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Rob Huebert Rhueb Ert@ Ucal Gary.Ca
Centre for Military and Strategic Studies THE CONTINUALLY CHANGING ARCTIC SECURITY ENVIRONMENT TThe Society Of Naval Architects And Marine Engineers – Arctic Section Rob Huebert Rhue ber t@ucal gary.ca Calgary April 20 , 2012 Main Themes • Increasing International and Canadian Debate as to what the Arctic will look like in the future – physical; economic; cultural; and geopolitical • A New Arctic Security Environment is Forming on a Global Basis – What will it look like? • How will this impact Canada? United S?WhdCddhUidStates? What does Canada and the United States need to do? The Transforming Arctic • The Arctic is a state of massive transformation – Climate Change – Resource Development – (was up to a high $140+ barrel of oil- now $108 barrel) – Geopolitical Transformation/Globalization The Image of Change: Accessibility The Melting Ice: Movement of Ice Sept 2007-April 2008 Source: Canadian Ice Service The Economics: The Hope of Resources Oil and Gas: Oil Resources and Gas of the North Source: AMAP Uncertain Maritime jurisdiction & boundaries in the Arctic www.dur.ac.uk/ibru/resources/arctic The Changing Technologies: PdAiLNGProposed Arctic LNG Source: Samsung Heavy Industries New Signs of Cooperation • Public Pronouncements • Creation of Arctic Council • Application of UNCLOS • Norway-RiMiiBRussia Maritime Bound ary Delimitation 2010 • Arctic Council – Search and Rescue Agreement 2010 • Public Pronouncements….. New Signs of Competition • Russia – Renewed Assertiveness/ Petrodollars • United States – Multi-lateral reluctance/emerging -
Air Defence in Northern Europe
FINNISH DEFENCE STUDIES AIR DEFENCE IN NORTHERN EUROPE Heikki Nikunen National Defence College Helsinki 1997 Finnish Defence Studies is published under the auspices of the National Defence College, and the contributions reflect the fields of research and teaching of the College. Finnish Defence Studies will occasionally feature documentation on Finnish Security Policy. Views expressed are those of the authors and do not necessarily imply endorsement by the National Defence College. Editor: Kalevi Ruhala Editorial Assistant: Matti Hongisto Editorial Board: Chairman Prof. Pekka Sivonen, National Defence College Dr. Pauli Järvenpää, Ministry of Defence Col. Erkki Nordberg, Defence Staff Dr., Lt.Col. (ret.) Pekka Visuri, Finnish Institute of International Affairs Dr. Matti Vuorio, Scientific Committee for National Defence Published by NATIONAL DEFENCE COLLEGE P.O. Box 266 FIN - 00171 Helsinki FINLAND FINNISH DEFENCE STUDIES 10 AIR DEFENCE IN NORTHERN EUROPE Heikki Nikunen National Defence College Helsinki 1997 ISBN 951-25-0873-7 ISSN 0788-5571 © Copyright 1997: National Defence College All rights reserved Oy Edita Ab Pasilan pikapaino Helsinki 1997 INTRODUCTION The historical progress of air power has shown a continuous rising trend. Military applications emerged fairly early in the infancy of aviation, in the form of first trials to establish the superiority of the third dimension over the battlefield. Well- known examples include the balloon reconnaissance efforts made in France even before the birth of the aircraft, and it was not long before the first generation of flimsy, underpowered aircraft were being tested in a military environment. The Italians used aircraft for reconnaissance missions at Tripoli in 1910-1912, and the Americans made their first attempts at taking air power to sea as early as 1910-1911. -
Assessment and Selection Process for the Bulgarian Special Forces
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive DSpace Repository Theses and Dissertations 1. Thesis and Dissertation Collection, all items 2019-12 ASSESSMENT AND SELECTION PROCESS FOR THE BULGARIAN SPECIAL FORCES Vlahov, Petar Georgiev Monterey, CA; Naval Postgraduate School http://hdl.handle.net/10945/64090 Downloaded from NPS Archive: Calhoun NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA THESIS ASSESSMENT AND SELECTION PROCESS FOR THE BULGARIAN SPECIAL FORCES by Petar Georgiev Vlahov December 2019 Thesis Advisor: Kalev I. Sepp Second Reader: Michael Richardson Approved for public release. Distribution is unlimited. THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK Form Approved OMB REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE No. 0704-0188 Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instruction, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188) Washington, DC 20503. 1. AGENCY USE ONLY 2. REPORT DATE 3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED (Leave blank) December 2019 Master’s thesis 4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE 5. FUNDING NUMBERS ASSESSMENT AND SELECTION PROCESS FOR THE BULGARIAN SPECIAL FORCES 6. AUTHOR(S) Petar Georgiev Vlahov 7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 8. PERFORMING Naval Postgraduate School ORGANIZATION REPORT Monterey, CA 93943-5000 NUMBER 9. SPONSORING / MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND 10. -
Safe, Sustainable Shipping Table of Contents
Safe, Sustainable Shipping Table of Contents Our Coverage Area 1 Quote from the Board Chair 1a President’s Message 3 2019 Highlights 5 Best in Class 7 Safe, Sustainable Shipping 9 2019 Year in Review 11 Prevent 13 Respond 14 Pioneer 15 Financial Stewardship & Accountability 17 Board Roster Back Cover • 2019 Annual Report Safe, Sustainable Shipping Our Coverage Area The Network’s area of service is incredibly vast. Flip the half page to hear why our board chair is proud of the work we consistently do. Beaufort Chukchi Sea Sea Western Alaska Captain of the Port Zone Prince William Sound Captain of the Port Zone Risk Reduction Areas Nontank Authorized Passes Response Hubs Gulf of Bering Sea Alaska Bristol Bay Buldir Pass Unimak Pass Amchitka Pass Amukta Pass Pacific Ocean 1 • 2019 Annual Report Safe, Sustainable Shipping Our Coverage Area The Network’s area of service is incredibly vast. Flip the half page to hear why our board chair is proud of the work we consistently do. Beaufort Chukchi Sea Sea Western Alaska Captain of the Port Zone Prince William Sound Captain of the Port Zone From the Risk Reduction Areas Nontank Authorized Board Chairman Passes Response Hubs “ Maritime shipping is a cornerstone of our global economy. As our industry continues to break new ground – whether it be cleaner fuel, advances in the prevention of maritime incidents, or exploring new routes through the Arctic – the Network is committed to fostering an environment of safe, sustainable shipping in balance with cost.” Gulf of Bering Sea - Network Board Chair MichaelAlaska Moore VP, Pacific Merchant Shipping Association Bristol Bay Buldir Pass Unimak Pass Amchitka Pass Amukta Pass Pacific Ocean 1 Message from the President & CEO H R O U G H P H T A R G T T N N E 2019 was a year of growth and change – and we fully anticipate 2020 will be one Our strength and core competency is E R as well. -
The Role of the Norwegian Coast Guard in Control Management: Discurse Or Guns?
WORKSHOP IN POLITICAL THEORY AND POLICY A-NAUVSfS 513 NORTH PARK Paper presented at the "Fifth Common INDIANA UNIVERSITY Property Conference: Reinventing BL0OMNGTQN. WBIANA 47408-3186 the Commons", Boda, 24. - 28. May 1995 Session: Enforcement and Control in Marine Fisheries THE ROLE OF THE NORWEGIAN COAST GUARD IN CONTROL MANAGEMENT: DISCURSE OR GUNS? I By Geir B. H0nneland NORUT Social Science Research Ltd., Troms0, Norway 1. Introduction1 In keeping with the tradition from Garrett Hardin's The Tradedy of the Commons (1968), controlling the harvesting of natural resources has been viewd as an element of I power utilization: Authorities survey the observance of regulations in order to punish violators. This paper includes another aspect of enforcement in marine fisheries. Control bodies may reach their goal of preserving the resource basis by seeking to increase the legitimacy of fishery regulations among fishermen. The traditional view of enforcement implies a control activity based on coercion, where fishermen are threatened by economic sanctions if revealed in violation. An enforcement based on discursive actions, 1 More elaborated accounts of the questions raised in this paper, are given in Norwegian language in H0nneland (1993 and 1995). 1 on the other hand, seeks to influence fishermen's behaviour by appealing to their reason and their trust in the righteousness of regulations. These theoretic approaches will be further elaborated in the first part of this paper. Subsequently, a brief outline is given of the organization of fisheries control in the Barents Sea, as well as the jurisdictional and management framework it operates within. In the last part of the paper, relevant tendencies in the violation statistics of the Norwegian Coast Guard is presented, and this empirical material is discussed in view of the theoretical focus of the paper. -
Legislation Factsheet: Conscientious Objection
UNITED STATES COMMISSION on INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM FACTSHEET August 2020 CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTION Gayle Manchin By Kirsten Lavery, Supervisory Policy Analyst Chair Tony Perkins Vice Chair Overview Anurima Bhargava Conscientious objection to military service is frequently connected to freedom of Vice Chair religion or belief, as many conscientious objectors are motivated by deeply-held religious beliefs. To protect the rights of these individuals, some states maintain laws Commissioners that exempt them from compulsory military service. Often, objectors are required to Gary Bauer participate in an alternative national service. James W. Carr Although the right to conscientious objection is recognized under international human Frederick A. Davie rights law, a number of governments do not have provisions for conscientious objection to military service. When this right is not recognized in states with mandatory military Nadine Maenza service, conscientious objectors may face prison time for their beliefs. Johnnie Moore Nury Turkel Eritrea – No right to conscientious objection: Despite the signing of historic peace agreement with Ethiopia in 2018, the law in Eritrea still requires all citizens Erin D. Singshinsuk to perform national service between the ages of 14 and 50 with limited exceptions. Executive Director The requirement includes 18 months of military service and training for those deemed fit. In practice, service often extends beyond 18 months. Thelaw does not provide for conscientious objection status for religious reasons, and there are no alternatives for objectors who are willing to perform alternative civilian USCIRF’s Mission service. Hundreds of Eritreans are believed to remain religious prisoners of conscience, including Jehovah’s Witnesses imprisoned for exercising their beliefs and conscientiously objecting to military service. -
Safe, Secure, Sovereign: Reinventing the Canadian Coast Guard Report of the Standing Committee on Fisheries and Oceans
HOUSE OF COMMONS CANADA SAFE, SECURE, SOVEREIGN: REINVENTING THE CANADIAN COAST GUARD REPORT OF THE STANDING COMMITTEE ON FISHERIES AND OCEANS Tom Wappel, M.P. Chairman March 2004 The Speaker of the House hereby grants permission to reproduce this document, in whole or in part for use in schools and for other purposes such as private study, research, criticism, review or newspaper summary. Any commercial or other use or reproduction of this publication requires the express prior written authorization of the Speaker of the House of Commons. If this document contains excerpts or the full text of briefs presented to the Committee, permission to reproduce these briefs, in whole or in part, must be obtained from their authors. Also available on the Parliamentary Internet Parlementaire: http://www.parl.gc.ca Available from Communication Canada — Publishing, Ottawa, Canada K1A 0S9 SAFE, SECURE, SOVEREIGN: REINVENTING THE CANADIAN COAST GUARD REPORT OF THE STANDING COMMITTEE ON FISHERIES AND OCEANS Tom Wappel, M.P. Chairman March 2004 STANDING COMMITTEE ON FISHERIES AND OCEANS CHAIRMAN Tom Wappel VICE-CHAIRS John Cummins Bill Matthews MEMBERS Andy Burton Hon. Shawn Murphy Rodger Cuzner Joe Peschisolido R. John Efford Carmen Provenzano Reed Elley Jean-Yves Roy Georges Farrah Gary Schellenberger Ghislain Fournier Paul Steckle Loyola Hearn Peter Stoffer Dominic LeBlanc Bob Wood CLERKS OF THE COMMITTEE Jeremy LeBlanc Angela Crandall FROM THE RESEARCH BRANCH OF THE LIBRARY OF PARLIAMENT Alan Nixon François Côté iii THE STANDING COMMITTEE ON FISHERIES AND OCEANS has the honour to present its FIRST REPORT Pursuant to Standing Order 108(2), the Committee has studied the Canadian Coast Guard and is pleased to report as follows: v TABLE OF CONTENTS SAFE, SECURE, SOVEREIGN: REINVESTING THE CANADIAN COAST GUARD .................................................................................................... -
The Ortelius Incident in the Hinlopen Strait—A Case Study on How Satellite-Based AIS Can Support Search and Rescue Operations in Remote Waters
resources Case Report The Ortelius Incident in the Hinlopen Strait—A Case Study on How Satellite-Based AIS Can Support Search and Rescue Operations in Remote Waters Johnny Grøneng Aase 1,2 ID 1 Institute for Marine and Antarctic Studies, University of Tasmania, Private Bag 129, Hobart, TAS 7001, Australia; [email protected] 2 Department of Research and Development, Norwegian Defence Cyber Academy, P.O. Box 800, Postmottak, NO-2617 Lillehammer, Norway; [email protected]; Tel.: +47-9285-2550 Received: 26 April 2017; Accepted: 24 July 2017; Published: 27 July 2017 Abstract: In this paper, Automatic Identification System (AIS) data collected from space is used to demonstrate how the data can support search and rescue (SAR) operations in remote waters. The data was recorded by the Norwegian polar orbiting satellite AISSat-1. This is a case study discussing the Ortelius incident in Svalbard in early June 2016. The tourist vessel flying the flag of Cyprus experienced engine failure in a remote part of the Arctic Archipelago. The passengers and crew were not harmed. There were no Norwegian Coast Guard vessels in the vicinity. The Governor of Svalbard had to deploy her vessel Polarsyssel to assist the Ortelius. The paper shows that satellite-based AIS enables SAR coordination centers to swiftly determine the identity and precise location of vessels in the vicinity of the troubled ship. This knowledge makes it easier to coordinate SAR operations. Keywords: tourism; polar; search and rescue; SAR; Arctic; Svalbard; AISSat-1; Ortelius 1. Introduction On Friday 3 June 2016 at 12:30 am local time, the tourist vessel Ortelius reported engine trouble in the vicinity of the Vaigatt Islands in the Hinlopen Strait. -
Defence Strategies of the Smaller NATO States – a Comparative Study Obranné Strategie Malých Států NATO – Komparativní Studie
Vojenské rozhledy č. 4/2020 DOI: 10.3849/2336-2995.29.2020.04.023-045 Peer-reviewed Defence strategies of the smaller NATO states – a comparative study Obranné strategie malých států NATO – komparativní studie Lukáš Dyčka, Taivo Rõkk, Zdzisław Śliwa Abstract: Defence strategies of smaller NATO states represent interesting source of information about defence policies of this pool of countries. Definition of what constitutes “small state” is discussed in first step. In second step, this study compares 10 selected NATO countries Defence Strategies in terms of identified risks and threats, future military capabilities to counter threats, processes of drafting defence papers, level of details and approving authorities. Outlining these indicators and characteristics provide useful overview for future draft of National defence strategies within countries of similar size. Abstrakt: Obranné strategie malých států NATO představují důležitý zdroj infor- mací o obranné politice. Definice “malého státu” je však nejasná a její zpřesnění představuje první část článku. Ve druhé části pak text srov- nává Obranné strategie deseti vybraných malých států NATO z pohledu hrozeb, budoucích vojenských schopností, procesu tvorby dokumentů, úrovně detailu a úrovně, na které je dokument schvalován. Přehledné se- řazení těchto poznatků pak potenciálně může sloužit jako vhodný základ a inspirace při tvorbě obranných strategií menších států. Key words: Defence; strategy; strategic documents; small states; military capabilities; NATO. Klíčová slova: Obranná strategie; koncepční dokumenty; malý stat; vojenské schopnos- ti; NATO. 23 Vojenské rozhledy č. 4/2020 Defence strategies of the smaller NATO states INTRODUCTION The re-emergence of the use of military power in the Eastern Europe after annexation of Crimea has again created a dilemma of making choices within defence policy of small states. -
Finnish Defence Forces International Centre the Many Faces of Military
Finnish Defence Forces International Finnish Defence Forces Centre 2 The Many Faces of Military Crisis Management Lessons from the Field Edited by Mikaeli Langinvainio Finnish Defence Forces FINCENT Publication Series International Centre 1:2011 1 FINNISH DEFENCE FORCES INTERNATIONAL CENTRE FINCENT PUBLICATION SERIES 1:2011 The Many Faces of Military Crisis Management Lessons from the Field EDITED BY MIKAELI LANGINVAINIO FINNISH DEFENCE FORCES INTERNATIONAL CENTRE TUUSULA 2011 2 Mikaeli Langinvainio (ed.): The Many Faces of Military Crisis Management Lessons from the Field Finnish Defence Forces International Centre FINCENT Publication Series 1:2011 Cover design: Harri Larinen Layout: Heidi Paananen/TKKK Copyright: Puolustusvoimat, Puolustusvoimien Kansainvälinen Keskus ISBN 978–951–25–2257–6 ISBN 978–951–25–2258–3 (PDF) ISSN 1797–8629 Printed in Finland Juvenens Print Oy Tampere 2011 3 Contents Jukka Tuononen Preface .............................................................................................5 Mikaeli Langinvainio Introduction .....................................................................................8 Mikko Laakkonen Military Crisis Management in the Next Decade (2020–2030) ..............................................................12 Antti Häikiö New Military and Civilian Training - What can they learn from each other? What should they learn together? And what must both learn? .....................................................................................20 Petteri Kurkinen Concept for the PfP Training -
Economic and Social Council
UNITED NATIONS E Distr. Economic and GENERAL Social Council E/CN.4/1997/99 16 January 1997 Original: ENGLISH COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS Fifty•third session Item 23 of the provisional agenda THE QUESTION OF CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTION TO MILITARY SERVICE Report of the Secretary•General prepared pursuant to Commission resolution 1995/83 CONTENTS Paragraphs Page Introduction ....................... 1 • 5 3 I. SUMMARY OF INFORMATION RECEIVED ......... 6 • 47 4 A. Existence of conscription .......... 6 • 15 4 B. Liability for service ............ 16 • 19 5 C. Length of service .............. 20 • 22 6 D. Recognition of conscientious objection .... 23 • 33 7 E. Known cases of conscientious objection .... 34 • 37 9 F. Alternative and development service ..... 38 • 40 9 G. Possible penalties for refusal to perform military service ............... 41 • 44 11 H. Dissemination of information on conscientious objection ........... 45 • 47 11 GE.97•10207 (E) E/CN.4/1997/99 page 2 CONTENTS ( continued ) Paragraphs Page II. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS ......... 48 • 54 12 Annexes I. Summary of information available on conscription, conscientious objection to military service, and alternative service ................... 14 II. Listing of countries or territories according to their situation with regard to conscription and alternative service ................... 52 III. Information on the question of asylum .......... 55 E/CN.4/1997/99 page 3 Introduction 1. In its resolution 1995/83 of 8 March 1995 the Commission on Human Rights appealed to States, if -
Re Energising Europe S Security and Defence Policy
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