Norwegian and Danish Defence Policy in the Post-Cold War Period: a Comparative Study

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Norwegian and Danish Defence Policy in the Post-Cold War Period: a Comparative Study Norwegian and Danish Defence Policy in the Post-Cold War Period: A Comparative Study By Håkon Lunde Saxi Master Thesis in History Department of Archaeology, Conservation and History University of Oslo Spring 2009 Acknowledgements When I first began researching the topic of this study in the fall of 2006, I was baffled to discover that two countries that I thought were surely like as twins were anything but with regard to defence policy. It was therefore with a growing enthusiasm to discover the origin of this puzzling difference that I emerged myself in the study of Norwegian and Danish defence policy. It has been a stimulating two years, separated by the year I spent in London gaining my MSc in International Relations at the London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE). Since I first began writing, developments in Afghanistan have further highlighted the different willingness of Norway and Denmark to engage in warfighting. While the thesis is in contemporary history, there is presently little to indicate that its underlying conclusions have in any way become passé. In the course of writing my thesis I have become indebted to a number of individuals and institutions, to whom I would like to offer my gratitude. Any mistakes or omissions in the thesis are of course entirely my own. First of all, I would like to thank my supervisor, Professor Rolf Tamnes, Director of the Norwegian Institute for Defence Studies (IFS), who first suggested the topic to me. With his authoritative command of Norwegian history and defence issues he could always provide advice as to the most important areas to look at, and yet he was never dismissive and was always ready to enter an open discussion when I presented my ideas. I am also deeply grateful to IFS for providing me with a special master scholarship, as well as an office and a stimulating working environment for my final months working on the thesis. Special thanks are due to PhD candidate Ingrid Lundestad and Editor Anne Therese Klingstedt for providing excellent technical advice. I would like to thank Professor Christopher Coker of the LSE, whose advice and facilitation of contacts in Norway and Denmark proved an invaluable aid during an early phase of my research. I am also grateful to Dr. Mikkel Vedby Rasmussen, Head of the Danish Institute for Military Studies, who offered valuable advice on where to go, what to read and who to talk to in Copenhagen. I would also like to thank my friend Morten Skumsrud Andersen, presently with the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI), who was always willing to offer his insightful thoughts. I would also like to thank Nina Græger at NUPI, who took the time to discuss my thesis and provided me with helpful literature. Moreover, I offer my thanks to the Department of Archaeology, Conservation and History at the University of Oslo for providing me with the funding to conduct a research trip to Copenhagen. i I am very grateful to the helpful staff at the Norwegian Defence University College library for putting up with my constant request for obscure literature, and for demonstrating a great deal of professionalism and humour throughout. Thanks also go to my friends and colleagues at the Office for Rule of Law and Security Institutions at the UNs Department of Peacekeeping Operations, who not only allowed me time to work on my thesis during my period with the UN, but also offered advice and recommended people to speak to or interview while in New York. I am grateful to the officers and civilians who took the time to be interviewed, as well as to all others who have taken the time to discuss my thesis over the years. Thanks are due to Peter Glanfield, of Bodø University College, for marvellous proofreading. Most of all I would like to thank my parents, whose unfaltering love, support and encouragement through all my years of studies have meant the world to me. I could not have done it without you. And finally, I would like to thank my ever patient and loving Monika, who has put up with my erratic working habits and lengthy absences, and whose love and support I could always count on. Kocham ci ę. Håkon Lunde Saxi Oslo, May 2009 ii Contents Acknowledgements i List of abbreviations v Introduction Danish Peace Enforcers and Norwegian Peacekepers? 1 The Research Question 4 The Four Factors Explaining the Difference 5 Sources 9 Types of International Military Operations 11 Outline of the Thesis 12 Section I Demonstrating Divergence: How Norwegian and Danish Defence Policy Has Differed Since the end of the Cold War 13 Chapter 1 The Long Lines of Danish and Norwegian Defence 14 Danish and Norwegian Defence Policy Until 1949 14 Norway and Denmark During the Cold War 20 The Armed Forces During the Cold War 23 Conclusion: Norway the Good, Optimistic Ally; Denmark the Bad Defeatist? 28 Chapter 2 Danish and Norwegian Defence Policy in the Aftermath of the Cold War 29 Reforming the Armed Forces After the Cold War 1990–1994 29 The Gulf War 1990–1991 and the Former Yugoslavia 1992–1999 35 SHIRBRIG and the Baltic States 41 Defence Reforms in the Post-Bosnian War Era 1995–2001 44 Conclusion: At First Divergence, Then Convergence at the Start of the 21 st Century? 49 Chapter 3 Danish and Norwegian Defence Policy in the Aftermath of 9/11 50 Afghanistan 2002–2008 and Iraq 2003–2007 50 Defence reforms 2002–2008 55 Conclusions: Divergence Persisted Into the 21 st Century 63 iii Section II Understanding Divergence: Why Danish and Norwegian Defence Policy Differed After the Cold War 65 Chapter 4 Danish and Norwegian Defence Policy in the Post-Cold War Era: The Impact of Geopolitics 68 The Security Environment of the 1990s 68 Defence Reform in the 21 st Century 74 Procuring Weapons for Going Abroad or Staying at Home? 78 Conclusion: Geopolitics, the Necessary but Insufficient Factor 80 Chapter 5 Danish and Norwegian Defence Policy in the Post-Cold War Era: The Impact of Leadership 81 Denmark: The Coming of the "Dynamic Duo" 81 Norway in the 1990s: In the Mire of Complacency 86 Norway After 2000: Taking the Turn Away From Invasion Defence 89 Conclusion: Leadership Determined When the "Turn" Was Taken 93 Chapter 6 Danish and Norwegian Defence Policy in the Post-Cold War Era: The Impact of Military Culture 95 Diverging Experience in the 1990s 96 Personnel Policy: Top-Heavy "People’s Defence" or Slim "Professional" Force 100 Different Responses to Internationalisation 105 Conclusion: Military Culture; a Facilitator in Denmark and a Hindrance in Norway 111 Chapter 7 Danish and Norwegian Defence Policy in the Post-Cold War Era: The Impact of Strategic Culture 112 Denmark: Reinventing Itself as a Strategic Actor 113 Norway: A Humanitarian Superpower 115 Talking About War, Risk-Perception and Sovereignty 117 Lingering Strategic Rationale for the Armed Forces 119 Conclusion: Strategic Culture, a Significant Cause of Divergence 121 Conclusion 122 Geopolitics, Leadership, Military and Strategic Culture 123 The Present and the Future 125 Final Remarks 127 Bibliography 128 Primary Sources 128 Literature 141 iv List of abbreviations APC Armoured personnel carrier ARRC Allied Rapid Reaction Corps BALTAP Allied Forces Baltic Approaches BALTBAT Baltic Peacekeeping Battalion BALTNET Baltic Air Traffic Control Network BAOR British Army of the Rhine BFO Befalets Fellesorganisasjon CAS Close Air Support CFE Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe CIMIC Civilian-Military Co-operation CPA Coalition Provisional Authority CS Centralforeningen for stampersonel CSCE Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe DIB Danish International Brigade ERRF European Rapid Reaction Force ESDP European Security and Defence Policy v EU European Union FIST Norwegian Army High Readiness Forces FRY Federal Republic of Yugoslavia FYROM The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia HJK Hærens jegerkommando (The Norwegian Army Special Operations Forces) HKKF Hærens Konstabel- og Korporalforening IFOR Implementation Force IR International Relations IRF Immediate Reaction Forces KFOR Kosovo Force LANDJUT Allied Land Forces Schleswig-Holstein and Jutland MBT Main Battle Tank MDF Main Defence Forces MLRS Multiple Launch Rocket System MoD Ministry of Defence MTB Missile Torpedo Boat vi NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organisation NCO Non-commissioned Officer NOF Norges Offisersforbund NORDCAPS Nordic Coordinated Arrangement for Military Peace Support NORDSAMFN Nordic cooperation group for military UN matters NORPOL Nordic-Polish Brigade OEF Operation Enduring Freedom PfP Partnership for Peace PRT Provincial Reconstruction Team PSO Peace Support Operations QRF Quick Reaction Force RAG Rådgivnings- og analysegruppe (Advisory and Analysis Group) ROE Rules of Engagment RRF Rapid Reaction Forces SDI Strategic Defence Initiative SFOR Stabilisation Force vii SHIRBRIG Multinational Standby High Readiness Brigade for United Nations Operations START Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty UN United Nations UNEF United Nations Emergency Force UNFICYP United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus UNIFIL United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon UNMEE UN Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea ONUC Opération des Nations Unies au Congo (United Nations Operation in the Congo) UNPROFOR United Nations Protection Force WEU Western European Union viii INTRODUCTION DANISH PEACE ENFORCERS AND NORWEGIAN PEACEKEPERS? Norway and Denmark are two countries with a great many similarities. The two states share a common Scandinavian language and culture, very similar democratic political systems, a generous welfare state, and even membership in the same military alliance. For many non- Scandinavians the two states may appear almost politically and socially indistinguishable. However, even very similar countries can sometimes develop marked differences in particular sectors of society. This dissertation will argue that defence policy represents one such marked difference. After the Cold War Norway was reluctant to get involved in international military operations, and initially did so only with low-risk support units.
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