Deterring Russian Aggression in the Baltic States Through Resilience and Resistance
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An Analysis of Conditions for Danish Defence Policy – Strategic Choices
centre for military studies university of copenhagen An Analysis of Conditions for Danish Defence Policy – Strategic Choices 2012 This analysis is part of the research-based services for public authorities carried out at the Centre for Military Studies for the parties to the Danish Defence Agreement. Its purpose is to analyse the conditions for Danish security policy in order to provide an objective background for a concrete discussion of current security and defence policy problems and for the long-term development of security and defence policy. The Centre for Military Studies is a research centre at the Department of —Political Science at the University of Copenhagen. At the centre research is done in the fields of security and defence policy and military strategy, and the research done at the centre forms the foundation for research-based services for public authorities for the Danish Ministry of Defence and the parties to the Danish Defence Agreement. This analysis is based on research-related method and its conclusions can —therefore not be interpreted as an expression of the attitude of the Danish Government, of the Danish Armed Forces or of any other authorities. Please find more information about the centre and its activities at: http://cms.polsci.ku.dk/. References to the literature and other material used in the analysis can be found at http://cms.polsci.ku.dk/. The original version of this analysis was published in Danish in April 2012. This version was translated to English by The project group: Major Esben Salling Larsen, Military Analyst Major Flemming Pradhan-Blach, MA, Military Analyst Professor Mikkel Vedby Rasmussen (Project Leader) Dr Lars Bangert Struwe, Researcher With contributions from: Dr Henrik Ø. -
Chapter 2 Introduction: the Enigmatic Zukertort
Chapter 2 Introduction: The Enigmatic Zukertort The Zukertort is a symphony of irony. Why do you say that? Well, to begin at the beginning, in his annotations to the oft-quoted seminal game on his opening, Zukertort v. Black- burne 1883, Zukertort wrote that he planned to play the whole game on the Q-side. Now players typically think of the system as one long, prepared attack on the enemy’s King. Secondly, the opening is called the “Colle-Zukertort,” even though Colle practically never played it. In fact, in my own personal data- base I have many hundreds of games where Colle played what is now known as the “Colle-Koltanowski,” but not a single game where he played the Zukertort except when his opponent used the Queen’s Indian Defense. Thirdly, it is unclear why the Colle-Koltanowski and the Colle-Zukertort are so often put in the same book. We do not see books for Black containing in-depth coverage of both the Dragon and Najdorf variations of the Sicilian. We do not see repertoire books for White going deeply into both the Botvin- nik and Meran variations of the Semi-slav. Why package these two very different systems in the same text? The Enigmatic Zukertort Fourthly, a thorough inves- very much different than he tigation of the Zukertort will can if he castles early (as we show that it appears to have shall see). no real mainline! Or, rather, I would suggest the stu- its “mainline” is so tactically dent understand the Zuker- different than most of its tort as an opening in which other lines that it is hard to White presents Black the same say whether it is the mainline choice given to the protago- of the system or a popular nists at the end of the movie deviation! Ghostbusters. -
Taming Wild Chess Openings
Taming Wild Chess Openings How to deal with the Good, the Bad, and the Ugly over the chess board By International Master John Watson & FIDE Master Eric Schiller New In Chess 2015 1 Contents Explanation of Symbols ���������������������������������������������������������������� 8 Icons ��������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 9 Introduction �������������������������������������������������������������������������� 10 BAD WHITE OPENINGS ��������������������������������������������������������������� 18 Halloween Gambit: 1.e4 e5 2.♘f3 ♘c6 3.♘c3 ♘f6 4.♘xe5 ♘xe5 5.d4 . 18 Grünfeld Defense: The Gibbon: 1.d4 ♘f6 2.c4 g6 3.♘c3 d5 4.g4 . 20 Grob Attack: 1.g4 . 21 English Wing Gambit: 1.c4 c5 2.b4 . 25 French Defense: Orthoschnapp Gambit: 1.e4 e6 2.c4 d5 3.cxd5 exd5 4.♕b3 . 27 Benko Gambit: The Mutkin: 1.d4 ♘f6 2.c4 c5 3.d5 b5 4.g4 . 28 Zilbermints - Benoni Gambit: 1.d4 c5 2.b4 . 29 Boden-Kieseritzky Gambit: 1.e4 e5 2.♘f3 ♘c6 3.♗c4 ♘f6 4.♘c3 ♘xe4 5.0-0 . 31 Drunken Hippo Formation: 1.a3 e5 2.b3 d5 3.c3 c5 4.d3 ♘c6 5.e3 ♘e7 6.f3 g6 7.g3 . 33 Kadas Opening: 1.h4 . 35 Cochrane Gambit 1: 5.♗c4 and 5.♘c3 . 37 Cochrane Gambit 2: 5.d4 Main Line: 1.e4 e5 2.♘f3 ♘f6 3.♘xe5 d6 4.♘xf7 ♔xf7 5.d4 . 40 Nimzowitsch Defense: Wheeler Gambit: 1.e4 ♘c6 2.b4 . 43 BAD BLACK OPENINGS ��������������������������������������������������������������� 44 Khan Gambit: 1.e4 e5 2.♗c4 d5 . 44 King’s Gambit: Nordwalde Variation: 1.e4 e5 2.f4 ♕f6 . 45 King’s Gambit: Sénéchaud Countergambit: 1.e4 e5 2.f4 ♗c5 3.♘f3 g5 . -
The Baltic Republics
FINNISH DEFENCE STUDIES THE BALTIC REPUBLICS A Strategic Survey Erkki Nordberg National Defence College Helsinki 1994 Finnish Defence Studies is published under the auspices of the National Defence College, and the contributions reflect the fields of research and teaching of the College. Finnish Defence Studies will occasionally feature documentation on Finnish Security Policy. Views expressed are those of the authors and do not necessarily imply endorsement by the National Defence College. Editor: Kalevi Ruhala Editorial Assistant: Matti Hongisto Editorial Board: Chairman Prof. Mikko Viitasalo, National Defence College Dr. Pauli Järvenpää, Ministry of Defence Col. Antti Numminen, General Headquarters Dr., Lt.Col. (ret.) Pekka Visuri, Finnish Institute of International Affairs Dr. Matti Vuorio, Scientific Committee for National Defence Published by NATIONAL DEFENCE COLLEGE P.O. Box 266 FIN - 00171 Helsinki FINLAND FINNISH DEFENCE STUDIES 6 THE BALTIC REPUBLICS A Strategic Survey Erkki Nordberg National Defence College Helsinki 1992 ISBN 951-25-0709-9 ISSN 0788-5571 © Copyright 1994: National Defence College All rights reserved Painatuskeskus Oy Pasilan pikapaino Helsinki 1994 Preface Until the end of the First World War, the Baltic region was understood as a geographical area comprising the coastal strip of the Baltic Sea from the Gulf of Danzig to the Gulf of Finland. In the years between the two World Wars the concept became more political in nature: after Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania obtained their independence in 1918 the region gradually became understood as the geographical entity made up of these three republics. Although the Baltic region is geographically fairly homogeneous, each of the newly restored republics possesses unique geographical and strategic features. -
Vs - Nur Für Den Dienstgebrauch
VS - NUR FÜR DEN DIENSTGEBRAUCH NATO UNCLASSIFIED NATO UNCLASSIFIED Foreword The term “counterinsurgency” (COIN) is an The document is divided into three parts: emotive subject in Germany. It is generally • Part A provides the basic conceptual accepted within military circles that COIN is an framework as needed to give a better interagency, long-term strategy to stabilise a crises understanding of the broader context. It region. In this context fighting against insurgents specifically describes the overall interagency is just a small part of the holistic approach of approach to COIN. COIN. Being aware that COIN can not be achieved successfully by military means alone, it • Part B shifts the focus to the military is a fundamental requirement to find a common component of the overall task described sense and a common use of terms with all civil previously. actors involved. • Part C contains some guiding principles to However, having acknowledged an Insurgency to stimulate discussions as well as a list of be a group or movement or as an irregular activity, abbreviations and important reference conducted by insurgents, most civil actors tend to documents. associate the term counterinsurgency with the combat operations against those groups. As a The key messages of the “Preliminary Basics for the Role of the Land Forces in COIN“ are: result they do not see themselves as being involved in this fight. For that, espescially in • An insurgency can not be countered by Germany, the term COIN has been the subject of military means alone. much controversy. • Establishing security and state order is a long- Germany has resolved this challenge with two term, interagency and usually multinational steps. -
A Short History of Poland and Lithuania
A Short History of Poland and Lithuania Chapter 1. The Origin of the Polish Nation.................................3 Chapter 2. The Piast Dynasty...................................................4 Chapter 3. Lithuania until the Union with Poland.........................7 Chapter 4. The Personal Union of Poland and Lithuania under the Jagiellon Dynasty. ..................................................8 Chapter 5. The Full Union of Poland and Lithuania. ................... 11 Chapter 6. The Decline of Poland-Lithuania.............................. 13 Chapter 7. The Partitions of Poland-Lithuania : The Napoleonic Interlude............................................................. 16 Chapter 8. Divided Poland-Lithuania in the 19th Century. .......... 18 Chapter 9. The Early 20th Century : The First World War and The Revival of Poland and Lithuania. ............................. 21 Chapter 10. Independent Poland and Lithuania between the bTwo World Wars.......................................................... 25 Chapter 11. The Second World War. ......................................... 28 Appendix. Some Population Statistics..................................... 33 Map 1: Early Times ......................................................... 35 Map 2: Poland Lithuania in the 15th Century........................ 36 Map 3: The Partitions of Poland-Lithuania ........................... 38 Map 4: Modern North-east Europe ..................................... 40 1 Foreword. Poland and Lithuania have been linked together in this history because -
Lithuania Country Chapter
EU Coalition Explorer Results of the EU28 Survey on coalition building in the European Union an initiative of Results for Lithuania © ECFR May 2017 Design Findings Chapters Preferences Influence Partners Policies ecfr.eu/eucoalitionexplorer Findings Lithuania Coalition Potential Preferences Policies Ranks 1 to 14 Top 3 for LT Ranks 15 to 28 Lithuania ranks overall #21 at Preferences Lithuania ranks #11 at ‘More Europe’ Top 3 for LT 1. Latvia 2. Estonia Country Findings 1. Latvia #11 3. CZ EL AT Austria #19 Q1 Most Contacted 2. Estonia Q14 Deeper Integration BE Belgium 3. Poland BG Bulgaria 1. Latvia Q16 Expert View Level of Decision-Making Q17 Public View HR Croatia #22 Q2 Shared Interests 2. Poland 3. Sweden CY Cyprus 63% 52% All EU member states 50% 46% CZ Czech Rep. 1. Latvia 13% 19% Legally bound core 14% 18% DK Denmark #22 Q3 Most Responsive 2. Sweden 17% 15% Coalition of states 14% 21% EE Estonia 3. Slovenia 7% 8% Only national level 22% 15% FI Finland LT EU EU LT FR France DE Germany EL Greece HU Hungary Partners Networks IE Ireland Lithuania ranks overall #20 at Partners Voting for IT Italy Top 3 for LT Latvia LV Lithuania Latvia 1. Latvia Top 8 for LT LT Lithuania #19 Q10 Foreign and Development Policy 2. Poland Poland LU Luxembourg 3. Sweden MT Malta Estonia 1. Latvia NL Netherlands #12 Q11 Security and Defense Policy 2. HR RO PL Poland 3. DK PL SE Sweden PT Portugal LT 1. Estonia RO Romania #21 Q12 Economic and Social Policy 2. -
Pesco: the Lithuanian Perspective / September 2018
#29 PeSCo THE LITHUANIAN PERSPECTIVE By Margarita ŠEŠELGYTĖ Studies Director, Institute of International Relations and Political Science, Vilnius University September 2018 The views expressed here are solely those of the authors. They do not reflect the views of any organization. Policy Paper PeSCo: The Lithuanian Perspective / September 2018 ABSTRACT The Lithuanian position vis-à-vis Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) derives from a national security concept, which suggests a clear division of labour between NATO and the EU, where NATO is accorded security provider function and the EU is considered as a source of economic welfare or the provider of so-called “soft” security. Reinvigoration of the European security and defence policy as well as increasingly challenging security environment, Brexit and impulsiveness of the actions of the US President, however, might inflict a revision of the current priorities. The paper outlines current Lithuanian position on PESCO, the factors shaping this position and the opportunities as well the challenges for more active engagement in various PESCP initiatives and p rojects. Keywords: PeSCo, Common Security and Defence Policy, Framework Nations Concept, European Defence Fund, European Defence Technological and Industrial Base, Lithuania. or a number of years being a pro-Atlantist member of the European Union (EU), Lithuania has been quite sceptical regarding the Common Security and Defence F Policy (CSDP) and the necessity to develop European strategic autonomy. The Lithuanian position vis-à-vis CSDP was highly influenced by its security concept, which has evolved since 1991 when Lithuania has re-established its independence in the face of the imminent threat from Russian Federation and is defined by its size and threat assessment. -
Review of National Police Oversight Models
Review of National Police Oversight Models For The Eugene Police Commission Police Assessment Resource Center 520 South Grand Ave., Suite 1070 Los Angeles, CA 90071 (213) 623-5757 www.parc.info February 2005 Police Assessment Resource Center Staff Senior Advisors Merrick J. Bobb Ronald L. Davis Brian R. Buchner Inspector General, Allyson Collins Oakland Police Department Sandra Cuneo Scott Dash William K. Finney Walter McKay Chief, Oren Root St. Paul Police Department (Ret.) Timothy Shugrue Norma Zamudio Thomas C. Frazier Commissioner, Baltimore Police Department (Ret.) Bernard K. Melekian Chief, Pasadena Police Department i Table of Contents Page No. I. INTRODUCTION........................................................................................................... 1 II. THE GROWTH OF POLICE OVERSIGHT................................................................. 4 A. THE FOUNDATION OF MODERN POLICING.............................................................. 4 B. THE DEVELOPMENT OF POLICE OVERSIGHT .......................................................... 6 III. POLICE OVERSIGHT MODELS ............................................................................. 11 A. REVIEW AND APPELLATE MODELS ...................................................................... 11 B. INVESTIGATIVE AND QUALITY ASSURANCE MODELS........................................... 14 C. EVALUATIVE AND PERFORMANCE-BASED MODELS ............................................. 21 IV. MAKING THE DECISION ...................................................................................... -
Press Release
Press Release Polish Premiere of Baltic Sea Youth Philharmonic’s ‘Baltic Sea Voyage’ programme at the Warsaw Philharmonic Concert Hall, 26 March 2015, 7.30 pm • Under the baton of Kristjan Järvi at the 19th Ludwig van Beethoven Easter Festival • BYP LAB from 22-25 March 2015 at the Krzysztof Penderecki Center for Music in Krakow Berlin, 23 March 2015. Baltic Sea Youth Philharmonic (BYP) returns to Poland to perform for the first time at the Ludwig van Beethoven Easter Festival, on Thursday 26 March at the prestigious concert hall, the Filharmonia Narodowa. Following on from its exhilarating debut at the Warsaw Philharmonic in 2014, BYP will now give the Polish premiere of its electrifying concert programme, Baltic Sea Voyage, under the baton of Founding Conductor and Music Director, Kristjan Järvi. The programme celebrates the rich and diverse musical landscape of the entire region, giving audiences the chance to discover the sounds of the countries bordering the Baltic Sea. Another Polish premiere will be the BYP LAB, the orchestra’s annual innovative educational workshop led by Kristjan Järvi and his team of internationally-renowned coaches. This year BYP LAB takes place at the Krzystzof Penderecki Center for Music in Krakow from 22 to 25 March 2015. Discover the unique sound of the Baltic Sea region Audiences of the Warsaw concert will have the chance to hear music from composers representing every country in the Baltic Sea region: Denmark, Sweden, Norway, Finland, Russia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Germany, and Poland. The programme of musical features 12 pieces of music, and will take audiences on a journey of discovery across the Baltic Sea. -
Policing in Federal States
NEPAL STEPSTONES PROJECTS Policing in Federal States Philipp Fluri and Marlene Urscheler (Eds.) Policing in Federal States Edited by Philipp Fluri and Marlene Urscheler Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF) www.dcaf.ch The Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces is one of the world’s leading institutions in the areas of security sector reform (SSR) and security sector governance (SSG). DCAF provides in-country advisory support and practical assis- tance programmes, develops and promotes appropriate democratic norms at the international and national levels, advocates good practices and makes policy recommendations to ensure effective democratic governance of the security sector. DCAF’s partners include governments, parliaments, civil society, international organisations and the range of security sector actors such as police, judiciary, intelligence agencies, border security ser- vices and the military. 2011 Policing in Federal States Edited by Philipp Fluri and Marlene Urscheler Geneva, 2011 Philipp Fluri and Marlene Urscheler, eds., Policing in Federal States, Nepal Stepstones Projects Series # 2 (Geneva: Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, 2011). Nepal Stepstones Projects Series no. 2 © Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, 2011 Executive publisher: Procon Ltd., <www.procon.bg> Cover design: Angel Nedelchev ISBN 978-92-9222-149-2 PREFACE In this book we will be looking at specimens of federative police or- ganisations. As can be expected, the federative organisation of such states as Germany, Switzerland, the USA, India and Russia will be reflected in their police organisation, though the extremely decentralised approach of Switzerland with hardly any central man- agement structures can hardly serve as a paradigm of ‘the’ federal police organisation. -
Lithuania: Defence Policy of Lithuania
Ministry of National Defence Republic of Lithuania :: Defence Policy »... http://www.kam.lt/en/defence_policy_1053/defence_policy_of_lithuania... Ministry of National Defence Republic of Lithuania :: Defence Policy » Defence Policy of Lithuania Defence Policy of Lithuania 1. The goal and objectives of Lithuania’s Defence Policy Lithuania’s Defence Policy is an integral part of the National Security Policy aimed at the development (formation) of the international security environment at the same time contributing to the international stability and peace, and formation of the national defence capability to ensure both - deterrence from an armed attack, and reliable defence in case of armed aggression. Objectives of Lithuania’s Defence Policy are: To ensure effective fulfilment of functions of the National Defence System in peacetime; To ensure readiness to conduct reliable defence in case of armed aggression, including readiness to conduct mobilisation and instruction of citizens; To contribute to the strengthening of NATO defence capacity and to other international-security building initiatives, including participation in multinational operations; To maintain readiness to respond to non-military threats by deploying military assets to assist state and municipal agencies 2. Principles of State Defence Legislation of the Republic of Lithuania sets forth the principles of State Defence which are the basis for formulation and implementation of Lithuania’s Defence Policy. Defence of Lithuania is full-scale and unconditional, it is implemented in line with NATO‘s principles of collective defence. The full-scale character of defence means that Lithuania has armed protection of the national armed forces as well as those of NATO allies, that national resources are invoked for the national defence, and that every citizen of Lithuania and the entire nation shall resist in every way defined as legitimate by the international law.