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Volume 13, Issue 1 2011 Baltic Security and Defence Review Volume 13, Issue 1 2011 Baltic Security and Defence Review is the publication of the Baltic Defence College © 2011, Baltic Defence College, All rights reserved ISSN 1736-3772 (print) 1736-3780 (online) Editorial Board Editor: Dr. James S. Corum, Dean, Baltic Defence College Lt. Col. John Andreas Olsen PhD, Norwegian Air Force, Dean, Norwegian Defence University College Dr. Richard DiNardo, Professor, US Marine Corps Staff College Dr. Joel Hayward, Dean, RAF College Cranwell, UK Dr. Adam Seipp. Dept of History, University of Texas Dr. Jürgen Foerster, Department of History, University of Freiburg Col. Robert Ehlers PhD, Professor, USAF School of Advanced Air and Space power Studies Dr. Arunas Molis, Department of Strategy and Politics, Baltic Defence College Brigadier General Walter Feichtinger PhD, Austrian National Defence Academy Dr. Hannu Kari, Finnish National Defence University Dr. Flemming Hansen, Royal Danish Defence College Assistant editor and layout: Berit Marksoo Cover design and print: Momo Electronic version of the Baltic Security and Defence Review can be accessed on the website of the Baltic Defence College at www.bdcol.ee All articles of the Baltic Security and Defence Review are also available through the International Relations and Security Network (ISN) at www.isn.ethz.ch All inquiries should be made to the Baltic Defence College, Riia 12, 51013 Tartu, Estonia, ph: +372 717 6000, fax: +372 717 6050, e-mail: [email protected] Baltic Security and Defence Review Volume 13, issue 1, 2011 Contents The Evolution of the Security Notion and Its Influence on the Concepts of Armed Forces Employment By Major General (Ret.) Krzysztof Załęski, Phd ............................................. 5 An Historical and Political Overview of the Reserve Forces of the Two Southern Rim Baltic Sea Countries at the Beginning of the Twenty-First Century By Colonel (Retired) Milton Paul Davis .......................................................17 Is Kosovo the Beginning and the End? Swiss Military Peacekeeping By Marco Wyss ......................................................................................51 Military History, Social Sciences and Professional Military Education By Dr. Eric A. Sibul ...............................................................................71 Bandit or Patriot: the Kenyan Shifta War 1963-1968 By Major John Ringquist ........................................................................ 100 Early Eighteenth Century Naval Chemical Warfare in Scandinavia: a Study in the Introduction of New Weapon Technologies in Early Modern Navies By Michael Fredholm ............................................................................. 122 In Search for Proper Small Nation’s Officer Training System: the Experiences of Interwar Estonia Development of Finnish Tactics After the Second World War By Petteri Jouko .................................................................................... 182 3 Volume 13, issue 1, 2011 Baltic Security and Defence Review 4 Baltic Security and Defence Review Volume 13, issue 1, 2011 The Evolution of the Security Notion and its Influence on the Concepts of Armed Forces Employment ∗ By Major General (ret.) Krzysztof Załęski, PhD The contemporary concept of security and its form – both the actual and the desirable one – will be the subject of debates and scholarly theses for a long time to come because as the international security environment develops the security concept will consequently evolve. This principle can clearly be seen in recent events. The security model we will try to attain in the future will be quite different from the one we knew in the second half of the 20 th century and also different from the security model that is prevalent today. There is little doubt the authority of the state system that treats the state as in the traditional Westphalia model-- as a “sovereignty/unlimited power” and “autocracy” 1—is a model that largely belongs to the past. The contemporary state is a scene of various political and social relations and approaches. Indeed, the armed forces have not managed to resist the effects of these relations. Given these key factors then the following questions are in order: What is the future of the armed forces? What future form should the armed forces take? And what are the key requirements for the armed forces that will make them effective tools to react to the current security threats? It is generally emphasized in the literature on this topic that the era of the classical war threats, when mass and well armed and trained armies stood facing each other, is generally past us today. Why is this so? This has happened because the major threats and the conditions surrounding the threats of conflict have changed considerably. Today the threats and ∗ Krzysztof Załęski, PhD is a retired major general, Polish Air Force and also holds a PhD from the National Defence Academy. Devoted his professional military service mainly to the air force where he dealt with the issues of reconnaissance and air force employment in operations. He is the authors of numerous research studies and articles on defence strategy, security of the state, and air force employment in operations. 5 Volume 13, issue 1, 2011 Baltic Security and Defence Review conditions are essentially of a different nature than before. In our time the threats and conditions are more asymmetric, while the essence of a conflict are various indirect actions made to avoid an enemy’s strong points and to attack his vulnerabilities that are usually unprotected and treated as the so called soft targets 2. Asymmetric threats include, first of all, terrorism and organized crime. But the current threats also include the potential use of weapons of mass destruction by various nonstate entities. The current threats also encompass various threats via information technology (information technology war or information war). Ulrich Beck calls all such terrorist groups “new global actors deprived of territorial and national roots, nongovernmental violence organizations.” 3 The activities of terrorist groups led to a situation where it is increasingly more difficult to observe the boundary between defensive and offensive operations. This is a relatively new phenomenon for the regular armed forces because they have to face network actors – i.e. the terrorist groups – who can undertake offensive actions in order to defend their values. Or these network actors may act in self-defence at the strategic level by attacking military and social targets at the tactical level as a means of counteracting the influence of cultures and ideologies alien to them. 4 In a similar manner we have to consider the case of cyber terrorism, which is also a phenomenon between attack and defence, although it seems to have more disruptive than destructive features. The blurring of the hitherto existing boundaries of peace and war operations will undoubtedly cause helplessness and paralysis of the traditional hierarchical national and military structures which for many years were developed and prepared to execute traditional military tasks resulting from the assigned areas of responsibility. Most often the network structures are indicated as the main source of threat to contemporary civilisations. As it is aptly noticed among the fundamental characteristics that shape strategic concepts of the armed forces employment 5 are: (1) operations and coordination of the network elements are not formally and hierarchically arranged, but emerge or change their subordination depending on the current needs and requirements related to the execution of a specific task; (2) networks are 6 Baltic Security and Defence Review Volume 13, issue 1, 2011 characterized by dynamism in creating and breaking informational relations, and frequently the scope of such relations extends beyond the parent organization. This enables the tracks of the enemy activity to vanish if they cross international borders; (3) structural connections (internal and external) do not result from organizational activities, yet are the effect of common standards, values, interests and mutual confidence. These values can include a common enemy, ideology, ethnic descent, religion, and so on. 6 The determinants presented here have led to the transformation in the way that security is perceived. In a similar manner, the scope of contemporary conflicts as well as the activity of terrorist groups have pushed the evolution of another completely new term, i.e. the “network war.” This term is frequently identified with an emerging form of conflict, one less intense than the traditional conventional war, but equally dangerous in its ability to affect society. Anonymous protagonists 7 of world terrorism make use of the network organization forms and its doctrines. Their strategy and technology are adjusted to the needs of the information era. 8 An excellent example of a network war is the current operation in Afghanistan. If the operation is not controlled by NATO forces then the armed actions of the opposition there could move directly into the forum of Europe, and the effects of this would be completely unpredictable in terms of regional security. It is beyond any doubt that this scenario provides the grounds for the international community to reinterpret the rules of armed interventions, especially the right to self-defence, and looks at means of taking action in the cases of imploded or dysfunctional nations. Therefore, given this context, how should we
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