HANDBOOK CSDP

THE COMMON SECURITY AND DEFENCE POLICY OF THE Volume I 3rd edition

HANDBOOK ON CSDP THE COMMON SECURITY AND DEFENCE POLICY OF THE EUROPEAN UNION Third edition

edited by

Jochen Rehrl

with forewords by

H.E. High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and Vice President of the

H.E. Hans Peter Doskozil Federal Minister of Defence and Sports of the Republic of

H. E. Christoforos Fokaides Minister of Defence of the Republic of This document has been produced with the financial assistance of the European Union and the Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Cyprus.

Disclaimer:

Any views or opinions presented in this handbook are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily represent those of the European Union, the Austrian Ministry of Defence and Sports or the Cypriot Minisrty of Defence.

Publication of the Federal Ministry of Defence and Sports of the Republic of Austria

Editor: Jochen Rehrl Idea and concept: Jochen Rehrl

Published by: Directorate for Security Policy of the Federal Ministry of Defence and Sports of the Republic of Austria

Picture credits for the front page: European Union, EUMM Georgia, EUNAVFOR MED, European Security and Defence College Printed and bound by: Armed Forces Printing Centre, Vienna/Austria, 2017 (16-03300 | 16-03527) © Federal Ministry of Defence and Sports of the Republic of Austria and Jochen Rehrl

Project Number: 2016.7906 Linguistic version Media/Volume Catalogue number ISBN DOI EN Paper/Volume_01 QW-07-16-116-EN-C 978-92-95201-05-7 10.2855/14292 PDF/Volume_01 QW-07-16-116-EN-N 978-92-95201-04-0 10.2855/764888

Printed according to the Austrian Ecolabel for printedmatter, Austrian Federal MinistryofDefence and Sports/ Armed Forces Printing Centre, UW-Nr. 943 CONTENTS

1 COMMON SECURITY AND DEFENCE POLICY 1.1. History and Development of CSDP (Gustav Lindstrom)...... 16 1.2. The EU lobalG Strategy...... 20 Factsheet: European Defence Action Plan...... 25 Graphic: The EU in a contested world...... 26 1.3. Analysing the EU Global Strategy on Foreign and Security Policy (Sven Biscop)...... 28 1.4. How to implement Strategy – Implementation Plan on Security and Defence (Raphaela Engel)...... 35

2 ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES 2.1. The uropeanE Union and CSDP – State of Affairs (Gabor Iklody)...... 42 2.2. The uropeanE Council and CSDP (Luis Amorim)...... 46 2.2.1. The uropeanE Council...... 46 2.2.2. The Council of inistersM of the European Union ...... 50 2.3. The oleR of the European Commission in CSDP (Diego de Ojeda)...... 55 2.4. The oleR of the in CSDP (Jérôme Legrand)...... 58 2.5. The EEAS and its Crisis Management Component (Arnold Kammel)...... 66 2.6. EEAS Crisis Response Mechanism (Pedro Serrano)...... 73

3 CSDP MISSIONS AND OPERATIONS 3.1. How to Launch a CSDP Mission or Operation (Ana Isabel Xavier and Jochen Rehrl)... 78 3.2. Challenges of Military Operations and Missions (Georgios Tsitsikostas)...... 83 3.3. Challenges for Civilian CSDP Missions (Kate Fearon and Sophie Picavet)...... 89 3.4. Excursus: EUFOR ALTHEA (Friedrich Schrötter)...... 97

4 EVOLVING SECURITY CHALLENGES 4.1. Migration and CSDP (Jochen Rehrl)...... 104 Factsheet: A European Border and Coast Guard...... 112 4.2. Counter-Terrorism and the CSDP (Birgit Löser)...... 114 4.3. Cyber Security/Defence and CSDP (Jan Peter Giesecke)...... 119 4.4. Hybrid Threat and CSDP (John Maas)...... 125 4.5. Critical Infrastructure Protection (Herbert Saurugg)...... 131

3 5 CROSS-CUTTING CSDP ISSUES 5.1. Gender and Women, Peace and Security in CSDP (Taina Järvinen)...... 140 5.2. Human Rights and CSDP (Taina Järvinen)...... 143 5.3. Rule of Law and CSDP (Daphne Lodder)...... 146 5.4. The ewN EU-Wide Strategic Framework to Support SSR (Karin Gatt Rutter and Gianmarco Scuppa)...... 152

6 CFSP AGENCIES 6.1. EU Institute for Security Studies (Antonio Missiroli)...... 156 6.2. The uropeanE Union Satellite Centre (Pascal Legai)...... 160 6.3. The uropeanE Defence Agency (Jorge Domecq)...... 164

7 COOPERATION AND COLLABORATION 7.1. CSDP and Partners (Clara Ganslandt)...... 170 7.2. Internal-External Security Nexus – Strengthening Ties Between CSDP and FSJ Actors (Michel Savary)...... 178 7.3. The eurityS and Development Nexus (Clément Boutillier)...... 184

8 CAPABILITY DEVELOPMENT 8.1. EU Capability Development (Herbert Sailer)...... 194 8.2. Strenghtening EU Defence with Multinational Cooperation (Sabine Mengelberg)...... 206 8.3. European Defence Deployable Capabilities (Christos Malikkides)...... 209

9 TRAINING AND EDUCATION 9.1. The CSDPTraining Policy (Horst Koukhol)...... 214 9.2. The uropeanE Security and Defence College (Dirk Dubois)...... 217 9.3. – European Initiative for Young Officers inspired by Erasmus (Harald Gell)...... 220 9.4. The ositiveP Side Effects of Training – The Security Policy Dimension (Jochen Rehrl)...... 223

4 LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

A CMC Crisis Management Concept AF Armed Forces CMPD Crisis Management and Planning AFET Committee on Foreign Affairs (EP) Directorate AKU Autonomous Knowledge Unit CoE Council of Europe AMIS African Union Mission in COM Commander AMISOM African Union Mission in Somalia CONOPS Concept of Operations APF African Peace Facility COPPS Coordinating Office for Palestini- ARF ASEAN Regional Forum an Police Support (EUPOL) ARGUS Secure Rapid General Alert System COREPER Committee of Permanent Repre- ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian sentatives of the Governments of Nations the Member States ASEM Asia-Europe Meeting COSI Standing Committee on Oper- AU African Union ational Cooperation on Internal Security B CPCC Civilian Planning and Conduct BENELUX , the , Luxem- Capability bourg CPPB Conflict reventionP and Peace BG Battle Building BIS Budgetary Impact Statement CRM Crisis Response Mechanism (EEAS) C CS Cyber Security CA Comprehensive Approach CSDP Common Security and Defence CAR Central African Republic Policy CBM Confidence-Building Measure CT Counter-terrorism CBSD Capacity Building in Support of CT/P-CVE Counter-terrorism/Prevention and Security and Development Countering Violent Extremism CCDP Civilian Capability Development CVE Countering Violent Extremism Plan CD Creative Destruction D CD Cyber Defence DCI Development Cooperation CDP Capability Development Plan Instrument CDPF Cyber Defence Policy Framework DDoS Distributed Denial-of-Service CEDC Central European Defence Co­ (cyber attack) operation DDR Disarmament, Demobilisation CERT Computer Emergency Response and Reintegration Team DG DEVCO Directorate-General for Internation- CHG Civilian Headline Goal al Cooperation and Development C-IED Counter Improvised Explosive DG NEAR Directorate-General for Neigh- Device bourhood and Enlargement Nego- CIP Critical Infrastructure Protection tiations CivCom Committee for Civilian Aspects of DIF Defence Industry Factories Crisis Management

5 DOTMLPF-I Doctrine, organisational, train- ESDI European Security and Defence ing/exercise, material, leadership, Identity (NATO) personnel, facilities and interopera- ESDP European Security and Defence bility Policy Dr Doctor ESS European Security Strategy DSG Deputy Secretary-General EU European Union EU INTCEN EU Intelligence and Situation E Centre EAB Executive Academic Board EU MS EU Member State EATs Embedded Advisory Teams EUBAM EU Border Assistance Mission EBCG European Border and Coast EUCAP European Union Capacity Build- Guard Agency (former FRON- ing Mission TEX) EUCO Conclusions EC European Commission EUDEL EU Delegation EC European Community EUFOR EU Force EC European Council EUGS EU Global Strategy on Foreign ECOMIB ECOWAS Mission in Guinea- and Security Policy Bissau EUISS EU Institute for Security Studies ECOWAS Economic Community of West EUJUST European Union Rule of Law African States Mission ECTS European Credit Transfer and EULEX European Union Rule of Law Accumulation System Mission EDA EUMAM European Union Military Adviso- EDAP European Defence Action Plan ry Mission EDF European Development Fund EUMC EU Military Committee EDTIB European Defence Technological EUMCWG EU Military Committee Working and Industrial Base Group EEAS European External Action Service EUMM EU Monitoring Mission EEC European Economic Community EUMS EU Military Staff EGF European Gendarmerie Force EUNAVFOR EU Naval Force EGS European Global Strategy EUPOL EU Police Mission EIDHR European Instrument for EUR (currency) Democracy and Human Rights EUROJUST European Union Agency for EIGE European Institute for Criminal Justice Cooperation Gender Equality EUROPOL European Union Agency for Law eLCIP eLearning, Cyber Security and Enforcement Cooperation Internet Performance EUROSUR European Border Surveillance ENP European Neighbourhood Policy System ENPI European Neighbourhood and EUSR EU Special Representative Partnership Instrument EUTM EU Training Mission EP European Parliament EPC European Political Cooperation F ESA European Space Agency FAC ESDC European Security and Defence FCAS Fragile and Conflict-Affected College States

6 FHQ Force Headquarters IMINT Imagery Intelligence FPA Framework Participation Agree- INI Own-initiative Report ment INSC Instrument for Nuclear Safety FRONTEX European Agency for the Manage- Cooperation ment of Operational Cooperation INTEL Intelligence at the External Borders of the INTERPOL International Criminal Police Member States of the European Organisation Union (see EBCG) IoT Internet of Things FSJ Freedom, Security and Justice IPA Instrument for Pre-accession As- FTA Free Trade Agreement sistance FTF Foreign Terrorist Fighters IPCR Integrated Political Crisis Re- sponse G ISAA Integrated Situational Awareness Group of Twenty and Analysis G7 ISBN International Standard Book GAC Number GAP Gender Action Plan (EU) ISS Internal Security Strategy (EU) GCC Gulf Cooperation Council ITPs Instructions to Parties GCTF Global Counter-terrorism Forum GEOINT Geospatial Intelligence J GFAP General Framework Agreement JCM Joint Consultation Meeting for Peace JHA Justice and Home Affairs GII Gender Inequality Index JSSR Justice and Security Sector Reform GSC General Secretariat of the Council (EU) L LCC LOT Coordination Centre H LegAd Legal Advisor H.E. His/Her Excellency LoA Level of Ambition HG Headline Goal LOT Liasion and Observation Team HoA Horn of Africa LtGen Lieutenant General HQ Headquarters LU Learning Unit HR High Representative (for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy) M HR/VP or High Representative and HRVP Vice-President MA Mine Action HTF Headline Goal Task Force MajGen Major General MD Managing Director (EEAS) I MDG Millennium Development Goal IA Integrated Approach MERCOSUR Mercado Común del Sur ICS Industrial Control System MFA Ministry of Foreign Affairs IcSP Instrument contributing to Stabil- MIA Ministry of Internal Affairs ity and Peace MISCA African-led International Support ICT Information and Communication Mission in the Central African Technology Republic IMD Initiating Military Directive

7 MMA Monitoring, Mentoring and Ad- pMS Participating Member StatesPolAd vising Political Advisor MOD(S) Ministry of Defence (and Sports) MOJ Ministry of Justice PRISM Prevention of conflicts, Rule of MPCC Military Planning and Conduct law/security sector reform, Inte- Capability grated approach, Stabilisation and MRE Mine Risk Education Mediation MS Member States Prof Professor MSC Munich Security Conference PSC Political and Security Committee NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organisa- tion Q QMV Qualified Majority Voting N NHQ NATO Headquarters R NORDEFCO Nordic Defence Cooperation RELEX Working Party of Foreign Rela- NRF NATO Response Force tions Counsellors REV Revision O RoL Rule of Law OC Organised Crime RPAS Remotely Piloted Aircraft System OCCAR Organisation for Joint Armament RTDI Research, Technology Develop- Cooperation ment and Innovation ODA Officialevelopment D Assistance S OECD Organisation for Economic SA Situational Awareness Cooperation and Development SASE Safe and Secure Environment OHQ Operation Headquarters SatCen Satellite Centre OpCdr Operation Commander SC Steering Committee OPLAN Operation Plan SCADA Supervisory Control and Data OSCE Organisation for Security and Acquisition Cooperation in Europe SECPOL Directorate for Security Policy and OSINT Open Source Intelligence Conflict Prevention SEDE Subcommittee on Security and P Defence (EP) PA Preparatory Action SESAR Single European Sky Air Traffic PARSEC Programme of support for Management Research Mopti-Gao enhanced security in the Mopti SG Secretary-General and Gao regions and for the man- SIAC Single Intelligence Analysis Ca- agement of border areas pacity PDT Pre-deployment Training SITCEN EU Joint Situation Centre PESCO Permanent Structured Cooperation SMEs Small and medium-sized enter- PFCA Political Framework for Crisis prises Approach SOC Security Operation Centre PfP Partnership for Peace (NATO) SOFA Status of Forces Agreement PI Partnership Instrument SOMA Status of Mission Agreement PMG Politico-Military Group SOP Standard Operating Procedures SOR Statement of Requirements

8 SSR Security Sector Reform SST Space Surveillance and Tracking STRATCOM Strategic Communication

T TCN Troop Contributing Nation TEU TFEU Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union TWP Working Party on Terrorism

U UK UN UNGA United Nations General Assembly UNMIK United Nations Interim Adminis- tration Mission in Kosovo UNSC(R) United Nations Security Council (Resolution) US(A) (of America)

V V4 Visegrad Group VP Vice-President (of the European Commission) VUCA Volatility, Uncertainty, Complexi- ty and Ambiguity

W WPS Women, peace and security

Y YES Yearbook of European Security (EUISS)

9 FOREWORD EC - Audiovisual Service/Jennifer Jacquemart Service/Jennifer EC - Audiovisual

The need for a strong European Union has the Mediterranean; or without Operation Ata- never been perceived so acutely as it is today. lanta, which has successfully contained piracy off None of our Member States – alone – has the the Horn of Africa; or the EUCAP Sahel mis- resources to stabilise fragile countries around our sions, supporting local security forces in one of borders, prevent the next refugee crisis, or create the most strategically important regions in our a safe environment for our economies to thrive. wider neighbourhood. But as a Union of almost half a billion citizens, To preserve these successes and expand our we are the first economic and trade power in the Common Security and Defence Policy, we must world, the largest investor in development coop- provide our personnel with the best training and eration and humanitarian aid, and a global secu- education. The European Security and Defence rity provider. College, supported by Member States’ commit- More and more, our partners around the world ments, provides first-class training to the EU see us as an ‘indispensable power’ to build a more civilian and military staff, by addressing real-time cooperative world order. The citizens and the gov- training needs and requirements. This hand- ernments of Europe, on their side, increasingly book gives an excellent overview of our CSDP. realise that European security, too, can only be Recognised experts from Europe provided their guaranteed through a collective effort. expertise to contribute to this new edition, which It is in this context that I presented a Global was again published by the Austrian Ministry of Strategy for our foreign and security policy, and Defence and Sports. a package of concrete measures to move towards Only if we understand our strength – what a true Union of security and defence – a pack- we do best and what we could do better – will age that has now been endorsed by the European we be able to reform our Union. In a moment Council. We are finally building the conditions when the very essence of the European project is to make full use of the tools at our disposal. The being questioned, we need to demonstrate that Global Strategy and its implementation process our Union can truly deliver on our citizens’ needs. aims precisely at that goal. Heading towards a real European Union of secu- Of course, we do not start from scratch. Our rity and defence has never been so important. missions and operations around the world are a well-established reality. I could not imagine our Federica Mogherini external action without , fight- High Representative of the Union ing against human traffickers and saving lives in for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy

10 FOREWORD Ricardo Herrgott Ricardo

The Common Security and Defence Policy is the ing together when our way of life is threatened. ‘business card’ of the European Union in crisis and The challenges faced by European countries today conflict areas. When this policy field became oper- cannot be solved on a national, stand-alone basis. ational in 2003, its main goal was to strengthen the The European Union is tasked with presenting crisis management toolbox using military and civil- solutions. In the current implementation phase of ian means. Fourteen years later, CSDP plays a lead- the Global Strategy, we have to ‘think global, and ing role within the comprehensive approach of the act European’. European Union, complementing other tools such The European Union, its Member States and as development cooperation, financial support and its citizens must regain their common vision. This diplomatic and conflict prevention measures. common vision can be found by reinforcing our With over 30 missions and operations around common European security culture, allowing us the world, the European Union has proven to be a to benefit from the joint situational awareness global and reliable actor. The Union and its Mem- that will lead to common action and a unified ber States did not reinvent the wheel, but rather Europe in a better world. implemented good practices, learned lessons The European Security and Defence College and followed a value-based crisis management (ESDC) has a leading role in establishing such a approach. Most of the missions and operations can security culture. With more than 12,000 alumni, be seen as part of the broader picture of security the ESDC has demonstrated its tremendous value sector reform, which bring only a few ‘quick wins’. to the European project in the past. Training and However, the focus is on long-term objectives. education is the foundation of a successful Com- Security is a field that is constantly developing: mon Security and Defence Policy, hence the basis challenges emerge, new tasks are allotted, pri- for a reliable European ‘business card’. orities shift. Taking this assessment as a starting I am happy that Austria is the main supporter point, the strategic guidance offered by the recent of the ESDC. This handbook series is an exem- EU Global Strategy, which aims to be a ‘Global plary means of transferring knowledge, sharing Strategy to promote our citizens’ interests’, is of best practices and stimulating discussions on utmost importance. According to the latest Euro- CSDP-related subjects. I wish the readers of this barometer survey, citizens are mainly interested publication all the best in their professional work, in two topics at the European level: tackling the good luck in future deployments in CSDP mis- migration challenge and countering the threat sions and a pleasant experience reading the articles of terrorism. In order to maintain our credibil- by various European experts on security issues. ity within the EU territory as well as outside of it, the EU must find ways to convince citizens of Hans Peter Doskozil the added value of working together at the Euro- Federal Minister of Defence and Sports pean level, of pooling our resources and of stand- of the Republic of Austria

11 FOREWORD Ministry of Defence/Cyprus

Today, more than ever before in its history, This new level of ambition for CSDP neces- the European Union is faced with unprecedented sitates the promotion of a common security and security threats that challenge the very essence of defence culture based upon our shared values, European civilisation and our open democratic ideals and security interests. Investing in system- societies. It is therefore high time for decisions atic education and training is a prerequisite for that respond to these challenges efficiently and achieving this goal. In this regard, the role of the comprehensively, coming up to the expectations European Security and Defence College is crucial. of our citizens. Cyprus actively supports the prominent work In this context, the EU Global Strategy sets out and the educational initiatives of the ESDC, a new level of ambition for a stronger and safer including the publication of the present Hand- Europe. Furthermore, the Implementation Plan book. on Security and Defence, as well as the European Defence Action Plan, constitute decisive steps I am convinced that it will be an invaluable towards an enhanced European defence and secu- tool for decision-makers and all those who want rity architecture. to deepen their understanding and knowledge of the Common Security and Defence Policy, and Located in a geostrategic of great insta- will thus contribute to advancing the wider goal bility, Cyprus is firmly committed to promoting of a common defence culture. the collective security of Europe in these demand- ing times that call for common action. Christoforos Fokaides, Minister of Defence of the Republic of Cyprus

12 PREFACE Ministry of Defence/Austria

In 2017, seven years after the first edition successful service for the European Union as the of the ‘Handbook on CSDP’, it is time for a first Head of the European Security and Defence completely revised version of the most popular College (ESDC). ESDC publication in the handbook series. Fortunately, the Austrian Ministry of Defence Federica Mogherini is the third High Repre­ and Sports as well as the new Head of the ESDC, sentative of the European Union for Foreign Mr. Dirk Dubois, remained committed to the Affairs and Security Policy and the second woman publication of this handbook. With Cyprus, to hold this position. She has brought new the handbook series welcomed a new partner on momentum to the Common Foreign and Secu- board. rity­ Policy, which has been driven by numerous challenges both inside and outside the European In this preface, I would like to repeat what I Union. Migration, terrorism and cyber security have already stated in previous editions of the can be included within the most demanding handbook, namely that such a publication can issues that require ‘united action’ and a ‘stronger only be possible with the help of a team of able Europe’. and willing experts, who are prepared to share their experience and expertise. Saying ‘Thank Only six months after its publication, the EU You’ is only a small sign of appreciation for Global Strategy is already the reference docu- their tremendous contribution, not only in the ment for all foreign and security-related work transfer of knowledge but also in facilitating the within the EU institutions and the EU Mem- establishment of a Common European Security ber States. Security and defence form the cor- Culture. nerstones for new developments which should help address the challenges ahead. Strategies and I would, in particular, like to thank: action plans have been drafted which will help • LtGen Günter Höfler, Head of the Austrian ensure that that there is an even more effective Military Representation in and his and efficient Common Security and Defence team; Policy for the future. • MajGen Johann Frank, Defence Policy Di- However, changes were not only evident on of the Austrian Ministry of Defence the European stage. The editorship of this hand- and Sports and his Directorate for Security book is also new. In the past, I co-edited this Policy; handbook with Mr. Hans-Bernhard Weisserth, • Mr Oliver Rentschler, Deputy Head of the who retired in spring 2015 after several years of Cabinet of Ms Federica Mogherini;

13 • Mr Gabor Iklody, Director of the Crisis Man- Lastly, I am more than grateful for the support agement and Planning Directorate; of my family, my wife Bernadeta and my chil- • the English editing service of the General dren Julia and Maximilian. I would like to thank Secre­tariat of the Council; them for their patience and understanding, in • Mr Roman Bartolomay, Head of the Austrian particular during the Christmas season. Printing Shop and his team, in particular Mr I hope that the third edition of the ‘Handbook on CSDP’ will meet your expectations and will • my colleagues in the ESDC Secretariat: Mr again serve as a reference document for the pres- Mario Marmo, Ms Irene Eich, Mr Symeon ent and future experts on the Common Security Zambas, Ms Charlotta Ahlmark, Mr Ovidiu and Defence Policy. Simina and Ms Ewelina Miazga. Jochen Rehrl IonS ERS S and operat Handbook on MISSIon Handbook FoR dECISIon Mak Jochen Rehrl (ed.): Rehrl Jochen

Jochen rehrl, Galia Glume (eds): rehrl, Jochen Handbook Handbook

MISSIonS FoR and operatIonS dECISIon MakERS

the CommoN SeCurIty aNd defeNCe PolICy the CommoN SeCurIty aNd defeNCe PolICy of the euroPeaN uNIoN of the euroPeaN uNIoN

ISBN: 978-3-902275-42-4 ISBN: 978-3-902275-35-6

The The The latest handbook on

HANDBOOK ON CSDP HANDBOOK FOR MIGRATION – MISSIONS AND OPERATIONS DECISION MAKERS HOW CSDP CAN SUPPORT

targets the personnel deplo- targets the strategic and opera- was published in the aftermath yed in the field. It describes the tional leadership level for CSDP of a high-level conference on structures and procedures with engagements abroad. It provides 13 September 2016 in Brussels. a focus on the implementation an overview of the Common Se- It includes articles from recog- of the mission mandate. It sum- curity and Defence Policy. The nised European academics and marises the principles and gui- handbook provides some skills practitioners as well as a com- delines of CSDP engagements. for decision makers, such as ne- pendium of various factsheets gotiation techniques, mediation on migration from the European Jochen Rehrl, Galia Glume (ed.): and conflict analysis. Commission, the European Par- Handbook on missions and liament and the European Exter- operations. Vienna, 2015. Jochen Rehrl (ed.): Handbook for nal Action Service. ISBN: 978-92-95201-07-1 Decision Makers. Vienna, 2014. ISBN: 978-92-95201-09-5 Sven Biscop, Jochen Rehrl (ed.): Migration – How CSDP can sup- port. Vienna, 2016. ISBN: 978-3-902275-45-5

14 COMMON SECURITY AND 1 DEFENCE POLICY

15 HANDBOOK ON CSDP

1.1. HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF CSDP

by Gustav Lindstrom Photo: Austrian Photo:

The success story of the Common European Security and Defence Policy started at the informal European Council in Pörtschach in October 1998 during the Austrian Council Presidency: In the picture, 1st row: António Guterres (PT), (UK), (EU), Martti Ahtisaari (FI), (AT), (FR), Gerhard Schröder (DE), (FI), Lionel Jospin (FR); 2nd row: Jean-Claude Juncker (LU), (IE), (GR), José Maria Aznar (ES), Göran Persson (SE), Jean-Luc Dehaene (BE), (DK), Massimo D’Alema (IT), (NL).

The origins of Europe’s security and defence In response, the concept of European Political architecture can be traced back to the years fol- Cooperation (EPC) was presented in the October lowing World War II. Beginning in the late 1940s, 1970 Davignon Report. The report defined EPC’s several initiatives facilitated increased cooperation objectives, including the harmonisation of posi- across Europe. Examples include the signing of tions, consultation and, when appropriate, com- the Brussels Treaty (1948) – sowing the seeds for mon actions. It also listed specific processes, such a – and the creation as six-monthly meetings of the Foreign Affairs of the European Coal and Steel Community in Ministers, as well quarterly meetings for the Polit- 1951, placing strategic resources under a suprana- ical Directors forming the Political Committee. tional authority. Overall, EPC aimed to facilitate the consultation In the late 1960s, the European Community process among EC Member States. (EC) began to explore ways to harmonise mem- EPC served as the foundation for the Com- bers’ foreign policies. At The Hague Summit, held mon Foreign and Security Policy introduced in in December 1969, European leaders instructed the . With its entry into force on their foreign ministers to examine the feasibil- 1 November 1993, it created a single institutional ity of closer integration in the political domain. framework, the European Union, based on three

16 1 COMMON SECURITY AND DEFENCE POLICY

pillars – the second of which was the Common Foreign and Security Policy. CFSP went beyond EPC. For example, it broke new ground through its Article J(4), which states that CFSP includes ‘all questions related to the security of the Union, includ- ing the eventual framing of a common defence policy, which might in time lead to a common defence’. While the European Union identified ambi- tious objectives in the area of external security and defence via the Maastricht Treaty, it would 2008 Tchad-RCA, Council General Secretariat/EUFOR not be until the late 1990s, in the aftermath of was the first High Representative of the ropean Union and held this position for 10 years the wars of secession in the Balkans – and a policy (1999–2009). change in the United Kingdom – that concrete provisions were introduced for an independent ‘Common European Security and Defence Pol- icy’ endowed with tangible crisis management management, including peacemaking. Examples capabilities. The UK’s evolving position was pre- include the Cologne European Council Meeting sented during the informal European Council (1999), the European Council Meeting held in Pörtschach (24-25 October 1998) under (1999), which introduced the Headline Goal the auspices of the Austrian EU Presidency. A 2003, and the Santa Maria da Feira European week later, the defence ministers of the Euro- Council Meeting (2000) which identified four pean Union convened an informal meeting in civilian priority areas. Vienna, reinforcing the call for a more proactive In 2003, ESDP became operational through Europe. These events paved the way for the bilat- the first ESDP missions and operations. Since eral meeting between and the UK held 2003, the EU has initiated over thirty crisis-man- in Saint-Malo, considered by many as the cat- agement missions and operations. In addition, alyst for European Security and Defence Policy the EU presented its first ever European Secu- (ESDP). rity Strategy in December 2003, outlining key Following the Saint-Malo Declaration in threats and challenges facing Europe. The strat- 1998, numerous European Council summit egy remained in place until the presentation of meetings defined the military and civilian capa- a follow-on EU Global Strategy in the summer bilities needed to fulfil the Petersberg tasks, con- of 2016. sisting of humanitarian and rescue tasks, peace- With the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty keeping tasks, and tasks of combat forces in crisis on 1 December 2009, ESDP was renamed Com-

24-25 October 1998 3-4 June 1999 19-20 June 2000 European Council in European Council in European Council in Pörtschach/Austria Cologne/ Feira/ Graphic: Jochen Rehrl The first steps towards a European Security and Defence Policy

17 HANDBOOK ON CSDP European Union European 60 years after the Treaties, the partners of the European Union see Europe as an ‘indispensab- le power’ to build a more cooperative world order. European security can only be guaranteed through a collective effort.

mon Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). The military solidarity among EU Member States Lisbon Treaty also established the post of High through the inclusion of a mutual assistance Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs clause (Article 42(7) TEU) and a solidarity clause and Security Policy, merging the two positions (Article 222 TFEU). of High Representative for CFSP and Commis- With the implementation of the EU Global sioner for External Relations – symbolising the Strategy of 2016, new momentum was given to disappearance of the EU pillar structure. the development of the Common Security and The Lisbon Treaty formally endorsed the exten- Defence Policy. Security and defence has become sion of the ‘Petersberg tasks’, which now include one of the priority areas for work on the imple- ‘joint disarmament operations, humanitarian and mentation of the EU global strategy, which also rescue tasks, military advice and assistance tasks, includes resilience-building and an integrated conflict prevention and peace-keeping tasks, tasks approach to conflicts and crises, strengthening of combat forces in crisis management, including the nexus between internal and external policies, peacemaking and post-conflict stabilisation’ (Arti- updating existing or preparing new regional and cle 43(1) TEU). In addition, these tasks may con- thematic strategies, and stepping up public diplo- tribute to the fight against terrorism, including by macy efforts. ‘supporting third states in combating terrorism in Work on security and defence is carried out their territories’. synergistically through implementation of the The extended Petersberg tasks and related mat- Commission European Defence Action Plan and ters are currently enshrined in the consolidated implementation of the joint declaration by the versions of the Treaty on European Union and President of the European Council, the President the Treaty on the Functioning of the European of the European Commission and the Secretary Union. Among them is the aim of political and General of NATO of July 2016.

18 1 COMMON SECURITY AND DEFENCE POLICY

BASIC TIME-LINE OF ESDP/CSDP EVENTS

Year Event 1945 End of World War II Churchill’s speech at the University of Zurich calling for a 1946 1947 Launching of the European Recovery Program (Marshall Plan) 1948 Signing of the Brussels Treaty 1949 Signing of the North Atlantic Treaty Unveiling of the Schuman Plan 1950 Outbreak of the Korean War Signing of the establishing the 1951 European Coal and Steel Community Failure of the European Defence Community (EDC) 1954 Signing of the Modified Brussels Treaty formally creating the WEU 1955 Establishment of the Warsaw Pact 1956 Suez Canal Crisis 1957 Signing of the Treaties of Rome 1961 Construction of the Berlin Wall 1969 The Davignon Report introduces the idea of European Political Cooperation 1975 Adoption of the Helsinki Final Act 1983 Stuttgart Declaration (‘Solemn Declaration’) 1986 Signing of the 1989 Fall of the Berlin Wall 1990 Signing of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe 1992 Signing of the Treaty on European Union (in force 1993) – Maastricht 1993 Official creation of the 1996 Reinforcement of ESDI within NATO at the Berlin Summit 1997 Signing of the Amsterdam Treaty (in force 1999) European Council held in Pörtschach, Austria 1998 Franco-British Joint Declaration on European Defence (Saint-Malo) Cologne and Helsinki European Council Meetings lay the 1999 foundations for ESDP 2000 Santa Maria da Feira European Council First CSDP missions and operations 2003 Adoption of the European Security Strategy Adoption of the Berlin Plus Arrangements / Civilian Headline Goal 2008 2004 (updated in 2007 to CHG 2010); Establishment of the EDA Entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty on the European Union. New institutions, 2009 scope of activities, and decision-making in CFSP/CSDP 2016 Presentation of the EU Global Strategy

19 HANDBOOK ON CSDP

1.2. THE EU GLOBAL STRATEGY

compiled from the EEAS website

We need a stronger Europe. This is what our citizens deserve, this is what the wider world expects.

security order has been violated, while terrorism and violence plague North Africa and the Middle East, as well as Europe itself. Economic growth is yet to outpace demography in parts of Africa, security tensions in Asia are mounting, while climate change causes further disruption. Yet these are also times of extraordinary opportunity. Global growth, mobility, and technological pro- gress – alongside our deepening partnerships – enable us to thrive, and allow ever more people to escape poverty and live longer and freer lives. We will navigate this difficult, more connected, con- tested and complex world guided by our shared interests, principles and priorities. Grounded in the values enshrined in the Treaties and building on our many strengths and historic achievements, we will stand united in building a stronger Union, playing its collective role in the world.

OUR SHARED INTERESTS AND PRINCIPLES

The European Union will promote peace and guarantee the security of its citizens and territory. Internal and external security are ever more inter- twined: our security at home depends on peace beyond our borders. The EU will advance the prosperity of its people. Prosperity must be shared and requires fulfilling the

European Union, 2016 Union, European Sustainable Development Goals worldwide, includ- ing in Europe. A prosperous Union also hinges on We live in times of existential crisis, within and an open and fair inter­national economic system beyond the European Union. Our Union is under and sustainable access to the global commons. The threat. Our European project, which has brought EU will foster the resilience of its democracies. unprecedented peace, prosperity and democracy, Consistently living up to our values will determine is being questioned. To the east, the European our external credibility and influence.

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surrounding regions to the east and south. We will act globally to address the root causes of conflict and poverty, and to promote human rights. The EU will be a responsible global stake- holder, but responsibility must be shared. Responsibility goes hand in hand with revamp- ing our external partnerships. In the pursuit of our goals, we will reach out to states, regional bodies and international organisations. We will work with core partners, like-minded countries and regional groupings. We will deepen our part- nerships with civil society and the private sector

European Union, 2016 Union, European as key players in a networked world.

The EU will promote a rules-based global order. THE PRIORITIES OF OUR EXTERNAL We have an interest in promoting agreed rules to ACTION provide global public goods and contribute to a peaceful and sustainable world. The EU will pro- To promote our shared interests, adhering to mote a rules-based global order with multilater- clear principles, the EU will pursue five priori- alism as its key principle and the United Nations ties. at its core. We will be guided by clear principles. These stem as much from a realistic assessment of the The Security of our Union current strategic environment as from an idealistic aspiration to advance a better world. Principled The EU Global Strategy starts at home. Our pragmatism will guide our external action in the Union has enabled citizens to enjoy unprece- years ahead. dented security, democracy and prosperity. Yet In a more complex world, we must stand today terrorism, hybrid threats, economic volatil- united. Only the combined weight of a true union ity, climate change and energy insecurity endan- has the potential to deliver security, prosperity ger our people and territory. and democracy to its citizens and make a positive An appropriate level of ambition and strate- difference in the world. gic autonomy is important for Europe’s ability to In a more connected world, the EU will engage promote peace and security within and beyond its with others. The Union cannot pull up a draw- borders. bridge to ward off external threats. To promote We will therefore enhance our efforts on the security and prosperity of our citizens and to defence, cyber, counterterrorism, energy and stra- safeguard our democracies, we will manage inter- tegic communications. dependence, with all the opportunities, challenges Member States must translate their com- and fears it brings about, by engaging the wider mitments to mutual assistance and solidarity world. enshrined in the Treaties into action. The EU In a more contested world, the EU will be will step up its contribution to Europe’s collective guided by a strong sense of responsibility. We security, working closely with its partners, begin- will engage responsibly across Europe and the ning with NATO.

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An Integrated Approach to Conflicts

When violent conflicts erupt, our shared vital interests are threatened. The EU will engage in a practical and principled way in peacebuild- ing, and foster human security through an inte- grated approach. Implementing the ‘comprehen- sive approach to conflicts and crises’ through a Shared Vision, Common Action: coherent use of all policies at the EU’s disposal A Stronger Europe is essential. But the meaning and scope of the A Global Strategy for the ‘comprehensive approach’ will be expanded. The European Union’s Foreign And Security Policy EU will act at all stages of the conflict cycle, acting promptly on prevention, responding responsibly and decisively to crises, investing in stabilisation, and avoiding premature disengage- ment when a new crisis erupts. The EU will act at different levels of governance: conflicts such as those in Syria and Libya have local, national, regional and global dimensions which must be addressed. Finally, none of these conflicts can be European Union, 2016 Union, European solved by us alone. Sustainable peace can only be achieved through comprehensive agreements rooted in broad, deep and durable regional and State and Societal Resilience to our international partnerships, which the EU will East and South foster and support.

It is in the interests of our citizens to invest in the resilience of states and societies to the east Cooperative Regional Orders stretching into Central Asia, and to the south down to Central Africa. In a world caught between global pressures and Under the current EU enlargement policy, a local pushback, regional dynamics come to the credible accession process grounded in strict and fore. fair conditionality is vital to enhance the resilience Voluntary forms of regional governance offer of countries in the Western Balkans and of . states and peoples the opportunity to better man- Under the European Neighbourhood Policy age security concerns, reap the economic gains (ENP), many people wish to build closer relations of globalisation, express more fully cultures and with the Union: our enduring power of attraction identities, and project influence in world affairs. can spur transformation in these countries. This is a fundamental rationale for the EU’s own But resilience is also a priority in other coun- peace and development in the 21st century, and tries within and beyond the ENP. The EU will this is why we will support cooperative regional support different paths to resilience, targeting the orders worldwide. In different regions – in most acute cases of governmental, economic, soci- Europe; in the Mediterranean, Middle East and etal and climate/energy fragility, as well as develop Africa; across the Atlantic, both north and south; more effective migration policies for Europe and in Asia; and in the Arctic – the EU will be driven its partners. by specific goals.

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Global Governance for the 21st Century A Responsive Union

The EU is committed to a global order based Our diplomatic action must be fully grounded on international law, which ensures human in the Lisbon Treaty. The Common Security and rights, sustainable development and lasting Defence Policy must become more responsive. access to the global commons. This commitment between Member States translates into an aspiration to transform rather should be explored, and might lead to a more than to simply preserve the existing system. The structured form of cooperation, making full use of EU will strive for a strong UN as the bedrock of the Lisbon Treaty’s potential. Development policy the multilateral rules-based order, and develop also needs to become more flexible and aligned globally coordinated responses with interna- with our strategic priorities. tional and regional organisations, states and non-state actors. A Joined-Up Union

FROM VISION TO ACTION We must become more joined up across our external policies, between Member States and EU We will pursue our priorities by mobilising our institutions, and between the internal and exter- unparalleled networks, our economic weight and nal dimensions of our policies. This is particularly all the tools at our disposal in a coherent way. To relevant to the implementation of the Sustaina- fulfil our goals, we must collectively invest in a ble Development Goals, migration, and security, credible, responsive and joined-up Union. notably counter-terrorism. We must also system- atically mainstream human rights and gender issues across policy sectors and institutions. A Credible Union

To engage responsibly with the world, credi- THE EUROPEAN UNION WILL BE bility is vital. The EU’s credibility hinges on our GUIDED BY CLEAR PRINCIPLES unity, on our many achievements, our enduring power of attraction, the effectiveness and con- In a more complex world, we must stand united. sistency of our policies, and adherence to our Only the combined weight of a true union has values. A stronger Union also requires investing the potential to deliver security, prosperity and in all dimensions of foreign policy. In particular, democracy to its citizens and make a positive dif- investment in security and defence is a matter of ference in the world. urgency. Full spectrum defence capabilities are In a more connected world, the EU will engage necessary to respond to external crises, build our with others. The Union cannot pull up a draw- partners’ capacities, and to guarantee Europe’s bridge to ward off external threats. To promote safety. Member States remain sovereign in their the security and prosperity of our citizens and to defence decisions: nevertheless, to acquire and safeguard our democracies, we will manage inter- maintain many of these capabilities, defence dependence, with all the opportunities, challenges cooperation must become the norm. The EU will and fears it brings about, by engaging the wider systematically encourage defence cooperation and world. strive to create a solid European defence industry, In a more contested world, the EU will be guided which is critical for Europe’s autonomy of deci- by a strong sense of responsibility. We will engage sion and action. responsibly across Europe and the surrounding

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regions to the east and south. We will act globally more closely together on security. To fulfil these to address the root causes of conflict and poverty, goals, Ministers also agreed to a range of actions to and to promote human rights. strengthen civilian and military capabilities, as well as EU security and defence structures and tools. The European Defence Action Plan was IMPLEMENTATION OF THE STRATEGY adopted by the European Commission on 30 November 2016. It comprises a European To implement the EU Global Strategy, decisive Defence Fund and other actions to help Member steps have been taken on security and defence. States boost research and spend more efficiently The package consists of three major pillars: new on joint defence capabilities, thus fostering a political goals and ambitions for Europeans to competitive and innovative defence industrial take more responsibility for their own security base and contributing to enhance European cit- and defence; new financial tools to help Mem- izens’ security. ber States and the European defence industry to The Council of the European Union and For- develop defence capabilities (‘European Defence eign Ministers of NATO adopted in parallel on Action Plan’) and a set of concrete actions as fol- 6 December 2016 a common set of proposals low up to the EU-NATO Joint Declaration which for EU-NATO cooperation. This followed the identified areas of cooperation. Together the three Joint Declaration signed by EU leaders and the elements constitute a comprehensive package to NATO Secretary General in July 2016. The set boost security of the Union and its citizens. of actions comprises 42 concrete proposals for Terrorism, trafficking and smuggling, hybrid implementation in seven areas of cooperation. threats by state and non-state actors and other EU-NATO cooperation is thus taken to a new threats and challenges are directly affecting our level, at a moment when facing common chal- internal security and often feed off the crises and lenges together is more important than ever. instability in the regions surrounding Europe. ‘For most Europeans security is a top priority today’ says High Representative/Vice President Federica CONCLUSION Mogherini. The EU has taken action to respond. It will become a stronger actor on the international The EU will be a responsible global stakeholder, scene to promote peace and security in its neigh- but responsibility must be shared. Responsibility bourhood and beyond. HR/VP Mogherini has set goes hand in hand with revamping our external out how to achieve this in a strategy (‘A Global partnerships. In the pursuit of our goals, we will Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign and reach out to states, regional bodies and interna- Security Policy’) adopted in June 2016. The three tional organisations. The European Union will interlinked decisions on security and defence are work with core partners, like-minded countries turning this vision into concrete actions. and regional groupings. We will deepen our part- Ministers on 14 November 2016 agreed on a nerships with civil society and the private sector as new level of ambition in security and defence. key players in a networked world. It focuses on three priorities: enabling the Euro- This Strategy is underpinned by the vision of pean Union to respond more comprehensively, and ambition for a stronger Union, willing and rapidly and effectively to crises, in particular in able to make a positive difference in the world. our neighbourhood; helping to make our part- Our citizens deserve a true Union, which pro- ners stronger when it comes to their security and motes our shared interests by engaging responsi- defence; and strengthening the European Union’s bly and in partnership with others. It is now up to capacity to protect European citizens, by working us to translate this into action.

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EUROPEAN DEFENCE ACTION PLAN

Europe can no longer afford relying on the military might of others. We have to take responsibility for protecting our interests and the European way of life. It is only by working together that Europe will be able to defend itself at home and abroad. " Jean-Claude Juncker State of the European Union - European Parliament, Strasbourg - 14 September 2016 THE BUSINESS CASE FOR DEFENCE SPENDING AND GREATER DEFENCE COOPERATION

The lack of cooperation between Member Around 80% of defence procurement is run States in the field of defence and security is on a purely national basis, leading to a costly estimated to cost annually between duplication of military capabilities. EUR 25 billion and EUR 100 billion. This is because of inefficiencies, lack of competition and lack of economies of scale for industry More Europe in defence will have a positive and production spill-over effect on the European economy. The European defence industry generates a total turnover of EUR 100 billion per year In 2015, the US invested more than twice and 1.4 million highly skilled peopled as much as the total spending of EU Member directly or indirectly employed in Europe. Each States on defence. China has increased its euro invested in defence generates a return defence budget by 150% over the past of 1,6, in particular in skilled employment, decade. research and technology and exports.

THE European Commission, 2016 European

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1.3. ANALYSING THE EU GLOBAL STRATEGY ON FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY

by Sven Biscop

The European Union as we know it came into sis on conflict prevention, and a broad approach being in 1993, when the Treaty of Maastricht through aid, trade and diplomacy. This approach entered into force and the preceding European has its roots in the external relations of the EEC. Economic Community (EEC) was absorbed into Although it had no formal competence in foreign a more overtly political Union which aspired to policy, the EEC developed dense worldwide trade pursue a Common Foreign and Security Pol- relations and built up a network of delegations icy (CFSP). In 1999 a politico-military arm was more encompassing than the embassy network of added to the CFSP; originally the European Secu- any Member State. rity and Defence Policy (ESDP), it is now known This implicit concept of strategy steered the as the Common Security and Defence Policy development of EU partnerships and long-term (CSDP). policies such as development. But it proved entirely insufficient when the EU was confronted with crisis. It was the EU’s failure to address the ABSENCE OF STRATEGY war in Bosnia and Herzegovina in the early 1990s and again in Kosovo in 1999 that drove the insti- However, the EU’s first strategy, the European tutional development of the CFSP and the CSDP. Security Strategy (ESS), was only adopted a full Even perfect institutions will not deliver, though, ten years later, in 2003. Member States purposely if there is no strategy for them to operate on. avoided any strategic debate, because of their widely differing views on the degree of auton- omy of EU policy vis-à-vis the capitals themselves TOWARDS THE ESS and vis-à-vis the US. That did not halt progress on other dimensions of foreign and security pol- That insight finally came to the Member States icy, however: Member States often pragmatically in 2003. That year the US invasion of Iraq cre- agree to disagree on one aspect, which allows ated a deep divide within Europe, between those them to move on the issues on which who wanted to stand by their most important ally they do agree. Thus they were able to create the no matter what, and those who felt that even an institutions of the CFSP and the CSDP. ally cannot be followed when it so clearly violates one’s own principles and, as would be revealed all too soon, acts against one’s interests. But whatever STRATEGIC ROOTS Europeans thought, it did not matter. This was the great lesson of the Iraq crisis: when Europe is The absence of a formal strategy does not neces- divided, it has no influence. sarily mean that all action is un-strategic. During This was the catalyst for the unexpected drive the first decade of the CFSP, an implicit ‘European to finally organise a formal strategic debate in the way’ of doing things emerged from the practice EU and produce a strategic document. EU Mem- of EU foreign policy-making, characterised by ber States needed to heal the wounds inflicted by cooperation with partner countries, an empha- the highly emotional debate over Iraq and pro-

28 1 COMMON SECURITY AND DEFENCE POLICY EU ISS/Bernal Revert On 22 April 2016, HR Mogherini presents and discusses her ideas for an EU global strategy at the EUISS annual conference in Paris.

ject an image of unity to the outside world once give their input on the draft, but alongside rep- again. It also sent a message to the US. Those resentatives from national parliaments, from key who had supported the invasion of Iraq wanted allies and partners, and from academia and civil to signal that Europe was still an ally and that it society. This approach created a much greater cared about the same threats and challenges as sense of ownership and produced a very readable the US. Those who had opposed it wanted to text, short and free of jargon. make it clear that caring about the same threats The final document was formally adopted by and challenges does not imply addressing them the European Council as the European Security in the same way. Strategy in December 2003. A strategy was born. The adoption of the ESS was a turning point, but DRAFTING THE ESS after several years calls for a strategic review began to sound louder and louder. This window of opportunity was not wasted. Javier Solana, then the High Representative, was tasked with producing a first draft, which was THE IMPACT OF THE ESS drawn up by a small team around him and put to the European Council in June 2003. Then, instead The ESS certainly worked as a narrative. In of discussing points and commas and working 2003, many expected that the ESS would be his way up through the hierarchy of CFSP bod- quickly forgotten – locked in some drawer, with ies, which is the normal procedure when drafting the key given to NATO. In fact, the opposite hap- official EU foreign policy texts, Solana had three pened: EU foreign policy decisions continued to seminars organised, where the same officials could refer to the ESS as the overall framework, and EU

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and national officials continued to refer to it when a view to proposing elements on how to improve explaining Europe’s role in the world, because it the implementation and, as appropriate, elements expressed it so neatly and concisely. That is impor- to complement it’. tant, because in a disparate organisation such as The debate was concluded by the adoption the EU, comprising twenty-eight Member States of a Report on the implementation of the Euro- each with their own strategic culture, commonal- pean Security Strategy – providing security in a ity must be stressed time and again. changing world by the December 2008 Euro- But did the ESS drive a proactive EU foreign pean Council, which decided to leave the text policy, and did it help the EU make the right deci- of the ESS itself untouched. The Report ‘does not sions in moments of crisis? Here the picture is more replace the ESS, but reinforces it’, and the ESS mixed, for the simple reason that the ESS was not a remained in force. complete strategy at all. In the ESS, the EU was very clear about its values, which it translates into very specific methods: Europe wants to tackle things in TOWARDS A GLOBAL STRATEGY? a preventive, comprehensive and multilateral way. The ESS had little to say, however, about either the After the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, means, apart from a general acknowledgement that a number of Member States, with once in the military field especially more resources were more in the lead, again attempted to put a revision required, or, even more importantly, the objectives. of the ESS on the agenda. However, no agreement The decision to prioritise assuming leadership in was reached. To continue the debate, Sweden, stabilising Europe’s own neighbourhood was an , and launched a think-tank important one; opting for a more indirect approach process, which in May 2013 produced a report at the global level was the logical corollary, for one on a ‘European Global Strategy’ (EGS). Member cannot prioritise everything at once. In the ESS States remained strongly divided on the need for a itself, however, neither broad objective was detailed new strategy, however. into more specific priorities that could drive day- Eventually, the December 2013 European to-day decision-making. The ESS codified how to Council, in the context of a debate about defence, do things – but it did not really tell Europe what could only agree on a veiled mandate for the High to do first. Representative to assess the impact of the changes CALLS FOR REVISION in the geopolitical environment. In layman’s terms: write a strategy? In the autumn of 2007 French President Nico- When the new High Representative, Feder- las Sarkozy and Swedish Foreign Minister Carl ica Mogherini, assumed office, she gave renewed Bildt put the revision of the ESS on the agenda impetus to the strategic debate. When she sub- as an objective for their upcoming Presidencies. mitted her assessment of the EU’s environment This idea did not meet with universal enthusiasm. to the European Council in June 2015, she finally Not everybody was convinced that the ESS was received a mandate to produce an entirely new already in need of updating, and some also feared strategy. that it would provoke excessively divisive debates, Albeit grudgingly in many cases, Member particularly on , and that the EU would end States could no longer deny that the various cri- up with a worse rather than a better document. ses in and around Europe, the US ‘pivot’ and the Hence the somewhat cautiously expressed man- rise of China called for a new strategy. This EU date given to High Representative Javier Solana Global Strategy on Foreign and Security Policy by the December 2007 European Council: ‘to (EUGS) was presented to the European Council examine the implementation of the Strategy with on 28 June 2016 by High Representative Fed-

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erica Mogherini. Many pundits portrayed it as EU INTERESTS an example of Brussels’ disconnectedness from reality – tabling an external strategy just a few The fact that for the first time ever we have an days after the UK had created a huge internal EU document listing our vital interests (which is challenge by voting to leave the EU. But would a breakthrough in its own right) is a reflection of it have demonstrated a better sense of reality this new approach. Policy is about interests; if it to pretend that because of the British decision isn’t, no one will invest in it. That applies to the to put a stop to its EU membership the world EU as much as to a state, and ‘there is no clash around Europe would come to a stop as well? between national and European interests’. The vital The EU needs the EUGS and that ‘is even more interests defined by the EUGS are vital to all true after the British referendum,’ as Mogherini Member States: the security of EU citizens and rightly says in her foreword. territory; prosperity (which, the EUGS states, implies equality – otherwise we would not be talk- ing about the prosperity of all citizens); democ- REALPOLITIK WITH EUROPEAN racy; and a rules-based global order to contain CHARACTERISTICS power politics. Setting these interests off against the analysis The EUGS introduces a new overall approach of the global environment that Mogherini pre- to foreign and security policy, which can be read sented to the European Council in June 2015, as a corrigendum to the ESS. ‘The best protection the EUGS identifies five priorities: (1) the secu- for our security is a world of well-governed demo- rity of the EU itself; (2) the neighbourhood; cratic states,’ the EU said in 2003. (3) how to deal with war and crisis; (4) stable Unfortunately, spreading good governance and regional orders across the globe; and (5) effective democracy proved more difficult than expected, global governance. The pursuit of the first three and when their absence provoked crises, we did priorities especially clearly reflects the modesty not always muster the will and the resources to or realism imposed by ‘principled pragmatism’, by respond. emphasising our own security, the neighbour- Where the ESS proved to be overoptimistic hood, and hard power, and by no longer empha- (and optimism is a moral duty, as Karl Popper sising democratisation. said), the EUGS is more conscious of the limits imposed by our own capabilities and by others’ intractability, and therefore more modest. THE SECURITY OF THE EU It charts a course between isolationism and interventionism, under the new heading of what The EUGS focuses on Europe’s own security the EUGS now calls ‘principled pragmatism’. (which was much less present in the ESS) and This represents a return to realpolitik. Not real- on the neighbourhood: ‘We will take responsibil- politik as it has come to be understood, as ends ity foremost in Europe and its surrounding regions, justifying means, but realpolitik in the original while pursuing targeted engagement further afield’. sense of the term. Coined by the German liberal Following the terrorist attacks in Paris and Brus- Ludwig von Rochau in 1853, it meant a rejec- sels, and the refugee crisis that is visible across tion of liberal utopianism, but not of liberal ideals Europe, addressing our internal and border secu- themselves. Rather, it was about how to achieve rity was indispensable for the EUGS to be credi- those ideals in a realistic way. As the EUGS has ble with citizens and Member States alike. it, ‘responsible engagement can bring about positive The focus on the neighbourhood is justified change’. by the range of our capabilities. It is defined very

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broadly, though, going beyond what Brussels now order to address urgent problems; the anti-IS coa- often calls our ‘neighbours’ neighbours’: ‘to the east lition is a case in point. The EUGS doesn’t say stretching into Central Asia, and south down to Cen- much about this dimension: how to work with tral Africa’. such regimes, in line with ‘principled pragma- Stabilising this part of the world is no mean tism’, without further strengthening their hold on task, yet the EUGS achieves the right balance, power? since it does not ignore the challenges in Asia This question demonstrates that resilience is a (‘there is a direct connection between European tricky concept. Increasing the resilience of a state prosperity and Asian security’) and at the global against external threats can easily lead to increas- level (such as the freedom of the global commons). ing the resilience of a repressive regime. While we must be modest about our ability to change regimes, we should not be propping them up THE NEIGHBOURHOOD either. It makes sense, therefore, for the EUGS to simultaneously advocate capacity-building and The EUGS puts much less emphasis on democ- the reform of the justice, security and defence racy. The EU will support democracies where they sectors, as well as human rights protection. The emerge, for ‘their success […] would reverberate strong emphasis on human rights (which is across their respective regions’ – but in our broad indeed to be distinguished from democratisation) neighbourhood the EUGS mentions only Tunisia is indispensable, for it is often against their own and Georgia as positive examples. As many oth- governments that people have to be resilient. But ers do not wish to pursue closer relations with the can we deliver on that promise? Perhaps ‘fighting EU, the EUGS puts the emphasis on reducing the inequality’ would have been a better heading for fragility of these states rather than on changing the new strategy towards our eastern and southern their regimes, for which we have but limited lev- neighbours than ‘resilience’. erage. On a side note, if the EU wants to be even more However, since many of our neighbours are honest with itself, then (the Balkans excepted) ‘a ‘repressive states [that] are inherently fragile in the credible enlargement policy’ does not really have long term’, that requires targeting civil society a place in the section on the neighbourhood, for instead. The aim is to increase the resilience of peo- enlargement is no longer a credible project, least ple and societies, notably by fighting poverty and of all for Turkey. inequality, so that over time home-grown positive change can emerge. This will require considerable funds, however. WAR AND CRISIS Lowering the level of ambition in terms of democratisation is simply acceptance of reality. The EUGS shows a much stronger aware- This is all about being honest with ourselves. The ness of the indispensability of a credible mil- EU cannot democratise Egypt, so it should not itary instrument. ‘Soft and hard power go hand pretend to. At the same time, it should then also in hand,’ Mogherini rightly says in the foreword. not feel obliged to pretend that the Al-Sisi regime The EUGS has not rediscovered geopolitics per is a great friend – it is not. But we maintain dip- se – the ESS already stated that ‘even in an era of lomatic relations with (nearly) everybody, not just globalisation, geography is still important’ – but it with our friends, and we work with (nearly) every- recognises to a greater extent than the ESS that body where interests coincide. some powers will not hesitate to use blackmail As long as they are there, we may indeed be and force in what they consider to be a geopo- obliged to work with authoritarian regimes in litical competition. Hence the ambition ‘to pro-

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tect Europe, respond to external crises, and assist in REGIONAL ORDERS developing our partners’ security and defence capac- ities’. Furthermore, our efforts ‘should enable the The focus on ‘cooperative regional orders’ also EU to act autonomously while also contributing reflects the awareness of ongoing geopolitical to and undertaking actions in cooperation with competition between different global and regional NATO’. powers. The intention of ensuring a coherent This can be read as the EU constituting the response to China’s ‘Belt and Road’ initiative, not European pillar that allows its Member States to just through the EU-China Connectivity Plat- act with the US where possible and without US form (to create a link with the EU’s own invest- assets when necessary. ment plans) but also through ASEM and the The ends to which the EU should apply this EU-ASEAN partnership, could signal the start of ‘strategic autonomy’ (as Mogherini calls it in the a sophisticated diplomatic initiative. In the same foreword) are spread throughout the text. vein, the aim of deepening dialogue with Iran and Firstly, ‘this means living up to our commit- the GCC countries ought to be the beginning ments to mutual assistance and solidarity’, i.e. Arti- of a new vision on the future regional order in cle 42(7) TEU and Article 222 TFEU. the Middle East. After all, there are not one but Secondly, where conflict is ongoing, the EU several wars ongoing in an area that clearly falls should ‘protect human lives, notably civilians’ and within the neighbourhood in which the EU ought ‘be ready to support and help consolidate local cease- to assume responsibility. This will also be one of fires’, presumably in the broad neighbourhood as the issues (though it is not among the examples a matter of priority. This is an ambitious under- explicitly listed in the EUGS) on which the EU taking, for it entails deploying troops on the will have to cooperate with Russia, while making ground, with serious firepower, who are backed ‘substantial changes in relations’ dependent on up by significant air support and ready reserves, Russia’s respect for international law. On Russia, and who are not necessarily there to seek out and the EUGS essentially advocates strategic patience. destroy an opponent but who will fight when the civilians for whom they are responsible are threatened. EFFECTIVE MULTILATERALISM Thirdly, the EU ‘is seeking to make greater prac- tical contributions to Asian security’, including in The fifth priority puts global governance the maritime area. Finally, the EU ‘could assist firmly back on the EU agenda, after ‘effective further and complement UN peacekeeping’ as a multilateralism’ (as the ESS phrased it) had demonstration of its belief in the UN as ‘the bed- more or less disappeared from radar screens. rock of the multilateral rules-based order’. Now the EUGS ambitiously sets out ‘to trans- These are more than sufficient elements to form rather than simply preserve the existing sys- translate the EUGS into a revised military level tem’, which will indeed be necessary to prevent ‘the of ambition in ‘a sectoral strategy, to be agreed emerging of alternative groupings to the detriment by the Council’ – into a white paper, in other of all’. Under this heading as well, an ambitious words, that should kick-start more cooperation programme on free trade (envisaging FTAs with and even integration in defence. the US, Japan, Mercosur, , ASEAN and The EUGS also offers guidelines on how to do others) and on the freedom of the global com- so: ‘an annual coordinated review process at EU mons could herald a creative diplomatic initia- level to discuss Member States’ military spending tive – and a more strategic use of EU trade pol- plans’. Or, as an earlier draft had it, a European icy, which ought to be as embedded in overall semester on defence. strategy as it is in the US.

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dination and initiative. But which body, includ- ing Commission and EEAS officials, will monitor implementation and prepare the annual state of play? (In the same way as the National Security Council in the US, which not only coordinates the drafting of the National Security Strategy but also monitors whether all relevant subsequent documents comply with its approach). And, most crucially, will the Member States feel ownership of the EUGS? Mogherini will obviously drive implementa- tion, but if she is the only one, it cannot work. And implementing this ambitious strategy will demand serious drive. European Union, 2016 Union, European The EU Global Strategy was presented at the European Council in June 2016, but was overshadowed by the BREXIT referendum (in the picture HR Mogherini and PM Cameron). It is on the implementation of the EUGS that The EUGS is a strategy, and strategies have Brexit will have the most impact. Not on sub- to be translated into sub-strategies, policies and stance: the analysis of the environment, the defi- action to achieve their objectives. Unlike in 2003, nition of our vital interests, and the identification the EUGS itself already provides the links to what of our priorities will not change because we have should become a systematic process of implemen- one fewer Member State. tation and review. But, unfortunately, it will have a negative impact on the capacity for delivery. For one, the EU has quite simply lost face – and face is impor- CREATING A PROCESS tant in diplomacy. The credibility and persua- siveness of any EU initiative will be undermined The EUGS calls for a prompt decision on by the fact that one of the three biggest Member ‘clear procedures and timeframes’ for revising States has just decided to leave. Furthermore, the existing sectoral strategies and designing new UK can no longer directly contribute its impres- ones. It then announces an annual reflection sive diplomatic and military clout to EU foreign on the state of play, ‘pointing out where further and security policy. implementation must be sought’, though not a What options there are to bring it to bear indi- systematic overall review. ‘A new process of stra- rectly will have to be explored. tegic reflection will be launched whenever the Nevertheless, Federica Mogherini is absolutely EU and its Member States deem it necessary’ (so right when she says that ‘a fragile world calls for a not automatically every five years, for every leg- more confident and responsible European Union’ islature). – even though the EU itself is somewhat more For this scheme to succeed, it is crucial that it be fragile now than in 2003. firmly anchored institutionally, not just within the Hiding inside for fear of the world around EEAS but in the Commission as well. Of course, us will not solve anything, whereas ‘responsible the High Representative has the main ownership engagement can bring about positive change’. of the EUGS and will take charge of overall coor-

34 1 COMMON SECURITY AND DEFENCE POLICY

1.4. HOW TO IMPLEMENT STRATEGY - IMPLEMENTATION PLAN ON SECURITY AND DEFENCE by Raphaela Engel

The new EU Global Strategy on Foreign and its institutions. In this context, it will be cru- Security Policy triggered a fruitful discussion in cial to maintain momentum and make all EU the area of security and defence that led to a com- Member States willing to act on it. This puts prehensive security package involving Member both the Commission and the High Represent- States and EU institutions alike. The continuity ative in particular under enormous pressure to and speed with which security and defence issues prove that the EU is more efficient and capable were drawn up in recent months has been remark- of providing joint solutions in the field of secu- able, especially given that any step taken towards rity and defence than the Member States on their a more European defence policy cannot be taken own. Quick wins must be achieved, e.g. through for granted. As a result of migration, terrorism, strengthening existing activities, reviving projects political unrest and armed conflicts in neighbour- (such as permanent structured co-operation) or ing regions, perceptions have changed in the last exploiting the full potential of the Treaty. At the couple of years. Europeans clearly expect govern- same time, the defence package proposes new ments to collectively take more responsibility for ideas and possibilities, and the Commission and their safety and security. the High Representative are only just beginning These expectations are also reflected in the new to establish concrete medium- and long-term EU Global Strategy, which states: ‘The European actions. Union will promote peace and guarantee the secu- rity of its citizens and territory. Internal and external security are ever more intertwined: our security at IMPLEMENTING STRATEGY home depends on peace beyond our borders.’ Less than four months after the Heads of State and Government welcomed the presentation MOMENTUM GROWING FOR MORE of the EU Global Strategy, High Representative DEFENCE Federica Mogherini proposed an Implementation Plan on Security and Defence1. There is no doubt that momentum is grow- During a joint session of Foreign and Defence ing for more defence cooperation and closer Ministers on 14 November 2016, conclusions were coordination among Member States and the EU adopted on implementing the EU Global Strategy institutions, and there has been a clear spike in in the area of security and defence based on the political will to deliver on defence. At the same Implementation Plan2. Subsequently, the Heads of time the UK’s decision to leave the EU displayed State and Government discussed the proposal dur- the Europe-wide sense of disappointment with ing the European Council in December 2016.

1 Implementation Plan on Security and Defence, Brussels, 14 November 2016, (14392/16). 2 Foreign Affairs Council conclusions, Brussels, 14 November 2016, (14149/16).

35 HANDBOOK ON CSDP

tion Plan on Security and Defence as well as FAC conclusions based on the Implementa- tion Plan of 14 November 2016). • New financial tools proposed by the Commis- sion, such as the establishment of a European Defence Fund to support the Member States as well as the European defence industry in devel- oping efficient joint defence capabilities (Euro- pean Defence Action Plan). • Concrete measures, as a follow-up to the EU-NATO Joint Declaration3. The declaration aims to achieve new levels of reciprocal coopera- tion between the two organisations, focusing on concrete areas such as fighting hybrid and cyber threats, supporting partners in defence capaci- ty-building, and increasing maritime security.

A COMMON LEVEL OF AMBITION

The EU Global Strategy (EUGS) refers to ‘an appropriate level of ambition’ as a requirement for Europe’s ability to safeguard security within and beyond its borders. The Implementation Plan identifies a comprehensive level of ambition for the EU in the field of security and defence for the first time. The focus is on achieving three priori- ties set out in the EU Global Strategy: • Responding to external conflicts and crises. Responding to today’s crises involves the full range of CDSP tasks as set out in Article 43 of the Treaty of the European Union (TEU). The

European Union, 2016 Union, European EU’s ambition is to have the ability to increase awareness and responsiveness during all phases of a conflict cycle, such as conflict prevention, The implementation process of the EU Global peacekeeping tasks, tasks of combat forces in Strategy consists of three strands of work in the crisis management, including peace-making field of security and defence, forming a so-called and post-conflict stabilisation. defence package. It includes: • Building the capacities of partners. The ob- • Increased levels of military ambition to allow jective of CSDP missions/operations with train- Member States to take more responsibility for ing-related tasks is to build/foster local capacities their own security and defence (Implementa- (e.g. the EU Training Mission in Mali). The EU

3 Signed during the Warsaw Summit on 8 July 2016 by President of the European Council , President of the European Commission Jean-Claude Juncker and Secretary General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Jens Stoltenberg.

36 1 COMMON SECURITY AND DEFENCE POLICY

should strengthen CSDP’s ability to contribute more systematically to the resilience and stabili- sation of partner countries. This can be achieved in synergy with other EU instruments and ac- tors, notably along the nexus of security and de- velopment. CSDP can also be used to provide expertise and assistance to strengthen partners’ resilience and counter hybrid threats. • Protecting the union and its citizens. CSDP is one instrument that is used to tackle challenges and threats that have an impact on the security of the Union and its citizens, along the nexus of internal and external security. While there are no legal grounds for deploying CSDP missions or operations inside the Union, there are various areas in which Member States can contribute to a safe and protected union from a security and defence perspective. This includes, inter alia: strengthening the protection and resilience of its networks and critical infrastructure; foster- ing the security of its external borders, building partners’ capacities to manage their borders, countering hybrid threats, cyber security, pre- venting and countering terrorism and radicalisa- tion, combatting people smuggling and traffick- ing, building their capacity to manage irregular migration flows, promoting compliance with non-proliferation regimes and countering arms trafficking and organised crime. These three priorities mutually reinforce each other and constitute a coherent approach. The Foreign Affairs Council (FAC) conclusions on the proposed level of ambition further highlight the importance of Mutual Assistance and/or Solidar- ity in line with Article 42(7) TEU and Article 222 2016 Union, European TFEU in this context. Like the EU Global Strategy, in which the importance of EU and NATO relations are very Another element highlighted in the EU Global clearly underlined, the FAC conclusions based on Strategy is the strategic autonomy of the Union, the Implementation Plan again stress that NATO which is an important component when discuss- remains the foundation for the collective defence ing the level of ambition. Even though the EU of its members. At the same time, the document prefers to work with partners, it must also be states that the specific character of the security able to tackle defence and security tasks alone, if and defence policy of all EU Member States will needed. This requires the development of a strong, be fully respected. independent defence industry that can produce

37 HANDBOOK ON CSDP

rather than the document presented by the High Representative, will serve as the reference. The actions proposed focus on five work strands: • Setting capability development priorities. Pushing for civil and military capability devel- opment – in line with the establishment of a European Defence Fund as proposed by the Commission as well as existing tools within the European Defence Agency. • Deepening defence cooperation. Deepening of defence cooperation, in particu- lar by means of a non-binding coordinated An- nual Review on Defence. • Adjusting structures, tools and financing. SIPRI, 2016 Adaptation of structures and instruments, in Four EU Member States (United Kingdom, France, particular financial instruments (e.g. review Germany and Italy) are among the top 15 on the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute of planning and implementation structures). (SIPRI)‘s world military expenditure list 2015. Preparation of proposals to improve crisis re- sponse – especially through the EU battle- groups – and reinforce their effective funding. everything that this entails – notably the strate- • Drawing on the full potential of the Treaty: gic enablers. The scope and extent of this strategic PESCO autonomy will reflect the readiness of Member Making use of the possibility outlined in Ar- States to contribute to their common defence. ticle 42(6) TEU of establishing Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO). • Taking CSDP Partnerships forward. ACTIONABLE PROPOSALS

The level of ambition outlines the goals that the THE WAY AHEAD EU and its Member States set out to achieve – as identified in the Global Strategy – in the form of The Security and Defence Implementation three priorities. The Implementation Plan pre- Plan forms part of a wider package that includes sented by the High Representative also includes the Commission’s European Defence Action Plan concrete proposals on how this level of ambition and the follow-up to the EU-NATO Joint Decla- should be reached. ration. Concrete actions based on the Implemen- A non-exhaustive list of actionable proposals to tation Plan must be an unequivocal translation of implement the level of ambition provides input for the political level of ambition as expressed in the the follow-on work. The FAC conclusions based EU Global Strategy. This is a matter of credibility on the Implementation Plan from 14 November in the eyes of our partners and adversaries and, 20164 also address the same actionable propos- at the same time, a clear message to the Member als and work strands; however, the language and States and their citizens. It is important to keep in details in the documents differ somewhat. In the mind that the process of acquiring the identified following paragraph the Council conclusions, capabilities to reach the level of ambition is first

4 Implementation Plan on Security and Defence, Brussels, 14 November 2016, (14392/16).

38 1 COMMON SECURITY AND DEFENCE POLICY

EU-28 UNITED STATES

Defence Expenditure % of total defence expenditure 6 7 Personnel 19 33 Operations and maintenance 51 29 Investment 23 (equipment procurement and R&D) 31 Other

Investment per Soldier Equipment procurement and R&D 23,829 102,264 Euro Euro

Duplication of Systems in Use Number of types of weapon systems* 154 27 Examples: Armoured personnel carrier (APC) = 2,000 units 17,160 units 27,528 units 37 types 9 types

Tanker aircraſt (air-to-air refuelling) = 50 units

42 units 550 units 12 types 4 types

Combat aircraſt = 500 units 1,703 units 2,779 units

*For selected weapon systems categories 19 types 11 types European Commission, 2015. European Lack of integration in defence in numbers (2015). and foremost in the hands of the Member States. and other organisations, should be given a special The EU institutions can provide clear structures, focus.’5 It will be crucial to the successful imple- financing mechanisms and ideas and guidelines, mentation of the defence package to get the mes- but in the end, the future development of the sage across and to stress the EU’s role as the main CSDP will very much depend on the political will security provider in and around Europe. of the Member States. While planning concrete actions to reach the Besides pushing for the swift implementation required level of ambition, the EU should not of measures, the EU must be more effective in lose sight of the long-term element of the new translating its ambitions into practice. The For- strategic documents. Since it takes years to build eign Affairs Council conclusions of 14 Novem- capabilities or gain usable results from defence ber 2016 in that regard state: ‘A proactive and research programmes, the EU is doing the right coordinated strategic communication, directed both thing by using the current momentum to set the inwards to the EU citizens and outwards to partners course.

5 Foreign Affairs Council conclusions, Brussels, 14 November 2016, (14149/16), paragraph 6.

39

ROLES AND 2 RESPONSIBILITIES

41 HANDBOOK ON CSDP

2.1. THE EUROPEAN UNION AND CSDP – STATE OF AFFAIRS by Gabor Iklody

The EU is facing a multitude of security chal- prepared to take integration to the next stage or lenges today – both externally and, no less impor- at least ensure substantially better coordination of tantly, internally. Looking at European political national efforts. agendas, there are two issues that clearly stand out and dominate discussions: migration and security. Both are very complex in nature, and if we want THREE KEY INITIATIVES to tackle them successfully, there must be close interaction between countries and between state The window will not be there forever, and the and non-state actors. Clearly, no one, however coming months will be decisive in terms of under- powerful, can face these challenges alone. standing whether or not Member States can turn These challenges are testing the EU’s ability to the current momentum into concrete steps. There act decisively and provide support to its members. are three key initiatives being pursued in parallel If we succeed, we will emerge stronger – but if we that can help bring about concrete results. These fail, trust in our institutions will be weakened and are: (1) the implementation of the security and so will cohesion within our community. So, the defence aspects of the EU Global Strategy (the stakes are high and our citizens want convincing ‘Implementation Plan’); (2) the European Defence and visible results, and they want them fast. Action Plan (EDAP); and (3) the implementation Today, the EU is undergoing a difficult phase of the EU-NATO Joint Declaration. These three in its development. It is precisely amidst such dif- strands of work are complementary and mutu- ficulties that it needs a good story to tell. A story ally reinforcing. The first gives the main direction that is compelling and can help citizens to under- and charts the way ahead in security and defence, stand that the EU is there to help them. The area of the second helps provide the instruments needed security and defence is particularly relevant from to promote defence-related cooperation, and the this perspective: the effects of the threat posed by third places these efforts in the larger context of terrorists and by actors who seek to undermine EU-NATO cooperation. Together, they will shape trust in our institutions and values concern soci- what CSDP looks like in the years to come as an eties in Europe directly. The heavy focus on secu- instrument in the EU’s varied crisis prevention and rity and defence seen at European political fora management toolbox; they will generate the civil- over the past months is therefore wholly justified. ian and military capabilities that Europe needs, and The significance of the outcome of current efforts create a sound defence industry base to underpin goes well beyond merely security and defence – those capabilities. The more the line between exter- it will have an impact on nal and internal security is blurred (think of cyber more broadly and could also help restore public or foreign fighters, for instance), the more the link trust. between the various instruments in the EU’s tool- Right now, there is a window of opportunity box becomes stronger. CSDP is no exception. The for the EU to take security and defence cooper- use of Article 42(7) TEU following the terrorist ation forward. The underlying question facing attacks in Paris is a case in point. Member States is whether they are willing and In crisis management, the EU’s often-cited

42 2 ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES

unique strength lies in the ‘comprehensive in a resource-conscious fashion so as to properly approach’, i.e. in the capacity to choose from back up ambitions. To deliver effectively, we need the very large array of instruments in its toolbox, to look at our institutions and our decision-mak- ranging from diplomacy through development ing, and we need to secure proper funding arrange- assistance to military means, and apply them as ments. Many concrete solutions that Member it feels appropriate. It also includes the option of States may want to consider again as options have moving between instruments as circumstances already been outlined in the Lisbon Treaty, such as require. This is a great concept, but one which permanent structured cooperation (PESCO). has yet to be implemented in full. There are the- The three strategic priorities are spelled out in atres which are often presented as places where the EUGS very clearly. These are: crisis manage- the concept is being tested. The Horn of Africa ment, partners’ capacity-building and protecting is an obvious example of a case where the EU has Europe. At first glance, they resemble NATO’s deployed a number of instruments simultaneously three core tasks of collective defence, crisis man- and is engaged not solely in containing piracy at agement and cooperative security. sea (i.e. focusing on the symptoms) but also trying So, how should we read that? Are we on a colli- to address the root causes onshore through train- sion course, set to compete? The answer is clearly ing, capacity-building and economic assistance. no. The goal is clearly to build complementarity CSDP was not designed to be a long-term and ensure closer alignment, for instance in areas instrument, but engagement in security and like planning. Of the three priorities, crisis man- defence in a country almost always is. The agement and capacity-building are traditional moment a decision is taken to deploy a mission, CSDP areas where cooperation with NATO has a commitment is made to stay the course and been growing stronger – take the example of the help bring about results; we cannot turn around Mediterranean where strong, pragmatic links of halfway down the road and leave. That is why it interaction are being developed between Opera- is so important to have the option to transition tion Sophia and NATO’s Sea Guardian, or take from one instrument to another. And let’s face it: our complementary security sector reform (SSR) the sort of security sector reforms that the EU is efforts in . increasingly engaged in, on both the civilian and The ‘protecting Europe’ component is perhaps military front, take time. Such reforms cannot be less obvious. It is important to be absolutely clear: completed in two or three years. Local ownership ‘hard-core’ military security and territorial defence is key in the process, but it is not something that is NATO’s business. The EU’s role in this regard we can take as a given in most places. We have to is more that of a ‘facilitator’, in the sense that it work for it. Ukraine may be cited as an example. can encourage and assist Member States, includ- ing through the EDAP and a much-awaited Euro- pean Defence Fund, in helping to fill identified STRATEGIC GUIDANCE: EUGS short-falls and acquire the required capabilities. The EU’s role is different and is indeed com- The role of the EU Global Strategy (EUGS) and plementary: think of the need to protect the EU’s the Implementation Plan is: (a) to provide strategic borders, working through internal security actors. guidance on our security and defence priorities in Think of the EU’s work on countering radicalisa- terms of geography and in terms of the range of tion in our societies, its ongoing efforts to counter activities envisaged; (b) to provide clarity on our hybrid threats, its investments in cybersecurity, civilian and military Level of Ambition (LoA); (c) or its work on strengthening our energy secu- to match priorities with the capabilities needed to rity. Or think of what will certainly become a key meet them; and (d) to facilitate the implementation driver in the coming years: the need to enhance

43 HANDBOOK ON CSDP

the resilience of our societies and infrastructure, the output of national defence spending we need an area which is clearly an EU strength. We need to come up with more multinational collaborative to have the capacity to withstand the blow and projects, and they need to have substance. Results then recover quickly. Greater resilience is there- to date, whether in the context of ‘pooling and fore a key form of defence – and it also serves as a sharing’ or ‘smart defence’, have been modest. deterrent, as it helps deny the benefit of a possible Clearly, nationally oriented defence programmes attack. Or think of efforts to improve the protec- cannot address capability shortfalls and provide tion of our land and maritime borders and build the core capabilities the EU needs. The reasons for a European Border and Coast Guard capacity, the insufficient progress are predominantly political, substantial beefing-up of Frontex. These are all arising from a narrow definition of sovereignty. areas where Europe is best placed to enhance the Over the past decade a number of initiatives protection of its members and citizens. have been introduced to address the above prob- Member States’ national defence capabilities lems. The EU’s ‘Permanent Structured Coopera- are essential to underpinning the credibility of tion’ (PESCO) and NATO’s ‘framework nations’ the EU’s action in the world and they are vital to concept are among them. Their goal is to promote ensuring Europe’s security – regardless of whether defence cooperation by committing countries to such capabilities are used nationally, as part of an spend more, collaborate more and deliver criti- EU effort or in the context of NATO actions. cal capabilities. PESCO will need to balance the Security does not come for free. The decline in requirements of efficiency and inclusiveness: in defence spending that has characterised European other words, it must enable those who are will- defence budgets for over a decade must stop and ing and prepared to move faster to do so, keeping be reversed. Europe’s security, the international their cooperation under the EU umbrella, and, context and the need for more equitable transat- on the other hand, ensure that PESCO does not lantic burden-sharing all require that. The rhet- become a divisive instrument, driving the EU oric that European citizens have been hearing further apart, especially not now. The fact that, practically since the end of the Cold War is nei- despite repeated efforts, PESCO has yet to take ther true nor sustainable today. The EU needs to off shows that it is not easy to reconcile those invest more in defence – and, given the challenges two requirements. Incentives, such as those that it faces, in security more broadly. EDAP and, further down the road, the European Defence Fund could offer, for countries to enter into more binding mutual commitments could MULTINATIONAL COLLABORATIVE become important game changers. PROJECTS Last but not least: we also need to modernise our definition of defence capabilities to include The question of course is not only what we areas like intelligence, cyber, space and dual-use spend but also how we spend it. Here, we need to capabilities, and not just traditional military hard- make sure that we build and keep capabilities that ware. NATO has already embarked on that road we truly need and that, once we have acquired with its Deterrence and Defence Posture Review them, we have the political will and resources to – and the EU should certainly not lag behind. By use them – otherwise, they are of limited value. way of illustration, let me refer to the increased There should therefore be a lot more focus on emphasis on enhanced situational awareness. The actual output. The EU’s aggregate defence spend- recent establishment of an EU Hybrid Fusion ing is almost EUR 200 billion per year. This is still Cell, linking together the various European a large amount of money – but we could certainly institutions and the relevant services of Member get more bang for our buck. If we want to increase States, and also NATO, to acquire and maintain

44 2 ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES

a shared situational awareness picture shows how clearly shifting towards training missions, on both critical it is to be aware of current or just-emerg- the civilian and military front. However, until we ing threats for both prevention and coordinated can complement current training efforts, provide response purposes. at least some equipment to support local militar- ies that we train and ensure proper sustainment, our capacity-building efforts will not deliver real ‘MULTI-STAKEHOLDER’ CHARACTER effect. Today, we can train but not equip – and OF SECURITY this simply does not work, whether we look at our CSDP efforts in Somalia, Mali or the Cen- All of the above requires a paradigm shift. If tral African Republic. Keeping our security and we want to be successful in our response to the development goals entirely non-aligned, as if they challenges we face, including for instance hybrid belonged to completely different universes, can threats (often described as the dark side of the hardly help us achieve our overall objectives. If we comprehensive approach), we need to apply a to want to truly establish a nexus between secu- sort of ‘whole of government’ approach at both rity and development, and make real headway, a national and European level. But not only that: change is required in the approach – not merely there is a compelling need to work increasingly at European level, but at national level in Member with non-state actors, too. Cybersecurity is a States, too. prime example of the ‘multi-stakeholder’ charac- There is much talk about EU Battlegroups ter of security. (BGs). They are a great instrument, readily avail- Funding remains central to the EU’s further able – but never used. Lots of work has gone into efforts to enhance the effectiveness of CSDP. Pro- the BGs to make them even more versatile. But, gress is also required in terms of raising national paradoxically, it only fuels frustration as it means spending on security and defence in all key areas, that there is an even larger range of scenarios including the financing of our own CSDP activ- where we could use them, but don’t. The prob- ities, funding equipment support to partners and lem, similar to NATO’s Response Force (NRF), is providing financial support to European capa- political, not military technical. It has to do with bility projects and the establishment of a sound decision-making and funding. Unless we can rec- defence industry base. oncile the national interests of those who have a According to the current funding arrangement, particular interest in a region and those who pro- only a small fraction (less than 10 %) of the over- vide the forces to deploy, BGs will likely continue all costs of a CSDP military mission is regarded as to exist solely on paper. Here, too, PESCO may common costs. The brunt of the expenses are paid prove to be the vehicle to break the decade-long by those who provide the troops and equipment, deadlock. in accordance with the ‘costs lie where they fall’ The window for taking the EU’s security and principle. This is what Defence Minister Le Drian defence cooperation to the next level is now open. called ‘10 % solidarity’. Turning Member States’ renewed high-level polit- ical commitments into concrete measures will be a task for the coming months. It is also important CAPACITY-BUILDING FOR SECURITY to ensure that the high-level ambitions regarding AND DEVELOPMENT security and defence are underpinned by concrete CSDP actions and commitments on the ground, One of the three priorities of the EUGS is to too. help build partners’ capacities – and indeed, as experience shows, the focus in CSDP has been

45 HANDBOOK ON CSDP

2.2. THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL AND CSDP

by Luis Amorim

2.2.1. THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL

The European Council provides the Union with the necessary impetus for its development and defines the general political direction and pri- orities thereof, including in relation to the Com- mon Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP).1 According to Article 22 of the Treaty on Euro- pean Union (TEU), the European Council shall identify the strategic interests and objectives of It consists of the Heads of State or Government the Union relating to the CFSP and in other of the Member States (i.e. presidents or prime areas of the external action of the Union, on the ministers), together with its own President and basis of the following principles, as stated in Arti- the President of the European Commission. The cle 21 TEU: democracy, the rule of law, the uni- High Representative of the Union for Foreign versality and indivisibility of human rights and Affairs and Security Policy (High Representative) fundamental freedoms, respect for human dignity, also takes part in its work. equality and solidarity, and respect for the United The European Council elects its own Presi- Nations Charter and international law. dent, by a qualified majority, for a term of two Moreover, Article 26 TEU states that the Euro- and a half years, renewable once. This ‘perma- pean Council shall identify the Union’s strategic nent’ nature of the post is one of the main inno- interests, determine the objectives of and define vations introduced by the .3 In general guidelines for the CFSP, including mat- addition to convening, chairing and preparing ters with defence implications, and shall adopt the European Council meetings, as well as driving necessary decisions. forward and ensuring the continuity of its work The European Council became one of the in cooperation with the President of the Euro- Union’s seven institutions when the Treaty of pean Commission, the President of the Euro- Lisbon entered into force on 1 December 2009.2 pean Council also ensures, at his level and in

1 The CSDP is an integral part of CFSP and is intended to provide the Union with an operational capac- ity drawing on civilian and military assets, which the Union may use on missions outside the Union for peace-keeping, conflict prevention and strengthening international security in accordance with the princi- ples of the United Nations Charter. The performance of these tasks is undertaken using capabilities pro- vided by the Member States. The CSDP is also expected to include the progressive framing of a common Union defence policy, which will lead to a common defence, when the European Council, acting unan- imously, so decides, in full accordance with the Member States’ respective constitutional requirements (Article 42 TEU). 2 The European Council was created in 1974 and formalised by the Single European Act in 1986. Between 1961 and 1974, seven summit meetings of Heads of State or Government had been convened to assess different turning points in the European Community’s history. 3 The expression ‘permanent’ should be read in contrast to the mandate of the Presidency of the Council of the EU, which is held by each Member State for a period of six months at a time on a rotating basis.

46 2 ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES Jochen Rehrl, 2017 Jochen Rehrl, The is the main seat of the European Council and the Council of the EU.

that capacity, the external representation of the convened during the mandate of President Tusk Union on issues concerning its CFSP, without to address the migration crisis. prejudice to the powers of the High Representa- The European Council has always been par- tive. It is worth noting that the High Represent- ticularly attentive to CFSP matters, including ative is appointed by the European Council and CSDP. is expected to ensure, inter alia, the implementa- tion of European Council decisions in the areas of CFSP and CSDP. Since the entry into force of the Treaty of Lis- bon, the European Council has had two ‘perma- nent’ Presidents: former Belgian Prime Minister , and former Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk. The European Council does not exercise leg- islative functions and, unless otherwise stated by the Treaties, takes its decisions by consensus and unanimity. It is assisted by the General Secretariat of the Council. The European Council is expected to meet at least twice every six months in the Europa Build- ing in Brussels (inaugurated in December 2016). The President may decide to convene special meetings of the European Council if the situation so requires. Several such meetings were held dur- ing the mandate of President Van Rompuy with 2017 Union, European regard to the euro crisis, and more have since been Donald Tusk, President of the European Council

47 HANDBOOK ON CSDP European Union, 2017 Union, European EU Heads of State or Government meet informally on 10 March 2017 to prepare for the 60th anniversary of the Rome Treaties.

The following political milestones in the spe- tic Treaty Organisation (NATO). The Euro- cific context of CSDP are worth highlighting: pean Council identified at this meeting priority actions for stronger cooperation in three main Presidency Conclusions of the European Council of areas: increasing the effectiveness, visibility and 12-13 December 2003 (5381/04): The European impact of CSDP; enhancing the development of Council adopted the European Security Strategy capabilities; and strengthening Europe’s defence (ESS), which provided the conceptual framework industry. for the CFSP, including what would later become the CSDP. European Council conclusions of 25-26 June 2015 (EUCO 22/15): The European Council tasked President conclusions of the European Council of the High Representative with continuing the pro- 11-12 December 2008 (17271/1/08 REV 1, cess of strategic reflection with a view to prepar- Annex 2): Declaration by the European Council ing an EU global strategy on foreign and security on the enhancement of the European Security policy in close cooperation with Member States, and Defence Policy (ESDP) . to be submitted to the European Council by June 2016. European Council conclusions of 19-20 December 2013 (EUCO 217/13): For the first time since European Council conclusions of 28 June 2016 the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, (EUCO 26/16): The European Council wel- the European Council held a thematic debate comed the presentation of the Global Strategy on defence, which was preceded by a meeting for the European Union’s Foreign and Security with the Secretary General of the North Atlan- Policy by the High Representative and invited

48 2 ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES European Union, 2017 Union, European The informal summit in on 3 February 2017: In the morning, the 28 EU Heads of State or Govern- ment discussed the external dimension of migration. The afternoon session built upon the political re- flection on the future of the EU with 27 Member States. her, the Commission and the Council to take respect, the European Council stressed the need the work forward. The European Council also to do more, including by committing sufficient discussed EU-NATO cooperation in the pres- additional resources, while taking into account ence of the NATO Secretary General and called national circumstances and legal commitments. for further enhancement of the relationship, in It also urged swift action to follow up on the light of their common aims and values and given Council conclusions of 14 November 2016 on unprecedented challenges from the South and implementing the EU Global Strategy in the East. At this meeting, it was also announced that area of Security and Defence, and the Council the President of the European Council and the conclusions of 6 December 2016 implementing President of the European Commission would the Joint Declaration signed in Warsaw by EU issue a declaration together with the NATO Sec- and NATO leaders. retary General at the NATO summit in Warsaw on 8 July 2016. FOR FURTHER INFORMATION European Council conclusions of 15 December 2016 To learn more about the work of the Euro- (EUCO 34/16): The European Council stressed pean Council and its President, go to: that Europeans must take greater responsibility for their security. In order to strengthen Europe’s http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/ security and defence in a challenging geopolit- european-council/ http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/ ical environment and to better protect its citi- european-council/president/ zens, confirming previous commitments in this

49 HANDBOOK ON CSDP

2.2.2. THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS OF THE EUROPEAN UNION

The Council of Ministers of the European cil. The Secretary-General ensures the execution Union (Council of the EU) is the Union institu- of services provided by the GSC to the rotating tion that, jointly with the European Parliament, and ‘permanent’ presidencies of the Council and exercises legislative and budgetary functions. It its preparatory bodies, and to the president of the carries out policy-making and coordinating func- European Council, including the administrative tions as laid down in the Treaties. It consists of a management of the GSC in terms of its human representative of each Member State at ministerial and financial resources. level, who may commit the government of the The Secretary-General takes part in Council Member State in question and cast its vote. The meetings as appropriate. The Secretary General of Council acts by a qualified majority except where the Council is also the Secretary General of the the Treaties provide otherwise. In the CFSP/ European Council and attends European Council CSDP domains, the Council acts by consensus meetings and takes all measures necessary for the and unanimity.1 The adoption of legislative acts is organisation of its proceedings. The current Sec- excluded (Article 24 TEU).2 retary General is Jeppe Tranholm-Mikkelsen. He Currently, the Council of the EU meets in the was appointed on 21 April 2015 for the period following 10 configurations: 1 July 2015 – 30 June 2020. • General Affairs Despite the fact that it meets in different con- • Foreign Affairs figurations, the Council of the EU is a single legal • Economic and Financial Affairs entity. This has three important consequences for • Justice and Home Affairs its work: • Employment, Social Policy, Health and Con- • Any legal act concerning any subject falling sumer Affairs with the Union’s competence can be formally • Competitiveness (Internal Market, Industry, adopted by any Council configuration, wheth- Research and Space) er or not it falls under its remit. • Transport, Telecommunications and Energy • There is no hierarchy among the different • Agriculture and Fisheries Council configurations, although the General • Environment Affairs Council has a coordinating role and is • Education, Youth, Culture and Sport responsible for institutional, administrative and horizontal matters. TheGeneral Secretariat of the Council (GSC) • The office of theresidency P of the Council is assists the work of the Council. It is led by its Sec- also a single office. This means, in practice, that retary-General, who is appointed by the Coun- the rules applicable to the Presidency apply to

1 The Council may only act yb qualified majority when adopting a decision defining a Union action or position on the basis of a decision or following a specific request of the European Council to the High Representative, when adopting any decision implementing a decision defining a Union action or position, and when appointing a EU special representative (Article 31(2) TEU). Finally, some decisions in relation to the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) in the CSDP may be taken by qualified majority voting (Articles 46(2) and 46(3) TEU). 2 The exclusion of the adoption of legislative acts does not deprive CFSP Decisions of their binding nature, which is con- firmed by Article 28(2) TEU. The exclusion of legislative acts is mostly linked to the exclusion of the legislative procedure from the CFSP domain, and hence with the inapplicability of the role of the Commission and the European Parliament in this procedure.

50 2 ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES Jochen Rehrl, 2017 Jochen Rehrl, The is the main seat of the General Secretariat of the Council.

any person chairing any one of the Council The General Affairs and the Foreign Affairs configurations, including the Foreign Affairs configurations are the only ones specifically men- Council ‘permanent’ chair, or, as appropriate, tioned in Article 16 TEU. any person chairing one of the Council’s pre- The General Affairs Council ensures consist- paratory bodies. ency in the work of the different Council config- It is not unusual for the members of the Council urations. It prepares and ensures the follow-up to to continue their discussions at the meals that are meetings of the European Council, in liaison with organised on the occasion of Council meetings. the President of the European Council and the However, such events do not form part of the offi- European Commission. cial Council meetings and any decisions taken or The Foreign Affairs Council elaborates the conclusions reached must be adopted at the offi- Union’s external action on the basis of the strate- cial meeting. gic guidelines laid down by the European Council Ministers also meet to reflect and exchange and ensures that the Union’s action in this area views freely on topics of general scope. These informal meetings are outside the framework and procedural rules laid down by the Treaties and their discussions cannot give rise to the pro- duction of documents, before or after the meet- ing, or to the drafting of conclusions or formal decisions. In the Foreign Affairs area, ministers meet informally usually once per semester, at ‘Gymnich meetings’, so called following the first meeting of this nature in the German town of Gymnich in Union European 1974. Ministers of Defence also meet informally HR Federica Mogherini chairs the once per semester. Foreign Affairs Council.

51 HANDBOOK ON CSDP

is consistent. This includes foreign policy, defence and security, trade, development cooperation and humanitarian aid. The Council can launch EU crisis management missions and operations, both civilian and military, in pursuit of the EU’s objectives of peace and security. It can also adopt measures needed to implement the EU’s foreign and security policy, including possible sanctions. The Foreign Affairs Council is composed of the foreign ministers of all EU Member States. Depending on the agenda, the Council also brings

together defence ministers (CSDP), development Union European ministers (development cooperation) and trade Ambassador Walter Stevens (BE) is the ministers (common commercial policy). Minis- permanent chair of the Political and Security ters from these policy areas usually meet twice a Committee (PSC). year under the Foreign Affairs Council configura- to be submitted subsequently to the Coun- tion. In the case of defence ministers, they usually cil for decision or adoption.5 Coreper’s cen- meet back-to-back with foreign ministers. tral role is illustrated by the fact that all the The High Representative chairs this Council items included on the Council’s agenda must configuration.3 The representatives of the Mem- be examined beforehand by Coreper unless, for ber State holding the six-monthly rotating Presi- reasons of urgency, the Council decides other- dency chair all other Council configurations. The wise. Coreper is divided in two parts, 1 (deputy Foreign Affairs Council meets once a month, with permanent representatives) and 2 (permanent the exceptions of August and September unless representatives). Coreper 2 prepares, inter alia, there is a situation warranting a meeting during the work of the Foreign Affairs Council.6 any of these two months. The Political and Security Committee A Committee of Permanent Represent- (PSC), provided for in Article 38 TEU, plays a atives of the Governments of the Member central role in the CFSP and CSDP domains. It States (Coreper)4 prepares the work of the performs two main functions: Council and carries out the tasks assigned to (1) it monitors the international situation in are- it by the Council. Coreper also ensures con- as falling within the CFSP and contributes to sistency in the Union’s policies and actions. the definition of policies, delivering opinions The chief role of Coreper is to coordinate and within the Council, without prejudice to the prepare the work of the different Council con- work of Coreper; figurations, including Foreign Affairs, and to (2) under the responsibility of the Council and of attempt to achieve, at its level, an agreement the High Representative, it ensures the politi­

3 It must be noted that the High Representative does not chair ministerial meetings that fall under the Foreign Affairs Council remit which deal with common commercial policy issues; these are chaired by the six-monthly rotating Presi- dency of the Council. As it is an exclusive competence of the EU, the Council adopts measures implementing the EU’s common commercial policy together with the European Parliament. 4 This acronym derives from the French abbreviation for ‘Comité des représentants permanents’. 5 It is worth noting that any agreement worked out by Coreper can always be called into question by the Council, which alone has the power to make decisions. 6 Coreper 2 is assisted by members of the ‘Antici Group’, so called after its first chairman. It was set up in 1975 to review the agenda for Coreper 2 and settle technical and organisational details. This preparatory stage makes it possible for the Presidency to have an initial idea of Member States’ positions, possibly to be taken when Coreper 2 meets.

52 2 ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES

cal control and strategic direction of civilian and military crisis management missions and operations and may, when appropriate and if so empowered by the Council, take decisions in this area. A representative of the High Rep- resentative chairs the PSC.7 Beyond Coreper and the PSC, more than 150 dif- ferent preparatory bodies, also known as working parties, support the work of the Council.8 Some 35 Council thematic and geographic preparatory bodies support the work of the Foreign Affairs Council. Below is a selection of those that are Jochen Rehrl, 2016 more closely associated with the CSDP domain. The two chairs, Ms Jana Kalimonova (CivCom) and General The European Union Military Commit- Michail Kostarakos (EUMC) – in the centre – flanked by two tee (EUMC) is the highest military body set Austrians, General Günter Höfler (Military Representative) and Alexander Kmentt (Ambassador to the PSC). up within the Council (Council Decision 2001/79/CFSP of 22 January 2001). It directs all military activities within the EU framework, The European Union Military Committee in particular the planning and execution of mil- Working Group/Headline Goal Task Force itary missions and operations under the CSDP (EUMCWG/HTF) is a group of experts dealing and the development of military capabilities. It with military capability development. It is the gives military advice to the PSC and makes rec- EUMC’s working body with regard to all aspects ommendations on military matters. of capability development where it has a responsi- The EUMC is composed of the chiefs of bility. Beyond that, it has been given tasks encom- defence of the Member States, who are regu- passing a wider range of capability-related issues larly represented by their permanent military in preparation of EUMC decisions. The EUM- representatives. The Committee has a perma- CWG/HTF has a permanent chair, selected and nent chair, selected by the EUMC meeting at appointed by the EUMC meeting at the level of the level of chiefs of defence, and appointed by military representatives. the Council. The EUMC chair is also the top The Politico-Military Group (PMG) car- military advisor of the High Representative. ries out preparatory work in the field of CSDP The European Union Military Committee for the PSC. It covers the political aspects of Working Group (EUMCWG) supports and EU military and civil-military issues, including assists the EUMC in its work on military mat- concepts, capabilities and operations and mis- ters within the EU framework. It carries out tasks sions. The PMG prepares Council conclusions assigned to it by the EUMC, such as the draft- and provides recommendations for the PSC, ing of military advice and military concepts, and monitors their effective implementation, con- reports to the EUMC. tributes to the development of horizontal policy The EUMCWG has a permanent chair, selected and facilitates exchanges of information. It has by the EUMC meeting at the level of military rep- a particular responsibility regarding partnerships resentatives and appointed by Coreper. with non-EU countries and other organisa-

7 The work of PSC is prepared by the ‘Nicolaidis group’, so called after its first chairman. 8 To see the full list of Council preparatory bodies, the following document can be consulted: List of Council preparatory bodies,5183/16.

53 HANDBOOK ON CSDP

tions, including EU-NATO relations, as well as tives, financing of external activities, non-prolifer- exercises. It is chaired by a representative of the ation matters, and other crosscutting issues in the High Representative and is composed of Member CFSP/CSDP domains. In 2004, a new formation States’ delegates. called ‘Sanctions’ was created within the working The Committee for Civilian Aspects of Cri- party. Its main task is to share best practice, and sis Management (CivCom) advises the PSC on to revise and implement common guidelines to civilian aspects of crisis management (Council ensure effective and uniform implementation of Decision 2000/354/CFSP of 22 May 2000). It EU sanctions regimes. prepares planning documents for new missions, RELEX is chaired by a representative of the provides advice to the PSC, and deals with the rotating Presidency of the Council. development of strategies for civilian crisis man- agement and for civilian capabilities. It is chaired by a representative of the High Representative and FOR FURTHER INFORMATION is composed of Member States’ delegates. To learn more about the work of the Council The working party of Foreign Relations of the EU in the CFSP/CSDP domain go to: Counsellors (RELEX) deals with the legal, finan- cial and institutional issues of the CFSP. Its pri- http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/ orities include sanctions, EU crisis management policies/defence-security/european-council/ president/ missions and operations, EU special representa-

The Council of the European Union

The Council is the EU institution where the EU Member States' government representatives sit, i.e. the ministers of each Member State with responsibility for a given area.

Tasks: 10 council configurations: Chaired by a permanent chair or the rotating Presidency - It adopts legislative acts - General Affairs (Regulations, Directives, etc.), in - Foreign Affairs Council of many cases in "co-decision" with - Economic and Financial Affairs the European Parliament; - Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) 'Ministers' - It helps coordinate Member - Employment, Social Policy, Health States' policies, for example, in and Consumer Affairs Prepared by the Permanent the economic field; Representatives Committee - Competitiveness (internal market, (COREPER) - It develops the common foreign industry, research and space) and security policy, on the basis - Transport and of strategic guidelines set by the Telecommunications and Energy European Council; - Agriculture and Fisheries - It concludes international - Environment Qualified majority = A minimum of agreements on behalf of the 260 of 352 votes and the majority - Education, youth, culture and Union; It adopts the Union's of Member States (voting strength sports ranges from 29 [Germany, France, budget, together with the Graph: Jochen Rehrl Italy, United Kingdom] to 3 [Malta]) European Parliament

54 2 ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES

2.3. THE ROLE OF THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION IN CSDP

by Diego de Ojeda

Although – contrary to most other EU pol- icy areas – the role of the European Commission in CSDP is secondary to those of the HR and the Member States, the Commission remains an essential actor in fully attaining CSDP goals. Indeed, Article 21(3) of the Lisbon Treaty calls upon the Council and the Commission, assisted by the HR, to cooperate to ensure consistency between the different areas of the Union’s exter- nal action, and between those areas and its other policies. This is without prejudice to the distinc- In addition, under the authority of the HR act- tive competences of each institution and both ing in her capacity as Vice-President, the Com- CFSP and non-CFSP decision-making proce- mission also implements the CFSP budget, which dures, as per Article 40. finances CSDP civilian missions, EU Special Rep- The ‘consistency’ principle was developed in resentatives and non-proliferation and disarma- the December 2013 Joint Communication on the ment projects. EU Comprehensive Approach, and the ensuing Furthermore, the Commission manages other, May 2014 Council conclusions. The idea is simple: somewhat related external action policies such as CSDP is not to act in isolation from other EU international trade and humanitarian assistance, external actions and instruments. On the contrary, as well as internal policies with substantial and it must act in sync with non-CFSP instruments growing external dimensions – security, migra- for which Commission participation is required as tion, climate, energy, transport, space, defence a result of its responsibility to implement the EU internal market, etc. – which are relevant to the budget as determined in Articles 317 and 318 of Union’s foreign, security and defence policy. the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU. Thus, the Commission fully participates in the Non-CFSP EU external instruments include PSC and all Council bodies – including CivCom, the geographic Instrument for Pre-accession Assis- PMG and the EUMC – discussing and prepar- tance (IPA), the European Neighbourhood and ing the decisions of the Foreign Affairs Council in Partnership Instrument (ENPI) and the Devel- its different configurations: FAC, FAC Defence, opment Co-operation Instrument (DCI), as well FAC Development and FAC Trade. as the extra-budgetary European Development Through a number of mechanisms, Commission Fund (EDF). The thematic Instrument contrib- services are increasingly able to make their input uting to Stability and Peace (IcSP), the Partner- available to the EEAS when preparing CSDP inter- ship Instrument (PI), the European Instrument ventions. Examples include the Crisis Platform for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR), chaired by the EEAS, which brings together all the the Instrument for Nuclear Safety Co-operation relevant services when necessary, and the Political (INSC) and the DCI thematic programmes also Framework for a Crisis Approach (PFCA), which belong to this category. is now a mandatory step in the process that may

55 HANDBOOK ON CSDP Jochen Rehrl The Berlaymont building houses the headquarters of the European Commission.

lead to deciding to establish a CSDP mission fol- was completed in the autumn of 2014, when lowing the completion of all other planning steps, Jean-Claude Juncker took office as President of to which Commission services also contribute. the European Commission and included the goal In short, the Commission is not only an impor- of making the EU a stronger global actor as one of tant actor when it comes to implementing CSDP the ten political priorities of his Commission. In directly – managing the budget – and indirectly parallel, he decided to set up the Commissioners’ – ensuring coordination with non-CSDP instru- Group on External Action, chaired by HR/VP Fed- ments – but it is also a substantial contributor erica Mogherini, to discuss all EU external action to the interdepartmental process leading to the issues with other relevant Commission Vice-Presi- preparation of CSDP interventions and their dis- dents and Commissioners as appropriate, without cussion in Council. prejudice to the decision-making competences of Of course, there is still much left to do to fully the college of Commissioners. deliver a truly comprehensive EU approach. The Indeed, the greater consistency achieved at double-hatting of the HR/VP and the estab- the political level trickles down to services and to lishment of the EEAS by the Lisbon Treaty were regional, country and thematic common strate- revolutionary steps that, with hindsight, inevita- gies that the HR/VP and the Commission discuss bly required some time for the intended gains to and prepare with a view to their submission for emerge. In addition to the non-negligible human, endorsement to the Council and the Parliament logistic and organisational aspects, the full assimila- and which increasingly guide EU external action, tion of and adjustment to the changes in roles and including CSDP. competences could not take place overnight. How- There should be no room for complacency, ever, it can be argued that the transition period however, at least not at this stage, so soon after

56 2 ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES

the Lisbon Treaty (in historical terms). Substan- tial ground has been covered already: now, the left and right hands of EU external action are aware of what the other is doing. But the goal is for them to go forward hand in hand, not merely in parallel, and the plurality of intense international crises, particularly within the Union’s neighbour- hood, suggests that the comprehensive approach should be deepened further to reap the synergies that can still be attained. The military dimension is particularly impor- tant in this respect. On the one hand, the Com- Commission European mission is not well-equipped to contribute given The college of Commissioners, comprised of the it does not have competence in the area and lacks 28 Commissioners, meets at least once per week (in general on Wednesday mornings). military resources. In addition, Article 41(2) TEU explicitly forbids the funding using the EU budget of any expenditure directly or indirectly arising in EU-NATO Set of Common Proposals that build the context of military operations. The discussions and expand on ongoing work in the field of Coun- in Council in recent years would appear to indi- tering Hybrid Threats. Finally, on 30 Novem- cate that Member States may no longer want to ber 2016 the Commission put forward an ambi- keep the Commission at bay when it comes to tious European Defence Action Plan (EDAP) that CSDP military missions and operations but, at aims to enhance cooperation between Member any rate, the Commission will remain bound by States and promote greater pooling of national the Treaty, which will not be easy to change. defence resources, strengthening the defence As a partial solution, building on the Joint Com- European internal market through the establish- munication on Capacity Building in support of Secu- ment, inter alia, of a European Defence Fund that rity and Development (CBSD) and in the context will lead to a Defence Research Programme and of the Joint Communication proposing an EU-wide the joint development of defence capabilities by strategic framework bringing together the CFSP and groups of Member States. non-CFSP concepts of Security Sector Reform in part- The direct relevance for CSDP of all of the ner countries, in July 2016 the Commission pro- above initiatives seems clear, as does the European posed an amendment to the regulation of the IcSP Commission’s role in developing them or contrib- so as to allow the funding of CBSD interventions uting to their implementation in its areas of com- as a last resort under very specific circumstances petence. The security of the Union and of its cit- (e.g. ‘failed’ states), where military actors may be izens is obviously a top priority for the European the only groups available to carry out developmen- Parliament, the Council, the High Representative tal activities, in line with recent policy develop- and also for the European Commission, both ments in the context of the OCDE development externally, including through CSDP and non- policy. It is to be hoped that both Council and Par- CFSP instruments, and internally, by enhanc- liament will be able to agree to the proposal soon. ing synergies with the external dimension of the In parallel, the services of the Commission are Union’s internal policies. In this context and with actively contributing to bringing forward the EU full respect of the competences assigned to each Global Strategy Implementation Plan on Secu- institution, the Commission plays, and will con- rity and Defence and to the implementation of tinue to play, a fully active role in this area in the the July 2016 EU-NATO Declaration and the best interest of the EU and its citizens.

57 HANDBOOK ON CSDP

2.4. THE ROLE OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT IN CSDP

by Jérôme Legrand

It is a commonly accepted view that the Euro- pean Parliament has very little power (if any) as far as Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) is concerned, and even less with regard to its defence component, the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). However, a detailed examination of the evolution of CSDP over the last decade reveals quite a different reality.

LEGAL BASIS AND INSTITUTIONAL taken by unanimity, with some notable exceptions FRAMEWORK relating to the European Defence Agency (EDA, Article 45 TEU) and the permanent structured The Common Security and Defence Policy is cooperation (PESCO, Article 46 TEU), to which an integral part of the Union’s Common Foreign majority voting applies. Proposals for decisions and Security Policy (CFSP),1 as framed by the are normally made by the High Representative of Treaty on European Union (TEU). As a matter the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, of fact, in its preamble, the TEU underlines the who also acts as Vice-President of the European Member States’ resolve to ‘implement a com- Commission (the ‘HR/VP’). mon foreign and security policy including the The Lisbon Treaty introduced the notion of progressive framing of a common defence pol- a European capabilities and armaments policy icy, which might lead to a common defence (...)’. (Article 42(3) TEU), which will be at the core of While Article 41 TEU outlines the funding of the the upcoming European Defence Action Plan CFSP and CSDP, the policy is further described (EDAP). The latter, to be presented on 30 Novem- in Articles 42 to 46, in Chapter 2, Section 2 of ber 2016, is based on four pillars:2 supporting Title V (‘Provisions on the Common Security and defence research with the launch of the prepara- Defence Policy’), and in Protocols 1, 10 and 11 tory action on defence research in 2017; unlocking and Declarations 13 and 14. EU tools to invest in the whole European defence Decisions relating to the CSDP are taken by supply chain (especially SMEs); working towards a the European Council and the Council of the possible European Defence Fund; and improving European Union (Article 42 TEU). They are the functioning of the single market for defence.

1 See Title V (‘General Provisions on the Union’s External Action and Specific Provisions on the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP)’) of the Treaty on European Union (TEU); see also → 6.1.1 on the EU’s foreign policy. 2 https://www.eda.europa.eu/info-hub/press-centre/latest-news/2016/11/10/commissioner-bie%C5%84kowska-outlines- upcoming-european-defence-action-plan-at-eda-annual-conference

58 2 ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES Jochen Rehrl A complex of parliament buildings in Brussels houses the European Parliament, a legislative chamber of the European Union.

The Lisbon Treaty also establishes a link on the CFSP, drafted by the Committee on For- between the CSDP and other Union policies by eign Affairs (AFET) and including elements relat- requiring that the EDA and the Commission work ing to the CSDP where necessary; and one on the in liaison when necessary (Article 45(2) TEU). CSDP, drafted by the Subcommittee on Security This concerns in particular the Union’s research, and Defence (SEDE). industrial and space policies. This link has created Since 2012, the European Parliament and the opportunities for the European Parliament (EP) Member States’ national parliaments have organ- to seek and develop a much stronger bearing on ised two interparliamentary conferences every year the CSDP than it had in the past. in order to debate matters of common foreign and security policy. Interparliamentary cooperation in these areas is foreseen by Protocol 1 to the Lisbon THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND Treaty, which describes the role of the national THE CSDP parliaments in the EU framework. Innovations in the Lisbon Treaty have provided The specific role of the European Parliament in an opportunity to improve the political coherence the CFSP and CSDP is described in Article 36 of of the CSDP. The HR/VP occupies the central insti- the TEU. It has the right to scrutinise the policy tutional role, chairing the Foreign Affairs Council and to take the initiative of addressing the HR/VP in its ‘Defence Ministers configuration’ (the EU’s and the Council on it (Article 36 TEU). It also CSDP decision-making body) and directing the exercises authority over the policy’s budget (Arti- EDA. The political framework for consultation and cle 41 TEU). Twice a year, the European Parlia- dialogue with the European Parliament is evolving ment holds debates on progress in implementing in order to allow the Parliament to play a full role the CFSP and the CSDP, and adopts reports: one in developing the CSDP. Under the Lisbon Treaty,

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• non-EU multilateral security and defence co- operation and structures, in particular regard- ing NATO; • international developments with regard to arms control and the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; • combating international terrorism, piracy, or- ganised crime and trafficking; • strengthening the European Parliament’s role in the CSDP through EU policies with implica- tions for security and defence (such as internal and border security, infrastructure development, research, and industrial and space policies);

European Parliament European • good practices to improve the effectiveness Exchange of views on respecting human rights in the context of security and defence investments and to of migration flows in the Mediterranean in the AFET/European strengthen the technological and industrial Parliament (from left to right: Mr António Guterres, the then base, ‘smart defence’ and ‘pooling and sharing’; United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees; Ms Federica Mogherini, High Representative of the EU for Foreign Affairs • institutional developments with regard to: EU and Security Policy; Mr , Member of the European military structures; security and defence coop- Parliament). eration within the Union; the EDA; and other EU agencies and structures in the domain of the European Parliament is a partner shaping security and defence;4 the Union’s external relations and is in charge of • legislation and political resolutions relating to addressing the challenge of ensuring popular sup- security and defence, particularly as they per- port to the CSDP, as described in the 2008 Report tain to the above-mentioned topics. on the Implementation of the European Security The European Parliament holds regular Joint Strategy.3 In particular, the European Parliament Consultation Meetings (JCMs) with the Coun- examines developments under the CSDP in terms cil, the European External Action Service (EEAS) of institutions, capabilities and operations, and and the Commission. These meetings allow for ensures that security and defence issues respond to the exchange of information on CSDP missions concerns expressed by the EU’s citizens. Delibera- and operations, on implementing the CFSP tions, hearings and workshops are held regularly, budget, and on regions of interest and con- devoted to topics including: cern. They are part of the consultations between • the current 16 civilian and military CSDP mis- the Parliament and the other EU institutions sions in the southern Caucasus region, Africa, involved in the CFSP and CSDP that have been the Middle East and Asia (November 2016); taking place since the HR/VP’s declaration on • international crises with security and defence political accountability in 2010. The European implications, and security sector reforms in the Parliament has concluded a series of inter-in- aftermath of crises; stitutional agreements on CSDP: of note is the

3 ‘Maintaining public support for our global engagement is fundamental. In modern democracies, where media and public opinion are crucial to shaping policy, popular commitment is essential to sustaining our commitments abroad. We deploy police, judicial experts and soldiers in unstable zones around the world. There is an onus on governments, parliaments and EU institutions to communicate how this contributes to security at home’. 4 Inter alia, the EU Satellite Centre (EU SatCen), the EU Institute for Security Studies (EUISS), the European Security and Defence College (ESDC) and the Organisation for Joint Armament Cooperation (OCCAR).

60 2 ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES European Parliament European Plenary in the European Parliament.

Inter-institutional Agreement of 20 Novem- IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CSDP ber 2002, which allows the European Parliament to have access to sensitive information of the The principal achievements of the CSDP up Council in the field of security and defence pol- to 2014 have been the consolidation of related icy, and the 2006 agreement on Budgetary Disci- EU structures under the aegis of the EEAS, and pline and Sound Financial Management, which the Council’s definition of the EDA’s statute, has led to regular political dialogue with the seat and operational rules, as foreseen in Article chair of the Political and Security Committee. 45(2) TEU. Given the key role that the North Atlantic Recognising the need to provide a strategic Treaty Organisation (NATO) plays in underwrit- impetus for Heads of State or Government, the ing European security, the European Parliament European Council set a number of initial targets participates in the NATO Parliamentary Assem- in December 2013 to advance the CSDP. It also bly with a view to developing EU-NATO rela- tasked the HR/VP and the European Commis- tions while respecting the independent nature of sion with an assessment of the impact of changes both organisations. This is particularly important in the global environment, with a view to report- in theatres of operation in which both the EU and ing on the challenges and opportunities arising NATO are engaged, such as Afghanistan, Kosovo, for the Union, in particular in terms of security and the fights against piracy off the Horn of Africa developments. and against human trafficking in the Mediterra- Ahead of the European Council of nean. 25-26 June 2015, HR/VP Federica Mogherini

61 HANDBOOK ON CSDP

presented a report on the implementation status of the targets of the December 2013 Council con- clusions, as well as initial proposals for the way forward. These formed the basis for the Foreign Affairs Council conclusions of 18 May 2015, which were endorsed and taken forward by the Euro- pean Council of 25-26 June 2015. On 28 June 2016, the presentation of the Global Strategy for the European Union’s For- eign and Security Policy (EUGS) by HR/VP Mogherini to the European Council was another important step towards a stronger CSDP. Wel- comed by the EU Heads of State or Govern- ment, the EUGS puts a strong emphasis on the security of the European Union, with CSDP as one of the Union’s five broad priorities. ‘Principled pragmatism’, the idea that ‘soft and hard power go hand in hand’, reflects the increased importance the EUGS gives to CSDP. The EUGS also foresees the development of a sectorial strategy, described by many as a White Book that should further specify the civil-mili- tary level of ambition, tasks, requirements and capability priorities stemming from the strat- egy. The importance of the CSDP is further reflected in the EUGS ‘Implementation Plan on Security and Defence’, which the HR/VP pre- sented at the 14 November 2016 Foreign Affairs/ Defence Council meeting, and which EU Mem- ber States welcomed. Building on the values and priorities of the EUGS, the actionable proposals refer to capability development and the need for a European approach in CSDP missions, which can contribute to three priorities: responding to external conflicts and crises; capacity building of partners; and protecting the Union and its citi- zens. Moreover, to ensure a solid follow-up, the implementation of the Global Strategy will be reviewed annually in consultation with the Council, the Commission and the European Par- liament. With many of the priorities the Euro- pean Parliament supported being highlighted

62 2 ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES

in the HR/VP document (e.g. more strategic as this would help harmonise civil and military autonomy for the EU, a high level of cooperation requirements, and would help build CSDP ca- between Member States, a better use of existing pabilities;7 CSDP tools and EU-NATO cooperation), the • building on the Union’s institutional frame- Parliament will no doubt have many opportuni- work – in the first instance by upgrading the ties to intervene in the follow-up phase. EDA to exploit the full range of its mission and Nevertheless, a number of opportunities to tasks as defined by the EU Treaties, particularly advance the CSDP have been missed: attempts for the deployment of capabilities and arma- to launch operations have either failed, as in Leb- ments policy under the CSDP (Article 42(3) anon and Libya, or lagged, as in Mali. As a result, TEU), and by defining the roles of other Union EU Battlegroups5 have not been deployed, and and European agencies operating in the area of the permanent headquarters for EU operations security and defence;8 9 has yet to be instituted. • defining permanent structured cooperation, From a wider perspective, and if one is to cat- including EU support to Member States com- egorise the key issues at stake, the CSDP could mitting military capabilities (as provided for by be advanced, the related institutional framework Article 46 TEU); developed, and cooperation among Member • definingthe relationship between the various States and with the Union’s structures enhanced elements of the CSDP: a capabilities and arma- by a number of orientations, which the EP has ments policy (Article 42(3) TEU), permanent advocated in several reports: structured cooperation (Article 46 TEU), the • developing a strategic approach with a view ‘mutual assistance’ clause (Article 42(7) TEU, to unlocking the full potential of the policy, which reads like a mutual defence clause), the as provided by the Lisbon Treaty and on the mutual solidarity clause (Article 222 TFEU), basis of an understanding of where the Union the Union’s commitment to progressively would add value; in such an approach a secu- framing a common EU defence policy (Arti- rity and defence white paper should describe cle 42(2) TEU), and the EU-NATO relation- the balance to be achieved between the Union ship.10 and the Member States;6 • incorporating defence into the EU’s research and innovation, space and industrial policies,

5 The EU attlegroupB Concept provides a CSDP instrument for early and rapid military crisis responses. A Battlegroup is a force package – composed of about 1 500 (normally multinational) personnel (a minimum to ensure military effective- ness) – capable of standalone operations or of conducting the initial phase of larger operations. EU Battlegroups have been operational since January 2005. 6 See EP own initiative reports 2015/2343(INI) on ‘Constitutional, legal and institutional implications of a common secu- rity and defence policy: possibilities offered by the Lisbon Treaty’ and 2016/2052(INI) on ‘European defence union’. 7 See EP own initiative report 2015/2276(INI) on ‘space capabilities for European security and defence’. See also the first research pilot project agreed in the field of defence research (with activities contracted on 28 October 2016), and the preparatory action (PA) on defence research (both EP-supported endeavours of the European Commission, in cooperation with the EDA). 8 In particular, European intergovernmental agencies outside of EU structures, such as the Organisation for Joint Armament Cooperation (OCCAR), the European Space Agency (ESA), the French-German Research Institute of Saint-Louis (ISL) and the European Organisation for the Safety of Air Navigation (), which either already have or could have roles in EU programmes of security and defence (or ‘dual use’) relevance, inter alia in areas pertaining to space, research and development, standardisation and certification. 9 See the EP >yearly reports on CFSP and CSDP, as well as the own initiative report (2014/2258(INI)) on ‘financing the Common Security and Defence Policy’. 10 See own initiative report (2012/2223(INI)) on ‘the EU’s mutual defence and solidarity clauses: political and operational dimensions’.

63 HANDBOOK ON CSDP

THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT’S tation of the Common Security and Defence DRIVING FORCE Policy’ approved in May 2015, where the Par- liament called on Member States ‘to achieve the While recent developments seem to be moving collective target of 2 % of our defence spending things in the direction supported by the EP, polit- on research funding’.12 ical will and coherent and sustained initiatives The European Parliament has taken the lead in will be required to address this list of enhance- scrutinising the advancement of the CSDP and ments to the Common Security and Defence analysing the policy’s setbacks. Since the entry Policy. The European Parliament has, for its part, into force of the Lisbon Treaty, it has solicited in demonstrated its will to act and to pursue politi- over twenty resolutions the effective implemen- cal initiatives in this field. tation of the CSDP. One of the latest examples As a first practical outcome, the Parliament of its proactive role is the own-initiative report proposed funding a pilot project on CSDP ‘on the EU in a changing global environment – a research using the EU’s 2015 budget. This pilot more connected, contested and complex world’, project, approved by the Parliament and the adopted in April 2016. On that occasion, the Par- Council in December 2014, means that, for the liament advocated the pooling of multinational first time, EU funds will be transferred to the military units with the ultimate goal of creating EDA to conduct research on military require- a European Defence Union, and the adoption of ments. Some research projects have been selected a White Paper on EU defence, together with the (‘Unmanned Heterogeneous Swarm of Sensor strengthening of EU-NATO cooperation. Platforms’, ‘Inside Building Awareness and Nav- Awaiting the Parliament’s first reading, the igation for Urban Warfare’ and ‘Standardisation own-initiative report ‘on the European Defence of Remotely Piloted Aircraft System Detect and Union’ will be as important as the above-mentioned Avoid’) and are expected to start in November initiatives in setting the guidelines for a more coher- 2016.11 The importance of research on CSDP ent CSDP. In its draft form, the report encourages has been underlined on many occasions, for the European Council to lead the framing of the instance in the EP resolution ‘on the implemen- European Defence Union and calls for greater and more systematic European defence cooperation among Member States. Among the various recom- mendations, it also advocates the establishment of multinational forces under the PESCO framework, and an enhanced role for the EDA. The Parliament has also acted as a motivating force by stimulating the debate and questioning Member States’ actions. In this sense, its infor- mal role has been as important as the formal one foreseen by the treaties. It is undeniable that the mutually beneficial interchange between the Par- European Parliament European The division of seats between the different political groups. liament and important international think tanks NI stands for ‘non-inscrits’, French for ‘non-attached’. has produced ‘food for thought’ in current debates These members are not part of a political group in the EP. on CSDP.

11 Reference: http://www.eprs.sso.ep.parl.union.eu/lis/lisrep/09-Briefings/2016/EPRS-AaG-593494-Preparatory-action-de- fence-research-FINAL.pdf 12 http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+TA+P8-TA-2015-0213+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN

64 2 ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES

An example of timely debate was the work- partners of the EU, such as the Transatlantic Leg- shop organised by SEDE on a study: ‘On the way islators Dialogue with the USA, or in the frame- towards a European Defence Union – A White work of EU-NATO relations,14 also allows the EP Book as a first step’, coordinated by former NATO to engage in open discussions on fundamental Secretary General and EU High Representative for developments in the western security and defence CFSP Javier Solana, and released in April 2016. environment. This is yet another way for the EP This report sets out a concrete proposal for an to exercise its legislative scrutiny and budgetary EU White Paper on defence and specifically rec- role and contribute to shaping EU policies in the ommends that the European Parliament upgrade field of security and defence. the Subcommittee on Security and Defence to a fully-fledged Committee and strengthen coopera- tion with national parliaments. In that regard, the CONCLUSION European Parliament could take advantage of the provisions for interparliamentary cooperation in As illustrated above, in reality, the European Protocol 1 of the Treaty of Lisbon.13 Parliament exercises much more influence on The European Parliament also plays an impor- CSDP than is commonly known. The follow-up tant role in parliamentary diplomacy. Its Presi- to the recent EU-NATO joint declaration of July dent is invited to speak at or participate in major 2016 on cooperation, for instance, is an impor- events, be they internal to the EU (such as Euro- tant development which the European Parlia- pean Council meetings) or international; at global ment will monitor closely. This is a key role at or regional level; and in institutional or informal a time when the request for increased security formats (UN General Assembly, G7 and G20, by the populations of the Member States is also NATO meetings, Munich Security Conferences, one of the few uncontested demands for more etc.). Interparliamentary dialogue with strategic Europe.

13 ‘Will CSDP enjoy ‘collateral gains’ from France’s invocation of the EU’s ‘mutual defence clause’?’, In-depth analysis by Jérôme Legrand, European Parliament, December 2015. 14 Members of AFET and SEDE participate in the EP permanent delegation to the NATO Parliamentary Assembly.

65 HANDBOOK ON CSDP

2.5. THE EEAS AND ITS CRISIS MANAGEMENT COMPONENT by Arnold Kammel

The idea of setting up a European diplomatic service dates back to the ‘Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe’, which was not ratified, and provided for the creation of a European Exter- nal Action Service (EEAS) to assist the Union’s Foreign Minister. With the ‘Treaty on European Union’, the post of Foreign Minister became that of the High Representative of the Union for For- eign Affairs and Security Policy (HR) and at the same time Vice-President of the Commission. July 2010. The EEAS was established as a ‘func- tionally autonomous body’ of the EU, ‘separate MANDATE from the General Secretariat of the Council and from the Commission’ and ‘with the legal capacity The competences of the EEAS had however necessary to perform its tasks and attain its objec- remained unchanged, and Article 27(3) TEU tives’ (Article 1(2) EEAS Decision). stipulates: ‘In fulfilling his mandate, the High Representa- tive shall be assisted by a European External Action TASKS AND STRUCTURE Service. This service shall work in cooperation with the diplomatic services of the Member States and In general, the tasks of the EEAS include shall comprise officials from relevant departments ensuring the consistency and coordination of the of the General Secretariat of the Council and of the Union’s external action and preparing policy pro- Commission as well as staff seconded from national posals and implementing them following approval diplomatic services of the Member States. The organ- by the Council. It should be noted that the tasks isation and functioning of the European External of the EEAS are quite complex. Firstly, the EEAS Action Service shall be established by a decision of the is to ‘support the High Representative in fulfilling Council. The Council shall act on a proposal from his/her mandates’ (Article 2(1) EEAS Decision), the High Representative after consulting the Euro- the enumeration of which reflects Articles 18 and pean Parliament and after obtaining the consent of 27 TEU and includes conducting the CFSP and the Commission.’ CSDP (Article 18(2) TEU), ensuring the consist- In March 2010, the High Representative pro- ency of the EU’s external action (Article 18(4) posed her draft Council Decision establishing the TEU), presiding over the Foreign Affairs Council organisation and functioning of the EEAS to the (Article 18(3) TEU), and acting as Vice-President Council that - after some deliberation with the of the Commission. The latter capacity not only European Parliament - was finally adopted on 26 includes ‘responsibilities incumbent on [the Com-

66 2 ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES European Union European The Capital building is the headquarters of the European External Action Service in Brussels.

mission] in external relations’ but also ‘coordinating ity of the HR. Furthermore, the EU is currently other aspects of the Union’s external action’ (Article present abroad through some 140 EU Delegations 18(4) TEU). Secondly, the EEAS must ‘assist the and Offices around the world. For over 50 years, President of the European Council, the President of these Delegations and Offices have represented the the Commission, and the Commission in the exercise European Commission vis-à-vis the authorities and of their respective functions in the area of external population in their host countries. Specifically, they relations’ (Article 2(2) EEAS Decision). present, explain and implement EU policy, analyse Thirdly, the EEAS is to ‘support, and work and report on the policies and developments of the in cooperation with, the diplomatic services of the host countries and conduct negotiations in accord- Member States as well as the General Secretariat of ance with a given mandate. Also, the various Spe- the Council and the Commission, in order to ensure cial Representatives (EUSR) fall under the remit of consistency between the different areas of the Union’s the HR’s office as they promote the EU’s policies external action and between those areas and its other and interests in troubled regions. policies’ (Article 3(1) EEAS Decision and Article While there is only one External Action Ser- 21(3), second subparagraph, TEU). Fourthly, it vice, many of the EU’s external policies are organ- must ‘extend appropriate support and cooperation to ised across the EEAS and different divisions of the the other institutions and bodies of the Union, in European Commission, e.g. trade and develop- particular to the European Parliament’ (Article 3(4) ment policy remain the responsibility of the rel- EEAS Decision). evant Commissioners. The EEAS is composed of desks dealing with After the last elections to the European Parlia- single geographical or thematic areas and also com- ment in May 2014, Federica Mogherini assumed prises the Union Delegations under the author- the post of the HR in late 2014.

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EUMS.E EUMS.C EUMS.B EUMS.A EUMS.D Director Director Director Director Director H. KRIEB D. LORIA EUMS.4 Logistics EUMS.DEP EUMS Operations Intelligence W. GLUSZKO W. S. BARBER LOPEZ D. GRAMMATICO L. CORNELIUSSON E. PULKKINEN Communication and information systems Director General C. MARTINS BARREIRA Deputy Director General Concepts and capabilities Horizontal coordination European Union military staff SG.2 EU ISS EU ISS A. CONTE A. A. MISSIROLI EDA Strategic planning CPCC CPCC.1 CPCC.2 CPCC.3 J. DOMECQ S. HUBER Director K. DEANE K. J.M. PISANI capability B. VERSMESSEN Chief of staff / Mission support Conduct of operations Horizontal coordination Civilian planning and conduct SG.1 Policy coordination M. MARTINEZ CARBONELL CMPD CMPD.1 CMPD.2 CMPD.3 CMPD.4 CMPD.ESDC D. DUBOIS Director planning G. PORZIO planning G. IKLODY B. RAMBAUD agreements Coordination C. GANSLANDT Defense College A. MOLENAAR (f.f.) Integrated strategic Integrated European Security and training and exercises Capabilities, concepts, CSDP, partnerships and Crisis management and SG.GENDER M. MARINAKI Gender adviser Gender DSG-CSDPCR P. SERRANO P. and crisis response P. LEGAI P. INTCEN INTCEN.1 INTCEN.2 INTCEN.3 INTCEN.4 EU SatCen centre Director F. FISCHER N. DELCROIX G. CONRAD intelligence SG.TF-IRAN Open source H. SOBRAL management Consular crisis Situation room P. MAVROMICHALIS Task force Iran Deputy Secretary General for CSDP General Deputy Secretary R. DOCHAO MORENO R. Intelligence analysis EU intelligence and situation S. TOMAT CSDPCR.PRISM Stabilisation and Mediation law/SSR, approach, Integrated Prevention of conflicts,Prevention Rule of J. BYLICA SECPOL D. GEER SECPOL.1 SECPOL.2 SECPOL.3 SECPOL.4 J. BYLICA F. RIVASSEAU Director proliferation F. RIVASSEAU Space policy export control J. GATT-RUTTER P. HERCZYNSKI Special envoy Non- Security policy Sanctions policy Disarmament, non- Counter-terrorism Security policy and Special Envoy for Space proliferation and arms Process M. KOSTARAKOS F. GENTILINI Director MEPP R. GILI MENA.2 MENA.4 MENA.DMD C. SCICLUNA , occupied Israel, EUSR Middle East Peace R. FUENTES MILANI Chair EU Military Committee and Regional Policies Deputy Managing Director Arabian Peninsula, Iraq Palestinian territories and MD-MENA N. WESTCOTT Managing director Jordan MENA.1 MENA.3 MENA.5 V. PIKET G. GRIPPA Maghreb Middle East and North Africa P. COSTELLO Strategy and Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, Egypt, instruments of the ENP P. BURIAN P. H. SALBER Russia T. KLAAR bilateral and Georgia EURCA.EAST L. DEVIGNE EURCA.EAST.1 EURCA.EAST.2 EURCA.EAST.3 EURCA.EAST.4 D. SCHUEBEL Central Asia EUSR Central Asia B. IAROCHEVITCH East. partnership, EUSR South Caucasus Director, Deputy MD regional coop.&OSCE F. ANDRESEN GUIMARAES Asia, Regional coop.&OSCE Asia, Regional Russia, east. partnership, Central MD-EURCA T. MAYR HARTING Managing director POL.PSC Director POL.PSC.1 F. LUNNY W. STEVENS committee correspondents Europe and Central Asia Political and security EUSR BIH committee team / European Turkey E. AUER EUSR Kosovo L-G. WIGEMARK N. APOSTOLOVA EURCA.WEST C. MAERTEN A. EICHHORST A. EURCA.WEST.1 EURCA.WEST.2 EURCA.WEST.3 J. NINO PEREZ J. NINO Chair of Political and security Western Balkans Western Western Europe Western Balkans and Turkey Director, Deputy MD Western Europe, Western DSG-POL HR/VP H. SCHMID J.C. BELLIARD F. MOGHERINI EUSRs report to HR/VP Secretary General Deputy Secretary General for General Deputy Secretary Director political affairs, Political Director ASIAPAC.2 ASIAPAC.4 ASIAPAC.DMD P. PAMPALONI P. E. MATHEWS Lanka, Maldives F-M. MELLBIN D. KRISSLER (f.f.) Taiwan, Mongolia EUSR Afghanistan Pakistan, Afghanistan, Sri Deputy Managing Director China, Hong Kong, Macao, MD-ASIAPAC G. WIEGAND Managing director Asia and Pacific D. DALY V. CODY ASIAPAC.3 ASIAPAC.5 ASIAPAC.1 J. WILSON South-east Asia Regional Affairs, India, New Zealand, Pacific New Japan, Korea, Australia, Japan, Korea, Bangladesh, Nepal and Bhutan Bangladesh, Nepal Director The Working Groups Chairs work under the authority of their Managing Director/Director and guidance PSC Chair. M. FANTI R. SCHÄFER R. TIBBELS E. HRDA AMERICAS.1 AMERICAS.2 AMERICAS.3 AMERICAS.4 AMERICAS.DMD Americas A. DELL'ARICCIA A. South America MD-AMERICAS Regional affairs Mexico, Central A. KOETSENRUIJTER A. United States and Managing director Deputy Managing Director America and Caribbean officer FPI SG.AFFGEN.DPO Data protection R. KRENGEL (f.f.) Director AFRICA.2 AFRICA.4 AFRICA.DMD A. LOSADA P. SPIRLET EUSR Sahel B. MARKUSSEN Central Africa (Commission service) Southern Africa G. NOTARANGELO Deputy Managing Director P. MALIN Foreign Policy Instruments Service Mediator Africa MD-AFRICA SG.AFFGEN.MEDIATOR K. VERVAEKE K. DSG-ECO Managing director C. LEFFLER AFRICA.1 AFRICA.3 AFRICA.5 C. WIEDEY H. SCHADEK A. RONDOS A. West Africa K. DE PEYRON Pan-African affairs Horn of Africa, East EUSR Horn of Africa economic and global issues Africa and Indian Ocean Deputy Secretary General for Deputy Secretary General SG.AFFGEN.5 L. PROMELLE ECO.HCA01 Economic diplomacy Internal audit A. PANGRATIS Director issues GLOBAL.2 GLOBAL.4 GLOBAL.6 security GLOBAL.DMD L. GABRICI D. PORTER J. JONSSON M. GIACOMINI Economic and global Multilateral relations Deputy Managing Director Migration and human SG.AFFGEN.4 Inspection T. VAN GOOL Director SG.AFFGEN S. GONZATO General affairs MD-GLOBAL L. KNUDSEN Managing director multilateral issues S. LAMBRINIDIS Human rights, global and GLOBAL.1 GLOBAL.3 GLOBAL.5 EUSR Human Rights E. GIAUFRET Development Human rights Democracy and M. GARCIA PEREZ electoral observation F. CERIANI SEBREGONDI cooperation coordination SG.AFFGEN.3 Legal affairs G. VAN HEGELSOM as of 01 February 2017 HQ Organisation chart SG.AFFGEN.2 G. VISENTIN BA.HR BA.HR.1 BA.HR.2 BA.HR.3 BA.HR.4 BA.HR.5 L. VERON Director K. AFHELDT K. A. WESTON D. MELLADO B. LARSSON Local agents coordination development Selection and HR policy and Parliamentary affairs A. KLOPOTOWSKI A. Human resources recruitment of staff Career, learning and Career, Rights and obligations EUROPEAN EXTERNAL ACTION SERVICE EUROPEAN BA BA.DEL.RCE G. DI VITA A. MANDLER Centre Europe Director General Task force Regional Strategic M. MANN SG.AFFGEN.1 communications Budget and administration BA.IBS Director BA.IBS.1 BA.IBS.2 BA.IBS.3 BA.IBS.4 BA.IBS.5 BA.IBS.6 BA.IBS.7 P. RUYS P. Budget D. O'NEILL Contracts budget & IT B. PLINKERT J. HOTTIAUX P. CAVENDISH S. CHRISTIANE Field security security policy and conferences

68 P. LLOMBART CUSSAC HQ security and EEAS Security, infrastructure, Security, A. CAMPOS GORDO (f.f.) Infrastructure, protocol Infrastructure, Information technology Secure communications Secure Source: https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/organisation_chart_february_2017.pdf Source: 2 ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES

EUROPEAN EXTERNAL ACTION SERVICE HQ Organisation chart HR/VP as of 01 February 2017 F. MOGHERINI

FPI Foreign Policy Instruments Service Chair EU Military Committee (Commission service) Secretary General M. KOSTARAKOS R. KRENGEL (f.f.) H. SCHMID

SG.AFFGEN

General affairs S. GONZATO SVK EU Presidency, 2016 EU Presidency, SVK Director

SG.AFFGEN.1 SG.AFFGEN.DPO SG.AFFGEN.2 SG.AFFGEN.3 SG.AFFGEN.4 SG.AFFGEN.5 SG.AFFGEN.MEDIATOR SG.TF-IRAN SG.GENDER SG.1 SG.2 Strategic Data protection HR Federica Mogherini flanked on the left by Deputy Secretary General of the EEAS Pedro Serrano and Parliamentary affairs Legal affairs Inspection Internal audit Mediator Task force Iran Gender adviser Policy coordination Strategic planning communications officer G. VISENTIN G. VAN HEGELSOM T. VAN GOOL L. PROMELLE P. MALIN H. SOBRAL M. MARINAKI M. MARTINEZ CARBONELL A. CONTE M. MANN on the right by Secretary-General of the Council of the EU Jeppe Tranholm-Mikkelsen during the infor-

mal defence ministers’ meeting in Bratislava/. EU ISS EU ISS A. MISSIROLI

DSG-ECO DSG-POL DSG-CSDPCR Deputy Secretary General for Deputy Secretary General for Deputy Secretary General for CSDP economic and global issues political affairs, Political Director and crisis response C. LEFFLER EEASJ.C. BELLIARD AND CRISIS MANAGEMENT P. SERRANO STRUCTURES POL.PSC ECO.HCA01 CSDPCR.PRISM Chair of Political and security Economic Prevention of conflicts, Rule of committee law/SSR, Integrated approach, diplomacy Stabilisation and Mediation W. STEVENS A. PANGRATIS Mr Pedro Serrano,Director Deputy Secretary General of S. TOMAT POL.PSC.1 Political and security committee team / European the EEAS, iscorrespondents responsible for the Common Secu- F. LUNNY

BA MD-GLOBAL MD-AFRICA MD-AMERICAS MD-ASIAPAC rity and DefenceMD-EURCA Policy and its crisis managementMD-MENA EUMS Human rights, global and Budget and administration Africa Americas Asia and Pacific Europe and Central Asia Middle East and North Africa European Union military staff multilateral issues structures. These structures comprise, in particular G. DI VITA K. VERVAEKE E. HRDA G. WIEGAND T. MAYR HARTING N. WESTCOTT E. PULKKINEN L. KNUDSEN Director General Managing director Managing director Managing director Managing director • the Crisis ManagingManagement director and ManagingPlanning director Director General BA.IBS BA.HR GLOBAL.DMD AFRICA.DMD AMERICAS.DMD ASIAPAC.DMD EURCA.WEST EURCA.EAST MENA.DMD SECPOL INTCEN CMPD CPCC EUMS.4 Security, infrastructure, Western Europe, Western Russia, east. partnership, Central EU intelligence and situation Crisis management and Civilian planning and conduct Human resources Security policy budget & IT M. GIACOMINI B. MARKUSSEN R. SCHÄFER P. PAMPALONIDirectorateBalkans and Turkey (CMPD),Asia, Regional coop.&OSCE C. SCICLUNA centre planning capability Horizontal coordination B. LARSSON P. HERCZYNSKI P. LLOMBART CUSSAC Director Director Director Director A. EICHHORST L. DEVIGNE Director G. CONRAD G. IKLODY K. DEANE C. MARTINS BARREIRA Director Director Deputy Managing Director Deputy Managing Director Deputy Managing Director Deputy Managing• Directorthe CivilianDirector, Deputy MD PlanningDirector, Deputyand MD Conduct CapabilityDeputy Managing Director Director Director Director Director MENA.2 SECPOL.1 EUMS.DEP BA.HR.1 GLOBAL.2 AFRICA.1 AMERICAS.1 ASIAPAC.1 ASIAPAC.2 EURCA.EAST.1 MENA.1 BA.IBS.1 GLOBAL.1 AFRICA.2 EURCA.WEST.1 Israel, occupied Disarmament, non- INTCEN.1 CMPD.1 CPCC.1 HR policy and Economic and global Horn of Africa, East United States and Regional Affairs, India, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Sri East. partnership, Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, Budget Human rights Southern Africa Western Europe Palestinian territories and proliferation and arms Intelligence analysis Coordination Conduct of operations coordination issues Africa and Indian Ocean Canada Bangladesh, Nepal and Bhutan Lanka, Maldives(CPCC), regional coop.&OSCE Jordan W. GLUSZKO D. O'NEILL M. GARCIA PEREZ G. NOTARANGELO C. MAERTEN MEPP export control F. FISCHER A. MOLENAAR (f.f.) J.M. PISANI D. PORTER C. WIEDEY R. TIBBELS V. CODY D. KRISSLER (f.f.) P. COSTELLO Deputy Director General A. KLOPOTOWSKI B. IAROCHEVITCH R. FUENTES MILANI J. BYLICA

BA.HR.2 GLOBAL.3 GLOBAL.4 AMERICAS.2 ASIAPAC.4• the EU Military StaffEURCA.EAST.2 (EUMS), MENA.4 INTCEN.2 CMPD.2 CPCC.2 BA.IBS.2 AFRICA.3 AFRICA.4 ASIAPAC.3 EURCA.WEST.2 MENA.3 SECPOL.2 Selection and Democracy and Migration and human Mexico, Central China, Hong Kong, Macao, Eastern partnership Arabian Peninsula, Iraq Open source Capabilities, concepts, Chief of staff / EUMS.A Field security West Africa Central Africa South-east Asia Western Balkans Maghreb Counter-terrorism recruitment of staff electoral observation security America and Caribbean Taiwan, Mongolia bilateral and Regional Policies intelligence training and exercises Horizontal coordination P. CAVENDISH H. SCHADEK P. SPIRLET D. DALY E. AUER V. PIKET J. GATT-RUTTER Concepts and capabilities D. MELLADO E. GIAUFRET L. GABRICI A. DELL'ARICCIA E. MATHEWS• the Security andD. SCHUEBEL Conflict PreventionR. GILI P. MAVROMICHALIS G. PORZIO B. VERSMESSEN H. KRIEB

BA.IBS.3 GLOBAL.5 ASIAPAC.5 MENA.5 SECPOL.3 CMPD.3 BA.HR.3 GLOBAL.6 AFRICA.5 AMERICAS.3 EURCA.WEST.3 EURCA.EAST.3 INTCEN.3 CPCC.3 Director HQ security and EEAS Development Japan, Korea, Australia, Strategy and Security policy and Integrated strategic Rights and obligations Multilateral relations Pan-African affairs South America DirectorateTurkey (SECPOL),Russia Situation room Mission support security policy cooperation coordination New Zealand, Pacific instruments of the ENP Space policy planning EUMS.B A. WESTON J. JONSSON K. DE PEYRON A. KOETSENRUIJTER J. NINO PEREZ F. ANDRESEN GUIMARAES R. DOCHAO MORENO S. HUBER B. PLINKERT F. CERIANI SEBREGONDI J. WILSON G. GRIPPA F. RIVASSEAU B. RAMBAUD Intelligence • the EU Intelligence and Situation Centre L. CORNELIUSSON BA.IBS.4 BA.HR.4 INTCEN.4 CMPD.4 AMERICAS.4 EURCA.EAST.4 SECPOL.4 Infrastructure, protocol Career, learning and Consular crisis CSDP, partnerships and Director Regional affairs Central Asia Sanctions policy and conferences development management agreements M. FANTI (INTCEN). T. KLAAR D. GEER EUMS.C S. CHRISTIANE K. AFHELDT N. DELCROIX C. GANSLANDT Operations BA.IBS.5 BA.HR.5 In December 2016, a new Division comple- D. GRAMMATICO Contracts Local agents Director A. CAMPOS GORDO (f.f.) L. VERON mented the crisis management structures, which EUMS.D Logistics BA.IBS.6 D. LORIA Information technology deals with Prevention of conflicts, Rules of Law/ P. RUYS Director

EUMS.E

BA.IBS.7 security sector reform, Integrated approach, Sta- Communication and information systems Secure communications S. BARBER LOPEZ J. HOTTIAUX bilisation and Mediation (PRISM). Director

BA.DEL.RCE CMPD.ESDC EUSR Middle East Peace Special envoy Non- Task force Regional EUSR Human Rights EUSR Horn of Africa EUSR Sahel EUSR Afghanistan EUSR BIH EUSR Central Asia EU SatCen European Security and EDA Centre Europe Process The crisisproliferation management structures S. LAMBRINIDIS A. RONDOS A. LOSADA F-M. MELLBIN L-G. WIGEMARK P. BURIAN P. LEGAI Defense College J. DOMECQ F. GENTILINI J. BYLICA A. MANDLER D. DUBOIS

EUSR South Caucasus EUSR Kosovo Special Envoy for Space and Georgia N. APOSTOLOVA F. RIVASSEAU H. SALBER 69 EUSRs report to HR/VP The Working Groups Chairs work under the authority of their Managing Director/Director and under the guidance of the PSC Chair. HANDBOOK ON CSDP

CMPD strategic planning, communications and infor- mation systems, cyber capability, logistics, con- The Crisis Management and Planning Direc- cept development, training and education, and torate (CMPD) has been tasked, strategically and support of partnerships through military-military politically, with: planning and following up civilian relationships. and military CSDP missions and operations, under Concurrently, the EUMS is responsible for the political control and strategic direction of the running the EU Operations Centre (OPSCEN) Political and Security Committee (acting under and providing the Centre’s core staff when it is the responsibility of the Council and the HR); brought into play. The Centre would be able to providing assistance and advice to the High Repre- lead military operations and missions as an Oper- sentative and the relevant EU Council bodies; and ational Headquarters (OHQ). In addition, a Mil- initiating, developing and coordinating a number itary Planning and Conduct Capability (MPCC) of activities to further develop civilian and military will be established within the EUMS. The DG crisis management capabilities and partnerships EUMS will become responsible for the planning with organisations such as the UN, NATO and and conduct of all military non-executive mis- OSCE and with third states, including in relation sions at the military-strategic level. Whilst he will to horizontal aspects of EU crisis management as retain responsibility for the missions, it is within well as concepts, training, exercises and lessons. his remit to delegate tasks as appropriate. The CMPD works in close cooperation with the EUMS is composed of five directorates: EUMS, CPCC and other relevant (crisis manage- 1. Concepts and Capability ment) bodies, including the European Commission. 2. Intelligence CMPD is composed of four divisions: 3. Operations 1. Coordination 4. Logistics 2. Capabilities, concepts, training and exercises 5. Communications and Information Systems 3. Integrated strategic planning 4. CSDP partnerships and agreements EU INTCEN

EUMS The EU Intelligence Analysis Centre (EU INTCEN) is the exclusive civilian intelligence The EU Military Staff (EUMS) works under service of the European Union, providing intel- the direction of the EU Military Committee ligence analysis, early warning and situational (EUMC) and under the authority of the High awareness to the High Representative of the Representative/Vice-President (HR/VP). It can EU for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and best be described as the source of collective mil- to the EEAS, to various EU decision-making itary expertise within the European External bodies in the fields of CSFP and CSDP and Action Service (EEAS). counterterrorism, as well as to the EU Mem- As an integral component of the EEAS’s com- ber States. EU INTCEN monitors and assesses prehensive Approach, the EUMS coordinates mil- international events 24 hours a day, seven days itary action, with a particular focus on operations/ a week, focusing in particular on sensitive geo- missions (both military and those requiring mil- graphical regions, terrorism and the prolifera- itary support) and the creation of military capa- tion of weapons of mass destruction and other bility. Enabling activity in support of this output global threats. includes: early warning (via the Single Intelligence However, EU INTCEN has no formal man- Analysis Capacity, SIAC), situation assessment, date to collect intelligence as traditionally under-

70 2 ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES

stood. Its analytical products are based on intel- The CPCC thus acts as the permanent opera- ligence from the EU Member States’ intelligence tional headquarters for civilian CSDP missions. and security services and on open-source intelli- It is responsible for the operational planning and gence (OSINT). In cooperation with the EUMS conduct of civilian CSDP crisis management mis- Intelligence Directorate, EU INTCEN produces sions and oversees the implementation of all mis- intelligence reports under the heading of Single sion-related tasks. The CPCC provides support Intelligence Analysis Capacity (SIAC), which for missions, is involved in developing doctrine combines civilian and military intelligence. and concepts, and provides missions with guid- EU INTCEN has its roots in the Joint Situ- ance on cross-cutting issues. ation Centre set up in 1999 as an open-source The CPCC is composed of three divisions: intelligence unit under the supervision of the then 1. Conduct of Operations High Representative Javier Solana. In the wake of 2. Chief of Staff/Horizontal coordination the terrorist attacks on New York and Washington 3. Mission support of 11 September 2001, Solana decided to use the Joint Situation Centre to start producing intelli- gence-based classified assessments. In 2002 it was SECPOL renamed the EU Joint Situation Centre (SIT- CEN) and was made a directorate of the General The Directorate for Security Policy and Con- Secretariat of the Council of the EU. When the flict Prevention (SECPOL) supports the High European External Action Service (EEAS) was Representative’s task of framing policies to ful- founded in 2010 it became one of its Directo- fil the EU’s objective to preserve peace, prevent rates. In 2012, it was renamed the EU Intelligence conflicts and strengthen international security, in Analysis Centre (EU INTCEN). accordance with Article 21(2)(c) of the Treaty on INTCEN is composed of four divisions: European Union. 1. Intelligence analysis The Directorate for Security Policy and Conflict 2. Open source intelligence Prevention provides the various crisis management 3. Situation room bodies with conflict risk assessments. It uses conflict 4. Consular crisis management analysis to assess the impact on actual and potential conflicts of a planned CSDP mission, supports the development of conflict mitigation strategies and CPCC conflict prevention missions, and contributes to the overall expertise on conflict, peace and security The Civilian Planning and Conduct Capabil- inside the crisis management bodies. ity (CPCC) was established in August 2007 as In addition, SECPOL’s responsibilities cover a permanent structure to conduct autonomous, disarmament, non-proliferation, arms export con- operational civilian CSDP crisis management trol, the sanctions regime, and the fight against ter- missions at strategic level. The Civilian Opera- rorism and organised crime, as well as addressing tion Commander is the Director of the CPCC. external security threats, including those relating to He exercises command and control at strategic outer space and the maritime and cyber domains. level for the planning and conduct of all civilian SECPOL is composed of four divisions: CSDP missions under the political control and 1. Disarmament – non-proliferation and arms ex- strategic direction of the Political and Security port control Committee and the overall authority of the High 2. Counter-terrorism Representative/Vice-President of the Commis- 3. Security policy and space policy sion. 4. Sanctions policy

71 HANDBOOK ON CSDP

areas. The Division will act as a centre of exper- tise on policy, programming, training, technical support and operational issues across the phases of the conflict cycle. PRISM is composed of four thematic teams: 1. Early Warning System and Conflict Preven- tion 2. Team Mediation Support Team 3. Stabilisation and Crisis Response Team 4. Rule of Law, Security Sector Reform (SSR) and Disarmament, Demobilisation and Rein- Jochen Rehrl tegration (DDR) Team The EEAS is at the crossroads between intra-EU institutional competition, Member States’ interests and a changing inter- The Division will also be organised into geo- national order. graphical teams, with each team offering cross-sectional expertise.

PRISM CONCLUSION

A new Division within the CSDP was created The EEAS is at the crossroads between in December 2016 by merging the Conflict Pre- intra-EU institutional competition, Member vention, Peacebuilding and Mediation Divi- States’ interests and a changing international sion (SECPOL.2) with the Crisis Response and order. Thus, the functioning of the EEAS Coordination Division (CSDP.1). depends not only on political factors related to Its name is PRISM, standing for Prevention the political will of the Member States or EU of conflicts, Rule of law/security sector reform, institutions, but also on the legal competences Integrated approach, Stabilisation and Media- the EEAS enjoys on the basis of the EU Treaties tion. and secondary legislation. Whereas the EEAS’ Located in the organisation chart immediately main purpose is to allow the EU to better organ- below Deputy Secretary General Pedro Serrano ise its external relations and to pursue speaking and linked with a dotted line to the Deputy Sec- with one voice, the current legal setup has taken retary General for Political affairs, Jean-Chris- account of the fact that the EU is not a federa- tophe Belliard, PRISM will be a focal point for tion of states and that Member States continue the EEAS and Commission – complementing to play a (sometimes autonomous) role in inter- CSDP, and geographical and cross-departmental national relations. By overcoming these internal activities – for coordinating EU responses to the issues, however, the EEAS will be a useful vehicle conflict cycle, including conflict analysis, early for extending influence in world politics. warning, conflict prevention and peacebuilding, mediation, security sector reform and the rule of law, crisis response and stabilisation. PRISM aims to be an agile and specialised service provider, recognised across the EU insti- tutions, and by Member States and external part- ners, as catalysing the delivery of an integrated EU response in fragile and conflict-affected

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2.6. EEAS CRISIS RESPONSE MECHANISM

by Pedro Serrano

The EEAS Crisis Response Mechanism (CRM) The Deputy Secretary General for Crisis is an internal EEAS procedure consisting of Response can also be requested to initiate the Cri- arrangements and structures for responding in a sis Response Mechanism by the HRVP, the SG or coordinated and synergic way to crises and emer- another DSG or Managing Director (MD). In the gencies – including hybrid threats – of an external DSG’s absence, responsibility is transferred to a nature or with an external dimension, potentially designated representative; for practical purposes, or actually impacting the interests of the EU or the latter will be by default the Director of INT- any Member State. CEN.

WHAT IS A CRISIS? ELEMENTS OF THE CRISIS RESPONSE MECHANISM For the purposes of the CRM, a crisis or an emergency is a sudden, serious deterioration of The fundamental elements of the Crisis the political, security and/or economic situation Response Mechanism are: the Crisis Meeting; the or an event or development in a given country or catalogue of possible Immediate Action; the Crisis region that might have an impact on the security Cell; the Crisis Platform; and the Task Force. interests of the EU or the security of EU person- The CRISIS MEETING gathers EEAS, Com- nel or citizens. mission and Council senior managers directly Responses to crises and emergencies imple- affected by the crisis in question. It assesses the mented through the CRM should envisage the short-term effects of the crisis and may decide to use of all available resources in a coordinated and implement one or more of the following courses synergic way, in line with the EU’s comprehensive of action: (A) taking immediate action; (B) acti- approach. vating the Crisis Cell; (C) convening a Crisis Plat- form. Those courses of action can be implemented in any time sequence. ACTIVATION The Crisis Meeting may agree on some imme- diate action to be taken, including providing Upon the occurrence of a serious situation or guidance and support to the EU Delegation, emergency concerning or in any way involving providing guidance to CSDP missions and oper- the external dimension of the EU, the Deputy ations, intensifying international contacts and Secretary General (DSG) for Crisis Response con- action, issuing public messages, initiating CSDP sults with the High Representative/Vice President prudent planning and launching fact finding mis- (HRVP) or the Secretary General (SG) and EEAS sions, among others. senior managers and, if the situation so warrants, The CRISIS CELL provides support to the activates the EEAS Crisis Response Mechanism. EEAS Headquarters’ decision-makers and ensures

73 HANDBOOK ON CSDP EEAS A Crisis Platform meeting brings together experts from the EEAS, the European Commission and the Council.

that decisions taken in the Crisis Meeting are aim is to follow and facilitate the implementation implemented. It is co-directed by a representative of the EU response. The Task Force evaluates the of the DSG for Crisis Response and a represent- impact of EU action, prepares policy documents ative of the services primarily involved in the cri- and options papers, contributes to the preparation sis. It is composed of a number of workstations of the Political Framework for Crisis Approach manned by representatives of EEAS, Commission (PFCAs), develops its own action plan, develops and Council services involved in the response to a roadmap and reviews it periodically, contributes the crisis. to the communication strategy, and adopts any The aim of the CRISIS PLATFORM is to other arrangements that can facilitate the imple- gather together relevant EEAS, Commission mentation of the EU response. and Council services to assess the medium and The Integrated Political Crisis Response (IPCR) long-term effects of crises and agree on action arrangements are activated by the EU Presidency to be taken. It is chaired by the HR/VP, the Sec- or upon request from one or more Member States. retary General or the DSG for Crisis Response. They allow for rapid consultation of EU Member The Crisis Platform may agree on activating the States at political level in the event of emergen- Task Force, evaluates its implementation reports, cies or crises of political significance and with a decides on possible further measures and discusses wide-ranging impact, taking place either inside or proposals for Council action. The Crisis Platform outside the EU. is an ad-hoc meeting; therefore, it is not perma- The EEAS contributes to the IPCR process, nently activated. including by providing input for Integrated Sit- The TASK FORCE is directed by the compe- uational Awareness and Analysis (ISAA) reports. tent geographic MD and composed of represent- The Situation Room is the EEAS central IPCR atives of the services involved in the response. Its 24/7 contact point.

74 2 ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES PFCA n C io elop Action Plan elop roadmap and review elop roadmap cil act Communication Strategy ev ev valuate result of EU action valuate EEAS and COM option papers, PFCAs it periodically ecommend European Council ecommend European eport from to/guidance oun PSC/Cooreper —E — Prepare policy documents, — to Contribute —D —D rC —R —R — FA Convene eporting to dvising hierarchy sals fo and operations through chains of and operations through command t to EUDEL — Assisting and supporting CSDP missions — Continuous situation monitoring —R —A — to Contribute — of crisis effects Medium term Activation of Activation Force Task Evaluation of Task Force implementation reports and decision on further measures Propo Guidance/parameters for further action and planning nt n. io ct ssessme m . Guidance/suppor Guidance to CSDP Missions/Operations Public Messages Initiate CSDP prudent planning Itensification of international contacts Inform/get support from Member States Crisis Meetings Follow-up Finding missions Launch Fact other analytical tools Activate Others Activate 2A 1A Crisis Cell is an rm e fo en at B nv Pl Mech Possible Co sis se Cri A immediate action C on on sp Ac ti Re isis Cr AS g in EE et he Me U interests ft nt rE fo me eo Crisis sess EU citizens tur — Situation on the ground — EU staff and Security risks for — Risks — reaction International As ec it ch Ar SG and/or CSDP s G- er rt ta DS equests establishment equests eports to roposes priority actions roposes rs enhance data collection Managers of POCs in relevant departments equest from HR/VP from equest other DSGs from equest or SG or Mds request or Commission he — to Instructs INTCEN — Consults with Senior — initial assessment Makes —P —R —R Ot —R —R — Council/Council European — Member States on by ti ec ll d countries Co erioration of s ta ernational el Directorate nt Da usion Cell eeping Capability arning System ve or EUDEL or CSDP CEN deterioration of law deterioration s s ed der in thir re ve ernal situation t atchK otification of threat ge hanc EU Delegations & or incident Operations/Missions abroad Hybrid F ex (countries, regions) Serious det Serious int Risks f Risks f EU citizens Risks for Other EU INT Geo Desks/ Early W EUMS Int Other ig — — — Gra — — — — — — — — —N —W — Tr En

Integrated Political Crisis Response (IPCR) arrangements.

75

CSDP MISSIONS 3 AND OPERATIONS

77 HANDBOOK ON CSDP

3.1. HOW TO LAUNCH A CSDP MISSION OR OPERATION

by Ana Isabel Xavier and Jochen Rehrl

rescue missions, military advice and assistance, and conflict prevention and peacekeeping, includ- ing post-conflict stabilisation. These all contribute to the fight against terrorism, including by sup- porting non-EU countries in combating terrorism in their territories. Since the first mission in 2003, the EU has already carried out around 30 civilian missions and military operations1 in Europe, Africa, the Middle East and Asia for the purposes of peace consolida- tion, observation and monitoring of elections or combating piracy and irregular migration. European Union/EU Military Union/EU European Staff, John O'Loghlen

Kenneth Deane, Director CPCC (left) and Esa Pulkkinen, THE PROCEDURE Director General EUMS (right).

To address the complex changing nature of Framed by the Treaty on European Union today’s crises, in the last few years the European (TEU), the Common Security and Defence Policy Union has been evolving in its commitment (CSDP) forms an integral part of the Common towards crisis management, both through civilian Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and is one of missions and military operations. In fact, as estab- the main pillars of EU external action. Under the lished by the Treaty on European Union, the EU treaty, CSDP was drafted as a crisis management has the ability to conduct a wide range of tasks tool and envisages a progressive definition of a which cover the full range of the crisis manage- common EU defence policy, thus consolidating ment cycle (prevention/intervention/peacebuild- the development of operational (civil and mili- ing). tary) capabilities for peacekeeping, conflict pre- Crisis response planning starts as soon as an vention and enhancing international security, in emerging crisis is identified by the EU at the full accordance with the principles of the Charter political level, but the range of bodies and struc- of the United Nations. tures involved spans both the political strategic To this end, Member States may form multi- level and the military strategic/operational level. national civilian and military forces that can be For that purpose, the EU has developed a flexible, deployed for different missions and operations: five-step decision-making process tailored to the joint disarmament operations, humanitarian and CSDP:

1 An overview of past and present missions and operations can be found here: https://eeas.europa.eu/topics/military-and- civilian-missions-and-operations/430/military-and-civilian-missions-and-operations_en.

78 3 CSDP missions and operations

EUROPEAN UNION CSDP OPERATIONS AND MISSIONS 2017

EUPOL COPPS Palestinian Territories Since 2006 EUAM Ukraine EUFOR ALTHEA Since 2014 Military Operations / Missions Bosnia Herzegovina Since 2004 EUMM Civilian Missions Georgia EULEX Since 2008 Military Operations / Missions Kosovo 6 EU NAVFOR Since 2008 MED EUBAM RAFAH Since 2015 Palestinian Territories EUTM Since 2005 Mali EUBAM 9 Civilian Missions Since 2013 Libya Since 2013 EUCAP SAHEL Mali EU NAVFOR Since 2014 Atalanta More than 5,000 people Since 2010 currently deployed EUCAP SAHEL EUTM Niger Somalia Since 2012 Since 2008 Objectives: keeping the peace, preventing conflicts, EUTM RCA EUCAP strengthening international security, supporting the rule of law, prevention Central African Republic SOMALIA Since 2012 of human trafficking, piracy, UN arms Since 2016 embargo and training of Libyan coast

guard. © European External Action Service - EEAS, January 2017 EEAS

Phase 1 – Monitoring and early is drafted by the EEAS geographic desk supported warning by all services and the respective EU delegation. The outcome of the PFCA will be a broad range of This phase represents the daily routine of crisis options available to the EU. This document mir- management, which consists of monitoring, plan- rors the comprehensive integrated approach and ning and anticipating crises and serious threats. At the political leaders will decide on which tools the beginning of each presidency, the Council holds should be used to tackle the crisis. a discussion on the global environment, based on the In this phase, and in accordance with the pro- geographic and thematic working groups, consulta- visions of the standing arrangements for consul- tion activities and a ‘watch list’, regularly updated by tation, NATO, the UN and other international, the Political and Security Committee (PSC). regional and non-governmental organisations are This phase in fact involves a fourfold respon- regularly consulted or involved in the political sibility: the Member States and the Commission dialogue, planning and coordination. monitor the situation on an early-warning basis; the PSC is informed both by the Member States and the Commission, as well as by the Coun- Phase 2 – Drawing up the Crisis cil. Moreover, both the EU Military Committee Management Concept (EUMC) and the Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management (CIVCOM) assess the risks If the PSC considers that CSDP action may be of potential crises, provide advice and make rec- appropriate, if and once a crisis erupts (or in a ommendations (military in the case of the EUMC preventive manner), a Crisis Management Con- and civilian in the case of CIVCOM) to the PSC. cept (CMC) is drafted, identifying the political When a crisis occurs, a document called the interests of the EU, the strategic options and the ‘Political Framework for Crisis Approach’ (PFCA) final goal. The CMC is the conceptual backbone

79 HANDBOOK ON CSDP

of crisis management operations as it ensures the depending on the engagement in question. coherence and comprehensiveness of EU instru- When the CMC has been agreed by the PSC, ments and tools in the crisis management field. the document is forwarded to the Council for It cannot be governed by a ‘one model fits all’ approval. A Council decision on the ‘establishment assumption, as it is triggered by different and of a mission/operation’ is the result of this process. complex variables, from the stage of a crisis to its At the same time, a force-sensing mechanism is nature and location. Those variables are assessed initiated, in which the Member States provide through periodic joint assessments by the Coun- first indications of whether they will contribute cil Secretariat and the Commission, information and if so, with which forces. gathering and consultation with international On the basis of this Council decision, one and regional organisations, as well as with the or several Status of Mission/Forces Agreements European Union Intelligence and Situation Cen- (SOMA/SOFA) are negotiated and, pending the tre (EU INTCEN), which collects, processes decision of the Member States, non-EU coun- and reports information to the competent deci- tries are invited to join the CSDP engagement. sion-making and crisis management bodies. In addition and only for military operations, the The CMC is drafted by the Crisis Management operation headquarters (OHQ) are identified and and Planning Directorate (CMPD), which is the the operation commander (OpCdr) is appointed. primary service for political strategic planning CPCC is the permanent operation headquar- on CSDP, supported by the EU Military Staff ters for all civilian missions; hence, no decision (EUMS) and the Civilian Planning and Conduct on the civilian OHQ has to be taken. However, Capability (CPCC). The CMC analyses the situ- the Council decision for civilian missions needs ation and proposes options. The High Represent- an annexed budgetary impact statement (BIS), ative (HR) submits the CMC to the PSC, which which is not necessary for military operations gathers advice from EUMC and CIVCOM, (Athena mechanism). Graphic: Jochen Rehrl Civilian and military command and control options.

80 3 CSDP missions and operations

Althea EUFOR EUNAVFOR EUCAP EUAM EUCAP Artemis (Berlin +) RD Congo Atalanta NESTOR Ukraine Sahel Mali PFCA   CMC        MSOD CSOD   IMD    CONOPS       OPLAN/ ROE-RUoF       

3 weeks 9 months 5 months 6 months 10 months Graphic: European External Action Service Action External Graphic: European Planning in reality.

Phase 3 – Operation planning tion conferences, to gather the military assets and capabilities and constitute the troop-contributing In this phase, the concept of operations nations (TCN). (CONOPS) and the operation plan (OPLAN) The next step requires Member States to agree are drafted. Both documents are produced by on their rights, obligations, immunities or facili- the operation commander and his/her team. The ties as defined in the Status of Forces Agreement operation commander presents the CONOPS (SOFA). A draft proposal is submitted by the to the PSC, which submits it to the Council for PSC to the Council as well as the draft military approval, if necessary. and civilian OPLANs. Both the Status of Forces For military operations, the Initiating Mili- Agreement and the operation plan process involve tary Directive (IMD), developed by the EUMS, a complex advice and recommendation cycle is a comprehensive ‘guideline’ that gathers all the before the Council approves the rules of engage- directives that will allow the operation com- ment (military operations) or the rules for the mander (OpCdr) to develop the concept of use of force (civilian missions with an executive operations (CONOPS), the Statement of Forces mandate). This phase is finalised with the Council Requirement (SOR) and the detailed script of decision on the ‘launch of an operation/mission’. the operation plan (OPLAN). It is then up to the PSC to note or approve the IMD and request the authorisation of the EUMC as the OpCdr needs Phase 4 –Deployment and to prepare a draft CONOPS and a SOR. implementation As soon as the Council approves the CONOPS, the OpCdr (responsible for conducting the mili- The chosen measures are thus implemented tary operation and reporting its progress to the with the political control and strategic direction EUMC) will start the force generation process. of the PSC, under the authority of the Council. This process is particularly important, because In this phase, the EUMC monitors and reports on its success depends on the political commitment execution to the PSC. For civilian missions, the of the Member States, through the force genera- Head of Mission is responsible for command and

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control in theatre whereas the civilian operation EUMS) has its own internal system for recording, commander is the one who reports back and is analysing and implementing lessons learned. The accountable vis-à-vis the PSC. CMPD collects lessons from political-strategic planning of CSDP missions and operations and from the related strategic reviews. Phase 5 – Strategic review: maintain, The CPCC collects lessons from operational refocus or terminate planning, conduct and support of civilian CSDP missions. The EUMS collects lessons from The conduct of missions and operations is reg- advance planning and support given to military ularly reviewed, in particular their respective man- HQ and from reports from missions and opera- dates and structures. The result of these reviews tions. As far as possible, lessons are also collected can be that the mission/operation will remain through visits by officials from Brussels HQ to with an unchanged mandate, will refocus its pri- CSDP missions and operations and through orities or that EU action in theatre will finish. interviews with mission and operation staff and This phase demands a (re-)evaluation of the sit- other stakeholders. uation and the revision of the CMC by the PSC, which forwards a recommendation to the Coun- cil in order to examine the action taken with the CONCLUSION Member States. A CSDP action can also be ter- minated without any further ado if an end-date is mentioned in the Council decision. Another This five-phase procedure was implemented as option to terminate a CSDP mission/operation is a guideline in order to coordinate the crisis man- through a new Council decision, which will state agement tools, ensure their complementarity and that the mission is accomplished and that the rapidly deploy the capabilities of the EU Member CSDP mission will end at a given time. States, which constitute the backbone of the EU’s external action on the ground. Although these procedures have been quite successful until now, LESSONS LEARNED PROCESS future efforts must be focused on fast-tracking the decision-making process in order to rapidly The lessons learned process follows the vari- deploy missions and operations on behalf of the ous phases of decision-making. Each of the three EU. Rapid and preventive deployment should be CSDP structures at EU HQ (CMPD, CPCC and the goal.

Lesson observed 1 • Action: proper analysis and validation

Lesson identified • Action: remedial action such as modifying concepts or standard 2 operating procedures

Lesson learnt 3 • Lesson implemented

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3.2. CHALLENGES OF MILITARY OPERATIONS AND MISSIONS by Georgios Tsitsikostas European Union European

The lack of quick and spectacular results may create frustration. Nevertheless, ‘quick wins’ were never anticipated or expected, although they would definitely be welcome.

Since 2003, the European Union has launched the smooth development of the EU’s engagement, 13 military CSDP missions and operations. following developments in the country in ques- Deployed in two continents, on land and at sea, tion. The example of the gradual development of these missions and operations constitute the mil- the executive EU military operation in Central itary contribution to the European Union’s com- African Republic (EUFOR CAR) to a non-exec- prehensive approach to crisis management. Their utive Military Advisory Mission (EUMAM CAR) objective, regardless of the geographical area they and later to a Training Mission (EUTM CAR) has are deployed in, is to support efforts to restore sta- educational value in this sense. bility and build security in states and regions in the Union’s periphery. Today, six EU-led military missions and operations are active. STABILITY PROJECTION AND The mandates of these missions and opera- SECURITY BUILDING tions, given through a resolution of the United Nations Security Council or via a request by the The lack of quick and spectacular results may host nation, have been diverse. This underpins create frustration. Nevertheless, ‘quick wins’ were the inherently flexible and adaptable nature of never anticipated or expected, although they the military approach which allowed and enabled would definitely be welcome. The nature of the

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rity institutions in areas such as operations, plans, logistics, administration and legal affairs, as well as providing specialised training to the Armed Forces of the respective host nation. Great emphasis is placed on advancing con- stitutional and democratic order over the mili- tary apparatus and on strengthening the rule of law. The strengthening of the local armed forces’ effectiveness, reforming them into a modernised,

European Union European ethnically balanced and democratically accounta- New threats call for new responses. Most if not all of them ble institution and the restoration of their credi- are transnational, multidimensional and dynamic threats bility and overall image among the population is that blur the boundaries of the traditional internal/external fundamental for a security environment that will security division. stand the test of time. Although the mandates of each of these three non-executive EU military military engagement in the current CSDP mis- missions differ, reflecting the different needs and sions and operations is fundamentally different priorities of the respective host nation, they are from the common military tasks, as undertaken similar in that the focus is on operating in the under national control and within national bor- background and doing an in-depth job, which ders. Although the military is linked to the ‘hard’ requires patience, persistence and commitment: element of the power nations or organisations pos- these qualities are encoded into the DNA of the Specific challenges can be addressed very quickly provided that there is a political will to do so. sess, and rightly so, in this unique EU approach, it military. is wrapped in a ‘velvet glove’. Its presence in the host nation or in the seas adjacent to unstable regions is intended to project EXECUTIVE CHARACTER AND stability rather than power, and to increase secu- MANDATE rity. The European Union’s commitment to peace The same approach can be unmistakeably iden- and security in Africa is growing, and the deterio- tified in the EU’s military operations. Their exec- ration of the security environment in parts of that utive character and mandate prioritise the rel- continent – which is very important for Europe evant tasks. The wording used here is stronger: – namely the Central African Republic, Mali and ‘[…] maintain a Safe and Secure Environment’ in Somalia, creates challenges and threats that need the case of EUFOR ALTHEA, ‘[…] protection of to be adequately and effectively addressed. From shipping, deterrence projection, repression of acts of the European side it is acknowledged that the key piracy’ in the case of EUNAVFOR ATALANTA, to achieving a sustainable Safe and Secure Envi- ‘[…] disrupt the business model of human smug- ronment (SASE) is to encourage, enable and sup- glers and traffickers’ in the case of EUNAV- port the local security institutions in building up FORMED SOPHIA. Here again, there are no their own capacities. To this end, creating own- quick fixes: EUFOR ALTHEA took over the ership of the endeavour and enjoying the exten- responsibility of maintaining a Safe and Secure sive support of all concerned stakeholders in the Environment from NATO Stabilisation Force nation in question are ‘sine qua nons’. (SFOR) in 2004; EUNAVFOR ATALANTA In this context the tasks entrusted to the mil- has been operating in the Indian Ocean since itary include supporting indigenous security 2008. EUNAVFORMED SOPHIA is likely building, providing advice to the respective secu- to be active for quite a long time as well. Here

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European Union/EUFOR ALTHEA

Specific challenges can be addressed very quickly provided that there is a political will to do so.

again, the flexibility and adaptability of the mili- crime, piracy or armed conflicts. The European tary instrument has proven its importance. Over Union’s Global Strategy on Foreign and Secu- time, and following developments on the ground rity Policy accurately identifies these challenges and the initial phased concept of the operation, and threats and offers a vision for the European the operations evolved to incorporate amended Union’s role as a credible security provider. or additional tasks. New threats call for new responses. Most if not In certain instances, these tasks are of a rather all of them are transnational, multidimensional non-executive character, such as an operation to and dynamic threats that blur the boundaries ‘[…] support the capacity building and training of of the traditional internal/external security divi- the coastguard’. sion; a joined-up civilian-military response is thus required in order to successfully tackle them. The European Union has to be inventive, adaptable TRANSNATIONAL, MULTIDIMENSIONAL and strong-willed to become a recognised strate- AND DYNAMIC THREATS gic actor. Making better use of the instruments already Over the last decade, the security environment in its extensive tool box, as well as fine-tuning and in the regions adjacent to Europe has changed sig- supplementing them with a number of additional nificantly. New challenges and threats have sur- features to bridge identified gaps or cover short- faced to join conventional, persistent ones. These falls will be sufficient to enable the Union to fulfil include terrorism, cybersecurity [hybrid threat], this role. the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery means, transnational organised

85 HANDBOOK ON CSDP European Union/EUTM Somalia Union/EUTM European The nature of the military engagement in the current CSDP missions and operations is fundamentally different from the common military tasks as undertaken under national control.

BATTLEGROUPS: RAPID RESPONSE, fact that has been widely acknowledged. This NEVER USED proves that the specific challenge can be addressed, provided that the political will to do so is present. The military CSDP missions and operations The same argument could be used in favour of are faced with challenges that are internal as the potential deployment of the Battlegroups, an well as external to the European Union, adding instrument that this year celebrates its tenth anni- to the overall complexity. All of them are quite versary but has never been used, despite the fact well known and have been thoroughly analysed. that on several occasions it could have constituted The European Union has been extensively criti- the proper response. Ten years after its birth, it is cised over an alleged slowness in its responses. high time to revisit the Battlegroups concept and Even more criticism was generated by the reluc- examine how relevant it still is to contemporary tance it has shown to use its rapid response forces, challenges. It is time to ask ourselves some hard namely, the Battlegroups. It cannot be denied questions, such as whether we still need (or want) that the established decision-making procedures to have this kind of rapid response capability and, within the European Union are indeed time-con- depending on the answers, to take the respective suming. It could be argued, however, that they are decisions. If the outcome of this debate is that the designed in this way precisely in order to facilitate challenges and threats the European Union is up this process, in an institution that currently brings against require that sort of capability, then it must together 28 sovereign nations with equal votes. At not only be preserved, but developed into some- the same time, whenever time was critical, such thing meaningful and useful. And if it is useful, as in the case of or EUFOR then it needs and deserves to be used. Like the CAR, adequate flexibility was demonstrated and issue of decision-making, this one is also a matter decisions were made in a very timely fashion, a of political will.

86 3 CSDP MISSIONS AND OPERATIONS European Union/EUNAVFOR Somalia Union/EUNAVFOR European The military objective of CSDP engagements, regardless of the geographical area they are deployed in, is to support efforts to restore stability and build peace in states and regions in the Union’s sphere of interest.

COLLECTIVE FUNDING UNDER of any meaning operationally. It should be noted ‘ATHENA’ that the overall cost of the CSDP to the Euro- pean Union budget is minimal, in stark contrast Adequate financing is another challenge the EU with the importance placed upon it. The revision military missions and operations face. Military of the ‘Athena’ mechanism in this way is likely to operations are usually financed through national produce secondary effects that will improve the funding, although some can be financed through attractiveness of potential contributing nations, collective funding under the provisions of the facilitating the creation of follow-on forces and ‘Athena’ mechanism. This arrangement does not improving the sustainability of the endeavour. The make participation in the missions and operations expectation is that this opportunity will be seized attractive, and for the most part discourages the and a political decision will be made to facilitate smaller Member States, or those affected by the the operation and maximise the effectiveness of financial crisis, from making a more active con- CSDP military engagement. tribution. The upcoming review of the ‘Athena’ mechanism in 2017 provides a unique opportu- nity to address this issue, which increases and to PERMANENT EU HEADQUARTERS a certain extent explains, reluctance to deploy the Battlegroups. In the case of the EU military mis- The way the European Union will address the sions, financing should also cover the provision identified shortcomings and gaps in the way CSDP of relevant material support to the recipients of military missions and operations are currently their training programmes, if the latter are to be planned and conducted constitute a different

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kind of challenge. Amongst these shortcomings In the future, there may be a request for an EU are the extended periods of absence commanders military mission to provide this kind of sup- are obliged to take from their posts in order to port to a Member State, as some have already be in Brussels. They also result in the loss of the implied. valuable, hard-won experience, lessons learnt and The invocation of Article 42.(7) (mutual assis- valuable expertise gained after a mission or opera- tance clause) of the TEU by France, following the tion concludes. The procedures followed so far in deadly November 2015 terrorist attacks in Paris the EU, and that are tested, proven and coherent, raised the issue and fuelled the discussions about differ from those used by national defence institu- the ways in which the European Union might pro- tions. The creation of an EU permanent planning vide assistance to a Member State in a similar sit- and conducting structure and of an operational uation in the future. This discussion also included headquarters have been clearly identified as the Article 222 (solidarity clause) of the TFEU. corrective steps, streamlining EU practices with The explicit reference of the latter to the use of well-established and proven norms. The challenge the military resources available to the European is to strike a balance between those Member States Union (‘[…] mobilise all the instruments at its dis- that call for a more ambitious development of posal, including the military resources made available European Union military capabilities, and those by the Member States […]’), presents an additional that express scepticism on the grounds of avoiding opportunity to reflect on the ways this could be unnecessary duplication with NATO, a subject on made possible, in particular because Article 222 which there is unanimous agreement. TFEU is not part of the Common Security and Agreement also exists on deepening coopera- Defence Policy and therefore does not fall under tion with NATO in a number of commonly iden- the responsibility of the EUMC. tified areas of mutual interest. This is also a field that presents a challenge, taking into account the different nature of each institution and the pre- EU: GLOBAL ACTOR AND SECURITY vailing political sensitivities of certain Member PROVIDER States. Practical cooperation is exercised at the tactical level, by solving problems on the ground The European Union is a global actor and a and maximising the effectiveness of the respective security provider. As such it enjoys great respect missions and operations. and is highly regarded. Nevertheless, these cannot be taken for granted: an actor’s position in the international system and its relative power is con- INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL SECURITY stantly evaluated and recalculated, based upon its decisions and its positions. In the contemporary The blurring of the boundaries of the tradi- security environment, characterised by instability tional internal/external security division and and revisionism, new actors – state and non-state the acknowledgement of the need to address the alike – have emerged. If the European Union internal/external security nexus demand, rather wants to be acclaimed as a respected security pro- than require, the closer cooperation between the vider it needs to d military and security forces. This has already ecisively and convincingly position itself as been witnessed in a number of Member States, such. At the conceptual level, the presentation of which mobilised their national Armed Forces the EU Global Strategy on Foreign and Security in order to respond to situations such as the Policy and the Implementation Plan on Security migrant crisis, whose intensity overwhelmed the and Defence was very timely. Now, it is time for capacities of the responsible civilian authorities. action.

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3.3. CHALLENGES FOR CIVILIAN CSDP MISSIONS by Kate Fearon and Sophie Picavet European Union/EUMM Georgia Union/EUMM European The civilian CSDP missions promote stability and build resilience in fragile environments through strengthening rule of law institutions and key leaders.

The civilian CSDP missions promote stabil- TEN CIVILIAN MISSIONS ON THREE ity and build resilience in fragile environments CONTINENTS through strengthening rule of law institutions and key leaders. They are just one tool in the EU’s tool- In 2016 there were ten civilian missions on box for dealing with security and defence matters, three continents (Kosovo,1 Ukraine, Georgia, and they work together with EU delegations in Niger, Mali, the Occupied Palestinian Territories, theatre, military CSDP missions and Operations Afghanistan, Somalia and Libya), with around and with Commission Directorates such as Devel- 2500 staff deployed in theatre and a budget of opment Cooperation. Thus they work to link up around EUR 200 million. The missions are sup- the three essential elements of the EU’s integrated ported by the Civilian Planning and Conduct approach as articulated in its Global Strategy Capability (CPCC), which is the Brussels-based for the EU’s Foreign and Security Policy (2016) Operational Headquarters. The CPCC is a direc- (hereinafter the ‘Global Strategy’) – diplomacy, torate of the European External Action Service security and defence, and development. (EEAS).

1 This designation is without prejudice to positions on status, and is in line with UNSCR 1244(1999) and the ICJ Opinion on the Kosovo declaration of independence.

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ations Commander, acting on behalf of the High Representative/Vice President of the Commis- sion, owes a ‘duty of care’ towards all staff. Before getting into the challenges, we will first present a whistle-stop tour of mission achieve- ments in 2016. Thus, for example, in Kosovo2 the EULEX mission implemented EU-facilitated dialogue agreements on integrated border man- agement, vehicles and licence plates, civil protec-

European Union European tion, police and judicial integration, thus promot- Thematically, CSDP missions work on issues such as pub­ ing normalisation between Kosovo1 and , lic order policing, community policing, organised and trans­ as well as arresting high profile public figures, national crime, irregular migration, anti-corruption, human resources management, human rights and gender concerns demonstrating that no one is above the law and in the criminal justice system. that everyone must abide by it. In Ukraine the mission (EUAM) facilitated the Minister of the Interior’s rolling out of a nation- Mission mandates are set by the Council of wide community policing programme, based on its the European Union and agreed with host states, successful pilot programme in one police station. who invite missions to assist them. Though the In Georgia the mission (EUMM) reduced ten- mandates vary from place to place, they usually sion and facilitated agreements between the con- involve supporting local institutions and key lead- flicting parties through its hotline and its ability ers in law enforcement. Specifically, the institutions to quickly deploy staff to remote locations where concerned usually include the public prosecution incidents occurred. services, the police, border management, the coast- In Niger, the mission (EUCAP Sahel Niger) guard, customs, prisons and the judiciary. The- completed a revision of the training manual for matically, they work on issues such as public order the police force, and facilitated the operationali- policing, community policing, organised and trans- sation of the ‘PC Mixte’ Command post concept national crime, irregular migration, anti-corrup- – a mechanism that will enhance coordination tion, human resources management, human rights between the various internal security forces. and gender concerns in the criminal justice system. In Mali the civilian mission (EUCAP Sahel The civilian missions are concerned with Mali) supported the complete overhaul of the increasing the capacity of law enforcement insti- national training curriculum for police, thus tutions by monitoring, mentoring and advising ensuring sustainable, standardised and high qual- on their organisation and on the legislative and ity training for all new recruits and seasoned policy framework in which they operate, and by officers alike, that will in the future include mod- training their personnel. One mission has an exec- ules on human rights and gender as standard. utive mandate, and so it also investigates, prose- In Palestine the missions (EUPOL COPPS cutes and adjudicates criminal cases. and EUBAM Rafah) supported increasing the Several missions operate in high-threat security capacity of the key institution on border manage- environments – in 2016 the Afghanistan, Niger, ment, and we saw progress on forensic skills and Mali and Libya missions operated in theatres with community policing with the Palestinian Civil a HIGH security risk rating. The Civilian Oper- Police.

2 This designation is without prejudice to positions on status, and is in line with UNSCR 1244(1999) and the ICJ Opinion on the Kosovo declaration of independence.

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European Union/EUMM Georgia

Managing a difficult situation: The right people are not always available for the right post at the right time.

In Afghanistan the mission (EUPOL) facili- gender balance of our civilian Heads of Mission, tated the signature of two key agreements on a with five women and five men leading the ten Police Ombudsman which will protect citizens civilian missions. against human rights abuses by the police, and on Police-Prosecutor Cooperation, which will be key to efficient detection and investigation of SHORT-, MEDIUM- AND LONG-TERM crimes. CHALLENGES In Somalia the civilian mission (EUCAP Nestor) saw the production of a new National While logistics, security, communications, Security Policy, facilitated meetings of the Somali transport, mandate delivery, changes in the per- Maritime Security Coordination Committee, sonnel of local partners, the transfer of trained and, with partners, supported the opening of an personnel to other roles, political interference, Operations Room for the Somali Coast Guard. weak local institutions, absorption capacity and In Libya, despite a challenging political and transition and exit strategies all present short-, security situation, the mission (EUBAM Libya) medium- and long-term challenges for the civilian was able to engage the Government of National CSDP missions, four key challenges were identi- Accord, and locate itself as a key player for future fied: two on both the operational and strategic security sector reform, in part by facilitating the level, and two on a purely strategic level. These are renewal of the National Team for Security and (1) responsiveness, (2) visibility, (3) adapting to Border Management. the wider, evolving security context and (4) out- And, for the first time ever, we achieved a 50:50 put, impact and influence.

91 HANDBOOK ON CSDP European Union/EUAVSEC South Sudan Union/EUAVSEC European The EU is called on to continue its broad range of civilian crisis management activities, including in the areas related to capacity building for the security sector, police reform, rule of law and border management.

DEVELOPMENT OF INDICATORS In order to mitigate this, the CPCC invested in reviewing and revising its job descriptions, dis- Force generation and deployment speed tilling multiple texts to around 80 job functions in terms of both personnel and technical and and sharing these with Member States. This is to administrative support are the main require- enable early force sensing, improve recruitment ments to ensure responsiveness. The Global procedures and increase transparency, and – on a Strategy holds the position that more ‘rapid and very practical level – to assist Member States with effective’ CSDP action is needed and that this can their own forward planning. be achieved ‘by encouraging force generation [and] speeding up deployment’. Standing civilian CSDP capacity Missions are comprised of a blend of seconded Genuine rapid response raises the issue of a and contracted international staff and contracted standing civilian CSDP capacity, that is to say, local staff. Of the international staff, the majority having a ‘first responder’ team that is comprised of are seconded by Member States. This represents in-house staff (from the Operational Headquarters) an important and welcome political commitment for fast interim deployment at very short notice to to the missions and the CSDP by Member States, key posts – as is the case with the standing capacity however, the staff are at times vulnerable to demands of police and rule of law staff in the United Nations made on domestic institutions (such as the police, – and that, following deployment, take part in the the judiciary, the prosecution or corrections service), early planning processes for any envisaged CSDP with the result that the right people are not always mission (which today frequently have complex available for the right posts at the right time. So, mandates related to capacity building of police, managing this situation is a challenge. migration and criminal justice authorities).

92 3 CSDP MISSIONS AND OPERATIONS European Union/EUCAP Nestor Union/EUCAP European The greater the local buy-in and local ownership, the greater the impact on the ground of the mandate delivery by the CSDP mission.

However, having a standing capacity will be of VISIBILITY little benefit unless they are able to operate in the field. The Global Strategy sets out the EU’s vital So, personnel, technical and administrative interests as ‘peace and security, prosperity and support is necessary, and the development of democracy’. The Global Strategy identifies the standard protocols and procedures across all mis- Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) as sions is a challenge for the coming year. a core delivery instrument, alongside diplomacy Amongst these, the secure use of informa- and development, of its global engagement and tion technology is important, as is the ability to influence. It exhorts the CSDP to become ‘more deploy equipment such as vehicles and comput- responsive and effective’, to be more joined up with ers at short notice: a new concept for storage and the EU’s other external policies and instruments, management of strategic stock – the ‘Warehouse and to be more visible. 2.0’ – has been developed for this reason. Its implementation will be a challenge, par- Strategic communication ticularly given current levels of resources. Thus, Specifically in relation to strategic communica- the creation of a standing civilian capacity and tions, it clearly states that ‘The EU will enhance its the concomitant mission support would allow strategic communications [...] in order to connect EU for a qualitative leap forward in terms of the foreign policy with citizens and better communicate responsiveness of civilian CSDP, but the key it to our partners’. In this, the Global Strategy ech- challenge will be to gain access to the additional oes and affirms policy asserted in Council conclu- resources to reflect such an upscaling in action sions (2013, 2014, 2015), for example by under- and responsiveness. lining the importance of effective communications

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to raise public awareness, and working on a more Home Affairs) has been developed in the areas effective, visible and results-oriented CSDP. of anti-corruption, the fight against organised In-theatre, adequate provision is made. Each crime, illegal migration and terrorism. Closer mission (with the exception of Libya) has a spe- links between the external dimension of Freedom, cific budget line for visibility and produces up to Security and Justice (FSJ) and civilian CSDP cri- ten media and/or communication products and sis management were also developed. posts them on up to 15 platforms in 12 languages. In November 2016, the Foreign Affairs Coun- The bigger missions have around ten people ded- cil adopted conclusions for the implementation icated to this work, with smaller missions having of the three strategic priorities identified by the between two and four people. EUGS: (a) responding to external conflicts and crises, (b) building the capacities of partners and Public communication (c) protecting the Union and its citizens. The con- However, the CPCC, the Brussels-based Oper- clusions pointed out the need to revisit the Feira ational Headquarters for the missions – and the priority areas with a focus on irregular migration, key interface between the missions’ work and the hybrid threats, cyber security, terrorism, radicali- EU institutions, Member States and the general sation, organised crime and border management. public – has no budget or full-time personnel But whereas previous civilian CSDP missions dedicated to strategic communications. The cen- focused mainly on capacity building activities, tral public communication output is thus lim- CSDP missions within the new framework of ited to updating posts on the CSDP and EEAS the EUGS would be even more intertwined with news pages with stories about the missions. Key internal security activities. The review of Feira audiences in Brussels (Member States’ Permanent should address CSDP added value in the com- Representatives, other EU institutions) and in prehensive approach model throughout the entire Member States (Foreign Ministries and Ministries conflict cycle. This requirement has implications of Defence, Justice and the Interior) should also both for strengthening ties with FSJ actors and for be kept up to date. The Operational Headquarters enhancing cooperation with military instruments. of the missions is well aware of this challenge and has already taken steps to address it. Responding to external conflicts and crises With regard to the more classic strategic prior- ities set out for the CSDP (responding to external ADAPTING TO THE EVOLVING conflicts and crises and building the capacities of SECURITY CONTEXT partners), the conclusions mainly focus on the EU’s awareness and responsiveness in the conflict How should we adapt to the evolving and prevention phase, its rapid and decisive capacity challenging security context? The Global Strat- response tools as well as on an increased use of egy notes the following challenges: ‘energy secu- strategic communication. rity, migration, climate change, violent extremism, and hybrid warfare’. The priority areas for civilian Building the capacities of partners engagement envisaged by the 2000 Feira Euro- The ability to contribute more systematically pean Council encompassed assistance to fragile to the resilience and stabilisation of partner coun- or post-conflict countries in areas related to polic- tries along the nexus of security and development, ing, the rule of law, civil administration and civil including through training, advice and/or men- protection; however, the last two tasks were never toring within the security sector, is highlighted. implemented. Since then, the external dimension The use of internal instruments to deal with exter- of EU internal security instruments (Justice and nal security with reciprocity is also recommended.

94 3 CSDP MISSIONS AND OPERATIONS European Union/EUPM European Force generation and deployment speed in terms of both personnel and technical and administrative support are the main requirements to ensure responsiveness.

Protecting the Union and its citizens and border management. The EU then aims to The third strategic priority is quite new for the be more Europe-centric (protection of Europe). CSDP. It covers the contribution that the EU and This paradigm shift may imply new challenges for its Member States can make from a security and CSDP missions with regard to local buy-in and defence perspective outside the EU to protect its local ownership requirements. This constraint domestic interests in various areas: protection will need to be addressed through finely tailored and resilience of EU networks and critical infra- CSDP activities. structure, security of EU external borders, build- The new Level of Ambition (LoA)3 will need ing partners’ capacity to manage their borders, to be evaluated against realistic criteria. In addi- civil protection and disaster response, access to tion, the implementation of the EUGS for civil- the global commons including the high seas and ian CSDP missions also implies a review of the space, countering hybrid threats, cyber security, planning and conduct structures and capabili- preventing and countering terrorism and radi- ties, as well as the enhancement of civilian/mili- calisation and combatting people smuggling and tary synergies. The need to rethink our mandates trafficking. The nexus between internal and exter- through a better combination of tools, including nal security and cooperation with (FSJ) actors is combined military and civilian tasks in the same underlined again in this area. mandate, could be explored using the model of The EU is called on to continue its broad existing military missions with a law enforcement range of civilian crisis management activities, component (for instance, the anti-smuggling including in areas related to capacity building mandate of Atalanta in the Gulf of Aden). for the security sector, police reform, rule of law

3 The previous LoA was: The EU should be able to deploy a dozen CSDP civilian missions of varying formats, inter alia in a rapid reaction situation, including a major mission (possibly up to 3 000 experts), which could last several years. It was set out according to a methodology transposed from the military system.

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OUTPUT, IMPACT AND INFLUENCE assessment can be conducted by desk officers and other CPCC staff deployed to the country. The The fourth, and main, challenge faced by civil- communication on findings is important. Last ian CSDP missions relates to the impact both on but not least, harmonisation between the strategic the ground and at the strategic level. Whilst pur- reviews of the timing and the scope of the impact suing political-strategic objectives in the frame- assessment would be beneficial. work of the EU’s CSDP, civilian missions aim to The methodology should also help to strengthen foster sustainable changes in countries and regions EEAS/CPCC analysis of operational and imple- affected by conflict. mentation obstacles. The greater the local buy-in The lack of baseline data to make optimal use of and local ownership, the greater the impact on indicators is a recurrent problem in post-conflict the ground of the mandate delivery by the CSDP countries where the ability to collect information mission. is often undermined by limited national capaci- CSDP missions may indeed face reluctance ties and data systems. The accountability of the from governments to implement agreed reform CPCC in terms of reporting to Member States on commitments without being able to use effective mandate delivery represents a unique opportunity leverage to oblige these authorities to fulfil their to increase its efforts to strengthen operational commitments. Activities focusing too much on effectiveness. At the same time, it highlights the training and not enough on institutional reform difficulties of measuring the impact of activities: can lead to this kind of outcome. Therefore, a these difficulties are generally greater than in the blend of activities on both the strategic and oper- military area (where the operational objectives are ational levels is usually needed. more easily assessed). Advisory tasks are, by their nature, difficult to measure, and capacity-building activities can take time before yielding results. As DEVELOPMENT OF INDICATORS a result, the CPCC keeps the methodology used for measuring outcomes of the missions under A more comprehensive approach to the for- constant review. mulation of the strategic framework of CSDP Significant efforts have been made in recent operations within the EU family (Missions, Euro- years to strengthen impact assessment tools. How- pean Commission, EU Special Representative, ever, the development of a common methodolog- Member States) should also be further explored, ical approach across the missions requires finess- including through the development of indicators ing. During the summer of 2016, missions were and measures of indicators. Based on the model of provided with new Mission Implementation Plan the indicators used by the EU Delegations when (MIP) guidelines and a template aimed at rein- developing state-building contracts (budgetary vigorating a standardised and simplified approach support), CSDP missions could explore bench- during the entire mission lifecycle. marks drawing on conditionality and discontin- The conduct of an impact assessment antici- uation of activities. Such a tool would allow the pates a strong role for the CPCC. In particular, missions to establish the stage at which working it is recommended that the CPCC promotes the with the government would allow them to pro- consistent use of standard terminology and tem- mote the reform most effectively. Some emphasis plates in order to rely on durable trend analysis could also be placed on the broader perspective without reconstructing post facto indicators. The by viewing the impact assessment within the over- delivery of training to missions for the imple- all conflict situation. Lastly, coordination at cen- mentation of impact assessments is done in the tral level could help to develop a more strategic country concerned and in Brussels. The impact impact assessment.

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3.4. EXCURSUS: EUFOR ALTHEA

by Friedrich Schrötter European Union/EUFOR Althea Union/EUFOR European Disposal of unsafe and surplus ammunition is conducted by the Armed Forces of BiH, and by local, regional and international companies with the support of the international community.

Mandated by the UN Security Council, Oper- tionally focused on ‘Capacity Building & Train- ation ALTHEA was launched on 2 December ing’ for the AF BiH. 2004. EUFOR currently operates under the legal The Instructions to Parties (ITPs) set out the authority of UNSCR 2315 (2016) and an Opera- guidelines for achieving the goals of the GFAP tional Plan issued by the Operation Commander. and are a key tool for the Force Commander. Since Since 2004 EUFOR, on the basis of its execu- the GFAP provisions are framed in general terms, tive mandate under Chapter VII of the UN Char- there is a need for further interpretation and clar- ter, is responsible for the implementation of the ification. The ITP are a vital tool for defining the military annexes to the Dayton Peace Agreement, Parties' responsibilities and obligations. Set out by also known as the General Framework Agreement the Force Commander, they ensure that the Par- for Peace (GFAP). The Force has contributed to ties are acquainted with the tasks contained in the the maintenance and stability of a Safe and Secure GFAP and know how to accomplish them. They Environment in BiH and helped to promote a cli- are signed off by both COM EUFOR and COM mate in which the peace process can continue. NHQ Sa so as to cover their respective respon- Furthermore, based on a decision by the EU sibilities; EUFOR for a safe and secure environ- Foreign Ministers, EUFOR has since 2010 addi- ment and NATO for defence reform.

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EUFOR ELEMENTS EUFOR’S MAIN OBJECTIVES

• The Headquarters at Camp Butmir. • Supporting the overall EU strategy for • The Multinational . BiH. • A network of 17 Liaison and • Ensuring a Safe and Secure Observation Teams spread across Environment (SASE) in the country, the country, headed by the LOT especially supporting the BiH efforts Coordination Center (LCC). in this regard. • Embedded Advisory Teams (EATs) • In parallel, providing the Armed attached to the AFBiH. Forces of BiH with ‘Capacity Building • National Support Elements of Troop- & Training’ so that they can attain Contributing Nations. international standards. European Union/EUFOR Althea Union/EUFOR European

POLITICAL CHALLENGES

Bosnia and Herzegovina is progressing on of the power arrangements (‘third entity’, ‘elec- its path towards EU accession, working on a toral district’, ‘federalisation’…). socio-economic Reform Agenda and dealing with • Public institutions are costly, fragmented and the EU Commission Questionnaire as a prerequi- partly dysfunctional. The reconciliation pro- site for achieving EU candidate status. cess, which is crucial for progress, is slow. There are still, however, big challenges • Political dialogue has in recent months been ahead: marked by a significant increase in inflamma- • The leadership of the three ‘constituent peoples’ tory nationalistic rhetoric. still disagrees on the foundations of BiH. Bos- • Some figures in the political elite fear ‘rule-of- niaks would prefer a strong and unitary state, law’ standards. whereas Bosnian Serbs tend to push for further • Short election cycles (general and local elec- self-governance, and Bosnian Croats continue tions alternating in a 2-year cycle) are not con- to strive for what they consider a ‘fairer share’ tributing to political continuity.

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?

TERRORISM POLITICAL INSTABILITY EXTREMISM

INTER‐ETHNIC TENSIONS FOREIGN TERRORIST FIGHTER (FTF) NETWORKS

SOCIO‐ECONOMIC ORGANISED CRIME (OC) INSTABILITY

ECONOMIC FINANCIAL CRIME AND CORRUPTION Graph: European Union/EUFOR ALTHEA

SECURITY CHALLENGES SURVEYS – PUBLIC PERCEPTION OF EUFOR There are several threats to the Safe and Secure Environment, and obstacles to substantial pro- EUFOR conducts two major surveys per year gress, amongst others: to gain information on public opinion regard- • Ethno-nationalist centered politics ing EUFOR, EU, NATO and security related • Polarisation and demagoguery issues. The survey results help measure the • Nationalistic and inflammatory rhetoric from success of EUFOR’s media campaigns and to political key figures design future campaigns. Furthermore, the sur- • Tendency towards ethnically motivated acts veys contribute to EUFOR’s situational aware- of intimidation, harassment,and in some cases ness. Surveys conducted in December 2016 even violence involving 2500 individuals in face-to-face and • Weak economy 1000 individuals in telephone interviews sug- • Corruption gested the following: • Powerful organised crime networks • Almost 92% of Bosniaks describe the po- • Unemployment rate over 40% litical situation as critical or deteriorating, only 5% call it stable. For Bosnian Serbs and Bosnian Croats the figure is 80% and 13% respectively.

99 HANDBOOK ON CSDP European Union/EUFOR Althea Union/EUFOR European EUFOR provides mine risk education for vulnerable and at-risk groups such as farmers, forestry companies, hunting clubs and in particular children of all ages.

• 65% of Bosniaks but only 35% of Bosnian ARMS CONTROL Serbs consider EUFOR to be an important fac- tor of safety and stability in BiH. • EUFOR conducts verifications and inspections • Opinions about EUFOR and NATO: of Defence Industry Factories (DIF) in close coor- Around 85% of Bosniaks have a (very) posi- dination with the Ministry of Foreign Trade and tive or neutral opinion of both EUFOR and Economic Relations (MoFTER) and the Ministry NATO, while only 5% have a very negative of Security (MoS) for Situational Awareness (SA) opinion of these organisations. Among Bos- and monitors imports and exports of Ordnance, nian Serbs, however, 24% have a very negative Munitions and Military Equipment (OME). opinion of EUFOR while 38% have a nega- • EUFOR trains, mentors and monitors AFBiH tive opinion of NATO. personnel by organising ammunition delabo- • Membership of EU and NATO: ration courses and thus providing know-how 81% of BiH citizens still support EU mem- on the demilitarisation of surplus ammunition. bership and 68% are in favour of NATO EUFOR fully supports the Bosnia and Herze- membership. Bosnian Serb support for EU govina (BiH) Mine Action (MA) authorities membership is still 66%, but that support has in the aim of making them more effective and significantly weakened since 2008. Only 34% efficient. EUFOR also supports the European of Bosnian Serbs currently support BiH mem- Union (EU) on technical issues concerning bership of NATO, while 53% strongly oppose the new demining projects in BiH. These pro- it. jects are aimed at reducing risk and supporting • Within a year, the number of citizens who mine victims, and the EU will invest significant think that a military presence will be needed funds in them from the Instrument for Pre-Ac- for another 3-5 years or even 5-10 years has cession Assistance 2013 (IPA 2013 Funds) for increased by 15 percentage points. demining activities.

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WEAPONS AND AMMUNITION

Visual Inspection and Inventory of Ammuni- tion: EUFOR conducts verifications and inspec- tions of Defense Industry Factories (DIF) in close coordination with the Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Relations (MoFTER) and the Ministry of Security (MoS) for Situational Aware- ness (SA) and monitors imports and exports of Ordnance, Munitions and Military Equipment (OME). Disposal of unsafe and surplus ammuni- tion is conducted by AFBiH, and by local, regional and international companies with operations, flight safety and communications the support of the International Community. security. Biggest financial donors: European Union and Furthermore, in 2016 the AFBiH were able Sterling Company, which has been tasked by the to declare 11 units at operational readiness, 8 of US State Department. Funding ensured until end which completed NATO Evaluation Level 1 in of 2018. May. For 2017, AFBiH, supported by EUFOR will be preparing these units for their NATO Evaluation Level 2. MINE ACTION

EUFOR fully supports the Demining Battal- ion of the Armed Forces of BiH by monitoring, advising and assisting their humanitarian dem- ining operations in the aim of increasing their operational and logistical effectiveness. EUFOR continues to provide Mine Risk Edu- cation (MRE) for vulnerable and at-risk groups such as farmers, forestry companies, hunting clubs and in particular children of all ages, in order to raise awareness and promote safe behav- iour. In 2016, EUFOR provided MRE training to 20611 BiH residents.

CAPACITY-BUILDING AND TRAINING

Along with military skills and leadership train- ing, EUFOR has enabled a significant range of capability-enhancing training events including dismantling and delaboration of surplus and out- dated ammunition, deployability and mobility, disaster relief operations, road construction, flight Althea Union/EUFOR European

101

European Union/EUFOR Althea HANDBOOK ON CSDP European Union/EUFOR Althea Union/EUFOR European EUFOR fully supports the Demining Battalion of the Armed Forces of BiH.

EUFOR LOT HOUSES FOR GREATER SITUATIONAL AWARENESS

EUFOR has 17 Liaison and Observation role of EUFOR as the legal successor to SFOR Team (LOT) houses in Bosnia and Herzego- remain relevant. Bosnia and Herzegovina has vina which act as the ’eyes and ears‘ of EUFOR. made significant steps towards European Union They are in touch with local authorities and the accession, but there are still a number of areas population as well as other agencies in BIH, in where improvements are expected. These relate order to gain awareness of the needs and con- primarily to the rule of law and to the ability cerns of the people. of the law enforcement agencies to cooperate The teams provide information to the effectively. Additionally there is the urgent need EUFOR Headquarters in Sarajevo through the to eradicate the terrible threat of landmines and LOT Coordination Center (LCC). other explosive remnants of war that still pollute the countryside. The Armed Forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina are developing well and mak- CONCLUSION ing progress toward achieving standards that would make them a welcome contributor to It is now over 20 years since the conflict multinational peace support operations around in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia forced the world. EUFOR’s role is to support this effort the United Nations to intercede and oversee and provide the International Community with the newly-formed State of Bosnia and Her- a robust and reliable force that is able to act if zegovina. Nonetheless the General Frame- necessary to enforce GFAP by maintaining a safe work Agreement for Peace (GFAP) and the and secure environment.

102 EVOLVING SECURITY 4 CHALLENGES

103 HANDBOOK ON CSDP

4.1. MIGRATION AND CSDP by Jochen Rehrl European Union/EUNAVFOR MED Union/EUNAVFOR European CSDP is already being used and has proved to be a useful tool in assisting the EU and its Member States in the management of migration flows.

In his speech on the ‘State of Union 2016’,1 few years we have seen a massive influx of migrants, the President of the European Commission, Jean- asylum seekers and refugees, and realised that no Claude Juncker, said that we should start our single country can face this challenge alone. reflection with a sense of realism and with great Migration is not necessarily the biggest challenge honesty. in Europe and for Europe, but the migration chal- ‘First of all, we should admit that we have many lenge is very present in our daily discussions, in the unresolved problems in Europe. There can be no mass media and on the streets. Hence the public doubt about this. … put it on the agenda of our politicians, who – since Secondly, we should be aware that the world is then – having been seeking common solutions. watching us. … Migration is not a seasonal phenomenon; the Thirdly, we should recognise that we cannot solve pressure will likely stay. Our systems were not all our problems with one more speech. Or with one built with this scenario in mind. Therefore we are more summit’.2 seeing overstretches of capacity, loss of trust and This is also a good starting point for the topic credibility in our democratic governments and as of migration, which highlights the inextricable link a result the rise of populist political parties taking between internal and external security. In the past advantage of this situation. Moreover, the soli-

1 Jean-Claude Juncker: The State of the Union 2016. Towards a better Europe – A Europe that protects, empowers and defends. Publications Office of the European Union, 2016. 2 Jean-Claude Juncker, p. 7.

104 4 EVOLVING SECURITY CHALLENGES

180 000 162 000 Asylum applications 144 000 126 000 108 000 90 000 72 000 54 000 36 000 18 000 0 14% Share of repeated applications 7% 0% 10% Share of claimed UAMs 5% 0% Jul Jul Jul Jan Jan Jan Jan Jun Jun Jun Oct Oct Oct Feb Apr Feb Apr Feb Apr Sep Sep Sep Dec Dec Dec Aug Aug Aug Nov Nov Nov Mar Mar Mar May May May

2014 2015 2016 2017 Copyright: EASO, latest asylum trends, January EASO, latest 2017 Copyright:

European Union/EUNAVFOR MED Union/EUNAVFOR European Migration is not a seasonal phenomenon; the pressure will likely stay. The total number of refugees and asylum seekers dropped by only 70 000 from 2015 to 2016

darity between EU Member States, which is elo- HOW CAN WE MANAGE MIGRATION? quently laid down in Article 23 and Article 3(5)4 of the Treaty on European Union, seems to have Migration is an issue combining humanitar- been weakened. This results in a decrease in cohe- ian aspects, employment, social welfare, security sion inside the Union. and many other areas. The main responsibility Our answers to the migration challenge must for managing it lies with the EU Member States. be comprehensive, credible and strategic. We The European Commission and its agencies are should not forget our values or our interests. How performing well, but much more has to be done. the Union will tackle the migration crisis will be And the EU has not stood idle in the face of the stress test for the structures in Brussels and the this crisis. Making use of all the policy tools at capitals. its disposal, a number of important actions have

3 Article 2 TEU: ‘The Union is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities. These values are common to the Member States in a society in which pluralism, non-discrimination, tolerance, justice, solidarity and equality between women and men prevail.’ 4 Article 3(5) TEU: ‘In its relations with the wider world, the Union shall uphold and promote its values and interests and contribute to the protection of its citizens. It shall contribute to peace, security, the sustainable development of the Earth, solidarity and mutual respect among peoples, free and fair trade, eradication of poverty and the protection of human rights, in particular the rights of the child, as well as to the strict observance and the development of international law, including respect for the principles of the United Nations Charter.’

105 HANDBOOK ON CSDP European Union/EUNAVFOR MED Union/EUNAVFOR European In a number of theatres the EU has already deployed CSDP missions and operations with the objective of complementing other EU efforts to address irregular migration.

been launched for a coordinated and coherent Common Security and Defence Policy European response. A new approach to better (CSDP), a Member State tool to manage exter- manage migration through the establishment of nal crises, is most probably not the main instru- partnership frameworks was set out at the Euro- ment to tackle this complex issue. But it should pean Council on 28-29 June 2016, fully embed- remain part of the comprehensive crisis man- ding the issue of migration in the EU’s overall agement toolbox, and we should examine how foreign policy. CSDP instruments could complement current The European Global Strategy, which was wel- activities. In a number of theatres the EU has comed at the same Council meeting, states very already deployed CSDP missions and oper- clearly, that ‘Together with countries of origin and ations with the objective of complementing transit, we will develop common and tailor-made other EU efforts to address irregular migration, approaches to migration featuring development, dip- in particular in the Central Mediterranean and lomacy, mobility, legal migration, border manage- the Sahel. ment, readmission and return. We will work with At the same time we should also be aware that our international partners to ensure shared global CSDP is meant to be deployed outside EU terri- responsibilities and solidarity’.5 tory;6 hence assistance and support to other EU

5 European External Action Service: Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe. A Global Strategy for the Euro- pean Union’s Foreign and Security Policy. June 2016. p. 28. https://eeas.europa.eu/top_stories/pdf/eugs_review_web.pdf 6 Article 42(1) TEU: ‘The common security and defence policy shall be an integral part of the common foreign and security policy. It shall provide the Union with an operational capacity drawing on civilian and military assets. The Union may use them on missions outside the Union for peace-keeping, conflict prevention and strengthening international security in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter. The performance of these tasks shall be undertaken using capabilities provided by the Member States.’

106 4 EVOLVING SECURITY CHALLENGES European Union/EUBAM Libya Union/EUBAM European In many CSDP missions and operations, the migration challenge is implicitly or explicitly mentioned in the mandates.

Member States via CSDP is not currently possible are not duplicated or hindered in their valua- in our legal framework. ble work. Securing the external borders of EU and its For example, since 6 October 2016 the Euro- Member States is one key policy area of the pean Border and Coast Guard has provided a Commission under which numerous initiatives missing link in strengthening Europe’s external have been launched. The European Agenda on borders, so that people can continue to live and Migration,7 the European Border and Coast move freely within the European Union – helping Guard Regulation,8 Smart Borders and EURO- to meet Europe’s commitment to get back to the SUR are amongst the significant measures taken normal functioning of the and the to reinforce the management of European bor- lifting of temporary internal border controls. ders. Nevertheless, some of the existing instruments And when we come to the point where we and structures are currently being reinforced are willing to deploy a CSDP mission and/ (e.g. the European Border and Coast Guard) and or operation, we should pay attention to the in the short- to mid-term, shortfalls could be existing structures, instruments and mecha- identified. CSDP tools could be used to fill these nisms outside the CSDP scope, ensuring they gaps and thereby support the civilian entities.

7 A European Agenda on Migration. Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions. Brussels, 13 May 2015. COM(2015) 240 final. http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/european-agenda-migration/background-informati- on/docs/communication_on_the_european_agenda_on_migration_en.pdf 8 A European Border and Coast Guard and effective management of Europe’s external borders. Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council. Strasbourg, 15 December 2015. COM(2015) 673 final. http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52015DC0673

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The Common European Asylum System (CEAS)

Asylum is granted to people who are fleeing persecution or serious harm in their own country and therefore in need of international protection. Asylum is a fundamental right and granting it is an international obligation, stemming from the 1951 Geneva Convention on the protection of refugees. Those who seek, or have been granted, protection do not have the right to choose in which Member State they want to settle. To this end, the Common European Asylum System (CEAS) provides common minimum standards for the treatment of all asylum seekers and applications. The CEAS consists of a legal framework covering all aspects of the asylum process and a support agency - the European Asylum Support Office (EASO). However, in practice, the current system is still characterised by differing treatment of asylum seekers and varying recognition rates amongst EU MemberSource: States. , This divergence December 2016 is what encourages secondary movements and is partly due to the fact that the current rules grant Member States a lot of discretion in how they apply the commonMigration EU rules. is not necessarily the biggest challenge in Europe and for Europe, but the migration challenge The large-scale, uncontrolled arrival of migrants and asylum seekers since early 2015 has put a strain on many Member States’ asylum systems and on the CEAS asis avery whole. present The EU now in needsour dailyto put indiscussions, place the tools to in better the managemass migrationmedia andflows onin the the medium streets. and long term. The overall objective is to move from a system which, by design or poor implementation, encourages uncontrolled or irregular migratory flows to one which provides orderly and safe pathways to the EU for third country nationals. The European Commission has presented proposals in May and July 2016 to establish a sustainable system for the future, based on common rules, a fairer sharing of responsibility, and safe legal channels for those who need protection to get it in the EU.

THE COMMON EUROPEAN ASYLUM SYSTEM (CEAS) Asylum is granted to people fleeing persecution or serious harm

The applicant is fingerprinted. The information goes to the An application Eurodac database (Eurodac Regulation). This data is used to for asylum help identify the country responsible for the asylum application is made. (Dublin Regulation). The database is managed by eu-LISA (European Agency for the Operational Management of large- scale IT Systems in the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice)

EASO is an EU agency Asylum applicants benefit from EURODAC assisting EU States in common minimum material fulfilling their European and reception conditions, such as international obligations in housing and food. (Reception the field of asylum. Conditions Directive) The asylum applicant is interviewed to determine whether he/she may Refugee or subsidiary protection qualify for refugee status status is granted. This gives or subsidiary protection the person certain rights, like a (Qualification Directive and residence permit, access to the Asylum Procedures Directive). labour market and healthcare (Qualification Directive). Asylum is not granted to the applicant at first instance, but this refusal may be appealed in court.

Confirmation of the If the negative decision negative decision by the is overturned on appeal, court. The applicant may the applicant can be be returned to the country granted asylum of origin or transit.

Migration and Home Affairs European Commission/Migration and Home Affairs European

108 4 EVOLVING SECURITY CHALLENGES

Source: Eurobarometer, December 2016 Migration was only a minor issue until 2013.

CSDP HAS PROVED TO BE USEFUL other specialised EU agencies to enhance border protection and maritime security with the objec- CSDP is already being used and has proved tive of fighting cross-border crime and disrupt- to be a useful tool in assisting the EU and its ing smuggling networks and thus saving more Member States in the management of migration lives. flows. Needless to say, it is only one of the tools at Possible areas of enhanced CSDP support as the EU’s disposal to address the migration chal- described above could be: lenge. In many CSDP missions and operations, • border surveillance and prevention of uncon- migration is implicitly or explicitly mentioned trolled border crossings, in particular for land in the mandates. Tasks include supporting host and sea borders; countries by providing training and advice for • processing of irregular migrants, in particular military and security forces, building institutions by providing training and technical assistance for the sustainable rule of law, and thus build- as well as capacity building for the so-called ing local capacity with the main objective of cre- ‘hotspots’; ating the conditions for economic growth and • law enforcement activities against smugglers’ prosperity. EUFOR ALTHEA, EUCAP SAHEL networks by strengthening intelligence sharing; NIGER, EUNAVFOR MED SOPHIA, EUTM • security sector reform in countries either of MALI and many more could be listed as exam- origin or transit. ples. A certain amount of time is needed between a Nevertheless, as CSDP mainly focuses on the fully-fledged CSDP mission or operation being security aspects of the EU’s support to our part- launched and starting to fully deliver its support. ner countries in managing migratory flows at This could be an issue in a rapidly changing situ- their borders, there are several key areas in which ation where smugglers are fast to respond and ad- CSDP support could have an added value. CSDP apt to any law enforcement action. It could there- missions and operations could work alongside fore be worth considering whether existing crisis the European Border and Coast Guard as well as management procedures and mechanisms could

109 HANDBOOK ON CSDP

be used more rapidly and flexibly. Alternatively, prevention and consequence management). The should the members states decide that CSDP procedure and structures for its implementation should play a more active role in providing sup- are in place and could be used immediately. The port to our partners, an entirely new mechanism Union must mobilise all the instruments at its dis- for more rapid CSDP deployment could be desig- posal, including the military resources made avail- ned for cases where urgent assistance or flexibility able by the member states. would be needed – as some member states have al- ready called for in the course of the current crisis. CONCLUSION

HOW CAN WE HELP EU MEMBER The abovementioned proposals were developed STATES IN NEED? by experts from EU member states and the EU institutions in the margins of the panel discus- One way could be to establish a clearing-house sion on migration, held at the Egmont Palace. function at EU level in order to have a clear pic- The driving factor for implementing one proposal ture of the national, bilateral, multilateral and or another is political will. Legal obligations are regional initiatives. Additionally, the clearing man-made and can be changed in the same way house could gather requests from member states as they were created. Solutions must bear in mind and forward them to entities which could offer the humanitarian dimension of the migration cri- support. The question remains open as to where sis, European values and the European population this clearing-house function should be located; at eager to see results. the European Commission (e.g. DG HOME), the The root causes of the migration challenge External Action Service (e.g. CMPD or EUMS) must also be addressed, and better today than or one of the relevant agencies. tomorrow. In general, the security situations in Another possible solution could be to refer to the countries of origin are not at the top of the Article 222 of the Treaty on the Functioning list. There we find economic and personal reasons of the European Union. The so-called ‘solidarity for migration. clause’ has a solid legal basis and covers natural And one core element in addressing the root and man-made disasters as well as terrorism (both causes has to be education. Without giving young

MIGRANT REFUGEE

The term ‘migrant’ is understood as Article 1(A)(2) of the 1951 Convention covering all cases where the decision to defines a refugee as an individual who is migrate is taken freely by the individual outside his or her country of nationality concerned, for reasons of ‘personal con- or habitual residence who is unable or venience’ and without intervention of an unwilling to return due to a well-founded external compelling factor. This definition fear of persecution based on his or her indicates that the term ‘migrant’ does race, religion, nationality, political opin- not refer to refugees, displaced or others ion, or membership in a particular social forced or compelled to leave their homes. group. Source: http://www.unesco.org/new/ en/social-and-human-sciences/themes/ BUT: Individuals who have received pro- international-migration/glossary/ tection in a third country are not consid- migrant/ ered refugees. (Article 1(C)).

110 4 EVOLVING SECURITY CHALLENGES Austrian Armed Forces/Wolfgang Riedlsperger Armed Forces/Wolfgang Austrian The main responsibility for tackling the migration challenge lies with the EU Member States.

people in the countries of origin or transit a cred- Jean-Claude Juncker said in his speech that the ible vision for their future, the migration flow will next twelve months are the crucial time in which to never end. deliver a better Europe: ‘Therefore we are in need of We have to act now and we have to be innova- • a Europe that protects; tive in our thinking. The former Secretary General • a Europe that preserves the European way of life; of the European External Action Service, Pierre • a Europe that empowers our citizens; Viemont, advocates the same, saying it is ‘time to • a Europe that defends at home and abroad; and be ambitious’.9 • a Europe that takes responsibility.’ 10

9 Pierre Viemont: Migration in Europe. Bridging the Solidarity Gap. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Washington/Brussels, September 2016. p. 23. http://carnegieendowment.org/files/Vimont_Migration_fulltext.pdf 10 Jean-Claude Juncker, p. 9.

MIGRATION ASYLUM SEEKER

Migration is the crossing of the boundary Asylum seekers are people who move of a political or administrative unit for a across borders in search of protection, certain minimum period of time. but who may not fulfil the strict criteria It includes the movement of refugees, laid down by the 1951 Convention. displaced persons, uprooted people as The terms ‘asylum seeker’/‘asylee’ and well as economic migrants. ‘refugee’ differ only in regard to the place where an individual asks for protection. Source: http://www.unesco.org/new/ Source: http://www.unesco.org/new/ en/social-and-human-sciences/themes/ en/social-and-human-sciences/themes/ international-migration/glossary/ international-migration/glossary/asylum- migrant/ seeker/

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SECURING EUROPE’S EXTERNAL BORDERS A EUROPEAN BORDER AND COAST GUARD

«A united refugee and asylum policy requires stronger joint efforts to secure our external borders. Fortunately, we have given up border controls between the Member States of the Schengen area, to guarantee free movement of people, a unique symbol of European integration. But the other side of the coin to free movement is that we must work together more closely to manage our external borders. This is what our citizens expect. The Commission said it back in May, and I said it during my election campaign: We need to strengthen Frontex significantly and develop it into a fully operational European border and coast guard system.»

European Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker, State of the Union Address, 9 September 2015

The Schengen area without internal borders is only sustainable if the external borders are effectively secured and pro- tected. The European Commission is proposing to establish a European Border and Coast Guard – designed to meet the new challenges and political realities faced by the EU, both as regards migration and internal security. The European Border and Coast Guard will be composed of the European Border and Coast Guard Agency and the national authorities and coastguards responsible for border management.

Between January and November 2015 an esti- From July to September 2015, 413 800 persons 2015 2015 JANUARY mated 1.5 million persons have crossed the EU JULY applied for international protection in the Member NOVEMBER external borders illegally – an all-time peak. SEPTEMBER States, twice as many as in the second quarter of 2015.

1.5 million

413 800

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A NEW MANDATE THE RIGHT TO INTERVENE

The limitations of the current EU border agency, Frontex, When deficiencies are identified, the have hindered its ability to effectively address and remedy Agency will be empowered to require the situation created by the refugee crisis: it is not able to Member States take timely corrective purchase its own resources, it does not have its own opera- action. In urgent situations that put the tional staff and relies on Member State contributions, it is functioning of the Schengen area at risk unable to carry out its own return or border management and when deficiencies have not been rem- operations without the prior request of a Member State edied, the Agency will be able to step in to ensure that and it does not have an explicit mandate to conduct search action is taken on the ground even where there is and rescue operations. The new Agency will be strength- no request for assistance from the Member State con- ened and reinforced to address all these issues. cerned or where that Member State considers that there is no need for additional intervention.

WORKING WITH AND IN THIRD COUNTRIES € € The Agency will have a new mandate to send liaison UNION STANDARDS FOR BORDER MANAGEMENT officers and launch joint operations with neighbour- The new Agency will ensure Union standards for bor- ing third countries, including der management are implemented at all external bor- operating on their territory. ders. The external borders will be constantly monitored with periodic risk analyses and mandatory vulnerabil- ity assessments to identify and address weak spots. Liaison officers will be seconded to Member States where the borders are at risk. They will be fully inte- grated into the national information systems and able to relay the information back to the Agency. A STRONGER ROLE IN RETURNS

A European Return Office within the Agency will allow the deployment of European Return Intervention Teams composed of escorts, monitors and return specialists who will work to A RESERVE OF EUROPEAN BORDER GUARDS AND effectively return illegally staying third TECHNICAL EQUIPMENT country nationals. A uniform European travel docu- ment for return will ensure a wider acceptance by The Agency’s permanent staff will be more than dou- third countries. bled and for the first time, the Agency will be able to purchase its own equipment and deploy them in border operations at a moment’s notice. A rapid reserve pool GUARANTEEING INTERNAL SECURITY and a of border guards technical equipment pool The Agency will include cross-border crime will be put at the disposal of the Agency – meaning and terrorism in its risk analysis, process there will no longer be shortages of staff of equipment personal data of persons suspected to be for Agency operations. involved in acts of terrorism and cooper- ate with other Union agencies and interna- tional organisations on the prevention of terrorism.

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4.2. COUNTER-TERRORISM AND THE CSDP

by Birgit Löser European Union/EUCAP SAHEL Niger Union/EUCAP European CSDP is perfectly suited to helping countries' authorities cope with growing threats that are ultimately linked to our own EU internal security, including migration issues (same root causes).

Since 2001 civilian CSDP missions have the case for more interaction and coordination been developing as important tools of EU com- between the two EU external policy instruments, mon foreign and security policy, operating with which would enhance the much sought-after post-conflict and conflict-prevention mandates in ‘comprehensive’, or ‘integrated’, approach that a variety of countries and regions abroad. Whilst the newly adopted EU Global Strategy advocates. these missions are generally well documented and The article also argues in favour of much stronger analysed, there is one angle few have considered to investment in CSDP, specifically with a view to date, which is the link with the EU’s counter-ter- addressing more systematically the CT require- rorism (CT) efforts that have also been an impor- ments in third countries when there is a link to tant part of the EU’s external and security policy Europe’s security. dimension. It appears that, even within the EU institutions, there has been little if any interac- tion between the relevant bodies, which is striking SIMILARITIES given the similarities in aims, objectives, and geo- graphical priorities; nor has there been any coor- The first similarity is the shared objective of dination between respective approaches, despite enhancing the rule of law: civilian CSDP missions the huge potential for synergies. with a capacity-building mandate usually focus The present article seeks to analyse these sim- on mentoring, monitoring, advising and train- ilarities in greater detail, with a view to making ing for the host country’s police and judiciary.

114 4 EVOLVING SECURITY CHALLENGES European Union/EUCAP SAHEL Niger Union/EUCAP European EUCAP Sahel Niger is so far the only mission that explicitly refers to counter-terrorism as part of its mandate.

They help countries with weak law-enforcement has continuously advocated this civilian approach. institutions to adapt their national legislation, The EU has been an active contributor to various they assist them with security sector reform, and landmark resolutions of the United Nations Secu- they contribute to improving related inter-agency rity Council (UNSC) on counter-terrorism and cooperation and coordination, and enhancing the countering violent extremism (CVE) that seek performance of the state apparatus and relevant to criminalise terrorist acts and to strengthen the personnel. Typical of this is the civilian nature of police and judiciary systems dealing with terror. the efforts: civilian CSDP uses civilian expertise The EU was a founding member of the Global from Member States’ active police and judiciary Counter terrorism Forum (GCTF), which is a personnel to carry out tasks relating to enhancing civilian platform for politicians and practitioners the rule of law in third countries. involved in CT. The EU continues to proactively The EU approach to CT is based on the rule of shape its numerous policy initiatives, best prac- law, in so far as terrorist acts are criminalised and tice documents, advocacy and coordination of thus investigated, prosecuted and the perpetra- capacity-building in countries in need. In 2016 tors sentenced in accordance with the rule of law the EU contributed around EUR 224 million to and international standards. Ever since the first CT/P-CVE (Preventing and Countering Violent EU Framework Decision on combating terrorism Extremism) assistance programmes in partner in 2001, and following the adoption of the EU countries and EUR 175 million to CT/P-CVE- CT strategy in 2005, the EU’s external CT action related assistance programmes, making a total of

115 HANDBOOK ON CSDP European Union/EUCAP Nestor Union/EUCAP European The fact that civilian CSDP missions use active service personnel means that they can draw on state-of-the-art best practice and policy.

around EUR 400 million of capacity-building in EU delegations since 2015 also contributes to relation to the rule of law abroad. the mainstreaming and promotion of globally Another similarity is the proactive bringing agreed standards and policies. of international standards and best practice to Looking at the geographical focus of civilian partner countries: use of international standards CSDP and EU external CT efforts, there seems is a recurrent feature in the planning documents to be far less overlap than might be expected con- for civilian CSDP missions. The fact that civil- sidering that in many regions terrorism is the root ian CSDP missions use active service personnel cause of instability or, conversely, it is likely to means that they can draw on the state-of-the-art arise where the state apparatus is weak and con- best practice and policy of their sending countries flict endemic. Some more detailed examples are: when helping to reform local services and local • Western Balkans: EULEX Kosovo, which is legislation. focusing on police reform and capacity-build- Another important dimension of the EU’s ing: CT expert deployed since the end of 2016 external CT action is advocacy and diplomacy, to cover the entire region and help coordinate for example through the numerous CT political a major initiative in the Western Balkans to ad- dialogues held with a variety of countries and dress CT and radicalisation; regional organisations such as the Arab League, • Pakistan: no CSDP mission but considerable the Gulf Cooperation Council, the Organisation CT engagement, including deployment of a of Islamic Cooperation and the African Union CT expert and a major programme currently (AU). The EU also takes and active part in the in the pipeline (CT STRIVE); GCTF (which includes co-chairing one of its • Afghanistan: significant CSDP effort (EUP- working groups) as well as sponsoring numerous OL Afghanistan, soon closing), but currently workshops and seminars on CT- and CVE-re- no CT expert; lated topics in priority countries and regions. • Middle East: Iraq CSDP mission now closed, The network of CT experts deployed in various but CT expert deployed since 2015 helping to

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coordinate a number of key assistance projects EUCAP Nestor, which was planned and set including intelligence services capacity-build- up in parallel (in 2012), was to help counter the ing; increasing threat posed by Al-Shabaab and its links • Palestine: a CSDP mission focusing on police to piracy groups operating in the Indian Ocean. reform and capacity-building, but no CT ex- Whilst this was clearly the context, the mandate pert deployed; of the mission ultimately focused on helping build • Lebanon and Jordan: no CSDP mission, but effective coast guards for the countries in the region, considerable CT assistance efforts and CT ex- without a specific reference to terrorism. perts deployed since 2015; EUCAP Niger, planned and set up later in • Algeria, Tunisia and Morocco: no CSDP mis- 2012, is so far the only mission that explicitly sion, but considerable CT assistance for Tunisia refers to counter-terrorism as part of its mandate, (Algeria and Morocco still pending), and CT which includes mentoring, advice and training experts deployed since 2015; for local security services in legislative and other • Sahel: two civilian CSDP missions ongoing, matters. all in the field of Security Sector Reform; two EUBAM Libya, planned in 2013, fell short of CT experts deployed (Chad and Nigeria) with explicitly referring to terrorism, albeit terrorism a number of CT-related assistance programmes was again part of the context at the time. ongoing. The overview shows that there is currently almost no coordination between the two instruments. To CHALLENGES, AND OPPORTUNITIES put this in more positive terms, the instruments FOR FURTHER INTERACTION AND avoid duplication and thus complement each COORDINATION other. However, this is to assume that the decision is deliberate. The reality is that there is no coor- The above explanations of linkages (or non-link- dination when an instrument is decided on, or at ages) between CSDP and CT so far clearly show least that this has not been happening enough. two things. On the one hand, the link does not Nevertheless, there are examples in the past have to be explicit: aims and objectives where where counter-terrorism considerations have the emphasis is on (re-establishing) the rule of played a role in the design and inception of a civil- law serve the same purpose, be this through civil- ian CSDP mission: ian CSDP or through the EU’s classical external The first was the AMIS Support Mission CT efforts such as dialogues or European Com- (2005-2006), which supported the command and mission-financed assistance programmes. On control operations of the first ever AU-led peace- the other hand, there is clearly scope for civilian keeping mission to counter the effects of the mil- CSDP missions to be used more specifically to itant groups laying waste to Darfur, which at the achieve external CT objectives. time were not categorised as ‘terrorists’. The changing global environment in fact points Some years later (in 2012), the EUAVSEC to a need to redouble the EU’s efforts in this area, mission in South Sudan was clearly conceived given the following main factors. in the context of the perceived threats posed by First, territorial gains in Iraq and Syria will weak security at Juba airport , where the main risk sooner or later lead to a situation where remaining was its potential use by terrorists to hijack planes. Da’esh fighters will move to ‘safe havens’, includ- The newly established landlocked state of South ing in Yemen or Somalia, but also in Sudan, Libya Sudan was then heavily reliant on massive air and the wider Sahel. transport to support state-building, and its only CSDP is well established in the Sahel, mainly international airport was a lifeline. through the two EUCAP Sahel missions (Mali

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and Niger), and possibly soon a new mission in in this article, and that concerns the issue of Libya that is currently being planned. All three resources: civilian CSDP relies on the secondment missions could easily see their mandates adapted of active service personnel from EU Member to more explicitly help the respective host coun- States. Security and judiciary services are already tries cope with the growing threat posed by terror- under severe strain given the heightened threat to ism. The same applies to EUCAP Nestor on the the European mainland. eastern coast of Africa. Tasks would for instance Making additional resources available for include adapting national legislation to interna- enhanced civilian CSDP missions would be very tional standards (e.g. UNSC resolutions and con- difficult, if impossible, without a major policy ventions), mentoring and training in relation to shift making the links between internal and exter- CT cases in the courts, enhancement of CT threat nal security more explicit. assessments, information exchange and evidence collection, etc. Ongoing discussions about ‘regionalisation’ of CONCLUSIONS the civilian CSDP missions in the Sahel through the deployment of CSDP experts in all Sahel There can be no doubt that there is in principle EU delegations also create an ideal opportunity scope for civilian CSDP to consider aspects of ter- for synergies between CT experts already in the rorism more specifically in the definition of man- field and Commission-funded projects that either dates, since civilian CSDP is perfectly suited to directly or indirectly pursue the same objectives helping countries’ authorities cope with growing as CSDP. threats that are ultimately linked to our own EU Current planning of a possible new civilian internal security, including migration issues (same CSDP mission for Libya likewise provides an root causes). ideal opportunity to combine efforts, as the aim But it is not enough to ensure good policing of this new mission would be not just to help law or the rule of law. It is necessary to address more enforcement agencies address terrorism and radi- specific aspects of counter-terrorism in order calisation, but also to tackle the links to migration to deal effectively with the phenomenon: this – in full recognition of the fact that terror and means CT-related information exchange, adapt- migration have the same root causes and require ing national legislation to international stand- similar measures by state authorities. ards, developing CT-specific best practices for law This is achievable and warranted, perhaps even enforcement and the judiciary (see GCTF work), more so now in view of the possible diminution etc. of US engagement in these regions, which is the These are less familiar areas for current EU second main factor to consider in this context. CSDP structures, but this can easily be addressed In summary, it seems that some opportunities so as to ensure that future CSDP mandates could certainly arise to establish more systematic include, subject to available resources, targeted links between CSDP and CT, with more targeted objectives and tasks relevant to CT. and specifically CT-related mandates for civil- Clearly this would be in the interest of the EU ian CSDP missions. This would meld the work and in line with the prerogatives of the recently already done by other EU services on external CT adopted global security strategy for the European measures/capacity-building with the CSDP-spe- Union, which calls for a more integrated approach cific methodology of ‘hands-on’ mentoring and using EU external instruments to address both advice/training. internal and external security needs. Despite these positive considerations, there is still one major challenge to the ideas outlined

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4.3. CYBER SECURITY/DEFENCE AND CSDP

by Jan Peter Giesecke

Our modern information society is deeply dependent on the availability of free and secure access to cyberspace and to the internet. This is true in nearly all areas of our lives, including, of course, in foreign and defence policy. The EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) activities, including civilian and military missions and operations, are no exception. They benefit from the digital world and their success is directly linked to the availability of assured information and functioning communication and information systems.

THE NEW THREAT LANDSCAPE

Cyberspace and the internet are increasingly becoming a new battlefield. Cyber-attacks are part of daily business, and at the same time are becoming more sophisticated, ranging from mas- sive denial-of-service attacks to advanced and complex intrusions aimed at gathering, stealing, encrypting or manipulating and compromising information. Adversaries vary from ‘script kid- ENISA dies’ and hacktivists to criminals, terrorists and Cyberspace and the internet are increasingly nation-states – or are supported by them. They becoming a new battlefield. have identified our dependencies and target our vulnerabilities, using the cyber domain to gain an increasingly supported by disinformation cam- asymmetric advantage and accomplish economic, paigns based on social media, or by destabilisation political or military objectives anonymously and operations with cyber-attacks on enabling sectors. unattributed, while remaining below the thresh- Cyber activities must therefore be considered old of armed conflict. as part of all future scenarios, comprehensively The EU institutions’ networks too are con- examined, and integrated into the broader crisis stantly being probed and tested, and although response and taken into account when countering there is no evidence yet of their being targeted, hybrid threats. With this in mind, what can we do CSDP operations and missions are already facing and what has been done so far, in particular in the a growing cyber dimension. Today’s conflicts are area of CSDP?

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POLITICAL FRAMEWORKS CYBER SECURITY AND DEFENCE IN PRACTICE In 2013, recognising the need for increased cyber security and for an ‘open, safe and secure Cyber security and defence have been cyberspace’, the EU institutions developed the EU taken into consideration in CSDP operations Cyber Security Strategy. Based on this, the Euro- and missions for several years, but to varying pean External Action Service (EEAS), as the home degrees. Cyber capabilities primarily depend of CSDP, developed an EU Cyber Defence Pol- on what mission or operation commanders icy Framework (CDPF) in 2014. The aim of the request, mainly based on the situation, their policy framework was to improve cyber defence perception of the cyber threat and their deci- resilience and capabilities for the implementation sion on how much to ‘invest’ in various capa- of CSDP activities, by tracking, interconnecting bilities. Hence, cyber security and defence and coordinating all the work carried out by the measures in ongoing operations and missions various stakeholders at the EEAS and beyond. vary from rather basic security and informa- Recently, the Global Strategy for the European tion assurance measures to well-established, Union’s Foreign and Security Policy designated state-of-the-art protection and resilience to cyber security and defence as a priority, focusing defend command and control and communi- on both resilience and protection, and addressing cation and information systems. in particular the need to cooperate and to share In future, all CSDP missions and operations information among Member States (MS) and also will have to give appropriate consideration to with military and civilian partners. cyber security and defence. For the three most These strategic documents form a valuable recent of them (EUMAM RCA, EUNAV- foundation and framework for cyber security and FORMED SOPHIA, EUTM RCA) this has defence in CSDP. But what does this all mean in already been done. However, for the moment the a practical sense? topic has been introduced only on a best practice European Union/EU Military Union/EU European Staff Cyber defence organisation within the Common Security and Defence Policy.

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level. There are as yet no formal structures or pro- cedures for assured and effective consideration of cyber threats in planning which could form a basis for defining appropriate requirements for the cyber defence capabilities to be made available for missions and operations.

THE CYBER DEFENCE CONCEPT

European Commission In view of this, in 2016 the EUMS, as the EU’s In 2013, recognising the need for increased cybersecurity and the EEAS’s provider of military expertise, and for an open, ‘safe and secure cyberspace’, the EU institutions developed the EU Cybersecurity Strategy. developed a new version of the EU Concept for Cyber Defence for military operations and mis- sions, reflecting the specific organisational and procedural aspects of military planning and mili- in the overall threat evaluation for the planned tary force generation and addressing requirements operation or mission. Information in the form of for MS’ provision of cyber capabilities for CSDP a cyber threat landscape should be provided by activities. As civilian missions do not depend on the EU’s strategic intelligence structures, based MS’ capabilities, work has started on a comple- around EEAS INTCEN and the INTEL Directo- mentary concept for the implementation of cyber rate of EUMS, and should be supported by infor- security in purely civilian missions, addressing the mation sharing, for instance with the EU’s cyber specific aspects thereof and taking into account information hub (CERT‑EU), military partners the military concept. such as NATO, and of course MS’ cyber informa- At this point, we have to understand that the tion providers. EU and the EEAS use the term ‘cyber security’ Together with INTEL experts, the EUMS cyber mainly in the civilian context and link the term defence team will assess the information provided ‘cyber defence’ to military action, even though the and support the operation/mission planning two concepts are closely connected, covering the teams, inserting a cyber narrative into initial plan- same threats, relying on the same basic principles ning documents (notably the Crisis Management and using similar measures. While the statements Concept and the Initiating Military Directive) made in this article are, in principle, valid for the and thereby providing a sound basis for further broader term ‘cyber security and defence’, it will planning. On that basis, the designated operation focus on cyber defence and the principles and or mission commander and his or her staff – sup- guidance reflected in the Cyber Defence Concept. ported by further intelligence and a more in-depth analysis of threats and risks from cyberspace in the area of operations – is able to take a decision on Planning cyber defence the importance of cyber defence and to define, in the concept of operations and the operation The first principle for ensuring effective cyber or mission plan, how an effective defence against security and defence, similar to a lesson identified potential threats from cyberspace can be achieved, during recent planning activities, is to consider requesting the necessary capabilities to ensure the cyber aspects as early as possible in the EU’s cri- resilience and protection of the IT systems and sis management and planning processes. Cyber networks to be used for the mission or operation. aspects must therefore be considered and included Since EUMS does not provide or deploy any

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operational cyber capabilities, these must gener- tures. A cyber cell should advise decision-makers in ally be requested from the MS which are support- the HQ, providing agreed and appropriate actions ing the CSDP activity in question and are willing or reactions. Therefore, the cells work closely with to provide forces. Therefore, in general, MS are the security operation centres (SOCs), which are responsible for providing capabilities. They are responsible for running the risk management for given guidance and advice on this in the Cyber the mission’s networks, observing the networks Concept. But what is meant by this general term and identifying, prioritising and mitigating risks. ‘cyber capabilities’? Standardised operations procedures (SOPs) are needed to complement these organisational ele- ments, and will ensure that both the strategic and Implementing cyber defence the operational level of missions and operations act and react appropriately and without delay and The implementation of cyber security and allow for ‘defence in depth’. defence in CSDP involves far more than simply providing some protection mechanisms in the networks. The term ‘capabilities’ has therefore Mitigating the human risks been considered in the Cyber Defence Concept in a broader context, covering doctrinal, organ- The most important aspect of resilience is to isational, training/exercise, material, leadership, prepare the people involved. The most common personnel, facilities and interoperability aspects ‘cyber-vulnerability’ remains the human element. (using the DOTMLPF-I scheme). Besides ‘sim- Mitigating the human risks essentially requires a ple’ material protection it is mainly concerned change in culture and behaviour in handling and with the preparation of systems, structures, pro- working with ICT, to be achieved through constant cedures and, especially, the people involved, to education and training. This must be supplemented ensure their resilience against threats from cyber- with up-to-date knowledge and awareness of the space. This cyber resilience and the related capa- threat environment through regular cyber aware- bilities must in fact be established and put into ness training. In addition, between this basic edu- practice long before the planning processes start. cation for all ICT users and the training for deep Information and communication technology specialists (the ‘geeks’) at the other end, there are (ICT), which is the basis for the systems and various specific training requirements, for instance networks used in CSDP action, cannot be made for cyber advisers, for specialists in the definition cyber-resilient when being handed over to a com- of cyber capability requirements and in cyber intel- mander. ICT providers, whether they are MS, ligence, and in particular for decision-makers and EU institutions or contractors in general, have to their planners, including legal and political advis- develop their systems in compliance with stand- ers. They have to be able to understand detailed ardised basic design requirements and necessary cyber-related information and intelligence reports security and assurance rules (‘design-to-security’). and to know about the impact of cyber operations As during the planning phase, organisational when immediate decisions are required on how elements and procedures to ensure effective cyber to react in the event of an incident. It is therefore defence must also be put in place during the con- essential to provide them with training and exercises duct phase of operations and missions. Therefore, on these issues, so as to bridge the typical ‘mind structures known as ‘cyber cells’ should be estab- gap’ between the higher-level decision-makers and lished within every OHQ/FHQ, to provide a con- the real specialists, and to build up broader opera- tinuous assessment of the cyber threat information tional excellence for an effective posture against the received from the supporting intelligence struc- threats from cyberspace.

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http://www.norse-corp.com

CYBER SECURITY AND DEFENCE IN CSDP: THE WAY AHEAD

While the Cyber Defence Concept addresses Although the new Cyber Defence Concept the various aspects of an effective cyber defence already provides a basic understanding for appropri- capability at a fairly high level, this has to be trans- ate action and reaction, SOPs have to be developed lated into actionable work packages. as a next step in cooperation between the EUMS One major aspect of this is the development of and operational stakeholders from HQ level. more concrete requirements and specific cyber This also comprises the development of busi- capability packages which can be implemented ness continuity and recovery plans, to ensure by potential providers – mainly the MS, but also that operations can continue even in a degraded civilian contractors. and contested cyber environment. As a basis for building the new capability A third aspect is of course education, training requirement catalogue in the framework of the and exercises and the streamlining of the EU’s implementation of the Global Strategy, cyber cyber defence education and training landscape. aspects and a threat landscape have to be injected Supported by the EUMS and the MS, the cyber into the existing scenarios, considering cyber as an discipline within the EU Military Training Work- operational domain. ing Group, the European Security and Defence Subsequently, concrete and detailed cyber College (ESDC) and the EDA are working hand- capabilities have to be defined, supported and in-hand on new initiatives for the design, devel- flanked by the studies carried out by the European opment, conduct and evaluation of training activ- Defence Agency (EDA) and its cyber defence pro- ities and exercises, from awareness training up to ject team. courses for high-level decision-makers.

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COOPERATION WITH PARTNERS CONCLUSION

A key enabler for the implementation of these The success of cyber security and defence in aspects is the cooperation with civilian and mili- CSDP operations and missions remains depend- tary partners. While cyber expertise from industry ent on a well-balanced combination of state-of- and academia is linked into the processes mainly the-art technology, well-functioning structures by the EDA and the ESDC, the EUMS interacts and procedures, and of course educated, aware and closely with NATO on military aspects of cyber competent staff. But more than ever this has to be defence, although this remains rather informal as enabled by cooperation and information-sharing yet. The implementation plan of the EU-NATO agreements, both with external partners such as Joint Declaration, which was adopted by Council NATO and internally across MS and EU institu- conclusions in December 2016, gives huge impe- tions. Facing the upcoming structural changes and tus not only to the common use and development the integration of civil and military elements in of training and exercises by the two organisations, crisis management and response, there is a strong but also on exchanges and involvement in cyber need for an integrated approach to counter cyber policy work and cyber information sharing, to threats (including hybrid threats), and hence to increase synergies, avoid duplication and allow merge the somewhat divided cyber security and the organisations to understand each other’s cyber defence efforts and measures to allow for mechanisms. a stronger posture across all military and civilian Besides this, some first steps have also been CSDP activities. taken towards closer cooperation between cyber security and defence in CSDP and cyber secu- rity in civilian sectors (counter-terrorism and crime, energy and aviation) which are covered by the Commission and related agencies like the Network and Information Security Agency (ENISA) or the European Cyber Crime Centre in Europol (EC3), for instance in pooling and sharing training and mutual attendance of and support for exercises (such as ‘Multi Layer’ and ‘Cyber Europe’).

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4.4. HYBRID THREAT AND CSDP

by John Maas

Countering hybrid threats – a European Union response through Joint Communication

A year ago, the term ‘hybrid’ was just entering the European Union lexicon. Commentators, pol- iticians, planners all had a sense of what ‘hybrid’ might mean but not necessarily a full under- standing of the true nature of the threat. Indeed, in terms of reaction, one of the first steps was to internally digest the fact that hybrid threats really were a challenge to the European Union both at Union European the level of Member States and also here in the The hybridity in ‘hybrid threat’ refers to coordination by a Brussels’ institutions. state and/or non-state actor to achieve specific objectives while remaining hidden and below the threshold of formally Just to reinforce what is meant by the terms declared warfare. ‘hybrid’ and ‘hybrid threat’: the concept of hybrid threat relates to the deliberate use and blending of coercive and subversive activities both conven- A COMPREHENSIVE JOINT tionally and unconventionally across the diplo- FRAMEWORK matic, information, military, economic spectra – with the hybridity coming from the coordina- The consequent extensive joint work has tion by a state and/or non-state actor to achieve resulted in a comprehensive Joint Framework specific objectives, while remaining hidden, and that sets out 22 actionable proposals across the below the threshold of formally declared warfare. full spectrum of European Union competences to It is important to understand that there is usu- counter hybrid threats. These proposals focus on ally an emphasis on exploiting the vulnerabilities four main elements: improving awareness, build- of society and on generating ambiguity in order ing resilience, prevention, responding to a crisis. to hinder decision-making processes at a politi- As such, the European Union goal was to develop cal level – and thereby gain leverage. These often a significant response with a real priority given to the insidious attacks are frequently masked by mas- political level in responding to the dramatic change sive disinformation campaigns, using social media in the European Union’s security environment, to control the political narrative or to radicalise, particularly in the eastern and southern neighbour- recruit and direct proxy actors who can in turn be hood. Furthermore, given that key challenges to used as vehicles for delivering a hybrid strategy. peace and stability continue to underscore the need To respond to these challenges, the European for the Union to adapt and increase its capacities Union Member States, through the Foreign Affairs as a security provider, a strong focus is placed on Council and the European Council, have taken the close relationship between external and inter- action and mandated the High Representative in nal security, which requires close cooperation with close cooperation with Commission services and partners. Here, as NATO is also working to counter the European Defence Agency (EDA), to forge a hybrid threats, the Foreign Affairs Council proposed credible European response. to enhance current EU–NATO cooperation.

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IMPROVING AWARENESS

Turning to the key tenets of the framework: as Moreover, the Cell is in direct contact with the a direct result of the often very subtle and hard Council’s Integrated Political Crisis Response to detect methods of deploying a hybrid threat, (IPCR) mechanism which, through regular meet- improving awareness is essential in supporting the ings of Commission DGs, collects ‘signals’ of early identification of changes in the security envi- ongoing events from the different areas of exper- ronment related to hybrid activity enacted by either tise (energy, trade, competition, telecommunica- state or non-state actors. To support this goal, tion, etc.) and is thus able to detect changes. If, for action has been undertaken in three main areas: example, one country produces two or more sig- First, the creation of a European Union Hybrid nals, that will trigger the mechanism to a higher Fusion Cell, established within the European alert. Union’s Intelligence and Situation Centre (EU The second element concerns strategic com- INTCEN), offers a one-stop shop for informa- munication. It is absolutely critical that the tion collation to support the analysis of potential European Union has an ability to respond to hybrid threats. This Cell, once at full operating misinformation campaigns that are deliberately capacity, will be capable of analysing information targeted at both the European Union as an insti- specifically related to indicators and warnings tution and individual Member States. A sound concerning hybrid threats with the aim of then strategic communications strategy (which rapidly disseminating the products to inform the makes full use of social media tools, as well European Union’s strategic decision-makers. This as the traditional visual, audio and web-based work will also help bring an input to European media and is delivered by professional commu- Union Member States’ security risk assessments. nicators with the appropriate language and cul-

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tural awareness) is essential. In direct response, supply chains and society need to be analysed and two task forces - Stratcom East working in the vulnerabilities addressed. For success in this area Russian language and Task Force South running to be achieved, it is imperative that a comprehen- a counter Da’esh narrative – have been set up to sive approach is adopted to allow all European counter active disinformation campaigns. Their Union instruments and policies to be brought to products are disseminated through weekly pub- bear, and for Member States to be offered the best lications that factually put the record straight guidance on critical infrastructure design in order and are complemented by the use of modern to ensure an overall improvement in resilience media methods such as . across the Union and with partners. To offer a fla- EU Mythbusters (@EUvDisinfo) is one such vour of the scope of this work, actions have been outlet which has a growing number of follow- outlined to build resilience in areas such as cyber­ ers. security, critical infrastructure protection, finan- Thirdly, building on the experience of some cial systems safeguards against illicit exploitation, Member States and partner organisations, and in and the countering of violent extremism and rad- order to fill a gap at the strategic level, icalisation. In each of these areas, implementation has accepted the European Union challenge for a of agreed strategies by the European Union insti- Member State to establish a European Centre of tutions as well as by Member States themselves Excellence. This work should start in early 2017 fully applying existing legislation are key factors and the Centre’s tasks will be specifically focused for success. on research and training on how hybrid strategies The European Defence Agency has a para- have been applied and, thereafter, on encourag- mount role in driving forward another form of ing the development of new doctrinal concepts resilience – that of building defence capabilities. to help Member States and allies improve the Here it is absolutely essential to stay abreast of advice given to strategic decision makers. This technological innovation to ensure that the Euro- will likely lead to a real-time capacity for exer- pean Union’s capacity to act as a defence and secu- cising demanding scenarios designed to improve rity provider remains relevant in a dynamically decision-making in situations blurred by ambi- and rapidly changing world. Here the European guity. The research should also help contribute Union is seen as being able to play a key role in to aligning European Union and national poli- helping Member States develop those capacities cies, doctrines and concepts, and help to ensure that will be needed in the future to counter the that decision-makers can respond better when full spectrum of potential threats. The first step faced with complex challenges posed by hybrid on this path has been to identify the relevant key threats which by their nature are designed to cre- capability areas of surveillance and reconnaissance ate uncertainty. as catalyst areas for future military capability development. Technological advances can also be complemented by shortening capability develop- CAPACITY TO WITHSTAND STRESS ment cycles, focusing investment on technologi- AND RECOVER cal prototypes, and encourageing both innovation and innovative commercial technologies. When Turning to the longer-term action, the fourth it comes to building resilience to hybrid attacks, domain is that of building resilience. Resilience commercial operators have very often through in this context is the capacity to withstand stress years of experience developed best practices that and recover, ideally through actioning of lessons the European Union could exploit rather than identified. To effectively counter hybrid threats, seeking bespoke military solutions. Cyber security the potential vulnerabilities of key infrastructures, is one such area.

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CYBER SECURITY MUTUAL ASSISTANCE CLAUSE AND SOLIDARITY CLAUSE While the European Union greatly benefits from its interconnected and digitised society Let’s go back to the issues relating to prevent­ – considered as a real strength and economic ing, responding to and recovering from hybrid driver – there are serious considerations linked to threats. One of the actionable proposals is to over-reliance. As regards hybrid attacks, the very examine the feasibility of applying the Solidarity connectivity that drives European Union society is Clause in Article 222 TFEU (as specified in the by definition a centre of gravity and may appear a relevant Decision) and Article 42(7) TEU, in the rewarding target for a would-be aggressor. Strong event of a wide-ranging and serious hybrid attack cyber security is therefore absolutely critical in the occurring – and specifically examining the poten- context of countering hybrid threats. Specifically, tial European Union actions to support a Member improving the resilience of communication and State seeking such assistance. information systems in Europe is vital in sup- Early work has seen the development of a porting the digital single market. The European European Union operational protocol. The sim- Union Cybersecurity Strategy and the European ple flow chart aims to help build better links Agenda on Security provide the overall strategic between the European Union’s already well-de- frameworks for European Union initiatives on veloped but often diverse response mechanisms. cyber security and cybercrime. Moreover, the The aim too is simple, to link information and European Union has been very active in develop- the analysis of information to be fed swiftly and ing awareness in Member States and in building coherently to key decision-makers within both inter-mechanism cooperation. the Commission and the External Action Ser- However, the European Union cannot in vice. By establishing this common protocol, the today’s interconnected world operate alone. There time taken from the initial identification of a is an inbuilt reliance on partners and neighbour- potential threat to a decision being taken to react ing countries, be it from global economic ties, should be considerably shortened. Furthermore, shared resources or simply the natural intertwin- this protocol outlines the modalities for bet- ing of cultures. Therefore, when we look to the ter coordination between structures, improved European neighbourhood, building capacities in intelligence fusion and analysis to better inform partner countries in the security sector is essen- the political, operational and technical levels tial. Taking a holistic approach by building on the nexus between security and development, the European Union is actively developing the secu- rity dimension of the revised European Neigh- bourhood Policy. In this respect the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) can offer tools for use on missions and operations that can be melded to complement other deployed European Union instruments or used independently. A couple of such examples might be advisory support for key ministries under stress from hybrid threats or additional support for border management agen- cies that are at risk of being overwhelmed by an engineered emergency.

128 4 EVOLVING SECURITY CHALLENGES European Commission European The creation of a European Union Hybrid Fusion Cell offers a one-stop shop for information collation to support the analysis of potential hybrid threats.

charged with making policy recommendations. the threshold of activity that might trigger a rec- In the European Union, coordination of cri- ognisable crisis, the European Union may need sis management occurs at three levels: politi- to take appropriate action in the pre-crisis phase. cal, operational and technical. It addresses the The attached table gives an indication of the full crisis management cycle: prevention/mit- interaction required to better inform and speed igation, preparedness, response, and recovery. up decision-making. Dedicated procedures govern the implementa- tion of the Commission system (ARGUS), the Council arrangements (IPCR) and the EEAS COOPERATION AND COORDINATION Crisis Response Mechanism (CRM). Within the CRM, identified points of entry allow coordina- Finally, the Council proposes to step up co­ tion with EU actors and international partners. operation and coordination between the Euro­ When there is a need for wider/emergency con- pean Union and NATO in common efforts to sultation on hybrid threats among Commission counter hybrid threats, not least as the two organ- services, the EEAS and European Union agen- isations share common values and face similar cies, appropriate use is made of these crisis man- challenges. European Union Member States and agement procedures. NATO allies alike expect their respective organisa- Given the nature of hybrid threats, the pur- tions to support them, by acting swiftly, decisively pose and design of which is often to stay below and in a coordinated manner in the event of a cri-

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sis. Of course, in a perfect world they should ide- CONCLUSION ally be able to prevent the crisis from happening. Therefore, an effective response calls for there In conclusion, the European Union’s response to to be an active dialogue and close coordination hybrid threats largely depends on Member States’ both at the political and operational levels of both willingness to share detected signals and their organisations. Closer interaction between the vulnerabilities; The more general point, which is European Union and NATO would improve both important for all to grasp is that countering hybrid organisations’ ability to prepare for and respond threats requires everyone to take a different intel- to hybrid threats effectively in a complementary lectual approach to security issues. The traditional and mutually supporting manner. internal and external, civil and military, public It is fundamental that this cooperation is based and private separations in the European Union on the principle of inclusiveness, while respect- approach to security and defence matters are no ing each organisation’s decision-making auton- longer sustainable and a necessary step change in omy and data protection rules. Closer European mindset was needed. The European Global Strat- Union–NATO cooperation in a number of areas egy has gone some way to updating security and has been endorsed at the highest level by both defence thinking in Europe, and the Joint Com- organisations. munication on Countering Hybrid Threats repre- These areas include situational awareness, stra- sents a first step towards building a safer Europe. tegic communications, cyber security, and crisis More needs to be done, including planting the prevention and response. seed in all those who work in the European Union There has also been political agreement that institutions or serve in delegations or on missions the two organisations should conduct parallel and and operations that hybrid threats are real, and coordinated exercises organised in this coopera- that they themselves have a role to play in support- tive framework. ing efforts to create a safer society.

Regular security forces Disinformation Special campaign forces

Hybrid Threat Economic = Irregular pressure combined, centrally designed forces and controlled use of covert/overt, military/ non-military and conventional/unconventional means and tactics Information Diplomacy operations

Cyber attacks Propaganda

Graph: Jochen Rehrl

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4.5. EXCURSE: CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION

by Herbert Saurugg

Critical infrastructure protection (CIP) is a the turkey’s trust will undergo a significant inter- major topic because of an increasing number ruption. of incidents. The main focus of protection is Humans often act similarly. We look back at prevention based on a sectoral approach. But how successful we or our systems have been up how are we to cope with significant infrastruc- until now and assume that past performance will ture interruptions if protection efforts fail and continue in the future. Although we are unlike tur- there are cascading effects? Public knowledge is keys, who cannot foresee future or changing devel- limited and people do not have the necessary opments, we tend to ignore significant changes. capabilities to deal with the incidents. Our Similarly, there are significant indications that belief that it will not happen does not actually we are undergoing a major transformation process prevent the event from happening. This can also which will comprehensively change our societies be described as the ‘Turkey Illusion’. and there are also sufficient signs that this process A turkey’s trust in its owner, who feeds it daily, could be accompanied by ‘creative destructions’, will increase based on its owner’s good care. What as described by Joseph Schumpeter many decades the turkey doesn’t know is that it is being fed for ago. However, our essential infrastructure inter- one purpose only. On the day before Thanksgiv- dependencies mean that the outlook is not very ing, when turkeys are traditionally slaughtered, pleasant.

30 20 10 0 – 10 – 20 – 30 – 40 – 50 Trust (Percent) Trust – 60 – 70 – 80 – 90 – 100

Feedings/passage of time Graph: Herbert Saurugg Turkey Illusion

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Herbert Saurugg

We are in a process of transformation to the Network Age or Society, which will change the way of life in our societies fundamentally.

TRANSFORMATION TO A NETWORK WHAT DOES COMPLEXITY MEAN? SOCIETY Complexity is already a part of everyday lan- During the Industrial Age, we had simple struc- guage usage, even if there are often related differ- tures (‘machinery’) and clear hierarchies which ent meanings like opacity, uncertainty, dynamism worked very well most of the time. Now, however, and so on. In short, complexity has the following we are in a process of transformation to the Net- typical characteristics: work Age or Society, which began in the 1950s, • Changing system properties because of feed- and which will change the way of life in our socie- back-loops and therefore the possibility of ties fundamentally. In considering ongoing devel- emergent new system properties. opments, it is dangerous to adhere currently to Take, for example, oxygen and hydrogen which, the knowledge and experience of former times, are flammable gases; these two elements com- even if past solutions were successful in their day. bined produce a liquid, aqua, that puts our fire. One major challenge will be that Industrial Age Even if we knew the character of the gases, we structures and thinking will not completely disap- would not be able to foresee the character of pear, but they will increasingly lose influence and the new element. importance. This will increase complexity and • This also causes non-linearity where requirements for those who must keep up with our appr­oved risk management systems the developments and will have to cope with new inevitab­ly fail and predictions are difficult challenges. or impossi­ble. They may work normally for

132 4 EVOLVING SECURITY CHALLENGES

a certain amount of time but system behav- iour could change completely in a single moment. • Interconnectivity leads to an increasing dy- namic (faster and faster) because the opportu- nities of system behaviour are increasing. • This also leads to irreversibility (no way back) and the impossibility of reconstructing the causes or restarting at a well-known point. As an example of a complex system, take a creature: you cannot cut creatures into well-structured pieces, analyse them and put them back together again. Systemic risks are characterised by a high degree of It will not work. And this is valid for all interconnectivity and interdependencies and missing outreach limitation. complex (live) systems. Reconstruction only works with complicated (‘dead’) systems (i.e. machines). • Another very well-known characteristic is that RISK AND UNCERTAINTY small causes could lead to large effects (known as the ‘butterfly effect’). However, we still try to address new possible A small problem in a supply chain link could risks and developments with successful past meth- Herbert Saurugg bring down the whole system/production, as ods which can hardly cope with increasing inter- we have recently seen. connectivity and complexity. In addition, risks • Delayed and long-term effects are another, are not the same as uncertainty. In a world with often underestimated, characteristic, espe- perfect hindsight, one knows what can/cannot cially in our very short-range focused econ- happen and therefore assigns risk-weighted prob- omy. Figures are given for quarters. abilities to such events, builds a model and takes We know that apparent short-term solutions calculated decisions. However, in a world where often have a negative impact on a long-term we cannot possibly know what can/cannot hap- view and that, for long-term success, accept- pen, assigning probabilities and building models ance of short-term disadvantages is often might lead us to the same fate as that suffered by needed. our turkey.

VUCA-TIMES SYSTEMIC RISKS

Experts are therefore also speaking from Consequently, the rise of systemic risks is hardly new VUCA-times or a new VUCA-nor- observed. Systemic risks are characterised by a high mal, the acronym for volatility, uncer- degree of interconnectivity and interdependencies tainty, complexity and ambiguity, which is and missing outreach limitation. Cascading effects directly connected to the increasing complex- are possible. Because of complexity and feedback ity caused by the ongoing man-made inter- loops, there are no simple cause-and-effect chains connectivity between everything. and the triggers, as well as the impact, are system- In particular, we are not used to dealing with atically underestimated by organisations and the ambiguity. persons in charge.

133 HANDBOOK ON CSDP Herbert Saurugg We are always improving interconnections between technical systems, but the necessary interconnection between people and organisations to cope with non-intended side effects is lagging behind.

WHAT CHALLENGES ARE WE FACING? edge, e.g. people working for public authorities or regulatory bodies to protect public interests. First, we have to recognise that in nature there In particular, administrative bodies are often still are only complex, open systems. These are new on organised under good old hierarchical structures a technical level, especially the increasing interde- which are hardly able to cope with fast changing pendencies (vulnerabilities). And we are still used VUCA-developments. Not to mention the fact to dealing with linear simple machines and not that interconnected special knowledge and fast with complexity, which is caused mainly by a lack reactions are often needed. Today, nobody can of education and training. Especially in the edu- know everything about everything and therefore cation system, we often still train and teach as was we have to arrange more flexible ad-hoc networks necessary for the Industrial Age, but that is hardly and interaction among different experts to address what is needed in the upcoming Network Age, complex dynamic challenges. This leads again to where even a black and white description is too complexity gaps, which brings systemic risks and simple. a danger of extreme events.

LACK OF KNOWLEDGE AND SYSTEMIC EXAMPLE ONE: CYBERSPACE AND THINKING CYBER SECURITY

There are of course improvements but, in Ten years ago, cyber security was hardly men- general, they cannot keep up with the fast-mov- tioned. We spoke about information and commu- ing technological developments and therefore nication technology (ICT)security, but not about we see more and more complexity gaps. Even cyber security. With increasing networking of though there are people who have the neces- systems and infrastructures and with the spread sary knowledge to develop these emerging and of new technologies like smartphones, the focus converting technologies, most people, includ- grew broader. This was also necessary because of ing people who should, do not have this knowl- an increasing threat landscape, both qualitative

134 4 EVOLVING SECURITY CHALLENGES

and quantitative. Hardly any nation has a cyber connected device and with every new interconnec- security strategy to mitigate new challenges com- tion within infrastructure systems. ing from the new virtual world. However, as we It is still early days but interconnectedness is can see, everyday regulations and efforts do not likely to increase rapidly within the next few years seem to be able to follow up the developments on because of smart grids, smart homes, smart cit- the dark side of interconnectivity. ies and also with ‘Industry 4.0’. Digitalisation is One reason could be that we still focus on on everybody’s lips, especially on politicians’ lips. symptoms and not sources. We still try to fix vul- But do we really know what we are doing? Why nerabilities and wonder why it does not work. But should rapidly increasing threats from ICT be more of the same will not work, to quote Albert solved when they become more connected? Why Einstein: ‘Problems cannot be solved with the same are we again seeing serious security vulnerabilities mindset that created them.’ in the IoT which we previously solved in other Of course, to conclude, some essential vulner- domains years or decades ago? Back then, they abilities will not be easy to fix because they are were in offline systems, but nowadays they are in often based on significant design failures, which highly interconnected systems where failure and exist because the internet and also the connected disruptions could spread very fast and very far. It hard- and software often were not designed for is as if we have not learned the right lessons, but the purposes for which they are used nowadays. the risks of today are growing exponentially and it This problem is escalating, in particular, with leg- seems that it will only be a matter of time before acy infrastructure systems like supervisory con- serious infrastructural disturbances arise because trol and data acquisition (SCADA) or industrial of an increasing complexity gap and underesti- control systems (ICS), which are used for auto- mated systemic risks. mation and were designed for offline use. Nowa- days, however, they are increasingly connected to office IT systems, so known office IT problems EXAMPLE TWO: EUROPEAN POWER and threats could spread without the possibility SUPPLY SYSTEM of using known IT security solutions because of other system requirements or because of costs. Another sector where a large complexity gap But developments do not stop: on the contrary, emerges is within the European power supply sys- new technologies like the Internet of Things (IoT) tem. We just started the largest infrastructure trans- emerge quickly and, with them, more future inter- formation ever, with the transformation from fossil connectedness and threats. A few months ago, only fuel driven power plants to renewable energy, which a few experts warned that major risks could spread means a major shift from centralised to decentral- from these technologies. Since some major distribu­ ised structures and power ratios. Yet every Member te­­d denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks, we know that State is carrying out its transformation at its own a large number of unsecured internet-connected speed and in its own way, with hardly any common digital devices, such as home routers and surveil- aim or plan; this leads to an increasingly fragile lance cameras and so on, could constitute a pow- system. However, insufficient new developments erful weapon and could also bring down parts of driven by the ICT-sector or new market players will our infrastructure. Until now, we have been lucky also increase vulnerabilities in this highly sensitive and only services have been interrupted. But what system. It is our most important lifeline even if we we have already seen would also be enough to trig- do not notice it normally because it works seam- ger a major cascading infrastructure collapse, even lessly almost every day. This means that we do not if most people still believe that this is not possible. have fall-back plans in the event of a considerable The threat increases with every new unsecure and disturbance in the power supply system.

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Herbert Saurugg

A European-wide power and infrastructure breakdown (‘blackout’) is unimaginable for many people, including most decision-makers.

Nevertheless, the warning signs have never to several days. The knock-on effect for our strong been as tangible as in recent months. System inverse infrastructure and society would be dev- instabilities have been increasing rapidly for years. astating, because we do not expect it and are not And even the Association of European Transmis- prepared for it. sion System Operators, ENTSO-E, stated in its For this crisis situation, there are rarely con- investigation report on the 2015 Turkey black- tingency plans for working ‘offline’, and, because out: ‘ Although the electric supply should never of the power outage, nor would it be long before be interrupted, there is, unfortunately, no col- the telecommunication systems collapsed. So we lapse-free power system!’ could say that we have very good systems and While most regions in the world have some operators because they have coped with all the experience of dealing with major disturbances problems to date. But we could also be suffering like this, Europe does not, owing to its excellent from a major Turkey Illusion. security of supply. It is therefore also difficult to predict how long it would take for power to be restored. The estimate ranges from several hours

136 4 EVOLVING SECURITY CHALLENGES

LEARNING FROM NATURE – ARE WE PREPARING FOR THE RIGHT ‘SMALL IS BEAUTIFUL’ THING?

We should learn more from nature, which has So we are moving along a very narrow path. a very long history and development phase. Only Benefits and risks are very close together. One survivable structures and organisms were success- key question therefore is, are we mature enough? ful and are still here. We often miss the so-called To prepare for an increasing number of possible ‘silent witnesses’, those who did not survive and and likely significant infrastructure interruptions, are not to be found in the history books. One it is not enough to speak only at a high political major structure that did succeed is ‘small is beau- or management level. We have to include people tiful’. and mobilise them to prepare themselves, because • Small structures are more flexible and robust such scenarios can be solved only by people them- against strikes (asymmetry). selves and not, as is usually the case, by emergency • People are more resilient in small structures. services. • You cannot prevent the development, but early • Thiscalls for open security and risk communi- warning is an important part of navigation and cation, which addresses risks and uncertainties we have to prepare to cope with uncertainty and assigns people their responsibilities in the and with major incidents/disruptions. event of significant infrastructure interruptions. • It is all about communication and knowledge. • We will also have to ask ourselves in politics If people and decision makers know the chal- and in the security sector if we have the right lenges, they can react and prepare before a crisis focus, or if we are preparing for ‘the last war’. or a disruption or change the path leading up For example, on the one hand, we are devot- to it. ing a large amount of money and effort to ter- • Security Communication will be a main driver rorism prevention, but on the other, we have a to increase people’s resilience and capacity to fundamental problem with our deadly vulnera- act in the event of uncertainty and after ex- ble infrastructures. treme events. The problem is that there is no easy, quick techni- • ‘Understanding the problem is half the solu- cal solution, but we have to start thinking about tion’, as Albert Einstein once said. it and developing new design approaches, to mit- igate already existing catastrophic potential. To start with all these steps in the aftermath of a first

Government incident, as we have done in the past, will be too Services Public Trans- late in the future. Health portation

Emergency Water Services Supply Critical Infrastructure Agriculture Defense and Fishery Sectors Industry

Tele- Chemical communi- Industry cations Postal and Food Shipping Industry

Graph: Jochen Rehrl

137

CROSSCUTTING 5 CSDP ISSUES

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5.1. GENDER AND WOMEN, PEACE AND SECURITY IN CSDP by Taina Järvinen European Union/EUPOL Afghanistan Union/EUPOL European Societies with a high level of gender equality tend to be more stable than those with a wide gender gap.

Women, men, girls and boys experience and DEFINITION OF GENDER are affected by armed conflicts differently. Vio- lence, displacement, disruption of support ser- Gender refers to the social attributes and vices, economic insecurity and unravelling of opportunities associated with being male social structures and judicial and security insti- and female and the relationships between tutions are some of the long-term consequences women and men and girls and boys, as that people in post-conflict settings have to well as the relations between women and endure, and each has a gender dimension. those between men. These attributes, op- International interventions, in the form of cri- portunities and relationships are socially sis management missions or post-conflict recon- constructed and are learned through so- struction programmes, need to be implemented cialisation processes. They are context- in a gender-sensitive manner, so as to ensure that and time-specific, and changeable. the measures in question are non-discriminatory and do not exacerbate existing inequalities but (European Institute for Gender Equality, EIGE). benefit both men and women.

140 5 CROSS-CUTTING CSDP ISSUES

European Union/EULEX Kosovo, Enisa Kasemi Kosovo, Union/EULEX European European Union/EULEX Kosovo, Enisa Kasemi Kosovo, Union/EULEX European The ultimate objective of the CSDP gender mainstreaming policy is gender equality, one of the core values of the European Union.

THE EU’S GENDER POLICY GENDER MAINSTREAMING

The EU’s gender policy in the area of crisis Gender mainstreaming is also applied for rea- management is based on mainstreaming, i.e. sys- sons of operational effectiveness. The underlying tematically integrating a gender perspective in all reasoning is that applying a gender perspective areas of the CSDP, from planning and implemen- will increase the EU’s crisis management capacity tation of missions and operations to reporting, by mobilizing additional resources and exploiting evaluation, training and lessons. The ultimate the full potential of the available human resources, objective of the CSDP gender mainstreaming pol- and will make the missions more effective in terms icy is gender equality, one of the core values of the of establishing peace and security and strength- European Union that is enshrined in the Treaty ening democratic values (11932/2/05). Other on European Union. The EU’s external actions, pragmatic reasons include improving situational including the CSDP, are guided by the Union’s awareness and reaching out to the host civilian core values and principles. population, in particular on issues such as con- Promoting gender equality contributes to sta- flict-related sexual violence or gender-based vio- bility. Studies show that societies with a high level lence. of gender equality tend to be more stable than A new key document, which provides a com- those with a wide gender equality gap. Similarly, prehensive policy framework for gender equality gender inequality is closely associated with armed and women’s empowerment in the EU’s external conflict. For example, all but one of the ten low- activities, is the EU Gender Action Plan (GAP) est-ranking countries in the UN Development for 2016-2020. It renews the EU’s commitment Programme’s gender inequality index (GII) were to gender equality, human rights, the empower- either experiencing or emerging from conflict ment of women and girls and the eradication of (HDR 2015). gender-based violence.

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Since then the UN Security Council has adopted six more resolutions: 1888, 1889, 1960, 2106, 2122 and 2242. The women, peace and security agenda is based on these eight resolu- 51 2015 tions. ©Europ E an Ext The European Union is a strong supporter E rnal ction a ction S of the women, peace and security agenda. The E rvic E Union has consistently called for its full imple- mentation, stressing the need to combat violence Gender balancing in CSDP missions against women in conflict situations and to pro- by Maline Meiske mote women’s equal and meaningful participa- tion in the prevention and resolution of conflicts, In October 2015, the UN Security Council con- relationships between peacekeepers and local citi- ducted a High-Level Review aiming at assessing zens. peace negotiations, peace-building, peacekeeping, progress in the implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1325 (2000) on women, peace With the gradual release of gender-disaggregated and security. The Review provides an opportuni- data on women’s participation in crisis manage- humanitarian response and post-conflict recon- ty to take a closer look at the developments and ment operations, research on gender balance and progress made in the context of the CSDP. Ensuring the impact on operational effectiveness is on the struction. women’s participation in CSDP crisis management rise. EEAS data on 16 civilian CSDP missions be- operations is still a major challenge, particularly tween 2007 and 2013 reveal an increase in wom- in military operations. Endeavours at the EU-level en’s participation, suggesting that gender policies alone, however, are insufficient, and can only suc- and initiatives have had some success. Overall, ceed in conjunction with member states’ efforts. the proportion of women participating in civil- ian CSDP missions rose from 20% to 26% and the The EU has increasingly recognised that conflict absolute number of female civilian personnel in- IMPLEMENTING THE WOMEN, PEACE and crisis management are not gender-neutral af- creased from 240 to 869. fairs and has introduced numerous gender poli- cies and initiatives to forward the aims of UNSCR For CSDP military operations, no gender-disag- AND SECURITY AGENDA 1325. The key phrase is ‘gender mainstreaming’ gregated data is retained – a shortcoming that is – the process of assessing the implications of any in the process of being addressed. The EU Military planned action for men and women, which in- Staff, however, estimates that only 3%-8% of the cludes the proportional representation of both deployed personnel in CSDP military operations genders in conflict resolution and crisis manage- are female. The key EU document for implementing the ment operations (also referred to as ‘gender bal- ancing’). Mind the gap women, peace and security (WPS) agenda is the Boosting women’s participation began as an equal To understand why women remain underrep- ‘Comprehensive Approach to the EU Implementa- rights issue, but it has developed into a func- resented in CSDP missions and operations, the tionalist argument about improved operational methods of recruitment must be examined. effectiveness of crisis management and sustain- Personnel are mainly supplied through national tion of UNSCRs 1325 and 1820 on Women, Peace ability of conflict resolution. Adequate representa- secondments, meaning that the decision-making tion of female personnel is thought to help com- authority in the allocation process lies with each and Security’ (15671/1/2008). bat sexual violence, promote gender awareness member state. The underlying characteristics of among the host nations’ populations, and improve each state thus determine women’s participation in It offers a holistic approach, which recognises the close links between peace, security, develop- European union institute for Security Studies november 2015 1 ment and gender equality and lists a range of EU external action instruments. The guiding doc- Full article see: ument ‘Implementation of UNSCRs on women, http://www.iss.europa.eu/publications/detail/article/ peace and security into CSDP mission and opera- gender-balancing-in-csdp/ tions’ (PSC document 7109/2012) focuses on the implementation of the WPS agenda in CSDP UNSCR 1325 WOMEN, PEACE AND missions. SECURITY In 2010, the EU adopted 17 indicators to identify both progress and gaps in implemen- The United Nations Security Council’s adop- tation based on the Comprehensive Approach; tion in 2000 of the landmark Resolution 1325 on five of these indicators focused specifically on the women, peace and security highlighted women’s CSDP. rights and gender equality for the first time as key The indicators were revised in 2016 (12525/16) factors in establishing international peace and and grouped under four thematic headings: pre- stability. This was followed by Resolution 1820 vention, participation, protection, and relief and (2008), which focused on sexual violence as a tac- recovery. tic of war and a possible war crime.

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5.2. HUMAN RIGHTS AND CSDP by Taina Järvinen European Union/EUTM Mali Union/EUTM European Training on international humanitarian law in the EU Training Mission in Mali.

In the context of Common Security and NORMATIVE FRAMEWORK Defence Policy (CSDP), the promotion and pro- tection of human rights and the rule of law are The European Union is committed to promot- considered essential for lasting peace and secu- ing and protecting human rights worldwide and rity. the development of EU human rights policies in Over the years the EU has mainly deployed its external action, including CSDP, has a strong missions focusing on capacity-building, training, normative basis. Human rights, democracy, the advising and supporting security sector or other rule of law and the principles of equality and sol- institutional reforms in post-conflict situations, idarity are founding principles of the EU embed- where human rights are part of broader recon- ded in the Treaty on European Union (TEU). struction efforts. In accordance with Article 21 TEU, the EU is However, CSDP missions increasingly oper- guided by and seeks to advance these principles in ate in complex and hostile conflict settings where its external action. Furthermore, Article 21 TEU national institutions are fragile or non-existent places the EU’s external activities within a broader and civilians are often deliberately targeted by international normative framework by including armed groups – a clear violation of international respect for the principles of the United Nations humanitarian law. Charter and international law among the guiding

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European Union/EUCAP Sahel Niger Union/EUCAP European

Training on human rights in the EU Capacity Building Mission in Niger.

principles. In other words, even when a CSDP mis- • providing human rights training to mission sion mandate does not explicitly refer to human personnel; rights, the mission operates in the framework of • integrating human rights aspects as part of international and EU human rights standards and flanking measures or technical assistance pro- indirectly aims to promote human rights. vided in the context of missions and opera- tions; • ensuring appropriate mission-specific reporting HUMAN RIGHTS MAINSTREAMING procedures and integrating lessons learned on human rights aspects in missions and opera- To ensure effective implementation of human tions; rights commitments in CSDP, the EU early on • cooperating with other international stake- adopted a policy of mainstreaming. holders. In June 2006 the Political and Security Com- In the context of CSDP operations and missions, mittee endorsed a paper entitled ‘Mainstream- human rights mainstreaming means that human ing of Human Rights into ESDP’ (11936/4/06). rights aspects are systematically integrated into all The document outlines the basic principles of phases of CSDP missions and operations, from human rights mainstreaming in CSDP and lists the early planning phase to implementation and a number of implementation measures for the review. missions, Member States and the Commission, The mainstreaming policy should pay special which include: attention to the needs and situation of children • ensuring the necessary human rights expertise affected by armed conflict and other vulnerable at headquarters and in missions; groups.

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ENHANCING EFFECTIVENESS AND However, after ten years it was necessary to COHERENCE take stock of the progress made and identify areas where more should be done. In April 2015, The European Union reaffirmed its commit- 20 Member States drafted a non-paper encourag- ment to human rights in 2012 when the Council ing the EU to enhance its efforts to mainstream adopted the package entitled ‘Human Rights and human rights, gender, women, peace and security Democracy: EU Strategic Framework and EU into CSDP. In May 2015, the Council welcomed Action Plan’. The second action plan on human the initiative for a baseline study that would allow rights and democracy for the 2015 – 2020 period progress and delivery on human rights, gender was adopted in 2015. The strategic framework and related fields to be measured over time. In and the consecutive action plans aim to fur- response, the EEAS conducted a baseline study on ther enhance the effectiveness and coherence of the integration of human rights and gender into EU policies by setting out objectives, principles CSDP during 2016. The 21 baselines were devel- and priorities, and to ensure a comprehensive oped based on existing policy commitments for approach to preventing and addressing conflicts integrating human rights, gender, United Nations and crises. Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1325 and the protection of children affected by armed con- flict into CSDP missions. INTEGRATING HUMAN RIGHTS INTO The study focused on both human rights and CSDP – TAKING STOCK gender, as CSDP policies have consistently pro- moted human rights and gender together. How- Considerable progress has been made and ever, efforts were made to separate human rights many of the measures identified in the 2006 doc- from gender so as to differentiate the complemen- ument have been implemented over the past ten tary importance to CSDP of, on the one hand, years. The EU and Member States have adopted human rights and, on the other, gender and new policies and developed a body of guidelines, UNSCR 1325 on women, peace and security. checklists, handbooks and other toolkits for The final report of the baseline study was mainstreaming human rights and other human approved by the High Representative and sub- rights–related fields such as transitional justice mitted to the Council in December 2016. The and international humanitarian law into CSDP. findings and recommendations of the study will Human rights aspects have been integrated provide an informed basis for further integration into the 2013 crisis management procedures, of human rights in CSDP. and there has been an increase in human rights expertise and resources. Human rights advisers or focal points are present in most CSDP missions and operations, and human rights components are included in CSDP training courses organised by various Member States under the framework of the European Security and Defence College (ESDC). Specialised training on human rights, gender, children and armed conflict, protection of civilians and conflict prevention is also available through ESDC and other Member State initia- tives.

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5.3. RULE OF LAW AND CSDP

by Daphne Lodder European Union/EULEX Kosovo, Enisa Kasemi Kosovo, Union/EULEX European The rule of law is a principle of governance whereby all persons, institutions and entities, public and private, including the state itself, are accountable under laws that are publicly promulgated, enforced and independently adjudicated.

Article 2 of the Treaty on European Union protection of human rights […].’ (TEU, Lisbon, 2009) states that: Article 21 TEU deals with the principles that ‘The Union is founded on the values of respect for inform EU foreign policy and extends Member human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the States’ values on which the Union is based to its rule of law and respect for human rights […]. These external action, where it aims equally to uphold values are common to the Member States in a society and promote these values: in which pluralism, non-discrimination, tolerance, ‘The Union’s action on the international scene justice, solidarity and equality between women and shall be guided by the principles which have inspired men prevail.’ its own creation, development and enlargement, and Article 3(1) TEU stipulates that: which it seeks to advance in the wider world: democ- ‘The Union’s aim is to promote peace, its values racy, the rule of law, the universality and indivisi- and the well-being of its peoples.’, and adds to this bility of human rights and fundamental freedoms, in Article 3(5) ‘In its relations with the wider world, respect for human dignity, the principles of equal- the Union shall uphold and promote its values […]. ity and solidarity, and respect for the principles of It shall contribute to peace, security […] (and) the the United Nations Charter and international law.’

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Furthermore: ‘The Union shall define and pursue common policies and actions, and shall work for […] cooperation in all fields of international relations’, (Article 21(2) TEU) in order to ‘consolidate and support democracy, the rule of law, human rights and the principles of international law’. (Article. 21(3) (b) TEU). Upholding the rule of law has a twofold effect on the EU: as a foundational and common value (internal dimension), and as a guiding principle Enisa Kasemi Kosovo, Union/EULEX European for international action (external dimension). Mock trial organised by EULEX for law students from the These dimensions – as also mentioned in the EU Pristina Law Faculty. Global Strategy1 – are ever more intertwined: this is becoming most obvious in the nexus between conflict. With an independent judiciary still cen- internal and external security, stressing that our tral to the delivery of that justice, the modern – security at home ‘entails a parallel interest in peace broader – concept of the rule of law, as defined in our neighbouring and surrounding regions’.2 above, also encompasses the executive (mainly the police) and the legislative branch of a state’s authority. However, against the backdrop of the RULE OF LAW AS A PRINCIPLE OF link between the ‘rule of law’ and ‘justice’ these GOVERNANCE terms have at times been used as synonyms: the rule of law is often applied in the sense of ‘justice The rule of law is a principle of governance3 system/judiciary’, or referring to the (criminal) whereby all persons, institutions and entities, ‘justice chain’ composed of police, courts, prose- public and private, including the state itself, are cution services and the penitentiary. In the next accountable under laws that are publicly prom- paragraph the meaning of the rule of law within ulgated, equally enforced and independently the CSDP context will be outlined. adjudicated, and which are consistent with As to the relationship between human rights and international human rights norms and stand- the rule of law, while human rights have to do with ards. It is closely linked to the principle of jus- the substance of rights and freedoms, the rule of tice, involving an ideal of accountability and law has to do with their just and effective protec- fairness in the protection and vindication of tion and promotion. Or, as stated in the preamble rights and the prevention and punishment of to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of wrongs. 4 1948, ‘human rights should be protected by the rule The initial emphasis within the rule of law of law.’ There is also an important relationship area at international level was on justice, to between Security Sector Reform (SSR)5 and the address war crimes and corruption that threat- rule of law, as SSR is aimed at gradually providing ened the stability of countries emerging from individuals and the state with more effective and

1 Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe – A Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign and Security Policy, June 2016 (EUGS). 2 EUGS, p.14. 3 The EU has adopted the definition as set outy b the 2004 UN report S/2004/616*, 23 August 2004: ‘The rule of law and transitional justice in conflict and post-conflict societies’, Report of the Secretary-General. 4 See EU Concept for CSDP Justice Missions (within the Rule of Law framework), Council of the European Union, Brus- sels, 20 December 2010, 18173/10, p.13. 5 The concept and process of SSR as such will be elaborated upon in the next chapter of this handbook (5.4).

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accountable security in a manner consistent with Amongst the main imperatives for the design, respect for human rights, democracy, the rule of planning and conduct of CSDP missions, as laid law and the principles of good governance.6 down in these concepts is that of ensuring sus- tainable, transparent, effective and accountable institutions in the host countries, set up in a EU PRINCIPLES AND CONCEPTS democratic fashion, being free from corruption, RELEVANT TO THE RULE OF LAW ON upholding human rights, in particular the rights CSDP MISSIONS of women, children and other vulnerable groups, operating within a coherent legal framework, At the Feira European Council of 2000, the developed via due legislative process, and in line ‘Rule of Law’ was identified as one of four pri- with international norms and standards. These ority areas for civilian crisis management along- institutions should include an independent and side police, civilian administration, and civil pro- impartial justice system, to which there is unhin- tection – effectively equalling ‘justice (reform)’ in dered access, one that is capable of dealing – with- recent terminology. However, with the adoption out fear or favour – with the legacies of the past of the Council conclusions on implementing the and the needs of the present, in coexistence with EU Global Strategy in the area of Security and informal or alternative dispute-resolution mecha- Defence7, it is proposed to review the priority nisms. When promoting these standards and con- areas of civilian CSDP missions in the light of cepts it is of utmost importance that CSDP mis- evolving political priorities and in order to better sions themselves operate in strict compliance with respond to current and future security challenges. applicable rules and regulations as well as with The review should address where CSDP can have professional and behavioural standards. A strong added value in line with the EU’s comprehensive internal accountability measure is the Code of approach throughout the entire conflict cycle.8 Conduct and Discipline which is applied by all A review of priorities could also provide a good civilian CSDP missions equally and holds mission opportunity in terms of further clarifying the con- members to account for their professional behav- cepts of ‘rule of law’ and ‘justice’, and how those iour. Another example of an accountability mech- are applied in a CSDP context. In this context anism but with an external/public dimension is consideration could also be given to reviewing the Human Rights Review Panel as established by the existing EU concepts, primarily those relating EULEX Kosovo, to hold the mission accountable to police strengthening missions and justice mis- to the local population, given its executive tasks sions9 (as referred to in this article). and direct impact of decisions. EU concepts for CSDP missions cover diverse Missions must pursue a tailored, systemic and state functions and policy fields in the broader rule comprehensive approach under local ownership, of law area, such as police and justice, civilian admin- and with a shared vision, in coordination with istration, customs, border management, anti-cor- EU institutions and actors, and with the wider ruption, human rights and gender. Those concepts international community. In the end, CSDP should be read in conjunction with the ‘core con- rule of law and justice missions take place as cept’, the ‘EU Concept for CSDP Justice Missions part of a wider, coherent EU action, and should (within the Rule of Law Framework)’ (18173/10). be supported by or lay the ground work for the

6 SWD(2016) 221 Joint Communication to the European Parliament and the Council – Elements for an EU-wide strategic framework to support security sector reform. 7 14149/16, 14 November 2016. 8 14149/16, p.7, para.11(a). 9 15031/09 and 18173/10 respectively.

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deployment of other, broader EU institutional structures and relevant civilian administration, support through other EU external assistance could involve a multiplicity of actors and agen- instruments, as well as those of Member States cies, in a holistic approach. in capacity building and development tools. It Depending on their mandates, missions may will significantly enhance the successful conclu- take on a combination of these generic types, sion of strengthening missions and/or substitu- and may address a variety of the state functions tion missions.10 and policy fields as outlined above. Even though not all missions have a clear RoL component or TYPES OF MISSIONS WITHIN THE RoL pillar, care is always taken to ensure that rule FRAMEWORK of law as a principle of governance is promoted across the various activities. Under the current There are two generic types of CSDP mission concepts, executive/substitution missions would in the area of the rule of law: firstly, strength- never stand alone, but would always be com- ening missions, whereby qualified justice per- plemented by strengthening activities – see the sonnel are deployed to monitor, mentor, advise example of EULEX Kosovo, the only current (MMA) and to train if appropriate host country CSDP mission whose mandate includes execu- justice officials, including judges, prosecutors tive functions. and lawyers, with the aim of ensuring that the host country’s legal system meets international standards. The second generic type of rule of law OTHER REFERENCE FRAMEWORKS & mission is at the level of executive/substitution DOCUMENTS functions for the local judiciary/legal system. This type of mission can be deployed in a cri- In addition to the documents already referred sis or post-conflict situation, where host country to in the text of the article and in the footnotes, structures have failed, or do not exist, and where the overarching EU rule of law framework con- justice personnel are deployed to carry out exec- ceptually includes: utive functions, to rebuild the rule of law and • Council conclusions on Ensuring Respect for thereby contribute to restoring public order and the Rule of Law, 16682/14: ‘(…) respecting the security.11 CSDP (justice) missions can take the rule of law is a prerequisite for the protection of following forms. This is further illustrated by the fundamental rights’. table on the next page: • Council conclusions on fundamental rights CSDP justice strengthening missions (mon- and rule of law, 10168/13. itoring, mentoring and advising justice officials, • Comprehensive Concept for ESDP Police including in the context of justice system reforms); Strengthening Missions (Interface with Broad- CSDP justice mission that carries out both the er Rule of Law), 15031/09. strengthening activities and executive/substitu- • Comprehensive Concept for Police Substitu- tion ones; tion Missions – Revised Version, 8655/5/02. CSDP integrated rule of law missions compris- • Comprehensive EU concept for missions in the ing several components (e.g. a justice component, field of Rule of Law in crisis management, in- a police component); cluding annexes, 14315/02 and 9792/03. SSR missions, comprising initial reorganisation • EU Concept for ESDP Support to Security and reform of military, police, justice, governance Sector Reform (SSR), 12566/4/05.

10 18173/10, p.15. 11 18173/10, p.20.

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Rule of law in civilian CSDP missions: an overview of activities and some examples of achievements

MISSIONS WITH A RULE OF LAW COMPONENT EUPOL COPPS (Palestine) Support for the Palestinian Criminal Justice System 2006 – ongoing • Support for the local authorities in the delineation of competences of the Ministry of Justice, the Office of the Attorney General and the High Judicial Council with the overall aim of adopting a new Law on Judicial Authority • Support for the Palestinian Judicial Institute • Support for legislative drafting initiatives, including amendments to the Law on anti-corruption, to the Code of Criminal Procedure or to the Law on the Protection of Families from Violence Support for police-prosecution cooperation • Development of an MoU between police and prosecutors • Support to the Working Group on the MoU implementation EUPOL Afghanistan Increase cooperation between police and prosecution 2007 – 2016 • Support for the development and use of a Police and Prosecutors Coordination Training Manual EULEX Kosovo Use of executive judicial competencies in specific areas 2008 – ongoing (organised crime, war crimes, corruption, property issues) • Mission judges delivered more than 43 600 judgements • Mission prosecutors have reviewed more than 2 300 case files on war crimes and serious and organised crime, resulting in 250 indictments or investigations Strengthening the Rule of Law institutions • Mission advice through MMA and peer-to-peer case management (mixed panels) has enabled the judicial authorities to develop and reinforce their capacity to investigate, prosecute and adjudicate cases • Support for legislative reform drafting European Union/EULEX Kosovo, Enisa Kasemi Kosovo, Union/EULEX European Missions must pursue a tailored, systemic and comprehensive approach under local ownership, and with a shared vision.

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MISSIONS WITH A RULE OF LAW COMPONENT EUCAP Somalia Support for the drafting and implementation of (former EUCAP NESTOR) maritime security legislation 2012 – ongoing • Support for the review and drafting of relevant maritime security legislation in compliance with international human rights standards (Law on the Organisation of the Police, Somali Maritime Security, Counter Piracy and Coast Guard legislation) Support for maritime security agencies and relevant judicial/legal institutions (establishment & development, organisational capabili- ties and professional skills) • Advice to high-level officials in the Ministries of Justice, Supreme Courts (and other courts), Attorneys General’s Offices, Maritime Polic­e Units and Coast Guard • Organisation of a regional conference on maritime security as well as regular regional workshops and legal seminars for prosecutors, judges and other legal practitioners on piracy trial exercises in Nairobi,­ Djibouti, Mogadishu, Puntland and Somaliland EUAM Ukraine Provision of strategic advice, notably in relation to 2014 – ongoing criminal investigations (including prosecution) • Advice on clarifying investigative and prosecutorial responsibilities incorporated in the Code of Criminal Procedure • Advice on developing the framework for vetting in the General Prosecutor’s Office Operational support to ensure implementation of strategic advice for reform • Enhancement of the National Anti-Corruption Bureau’s/Specialised Anti-Corruption Office’s capacity orf international legal cooperation • Training of national police and prosecutors’ office in investigation techniques for money laundering and cross-border crime

MISSIONS STREAMLINING RULE OF LAW ACROSS THE MISSION COMPONENTS EUCAP Sahel Niger Advice to the Mission on Rule of Law matters 2012 – ongoing • Review of training curricula for the Nigerien security forces and the justice sector focusing on the reinforcement of the Rule of Law and Nigerien capacities to fight terrorism and organised crime • Inclusion of key EU standards in Security Sector Reform in national training curricula for sustainability of efforts EUCAP Sahel Mali Advice to the Mission on Rule of Law matters 2014 – ongoing • Review of training curricula for the Malian internal security forces (ISF), notably for the modules on the fight against terrorism, organised crime, judiciary police, criminal investigation, custody and interviews procedures, complaint filing and victims support • Distribution of codes (penal and penal procedure) and manuals to ISF

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5.4. THE NEW EU-WIDE STRATEGIC FRAMEWORK TO SUPPORT SSR

by Karin Gatt Rutter and Gianmarco Scuppa

Security Sector Reform (SSR) can be translated as: the recognition of the increasingly stronger links between security and development as explained in ‘transforming a country’s security system so that it the Agenda 2030 and more explicitly in sustaina- gradually provides individuals and the state with ble development goal 16.2 more effective and accountable security and in a manner that is consistent with respect for human rights, democracy, the rule of law and the princi- OBJECTIVES FOR SECURITY SECTOR ples of good governance.’ REFORM

The EU has been supporting Security Sector This SSR strategic framework sets clear objec- Reform in numerous countries for many years tives for EU engagement in the security sector: by using external action instruments and crisis • support partner states in concretely improving management tools. In 2015, foreign ministers security for individuals and the state; asked the High Representative and the Commis- This means, in particular, addressing the security sion to review the existing policy framework and needs of different groups (including women, mi- to maximise the impact, efficiency and consist- nors and minorities) as perceived and experienced ency of the EU’s support. This led to the develop- by them. ment of the new EU-wide strategic framework • improve the legitimacy, good governance, in- to support Security Sector Reform, which was tegrity and sustainability of the security sector issued in the form of a Joint Communication by in partner states. the High Representative and the Commission This means encouraging and supporting the se- in July 2016 and subsequently endorsed by the curity sector in partner states to respect inter- Foreign Affairs Council in November the same nationally accepted human rights, the rule of year. law and democratic principles, apply the good This new SSR policy framework merges and governance principles of transparency, openness, updates previous policies from 2005 and 20061 participation, inclusivity and accountability, that have been guiding EU action in the field of respect public finance management rules and Security Sector Reform and includes new ele- procedures, fight corruption and be fiscally sus- ments in line with international trends, such as tainable.

1 A concept for European Community support for Security Sector Reform, Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament (SEC(2006) 658), and EU concept for ESDP support to SSR (12566/4/05), which was produced on the basis of the European Security Strategy – A Secure Europe in a Better World, adopted by the Euro- pean Council on December 2003. 2 Transforming our world: the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development (Resolution adopted by the General Assembly on 25 September 2015; UNGA A/RES/70/1); Goal 16: ‘promote peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable develop- ment, provide access to justice for all and build effective, accountable and inclusive institutions at all levels’.

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European Union/EUPOL COPPS Union/EUPOL European National ownership is essential for achieving any sustainable changes in the partner country.

SCOPE OF SSR ent in the field, such security sector analysis and reporting should be done jointly. If the situation The SSR strategic framework has a very wide calls for substantial security assistance, specific scope as it applies to all EU actors and instru- and in-depth security sector assessments could ments, including political/diplomatic, external be undertaken to identify security needs as per- actions instruments, crisis response and CSDP ceived and experienced by the different groups of civilian and military actors. It also applies in all the population (for instance woman and minor- contexts, not only in conflict or post-conflict sit- ity groups) and to what extent the security sector uations or any specific geographical region. It is addresses them. designed to be broad enough to guide a variety of situations encountered throughout the various phases of EU support from identification, plan- NATIONAL OWNERSHIP ning and programming to implementation of activi­ties. EU assistance should therefore be based on The starting point for any EU action in the a solid understanding of the features and actors security sector of a partner country should be an of the security sector and be built on ongoing understanding of the security sector and the con- national debates and initiatives and, where exist- text in which it is situated. EU delegations will ing and credible, on national strategies, policies therefore be requested to report more regularly on and plans. This will enhance the national owner­ security sector developments as part of the reg- ship, which is essential for achieving any sustaina- ular political reporting to headquarters. Where ble changes in the partner country. National actors there are CSDP missions and operations pres- should steer the reform process and take overall

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tion of EU support, including with EU Member States. The new framework therefore proposes the mapping of all EU SSR activities and the devel- opment of coordination matrices that set common EU objectives and identify links and sequencing of diplomatic, development cooperation and pos- sible CSDP actions to achieve them. Involvement with other relevant international actors is also necessary to avoid duplication and to increase a shared understanding of needs and objectives. An essential part of any form of support is

European Union European monitoring and evaluation, as well as understand- ing the risks linked to assistance/intervention. The The starting point for any EU action in the security sector of a partner country should be an understanding of the security most important risks can be categorised under sector and the context in which it is situated. broad headings related to 1) insufficient national political commitment to change, 2) negative responsibility for the results of interventions, unintended consequences, 3) reputational risks, which should result from an in-depth political and 4) the risks of non-intervention. and policy dialogue on the security sector with all Context analysis and conflict-sensitive analy- national stakeholders, including oversight entities sis are important tools with which to generate an such as legislative bodies, and civil society. Issues understanding of the context in which support is of good governance, human rights, the rule of law provided. Additionally, a solid risk management and democracy are also part of such dialogues, as and risk mitigation framework will be developed the respect for these principles is particularly crit- to guide any future EU assistance in the security ical in the security sector. sectors of partner countries. Transforming any security sector is a complex To maximise the EU’s effectiveness in provid- and lengthy process which requires long-term ing SSR support, EU SSR expertise will have to engagement and flexibility, because the political be developed both at the level of headquarters and/or operational environment may change rap- and in the field. Following the endorsement of idly and the EU must be able to adapt its political, the strategic framework a permanent, informal, technical and financial support. inter-service task force has been established with Moreover, in many situations the population staff from relevant thematic EEAS and Commis- may have pressing security needs. It is therefore sion services. fundamental to contribute to immediate solu- The function of this task force is to develop tions to these needs while gradually progressing methodological tools, oversee EU SSR activities towards longer-term systemic changes in the secu- and provide support and advice to EU Delega- rity sector. tions, EEAS and Commission services and CSDP missions. In the field, CSDP missions should assist the COOPERATION AND COORDINATION EU Delegation on SSR-related issues and all EU actors – including Member State diplomatic mis- One key aspect of the new strategic frame- sions – and should share information and analysis, work is the enhancement of the effectiveness and participate in joint analysis and contribute to the impact of EU action through better coordina- formulation of SSR coordination matrices.

154 6 CFSP AGENCIES

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6.1. EU INSTITUTE FOR SECURITY STUDIES

by Antonio Missiroli

The European Union Institute for Security Studies (EUISS) is the Union’s agency dealing with the analysis of foreign, security and defence policy issues. European Union Institute for MISSION AND STRUCTURE Security Studies

The Institute was set up in January 2002 as an autonomous agency under the Common For- eign and Security Policy (CFSP) [Council Joint the new structures that underpin the further Action 2001/554, now regulated by Council development of the CFSP/CSDP. Decision 2014/75/CFSP] to foster a common The Institute’s core mission is to provide anal- security culture for the EU, support the elabo- yses and fora for discussion which are useful and ration and projection of its foreign policy, and relevant for the formulation of EU policy. In car- enrich the strategic debate inside and outside rying out that mission, it also acts as an interface Europe. Based in Paris with a liaison office in between European experts and decision-makers Brussels, the EUISS is now an integral part of at all levels.

Director

Personal Assistant to the Director Head of Administration

IT and Data Financial Officer Publications Officer Protection Officer Human Resources Coordinator Public Information Brussels Liaison Officer Officer Financial Clerk

Office Maintenance Editorial Assistant Treasurer Assistant

Senior Event Coordinatiors Analysts Associate Analysts

Junior Analysts/ Trainees

Structure of the EU Institute for Security Studies

156 6 CFSP AGENCIES European Union/ESDC, Ovidiu Simina Union/ESDC, European Since September 2015, the EUISS Director has been the Chair of the ESDC Executive Academic Board (in the picture: Mr Dirk Dubois/Head of the ESDC, Dr Sven Biscop/Honorary Fellow of the ESDC and Dr Antonio Missiroli/Director of the EUISS and Chair of the ESDC.EAB).

The Institute is funded by the EU Member States according to a GNI-based formula. It is governed by a Board – chaired by the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs CHAILLOT PAPER Nº 137 — March 2016 and Security Policy (HR/VP), with the EEAS providing the secretariat – which lays down Envisioning its budgetary and administrative rules and European approves its work programme. The Political and defence Security Committee (PSC) exercises political Five futures supervision – without prejudice to the EUISS’s intellectual independence and operational BY autonomy. Jan Joel Andersson Sven Biscop Bastian Giegerich Christian Mölling Thierry Tardy PUBLICATIONS

As part of its mission to promote a common secu- rity culture for the EU, help develop and project Chaillot Papers the CFSP, and enrich Europe’s strategic debate, the European Union Institute for Institute regularly releases publications on issues at Security Studies the core of the Union’s work. The EUISS conducts The Institute's flagship publication is its series of its research both by theme and by region. In addi- Chaillot Papers. tion to the work produced on the CFSP and CSDP www.iss.europa.eu/publications/chaillot-papers/

157 HANDBOOK ON CSDP BMEIA/Mahmoud The Institute's core mission is to provide analyses and for a for discussion which are useful and relevant for the formulation of EU policy.

proper, the EUISS addresses the various dimensions EVENTS of the Union’s common external action – from energy to sanctions, from cyber issues to climate EUISS events are intended to enhance the change, from space to strategic communications. Union’s analytical capacities and facilitate the Particular emphasis is placed on the Union’s neigh- shaping of common approaches. bours to the east and the south, as well as on the They bring together EU officials, national Sahel, the Horn of Africa and territorial disputes in experts, academics, decision-makers, media and Asia. civil society representatives from the EU Member The Institute’s flagship publication is its series States as well as the rest of the world. of Chaillot Papers, which are based on focused, EUISS conferences are large public events in‑depth research. A special effort has been made attended by well-known figures which centre on in recent years to help keep the general public broad political issues. EUISS seminars are medi- informed, by developing products such as the um-sized events focused on specific subjects, often Yearbook of European Security (YES) and pub- with a regional or policy emphasis. lishing leaflets (on CFSP and CSDP) and pocket EUISS task forces are smaller groups which books (on defence and strategy). meet fairly regularly to monitor events in a par- These products, together with the series of ticular region and/or specific policy develop- Briefs and Alerts, have become reliable sources of ments, and often to deliver targeted advice. analysis and information for both diplomats and In recent years, priority has also been given to academics the world over. dialogues with partner institutes in third coun-

158 6 CFSP AGENCIES

tries, through the annual Transatlantic Forum liaises regularly with all EEAS departments deal- in Washington and strategic dialogues with the ing with security and defence, as well as with the Institute’s Chinese, Indian, Korean and Japanese geographical desks, and involves relevant officials counterparts. in its various events whenever possible. Collaboration with the EU institutions and the other agencies has also increased, leading to COOPERATION projects conducted for the Commission’s DG DEVCO, the European Defence Agency and the Over the course of 2015 and 2016, the EUISS – European Parliament. in close cooperation with the Strategic Planning Cooperation with the SATCEN has recently Division of the European External Action Service been formalised through a dedicated memoran- (EEAS) – successfully coordinated the expert con- dum of understanding. The EUISS also enjoys sultation and outreach process leading up to the excellent working relations with the European EU Global Strategy (EUGS), which was launched Security and Defence College (ESDC): the Insti- by the HR/VP in June 2016. tute offers its expertise and support for courses The process brought together the broader and events (including the alumni network), and, expert community represented by think tankers since September 2015, the EUISS Director has and academics from across Europe (and beyond). been Chair of the ESDC Executive Academic This ‘strategic semester’, as it came to be known, Board. included events in almost every EU Member State, Finally, cooperation with the Member States – organised in collaboration with a national centre or through the PSC and the Board, as well as the institute and often with the direct participation of Permanent Representations, the rotating EU Pres- the foreign ministry. idencies and, occasionally, the Working Groups – The EUISS, which was recently placed under is also a key part of the work of the EUISS. the aegis of the EEAS Secretary-General, also

159 HANDBOOK ON CSDP

6.2. THE EUROPEAN UNION SATELLITE CENTRE

by Pascal Legai

The EU SatCen provides products and services derived from the exploitation of space assets and collateral data to the European Union (to support its decision‑making, missions and operations), EU Member States, third States1 and international organisations. It was founded in 1992 as part of the Western European Union and was incorpo‑ rated into the European Union as an agency on 1 January 2002.

ROLE

Under the supervision of the Political and Secu‑ In response to task requests, SatCen produces rity Committee and the operational direction of analyses. These range from brief descriptions when the High Representative of the Union for Foreign a quick response is required to detailed studies on Affairs and Security Policy, SatCen is a decentral‑ complex areas, installations and activities. ised EU agency which provides decision‑makers Depending on the requests received, SatCen with early warning of potential crises to allow analyses satellite and aerial images for activities timely diplomatic, economic and humanitarian related to EU crisis management operations, arms measures to be taken, including generic planning control, non-proliferation and treaty verification, and conduct for intervention. counter-terrorism, counter-crime, migration, humanitarian aid, contingency planning and gen‑ eral surveillance. SERVICES

GEOINT Training

Geospatial intelligence (GEOINT) is a dis‑ SatCen offers specialised training to image ana‑ cipline that uses the exploitation and analy‑ lysts and general information for users. For this sis of imagery and geospatial information to purpose, it is constantly developing applied train‑ describe, assess and visually depict physical ing techniques and products, such as multimedia features and geographically referenced activi‑ tutorials, remote sensing imagery processing and ties on Earth. data fusion.

1 Third States are non-EU NATO members and other countries which are candidates for accession to the EU.

160 6 CFSP AGENCIES

Director

Deputy Director

Strategy Coordination & Policy & Planning

Brussels Communication Office

Capability Operations IT Administration Finance Development Division Division Division Unit Division

SatCen structure

Capability development activities STAFF

SatCen executes projects and participates SatCen staff are drawn from EU Member in programmes aimed at developing new – or States. In addition, experts seconded from Mem‑ improving existing – capabilities: ber States work at SatCen for periods ranging • Activities under the Copernicus programme, from six months to three years, and temporary supporting in particular EU external action, staff are recruited locally as needed. SatCen’s GEOINT activities, and cooperation in the areas of maritime and border surveillance. • Space surveillance and tracking (SST) activities SUPPORT TO CFSP which contribute to the protection and en‑ hancement of space assets. SatCen is in direct As a unique operational asset in the field of contact with SST users. space and security, SatCen serves a variety of insti‑ • Research, technology development and inno‑ tutional users, ranging from the EU’s high-level vation (RTDI) activities to identify and assess decision-makers, such as the High Representa‑ technical and programmatic solutions to in‑ tive of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Secu‑ coming and transversal issues. rity Policy and Vice President of the Commis‑ sion (HR/VP), and the crisis management and PARTNERS situational awareness structures of the European External Action Service (EEAS) to the person‑ SatCen cooperates with national and international nel on the ground involved in EU missions and institutions in the space sector. It works closely with operations. Within the EEAS, the main users of the European Commission, the European Defence SatCen products are the Crisis Management and Agency and the European Space Agency, as well as Planning Directorate (CMPD), the EU Military other institutions and international organisations. Staff (EUMS), the Intelligence Analysis Centre

161 HANDBOOK ON CSDP

D MISS N AI IONS RIA ITA N A M U h TY SURVE GEoinT URI ILLA G C N Our N Our E I S CE D T N R A Geospatial Intelligence O E p M I (GEOINT) is a discipline p R services U partners

C S

L that comprises the A

R

E exploitation and analysis

N E of imagery and geospatial The SatCen cooperates with national

G information to describe, Training and international institutions in the field assess and visually depict of space. physical features and The SatCen offers specialised geographically referenced training to image analysts. For this It works closely with the European activities on Earth. purpose, it is constantly developing applied Capability development initiatives Defence Agency, the European formative techniques and products, such Commission and the European Space In response to task requests, as multimedia tutorials, remote sensing Agency, as well as other institutions and the SatCen produces imagery processing, data fusion, etc. The SatCen executes projects and international organisations. reports. These range from brief participates in programmes suitable descriptions for fast response The Centre organises the following courses: for the development of new –or the requirements to detailed studies on improvement of existing– capabilities: complex areas and installations. GEOINT course SAR course IMINT course Nuclear course Depending on the task received, Our Sketchup course In-situ courses • Activities in the framework of the SatCen: the Copernicus programme supporting in particular EU staff Detailed information can be found on analyses: external action and the GEOINT www.satcen.europa.eu activities of the SatCen and SatCen staff are drawn from EU Member Critical infrastructure for cooperation in the areas of maritime and border surveillance; States. In addition, experts seconded from Member States work at the SatCen Military capabilities for periods ranging from six months • Space Situational Awareness to three years, and temporary staff are Weapons of mass destruction (SSA) activities contributing to the protection and enhancement locally recruited as needed. of space assets needed to perform the SatCen mission; Details of vacancies are posted on our supports: website.

Humanitarian aid missions • Research, Technology Development and Innovation Contingency planning (RTDI) activities identifying and assessing technical and General crime and security surveillance programmatic solutions on incoming and transversal issues.

(IntCen) and the Civilian Planning and Conduct Security Policy (CFSP), particularly Common Capability (CPCC). Furthermore, the Ministries Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). SatCen of Foreign Affairs and Ministries of Defence of provides support almost in real time and, when EU Member States, the Commission, third States necessary, around the clock. and international organisations like the United SatCen is a concrete example of the pooling Nations can request the support of the Centre. and sharing of know-how and services in a sensi‑ EU SatCen products, handled at various lev‑ tive field. Each Member State, paying only a frac‑ els of confidentiality, are delivered both to central tion of the contributions to the SatCen budget operational entities (e.g. EU Military Staff) and but receiving 100% of the output, directly ben‑ to the Operations Headquarters (OHQs). Every efits from the operational work, shared infor‑ single product is systematically distributed to mation for common decision making, financial all Member States to facilitate cooperative deci‑ optimisation and savings. This pooling of analysis sion-making in the field of Common Foreign and capabilities and sharing of the resulting services

162 6 CFSP AGENCIES

D MISS N AI IONS RIA ITA N A M U h TY SURVE GEoinT URI ILLA G C N Our N Our E I S CE D T N R A Geospatial Intelligence O E p M I (GEOINT) is a discipline p R services U partners

C S

L that comprises the A

R

E exploitation and analysis

N E of imagery and geospatial The SatCen cooperates with national

G information to describe, Training and international institutions in the field assess and visually depict of space. physical features and The SatCen offers specialised geographically referenced training to image analysts. For this It works closely with the European activities on Earth. purpose, it is constantly developing applied Capability development initiatives Defence Agency, the European formative techniques and products, such Commission and the European Space In response to task requests, as multimedia tutorials, remote sensing Agency, as well as other institutions and the SatCen produces imagery processing, data fusion, etc. The SatCen executes projects and international organisations. reports. These range from brief participates in programmes suitable descriptions for fast response The Centre organises the following courses: for the development of new –or the requirements to detailed studies on improvement of existing– capabilities: complex areas and installations. GEOINT course SAR course IMINT course Nuclear course Depending on the task received, Our Sketchup course In-situ courses • Activities in the framework of the SatCen: the Copernicus programme supporting in particular EU staff Detailed information can be found on analyses: external action and the GEOINT www.satcen.europa.eu activities of the SatCen and SatCen staff are drawn from EU Member Critical infrastructure for cooperation in the areas of maritime and border surveillance; States. In addition, experts seconded from Member States work at the SatCen Military capabilities for periods ranging from six months • Space Situational Awareness to three years, and temporary staff are Weapons of mass destruction (SSA) activities contributing to the protection and enhancement locally recruited as needed. of space assets needed to perform the SatCen mission; Details of vacancies are posted on our supports: website.

Humanitarian aid missions • Research, Technology Development and Innovation Contingency planning (RTDI) activities identifying and assessing technical and General crime and security surveillance programmatic solutions on incoming and transversal issues. https://www.satcen.europa.eu/key_documents/SatCen%20leaflet.pdf

strengthen the case for making further use of entities. This is reflected in the demand for Sat‑ the concept upon which SatCen is built and for Cen products and services and, consequently, applying its working methods more widely. capability development has become a central con‑ This specific role requires the Centre’s geospa‑ cern for SatCen. tial intelligence (GEOINT) and imagery intelli‑ gence (IMINT) products and services to be tai‑ lored to support and enable SatCen users in their ADDITIONAL INFORMATION specific undertakings, from diplomatic, economic and humanitarian measures to mission planning • SatCen website: https://www.satcen. or intervention, through a permanent exchange to europa.eu/ support their core business. • europa.eu/about_the_eu_satcen/ The Treaty of Lisbon has increased and diver‑ videos sified the operational engagement of European

163 HANDBOOK ON CSDP

6.3. THE EUROPEAN DEFENCE AGENCY (EDA)

by Jorge Domecq

The European Defence Agency (EDA) was established under the Joint Action of the Coun- cil of 12 July 2004 ‘to support the Member States and the Council in their effort to improve European defence capabilities in the field of crisis management and to sustain the European Security and Defence Policy – now Common Security and Defence Pol- icy (CSDP) – as it stands now and develops in the future’. directorates: Cooperation Planning & Support; To implement the Treaty of Lisbon, this Joint Capability, Armaments & Technology; and Euro- Action was replaced by a Council Decision on pean Synergies & Innovation. 12 July 2011, which was then revised by Council It also has a Corporate Services directorate Decision (CFSP) 2015/1835 of 12 October 2015 which ensures the smooth and efficient function- on the statute, seat and operational rules of the ing of the Agency. EDA. The main tasks of the EDA are to: • identify Member States’ operational military capability requirements and promote measures STRUCTURE AND MANDATE to satisfy those requirements; • propose multilateral projects to fulfil the objec- The Head of the Agency, who chairs the EDA’s tives for military capabilities; Steering Board, is also the High Representative • coordinate the programmes implemented by of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Member States and manage specific coopera- Policy as well as Vice-President of the Euro- tion programmes; pean Commission (currently Federica Mogher- • promote collaborative R&T projects that pro- ini). The EDA Chief Executive (currently Jorge vide Member States and Europe with the mili- Domecq) is appointed by the Steering Board. tary capabilities they will need now and in the In addition to the Defence Ministers’ meetings, future; which are held at least twice a year, the Steering • help identify and implement any measures Board also meets at the level of national arma- needed to strengthen the industrial and tech- ments directors, R&T directors and capabilities nological base of the defence sector; directors. • participate in establishing a European capabili- The EDA’s staff is composed of experts in ties and armaments policy; capability development, research and technol- • work to ensure coherence with other EU poli- ogy, armament cooperation and industrial mat- cies which have implications for defence capa- ters; it combines bottom-up expert‑level initia- bilities; tives (the EDA connects around 2 500 nationally • promote and foster stronger defence coopera- based experts) and top-down political direction. tion between participating Member States; The Agency is organised into three operational • provide support to CSDP operations.

164 6 CFSP AGENCIES European Defence Agency/Black Blade 2016 Defence European HR Mogherini is the Head of the European Defence Agency.

The EDA works ‘à la carte’, from a minimum of act as a powerful lever: projects and programmes two EU Member States to all (except ), launched and managed by the EDA generate sev- and also works with partners such as , Ser- eral hundred million worth of ad hoc invest- bia, and Ukraine (the third countries ments. Since the creation of the Agency in 2004, which have concluded administrative arrange- approximately EUR 1 billion has been invested ments with the EDA). Depending on their stra- in defence research and programmes through the tegic priorities, their operational requirements or EDA. their interest in a specific project, Member States The EDA provides a platform where Member decide themselves when and to what extent they States keen to enhance and develop their defence wish to participate in the Agency’s projects, pro- capabilities through cooperation with other Mem- grammes and activities. ber States can do so. The Agency thereby helps to The EDA is small in size (around 140 staff) develop European military capabilities, adopting a but its specialised personnel work closely with through-life approach: from harmonising require- expert counterparts in Member States, industry, ments to delivery capabilities, from research and EU institutions – notably the European Com- innovation to the development of technology mission – and other multinational organisations demonstrators, and from training and exercises to and entities, such as the European Space Agency maintenance and support for operations. In this (ESA) and the Organisation for Joint Armament respect, the capabilities developed through the Cooperation (OCCAR). The EDA functions EDA can be used in EU CSDP and NATO oper- with a relatively small annual budget (currently ations as well as in other multinational or national just over EUR 30 million) sourced directly from engagements. the Ministries of Defence, which nevertheless, The EDA also acts as a facilitator between combined with its in-house expertise, enables it to Member States’ military stakeholders and wider

165 HANDBOOK ON CSDP European Defence Agency/Black Blade 2016 Defence European The EDA sees itself as an intermediary body which facilitates the establishment and running of EU operations.

EU policies. The Agency represents and defends tems (RPAS), cyber defence, and governmental military views and interests in the process of satellite communications) as well as many other shaping and implementing EU policies while at cooperation projects and programmes in domains the same time offering a platform for the Euro- such as airlift training and exercises, countering pean Commission and other EU bodies to hold improvised explosive devices (C-IED), military a dialogue with the Ministries of Defence. It can airworthiness, single European sky air traffic man- also facilitate the access of Ministries of Defence agement research (SESAR), the impact of energy and the defence industry, notably SMEs, to EU and the environment on defence, and support for instruments and tools, including EU funding. defence-related SMEs (access to EU funding). The idea is to support the development of capa- bilities which attract a critical mass of Member DEFENCE CAPABILITY DEVELOPMENT States, and thereby also strengthen the European defence technological and industrial base. Cooperation among Member States with a view The EDA also plays a key role in drawing up to pooling and sharing military assets is consid- and reviewing the capability development plan ered to be the most appropriate and cost-efficient (CDP), which serves as a reference for national solution to ensure that Europe is able to acquire, capability planning by informing Member States maintain and develop the critical defence capabil- about capability requirements over time and iden- ities it needs to face current and future threats. tifying areas for capability improvements. The Against this backdrop, the EDA has launched EDA has been tasked by Defence Ministers with four main capability development programmes presenting a new set of EU priorities for military (air-to-air refuelling, remotely piloted aircraft sys- capability development by spring 2018.

166 6 CFSP AGENCIES

RESEARCH AND TECHNOLOGIES (R&T)

Stimulating and facilitating collaborative European defence research is another major task of the EDA. It is beyond debate nowadays that investing in future-oriented defence research and technology programmes is absolutely crucial if Europe wants to maintain an appropriate level of strategic autonomy – as is mentioned in the EU Global Strategy – and develop the military capabilities it will need in the future to become a credible security provider for its citizens, its neighbours and its partners. The EDA has been facilitating collaborative research since 2005 by providing technical exper- tise through its various ‘CapTechs’, facilitating 2016 the negotiation process with the Member States Annual and enhancing the effectiveness of the process. report Since 2005, the EDA has facilitated and man- 1 aged over 180 R&T projects, for which the total budget contributed by participating Member Publication: EDA Annual Report 2016 States exceeds EUR 800 million. https://www.eda.europa.eu/docs/default-source/ eda-annual-reports/eda-2016-annual-report-final In addition to this, the EDA is involved in preparations for the launch of the Euro- pean Commission’s ‘Preparatory Action’ (PA) on defence research in 2017. Whereas today’s multiannual EU research programme (Horizon 2020) is exclusively dedicated to civilian-fo- cused research, the PA is meant to test defence research implementation and funding within an EU framework. In the run-up to the PA, which is expected to start in 2017, the EDA is currently managing Support and implementing (on behalf of the European Commission) a pilot project for defence research to CSDP which was launched in March 2016 (call for pro- posals) and for which grant agreements worth Operations almost EUR 1.4 million were signed at the end of October 2016. The pilot project marks the first time that defence research has been funded through the EU budget. The PA may become the nucleus for a fully fledged European defence research pro- Publication: Support to CSDP Operations https://www.eda.europa.eu/docs/default- gramme under the next multiannual financial source/eda-publications/eda-operation-support- framework for 2021 to 2027. brochure_final

167 HANDBOOK ON CSDP

SUPPORT FOR CSDP OPERATIONS

The EDA also sees itself as an intermediary The above is just an illustration of what the body which facilitates the establishment and run- EDA does in accordance with its missions and ning of EU operations in every way it can. tasks. It therefore offers various types of support to The EU Global Strategy (EUGS) presented in Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) June 2016 by Federica Mogherini makes several missions and operations and to EU Battlegroups references to the EDA and in particular states that without generating any additional costs for the full use of the EDA’s potential, especially in capa- Member States or the Agency itself. bility development, is an essential prerequisite for The assistance ranges from expertise and European security and defence efforts. existing projects to providing ready-to-use solu- In this respect, the Agency’s role in the imple- tions for contracting and procurement, and also mentation of the EUGS is crucial, especially as human resource management support and cyber regards the development of defence capabilities. awareness training. In the Council Decision of 12 October 2015 ADDITIONAL INFORMATION on the statute, seat and operational rules of the EDA, support for EU-led operations was even For more information on the EDA’s promoted to one of the Agency’s key tasks. activities, see: www.eda.eu

168 COOPERATION AND 7COLLABORATION

169 HANDBOOK ON CSDP

7.1. CSDP AND PARTNERS

by Clara Ganslandt European Union/EUFOR ALTHEA Union/EUFOR European

The EU and its partners can mutually benefit from each other‘s knowledge, expertise and specific capabilities, thereby bringing them closer to one another.

Common challenges call for shared responsibil- • Cooperation with international organisations ity in addressing them. and in regional and international fora The European Union Global Strategy states • Participation in CSDP missions and operations that ‘the EU will be a responsible global stakeholder, • Security and defence (CSDP) dialogues and but responsibility must be shared and requires invest- seminars ing in our partnerships’. • Capacity building Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) has been an open project from the outset. A com- EUROPEAN UNION GLOBAL STRATEGY prehensive approach means not only drawing on all EU strengths, but also working with interna- The EU will be a responsible global stake- tional and regional organisations, such as the UN, holder, but responsibility must be shared NATO, the OSCE and the African Union, as well and requires investing in our partnerships. as with non-EU countries. Co-responsibility will be our guiding princi- ple in advancing a rules-based global order. The EU and these partners can mutually ben- In the pursuit of our goals, we will reach out efit from each other’s knowledge, expertise and to states, regional bodies and international specific capabilities, thereby bringing them closer organisations. We will work with core part- to one another. ners, like-minded countries and regional The European Union is developing CSDP groupings. partnerships in four main areas:

170 7 COOPERATION AND COLLABORATION NATO, 2016 NATO, Signing ceremony of the EU-NATO Declaration on 8 June 2016 in Warsaw Mr Donald Tusk, President of the European Council; Mr Jens Stoltenberg, Secretary General of NATO; Mr Jean-Claude Juncker, President of the European Commission.

COOPERATION WITH INTERNATIONAL within a broader political and operational frame- ORGANISATIONS AND IN REGIONAL work, making them more effective and efficient AND INTERNATIONAL FORA and enabling the EU to play its role in supporting effective multilateralism. In addition to coopera- EU-UN cooperation in crisis management tion on the ground, there is also regular dialogue and peacekeeping is constantly developing. It between the two organisations on planning, stra- adds value to both organisations and is focused tegic reviews and the implementation of man- on bringing operational benefits to efforts on the dates. ground. Cooperation in Mali and the Central Operational cooperation is accompanied by African Republic are good examples of the EU multiannual initiatives through which the UN and and the UN coordinating support for national the EU continue to strengthen their partnership. security and defence sectors, with EU missions The UN-EU Strategic Partnership on Peacekeeping deployed alongside UN peacekeeping operations. and Crisis Management, which is currently being EU bridging operations have also been conducted implemented, outlines priorities for 2015-2018, to support UN peacekeeping missions, such as the including, inter alia, rapid response, security sec- EUFOR RCA operation in the Central African tor reform, information and analysis exchange, and Republic. support for the African Peace and Security Archi- The EU and the UN work together on EU-led tecture. The focus is on putting modalities and crisis management operations and missions in, procedures in place to allow for closer cooperation. for example, Mali, the Central African Repub- The partnership also features regular high-level lic, Somalia, Libya, the Horn of Africa and the dialogue, including the biannual EU-UN Steering Western Balkans. EU cooperation with the UN Committee on Crisis Management, regular meet- on peacekeeping places the EU’s CSDP missions ings between ambassadors from the EU Political

171 HANDBOOK ON CSDP

proposals consisting of 42 action-oriented deliver- ables covering all seven areas of cooperation iden- tified in the Joint Declaration. In its conclusions of 15 December, the European Council urged swift action on implementation, avoiding dupli- cation and ensuring complementarity between the EU and NATO. Implementation of the Joint Declaration is a key political priority for the EU. It will be carried out in accordance with the guid- ing principles of transparency, inclusiveness, reci- procity and with full respect of the decision-mak- ing autonomy of the two organisations and the

European Union European specific character of the security and defence pol- EU-UN cooperation in the field is essential for mission icy of all members. accomplishment. Strengthening EU-NATO cooperation is linked to broader efforts by the EU to enhance and Security Committee (PSC) and the UN Secu- its contribution to Europe’s security – notably rity Council (UNSC), the participation of the UN through the implementation of the EU Global Under-Secretary General for Peacekeeping Oper- Strategy and the European Defence Action Plan. ations in high-level meetings of the EU Member This will be done by assisting Member States in States (e.g. informal defence ministers meetings, developing their security and defence capabilities, PSC meetings) and an annual visit of the High as well as strengthening the EU’s own structures Representative to the UNSC. and mechanisms in order to be able to deliver on Maintaining a strong transatlantic relationship missions and operations. remains of fundamental importance to Europe. In These efforts will also benefit NATO – both the current security environment, strengthening by boosting capabilities and by giving the organ- EU-NATO cooperation is more important and isation a stronger partner with whom to share necessary than ever. Our bond has a solid foun- responsibilities. Reinforcing EU-NATO coopera- dation: our shared values, our common interests tion plays a considerable role in strengthening the and the need to face current challenges together. transatlantic bond as well. The Joint Declaration signed by President Tusk, Multilateral cooperation under the Eastern President Juncker and the NATO Secretary Gen- Partnership Panel on CSDP, launched in 2013, eral Jens Stoltenberg in Warsaw in July 2016 gave complements bilateral relations and allows all six new impetus and substance to EU-NATO coop- Eastern Partnership countries (Armenia, Azer- eration. The Joint Declaration identified seven baijan, Belarus, Georgia, the Republic of Mol- areas of cooperation: countering hybrid threats; dova and Ukraine) to be involved in numerous operational cooperation, including at sea and on workshops, seminars, field visits and other train- migration; cyber security and defence; defence ing activities. Georgia, the Republic of Moldova, capabilities; defence industry and research; exer- and Ukraine remain the most active partners – all cises; and supporting Eastern and Southern part- three are clearly committed to closer cooperation ners’ capacity-building efforts. It also mandated in CSDP missions and operations. EU and NATO staff to develop concrete propos- All CSDP training activities are organised als for implementation. in cooperation with the national authorities of On 6 December 2016, the NATO and EU partner countries and financially supported by Councils respectively endorsed a common set of the EU (European Neighbourhood Instrument).

172 7 COOPERATION AND COLLABORATION European Union European EU cooperation with ASEAN countries.

Since 2013, the EEAS’s Crisis Management and by the Joint Africa-EU Strategy, signed in 2007, Planning Directorate (CMPD), together with the which made peace and security a priority across European Security and Defence College (ESDC) the eight thematic partnerships to be developed and EU Member States, have conducted more in a comprehensive manner between the EU and than 30 different CSDP activities for Eastern Africa. partners, including outreach events in Kyiv, Tbi- EU support for capacity building for peace and lisi, Chisinau, Minsk, and Yerevan. In addition, security in Africa under various instruments and all partner countries take advantage of the regular policy areas has gradually increased over the last training and education events organised by the few years. ESDC. EU support for peace and security includes In the short and medium term, the EU and both longer-term structural support and support its partners are looking for opportunities to of a more time-bound nature. expand cooperation in the field of security. The Activities may be financed under the general EU’s Global Strategy, together with the revised budget of the Union, by the European Devel- European Neighbourhood Policy and the Joint opment Fund, or bilaterally by EU Member Communication on countering hybrid threats, States. will offer new opportunities enabling the EU to CSDP activities in Africa are the main EU deliver more security in the European neighbour- defence and security tools for cooperation with hood and to engage in capacity building. African security and , be it within The EU partnership with the African Union national forces or in close coordination with UN (AU) and African actors in peace and security and or AU contingents. Civilian and military mis- crisis management was put on a strategic footing sions in the Sahel, Central Africa and the Horn

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of Africa are cooperating with African forces on NATO allies and candidate countries have partic- a daily basis. ipated in various CSDP missions and operations The EU’s willingness to step up cooperation and were the first to develop close cooperation with its Asian partners also translates into multi- with the EU in this respect. lateral activities. From autumn 2013 until spring Partners have contributed to EU-led missions 2014, for example, the EU co-chaired with Myan- and operations, sometimes providing key enabling mar the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) Inter-Ses- assets and capabilities. Approximately 45 non-EU sional Support Group on Confidence Building states have participated in CSDP operations since Measures and Preventive Diplomacy. The three the first operation was launched in 2003. editions of the EU-ASEAN High-Level Dialogue Here are some examples: on Maritime Security have complemented and • Since 2014, Georgia has been contributing to added value to the ongoing ASEAN mechanisms the EU-led CSDP operation, with 156 military and processes in this area. at the peak of its deployment. The country also Between 2017 and 2020, the EU will co-chair contributed to the follow-on mentoring and – along with Vietnam and Australia – the ARF advisory mission EUMAM RCA, and is set to Inter-Sessional Meeting on Maritime Security for participate in the EU military training mission the first time. EUTM RCA. The EU also regularly participates in ARF- • Serbia is providing medical support to the three driven exercises in humanitarian assistance and EUTMs and Turkey is amongst the largest con- disaster relief, and in workshops on issues such tributors to EUFOR Althea in Bosnia and Her- as maritime security and mediation. In 2016, EU zegovina. Albania, Chile, the former Yugoslav officials were invited to attend the Multilateral Republic of Macedonia and Switzer­land also Naval Exercise Komodo, organised by Indonesia, provide long-term support to Althea. and the joint China-US Disaster Rescue Exercise • Albania, Georgia, Montenegro and the Repub- – both first-time occurrences. lic of Moldova have participated in EUTM Mali and Switzerland has joined EUCAP Sahel Mali. PARTICIPATION IN CSDP MISSIONS • Canada, Georgia, Norway and Switzerland AND OPERATIONS have contributed to EUAM Ukraine. • Numerous third countries regularly participate CSDP partnerships with third countries have a in EUNAVFOR Atalanta or cooperate with the number of different objectives, including foster- maritime operation. ing third-country participation in CSDP oper- Altogether, 12 partner countries participated in ations, building resilience in a particular coun- nine EU-led missions and operations in 2016: try or region, contributing to efforts to prevent EUNAVFOR Atalanta; EUMAM RCA; EUTM or manage a crisis and dialogue in view of the Somalia; EUTM Mali; EUCAP Sahel Mali; geo-strategic significance of the partner countries. EUPOL COPPS; EUFOR Althea; EULEX The primary objective of CSDP cooperation with Kosovo; and EUAM Ukraine. The number fluc- partners is to maximise the impact of CSDP oper- tuated throughout the year, but at times part- ational activities. ners’ participation constituted almost 10 % of The Union regularly invites third countries to the overall personnel deployed in CSDP mis- participate in specific missions and operations. sions. The current number (at the end of 2016) This cooperation is mutually beneficial in terms of of participating personnel from partner countries capacities, interoperability and experience, as well is around 305 (around 5 %). The EU concludes as legitimacy and political leverage. All non-EU Framework Participation Agreements (FPA) with

174 7 COOPERATION AND COLLABORATION European Union/EUNAVFOR Somalia Union/EUNAVFOR European EU Naval Force warships FS Siroco and FGS Hessen conducted a joint counter-piracy exercise with two Chinese Navy ships, CNS Yancheng and CNS Taihu. selected partner countries to facilitate their partic- activities in these countries by preventing dupli- ipation in CSDP missions and operations and fos- cations while exploring uncharted territories ter long-term cooperation. The network of CSDP between the two organisations. Against this back- Framework Participation Agreements has even ground, it is also worth recalling the priorities set expanded to Asia and Latin America. So far (at out in the EU Global Strategy of building resil- the end of 2016), 18 such legally binding inter- ience in the neighbourhood and providing more national agreements have been signed with: Alba- protection for EU citizens. CSDP partnerships nia, Australia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Canada, will thus continue to be instrumental in achieving Chile, Colombia, the former Yugoslav Republic this goal. of Macedonia, Georgia, , Montenegro, the It is now regularly possible for new CSDP Republic of Moldova, New Zealand, Norway, the missions and operations to establish project Republic of Korea, Serbia, Turkey, Ukraine and cells in order to gather parallel support from the USA. These agreements will open new ave- potential donors from Member States and part- nues for dialogue and concrete operational coop- ner countries, following the positive example of eration. Canada’s financial contribution to a project run In the Southern Neighbourhood, the EU by EUTM Mali. Beyond US participation in remains forthcoming in CSDP contact with, inter the CSDP mission in Kosovo, flexible informal alia, Tunisia, Morocco, Jordan and the League of cooperation with the US continues in the Horn Arab States. Some of these entities have recently of Africa/Somalia and at military-to-military shown a renewed interest in engaging more com- level. Some partners are also joining the EU prehensively with the EU on security and defence. Battlegroups (FYROM, Norway, Turkey and Moreover, the implementation of the EU-NATO Ukraine) or training with the EU (China and Warsaw Declaration could provide a new impetus Japan held naval exercises with EUNAVFOR to improve the effectiveness of capacity-building Atalanta).

175 HANDBOOK ON CSDP European Union/EUFOR RCA Union/EUFOR European Georgia has been contributing to the EU-led CSDP operation with 156 military at the peak of its deployment.

SECURITY AND DEFENCE (CSDP) highly appreciated training and education that the DIALOGUES AND SEMINARS ESDC provides to and undertakes with partner countries strengthens connections and paves the The EU has developed regular dialogues in the way for enhanced future cooperation. field of CSDP with several countries and organi- The EU has also increased the number of sem- sations. Following the principle that ‘one size does inars on security and defence organised together not fit all’, the level, frequency, topics and formats with the ESDC. These seminars reach out to of these dialogues are adapted to the EU’s and its potential partners or important stakeholders (East- partners’ respective expectations and interests. ern Partnership countries, the Western Balkans, Beyond dialogue and operational cooperation, ASEAN, China, South America and Mexico) and the role of the European Security and Defence have a wide array of objectives, ranging from build- College (ESDC) should also be highlighted. The ing confidence between the EU and other security actors, to explaining the CSDP in depth, sharing TREATY ON EUROPEAN UNION best practices and encouraging interest in partner- ships for our missions and operations. Article 21: The Union shall seek to devel- op relations and build partnerships with third countries, and international, region- CAPACITY BUILDING al or global organisations which share the [same] principles. It shall promote multi- Security challenges have to be tackled by those lateral solutions to common problems, in and with those most affected. The EU is therefore particular in the framework of the United Nations. increasingly engaged in building the capacities of partner countries and organisations in volatile

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regions. The long-term objective is to enable them FOREIGN AFFAIRS COUNCIL, to take responsibility for their own security so that 14 NOVEMBER 2016 they can increasingly prevent and manage crises by themselves. It is in this context that the flagship ‘Stressing the importance of taking forward initiative ‘Capacity building in support of security the cooperation with partner organisations and development’ (CBSD) was launched. and partner countries, the Council invites The overall objective is to support partner the High Representative to present options for a more strategic approach to CSDP part- countries in enhancing their own capacity to nership cooperation with partner countries prevent and manage crises on their own in a sus- which share EU values and are able and tainable manner. This need was identified by our willing to contribute to CSDP missions and CSDP missions: the training provided by our mil- operations, in full respect of the EU’s insti- itary missions could not be sustained and could tutional framework and its decision-making become a lost investment for the EU without autonomy. further support in the provision of equipment This strategic approach should also include (non-lethal items like boots, tents, blankets, etc.) possibilities to strengthen the resilience of and basic infrastructure. partners to our East and South, including Following the Joint Communication of April in Africa, also taking into account the im- 2015 on CBSD, in July 2016 the EEAS and the portance of security under the review of the European Union/EUFOR RCA Union/EUFOR European Commission adopted a package aimed at enhanc- European Neighbourhood Policy.’ ing the EU’s role as a global actor in the field of security. The package consisted of an EU-wide strategic framework to support security sector reform and a legislative proposal amending the FOREIGN AFFAIRS COUNCIL, 14 NOVEMBER 2016 Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace (IcSP) to enhance capacity building in support of ‘The Council is committed to strengthening security and development in third countries, par- the Union’s ability to act as a security pro- ticularly as regards non-lethal military equipment vider and to enhance the Common Security and infrastructure. and Defence Policy (CSDP) as an essential This priority is clearly reflected in the EU part of the Union’s external action. This Global Strategy as well as in the European Coun- will enhance its global strategic role and cil conclusions of December 2016. its capacity to act autonomously when and where necessary and with partners wher- ever possible.’ NEXT STEPS

The Foreign Affairs Council (FAC) in Novem- Moreover, this strategic approach ‘should also ber 2016 stressed the importance of taking coop- include possibilities to strengthen the resilience of eration with partner organisations and partner partners to our East and South, including in Africa, countries forward and invited the High Repre- also taking into account the importance of security sentative to present ‘options for a more strategic under the review of the European Neighbourhood approach to CSDP partnership cooperation with Policy’. partner countries which share EU values and are Work to prepare such options is now being able and willing to contribute to CSDP missions and taken forward. operations, in full respect of the EU’s institutional framework and its decision-making autonomy’.

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7.2. INTERNAL-EXTERNAL SECURITY NEXUS – STRENGTHENING TIES BETWEEN CSDP AND FSJ ACTORS by Michel Savary European Union European Nowadays, EU missions and operations are increasingly embedded in a wider EU approach. The link between CSDP and FSJ must be further reinforced based on a coherent set of actions.

CSDP was designed as a tool to prevent, man- CSDP EMBEDDED IN A WIDER EU age or resolve crises of both a military and civilian APPROACH nature, outside the EU and as an integral part of EU foreign policy. Today, EU missions and operations are increas- Many CSDP missions and operations may ingly embedded in a wider EU approach; it could also directly or indirectly deal with reform of the not be otherwise. Strengthening the links between security sector (SSR) and the provision of support internal and external security, especially in areas to a host country to build sustainable rule of law such as irregular migration, trafficking of all sorts, institutions as part of their contribution to inter- terrorism and hybrid threats is increasingly impor- national peace and security. tant for the further development of CSDP when considering any possible new operation/mission. In this vein, the Council conclusions on CSDP1

1 8971/15.

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European Union The link between CSDP and FSJ must be further reinforced based on a coherent set of actions.

adopted by the Council on 18 May 2015 state: Statement2 and the statement by the European ‘The Council strongly underlines the need to further Council on the fight against terrorism of 12 Feb- strengthen the links between external and internal ruary 2015. security.’ The HR/VP/Head of the Agency report ahead of the European Council in June 2015 mentions COHERENCE BETWEEN INTERNAL/ that ‘… terrorist and other attacks in several Mem- EXTERNAL SECURITY ber States have impacted on the internal security situation and have further highlighted the linkages The Commission’s communication on the Euro- between external and internal security.’ pean Agenda on Security adopted on 28 April 20153 This has been identified in various other high identifies the need to ensure coherence between level discussions as well, such as the Riga Joint the internal and external dimensions of security

2 5855/15, page 7. 3 COM(2015) 185 final.

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as one guiding principle. Stressing the inter-link- A Joint Staff Working Paper – ‘Strengthening age between EU internal security and global secu- Ties between CSDP and FSJ Actors – Proposals for rity, and the fact that security threats are not con- a Way ahead’ 4 presented jointly to the Political strained by the borders of the EU, the Commission and Security Committee (PSC) and the Stand- underlines the need for a comprehensive approach, ing Committee on Operational Cooperation on based on a coherent set of actions, to further rein- Internal Security (COSI) in June 2011 clarifies force links between Justice and Home Affairs and where the interface of their policies affords scope the Common Security and Defence Policy. for coordinated or possible concerted action, while respecting their respective competencies. The following specific areas where cooperation INTEGRATIVE AND COMPLEMENTARY can be further strengthened have been identified APPROACH as having potential for further action: Compre- hensive Situational Awareness and Intelligence The Council conclusions on the renewed Support to the EU; Exchange of information and European Union Internal Security Strategy (2015- mutual support; Improving mechanisms in the 2020) adopted by the Council on 16 June 2015 decision-making process; Improving cooperation state inter alia: the council, ’ […] acknowledging in planning EU external action; Capabilities: the growing links between the European Union Human Resources and Training. internal and external security as well as following an Along these lines a roadmap was established in integrative and complementary approach aimed at December 20115 (12 priority lines of action out reducing overlapping and avoiding duplication […] of 27 lines of action). Four progress reports on the welcomes the call of the Foreign Affairs Council of overall implementation of the roadmap activities 18 May 2015 to develop synergies between CSDP and, in parallel, completed actions were presented and relevant actors in the area of freedom, security to Member States in Civcom and the COSI sup- and justice, and calls on all actors involved to increase port group. further their efforts and support to the implemen- tation of the principles contained in the road map ‘Strengthening ties between CSDP and FSJ’.’ STRUCTURED COOPERATION As a matter of fact, and as identified in the Civilian Headline Goal 2010 (HLG), actions to The priority has been to structure the approach strengthen ties between the Common Security to cooperation, in particular with EU agencies and Defence Policy (CSDP) and the area of Free- (Europol, Frontex, Eurojust and CEPOL), EURO- dom, Security and Justice (FSJ) actors were set GENDFOR and INTERPOL, and to agree on up years ago, and linkages have been established possible cooperation and coordination mechanisms between the external and internal security of the (among others, the administrative arrangement on EU. sharing classified information between the EEAS This initiative supports the idea that closer and Europol and Frontex, the working arrange- cooperation between civilian CSDP missions and ment with Frontex, the exchange of letters on JHA actors could yield tangible improvements in enhancing cooperation with Europol, Interpol…). terms of European security. I would like to high- The ‘General Administrative Arrangement between light one particular area where tangible actions the European Gendarmerie Force’ (EUROGEND- took place in practice: FOR or ‘EGF’) and the European External Action

4 9878/11 of 6 May 2011. 5 Strengthening Ties between CSDP and FSJ actors-roadmap, 18173/11, 5 December 2011.

180 7 COOPERATION AND COLLABORATION EUCAP Sahel Mali 40 National Guard sergeants trained by Malians with the pedagogic support of EUCAP Sahel Mali

Service (EEAS) on cooperation under the Com- ism-related products are provided by INTCEN mon Security and Defence Policy’ entered into to COSI and the Working Party on Terrorism force on 6 October 2014 and consolidated the (TWP), which then brief the PSC with intelli- EGF’s support for crisis management structures gence based assessments on matters of foreign and and its involvement in missions and operations. security policy relevance. EU agencies are regularly A permanent relationship/triangular connection invited to the PSC as well. Informal joint meet- with EU agencies and the Commission is being set ings of PSC/COSI take place once per Council up: trilateral meetings at Director level between the Presidency, and all interlocutors have talks on the Commission, the EEAS/Europol and Frontex; the internal/external nexus. participation of the EEAS included crisis manage- ment structures in the establishment of EU agen- cies’ work programmes. Regular staff-level talks are TRAINING AND EDUCATION giving rise to new initiatives for cooperation, and will potentially come up with new, innovative ways In the area of training and education, the to move this agenda forward. institutionalisation of CSDP/FSJ courses as well EEAS services have taken part in the consulta- as the streamlining of the CSDP/FSJ nexus in tion on the overview of analytical products under- various courses organised in the framework of taken by the Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) agen- the European Police College (CEPOL) and the cies network, underlining that it is critical to share European Security and Defence College (ESDC) information, and not only on specific threats. should also be noted. Links between the ESDC Concerning the decision-making process, ter- and relevant Union agencies, including CEPOL rorist threat assessments and other counter-terror- and Frontex, and with the European Union’s

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law enforcement agency (Europol) have been In order to contribute to this process, the strengthened and the development of joint train- principles contained in the ‘Strengthening Ties ing activities encouraged. Cooperation on train- between CSDP and FSJ’ Roadmap remain valid. ing (with Europol) in the field of cyber-related If most of the actions identified have been carried issues is also scheduled. out successfully, it has now become necessary to move beyond the measures identified in 2011 and to take into account the evolving international INFORMATION SHARING context and especially those aspects that challenge security in Europe. From a strategic and operational perspective, it should be noted that the EEAS, INTCEN and Frontex have started to systematically share their CONTRIBUTION OF CSDP non-classified analytical products and situation reports, which are then distributed within the As a follow up on this process, a CMPD Food EEAS. for Thought Paper ‘From strengthening ties On the basis of the new Council Decision on between CSDP/FSJ actors towards more security the EU Satellite Centre6 (SATCEN), a service in EUROPE’ 7 was written in July 2016, focusing level agreement has provided solid ground for on the contribution of CSDP missions in ensur- enhanced operational cooperation for the provi- ing more ‘return on investment’ for EU security. sion of satellite products between the SATCEN The paper’s aim is to draw the attention of Mem- and Frontex. ber States to concrete actions which, at a later As for civilian missions, the revision of the ‘vis- stage, may contribute to the implementation of iting experts’ guidelines has enabled a sound legal the newly adopted EU Global Strategy on Foreign and financial basis for the participation of FSJ and Security Policy (EUGS), particularly in three experts from agencies in the conduct of CSDP specific areas: missions. Cooperation frameworks with Eurojust • Operationalising the internal/external secu- and CEPOL are now being considered. rity nexus. Additionally, the new legal frameworks of cer- We need to be able to work on an operational tain JHA agencies such as Europol that will enter timescale. Cooperation frameworks are to be into force next year and, more recently, that of the fully implemented with EU internal security European Border and Coast Guard Regulation actors at the strategic and operational levels, (2016) will increase the external activities of these enabling permanent consultation. new external crisis management actors. There is • Improving situational awareness and ex- also an enhanced role for EU Delegations. changing information within the EU. EU actors abroad, in particular EU Delega- This new approach would mean maintaining tions – where counter-terrorism/security & defence the confidence and support of the authorities of experts, European migration liaison officers the host countries where missions are deployed. (EMLO) or EU agencies liaison officers (such as While a challenge, introducing significant FSJ Frontex) are deployed – and CSDP missions should assets and internal security objectives into CSDP further contribute to situational awareness and to should not alter the credibility or undermine the the exchange of information among EU actors. effectiveness of future CSDP operations.

6 Council Decision 2014/401/CFSP of 26 June 2014 on the European Union Satellite Centre and repealing Joint Action 2001/555/CFSP on the establishment of a European Union Satellite Centre. 7 10934/16.

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• CivMil convergence and synergies. The Council conclusions on implementing the In essence, it can be argued that the internal/ EU Global Strategy (EUGS) in the area of Secu- external security nexus should also generate en- rity and Defence of 14 November 2016 set out hanced civilian-military interaction within the ‘the main goals which the EU and its Member States CSDP. Further consideration should also be will aim to achieve in order to implement the EUGS given to the design, deployment and support of in the area of security and defence, including through a well-coordinated and possibly even integrated CSDP, in support of three strategic priorities identi- civ-mil CSDP deployment with complementa- fied in the EUGS: (a) responding to external conflicts ry mandates and objectives. and crises, (b) building the capacities of partners, and (c) protecting the Union and its citizens’. As stated in the Global Strategy, ‘Security of The level of ambition and the guidance required Our Union is a priority for our external action’. in the future for this level of ambition are set out The strategy highlights the fact that ‘internal as follows: and external security are ever more intertwined: • ‘Protecting the Union and its citizens covers the our security at home depends on peace beyond our contribution that the EU and its Member States borders’. This should be the guiding principle on can make from a security and defence perspective, how we use our instruments, taking a holistic notably through CSDP in line with the Treaty, approach in the light of what any given situation to tackle challenges and threats that have an im- may require. pact on the security of the Union and its citizens, In line with the comprehensive approach, along the nexus of internal and external security, CSDP should be seen as complementary to other in cooperation with Freedom, Security and Justice approaches, whilst avoiding duplication through (FSJ) actors’. action being carried out either by EU Member • ‘Promoting civil-military cooperation in the field States or the Commission. as well as strengthening ties with FSJ actors, where In the words of the EU Global Strategy, appropriate, should be pursued in this context [as ‘CSDP missions and operations can work alongside an action to be implemented]’. the European Border and Coast Guard and EU This should be streamlined as a mantra that is specialised agencies to enhance border protection applicable to external activities and will require and maritime security in order to save more lives, even closer cooperation between all EU actors in fight cross-border crime and disrupt smuggling net- the future in order to achieve better synergies and works’. avoid duplication of efforts.

FSJ AND CSDP ARE DIFFERENT, BUT…

It may be recalled that the area of freedom, security and justice (FSJ) and the Common Secu- rity and Defence Policy (CSDP) are still distinct policy areas acting under different legal regimes, governed by different stakeholders (military, dip- lomatic or home affairs) and implemented by dif- ferent EU entities. However, there may now be a need to blur the lines between internal and exter- nal security.

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7.3. THE SECURITY AND DEVELOPMENT NEXUS by Clément Boutillier European Union/ECHO, Mallika Panorat Mallika Union/ECHO, European To improve the effectiveness and the impact of EU development policy, the security and development nexus provides added value compared to traditional development approaches by taking into account the specificities of working in fragile and conflict-affected states.

The security and development nexus – peace visible and less predictable’, combining terrorism, is also often added into the equation – has been regional conflicts, weak state governance and defined and referred to in a large number of Com­ organised crime outside its borders, including in mission communications, Council conclusions many countries supported by the EU’s develop­ and other policy documents. The EU Security ment policy. The 2006 European Consensus on Strategy 2003 stressed that security is a precondi­ Development defined the security and develop­ tion for development and that, in turn, develop­ ment nexus as follows: ‘without peace and secu­ ment is a powerful tool to encourage reform in rity, development and poverty eradication are not partner countries. In 2003, Europe had started possible, and without development and poverty to face new threats that were ‘more diverse, less eradication no sustainable peace will occur’.1

1 European Consensus on Development, 2006, available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ. do?uri=OJ%3AC%3A2006%3A046%3A0001%3A0019%3AEN%3APDF, last accessed on 10 December 2016.

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ERADICATION OF POVERTY

As set out in Article 208 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU, the main objective of development policy is the reduction and, in the long term, the eradication of poverty. Develop­ ment policy also pursues other objectives, such as ensuring sustainable economic, social and environmental development and the promotion of democracy, rule of law, good governance and international respect for human rights. To improve the effectiveness and the impact of EU development policy, the security and devel­ opment nexus provides added value compared to traditional development approaches by taking into account the specificities of working in fragil­e Starohnativka and Humanitarian Aid/ IOM, Volodymyr EU Civil Protection and conflict-affected states (FCAS). Ukraine: Vital supplies reach civilians in frontline villages. More than 50 % of EU development assistance Hygiene kits were distributed in Starohnativka, Donetsk region today is directed at countries affected by conflicts and fragility. The EU has a wide range of instru­ ments in its toolbox to address conflicts and crises, Union and its Member States are the number one such as conflict prevention, sanctions, human­ provider of official development assistance (ODA) itarian aid, mediation, Common Security and in the world. Defence Policy (CSDP) missions and operations, stabilisation, political dialogue and development cooperation. THE SECURITY AND DEVELOPMENT Development cooperation is a cornerstone NEXUS of the external action of the European Union. It is managed by the Directorate-General for An early example of a development strategy International Cooperation and Development implemented on the basis of this nexus is pro­ (DG DEVCO), which defines the EU’s develop­ vided by Sierra Leone from 2001 onwards. The ment policy and uses a set of instruments to imple­ authorities, with the support of the international ment programmes and projects on the ground. community, prioritised security as their first devel­ It does so by following development effective­ opment objective after years of civil war in order ness principles such as ownership of interventions to be able to build infrastructure and deliver social by partners at the local, national or regional levels, services across the country later. alignment behind objectives and strategies defined As it became increasingly clear that FCAS by those partners and coordination and informa­ were lagging behind other developing countries tion-sharing among donors to avoid duplication. in meeting the Millennium Development Goals2 In 2015, the budget managed by DG DEVCO (MDGs), a consensus emerged among donors to amounted to EUR 8.42 billion. The European prioritise support to those countries.

2 To eradicate extreme poverty and hunger; to achieve universal primary education; to promote gender equality and empower women; to reduce child mortality; to improve maternal health; to combat HIV/AIDS, malaria, and other dis­ eases; to ensure environmental sustainability; to develop a global partnership for development.

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DEVELOPMENT, HUMANITARIAN AND rity and development nexus in FCAS will become SECURITY COOPERATION all the more important in the future as it is esti­ mated that the percentage of the world’s poor living Although fragility is a multidimensional con­ in FCAS will rise from 43 % in 2015 to 62 % in cept spanning economic (e.g. youth unemploy­ 2030, compared to only 20 % in 2005.5 ment), environmental (e.g. exposure to natural The EU has been one of the earliest and most disasters and epidemics), political (e.g. corruption, prominent players to translate the nexus between lack of political inclusiveness), security (e.g. crime) security and development into its policy frame­ and societal (e.g. inequalities) factors,3 violence work and action given its history and experience and insecurity are often the main reasons why a in promoting peace within its own borders and its country is considered fragile. FCAS usually have credibility in promoting values such as democracy limited capacity, authority and/or legitimacy to and human rights. It is also due to the scale of achieve peace and sustainable development, and its support, the continued partnership it has built the authorities have to deal with multiple pressing over time with many FCAS and the diversity of priorities. As a result, the sequence of reforms has the short-term and long-term instruments the EU to be adapted to the specific context, although it can mobilise across the conflict cycle. The 2011 should usually start with the building of institu­ Agenda for Change,6 defining the EU’s develop­ tions and specific action to improve trust between ment policy, underlines the efforts to be pursued state and society. The New Deal for engagement in to tackle the challenges related to security and fragile states,4 adopted as part of the outcome of fragility calling for a more integrated, coherent the Busan High Level Forum on aid effectiveness and coordinated response. The EU Global Strat­ in 2011 with strong support from the EU, listed egy of 2016 also calls for ‘the dual – security and five peacebuilding and statebuilding goals to serve development – nature of the [EU] engagement’ as a guide for the delivery of development assis­ to be developed to deal with specific challenges tance in FCAS: legitimate politics, security, justice, posed by conflicts. The proposal for a new Euro­ economic foundations and revenues and services. pean Consensus on Development, adopted by Coordination between development, humanitarian the European Commission in November 2016,7 and security actors, in full compliance with their also states that ‘the EU and its Member States respective mandates and principles, in order to will use development cooperation as part of the prevent crises from recurring or to help countries full range of policies and instruments to prevent, recover in the longer term, is often an additional manage and help resolve conflicts and crises, meet challenge. Despite recent impressive progress in humanitarian needs and build lasting peace and countries such as Myanmar/Burma and Colom­ good governance’. The revised European Consen­ bia, crises and conflicts are becoming more pro­ sus on Development reflects the fact that the EU tracted and recurrent. In six countries out of ten, aims to play a leading role in the implementation significant humanitarian needs related to disasters of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development of human and natural origin last for eight years or adopted in 2015. The 2030 Agenda represents more. Improving the implementation of the secu­ a new way of addressing global challenges based

3 OECD, States of Fragility 2016 (Highlights), p. 37, available at http://www.oecd.org/dac/conflict-fragility-resilience/docs/ Fragile-States-highlights-2016.pdf, last accessed on 10 December 2016. 4 A New Deal for engagement in fragile states, available at https://www.pbsbdialogue.org/media/filer_pub­ lic/07/69/07692de0-3557-494e-918e-18df00e9ef73/the_new_deal.pdf, last accessed on 10 December 2016. 5 OECD, States of Fragility 2015: Meeting Post-2015 Ambitions, p. 21, available at http://www.oecd.org/dac/govern­ ance-peace/publications/documentuploads/SOF2015.pdf, last accessed on 10 December 2016. 6 See COM(2011) 637 final of 13 October 2011. 7 COM(2016) 740 final of 22 ovemberN 2016.

186 7 COOPERATION AND COLLABORATION European Union , 2017/Jennifer Jacquemart , 2017/Jennifer Union European Participation of , Member of the European Commission, in the EU/Angola Annual Ministerial Meeting on Maritime Security. on common objectives and a shared responsibil­ of programmes and projects. Between 2001 and ity for all countries. Peace and security is a build­ 2009, European Commission support for JSSR ing-block for the achievement of the agenda as a rose from EUR 14 million to EUR 174 million a whole, and progress will be monitored through a year, and support for CPPB from EUR 120 million dedicated goal – Sustainable Development Goal to EUR 854 million. For the 2014 – 2020 period, 16 – on peace, justice and strong institutions. more than 10 % of EU development cooperation was programmed in support of conflict prevention, resolution, peace and security-related activities. EU IMPLEMENTATION OF PROGRAMMES interventions in these areas take place at all levels, AND PROJECTS from the local to the global level. This support covers a wide range of activities, from supporting Two evaluations of the support provided by the conflict resolution mechanisms at community level European Commission, to justice and security sec­ in Nigeria’s north-east to contributing to the recon­ tor reform (JSSR)8 and to conflict prevention and struction trust fund in Afghanistan, preventing peacebuilding (CPPB)9 respectively, were pub­ human rights abuses in , and supporting lished in 2011. They help measure how the secu­ demining programmes and anti-piracy action. The rity and development nexus has gained importance African Peace Facility (APF) represents a large part not only in policy but also in the implementation of EU support provided to CPPB. The facility was

8 Available at http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/how/evaluation/evaluation_reports/reports/2011/1295_vol1_en.pdf, last accessed on 10 December 2016. 9 Available at http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/fpi/documents/thematic_evaluation_of_ec_support_to_pb_and_conflict_preven­ tion_2011_en.pdf, last accessed on 10 December 2016.

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established in 2004 to support the capacity of the provides practitioners with guiding principles to African Union and Regional Economic Commu­ work in situations of conflict and crisis. It is not nities (RECs) to manage conflicts and more than about ‘what to do’ but rather ‘how to do it’. It EUR 2 billion has been committed under the APF builds on a number of previous initiatives such as so far. It serves to support peace operations in Africa the Sahel and Horn of Africa strategies, which aim such as AMISOM in Somalia, MISCA in the Cen­ to make the EU’s external action more coherent, tral African Republic, ECOMIB in Guinea­ -Bissau more visible and more effective by mobilising all and the Multi-National Joint Task Force (MNTJF) EU tools towards a common objective. For exam­ for the fight against Boko Haram. It is also used to ple, the strategy for development and security in enhance dialogue on challenges to peace and secu­ the Sahel, adopted in 2011, calls for the mobili­ rity and to support the operationalisation of the sation of all the EU’s available tools to meet the African Peace and Security Architecture for conflict long-term objective of ‘enhancing political sta­ prevention and management. bility, security, good governance, social cohesion and economic and education opportunities in the Sahel states, thus setting the conditions for local PEACEBUILDING AND STATEBUILDING and national sustainable development’. Eight elements underpin the EU’s compre­ Evaluations of development cooperation pro­ hensive approach: (1) a shared analysis to build a grammes highlight a number of issues particularly common understanding of the challenges at hand relevant for peacebuilding and statebuilding: (a) in a given context; (2) the definition of a common the interdependency between good governance, strategic vision setting the direction for the EU’s security, justice, growth, employment and the engagement; (3) a focus on prevention to preserve delivery of basic services; (b) the need to base sup­ lives, to save costs and to protect the EU’s inter­ port on a thorough and shared analysis of con­ ests; (4) mobilisation of the different strengths and flict dynamics, fragility and factors of resilience capacities of the EU; (5) a long-term commitment in order to address the root causes of conflicts taking into account that addressing fragility and rather than their symptoms; (c) the necessity for building resilient societies takes time; (6) acknowl­ national ownership­ and (d) the ability of part­ edging the link between internal and external pol­ ners to be flexible in order to adapt to changes icies and action in areas such as migration, climate on the ground and to work together. The 2013 change and organised crime; (7) a better use of EU joint communication on the EU’s ‘comprehen­ delegations as the central players to carry out EU sive approach to external conflicts and crises’ is an dialogue and support in partner countries; and (8) attempt to address some of these issues.10 the necessity to work in partnership, for instance with the United Nations or NATO.

A COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH TO EXTERNAL CONFLICTS AND CRISES IMPLEMENTATION IS A SHARED RESPONSIBILITY The comprehensive approach outlined in the 2013 communication mentioned above attempts Implementation of the comprehensive to improve the implementation of the security approach, as pointed out in the Council conclu­ and development nexus while also encompass­ sions of May 2014, is the shared responsibility ing other areas such as migration and gender. It of EU institutions and Member States. Action

10 JOIN(2013) 30 final of 11 ecemberD 2013

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plans to take forward specific thematic and geo­ to maximise the impact of the EU’s action and graphic priorities relating to the comprehensive to manage the risks of intervening in situations approach have been prepared for 2015 and for that are volatile by nature. Developing a shared 2016-2017. These two action plans include analysis by using such tools is crucial because the for instance transition from CSDP missions to link between security and development is always other EU instruments, the global roll-out of context-specific and will determine the choice and the early warning system and the reinforcement coordination of the most appropriate interven­ of staff in EU delegations specialised in migra­ tions (see graph below). tion, security issues and security sector reform. They also include geographic priorities such as Ukraine, Afghanistan, Somalia and Mali. As part TRANSITION FROM CRISIS of its focus on prevention and shared analysis, MANAGEMENT TO PEACEBUILDING the comprehensive approach has led the EU to reinforce its capacity to understand fragility and The EU Global Strategy emphasises that the anticipate crises and conflicts by developing a EU’s ‘peace policy must also ensure a smoother number of tools. The early warning system aims transition from short-term crisis management to identify risks of emergence or escalation of to long-term peacebuilding to avoid gaps along violence and conflicts across a variety of indi­ the conflict cycle’. Linking crisis responses, such cators, notably in countries and regions and on as humanitarian aid and CSDP, with long-term thematic priorities where the EU has particu­ actions on peacebuilding, statebuilding, resilience lar interests and leverage. The exercise triggers and governance is indeed a recurrent challenge increased attention, intensified monitoring and for the implementation of the comprehensive appropriate preventive action for the selected approach, although the Instrument contributing countries, regions and thematic areas across the to Stability and Peace (IcSP) can be used to pre­ EU system. Guidance on conflict analysis and pare the ground for more sustained and longer- conflict sensitivity has also been issued in order term assistance delivered by EU development

Prevention of Shuttle diplomacy/ Capacity building recurrence of violence mediation Political dialogue/ Development Long-term Conditionality/ Crisis intervention mediation peace sanctions (e.g. CSDP mission) Election State building and stability Humanitarian assistance observation Security sector reform LRRD Institutional reform

Hot conflict Peace making Peace-building decade Generational Immediate action Short- to medium- Thinking vision (0–6 months) range planning and (5–10 years) (20+ years) action (1–2 years) European Commission: Operating in situations of conflict and fragility. Brussels 2014, p 3 Brussels 2014, Commission: Operating in situations of conflict and fragility. European A wide range of interventions Note: CSDP = Common Security and Defence Policy LRRD = linking relief, rehabilitation and development

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CAPACITY BUILDING IN SUPPORT OF most fully developed response to this challenge, SECURITY AND DEVELOPMENT and works by delivering development assistance more flexibly with faster proce­dures in crises and In parallel to the joint communication on post-conflict situations. The objective of the EU security sector reform, a legislative pro- emergency trust fund for Africa, established at the posal to amend the Instrument contrib- Valletta Summit in November 2015, is to support uting to Stability and Peace (IcSP) was partner countries in the North of Africa, the Sahel presented1 in July 2016. The proposal extends the EU’s assistance to the mili- and the Horn of Africa with development projects tary of partner countries, under excep- and programmes focusing on addressing the root tional and clearly defined circumstances, causes of instability, insecurity, forced displace­ to achieve sustainable development and ments and conflicts. help partner countries prevent and man- For example, the Sahel Window includes as pri­ age crises by themselves. The proposal orities (a) reinforcing the resilience of local com­ highlights that the military can play an munities to deal with environmental, socio-eco­ important role in preventing violence and nomic and security challenges; (b) improving can contribute to setting the conditions border management, fighting transnational traf­ for peace. It follows up on the gaps iden- ficking and criminal networks; and (c) prevent­ tified in EU support for the capacities of ing radicalisation and violent extremism. Several partners in the security sector outlined projects have been designed thanks to the com­ in the joint communication on Capacity Building in support of Security and Devel- bined analysis and knowledge of DG DEVCO opment (CBSD) of April 20152. The assis- at its headquarters and in EU delegations and of tance provided under this legislative pro- CSDP missions operating in the same area. A pro­ posal may cover training, mentoring and gramme to strengthen security in the Mopti and advice, as well as the provision of equip- Gao regions of Mali and to improve the manage­ ment or infrastructure improvements ment of border areas (PARSEC Mopti-Gao) was with a development and human security drawn up in close cooperation with the EUCAP related objective. However, it excludes re- and EUTM missions. current military expenditure and the pro- These provide a concrete illustration of some curement of arms and ammunitions. of the elements of the comprehensive approach to conflicts and crises, as does the new EU policy 1 COM(2016) 447 final of 5 July 2016. 2 JOIN(2015) 17 final of 28 April 2015. framework for security sector reform.

THE SECURITY SECTOR REFORM interventions. The communication on the com­ POLICY FRAMEWORK prehensive approach emphasised that program­ ming of development assistance should be flexi­ Over the current programming period (2014- ble to adapt to the volatile environment of fragile 2020), 15 countries have a specific security com­ countries. Although the seven-year programming ponent as part of their cooperation with the period for development instruments is very help­ European Commission. Activities financed with ful for partner countries to define areas where the EU instruments in security sector reform (SSR) EU can support them and to have reliable and pre­ include, but are not limited to, law enforcement, dictable development flows, it is usually difficult border management, disarmament, demobilisa­ to adapt programming to an evolving conflict sit­ tion and reintegration (DDR), and civilian over­ uation. The establishment of EU trust funds is the sight of the security forces by parliaments and

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THE COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH IN THE CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC AND THE EU’S APPROACH TO FRAGILITY

A conference on the Central African Republic took place in Brussels in November 2016. Its objective was to gather support from the inter- national community to help the country recover from a long period of instability after its govern- ment was overthrown in 2013. Throughout the crisis, the EU has used all means available to support the country, including via three CSDP missions and a large amount of humanitarian aid. It has engaged in political dialogue with the authorities. It has set-up a multi-donor trust fund ‘Bêkou’ to link relief, rehabilitation and develop- ment, and has channelled development funds to support civil society, food security, education and health. It has also supported a free and fair electoral process for a return to constitutional or- der and to round off what it considers a success- ful political transition. While 2 million people are still at risk of food insecurity and one-fifth of the population remains displaced, the EU, the United Nations and the World Bank have supported the CAR authorities in drawing up their National Recovery and Peacebuilding Plan for 2017 – 2021. The plan prioritises specific development activities while taking into account the humanitarian and life-saving needs of the population as well as security, peace and reconciliation. The case of the Central African Republic illustrates that sustainable development is only possible when and where there is peace and security. As part of the assessment several consultations and surveys have been carried out in the country to gain more insight into the population’s expectations and priorities. Security was considered the main concern and forms, together with peace and reconciliation, the first pillar of the strategy.

civil society organisations. The communication A HUMAN SECURITY PERSPECTIVE on security sector reform adopted in July 2016 brings all EU actors and instruments under a The first objective of EU support for SSR is single policy framework, taking into account to improve the security of states and above all that CSDP missions and operations, develop­ the security of individuals. From a human secu­ ment cooperation and the IcSP can be used to rity perspective, trust between populations and implement SSR interventions. EU actors there­ security actors and the state’s ability to deliver on fore need to share information on the various security are key for state legitimacy. The percep­ interventions they run in this field either in tion of the state largely depends on the way pop­ post-conflict situations or to prevent crises, not­ ulations and security actors interact in everyday ing that ‘insecurity and instability are frequently life. The second objective is therefore to support generated or aggravated by a lack of effective and the security sector and to ensure security actors accountable security systems’. are accountable and act in full compliance with

191 HANDBOOK ON CSDP Austrian Armed Forces Austrian CSDP can fill the gap in the short-run, but in the long-run other EU instruments should take the lead.

human rights, democracy and the rule of law. of a broader strategy towards peacebuilding and Support is to be provided for SSR in line with a statebuilding, has acquired a growing importance number of key principles, including those related in the EU policy framework. Policy-making is the to development effectiveness. National ownership result of a continuous process of learning, based on and the ability of all EU instruments to adapt to experiences from the field and on new approaches changing circumstances in the field as well as the being tested. Past experiences show that long-term importance of conducting regular political and development and peace need to be at the core of policy dialogues on security are key. Managing the EU’s response from the outset of a conflict or risks, including the risk of doing harm and repu­ crisis. The implementation of the EU Global Strat­ tational risk, is crucial when engaging in SSR and egy and of the revised European Consensus on requires a thorough analysis not only of the sector Development, in a challenging global context, will itself but also of the wider governance system. surely keep the security and development nexus in the limelight in the near future.

CONCLUSION TREATY ON EUROPEAN UNION

Development approaches focusing on poverty Article 21: The Union shall seek to devel- reduction through growth and the provision of op relations and build partnerships with basic social services have had mixed to disappoint­ third countries, and international, region- al or global organisations which share the ing results in FCAS. As a consequence, the devel­ [same] principles. It shall promote multi- opment community has been forced to take into lateral solutions to common problems, in consideration the specificities of working in such particular in the framework of the United countries to a much greater extent. This explains Nations. why the security and development nexus, as part

192 CAPABILITY 8 DEVELOPMENT

193 HANDBOOK ON CSDP

8.1. EU CAPABILITY DEVELOPMENT

by Herbert Sailer European Union European Capability is the power or ability to do something.

The cornerstone of the European Union’s reac- performance of these tasks shall be undertaken using tion to external conflicts and crises is the com- capabilities provided by the Member States.’1 prehensive approach; and one element is the Bearing in mind that the different national Common Security and Defence Policy. In order capacities and development programmes should to be able to plan and conduct the full spectrum also serve supranational interests, a common of missions and operations envisaged in the Treaty European capability development process is nec- on European Union, a toolbox of different capa- essary. Capability development itself, in general bilities, military as well as civilian, is required. In a military domain by nature, seems to be an accordance with Article 42 of the Treaty on Euro- important process for addressing specific short- pean Union, all EU Member States are responsible falls within the European Union and for closing for providing the necessary resources: ‘The com- persisting gaps with regard to upcoming future mon security and defence policy shall be an integral challenges. The different national positions may part of the common foreign and security policy. It lead to miscellaneous views on these ‘gaps’. The shall provide the Union with an operational capac- EU’s commonly known ‘capability-expectations ity drawing on civilian and military assets. (...) The gap’has narrowed considerably due to improve-

1 European Union/EU law and publications: Treaty on European Union, Article 42, Online: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/ legal-content/en/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A12012M%2FTXT [4/12/16].

194 8 CAPABILITY DEVELOPMENT

ments in terms of its resource availability, as well A closer look at history and at processes, both as the instruments at its disposal. But there still military and civilian, as well as at the institutions exists a gap between that what the EU Member involved might create a better understanding and States are expected to do globally and what they highlight similarities as well as differences. are actually able to agree upon (‘consensus-expec- tation gap’).2 MILITARY CAPABILITY DEVELOPMENT

GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS ON The basis of the European Union’s ambition for CAPABILITIES capability development resides in the idea of a Com- mon European Defence Policy that dates back to What are ‘capabilities’? According to the 1948 (the , which in 1954 was trans- Oxford Dictionary, a capability is the power or formed into the Western European Union, WEU). ability to do something, either by force or using After the end of the Cold War, the Balkan con- resources that provide a country with the capacity flicts demonstrated the EU’s shortcomings (most to undertake a particular kind of (military) action.3 of them political, with the lack of a common for- The military follows the paradigm of perceiving eign and security policy) in this regard. During the capabilities in the form of doctrines, organisations, Cologne European Council of 1999, EU Member training, materiel, leadership, personnel, facilities, States reaffirmed the Union’s willingness to develop and interoperability.4 These modules are also called capabilities for autonomous action backed up by ‘lines of development’. According to that paradigm, credible military forces.6 The definition of the a desired capability can only be achieved if progress so-called Military Headline Goals (HLGs) consti- is made in a balanced way and within the scope of tuted the starting point for the military capability the above-mentioned eight lines. development process: ‘[…] To develop European Looking at other definitions, the European capabilities, Member States have set themselves the Union also has to accept that European military headline goal: by the year 2003, cooperating together capability is context-dependent, for instance with voluntarily, they will be able to deploy rapidly and respect to existing threats, the physical environ- then sustain forces capable of the full range of Peters- ment, or contributions made by partners,5 or pro- berg tasks […] up to corps level (up to 15 brigades visions by Member States based on their level of or 50 000 – 60 000 persons). […] Member States ambition. Therefore, a capability itself is a very should be able to deploy in full at this level within 60 complex system relying on different and interde- days […]. They must be able to sustain such a deploy- pendent influences. ment for at least one year […].’7

2 Asle Toje: ‘The consensus–expectations gap: explaining Europe’s ineffective foreign policy’, 2008, Security Dialogue Vol. 39. 3 cf. ‘Capability’, Oxford Dictionary: https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/capability [4/12/16]. 4 cf. European Defence Agency: European Defence Agency study identifies cooperation prospects in cyber defence, 2013, Online: https://www.eda.europa.eu/docs/default-source/press-releases/2013-05-24-press-release_cyber-defence- stocktaking_final.pdf [4/12/16]. 5 Yue, Yi/Henshaw, Michael: An holistic view of UK military capability development. 2009, Defense and Security Analysis, Volume 25, No 1. 6 cf. European Union External Action Service: Shaping of a Common Security and Defence Policy, 2016, Online https:// eeas.europa.eu/topics/common-security-and-defence-policy-csdp/5388/shaping-of-a-common-security-and-defence- policy-_en [5/12/16]. 7 European Council: Helsinki European Council, Annex IV of the Presidency Conclusions, 1999: https://www.consilium. europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/Helsinki%20European%20Council%20-%20Annex%20IV%20of%20the%20 Presidency%20Conclusions.pdf [5/12/16].

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from the strategic point of view, for addressing the overall coherence and complementarity as well as for mutually reinforcing the development of capa- bilities common to the requirements of the two organisations.9

European Union European The European Union Military Committee Capability development is an important process for (EUMC) is the highest military body within the addressing specific shortfalls within the European Union EU Council. It is responsible for ‘[…] the elab- and for closing persisting gaps with regard to upcoming oration, the assessment and the review of capability future challenges. objectives according to agreed procedures’.10 The EUMC is composed of the Chiefs of In the years that followed, the HLG was Defence of the Member States, represented by amended by different ‘add-ons’ like the 2010 HLG, their permanent military representatives. In the created in 2004 and based on specific scenarios to area of capability development, the EUMC is sup- be addressed by the European Union by means of ported by the EU Military Committee Working increased rapid response capabilities. Later on, this Group/Headline Goal Taskforce (EUMCWG/ HLG led to the creation of European Union Bat- HTF), a group of Member States experts dealing tlegroups (triggered by the first autonomous CSDP with capability development.11 operation 2003’s Artemis in the Democratic Rpub- These Council bodies are responsible for pro- lic of the Congo), to ‘pooling and sharing’, and viding the Political and Security Committee finally to the idea of civil-military capability devel- (PSC) with military advice and recommendations opment. The qualitative focus of the 2003 HLG on all military matters, based on the consensus of has evolved in a more quantitative direction. all Member States. In terms of methodology, the political objec- As far as the content of such advice or recom- tive of the HLG is translated thus ‘[…] into a mendation is concerned, the European Union Requirements Catalogue (precise set of objectives Military Staff (EUMS) provides relevant military and planning elements), a Force Catalogue (assets expertise under the direction of the EUMC and identified by Member States for use within the EU under the authority of the High Representative framework), and a Progress Catalogue (identifying of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and the shortfalls to be remedied)’.8 Security Policy and Vice-President of the Euro- These three elements (establishing military pean Commission.12 The EUMS is part of the requirements, monitoring and evaluation as well European External Action Service (EEAS) and it as addressing shortfalls) are defined in the Capa- ‘[…]is the source of collective (multi-disciplinary) bility Development Mechanism. military expertise within the European External Mention should also be made of an EU/NATO Action Service (EEAS). As an integral component capability group to provide the principal forum, of the EEAS’s comprehensive approach, the EUMS

8 Jean François Morel/Alastair Cameron: The EU and Defence Capabilities: Charting the Course, in Alastair Cameron/Jean François Morel/Oliver Foster/Bjoern Seibert/Derek Braddon/James Fanshaw edited by Luis Simon: European Defence Capabilities – No Adaptability without Cooperation, 2010, Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) Occasional Paper. 9 Council of the European Union: Defining the EU Capability Development Mechanism (CDM), 2003, 6805 REV 1. 10 European Council: Council Decision of 22 January 2001 setting up the Military Committee of the European Union, 2001, 2001/79/CFSP. 11 European Council: Council of the European Union, Preparatory Bodies: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/council-eu/ preparatory-bodies/european-union-military-committee-working-group/ [4/12/16]. 12 European Union External Action Service: CSDP structures, instruments and agencies: https://eeas.europa.eu/topics/ common-security-and-defence-policy-csdp/5392/csdp-structure-instruments-and-agencies_en [4/12/16].

196 8 CAPABILITY DEVELOPMENT European Union European Military capability development is a responsibility of the Member States based on voluntariness.

coordinates the military instrument, with particu- analysis and lessons learned as well as for coopera- lar focus on operations/missions (both military and tion with the European Defence Agency.14 those requiring military support) and the creation of Military Capability Development is a responsi- military capability. Enabling activity in support of bility of the Member States based on voluntariness, this output includes: early warning (via the Single i.e. their willingness to contribute. It is based on Intelligence Analysis Capacity – SIAC), situation soft law mechanisms, which means that no official assessment, strategic planning, Communications and sanctions will be taken in the case of non-contribu- Information Systems, concept development, training tion. In general, this methodology can be called the and education, and support of partnerships through ‘Open Method of Coordination’.15 military-military relationships. Concurrently, the The European Defence Agency (EDA) was EUMS is charged with sustaining the EU OPSCEN established in 2004 ‘to support the Council and the and providing its core staff when activated’.13 Member States in their effort to improve the EU’s Within the EUMS the capability-related issues defence capabilities in the field of crisis management are concentrated in the ‘Concepts and Capabili- and to sustain the European Security and Defence ties Directorate’ which is responsible, inter alia, for Policy’.16 capability planning and capability development, In line with the above-mentioned Capability including crisis management exercises, training, Development Mechanism, the Capability Devel-

13 European Union External Action Service: CSDP structures, instruments and agencies: https://eeas.europa.eu/topics/ common-security-and-defence-policy-csdp/5392/csdp-structure-instruments-and-agencies_en [4/12/16]. 14 European Union External Action Service: The European Union Military Staff (EUMS): https://eeas.europa.eu/topics/ common-security-and-defence-policy-csdp/5436_en [27/11/16]. 15 European Commission: European Governance – A White Paper, 2001, Doc. 2001/C 287/01. 16 European Council: Council Joint Action of 12 July 2004 on the establishment of the European Defence Agency, 2004, Doc. 2004/551/CFSP.

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opment Plan (CDP) provides the reference frame- specific capability in itself, especially in the case work for the EDA’s activities. It consists of four of new developments such as weapon systems, modules, the so called ‘strands’, which are: require the anticipation of possible capability • analysis of current capability shortfalls and op- gaps. In fact, the military capability development erational risks (HLG process), process focuses on military organisations, which • identification of potential trends in future mil- can be described as the totality of personnel, itary capability characteristics (2025 and be- equipment, training, and specific criteria like per- yond), formance, operational readiness, interoperability, • understanding of current plans/programme led sustainability and deployability. by Member States to mitigate risks and identi- Due to the above-mentioned considerations fication of possible cooperation opportunities, and the fact that technology is a specific driver • lessons learned from current operations.17 for the remaining, interconnected lines of devel- For military capability development this CDP is opment, military capability development focuses the clear focus. It is owned by the Member States on equipment. and administered by the EDA, which therefore plays a crucial role in capability development. But in order to know which capabilities should be CIVILIAN CAPABILITY DEVELOPMENT developed, we first need to know which capabili- ties are or will be required. The EUMC is respon- Driven by decisions regarding military capa- sible for two work strands of the CDP: A (HLG bility development and considering the European Process, ambition) and D (Lessons Learned). The Union’s lessons identified during the Balkans first is very complex itself (Scrutinising, Assessing, conflict, especially regarding ‘[…] the difficulty in Evaluating (operational risk) and Prioritising of the aftermath of NATO-led intervention in deploy- Member States’ contributions)18 and leads to a list ing a sufficient number of police personnel within of prioritised military capabilities shortfalls. The UNMIK led the European states to also include the second one uses lessons learned from operations. enhancement and better coordination of the Union’s The EUMC has the EUMCWG/HTF as a work- and the Member States’ non-military crisis response ing body, which is supported by the EUMS. The tools […]’,19 an official civilian capability discus- other two strands, B (future trends) and C (Mem- sion started in December 1999. In 2000, the ber States’ plans and programmes), are owned by first four priority areas for civilian crisis manage- the EDA. ment were identified at the European Council of Since assers are provides by the EU Member Santa Maria da Feira, Portugal (‘Civilian Head- States om a voluntary basis, it cannot be taken for line Goals’, CHG): policing, the rule of law, civil granted that all assets identified during this process administration and civil protection. In detail, (as for example shown in the force catalogue) will this means that the EU Member States, cooper- be committed to joint EU operations. ating voluntarily, should be able to provide up Besides that, the time-consuming nature of to 5 000 police officers for international opera- procurement procedures and the complexity of a tions, ranging from conflict prevention to crisis

17 cf. Jean François Morel/Alastair Cameron: The EU and Defence Capabilities: Charting the Course, in Alastair Cam- eron/Jean François Morel/Oliver Foster/Bjoern Seibert/Derek Braddon/James Fanshaw edited by Luis Simon: European Defence Capabilities – No Adaptability without Cooperation, 2010, Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) Occasional Paper. 18 European Council: UMC Glossary of Acronyms and Definitions Revision 2015, 2016, 6186/16. 19 Agnieszka Nowak: Civilian crisis management within ESDP, in Catriona Gourlay/Damien Helly/Isabelle Ioannides/Radek Khol/Agnieszka Nowak/Pedro Serrano, Edited by Agnieszka Nowak: Civilian crisis management: the EU way, 2006, Chaillot Paper n° 90, European Union for Security Studies.

198 8 CAPABILITY DEVELOPMENT European Union/EUMM Georgia Union/EUMM European The CPCC has contributed significantly to the professionalisation and standardisation of civilian crisis management and to civilian capability development.

management, of whom 1 000 should be deploy- The 2010 CHG was drafted in 2007, focusing able within 30 days. The European Council also on non-human resources, i.e. equipment, and civil- welcomes the willingness of the Commission to ian-military synergies in capability development.22 make, within its spheres of action, contributions The Committee for Civilian Aspects of Cri- to civilian crisis management efforts.20 sis Management (CIVCOM) is the organisation The 2008 CHG added two new priorities: within the Council of the European Union deal- monitoring missions and support for EU Spe- ing also with civilian capability development. ‘[…] cial Representatives. Besides that, it highlighted The Committee shall operate as a Council working two further focus areas for the European Union: party and report to the Permanent Representatives security sector reform (SSR) and disarmament, Committee. It will provide information, formulate demobilisation and reintegration (DDR). It also recommendations and give advice on civilian aspects emphasised the need for the Union to conduct of crisis management to the interim Political and simultaneous missions.21 The 2008 CHG focused Security Committee and to the other appropriate on the human resources needed for CSDP civilian Council bodies in accordance with their respective crisis management. competencies.’23

20 cf. European Parliament: Presidency Conclusions, Santa Maria da Feira European Council, 19 and 20 June 2000: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/summits/fei1_en.htm [27/11/16]. 21 European Union/EU law and publications: Civilian Headline Goal 2008, 2004: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/ EN/TXT/?uri=URISERV%3Al33239 [27/11/16]. 22 European Council: Civilian Headline Goal 2010, 2007: https://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/Civilian_ Headline_Goal_2010.pdf [27/11/16]. 23 European Union/EU law and publications: Council Decision of 22 May 2000 setting up a Committee for civilian aspects of crisis management, 2000, 2000/354/CFSP.

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Following the Nice European Council (2000), • to support the operational planning and estab- the EU established permanent political and mili- lishment of civilian CSDP missions; tary structures, thus enabling itself to fully assume • to set up human resources policies and provide its responsibilities in terms of crisis management. support to the missions in the management of Speaking of civilian capability development, their budget and in legal, logistics and security we must not forget to mention, along with areas.26 EUMCWG, EUMC, EUMS, and CIVCOM, As the operational Headquarters the CPCC is the Crisis Management Planning Directorate responsible for the planning, conduct and sup- (CMPD). It is an element of the EEAS and is port missions and, most often in liaison with the responsible for the political-strategic planning of CMPD, for providing guidance on cross-cutting CSDP civilian missions and military operations issues and the conceptual development of civilian as well as the coherence and effectiveness of such operational capabilities.27 Over the years, in coor- operations, which are part of the EU’s compre- dination with CMPD, the CPCC has contributed hensive approach. It is also responsible for CSDP significantly to the professionalisation and stand- capabilities.24 Within the structure of the EEAS ardisation of civilian crisis management and to the the Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability civilian capability process. (CPCC) must also be mentioned. It was created The civilian capability development process in 2007 in order to offer a permanent OHQ to also deals with voluntary contributions made by civilian CSDP missions. With a staff of over 60, Member States. it provides command and control of the mis- In the meantime, civilian capability develop- sions under the authority of the Civilian Oper- ment follows a plan, known as the Civilian Capa- ation Commander and fulfils a duty of care for bility Development Plan (CCDP), established in approximately 2 500 staff deployed in the field. 2012. Its methodology is similar to that of the It must be mentioned that there is no military military development process: EU ambitions, equivalent due to the fact that a separate Chain capability trends, national strategies and lessons of Command has to be established for each mil- learned are the driving elements of CCDP.28 In itary operation.25 December 2011, the Council also called for a The main tasks of the CPCC are: multi-annual CCDP work programme, finally • to support missions in relation to their respec- leading to the adoption of the CCDP in July 2012 tive mandates and ensure that the political by integrating the four above-mentioned drivers. objectives of the High Representative and the Whereas the military capability development Member States are followed; process focuses on equipment, the civilian capa- • to provide guidance on cross-cutting issues to bility development process deals mainly with ensure greater consistency and coherence in op- bringing the right person to the mission theatre. It erational mandate delivery, therefore concentrates on training and personnel.

24 cf. European External Action Service: CSDP structures, instruments and agencies: https://eeas.europa.eu/topics/common- security-and-defence-policy-csdp/5392/csdp-structure-instruments-and-agencies_en [27/11/16]. 25 European Parliament: European Council Briefing: Implementation of European Council conclusions in Common Secu- rity and Defence Policy (CSDP) since the Lisbon Treaty, 2016, Online: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/ BRIE/2016/573280/EPRS_BRI(2016)573280_EN.pdf [27/11/16]. 26 European External Action Service: The Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability (CPCC)-Organisation, 2016: https://eeas.europa.eu/topics/common-security-and-defence-policy-csdp/5438/the-civilian-planning-and-conduct- capability-cpcc_en [22/11/16]. 27 European External Action Service: The Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability (CPCC)-Organisation, 2016: https://eeas.europa.eu/topics/common-security-and-defence-policy-csdp/5438/the-civilian-planning-and-conduct- capability-cpcc_en [22/11/16]. 28 European External Action Service: CSDP Capabilities, 2016: https://eeas.europa.eu/topics/common-security-and-defence- policy-csdp/5393/csdp-capabilities_en#Civilian+capabilities [22/11/16].

200 8 CAPABILITY DEVELOPMENT European Union/EUPM European The Civilian Capability Development Plan is similar to that used in the military development process.

The reason for that can be found in the recruit- DIFFERENCES AND CHALLENGES ment process for civilian CSDP missions itself. This process is more complex than similar exer- Since Member States’ contribution are made cises on the military side, due to the fact that the on a voluntary basis, the supranational (EU) level respective ‘[…]experts are normally requested from depends on the Member States and their commit- various governmental or non-governmental entities, ment to develop capabilities that might later on such as the Ministry of Justice for judges, the Ministry be used under the EU flag. For the military, the of the Interior for police and the Ministry of Foreign capacity for multinational cooperation and a suf- Affairs for diplomats. Some experts from the private ficient degree of interoperability and standardisa- sector are also targeted in order to recruit the best tion have always played an important role. composition of personnel to accomplish a mission’.29 Interaction between the supranational and Moreover, these experts are normally employed national level is another aspect to be considered at home, hence they are not earmarked for mis- during the process. While military operations are sions abroad.30 It must be recognized that ‘civilian covered by the respective Ministries of Defence, personnel’ are also shared among different actors civilian-dominated operations, depending on the at supranational level. There are also other actors, need (e.g. police or rule of law), might be taken even within the European Union, targeting the charge of by more than one ministry. This makes same expertise, such as Justice and Home Affairs force generation more complex at the suprana- agencies (e.g. Europol, Eurojust and Frontex). tional and even at the national level. Complex-

29 Jochen Rehrl: Training and Recruitment, in Handbook for Decision Makers, 2014, Federal Ministry of Defence and Sports of the Republic of Austria. 30 ibid.

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ity might also affect lines of communication and, States affected by the financial crisis agreed in 2010 thus, coordination at national and European lev- on the so-called ‘Ghent Framework’, also known els. Member States are tasked with providing the as ‘Pooling and Sharing’. Through this agreement, right civilian personnel – to develop capabilities Member States were encouraged to ‘systematically to be trained and deployed to civilian CSDP mis- analyse their national military capabilities’, aiming sions balanced with the needs and requirements at measures to increase their military interoperabil- of all the other national and supranational actors. ity for capabilities to be maintained on a national Regarding financial regulations, the common level, to explore their input for international costs for civilian operations are to be covered by the pooling, to intensify international cooperation, EU budget (Common Foreign Security Policy). and to support structures and tasks that could be The CFSP budget is administered by the Com- addressed on the basis of role and task sharing’. In mission’s Service for Foreign Policy Instruments fact, this pragmatic approach has since then been (European Commission) under the responsibility focusing on ‘pooling and sharing’.32 of the HR/VP.31 CSDP military operations cannot Directly linked to this approach is the question be funded by the EU budget. Therefore, the costs of whether pooling and sharing could restrict the for military operations are normally borne by the sovereignty of EU Member States. Therefore, the states participating in the operations. In March successful implementation of this system depends 2004, the Athena financing mechanism was estab- on a depoliticisation of the debate and a link with, lished. It is a system that coordinates the covering for example the NATO agenda (‘complementa- of certain common expenses arising from EU-led rity’ as a key word).33 military operations. The EU Member States The whole discussion on capabilities regained (except Denmark, which has opted out of military momentum in 2013 and 2015 when the topic CSDP activities) contribute to this mechanism was listed on the agenda of the European Council. with an annual share based on their gross national Moreover, recent terrorist attacks have reminded income. With the Athena Mechanism all Member Europe of its vulnerability. Therefore, the decline States, except Denmark, are covering the common in European collective defence spending seems to costs arising out of EU military operations. have come to a temporary halt.34 The enhance- ment of capability development and greater com- mitment in this regard (e.g. a sufficient amount EUROPEAN INITIATIVES AND RECENT of defence spending) as well as new ways to meet DEVELOPMENTS well-known challenges have been addressed: ‘[…] fostering greater and more systematic Euro- Looking at the developments within the Euro- pean defence cooperation to deliver key capabilities, pean Union, a loss of momentum following the including through EU funds […]’.35 financial crisis of 2008 could be observed. As a This process is reflected in the Global Strategy reaction, the defence ministers of the EU Member for the European Union’s Foreign and Security

31 European Parliament: Financing of CSDP missions and operations, 2016, At a Glance, February 2016: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/ATAG/2016/577958/EPRS_ATA(2016)577958_EN.pdf [5/12/16]. 32 cf. Sven Biscop/Jo Coelmond: Pooling & Sharing: From Slow March to Quick March?, 2011, Egmont, Security Policy Brief No. 23. 33 cf. Giovanni Faleg/Alessandro Giovannini: The EU between Pooling & Sharing and Smart Defence – Making a virtue of necessity?, 2012, Centre for European Policy Studies. 34 cf. Jan Joel Andersson/Sven Biscop/Bastian Giegerich/Christian Mölling/Thierry Tardyisiroli: Envisioning European Defence, Five Futures, 2006, European Union Institute for Strategic Studies: http://www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/ Chaillot_Paper_137.pdf [4/12/16]. 35 European Council: European Council meeting (25 and 26 June 2015) – Conclusions, 2015: http://www.consilium. europa.eu/en/meetings/european-council/2015/06/euco-conclusions-pdf/ [5/12/16].

202 8 CAPABILITY DEVELOPMENT European Union/EUPM European The experts for civilian missions, such as judges and prosecutors, are normally employed at home, hence they are not earmarked for missions abroad.

Policy, published in 2016 and stating that Mem- November 14, 2016: ‘High Representative ber States will remain sovereign in their defence Federica Mogherini has proposed […] an Imple- decisions, but that nevertheless defence coopera- mentation Plan on Security and Defence, to turn tion must become the norm in order to achieve into action the vision set out in the EU Global and maintain many of these capabilities.36 Along Strategy. The Plan has been welcomed by the with all these recent developments, the joint dec- European Union’s Foreign and Defence Ministers laration published by the President of the Euro- […].’ 38 Concerning capability development pean Council, the President of the European the plan highlights the need to identify priori- Commission and the Secretary-General of the ties related to the level of ambition and the EU North Atlantic Treaty Organisation constitutes Global Strategy. Moreover, it is mentioned that another step towards possible increased defence proposals should be developed for revisiting the cooperation, a form of cooperation where the key- above-mentioned Santa Maria da Feira priority word ‘complementarity’ shines in new splendour: areas for civilian missions as well as for enhanc- ‘Develop coherent, complementary and interopera- ing the responsiveness of civilian crisis manage- ble defence capabilities of EU Member States and ment. In this regard further work on the generic NATO Allies, as well as multilateral projects’.37 civilian CSDP tasks list is mentioned; this list

36 European External Action Service: Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe A Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign And Security Policy, 2016: https://europa.eu/globalstrategy/en/file/441/ download?token=KVSh5tDI [4/12/16]. 37 European Commission: European Commission - Statement, 2016: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_ STATEMENT-16-2459_de.htm [4/12/16]. 38 European External Action Service: Mogherini presents Implementation Plan on Security and Defence to EU Ministers, 2016: https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/14820/mogherini-presents-implementation-plan-on- security-and-defence-to-eu-ministers_en [4/12/16].

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The time-consuming nature of procurement procedures and the complexity of a specific capability require the anticipation of possible capability gaps.

will contribute to a common understanding Analysing the recent developments in the area and help to identify capability requirements. of civil and military capability development, the For military capability development a review is operational key drivers for further progress can envisaged too. The EDA for instance should take be reduced to increased interoperability, lessons forward the work to specify and complement learned, rapid deployment and financing of mis- capability priorities, as part of the revision pro- sions and operations, and fair burden sharing. cess of the Capability Development Plan, and On the military side, discussions are still ongo- Member States should agree to review the mili- ing on how to make the Battlegroups operational. tary requirements based on the level of ambition Currently, the political ambition of forming two and the EU Global Strategy. The plan suggests standing Battlegroups seems to be difficult in drawing on the full potential of the Treaty: ‘The terms of its implementation. Besides that, we can Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO), as also identify important gaps in the future EU Bat- defined in Articles 42(6) and 46 of the TEU and tlegroup Roster. Protocol 10, has the potential to generate a more EU Battlegroups should become ‘[…] an binding commitment as regards capability develop- instrument that can be tailored to respond to a spe- ment, improving output and strengthening CSDP cific crisis, and combined with additional land, […].‘ 39 Based on the decision of the Member naval and air elements based on advance planning States, the work should commence in 2017.40 and commitments by Member States’.41

39 Council of the European Union: Implementation Plan on Security and Defence, 2016, 14392/16 . 40 ibid. 41 European Commission: In Defence of Europe – Defence Integration as a Response to Europe’s Strategic Moment, 2015, European Political Strategy Centre No. 4.

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Hand in hand with the discussion on the use supporting training, recruitment, capability devel- of EU Battlegroups, we also have to consider the opment and institutional memory for EU/interna- idea of fair burden sharing. When Member States tional crisis management’)44 or CSDP – Freedom, are willing to provide capabilities, they also have Security and Justice (FSJ) cooperation. The latter to take over the costs arising from such a commit- should also be pursued, where appropriate, beside ment. ‘Beyond a limited coverage of common costs other work strands in future.45 through the Athena mechanism – roughly 10 % – All the aforementioned developments are also costs of EU operations essentially lie where they fall. a consequence of lessons learned from previous […] This is even more true for Battlegroup deploy- operations and the fact that equipment must be ment, for which there is no established framework for interoperable. Besides that, purchase on demand burden-sharing beyond an uncertain declaration on might be too expensive to set up a mission, espe- strategic transport costs […].’ 42 cially in a time-constrained environment. The potential dualuse of equipment is also dis- From the strategic point of view the recent cussed as part of the European Union’s agenda, as developments starting with the EU Global Strat- are civilian-military synergies. egy, the Joint Declaration by the President of the The dual-use idea may apply not only for sur- European Council, the President of the Euro- veillance operations and border control, but also pean Commission and the Secretary-General of for any kind of defence operations, including the the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation and the third dimension and space. The fact that equip- Implementation Plan on Security and Defence lay ment is intended to be designed for both military the emphasis on the security and defence of the and civilian use is one of the key findings when we European Union. talk about civilian-military synergies. In line with these developments, the recent pro- Interoperability, which, in military language, posal from the European Commission to create a means the ability to work together smoothly in European Defence Fund to support investment in a multinational environment and with different joint research and joint development of defence equipment has become very important on the equipment and technologies and other actions to civilian side too. support Member States’ more efficient spending Throughout the years different aspects of civil- on joint defence capabilities must be mentioned.46 ian capability development have been identified: All the above-mentioned actions are closely these include training, expert pools and ware- linked and complement the European Union housing (to improve rapid reaction)43 as well as Global Strategy. The ‘preconditions’ are set and development of IT tools (such as Goalkeeper, the proposed actions might lead to a stronger ‘[…] a web-based platform that serves Member European Union in defence and new momentum States, Headquarters and CSDP civilian missions by in the area of capability development.

42 European Commission: In Defence of Europe – Defence Integration as a Response to Europe’s Strategic Moment, 2015, European Political Strategy Centre No. 4. 43 European Council: Council conclusions on Common Security and Defence Policy, 2011: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/126504.pdf [4/12/16]. 44 European External Action Service: Goalkeeper: https://goalkeeper.eeas.europa.eu [11/12/16]. 45 Council of the European Union: Council conclusions on implementing the EU Global Strategy in the area of Security and Defence, 2016, 14149/16. 46 European Commission: European Defence Action Plan: Towards a European Defence Fund, 2016: http://europa.eu/ rapid/press-release_IP-16-4088_en.htm [4/12/16].

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8.2. STRENGTHENING EU DEFENCE WITH MULTINATIONAL COOPERATION

by Sabine Mengelberg

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND PURPOSE

The last decade saw an increase in new forms of In general, the purpose of these regional initi- differentiated cooperation between EU Member atives is to enhance defence cooperation in com- States, varying from cooperation based on ad-hoc pliance with the provisions of EU’s Common agreements, to political agreements, to permanent Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). Inspired by forms of cooperation. Some of these agreements the EU ‘Pooling and Sharing’ Initiative, multina- have a historical background originating in the tional cooperation is driven by the desire to foster Cold War, while others were founded more recently. interoperability, enable the sharing of experiences, Either way, European governments have responded identify and respond to future common threats and to the combined challenges of hybrid threats, the execute joint exercises or even joint operations. need to maintain and modernise capabilities, and Regional joint initiatives that originate from declining defence budgets by establishing or rein- Member States can be submitted to the CSDP. forcing these ‘clusters’ of defence cooperation. Conversely, these initiatives can also originate Consequently, for reasons of national interest, from the EU and be submitted to the Member efficiency or cultural links, EU Member States States. This leads to a two-way approach – both are engaged in bi- and multinational coopera- bottom-up and top-down – to strengthen the tion in various policy areas, including defence EU’s defence cooperation. Furthermore, there cooperation. Alongside the possibilities that the have been instances of partnering between multi- EU provides for enhanced multinational defence national cooperation initiatives7, partnering with cooperation, EU Member States have set up bi- non-EU states and cooperation with organisations and multilateral regional clusters to deepen their like the UN and NATO. defence cooperation, which enriches the network For the sake of efficiency, the EU states partic- of EU cooperation and integration. Examples of ipating in regional clusters do not need to seek these bi- and multinational regional clusters are the the approval of the other EU Member States; Visegrad Group Defence Cooperation (V4)1, the informing the Council and the High Represent- Central European Defence Cooperation (CEDC)2, ative is sufficient. In other words, the consensus NORDEFCO3, the Baltic cooperation4, Benelux5, rule that applies to CSDP cannot hinder the bot- the Weimar Triangle6 and the ‘Lancaster House tom-up process of building multinational defence Treaty’ between the United Kingdom and France. cooperation. Consequently, regional defence

1 Comprising the , , Poland and Slovakia. See: http://www.visegradgroup.eu. 2 Comprising Austria, , the Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovakia and . 3 Comprising Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Finland and Iceland. See: http: www.nordefco.org 4 Comprising , and . See: http//www.baltasam.org 5 Comprising Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxemburg. See: http://www.benelux.int 6 Comprising Poland, Germany and France. 7 For example: Enhanced Visegrad activities in the Eastern Partnership, Bratislava, 16 June 2011; Nordic-Baltic Declaration, Stockholm, 10 November 2015

206 8 CAPABILITY DEVELOPMENT Austrian Armed Forces/Pusch Austrian Meeting of the Central European Defence Cooperation in Frauenkirchen/Austria in November 2016.

cooperation in whatever field, whether it involves edge and practical experience. Similarly, the V4 capacity building, exercises or operations, remains is deepening defence cooperation and aligns its nationally determined and democratically con- members’ defence planning in order to maximise trolled. Likewise, multinational cooperation can the scope for joint procurement8. The focus of be implemented or operationalised by existing the V4 cooperation lies in the areas of common national chains of command or the Framework interest such as joint capability development, Nations Concept (FNC) in which interoperabil- defence industry (joint procurement and acqui- ity between Member States increases. sition), establishment of multinational units (the V4 EU Battlegroup) and permanent modular force modalities. The cooperation also covers DIFFERENT FORMS OF COOPERATION joint education, training and exercises, and the group runs cross border activities. Under ‘V4 Bi- and multinational defence coopera- Plus’ cooperation formats, the V4 works with tion comes in various forms, which differ in partners inside and outside the EU. Furthermore, their goals and achievements. There have been The Nordic countries (NORDEFCO) cooperate advances in the operational area, such as joint to coordinate the strengthening of their defence training and exercises, or even the combining of capabilities. This strengthening links strategic units from different nations. For instance, the development, capabilities, human resources and merger of the German/Netherlands Corps, who education (peace support operation courses), are integrating their tank division, allows the training and exercises and common operations, Dutch military to maintain operational knowl- such as in Afghanistan.

8 V4-CDEC Ministerial Meeting, Prague, 8 June 2016.

207 HANDBOOK ON CSDP European Union/EUTM Somalia Union/EUTM European Bi- and multinational defence cooperation comes in various forms, which differ in their goals and achievements.

BI- AND MULTINATIONAL FUTURE COOPERATION AND THE EU CSDP Multinational defence cooperation has become The EU encourages and provides enhanced a reality within the CSDP. To be successful and multinational clusters based on the EU Battle- strengthen EU defence cooperation in the future, group concept and flexible cooperation clauses these various initiatives should be coordinated in the Treaty of Lisbon (TEU, 2009). Permanent carefully with one another to avoid replication of Structured Cooperation (PESCO, Article 46 effort between (overlapping) regions and within TEU) provides a potential framework for working the EU. Therefore, the EU could facilitate and in smaller groups and deepening defence cooper- support these different forms of cooperation, serve ation in core groups, with the option of involving as a mediator where agendas overlap and provide the European Defence Agency (EDA) as a sup- expertise whenever required. Furthermore, the porter and facilitator for assessment, accountabil- flexible cooperation clauses of the EU could be ity and procurement. Furthermore, the Council is strengthened, for instance by deepening PESCO allowed to ‘entrust the implementation of a task from material cooperation to the execution of to a group of Member States which are willing operations for Member States who are willing and have the necessary capability for such a task’ and able. In short, multinational cooperation can (Article 44 TEU). This article specifically aims bring benefits to the EU integration process and to foster CSDP military operations and civilian strengthen the capacities of the Member States, missions. Finally, ‘enhanced cooperation’ (Title including capability development and interoper- IV, TEU) allows a minimum of nine EU Member ability for exercises and operations, if linked to States to establish advanced cooperation within the EU’s security and defence policy – a win-win EU structures. situation.

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8.3. EUROPEAN DEFENCE DEPLOYABLE CAPABILITIES

by Christos Malikkides European Defence Agency Defence European Defence innovation remains a top priority if we are to have a robust European Defence Technological and Industrial Base (EDTIB).

A SCALABLE AND SUSTAINABLE In particular, the volatile security situation in IMPACT ON OPERATIONAL the Middle East and North Africa, the massive EFFECTIVENESS immigration flow, the recent terrorist attacks on European territory and the ongoing crisis close Emerging hybrid and asymmetrical threats to the EU’s eastern borders illustrate three funda- penetrate the Union’s internal and external secu- mental points: rity borders more and more frequently. Such • we can no longer claim that we live in secure threats call for a collective reaction that should and stable conditions be proportionate, scalable and adaptive to new • we need to unify our efforts to cope with cur- threats. To that extent, it is imperative that CSDP rent and future challenges be re-adapted to become more comprehensive, • we need to readjust our defence structures to responsive and robust in order to counteract such ensure our security in the long term. threats.

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(Article 42(6) TEU) provides the opportunity to pool and share our resources and capabilities in an integrated and cost-efficient manner. Although, as indicated, the Lisbon Treaty entered into force in 2009, that provision has not been activated yet. However, it provides the framework for interested Member States to address collectively their oper- ational and capability requirements through the EU structures. Acknowledging the fact that several EU Member States possess critical defence capa-

European Union/EUFOR ALTHEA Union/EUFOR European bilities, it is strategically imperative to streamline A first step could be the identification and exploitation of work in this area and to enhance in this respect synergies in resources and capabilities. the European defence output. The vital interconnected and interrelated IDENTIFICATION AND EXPLOITATION domains of military deployability and sustainability OF SYNERGIES could form the bedrock for establishing permanent structured cooperation. Although both areas are con- The Global Strategy on the European Union’s sidered national responsibilities, their multinational Foreign and Security Policy clearly indicates that dimension cannot be ignored when it comes to the the EU has a comprehensive understanding of field of CSDP. Notably, the lack of an overarching the nature of current and future security chal- EU entity to facilitate the coordination of move- lenges. Critically, it acknowledges the vital role ment and transportation of assets poses a critical that defence can play in managing such chal- challenge to the EU’s capacity to conduct CSDP lenges. Despite the fact that the Lisbon Treaty crisis management operations. Furthermore, was adopted seven years ago and provides the uncoordinated military transportation generates institutional framework for strengthening the unnecessary duplication, associated inefficiencies military dimension of CSDP, progress has been and additional costs. Therefore, for more efficient relatively limited. It is now up to the Member results, it is crucial to ensure the fast and smooth States to demonstrate leadership regarding CSDP. movement of national military forces across EU A positive first step could be the identification territory, especially in the event of an emergency. and exploitation of synergies in resources and These shortfalls, as mentioned earlier, could capabilities. EU institutions such as the European be addressed through a permanent cooperative Defence Agency (EDA), the European External framework leading to the establishment of an Action Service (EEAS) and the European Com- overarching European Movement Coordination mission are well placed to serve as the key strategic Entity. This entity should act as a CSDP enabler enablers for that first step. to facilitate the delivery of humanitarian aid as well as the mobilisation of military assets in the event of armed conflicts, peace support opera- DEEPENING MILITARY COOPERATION tions, terrorist attacks, or natural or man-made disasters. Additionally, daily requirements for mil- To enable the EU to address those diverse itary movement and transportation of EU forces challenges across the full security and defence and equipment across our territories could be ade- spectrum, we need to further deepen our mil- quately addressed by adopting an agreed set of EU itary cooperation inside the Union. The estab- border-crossing legal, customs-related and other lishment of permanent structured cooperation administrative arrangements and procedures.

210 8 CAPABILITY DEVELOPMENT MILEX 09/Jochen Rehrl Lessons learned through the years clearly demonstrate that for capabilities to be functional and effective at multinational level, it is essential that they be standardised, interoperable and compatible.

CONNECTING AND COMPLEMENTING patibility and interoperability. Undoubtedly, this SCARCE RESOURCES would entail optimising levels of pooling and shar- ing. In light of the evolving and complex inter- Cyprus is one example of how existing national national security environment and decreasing capabilities can be used for common security pur- defence budgets, it is crucial to connect and com- poses and peace support operations. Due to its plement our scarce resources, niche capabilities, unique geostrategic position, it represents a bridge technologies and expertise. The EU would then between the EU and the Middle East, constitut- be able to act as a credible global security pro- ing in this regard a ‘permanent aircraft carrier in vider, and to deploy and sustain CSDP missions the Eastern Mediterranean’. Moreover, the country and operations efficiently and safely. For this to be has the infrastructure needed to host international achieved, Member States, whether acting as pro- forces, as well as the services and expertise required viders, users, or both, need to unify their efforts to provide logistical support for their deploy- and complement their assets and requirements ment. The value of those capabilities is reflected so as to safeguard the strategic autonomy of the in their use over the last thirty years for missions EU. However, our efforts should not be solely in countries in the region. A considerable number restricted to complementing our capabilities. We of partners also frequently use Cyprus as a transit need to ensure that our capabilities can be func- hub or for the recovery of their personnel (decom- tional at multinational level through their com- pression). Additionally, Cyprus provides valuable

211 HANDBOOK ON CSDP European Union/EUFOR ALTHEA Union/EUFOR European It is crucial to ensure the fast and smooth movement of national military forces across EU territory, especially in the event of an emergency.

facilities to United Nations missions as well as to either individual partners or the EU. Given the other international organisations. It also offers a increased challenges and threats as well as our permanent non-combatant evacuation operation decreased defence budgets, it is essential to map headquarters for humanitarian and peacekeeping these capabilities and identify how to enhance operations, while its aim is to become a search and their efficiency further. The EU Global Strategy rescue hub. and the European Defence Action Plan (EDAP) provide the impetus and the tools needed to com- bine our military capability development pro- STANDARDISED, INTEROPERABLE cesses with research, innovation and diffusion in AND COMPATIBLE order to produce tangible and relevant results. While change is required in terms of defence Lessons learned through the years clearly innovation and remains a top priority if we are to demonstrate that for capabilities to be functional have a robust European Defence Technological and and effective at multinational level, it is essential Industrial Base (EDTIB), enhancing existing criti- that they be standardised, interoperable and com- cal military capabilities also remains vital. patible. Building on those principles and exploit- ing its geographic position as well as its national infrastructure and versatile capabilities (airlift, RENEWED, ROBUST AND INNOVATIVE seaports, warehouses, logistics, human expertise and advanced technologies), Cyprus has managed The March 2017 celebrations of the 60th to act as a regional multimodal transport hub in a anniversary of the Rome Treaties provide a suitable volatile area of high strategic interest to the EU occasion to remind ourselves that the European and its partners. vision to establish a United Europe for a more sta- Similar to the Cyprus case, there are examples ble and secure world could be revitalised through of other EU Member States which possess critical a renewed, robust and innovative common security capabilities that could be used to the benefit of and defence policy.

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9.1. THE CSDP TRAINING POLICY

by Horst Koukhol

Training and the professional performance guiding principles and responsibilities of CSDP. of staff are interlinked. Enhanced training will CSDP training is a responsibility of the Mem- improve capabilities. Better trained experts will ber States and CSDP training activities do com- provide better impact on the ground and will plement from the EU level the CSDP-relevant make civilian missions and military operations training provided by Member States. Member more effective and the EU as a security provider States remain the key actors in civilian and mili- more credible. Training is essential to making tary CSDP, as they provide the absolute majority CSDP effective: the EU external policy could not of assets and capabilities. Any policy on CSDP work without the efforts of well-prepared diplo- training therefore has to set a clear framework for mats, uniformed civilians, rule of law and military maximising the performance of all personnel con- personnel. The ‘EU Policy on Training for CSDP’ nected with missions and operations, including aims to contribute to the development of a Euro- contract staff and officials working in EU Delega- pean security and defence culture. The document tions. The EEAS has recognised this, and has been creates conditions for a broader development of supporting the Member States with their train- CSDP training within the CFSP context and also ing programmes in support of CSDP missions with regard to the comprehensive approach. In across the spectra of military, police and civilians. this regard, it has a civil-military dimension as Ensuring the appropriate training for civilian and there is a recognised need to strengthen synergies military staff deployed in EU missions and oper- between military and civilian training personnel. ations is therefore both the responsibility and the The document creates conditions for a broader guarded prerogative of the Member States. In the development of CSDP training, within the CFSP area of civilian CSDP this translates mainly into context and also with regard to the comprehensive civilian experts who are deployed as seconded approach. national experts from Member States’ police, judiciary, penitentiary, or other parts of the civil service. MEMBER STATES REMAIN THE KEY ACTORS TRAINING NEEDS AND REQUIREMENTS The recently presented ‘EU Policy on Training for CSDP’ and its ‘Implementing Guidelines’ take The document on the new CSDP training pol- into account new drivers for training arising from icy creates conditions for a broader development of considerable developments in the field of CSDP CSDP- and CSDP-related training. It comprises in both civilian and military crisis management. aspects of civilian and military training needs gath- The aim of this policy paper is also to set out the ered from vaarious sources such as lessons learned

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reports, feedback from missions/operations and A HOLISTIC AND COORDINATED stakeholders involved in providing (CSDP and APPROACH CSDP-related training at strategic and operational level. CSDP and training for CSDP must also be CSDP training activities have to contribute to seen in context as just one EU external action the comprehensive approach by taking stock of tool which needs to fit in with the rest, reflect- training needs, including feedback received from ing the development of EU crisis management stakeholders and reflecting needs identified. There capabilities, integrating training requirements are also certain developments in the civilian-mil- from operational activities and lessons from exer- itary field which create new CSDP training cises into training, and identifying and sharing requirements, such as the EU Global Strategy for best practices among training providers. CSDP the European Union’s Foreign and Security Policy, training must be cost-effective and make the best EU Security Sector Reform (SSR), the compre- possible use of the available resources/infrastruc- hensive approach, the mainstreaming of human tures – including through bilateral/multilateral rights and gender issues and mandatory pre-de- cooperation – inside and outside the EU – in ployment training for seconded and international delivering training activities and seeking synergies contract staff working in EU missions and on EU with international organisations. CSDP training operations. will also need to meet requirements in the area of Additionally, there is an emerging need for EU relations with third states and international training courses enhancing the capabilities of organisations, with a view not only to enhancing staff as rgards ‘Mentoring, Monitoring and Advis- cooperation, but also to sharing common training ing’, ‘Leadership and Management, ‘External and standards and recognition of training. Internal Security of the EU’, ‘Cyber Security’ and This calls for the adoption of a holistic and ‘Hybrid Warfare’. coordinated approach to training matters aimed at establishing links and strengthening synergies between the different training initiatives at EU level within CSDP, with a particular focus on the interface between military and civilian areas.

EUCTG CSDP Training EUMTG Requirements Training Requirements EUCTG EU Training EUMTG Programme

Planning

Assessment Conduct Providers Training activities

EUCTG CART EUMTG Evaluation

Evaluation Providers Reports

CSDP training cycle

215 HANDBOOK ON CSDP European Security and Defence College/Ovidiu Simina Security and Defence European

The training policy was discussed on various occasions; one of them was the CSDP Annual Training and Education Conference in November 2016.

THE CSDP TRAINING CYCLE CONCLUSION

The CSDP training cycle is an iterative Given the complexity and shared responsibil- sequence of activities aimed at supporting the ities in CSDP training, extensive consultations achievement of CSDP training requirements. The have taken place within the EEAS, with Member CSDP training cycle is a continuous process and States and with external actors involved in CSDP- is informed by regular analysis of CSDP training and CSDP-related training. As a result of all these requirements. It consists of four phases: planning, consultations, the drafting exercise of the ‘EU Pol- conduct, evaluation and assessment. icy on Training for CSDP’ and the ‘Implementing It will apply to personnel from EU institutions Guidelines’ followed a thorough procedure based when they are involved in the programming and on joint effort. implementation of EU training activities and also to personnel of institutions and organisations working on behalf of the European Union and where proper integration with EU actors would be vital to the success of the operation involved. It will also apply to personnel of Member States dealing with CSDP matters.

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9.2. THE EUROPEAN SECURITY AND DEFENCE COLLEGE by Dirk Dubois

Established in 2005, the European Security and Defence College (ESDC) is a network of training institutes, think tanks and other actors identified by Member States that has become the main provider of training on the Common Secu- rity and Defence Policy in the larger framework of the Common Security and Defence Policy of the European Union. It is the only training provider on this topic that acts at the European level and that addresses civilians, diplomats, police officers, military personnel and other civil servants. The ESDC owes its success to its rather unique struc- ture, relying on the expertise of both the Member States and the institutions and relevant agencies of the European Union. The ‘pooling and shar- ing’ of the different training activities makes the ESDC extremely cost-efficient as an organisation, training almost 2 000 participants in residential Of course, the College’s operational budget courses in 2016 with an operational budget of does not give a good idea of the real costs of the only EUR 630 000. courses. Most of the costs are still borne by the

Academic advice MS provide political Project focussed guidance configurations QMV STEERING EXECUTIVE Responsible for quality COMMITTEE ACADEMIC insurance BOARD

Supports all other ESDC HEAD OF Sole legal bodies SECRETARIAT THE ESDC representative Helps ensure quality financial and and consistency in all administrative Day-to- parts of training day management

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academies, police academies, military academies, universities, think tanks and research institutions. The main thing that they have in common is that they are certified by their Member States to pro- vide high-quality training and education in the field of security studies. A particular role in the network is played by the EUISS. This EU agency makes its expertise available to the ESDC in the form of its publica- tions and contributions to the e-learning system

of the ESDC and, most importantly, by making available on a very regular basis the skills and knowledge of its researchers for lectures at ESDC training activities. The organisational setup of the ESDC also contributes to its cost-efficiency. Cur- rently, the ESDC is managed by the Head of the ESDC, who is an official seconded by the EEAS. Political guidance is provided the ESDC Steering Committee, in which the Member States take decisions by qualified majority. Academic exper- jochen_rehrl_-_what_we_are_-_what_we_do_-_second_edition_-_final.pdf jochen_rehrl_-_what_we_are_-_what_we_do_-_second_edition_-_final.pdf https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/ tise is provided by an Executive Academic Board, on which the training institutes are represented by Member States through their training institutes senior staff members. and by other entities in the ESDC network. The Board has an advisory role and as such does Currently, the ESDC network consists of over not take decisions. Although there is only one 100 training providers, including diplomatic Board, it actually convenes in different project-fo-

Generic CSDP training

Leadership training

Skills training

Military Erasmus

Pre‐deployment training

Training for partnerships

Training on horizontal issues Graph: Jochen Rehrl

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cused configurations, depending on the topic. Finally, the small, permanent secretariat supports the Head, the Committee and the Board to ful- fil their mandates. In particular, they help ensure that all steps in the delivery of a training activ- ity – from curriculum development to content to methodological approach – reflects the highest possible standards. In 2008, the College established its own training concept, addressing all levels of person- nel from working level up to the level of deci- sion-makers working in the field of CSDP. At the time of writing this article, the EEAS is finalising its new training policy on training for CSDP and College Security and Defence European the accompanying implementing guidelines. Since 2005, the ESDC has trained over 10 000 people from At the same time, the College is developing its the EU Member States, the EU institutions and agencies, as well as from partner countries and organisations. new legal basis, which will also reflect this pol- icy in terms of the training activities the College offers through its network. Currently, the ESDC addresses target audi- dential module too: depending on the size of the ences ranging from high-level decision makers to audience, and on the topics concerned, lectures, people at the beginning of their career with more panel discussions, practical exercises and other than 40 different types of courses. On top of that, pedagogic approaches are combined to make the the College has also developed some 20 common courses as interactive as possible. modules. Since 2005, the ESDC has trained over These common modules have been successfully 10 000 people from the EU Member States, the combined to create a European semester at bach- institutions and agencies. Moreover, it has pro- elor level and will also be combined to create the vided training to an ever larger number of partic- basis for a joint master’s degree on European secu- ipants from third countries and internal organi- rity studies, starting in 2017. sations which cooperate with the EU. The main The ESDC promotes the use of blended learn- focus remains on those countries that are actively ing in all its training activities. All participants in engaging with the EU in its efforts to create a sta- ESDC courses are introduced to this approach in ble neighbourhood through its CSDP operations, advance of the residential courses. but at the same time training can also be used as Before they attend a residential training activ- a political tool to promote better understanding ity, they are asked to go through an e-learning and cooperation with more distant partners. phase. Currently, the learning management sys- In each of the last two academic years, the tem contains almost thirty different ‘autonomous ESDC has conducted between 80 to 90 training knowledge units’ (AKUs) or lessons, developed activities on four different continents. either by existing network members or by external As well as trying to rationalise the existing partners like the Geneva Centre for Security Stud- courses it offers, the College network constantly ies, the Institute for European Studies and many rises to the new challenges and requirements fac- others. Once the basic theoretical concepts are in ing it by regularly offering new pilot activities place, the residential module takes place. The Col- reflecting emerging policies and replying to civil- lege promotes blended learning during the resi- ian and military strategic training needs analysis.

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9.3. MILITARY ERASMUS – EUROPEAN INITIATIVE FOR YOUNG OFFICERS INSPIRED BY ERASMUS

by Harald Gell

In November 2008 the European Union Min- security and defence culture among future mil- isters of Defence decided in their Council Con- itary leaders. The Implementation Group is a clusions on the ESDP – during the 2903rd Exter- project-focused configuration of the Executive nal Relations Council Meeting – to establish an Academic Board supported by the Secretariat of Implementation Group for the ‘European Initi- the European Security and Defence College. ative for the exchange of young officers inspired Consisting of experts from basic officer edu- by Erasmus’, tasked with harmonising the Euro- cation institutions, the Implementation Group pean Union basic officer education, increasing develops possibilities and creates the conditions interoperability and promoting a European for exchanges of young officers during their initial

Common module CSDP Olympiad in Slovakia in 2016. Theresan Military Academy Common module on CSDP in Austria in 2016.

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Armed Forces Academy of General M. R. Štefánik

Common module CSDP Olympiad in Slovakia in 2016.

education and training. It uses existing exchange By the end of 2016, some 24 common modules programmes – including civilian ones such as worth 72 credits (ECTS) have been developed ERASMUS+ – as well as creating new avenues which may cover more than two academic semes- of approach for the purpose of strengthening the ters. interoperability of the EU Armed Forces and – as Each year some 1,000 officer cadets partici- a consequence – increasing EU security within the pate in common modules which are developed framework of CSDP. by the Implementation Group – and the trend The Implementation Group defines problem is increasing. areas which are to be solved to facilitate exchanges. A huge step forward is the cooperation between These ‘lines of development’ focus on specific five European Union basic officer education insti- fields, such as the development of necessary tutions to hold annual conferences dedicated to competences for officers, regulations concerning future developments in favour of the Implementa- administrative matters, how to pass information tion Group’s tasks. Challenges – such as developing to the people who need it, and defining common common modules, establishing an international modules which are considered essential by all EU semester, financing exchanges and implementing Member States to the education of young officers. educational elements developed by the by 28 EU If these common modules are implemented into Member States into national academic curricula – national curricula, then step by step the European are solved during these conferences, which are open Union basic officer education will be harmonised. for participation to all EU Member States.

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Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Cyprus

The common module ‘Cadet leadership development under harsh conditions’ was organised by the Republic of Cyprus.

Following a proposal by EU officials concern- SOURCES FOR MORE AND ing the Common Security and Defence Policy – UPDATED INFORMATION ‘Member States should introduce a European Semester on Defence’ – the five institutions men- • Website: http://www.emilyo.eu tioned above also developed a detailed interna- • Website: http://www.maf-reichenau.at/ • iMAF 2014 (Harald Gell & Sylvain Paile- tional semester within the framework of the civil- Calvo) available on http://www.emilyo.eu ian Erasmus+ Strategic Partnership programme. • European Education and Training for It consists of a combination of existing and new Young Officers – The European Initiative common modules, and all the developments will for the Exchange of Young Officers, be available for all EU Member States by the end inspired by Erasmus (Sylvain Paile-Calvo) of 2017. available on http://83.64.124.70/ campus/iep/pdf/2014/Basic_ The Implementation Group is driven by the Documents/2014-03-Paile-erasmus_ key idea that exchanges of officer cadets between booklet_fin.pdf European basic officer education institutions will • From European Mobility to military in itself create a European security and defence Interoperability – exchanging Young culture, and thus increase Europe’s security and Officers, knowledge and know-how defence capabilities. (Sylvain Paile-Calvo) available on http://www.emilyo.eu

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9.4. THE POSITIVE SIDE EFFECTS OF TRAINING – THE SECURITY POLICY DIMENSION by Jochen Rehrl

Prologue: The European Security and Defence THE POSITIVE SIDE EFFECTS OF College is a ‘network college’ which is comprised of TRAINING 120 national entities including diplomatic acade- mies, national defence universities, police colleges and The positive side effects of training, from the NGOs. The article below is based on that specific trainer’s and trainee’s perspective, include training environment, in which the training audience a) Institution building is mainly recruited from the EU institutions and the b) Human capacity building country’s administration, i.e. from various ministries c) Democratisation and agencies. The training environment is interna- d) Intellectual diversity tional and includes both military and civilian partic- e) Regional focus ipants, with a focus on ensuring gender and regional f) Agenda setting balance among trainees. In general, the ESDC pro- g) Confidence building vides training and education for the Union’s Common h) Networking Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) in the wider This list does not claim to be exhaustive, but context of the Common Foreign and Security Policy it gives a good overview of the potential of each (CFSP) at European level. training activity. It is up to the training designer to think about that potential and to the course director to ensure that it is fulfilled. INTRODUCTION

When ‘training’ is mentioned, the general assumption is that this word refers to acquiring and applying the knowledge, skills and competencies which are needed for a specific job. But besides the classic training goals, there are some other relevant dimensions which play a crucial role, in particular when it comes to training at strategic level. These positive side effects can be described as the ‘security policy dimension’ of training. These side effects can include institution and human capacity building, strengthening participants’ intellectual diversity and confidence building – to name but a few. It is of utmost importance that the training designer be aware of these pos- itive side effects, in order to make the best use of them. Graph: Jochen Rehrl

223 HANDBOOK ON CSDP European Security and Defence College Security and Defence European A sign of good networking during training is when participants know their counterparts in the other ministries and even in the ministries of partner countries.

a) Institution building present and visible. This process, which includes When a training course is provided in a third the cabinet of various ministries, can again be country (‘local host’), the responsible organisation used to stimulate working relations between var- is generally working together with one of the reg- ious actors, and to create a network, which will ular ESDC network partners from one of the EU then hopefully last beyond the end of the training Member States. A representative from the ESDC event. Secretariat also assists the course organisers in planning and conducting the training event. The b) Human capacity building local host is requested to identify a point of con- Of course, the training courses themselves con- tact which has connections to other key ministries tribute to the creation of knowledgeable personnel in order to simplify the nomination process. within the countries involved (both participating In some cases, working relations between the and organising). But coming back to what was said various ministries leave some room for improve- under point a), the local personnel responsible for ment. The training activity can be used as a facil- the courses must be not only good organisers, but itator in order to establish or improve these rela- also good facilitators, mediators and networkers. tions. The preparation of such an event can also be They should be able to make middle-management used to introduce permanent working bodies, e.g. decisions, while always bearing the bigger picture in order to deal with EU Common Foreign and in mind. The training field should not be used for Security Policy issues. national turf battles. During training events conducted under the The personnel nominated to give a lecture or umbrella of the ESDC, the local host should contribute to a training event face a very specific ensure that a number of high-ranking officials are challenge. Similarly to the personnel involved in

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European Security and Defence College

Freedom of speech and academic freedom are the cornerstones of any valuable training and education event.

organising the event, local lecturers asked to pro- The challenges above put pressure on the lec- vide a contribution will mostly be doing so for turer, both because they represent a brand new the first time in an international environment, in experience and because there may be many dif- a foreign language and on a topic which could be ferent ways of handling them. Within the ESDC, controversial and therefore challenging to discuss. the Chatham House rule is commonly used, Besides these elements, the presentation style which means that ‘information disclosed during can differ depending on the audience. Let’s use a meeting may be reported by those present, but some stereotypes in order to make the point clear: the source of that information may not be explic- whereas military audiences love to follow a Pow- itly or implicitly identified’. In some countries it erPoint presentation, academics prefer to listen could be the case that all information disclosed and receive a well-structured speech; civilians, on has to be approved by a higher authority, which the other hand, tend to appreciate a mixture of puts additional pressure on the lecturer, in par- slides, role plays and other interactive elements. ticular during the Q&A session. In general, military participants wait until they The ESDC has established a well-functioning are asked, keeping their questions until the Q&A evaluation system, which can be used to give the session is opened, whereas civilians try to clarify lecturer feedback on his or her personal presenta- questions as soon as they come into their minds. tion style and how it was perceived. In addition, The lecturer is tasked with both making everyone the College provides ‘Train the Trainer’ seminars happy … and delivering the message. in order to improve lecturers’ performance.

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Responsibility for this endeavour lies with the moderator/facilitator of a specific training and education event. This person is tasked with keeping the questions rolling, intervening when the discussion is not remaining within the given parameters (in terms of both content and polite- ness) and finding ways to link contributions with the overall learning outcomes of the whole event.

European Security and Defence College Security and Defence European d) Intellectual diversity Confidence-building measures can be facilitated Freedom of speech and academic freedom are through role plays or other interactive exercises. the cornerstones of any valuable training and edu- cation event: listen to each other; try to under- stand your opponent and make your point clear c) Democratisation and understandable; don’t take statements person- Democracy and its values are one of the key ally, and try to remain on factual grounds. priorities of the European Union in its neighbour- Intellectual diversity can be challenging and is hood policy: free and fair elections; accountability even sometimes not appreciated in less developed of the political elite; active contribution of soci- democratic cultures. There are also differences ety to political debates; an administration based between various cultures, e.g. in some Asian coun- on the rule of law; and the protection of human tries, public disagreement is a no-go; hence, cul- rights in all aspects. tural awareness should also be taken into account Training and education promotes these ideas in when discussing this issue. two ways: on the one side, by making the organ- Promoting intellectual diversity and aca- During training events conducted under the umbrella of the ESDC, the local host should ensure that a number isers/lecturers (training providers) aware of these demic freedom does not necessarily mean that of high-ranking officials are present and visible. principles; and on the other side, by providing everything must be accepted. There are certainly training for an audience (training receivers) which red lines which should not be crossed, such as will be confronted with critical assessments and xenophobic remarks or other statements that vio- discussions. late human rights. The former President of the Education (more so than training) should focus European Parliament, Mr , gave a on facts and figures – that is to say, on the transfer good example of a response to such a transgres- of knowledge. Nevertheless, for more advanced sion in March 2016, when a right-wing member courses and seminars, the trainees should be pro- of the Parliament provoked the plenum with rac- voked into making (self-)critical assessments. This ism and therefore Mr Schulz had him excluded allows them to experience a healthy debate and from the meeting. This kind of measure should discussion environment – the basis for democratic not be excessively used in training and education discourse. events, but it should not be excluded either. Lecturers, who – in general – have to have their Bearing in mind that training and education seminars approved by a superior, will get imme- events should first of all be informative, intellec- diate feedback on their arguments in the Q&A tual diversity comes into play when climbing up period, in which they will have to defend their the ‘knowledge pyramid’. When trainees are asked points of view. Trainees are invited to question to apply, understand and explain why and how everything, challenge the arguments of the lec- procedures and structures are as they are, they turer and even to play devil’s advocate in order to should be confronted with various approaches stimulate a thought-provoking exchange of views. and methods. Intellectual diversity will help them

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European Security and Defence College

During training events conducted under the umbrella of the ESDC, the local host should ensure that a number of high-ranking officials are present and visible.

to find their own way. Being critical, questioning important for EU bureaucrats who can easily what they have been taught and developing their become trapped in the Brussels bubble; external own problem-solving approach to challenges is experts can therefore help to keep things simple the best kind of learning, and one which could and understandable. even lead to a change in attitude. The regional focus ensures that both sides take into account each other’s positions, encouraging e) Regional focus them to think about one another and thereby The regional focus – in other words, the local opening their horizons. At the end of this kind of ownership – of training can be seen as the key to training event, the EU officials should know more success. A training and education event should about the region and the regional representatives never be a one-way street: a trainee from a spe- should know more about the EU; a classic win- cific region can enrich the event by sharing his win situation. or her experience, contributing to discussion and highlighting links which are hard to identify from f) Agenda setting an outside perspective; while a trainer from a spe- By training and educating specific audiences, cific region is also beneficial for the event, because organisers have an important tool at their disposal: he or she can bring in a regional perspective on agenda setting. Although most EU/ESDC train- certain issues. These perspectives are particularly ing is already standardised and harmonised, the

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course director has the power to focus on specific h) Networking topics and distribute the available time according Last but not least, networking between the to his or her priorities. participants – but also between the lecturers – is Agenda setting is a skill which was very well crucial if the event is to have a lasting impact. known to the former High Representative, Javier Exchanging business cards, phone numbers and Solana. In 2008, he wrote a publication entitled email addresses can facilitate work after the event ‘Security and Climate Change’. In the following is over. Having a contact person in another coun- months, he included this topic in each and every try, who is reliable and can be called any time, can meeting. By doing so, he gently forced the other make life easier, in particular when an individual side to read his publication and find its own posi- is under stress or is lacking situational awareness tion on this subject. This is a textbook example of Networking should bring together the alumni how agenda setting can be used. of a specific training course, creating relationships For training and education events, the major between various ministries but also across bor- themes are already stipulated. But there is usually ders. A sign of good networking during training a certain amount of room for manoeuvre, and this is when participants know their counterparts in should be used to add topics which are impor- the other ministries and even in the ministries of tant for the organisation or the audience. Having partner countries. said that, agenda setters should be aware of their If training and education events are provided power and use it wisely. on a regular basis, the network between the stu- dents and alumni will grow from year to year. This g) Confidence building network can form the basis for trust and further One of the main aspects of training and edu- cooperation, but above all for an extended period cation events within the European Security and of peace in Europe, which we all wish for. Defence College is confidence building. Some training events involve conflicting parties sitting in the same room. If the organiser succeeds in bring- CONCLUSION ing them together, discussing issues and maybe even finding common ground, then the event can Training and education has, in addition to the be deemed a success. Training and education – learning perspective, a lot of other positive side the transfer of knowledge and the strengthening effects which should be taken into account and of skills – are vectors for social engineering and used whenever possible. In order to use the secu- networking. rity policy dimension of training, responsible and Confidence-building measures can be facil- well-educated trainers are of utmost importance. itated through role plays or other interactive When training is mingled with a political man- exercises. It is important to give the floor to the date, the positive side effects of training can take audience; they should lead any interactions, dis- the lead in order to accomplish the mission. And cussions or debates. Topical facilitators could be when training has the potential to make the world exercises focused on conflict analysis, mediation a better place, why shouldn’t it be used to do so? or negotiation. All these facilitators stimulate interaction between the participants and force them to think in the mindset of others.

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230 ISBN: 978-92-95201-05-7