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Defence Mobilisation Planning Comparative

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Defence Mobilisation Planning Comparative AUSTRALIA JOANNE NICHOLSON, PETER DORTMANS, MARIGOLD BLACK, MARTA KEPE, SARAH GRAND CLEMENT, ERIK SILFVERSTEN, JAMES BLACK, THEODORA OGDEN, LIVIA DEWAELE, PAU ALONSO GARCIA-BODE Defence Mobilisation Planning Comparative Study An Examination of Overseas Planning The research described in this RAND Australia report was prepared for Australian Department of Defence and was conducted within RAND Australia under Contract SON2901652. About RAND Australia RAND Australia’s mission is to help improve policy and decisionmaking through research and analysis. RAND’s publications do not necessarily reflect the opinions of its research clients and sponsors. To learn more about RAND Australia, visit www.rand.org/australia Published by the RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, Calif. © 2021 RAND Australia R® is a registered trademark. For more information on this publication, visit www.rand.org/t/RRA1179-1 Preface The Vice Chief of Defence Force (VCDF) has established a small Directorate within Force Design Division in response to significant changes in Australia’s strategic outlook, to ensure a contemporary mobilisation planning framework across Defence. This mobilisation planning process will be conducted over two and a half years and will include several research activities. In June 2020, RAND Australia was engaged by the Australian Department of Defence to undertake a series of material studies and analysis activities. RAND Australia was asked to undertake a comparative study of mobilisation planning in selected countries to discern principles for mobilisation planning. For this a comprehensive international literature review was undertaken spanning the United States, Switzerland, Sweden, Finland, and Singapore. To present the results so that they could be readily compared against each other, a research framework was constructed comprising examination of four areas: Planning Model, Activation, Attributes and Principles, and Forecast Trends. This framework proved useful in drawing out policy and planning approaches to mobilisation, in most case studies, if not explicitly listing details of specific mobilisation events. Accompanying this report, in a separate electronic volume, are the individual findings for each of the countries studied. As a more contemporary mobilisation plan for Australian Defence is being built, the report presents comparisons that might usefully be considered in the planning. The Australian Defence Force (ADF) may be mobilised in a new range of situations, from engaging in different warfighting constructs to increasing support during domestic natural disasters and crises, and it is recognised that such new situations require a whole-of-society approach. To engage the whole of society it is suggested a new strategic narrative around national resilience may be required. This report is intended for an audience that has some familiarity with mobilisation planning and does not necessarily reflect the views of the Department of Defence or the ADF. Essential research in the delivery of this work was provided by RAND Europe and RAND United States staff. For more information about RAND Australia, see www.rand.org/australia or contact the RAND Australia Director listed on that webpage. iii Contents Preface ...................................................................................................................................... iii Figures..................................................................................................................................... vii Tables ..................................................................................................................................... viii Summary .................................................................................................................................. ix Acknowledgements ................................................................................................................ xix Abbreviations ...........................................................................................................................xx 1. Introduction ............................................................................................................................1 Background ............................................................................................................................1 Research Purpose and Approach ...........................................................................................2 International Comparisons .....................................................................................................3 Selection of Country Case Studies .........................................................................................4 Presentation of Findings ........................................................................................................4 2. Case Study: Singapore ...........................................................................................................7 Country Overview ..................................................................................................................7 Singapore Armed Forces .......................................................................................................8 2020 Threat Assessment ......................................................................................................10 Planning Model ....................................................................................................................11 Activation .............................................................................................................................13 Attributes and Principles—Exercising Mobilisation Plans .................................................14 Forecast Trends ....................................................................................................................17 3. Case Study: Finland .............................................................................................................19 Country Overview ................................................................................................................19 Finnish Defence Forces .......................................................................................................20 2020 Threat Assessment ......................................................................................................23 Planning Model ....................................................................................................................24 Activation .............................................................................................................................26 Attributes and Principles—Exercising Mobilisation ...........................................................27 Future Trends .......................................................................................................................29 4. Case Study: Switzerland ......................................................................................................31 Country Overview ................................................................................................................31 Swiss Armed Forces ............................................................................................................31 2020 Threat Assessment ......................................................................................................34 Planning Model ....................................................................................................................35 Activation .............................................................................................................................38 Attributes and Principles—Exercising Mobilisation Plans .................................................40 Future Trends .......................................................................................................................43 5: Case Study: Sweden .............................................................................................................45 Country Overview ................................................................................................................45 iv Swedish Armed Forces ........................................................................................................46 2020 Threat Assessment ......................................................................................................47 Planning Model ....................................................................................................................48 Activation .............................................................................................................................52 Future Trends .......................................................................................................................53 6. Case Study: United States ....................................................................................................56 Four Pillars of the U.S. National Security ...........................................................................56 Planning Model ....................................................................................................................59 Activation .............................................................................................................................60 Attributes and Principles: Mobilisation of Civilian Resources ...........................................61 Observations ........................................................................................................................69
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