European Union and NATO
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Johannes Varwick* European Union and NATO Partnership, Competition or Rivalry? Kieler Analysen zur Sicherheitspolitik Nr. 18 Juni 2006 .org ISUK Institut für Sicherheitspolitik an der Christian-Albrechts-Universität zu Kiel European Union and NATO ISUK.org Prof. Dr. Johannes Varwick European Union and NATO. Partnership, Competition or Rivalry? Kieler Analysen zur Sicherheitspolitik Nr. 18 Kiel, Juni 2006. Impressum: Herausgeber: Direktor des Instituts für Sicherheitspolitik an der Christian-Albrechts-Universität zu Kiel Prof. Dr. Joachim Krause Westring 400 24118 Kiel ISUK.org Die veröffentlichten Beiträge mit Verfasserangabe geben die Ansicht der betreffenden Autoren wieder, nicht notwendigerweise die des Heraus gebers oder des Instituts für Sicherheitspolitik. © 2006 Institut für Sicherheitspolitik an der Christian-Albre chts-Universität zu Kiel (ISUK). - 1 - European Union and NATO ISUK.org 1. NATO and the EU: a ´clarified, Secretary General. In March 2003 1 though still undefined` relationship permanent arrangements came into ef- fect which enable the EU to draw on Transatlantic relations certainly en- NATO assets and capabilities and in compass more than just the relation- May 2003 a “NATO-EU Capability ship between the North Atlantic Treaty Group“ was established. That is, at first Organization (NATO) and the Euro- sight the relationship between both or- pean Union (EU) and there is every in- ganizations seems close, clarified, and dication that the North Atlantic Alliance unproblematic. has become far too narrow to still rep- Yet, according to German commenta- resent the defining transatlantic frame- tors, Washington suspects the EU of work.1 However, there are good rea- attempting to become an independent sons for arguing that the relationship actor in security policy under French between the two most important or- and German leadership. Conversely, ganizations of the political West is cen- the US is supposed to reshape NATO tral to any analysis, for without mean- into an instrument by which it can keep ing to overvalue the role of institutions: the EU´s military ambitions under con- the institutional mechanisms and sub- trol. Since both views might be true in stance of arrangements between principle, “nerves are frayed” (Winter NATO and the EU are among the most 2003). Consequently, it has been ar- decisive factors determining how rela- gued that for open conflict to break out tions between Europe and the United between NATO and the EU or the States will evolve in the future.2 The European Security and Defence Policy two organizations established a net- (ESDP), respectively, nothing else but work of co-operation in the past years, an appropriate trigger would be miss- including arrangements for regular ing (Wernicke 2003). The perceptions consultations at different levels. Since of the involved parties, however, turn 2001, NATO-EU consultations involve out to be different – at least officially. joint meetings at the level of foreign Thus, the North Atlantic Council’s final ministers twice a year, between the communiqués routinely stress the North Atlantic Council and the Political common strategic interests between and Security Committee at least three NATO and the EU (see exemplary: times a year and between both Military NATO 2003) and likewise a declaration Committees biannually. Furthermore, of the European Council states unmis- the EU and NATO Ambassadors meet takably: “The transatlantic relationship every four to six weeks and a broad is irreplaceable. The EU remains fully range of formal and informal contacts committed to a constructive, balanced exists between the EU Secretary Gen- and forward-looking partnership with eral / High Representative and NATO our transatlantic partners” (European Council 2003). Nevertheless, even * Der Verfasser dankt Jennifer Aßmann und Svenja Sinjen für wertvolle Kommentare. high-level officials criticize the current - 2 - European Union and NATO ISUK.org state of affairs between NATO and the consequences for a renewed NATO- EU. In this sense, the NATO Secretary EU relationship (section 4). General expressed “deep concern” re- garding the evolution of formal rela- 2. A transatlantic controversy: the tions between both organizations Europeanisation of security policy (quoted in FAZ, 3 February 2006: 2) and complained about still “too many” Transatlantic relations are in a phase people “who misunderstand NATO and of fundamental reorientation. In es- the EU as rival organizations and dis- sence, the end of the Cold War pro- play a protectionism in some sort of foundly changed the central parame- zero-sum thinking to safeguard ESDP” ters of the relationship between Europe (De Hoop Scheffer 2005). Likewise, and the US – a challenge which came the German Military Representative to to full effect some fifteen years later. NATO and the EU lamented: “We are Transatlantic relations are far more far away from having finished solutions complex than just being characterized for the final design of a strategic part- by security policy issues and also nership between NATO and the EU, cover cultural, political, and economic though this has been repeatedly as- aspects. Furthermore, they are distin- serted in summit declarations” (Ol- guished by the fact that each of the two shausen 2005: 25). is the most important partner for the other. It is also true that, at the begin- Which position reflects reality most ac- ning of the 21st century, actors on both curately? Do the partners of both sides sides of the Atlantic are brought closer of the Atlantic try to limit the damage together by their interests, culture, and by playing down any conflict between economies as well as advances in both organizations although they in- communication and transportation creasingly pursue divergent policies? technology, but at the same time the Is a disagreement just being brought potential for causes of friction and with on by commentators and political ac- it the possibility of conflict increases. tors which does not actually exist in po- For despite of a close co-operation and litical practice? In sum, there are con- joint institutional arrangements, Europe vincing reasons for an analytical ex- – so far as one might talk already amination of the relationship between about it as a single actor – and the US both organizations. To begin with, this frequently develop divergent ideas article explores the changes within the concerning important questions in in- transatlantic security structure resulting ternational politics. As the former Dep- from a growing Europeanisation of se- uty Secretary of State serving during curity policy (section 2), next outlines the Clinton Administrations second the evolution of relations between term put it: the US does not want to NATO and the EU (section 3), and fi- see an ESDP “that comes into being nally debates possible scenarios and first within NATO but then grows out of - 3 - European Union and NATO ISUK.org NATO and finally grows away from and where true security and the de- NATO”, as this would inevitably lead to fense and promotion of a liberal order rivalry between both organizations still depend on the possession and use (Talbott 1999).3 of military might” (Kagan 2003: 1). Fur- thermore, US-European differences 2.1. The reorientation of transatlan- over strategies could particularly be tic relations explained by their different capacities for power projection. Kagan concludes Already in summer 2002, US political that “Americans are from Mars and scientist Robert Kagan exposed the Europeans are from Venus”. underlying roots of this debate in a In the same sense, Thomas Risse re- much-noticed essay, which has been gards the debate about the Iraq War as published as a book in an expanded obscuring a threefold controversy version, by arguing that it is about time about “constitutive principles and val- to stop deluding oneself to the illusion ues of the Western security commu- that “Europeans” and “Americans” nity” (Risse 2003: 114ff). This conflict would share a common world view or over world order within the West has even live in the same world. Although three components: firstly, it is about the the differences over the Iraq War relevance of multilateral institutions should not be regarded as a transat- and arrangements under international lantic dispute since Europe did not law; secondly, it concerns the question present itself as a coherent actor op- of the relative importance of democ- posing the US – rather this issue gen- racy and human rights and how to erated rifts within Europe itself – Kagan promote and implement them; and argues more broadly that “[o]n the all thirdly, it is about how to manage the important question of power – the effi- new types of security challenges, that cacy of power, the morality of power, is to say, what role should be assigned the desirability of power – American to the use of force. and European perspectives are diverg- These differences are reflected in the ing. Europe is turning away from relevant strategic documents of both power, [...] it is moving beyond power the EU and US. While the March 2006 into a self-contained world of laws and US National Security Strategy (Na- rules and transnational negotiation and tional Security Strategy 2006) and the cooperation. It is entering a post- December 2003 European Security historical paradise of peace and rela- Strategy (European Security Strategy tive prosperity, the realization of Im- 2003)4, which still remains operative, manuel Kant´s “perpetual peace”. display a high degree of consensus