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Targeted Interoperability a New Imperative for Multinational Operations

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Targeted Interoperability a New Imperative for Multinational Operations C O R P O R A T I O N Targeted Interoperability A New Imperative for Multinational Operations Christopher G. Pernin, Jakub P. Hlavka, Matthew E. Boyer, John Gordon IV, Michael Lerario, Jan Osburg, Michael Shurkin, Daniel C. Gibson For more information on this publication, visit www.rand.org/t/RR2075 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Names: Pernin, Christopher G., 1973- author. | Rand Corporation, issuing body. Title: Targeted interoperability : a new imperative for multinational operations Christopher G. Pernin ... [and seven others]. Description: RAND : Santa Monica, CA, [2019] Identifiers: LCCN 2019009931 | ISBN 9780833098733 (pbk. : alk. paper) Subjects: LCSH: Combined operations (Military science) | Communications, Military. | Internetworking (Telecommunication) Classification: LCC U260 .P47 2019 | DDC 355.4/6--dc23 LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2019009931 Published by the RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, Calif. © Copyright 2019 RAND Corporation R® is a registered trademark. Limited Print and Electronic Distribution Rights This document and trademark(s) contained herein are protected by law. This representation of RAND intellectual property is provided for noncommercial use only. Unauthorized posting of this publication online is prohibited. Permission is given to duplicate this document for personal use only, as long as it is unaltered and complete. Permission is required from RAND to reproduce, or reuse in another form, any of its research documents for commercial use. For information on reprint and linking permissions, please visit www.rand.org/pubs/permissions. The RAND Corporation is a research organization that develops solutions to public policy challenges to help make communities throughout the world safer and more secure, healthier and more prosperous. RAND is nonprofit, nonpartisan, and committed to the public interest. RAND’s publications do not necessarily reflect the opinions of its research clients and sponsors. Support RAND Make a tax-deductible charitable contribution at www.rand.org/giving/contribute www.rand.org Preface In recent years, the U.S. 82nd Airborne Division and the British 16th Air Assault Brigade ventured to build a combined unit where the two organizations could conduct high-end airborne operations with “seamless” integration. In many ways, this targeted effort was a depar- ture from past interoperability aspired to by airborne units and brought tactical units closer than ever before. Targeted interoperability of this type is rare; however, interest in it seems only to grow as more nations interact at lower echelons on shorter time lines than in the past. In September 2014, the 82nd Airborne Division asked RAND Arroyo Center to look into the broader context in which their activi- ties were being conducted. This study, produced under a project enti- tled “Towards a Coalition Global Response Force,” highlights trends in and motivations for interoperability and constructs a framework for moving forward with future interoperability. This study should be of interest to tactical units building multi- national interoperability, headquarters offices that are tasked with con- structing the requirements and securing the resources for such interop- erability, and the combatant commands who might best benefit from advancing interoperability in the U.S. Army. The Project Unique Identification Code (PUIC) for the project that produced this document is HQD156906. This research was conducted within RAND Arroyo Center’s Forces and Logistics Program. RAND Arroyo Center, part of the RAND Corporation, is a federally funded research and development center (FFRDC) sponsored by the United States Army. iii iv Targeted Interoperability RAND operates under a “Federal-Wide Assurance” (FWA00003425) and complies with the Code of Federal Regula- tions for the Protection of Human Subjects Under United States Law (45 CFR 46), also known as “the Common Rule,” as well as with the implementation guidance set forth in U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) Instruction 3216.02. As applicable, this compliance includes reviews and approvals by RAND’s Institutional Review Board (the Human Subjects Protection Committee) and by the U.S. Army. The views of sources utilized in this study are solely their own and do not represent the official policy or position of DoD or the U.S. Government. Contents Preface ............................................................................. iii Contents ............................................................................ v Figures ............................................................................. ix Tables .............................................................................. xi Summary .........................................................................xiii Acknowledgments ............................................................ xxiii Abbreviations ................................................................... xxv CHAPTER ONE Introduction ....................................................................... 1 Why Hasn’t This Been Fixed to Date? ........................................... 6 About This Study ..................................................................10 Structure of the Report ...........................................................12 CHAPTER TWO What Is Interoperability? ......................................................13 Definition ..........................................................................13 Technical Definitions of Interoperability ....................................14 Trends in Interoperability ........................................................17 More Tactical Interoperability .................................................17 More and Varied Partners and Operations ................................. 24 Standing Interoperability ..................................................... 28 Implications of Interoperability Trends ....................................... 30 v vi Targeted Interoperability CHAPTER THREE Why Build Interoperability? ...................................................33 Building for Operational Value ................................................ 34 Access to Locations .............................................................35 Bridging Capability Gaps ..................................................... 36 Augmenting U.S. Capabilities .................................................37 Providing Operational Support to Partner-Led Missions ..................37 Toward Legitimacy .............................................................. 38 Implications of Interoperability Drivers ....................................... 42 CHAPTER FOUR What Kind of Interoperability Is Being Built? ............................ 43 Interoperability Outputs ........................................................ 44 Communications and Information Systems ................................ 44 Aligned Procedures .............................................................45 Individual Interoperability .................................................... 46 Shared Art of Command—Unit-Based Interoperability ...................47 Compatible Equipment ....................................................... 48 Which Are the Most Important Outputs? .................................... 48 Interoperability Through History and Lessons Learned ...................49 Interoperability Across Warfighting Functions, Scenarios, and Partners ............................................................... 54 Conclusions ....................................................................... 56 CHAPTER FIVE How Do You Build It? ..........................................................59 Ten Activity Categories ..........................................................59 One Hundred Ninety-Two Underlying Programs ............................61 Combining Activities to Build Interoperability .............................. 64 CHAPTER SIX Interoperability Outcomes .....................................................67 Justifications for Tiered Interoperability .......................................67 U.S. Army Interoperability Guidance ........................................69 Targeted Versus General Interoperability ......................................71 Contents vii Generating General Interoperability ............................................73 NATO Doctrine: An Example ................................................75 Recommendations for Building General Interoperability................. 77 Generating Targeted Interoperability ...........................................78 Types of Units Built and Interoperability Demanded ......................79 The Push Toward the Few .................................................... 80 Is Targeted Interoperability Short-Lived? ....................................81 Value-Added of Targeted Interoperability ...................................81 CHAPTER SEVEN Choosing Partners for Interoperability ......................................85 Targeting What Kinds of Interoperability with Which Partners .......... 86 Hedging ......................................................................... 86 “Usual Suspects” ............................................................... 88 Plan-Focused ....................................................................89 “Ops du Jour” .................................................................. 90 Targeted Versus General Interoperability with Partners .................... 92 Tracking and
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