeutsche Zeitung, 30 May 2003, p. 11). deepen working relationships between and 13 The British-French-German document with across institutions, as it is doing with the EU, the title “European Defence: NATO/EU Consul- and as it also could do with new institutions. tation, Planning and Operations“ is reprinted Such relationships offer opportunities for en- in: Missiroli 2003. hancing the distinctive strengths and missions 14 See also section 4 of this article. In the same of each organization“ and the 2006 Quadren- sense the French Defence Minister, who ar- nial Defense Review Report describes NATO gued at the Munich Conference on Security as the “cornerstone of transatlantic security” (p. Policy in February 2006: “The key word is 87). Additionally, the QDR calls for the estab- complementarily in our actions. In terms of de- lishment of a European “constabulary force” fense, we must make the specificities of NATO (i.e. police forces trained in military skills). The operations and EU operations clearer. Today, fact that the US itself does not have constabu- NATO is better equipped to handle heavy and lary forces and that it demands such forces long-lasting operations, when the United from Europe and finally that it recognizes that States are involved. ESPD is better adapted to these forces are a vital element in stabilization ‘lightning’ operations and civil-military actions. operations indicates that the US rather as- One should not think in terms of competition sumes a minor, or at least different role for it- between organizations; one should rather pro- self in stabilization missions. vide the necessary flexibility in the procedures 19 Hans-Peter Schwarz rightly recalls some of in order to allow the optimal use of capabilities Konrad Adenauer´s remarks on the transatlan- in all circumstances”, available at: tic relationship: The one who wants to take out http://www.securityconference.de/konferenzen/ insurance, needs to pay a premium, and the rede.php?menu_2006=&menu_ konferen- one who believes Europe is insured with the zen=&sprache=de&id=167&, accessed on 15 US free of premium, is wrong (Schwarz 2003). February 2006. 15 However, this is not to say that there have not been any problems. Additionally, the char- acter of these operations was comparatively unproblematic, i.e. a genuine acid test has not yet come. A list of current and past EU operations is available at: http://www.consilium. europa.eu/cms3_fo/showPage.asp?lang=en&id= 268&mode=g&name=, accessed on 1 March 2006. 16 See also the critical assessment of the rivalry between the two institutionalized Mediter-

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