Occasional Paper

Launching EU Battlegroups A RUSI European Security Programme Study

Contributions by Major General Graham Messervy-Whiting CBE and Tim Williams

Edited by Alastair Cameron

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The views expressed in this paper are the authors’ own, and do not necessarily reflect those of RUSI. Comments pertaining to this report are invited and should be forwarded to: Alastair Cameron - Head, European Security Programme, Royal United Services Institute, Whitehall, London, SW1A 2ET, United Kingdom, or via email to [email protected] Graham Messervy-Whiting & Tim Williams

Launching EU Battlegroups The true test as to whether or not these Executive Summary Battlegroups are effective military capabilities rather than just a new concept In association with the EU Military Staff, will be determined by the ability of these the UK Foreign and Commonwealth force packages to fight, to take and to Office and Manpower Software, the Royal accept loss of lives. Countries contributing United Services Institute hosted a to a Battlegroup are currently responsible conference in June 2007 on “Launching for certifying their own commitments, EU Battlegroups”. Discussions centered and it is the framework nation’s on the progress which has been made by responsibility to certify the force package the European Union in terms of the as a whole. To guide this process, the EU development of the Battlegroups, and the has developed a ‘Standards & Criteria’ effect that these force packages will have checklist that provides benchmarks in on the Union’s crisis-management nine areas. However, in order to be capabilities. efficient a battalion, its combat support and combat service support elements Fully operational since the beginning of need to be bound into a single, 2007, with two Battlegroups now on duty homogeneous force, and unless each at any given time, these ‘ready-to-go’ Battlegroup offers broadly similar forces of 1,500 troops are intended for capabilities, then the force packages are rapid response to emerging crises within a unlikely to be able to execute equally 6,000 km radius of Brussels. Designed to challenging missions. The most effective be up and running within 15 days of an solution to achieving a balanced and initial green light and no later than 10 consistent Battlegroup roster would days after a formal decision to launch an therefore be to develop a centralised operation, the EU envisages being able to certification process with the EU Military undertake two concurrent Battlegroup Committee, through the EU Military operations should it be required to do so. Staff, performing this task and assuming responsibility for declaring each Under current arrangements, Battlegroup Battlegroup ready for operational duty. generation is expected to be a relatively Whilst this might be resisted politically by straightforward task. However, if a some Member States, a first step in this Battlegroup’s deployment was to be direction could help promote more succeeded by larger follow-on EU forces transparency between partners and or be extended beyond its initial Battlegroups. mandated time-line, then the EU might well need to think about a common, more An essential first step within the EU has responsive and more flexible approach to always been the production and approval Battlegroup force generation. A more of an overall concept for each particular detailed EU-wide database of available Common Foreign and Security Policy forces than that provided by the current action. This is required in terms of setting Forces Catalogue would therefore be of out what the EU seeks to achieve evident use and would facilitate the strategically in the relevant area or identification of relevant forces for a country; what it hopes to achieve by particular mission. exerting any particular action; what instruments it should bring to bear in Launching EU Battlegroups order to do so; how the desired end-state Battlegroups should primarily be seen as a would be measured; within a fixed rung on the ladder of overall capability duration and with a view of total improvements within EU Member States. estimated costs. A Battlegroup Whilst at the Head of State or deployment would thus respond to well Government level, the Battlegroup identified criteria, such as making a concept is unlikely to lead to an increase positive difference to the country the EU of the defence budget, at the Defence wanted to send it to rather than building Ministerial level, there might well be Europe. Furthermore, if a deployment room within the budget to redefine was anticipated to last for longer than four priorities and re-allocate funds. In the long months, all elements of the EU decision- term, Battlegroups will undoubtedly making machine, including the Member complement other NATO initiatives and, States, should have a clear understanding within the EU, the Defence Agency’s that any initial Battlegroup mission was tasks. The overall cumulative effect of only a first response whilst a longer-term these initiatives should finally be to foster solution is generated. The EU needs also a developing strategic culture in Europe identify what it should be doing next and which favours early, rapid and where be confident that this longer-term solution necessary robust intervention. will be in place before the Battlegroup is due to withdraw.

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Six key themes were discussed at the conference – using the Battlegroups; Introduction generation, validation and lessons learned; Battlegroups and capability development; On 25 June 2007, a ‘Launching EU strategic planning and political will; and Battlegroups’ conference was held at the civil-military co-operation. The event Royal United Services Institute in London reported on EU countries’ achievements in association with the EU Military Staff, in developing the Battlegroups, the the UK Foreign and Commonwealth challenges that might arise when Office and Manpower Software. The deploying the Battlegroups and the event provided an opportunity to assess various ways in which current the EU’s progress to-date in the arrangements and procedures for the development of the Battlegroups and the Battlegroups might be improved. This effect the force packages will have on the report draws on speakers’ contributions to Union’s crisis management capabilities, as the debate and addresses both the status well as future challenges and priorities. quo and the future of the Battlegroups and the EU’s crisis management Lieutenant General David Leakey, capabilities. Director General of the EU Military Staff, delivered the keynote address: ‘Using the Battlegroups’. Other speakers included: Background to the Battlegroups and Vice Admiral Anthony K Dymock (UK Capability Snapshot Military Representative to NATO and the EU); Major General Bengt Andersson Since its launch in 2004, the plan to (Operations Commander, Nordic develop Battlegroups, each 1,500 troops Battlegroup); Brigadier General Bruno strong, has quickly become the focus of Pinget (Commander, French-German the EU’s European Security and Defence Brigade); Andrew Mathewson (Director Policy (ESDP). The Battlegroups became for Policy on International Organisations, fully operational at the beginning of 2007, UK Ministry of Defence); Ambassador two are now on duty at any given time Adam Kobieracki (Assistant Secretary and the EU hopes to be able to undertake General for Operations, NATO); two concurrent Battlegroup operations Commodore James Fanshawe (Defence should the need arise. These ‘ready-to-go’ Advisor, Manpower Software); Roland forces are intended for particularly rapid Zinzius (Deputy Head, Civil-Military Cell, deployment in response to crises and/or EU Military Staff); Colonel Martin Pazik requests from the UN. They are designed (Deputy Head, NATO and EU Section, to be in place and able to begin Security Policy Department, Czech implementing their mission within 15 Ministry of Defence); Graham Messervy- days of an initial green light, and no later Whiting (Deputy Director, Centre for than 10 days after the formal decision to Studies in Security and Diplomacy, launch an operation. European Research Institute, University of Birmingham); and Dr Markus Kaim The EU Capabilities Commitment (Senior Research Associate, Stiftung Conference of November 2004 provided a Wissenschaft und Politik). more detailed analysis of the military and strategic elements of the Battlegroup concept, concluding that Battlegroups are

3 Launching EU Battlegroups the ‘minimum military effective, credible, rapidly deployable military capability to rapidly deployable, coherent force show for the years of political effort that package capable of stand-alone had gone into ESDP. Drawing largely on operations, or for the initial phase of existing forces and requiring less larger operations. The BG is based on a capability generation than the 2003 Goal, combined arms, battalion sized force and the Battlegroups appeared the perfect reinforced with Combat Support and remedy to the EU’s capability (and Combat Service Support elements. A BG credibility) gap. Battlegroups were seen, could be formed by a Framework Nation in short, as the fast track to a genuine and or by a multinational coalition of Member fast boots-on-the-ground EU military States. In all cases, interoperability and capability - to enhance the ability of the military effectiveness will be key criteria. EU to make a difference in the world, to A BG must be associated with a force act as a force for good. headquarters (FHQ) and pre-identified operational and strategic enablers, such as But this was not the only objective behind strategic lift and logistics.’1 Since the time the Battlegroup concept for there were of the November 2004 conference the specific ‘added value’ functions that such a option of a single nation Battlegroup was capability would give the EU. The also added to the list, though on the Battlegroups were intended to be quick current Battlegroup roster only one response tools – quick to deploy but then unilateral force appears – the UK in 2008. to withdraw and hand the challenge on after an initial period of stabilization. In so As such, the Battlegroup concept is the doing they were designed to complement cornerstone of the EU’s current ‘Headline the other mechanisms available to the EU Goal 2010’ action plan to improve - as only one component of EU European military capabilities – but its capabilities they are intended for origins lie in an earlier EU capability deployment alongside non-military target, the Headline Goal 2003. The 2003 instruments, a reflection of the EU’s goal was set in 1999 and called upon EU balanced approach to managing crises. countries to be able, by voluntary Battlegroups were also designed to act as cooperation, rapidly to deploy, by 2003, a catalyst for defence reform in countries forces in operations up to Corps level (up with less experience of expeditionary to 15 brigades or 50,000-60,000 persons) operations in order that the burden of within 60 days and that would be rapid response should not fall sustainable for a year. The forces were unreasonably on three or four EU intended to carry out humanitarian, countries. peacekeeping and crisis management missions – the so-called Petersberg Tasks Battlegroups were conceived as – but a Corps-level rapid-reaction formations capable of both the Petersberg capability proved difficult to generate. Tasks and other European Security Consequently, by early 2004, EU leaders Strategy roles such as stabilization, were in urgent need of a more visible, reconstruction and military advice to third countries. They are to be rapidly 1Military Capability Commitment Conference, deployable, held at high readiness so they Declaration on European Military Capabilities can be on the move within five to ten (Brussels, 22 November 2004) days and able to serve either as a stand- alone force or as the initial phase of a

4 Graham Messervy-Whiting & Tim Williams larger operation. They should be significant element of the generation sustainable in a foreign theatre of process will be the provision of pre- operations for 30 days, extendable to 120 assigned forces by contributing countries. days if re-supplied. Most of the declared That said, some Battlegroup elements, Battlegroups are multinational such as operational and strategic enablers, configurations, though some are purely will vary according to mission national packages, and a six-monthly requirements and some form of rotation system is designed to ensure that generation process will therefore be two Battlegroups are on call at a time. required.

Although the Battlegroups are not a war- The Operation Commander, through his winning tool, some foreseen Battlegroup Operation HQ (OHQ), is responsible for scenarios go beyond the soft end of force generation and the deployment of military utility. These types of mission the Battlegroup and the detailed force envisage combat operations that, while generation methodology remains the not top end warfighting, could involve business of the OHQ. It is likely that each intense combat and Battlegroups have OHQ will implement the system that best been prepared with such tasks in mind. suits the needs of the particular Consequently Battlegroups are reinforced Battlegroup in question. The Force with combat support and combat service Commander is charged with setting the support. With some Battlegroups’ combat order of arrival in theatre though it is the support intended to be provided by sea availability of strategic assets that will and air power, the total number of limit their rate of deployment and if the personnel in some of the force packages Battlegroup elements are dispersed then may now reach 3,000. additional time and effort will be required to get them to the strategic airhead. Any Having provided this brief explanation of such logistical difficulties are, however, both the emergence of the Battlegroups likely to present relatively simple concept and a summary of the capability, problems in comparison with some this report will now assess in rather more countries’ national procedures for detail the various stages in a Battlegroup authorizing participation in Battlegroup operation. This begins with the operations. generation of the force, the validation that it is capable of carrying out the specified In short, therefore, responsibilities for roles, and the process of deploying to Battlegroup generation are largely split theatre. It will then go on to explore how between contributing countries and the the Battlegroups are also a rung on the Operation Commander: participating ladder of capability improvement. nations are responsible for providing the assets and capabilities promised to the Battlegroup and the OHQ is charged with Generation overseeing the process and generating operational and strategic enablers. As Under current arrangements, Battlegroup such, Battlegroup generation is largely generation is expected to be a relatively separated from the EU structures (EU straightforward task. The Battlegroups Military Committee, EU Military Staff rely, as far as possible, on pre-identified etc). In addressing the question of assets and capabilities so the most whether this process could be improved

5 Launching EU Battlegroups in the future, such considerations are force planning: namely that capability intimately linked with the level of EU should match requirement. ambition. Such a situation is not ideal and suggests If Battlegroups, in their current form, that a detailed EU-wide database of largely satisfy the EU’s rapid-reaction available forces might better suit the land-force expeditionary ambitions then fulfilment of the roles ascribed to the the existing generation process could Battlegroups. If an OHQ were able to prove sufficient for EU purposes though generate a bespoke force from a common there will no doubt be valuable lessons database the configuration produced will learned from Battlegroup deployments no doubt be better suited to the task at that can be translated to the force hand than a pre-designed, one-size-fits-all packages. However, if Battlegroups are to force. Existing arrangements might well grow into larger force configurations or if, prove to be sufficient for Battlegroups to as is more likely, their deployment will be execute their missions with sufficient succeeded by larger follow-on forces then success. However, if the EU aspires to the EU might well need to think about a improve the military capabilities at its common, more responsive and more disposal the provision of some flexibility flexible approach to force generation. in Battlegroup generation would be Examination of the EU’s stated objectives advisable. clearly suggest that the Battlegroups alone do not fulfill EU ambitions: the capability Such an argument is supported by targets of Headline Goal 2003 have not consideration of the potential time-lines of been abandoned and one of the functions an operation. While Battlegroups are of the Battlegroups is as the ‘initial phase designed for a maximum of 120-day of larger operations’. deployments, the full duration of a mission may not coincide with rotations It is true that a Battlegroup, in itself, is the of the Battlegroup roster, i.e. a ‘minimum military effective, credible, Battlegroup mission may well continue rapidly deployable, coherent force beyond the sixth month duty period of package capable of stand-alone the deployed Battlegroup. In such a operations’ but that does not mean that its scenario the provision of reserve or generation should not allow for some standby forces, or a follow-on flexibility in its make-up. Some Battlegroup, would be greatly aided by a Battlegroup missions may well require a comprehensive EU planning tool. If the rather different force package from others. EU Military Staff were to hold a more Under usual circumstances a force detailed database than the current Forces designed to undertake a peacekeeping Catalogue, to include availability of EU operation in an unstable environment forces, some of the potential difficulties would not, for example, look quite the created by the static nature of the same as one designed to provide military Battlegroup roster might be overcome. advice to third countries. Within the Battlegroup concept both types of mission The case is further strengthened when are potential operations and the current follow-on forces are considered because, generation process means that they could given the planning stipulation that a be undertaken by similar force packages. Battlegroup operation might form the This rather contravenes a basic rule of initial phase of a larger mission, the force

6 Graham Messervy-Whiting & Tim Williams packages cannot be seen in isolation. reinforced with Combat Support and While a static, rotational approach to Combat Service Support elements.’ The force generation could prove sufficient for indication is that Battlegroup missions are the Battlegroups themselves, a more expected to be testing, particularly for flexible, responsive method will be those countries with limited experience of required for larger configurations expeditionary operations, and the EU has designed for operations of differing developed a system designed to validate duration. Indeed numerous other factors the capability of the force packages, including proper co-ordination with ensuring they are up to the job. civilian capabilities, joint ops and changing operational trends would all Countries contributing to a Battlegroup benefit from the employment of a are responsible for certifying their common, dynamic force generation commitments at the unit level and it is the process. responsibility of the framework nation to certify the force package as a whole. In To conclude, the idea of EU Battlegroups addition the EU Military Committee, first emerged at the Franco-British through the EU Military Staff, oversees Summit of 2003. The Summit declaration the process by visiting Battlegroups called for ‘a catalogue of high utility preparing for duty and liaising closely packages that can be tailored to specific with their Operation Commanders. To missions’. In short, while the EU has guide the certification process, the EU has endorsed and subsequently developed developed a ‘BG Standards & Criteria’ such Battlegroups, it has not yet given checklist that provides benchmarks in them the means to be properly tailored in nine areas: availability, flexibility, the way that the packages were first employability, deployability, readiness, envisaged. connectivity, survivability, medical force protection and interoperability. And Validation Battlegroups are also encouraged to rely on existing NATO standards wherever The acid test of whether, in the possible, to avoid duplication and Battlegroups, the EU has developed a promote interoperability. useable military capability will be determined by the ability of the force The advantage of such a set of common packages (and the willingness of their standards is that they provide clarity on political masters to allow them) to fight, the objective in Battlegroup development to take lives and potentially to lose lives. by articulating a shared interpretation of This is not because the Battlegroups are the professional skills and equipment intended to be a war-winning tool – they required by each force package. In so are not – but some of the Battlegroup doing they allow for the capability of each scenarios go beyond the soft end of force package to be measured – via military utility and envisage the possibility national then framework nation of combat operations. As a consequence certification. By declaring the agreed the focus of the Battlegroup is on combat standards have been met, Operation capability – as the November 2004 Commanders are able to send a clear Capabilities Commitment Conference signal to the political authorities that the concluded, ‘The BG is based on a force package is ready and capable of combined arms, battalion sized force and executing Battlegroup missions.

7 Launching EU Battlegroups

In 2010, the British-Dutch Battlegroup And while the ‘BG Standards & Criteria’ will draw on the strong, long-standing set a challenging goal there is a practical relationship between the Royal requirement for training that goes beyond Netherlands Marines and the UK’s Royal these EU benchmarks. A Battlegroup is Marine Commandos. This pre-existing based around its infantry battalion core British-Netherlands Amphibious Force and the key ingredient in its operational (UKNLAF) conducts training and effectiveness will be the underpinning operations as a single force under unified strength of the core battalion. The force command and is Europe’s oldest packages have to be much more than a integrated military unit. UKNLAF has gathering of several individual companies gained an enormous operational and cannot rely upon common experience in both Iraq conflicts and in procedures or processes alone. Collective the Balkans. Similarly the Franco-German training is therefore critical to bind both Battlegroup, on duty in 2008, benefits the battalion and its combat support and from close peacetime training affiliations combat service support elements into a and procedures. single, homogeneous force and such training should also be extended to key But not all Battlegroups have the operational enablers. Again, the advantage of longstanding co-operation responsibility to take a lead in this area between the contributing nations to draw rests with the framework nation though upon. At present, the Battlegroup concept all Battlegroup contributors are free to does not demand joint training in all these shape the force package’s training, as long areas and, given that a number of as it leads to successful certification in Battlegroups are engaging in it, the future accordance with the ‘BG Standards and inclusion of a collective training Criteria’. requirement might be a prudent minimum standard. And this, in a rather Multinationality can weaken the bonds of circular manner, brings the question of military cohesiveness and brings an validation to the forefront. As previously additional burden for training, logistics, indicated, measurement of Battlegroup command culture and national rules and training and capability success is provided regulations – challenges that must be through national and framework nation overcome if the EU is serious about the certification – validation that is therefore delivery of effective military capability. underwritten by national military Joint interaction can help develop judgement that in turn is the product of a common understanding and also uncover national military culture. There is no issues such as national caveats and suggestion that the EU should attempt to regulations for the use of specified develop a monolithic military culture but equipment, which can then be taken into it is true that national cultures can colour, account in planning and during and even distort judgement, creating the deployments. Additionally the OHQ and possibility of significant differences in Force Headquarters (FHQ) have training capability from one Battlegroup to needs that should not be overlooked, both another. in terms of staff skills and the culture challenges of a multi-faceted Not only could shortcomings in any one environment. Battlegroup pose major operational risks but they could also undermine the entire

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Battlegroup initiative. Should a Additionally, should a requirement arise Battlegroup encounter problems in at a given time and the Battlegroup on theatre, or should there be serious doubts duty deemed not to be up to the task, the about a Battlegroup’s effectiveness, credibility of the EU will be brought into European nations could well become question. For reasons such as this, the reluctant to commit troops and Battlegroup concept documents are quite equipment to the force packages – clear that each and every force package on particularly those governments with the roster must be able to undertake the limited experience of expeditionary full range of tasks. If all EU governments operations. Battlegroups are considered endorse the full range of Battlegroup the minimum deployable force package missions, training goals can be improved and because of their limited size and over time and the baseline for Battlegroup firepower the potential exists for a capability raised. Battlegroup to get into difficulties in theatre. It is critical, therefore, that all the The most effective solution to the Battlegroups are, and are seen to be, problem of achieving a balanced and coherent and credible formations both for consistent Battlegroup roster would be to their own safety and to ensure ongoing develop a centralized certification process political commitment to the initiative. for the Battlegroups. The EU Military Committee, through the EU Military Unless each Battlegroup offers broadly Staff, could perform this task and assume similar capabilities, the force packages are the responsibility for declaring each unlikely to be able to execute equally Battlegroup ready for operational duty. challenging missions. This, in turn, leads This would provide a level of confidence to an unbalanced roster and reduces the that all Battlegroup contributors are flexibility, responsiveness and utility of pulling their weight and that the EU will the concept as a whole. The first stage in be able to respond properly in the event ensuring some consistency in the of an emergency. Indeed without such a Battlegroup capability is for all EU process the measurement of whether a governments to recognize and accept the Battlegroup meets the ‘BG Standards & Battlegroup tasks and the challenges they Criteria’ will remain a subjective one represent in terms of delivering military (drawing upon the military judgement of competence. those responsible for the delivery of the product). However, rather than follow this course, some governments have suggested that In the eyes of some governments, certain Battlegroups should be considered however, a centralized certification only for lower intensity Petersberg and process might be a move too far at this European Security Strategy tasks, e.g. stage. A first step in this direction would humanitarian aid and rescue missions. be to promote transparency between This is no solution to the capability partners and Battlegroups. Differing challenge. Such proposals are unfair to military cultures mean that countries have those countries that have worked hard to varying levels of competence and provide Battlegroups capable of the full capabilities across the military spectrum. range of operations and solidarity must be No one nation has a monopoly on a feature of the Battlegroup initiative if it experience or good ideas and the is to retain support in the longer term. exchange of information, sharing of skills

9 Launching EU Battlegroups and promotion of best practice could be and, given this wider relevance, should be intensified. The provision of observers or considered all-the-more important. participants to exercises, study periods and certification activities would be one of Deployment the ways in which such practices could be established. This section will not examine the technical aspects of deployment2 but But in the longer-term it might prove rather attempt to look forward to the inevitable that the EU will have to think politico-military process which would about centralized certification. As is the lead to a Battlegroup being deployed. case with force generation, the EU’s approach to Battlegroup validation is It is quite natural for a student of the linked to its level of ambition. Validating a Battlegroup issue sitting outside the EU pre-identified force that has been politico-military (pol-mil) machinery to preparing for a duty period is one thing, seek to examine it as a discrete military but certifying an ad hoc force that is subject, analysing the criteria which following on from a Battlegroup should determine its selection as the deployment as the larger phase of an appropriate tool, then its mission, operation is quite another. And the ability duration, handover and extraction. to deliver such capabilities to foreign theatres is, of course, the EU’s stated But the machinery in practice doesn’t ambition. In this context EU governments work like that. The EU’s pol-mil ‘moving must continue to develop deployable, parts’ include, from bottom up: the sustainable, flexible and interoperable Civilian and Military Staffs, the Joint armed forces for a range of missions and Situation Centre, the Military Committee the creation of the Battlegroups should and the Political and Security Committee. reinforce, and not detract from, these They continuously analyze, assess and efforts. review developing situations around the world which bear on the EU’s Security Larger, ad hoc formations are unlikely to Strategy and its derived priorities. From have had the same opportunities for joint these, they will identify situations which training that identified Battlegroups will will (or may) require the application of have and consequently it is of paramount the EU’s appropriate External Relations importance that these ad hoc force tools, including those outside the packages are properly validated prior to Common Foreign and Security Policy deployment. Without centralized (CFSP) arena, such as foreign trade and certification it is difficult to see how the development assistance. Within the CFSP EU will ensure minimum standards are, arena, the ESDP toolkit includes both and are seen to be met. Of course, a civilian and military instruments. Indeed, necessary pre-cursor for this is European of the seventeen or so missions that have governments’ clear endorsement of EU been mounted in ESDP’s first seven years, missions in order that training goals can twelve have been largely non-military in be both harmonized and improved over flavour, ranging from judicial reform to time. As previously indicated, this is police training. something that should be taking place in the context of Battlegroup development 2 For an analysis of these, see Gustav Lindstrom’s ‘Enter the EU Battlegroups’ (ISS Chaillot Paper No 97, February 2007).

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not become the default military If the EU does assess, in relation to a response; particular developing situation, that some ƒ There should be a real form of CFSP action is required, then it contribution to burden sharing; brings its comprehensive crisis- ƒ Is a Battlegroup deployment the management procedures into play. These right response in the country the EU may be applied in whole or in part, wants to send it to? This should be dependent on the complexity of the about making a difference to the situation and the timelines involved. But wider world, not building Europe. the essential first step has always, to date, been the production and approval by the Indeed, there might well be an opposite EU pol-mil machine of an overall concept danger that the criteria surrounding the for the CFSP action which, as a minimum, deployment of an EU Battlegroup would sets out: what it is that the EU seeks to be so constraining in practice that it may achieve strategically, in the longer term, prove difficult to achieve a first-ever BG in the relevant area or country; within this deployment. framework, what it will seek to achieve by this discrete CFSP action; what There is indeed the presumption, again instruments it will wish to bring to bear in raised in the conference, that BG missions order to do so; how the desired end-state will be of short duration, either: will be measured; a fixed duration; and the estimated costs. This approved ƒ As a preamble to a full-scale overarching EU concept governing this military or civil-military mission proposed intervention is then the starting (essentially allowing the EU time for point for more detailed military planning force generation); if the use of a military ESDP instrument, ƒ Or to allow time for the UN to such as a Battlegroup, is under generate a force to provide longer- consideration. term stabilization; the EU’s second military operation, ARTEMIS in the Thus, there would be no danger, within Summer of 2003, fell into this the EU system and its very tight political category and indeed provided one control over the use of its ESDP template for the development of the instruments, both civil and military, of a BG Concept3. Battlegroup deployment being made ƒ Or for a discrete, time-limited task without consideration of criteria, raised in such as providing stability in the run- discussion at the Battlegroups conference, up to elections, as with EUFOR RDC such as: in Kinshasa in 2006, or for a mission to evacuate EU citizens. ƒ Is the EU making a positive contribution to solving current If a deployment is anticipated to last problems? longer than four months, all elements of ƒ Is the deployment true to the the EU pol-mil machine, including the original quick-response concept - Member States, should have a clear quickly in and quickly out? understanding that any initial Battlegroup ƒ The Battlegroup should not be

used to the exclusion of the EU’s 3 other tools and, in particular, should See op cit (p10 et seq) for an account of ARTEMIS’ influence on the BG Concept.

11 Launching EU Battlegroups mission is only a first response whilst a and NATO in the European capability longer-term solution is generated. The EU development process. needs to know what it is going to do next and be confident that this longer-term How do all these initiatives play within an solution is going to be in place before the individual Member State and its ‘one set Battlegroup is due to withdraw4. of forces’? At Head of State or Government level, they are unlikely to Future Capabilities lead to a decision to increase the slice of the national budget allocated to defence, This section seeks to develop the theme, except perhaps in certain specific discussed during the Conference, that circumstances, such as additional Battlegroups were not only be seen as expenditure linked to a perceived new addressing the Helsinki Headline Goal priority like ‘homeland resilience’. At requirement ‘to provide [within the Goal] Defence Minister level, however, there smaller rapid response elements available may well be room, within his or her and deployable at very high readiness’ but budget, to redefine priorities and re- also as a rung on the ladder of overall allocate funds. This will tend to be at the capability improvement within EU margins in the short-to-medium term, Member States. since most defence expenditure is already likely to be committed to personnel and NATO HQ, from Secretary-Generals equipment programme costs. It is only in downwards, have been engaged in the long term that any major decisions on encouraging, cajoling (and even new personnel structures and new occasional bullying) the NATO nations to equipment programmes are likely to bear improve their capability speedily to fruit. deploy effective expeditionary armed forces since at least the late 1980s. A So what part might the Battlegroups play resuscitated Western European Union in all of this? For the long term, they will tried to do the same for its European undoubtedly reinforce the NATO members and partners in the late 1990s, initiatives and, within the EU, the with the EU taking over the baton from Defence Agency’s role in: 2000 onwards. NATO also redoubled its efforts at the turn of the millennium, ƒ Developing defence capabilities in creating its Allied Command the field of crisis management Transformation (ACT) and bringing to ƒ Promoting and enhancing fruition its rapid-reaction NATO European armaments co-operation Response Force (NRF). The EU in turn ƒ Strengthening the European created its European Defence Agency defence industrial and technological (EDA) and brought to fruition its rapid- base reaction Battlegroups. The EU-NATO ƒ and creating a competitive Capability Group is one of several European defence equipment market. mechanisms that are designed to ensure transparency and coherence between EU Battlegroups could also in due course help to provide impetus to the provisions on

4 See op cit (p53 et seq) for an analysis of reserve force requirements.

12 Graham Messervy-Whiting & Tim Williams

‘structured co-operation’ in the EU’s draft they transit through the preparation, Reform Treaty5. deployment, and recovery cycles.

In the short to medium-term, they could Battlegroups should also be a driver for develop an influence, within the armed combined joint exercising (thereby forces of Member States, through enhancing the capability in due course to activities such as: conduct combined joint operations) within the EU. From 2000 onwards, the ƒ Culture change EU’s top priority for combined (i.e. ƒ Education and training multinational) exercising has been its new ƒ Combined joint exercising pol-mil machinery, down to and including ƒ Smarter information technology its Operation and Force HQs. This will and communications (ITC). need to continue. But for the first time in 2007, the EU also conducted a military Battlegroups should be a reinforcing exercise (MILEX 07), which involved a driver for smarter ITC both at the EU and Battlegroup’s command and control Member State levels. Within the EU chain. This was the Nordic BG, with Military Structures, the requirement to Sweden as the framework nation, which is handle, speedily and securely, changing one of the BGs rostered for the first half of packets of data about the Member States 2008. Significantly, MILEX 07 was due to armed forces, a requirement which be followed in late 2007 by a live Nordic already exists in the shape of the Headline BG exercise, organized by the framework Forces Catalogue, has become even more nation in northern Sweden and including complex with the development and forces from the BG’s five troop- 6 implementation of the Battlegroup contributors (Sweden, Finland, Norway , concept. The absence of a single, Estonia and Ireland). This pattern of pre- permanent command and control roster multinational exercising could well structure from EU HQ, down through be developed over time. Combined joint Operation and Force HQs, to a deployed (i.e. multi-service as well as multinational) BG should also be a powerful driver for exercising can be more challenging to smart ITC; so should the requirements schedule: the relatively small numbers of posed by intelligence, surveillance, target high-value maritime and air platforms acquisition and reconnaissance (ISTAR) tend to be in short supply for such feeds to enable the conduct of effects- exercises (they are often heavily based operations. Within Member States, committed operationally); and their there is likely to be a continuing trend to running costs tend to be high. This is standardize and render fully compatible perhaps more of a challenge for the larger not only the compilation of such data but NATO Response Force, which is designed also the near real-time tracking of discrete as a truly ‘joint’ force with integral aspects of capability, including the vital maritime and air components, than for force multipliers such as key personnel, the smaller EU Battlegroups, where key communications and key logistics, as maritime and air capabilities are seen as ‘à la carte’ supporting strategic enablers. But work on developing rapid-response

5 At the time of writing, these are in draft Protocol No4, pursuant to draft Articles 27(6) and 31 (See 6 The EU Battlegroups are open to contributions CIG 2/1/07 REV 1). from non- Member States.

13 Launching EU Battlegroups maritime and air assets is currently decision not to attempt any unnecessary ongoing in the EU and the ‘joint’ duplication, because NATO has done it so exercising issue will undoubtedly return well. to the fore downstream. And secondly, through projects like Allied Command Transformation and the The education and training of EU NATO Response Force, not only in the Member States’ armed forces in the field transformation of European armed forces of rapid-response deployability should into being truly rapidly deployable on also be reinforced by the Battlegroup combined joint operations but also in initiative. Under the education heading, continuing to foster some interoperability four courses on ESDP are on offer for the between European and US forces. academic year 2007-2008 by the European Security and Defence College, a ‘virtual’ EU college for which colleges in EU States Conclusion & Summary of host modules7. Another 75 national Recommendations courses are on offer outside the ESDC framework. Under the training heading, The Battlegroup concept is the some 16 of the 27 Member States now cornerstone of the EU’s current action offer access to training facilities listed in an plan to improve European military annually revized catalogue published by capabilities. the EU8. For example, the UK, under the maritime heading, is offering access to all Under current arrangements, Battlegroup courses run under the Royal Navy’s generation is expected to be a relatively International Defence Training scheme. straightforward task. However, if a Battlegroup’s deployment is to be The cumulative effect of all these succeeded by larger follow-on EU forces initiatives should foster a developing or be extended beyond its initial strategic culture in Europe favouring mandated time-line, then the EU might early, rapid and where necessary robust well need to think about a common, more intervention. NATO should also continue responsive and more flexible approach to to play a vital role in this ‘transformation’ BG force generation. A more detailed EU- field: wide database of available forces than that provided by the current Forces Catalogue First and foremost, in largely unsung ‘nuts might be needed; this would also assist and bolts’ areas, not widely known some ‘tailoring to mission’, as initially outside Alliance cognoscenti, such as envisaged in the developing BG concept. operational and tactical-level command, control and communications; doctrine Turning to validation, the acid test of and procedures; interoperability and whether, in the Battlegroups, the EU has standardization. These are areas where developed a useable military capability the EU has so far taken the deliberate will be determined by the ability of the force packages (and the willingness of 7 See their political masters to allow them) to http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUp fight, to take and to lose lives. Countries load/INTERNET2007-2008.pdf for details. contributing to a Battlegroup are 8 See currently responsible for certifying their http://www.consilium.europa.eu/cms3_fo/show commitments and it is the responsibility Page.asp?id=1223&lang=en for details.

14 Graham Messervy-Whiting & Tim Williams of the framework nation to certify the deployment being made without force package as a whole. To guide this consideration of criteria, raised in process, the EU has developed a ‘BG discussion at the Battlegroups conference, Standards & Criteria’ checklist that such as: is a Battlegroup deployment the provides benchmarks in nine areas. But right response in the country the EU there is a practical requirement for wants to send it to - this should be about combined (i.e. multinational) training that making a difference to the wider world, goes beyond these EU benchmarks; a not building Europe. If a deployment is battalion and its combat support and anticipated to last for longer than four combat service support elements need to months, all elements of the EU pol-mil be bound into a single, homogeneous machine, including the Member States, force. Unless each Battlegroup offers should have a clear understanding that broadly similar capabilities, the force any initial Battlegroup mission is only a packages are unlikely to be able to execute first response whilst a longer-term equally challenging missions. The most solution is generated. The EU needs to effective solution to the problem of know what it is going to do next and be achieving a balanced and consistent confident that this longer-term solution is Battlegroup roster would be to develop a going to be in place before the centralized certification process; the EU Battlegroup is due to withdraw. Military Committee, through the EU Military Staff, could perform this task and Turning to the theme, discussed during assume the responsibility for declaring the Conference, that Battlegroups were each Battlegroup ready for operational also to be seen as a rung on the ladder of duty. This might be resisted politically by overall capability improvement within EU some Member States but a first step in this Member States, at Head of State or direction could be to promote more Government level, the BG concept was transparency between partners and unlikely to lead to a decision to increase Battlegroups. the slice of a national budget allocated to defence. At Defence Minister level, Focussing on deployment, the essential however, there may well be room, within first step has always, to date, been the his or her budget, to redefine priorities production and approval by the EU pol- and re-allocate funds. For the long term, mil machine of an overall concept for a Battlegroups will undoubtedly reinforce particular CFSP action which, as a the various NATO initiatives and, within minimum, sets out: what it is that the EU the EU, the Defence Agency’s tasks. They seeks to achieve strategically in the longer could also in due course help to provide term in the relevant area or country; impetus to the provisions on ‘structured within this framework, what it will seek co-operation’ in the EU’s draft Reform to achieve by this discrete CFSP action; Treaty. In the short to medium-term what instruments it will wish to bring to though, they could well develop an bear in order to do so; how the desired influence, within the armed forces of end-state will be measured; a fixed Member States, through activities such as: duration; and the estimated costs. Thus, culture change; education and training; there should be no danger, within the EU combined joint exercising; and smarter system and its very tight political control information technology and over the use of its ESDP instruments, communications (ITC). In the ITC field, both civil and military, of a Battlegroup there is likely to be a continuing trend to

15 Launching EU Battlegroups standardize and render fully compatible developed as a template over time. Work not only the compilation of data about on developing rapid-response maritime offered forces but also the near real-time and air assets is currently ongoing in the tracking of discrete aspects of capability, EU and the ‘joint’ exercising issue will including the vital force multipliers such undoubtedly return to the fore as key personnel, key communications downstream. The education and training and key logistics, as they transit through of EU Member States’ armed forces in the the preparation, deployment, and field of rapid-response deployability recovery cycles. Battlegroups should also should also be reinforced by the be a driver for combined joint exercising Battlegroup initiative. The cumulative within the EU. The pattern of pre-roster effect of all these initiatives should foster a multinational exercising established in developing strategic culture in Europe 2007 by the Swedes, as framework nation, favouring early, rapid and where for their five-nation BG, could well be necessary robust intervention.

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The Individual Membership package has been designed for those with a personal interest in national and international defence and security. Members include serving and retired armed forces personnel; ministers and government officials; academics; journalists; emergency response planners and operators; facilities managers; advisors and students. They meet regularly at the Institute, many taking advantage of the impressive library. For a one-off joining fee and an annual subscription, individual members receive an official identity card giving access to the premises, and to a busy programme of lectures, seminars and conferences, plus a regular copy of the RUSI Journal and RUSI Defence Systems. Additional publications can be added to the membership subscription at any time. These include RUSI's Homeland Security and Resilience Monitor, RUSI's Whitehall papers and Newsbrief and the Chinese Military Update.

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In partnership with the EU Military Staff, the UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office and Manpower Software, RUSI held a conference in June 2007 called ‘Launching EU Battlegroups’. The event provided an opportunity to assess the EU’s progress to-date in the development of the Battlegroups and the effect that these force packages will have on the Union’s crisis management capabilities, as well as future challenges and priorities.

This European Security Programme Study is the final report supporting the findings of the conference.

The Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies (RUSI) is the leading professional forum in the United Kingdom for those concerned with national and international defence and security.