Quarantine to Be Partly Lifted He Lithuanian Armed Forces Lead- Scripts and Their Families from a Rapid Spread Ership Decided to Start Loosening of the Virus

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Quarantine to Be Partly Lifted He Lithuanian Armed Forces Lead- Scripts and Their Families from a Rapid Spread Ership Decided to Start Loosening of the Virus MAY 2020. NO 5 (24). NEWS MANIPULATIONS MOVE FROM SOCIAL MEDIA PLATFORMS TO PHYSICAL SPACE SPAIN, UK AND FRANCE TO PATROL AIRSPACE NATO'S PRESENCE THE BELGIAN TIGERS: SECURING THE BALTIC SKIES Quarantine to be partly lifted he Lithuanian Armed Forces lead- scripts and their families from a rapid spread ership decided to start loosening of the virus. up the virus spread risk prevention Part of the risk mitigation measures will Tmeasures at the Lithuanian Armed Forces remain in place: movement of personnel units following the resolutions of the Go- and vehicles between units will remain mini- vernment of Lithuania on easing the qua- mized to essential communication, access to SPECIAL rantine throughout the country. Planning is military units will be still restricted, control underway for a range of activities, from mili- of persons admitted to military territories will FOOTPRINTS OF tary training to grating leaves for Continuous still be carried out. All Lithuanian and NATO Mandatory Initial Military Service conscripts. military personnel returning or arriving in LITHUANIAN AMERICANS To begin with, military training of units Lithuania will still undergo testing and qua- IN THE STRUGGLE FOR up to the size of a platoon is resumed to rantine to prevent the coronavirus spread as INDEPENDENCE maintain readiness to complete designated necessary. tasks. Exercises will still be conducted solely The Lithuanian Armed Forces will contin- in military territories with personal protec- ue rendering assistance to civilian institutions tive equipment and maintaining social dis- managing the COVID-19 pandemic. The task tancing. If that does not result in a significant is currently carried out by nearly 200 sol- outbreak of COVID-19 cases, Continuous diers activated on the basis of the Lithuanian Mandatory Initial Military Service con- Armed Forces Domestic Support Plan from scripts will be granted weekend leaves home across the Lithuanian Armed Forces. again. In the estimation of the Lithuanian Photo credits: Sgt Spc 1st Class Armed Forces leadership, the measure was Ieva Budzeikaitė one of the main factors that protected con- Lithuanian Armed Forces information News Content NEWS QUARANTINE TO BE PARTLY LIFTED......................................................................................................1 SPAIN, UK AND FRANCE TO PATROL AIRSPACE................................................................................................2 MANIPULATIONS MOVE FROM SOCIAL MEDIA PLATFORMS TO PHYSICAL SPACE.................................................................................3 LITHUANIAN TROOPS RETURNED FROM Spain, UK and France THE INTERNATIONAL OPERATION IN MALI, NEW ROTATION CAME IN.............................................................4 to patrol airspace LITHUANIAN AND U.S. WARSHIPS RENDERED Spanish Air Force Detachment will lead the 53rd NATO Air PASSING HONOURS..........................................................................5 Policing Mission in the Baltic States augmented by the British Royal Air Force and the French Air Force for the next four months, May through August. NATO MILITARY AIRCRAFT On April 30 the Belgian Royal Air Component Detachment handed TRAINING EVENT...............................................................................5 over the NATO Air Policing Mission to the incoming Spanish Air Force Detachment with six F-18 Hornet fighter aircraft the British Royal Air IN SHORT Force Detachment enhancing the mission with three Eurofighter Ty- phoons after safeguarding the Baltic airspace for 8 months, i.e., two con- PARTISAN HONOURING, MILITARY secutive rotations. The mission will be enhanced by the French Air Force AND PUBLIC UNITY DAY................................................................6 with four Mirage 2000 fighter aircraft from Estonia, making it the total of 13 NATO fighter jets guarding the Baltic airspace through the summer. NATO'S PRESENCE "I pay respect on behalf of Lithuania to the Air Component of the Bel- gian Royal Defence Forces for the efforts to keep the Baltic airspace safe THE BELGIAN TIGERS: at this time that is so tense to al of us," Commander of the Lithuanian Air SECURING THE BALTIC SKIES....................................................8 Force Colonel Dainius Guzas said at the formal hand over — take over ceremony. The Belgian Air Component Detachment conducted two ro- tations of the NATO Air Policing Mission from Šiauliai in a row, four SPECIAL month, in total, with four F-16 fighter jets. FOOTPRINTS OF LITHUANIAN Commander of the Belgian detachment handed over the symbolic key to the Baltic airspace to the commanders of the incoming Spanish AMERICANS IN THE STRUGGLE FOR and British rotations and wished them strength and good health in their INDEPENDENCE..............................................................................16 mission in the Baltics. Spain deployed its seventh rotation of the mission and the United Kingdom will guard the Baltic airspace for the sixth time. Detachments of NATO allies are kept on high alert throughout the NATO Air Policing Mission rotations to be ready to respond to any sus- picious activity near the Alliance’s borders. The NATO Baltic Air Policing Mission was introduced in Lithuania, Military Press Office of Lithuanian Armed Forces Totorių str. 25, LT-01121, Vilnius; Latvia and Estonia when the three countries became members of the Phone (370 5) 210 3897, GSM (370 6) 86 94458; fax (370 5) 273 5550; Alliance in 2004. The mission was enhanced as a result of the Russian Email [email protected] aggression in Ukraine in 2014. NATO fighter aircraft safeguarding the Publisher — Lithuanian Armed Forces. The opinion of editorial office does not necessarily coin- Baltic airspace carry out numerous alert scrambles to intercept Russian cide with the opinion of the authors. Pictures, manuscripts are not returned and reviewed. Cir- culation is 300 copies. Printed by the Cartography Center of Lithuanian Military, Muitinės str.4, fighter jets approaching the Baltic airspace, frequently without obser- Domeikava, LT-54359 Kaunas dist. Order GL-217. ving the international rules of safe aviation. Last year approx. 200 alert scrambles were carried out while completing mission tasks. Photo credits: Antanas Gedrimas, Lithuanian Air Force Base 2 Lithuanian Military Digest News Manipulations move from social media platforms to physical space ccording to analysts of the Strategic information narratives, the most pervasive of instance, they say that the Union loses its pur- Communication Department of the which probably is conspiracy theories that are pose and is unable to respond to the coronavi- Lithuanian Armed Forces, the main not based on any real facts, for instance, asser- rus-caused challenges properly because there Atargets of disinformation and information tions that COVID-19 is a man-made biological is not consensus among its members, and the attacks remain the same: European Union, weapon developed in secret laboratories, pur- alleged lack of European support to Italy is pre- NATO, and efforts of Lithuanian state institu- portedly paid for by pharmaceutical companies, sented as a major EU betrayal. Another theme tions to manage COVID-19 consequences. and former Microsoft head Bill Gates seeking to is the pointlessness of NATO existence that Lithuanian Armed Forces experts tasked with profit from mass vaccination is behind it. Other endangers NATO allies themselves. Residents standing monitoring of information space note examples are the conspiracy theories saying of the Baltic States are purportedly dissatisfied that for the second week in a row the deliberate that COVID-19 is only an excuse for state in- with NATO military presence in their countries opinion shaping through the spread of mislead- stitutions to introduce 5G networks infrastruc- which serves the only purpose of provoking ing information is moving from digital space ture without any obstacles, or that the novel Russia and possibly spreads the coronavirus. and social media to physical space. Examples coronavirus does not exist at all and it was only U.S. interests are falsely claimed to harm EU of such activities are fomentation of protest made up by Government institutions to intimi- and NATO allies’ citizens and pressure to be against the quarantine requirements, encou- date people for their own purposes. put on some of the European and NATO mem- ragement not to wear masks, not to observe Disinformation is also spread that Lithua- bers to reject humanitarian aid from Russia. health protection requirements, and not to nian doctors are forced to counterfeit the coro- Lithuanian Armed Forces analysts point out practise social distancing. navirus death toll, families of the deceased are that disinformation is used to mislead the pub- From April 24 through 30 88 information purportedly made to sign a document stating lic, manipulate public sentiment and undercut incidents were identified, over 50% of them the death had been caused by COVID-19. critical thinking, increase the divide between were carried out in the Russian language. Over Also, that the quarantine introduced in the the state and the society, decrease confidence the period from February 1 to April 30 the country by the Government is simply an ex- in the EU and NATO and fellow members of total of nearly 1.000 information incidents of ercise carried out on the basis of the influenza the said international organizations, and ob- different types on the topic of COVID-19 were pandemic preparedness programme
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