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The EU‘s Battlegroup in perspective: addressing present challenges for future deployments

Ana Isabel Xavier

Origins and goals – Brief background the name “Battlegroups“ (British) or “Tacti- used anywhere and globally. After “notice perspective cal Groups“ (French), but the final “label” to move“, the BG has then 10 days to its was only approved on 10th February 2004 projection, guarantee its capability up to The Battlegroup (EU BG) when , and the United 30 days, and if replenished, remain on the was designed as a military unit within the Kingdom released a document proposing field up to 120 days. framework of the Common Security and a number of autonomous groups based Defence Policy (CSDP) and reached Full on Artemis. The “Battlegroup concept” was On 1st January 2005, the BG reached its Operational Capability (FOC) on the 1st finally approved and then submitted to Initial Operational Capability (IOC) and January 2007 to perform mainly in North the Political and Security Committee (PSC) on 1st January 2007 has reached its FOC Africa, Middle East, Balkans and Caucasus. which, in turn, requested the advice of the with ability to «undertake if so decided It is composed of an infantry - EU Military Committee (EUMC). The EU by the Council two concurrent single sized force (1500 troops) based on the BG started to gain force after the informal Battlegroup-sized rapid response opera- contributions from a coalition of member meeting that brought together ministers tions, including the ability to launch both states set under a “lead nation” on existing of defence and chiefs of staff on 5 and 6 such operations nearly simultaneously» ad hoc missions that the EU is undertaking April 2004, with higher expectations to be (European Union Council, 2007), «either as under the political control and strategic operational early in 2007. stand-alone actions or as part of a larger direction of the Council. operation» (Consilium, 2013). The EU Military Staff (EUMS) soon devel­ The EU BG concept was officially created in oped the Battlegroup Concept which was The initial thirteen Battlegroups were pro- 2004 due to the success of the Operation finally agreed upon in June 2004. These posed on 22 November 2005, but further Artemis as requested by the United Na- groups would be at the disposal at short groups have joined them since then. In tions to intervene in the Democratic Repu- notice for any UN request and be rapidly order to assure full capability, the Battle- blic of Congo. At the time, the Secretary- tailored to specific missions including groups rotate every six months (EUMC, General emphasised the value conflict prevention, evacuation, humani- 2006). The principles of multina­tionality of the Battlegroups in helping the United tarian aid or initial stabilisation. Moreover, (, 2007: 4) and inter­ Nations to deal with instability crisis all the Battlegroups would have enough operability are of great importance to over the world. Indeed, Artemis showed range to deal with all those tasks, although ensure the effective use of military forces the ability of the EU to rapidly react and ought to be limited in “size and intensity“ on the field. deploy in a short time and distance scale due to the small nature of the groups. since, in just three weeks, the EU managed They were defined as combat-trained, so Challenges and prospects – to agree on the Crisis Management Con- their full potential would be best realised a critical insight cept (CMC) and launch the operation. In in tasks of combat forces in crisis manage­ fact, in only 20 days the deployment took ment, bearing in mind their limited Though the BG concept is properly up­ off. As a result, the success of the Artemis size. Battlegroups operations would be dated and appears to be conceptually mission gave the impression that all future conducted under a UN Security Council appropriate for the missions and tasks rapid response deployments would be Resolution (UNSCR), although operations that were designed to for the EU to rapidly easily putted in practice. could be drawn in situations with no need react in trouble spots, there are still some of such procedure, like the evacuation of major problems dealing with political In 24th November 2003, a Franco-British EU citizens. decision making and military force deploy- Summit concluded that the EU should be ment deadlines, as well as lack of additio- able to respond to all the requests made The BG succeeds in an area of employment nal resources for strategic force multiplier by the UN, both in Africa and anywhere at a distance up to 6000 km from Brussels assets (transports, satellites). else in the world. The proposal suggested as the centre of the range, but can be

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Furthermore, to be consistent with a com- the substantial costs associated with the In addition, another future challenge refers prehensive approach, there is the need to preparation and the possible deployment to ongoing initiatives encouraged by include a robust civilian component and of Battlegroups, combined with cur- groups of “small” states that seem to have review the Athena mechanism (Paccaud, rent financial crisis and austerity, pose, less money available but more interest 2012) in order to address and mitigate however, challenges to fill the Battle- in gathering interests and capabilities for the current impact of the financial crisis Roster. This situation has triggered defence. No wonder that «in consequence, on the European defence capabilities, inten­sive work and initiatives to mitigate their added-value [BG] has been more namely following the pooling and sharing existing shortfalls» (Consilium, 2013). significant for individual member states milestones. than for the Union as a whole, and for its One of the reasons that may explain the role as a global actor» (Hatzigeorgopoulos, In fact, Europe surely wants to take care of difficulties to pursue its mission is the lack 2012). One of the best examples is its backyard, but without supporting an of political will of the EU member states and that recently announced the expensive model or duplicating its efforts to send troops abroad (frequently the “re­ creation of a joint in similar structures such as the NATO mote” abroad off to the neighbourhood), and urged a Non EU country () to Response Force (NRF). In fact, EU and NATO as well as (or specially) the already menti- gather in order to make up the required members need proper planning, coordina- oned economic constraints. In fact, the EU 1500 elements. tion and cooperation in order to assure the BG formations are based on contributions different commitments towards collec­ from the member states and the troops Nonetheless, this kind of initiatives may tive security, both in terms of troops and and equipment are drawn from the EU also warn us on a “two speed” EU BG, since specially the financial resources. In addition, member states under a “lead nation“. the larger member states will generally a unit cannot be on stand-by for the EU contribute with their own Battlegroups, Battlegroup and the NRF at the same time. Along with the lack of political will two while smaller members are expected to Therefore, though it is a project running other “classic” obstacles still remain: first, create common groups. In fact, each group within the European framework, a perma- the huge differences on the national must have a ‘lead nation‘ or ‘framework na- nent tactical group clearly presents relevant perceptions of security and safety; and tion‘ which will take operational command implications for both EU and NATO. If the EU second, the time-consuming discussion, and will also be associated with a deploy­ Battlegroups were available for future NATO approval and launching process of ex­ able headquarters in order to assure that operations or used as a contribution to the tremely short-notice combat missions. In at least one Battlegroup is on standby NATO Response Force, European security fact, many of the nations that supply the every six months. However, although the and defence could also highly benefit in troops need a parliamentary approval for Battlegroup concept is open to non EU terms of lessons learned (always useful for such assignments and the very short time- countries (Norway and , participate building the alliance’s security and defence line between the approval of the CMC, the in a group each) other EU member states framework) as well as certification process political decision to launch the operation already stressed its opting out clauses and (NATO’s pre-planned trainings and exercises and the troops to be projected on the “a la carte” solutions. Those are the cases could be plugged into the Battlegroup ground frequently doesn’t converge on. of that is not obliged to partici- certification process and vice-versa). pate in the common defence and security To overcome these problems, Gros-Ver- policy according to its accession treaty, Another feature that deserves to be heyde (2012a) present us some solutions, as well as that doesn´t participate highlighted is that the EU Battlegroups are including: the gathering of the member in any Battlegroup. Other Member States not permanent, but created on an ad hoc States and the formation of each lead decided to focus in specific capabilities in basis to fill the roster and always based on nation (in turn, the smaller States should support of the EU Battlegroups: voluntary offers. For that particular reason, crowd and organize themselves into (medical group), (a water purifi- Gros-Verheyde (2012a, 2012b) warns us regional partnerships to build leading cation unit), (the Athens Sealift Co- about some “holes” on the Battlegroup nations); the inclusion of a civilian compo- ordination Centre) and France (structure calendar. In fact, even differing from what nent; introducing changes around some of a multinational and deployable Force prevailed until the year 2012 (where there of its rapid response capabilities, such as Headquarters). have always been on call two BG), from medical support, establishing contracts for the first semester of 2013 until the year logistical support strategic transport, an 2016 only one BG is available per semes- between the EUMS ter (except for the second half of 2014 and UN logistical structures. The author where there’s none, as well as from 2017 also accepts the possibility of the BG to be ahead). As a result, «[t]he high operational, used as a reserve force.

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Concluding Remarks the deployment of tactical Battlegroups ly as in 8-12 years from now, «decreasing in Mali. R[esearch] &T[echnology] funds will Although the Battlegroup was born and impact negatively on Europe’s current rela- raised as a “standing army“ for Europe and Additionally, seems quite evident that tive technological edge, rendering the re- eighteen BG have been created so far, as of the 28 member states have very different quired minimum of ‘strategic autonomy’ a today we are still waiting for their opera­ military capabilities and strategic cultures. pipedream. In prospect, this could lead to tional deployment. Moreover, they only contribute when and a de facto ‘de-industrialisation’ of European how they really want, in the exact measure defence» (Missiroli, 2013: 12). Moreover, As Arnaud Danjean, a French member of of their will, capability and strategic inter­ according to Hamelink «[t]he BG Concept the centre-right EPP group, argues «like ests. Therefore, the European security provides the EU with a specific tool in a all the other observers, the European and defence policy remains open to its whole range of rapid response capabilities, Parliament has noted that these groups biggest founding mission: offer a common which contribute to making the EU more have never been used: they remain a response­ in line with the interests and coherent, more active and more capable» virtual instrument» (2013). In addition, resources of each country and honour (2005: 10).2 «the current tactical group on standby has the missions carried out in the name of a troops from France, and Germany, common security and defence policy. That’s one of the reasons why the 10 years which all three are in favour of reviving celebration of the Solana’s European Secu­ the European defence policy and are quite Bearing this in mind, should the EU keep rity Strategy would surely be helpful to ambitious about it. It‘s a shame that one of up the tactical units, broad the scope or recall the need for a security and defence the tools of the European defence policy abolish them for good? There seems to agenda that truly promotes European that was available has not been used» be a wide consensus in Europe that the contribution to multinational operations (Danjean, 2013). Battlegroups must succeed somehow, for ensuring global peace and security. A since they represent Europe’s ambitions clear sign of the willingness to give some Michael Gahler, the German representative in the word’s stability, democracy and steps further is the paragraph 8 of the of the Christian Democratic Union in the development. In fact, if Europe wants last as emphasises the European Parliament and security spokes- to be credible in contributing to assure “need to improve the EU rapid response person of the EVP parliamentary group, peace and security and to take the lead in capabilities, including through more flex­ also agrees that «[a]t some point you have security and defence issues, at least within ible and deployable EU Battle groups as to wonder whether another way to do this its strategic neighbourhood, the Battle- Member States so decide”. We then hope isn‘t better (...) or at some point, no one groups must add to its original military that the decisions on the Battlegroups, the will believe in this option any­more».1 In mission - prepare the ground for long- robustness of the missions and the role practice, French soldiers, not the EU Battle- term missions – other civilian tasks such as that this tactical task force may play in the groups, are now deployed in Mali. training missions or „observe, advice and international arena will not be forgotten in assist“ (as UN assigns). The future trend the head of states in 2014 as the political Mali is, indeed, one of the most recent seems, therefore, complimentary, in order agenda will surely be focus on the 2020 international crises that show in prac­ to enhance the European Union’s role as a Strategy goals and European Parliament tice the dilemmas of this tactical force, crisis management global player. In fact, elections next May. considered the most versatile military unit there are plans to extend the concept to for responding quickly to the crisis once air and naval forces, although not to the Ana Isabel Xavier and where they occur. The Battlegroup extent of having a single standing force on Assistant Professor in International Relations is the smallest self-sufficient military unit standby, but scattered forces which could and Political Science in NOVA University that can be deployed and sustained on an be rapidly assembled. and Post Doctoral Research Fellow in Minho operation field. Moreover, the flexibility of University (). the Battlegroup “package“ and its capacity What is certain is that the EU must indeed to be tailored to the mission is one of the “keep the boots on the ground”, because key elements of success since the differ­ in the present «Europeans are already ent combinations allows the ability to losing sovereignty by not consolidating, perform a wide range of tasks. That was not optimising, not innovating, not regio- why, besides the offer to train the Mali nalising and not integrating their military Army, the European Parliament´s security capabilities» (Missiroli, 2013: 7). Moreover, and defence subcommittee recommended the future perspectives are not EU’s friend-

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Notes European Union Military Committee (EUMC). 2006. EU Battlegroup Concept. 1) Please check the interview in http:// Brussels. www.dw.de/debate-surrounds-future-of- eu-battle-groups/a-16852649 (accessed in Gros-Verheyde , N. 2012a. Battlegroups. December 20, 2013). Pourquoi le planning n’est pas tenu? La réflexion continue. http://www. 2) The three objectives addressed by bruxelles2.eu/defense-ue/capacites- Solana in 2003 in his European Security milit-%E2%80%93-exercices-ue/battle- Strategy, http://consilium.europa.eu/ groups-pourquoi-le-planning-nest-pas- uedocs/cmsUpload/78367.pdf (accessed tenu-la-reflexion-continue.html (accessed December 10, 2013). December 10, 2013).

References Gros-Verheyde, N. 2012b. Battlegroup, Consilium. 2013. EU Battlegroups. Brussels. un problème, chronique? http://www. bruxelles2.eu/defense-ue/capacites-milit- Danjean, Arnaud. 2013. Mali: It‘s a %E2%80%93-exercices-ue/battlegroup- shame that the EU‘s tactical Battle- un-probleme-chronique.html (accessed groups are not being deployed, Security December 10, 2013). and defence, 31-01-2013, http://www. europarl.europa.eu/news/en/headlines/ Hamelink, Ron. 2005. The Battlegroups content/20130125STO05492/html/Mali- Concept: Giving the EU a concrete “milita- It‘s-a-shame-that-the-EU‘s-tactical-battle- ry” face. Eurofuture – winter 2005: 08-11. groups-are-not-being-deployed (accessed http://www.consilium.eu.int/uedocs/cm- December 10, 2013). sUpload/Battlegroup1DefenseandSecurity. pdf (accessed December10, 2013). European Council. 2007. EU Battlegroups - Factsheet. Brussels. Hatzigeorgopoulos, Myrto. 2012. The role of EU Battlegroups in European Defence. European Council. 2013. Conclusions European Security Review 56. ISIS Europe. of the European Council http://www. Missiroli, Antonio (ed.). 2013. Enabling the consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/ future European military capabilities 2013- docs/pressdata/en/ec/140245.pdf (acessed 2025: challenges and avenues. Paris: Euro- December 22, 2013). pean Union Institute for Security Studies.

European Parliament – Policy Department Paccaud, Laurent. 2012. European Union External Policies. 2007. The Battle Groups: Battlegroups. http://www.consilium. catalyst for a European Defence Policy. europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/8%20-%20 © Institut für Europa- Brussels. BG%20issues.ppt (accessed December 10, und Sicherheitspolitik, 2013 2013). Alle Rechte vorbehalten.

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