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Ituri:Stakes, Actors, Dynamics

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Ituri:Stakes, Actors, Dynamics ITURI STAKES, ACTORS, DYNAMICS FEWER/AIP/APFO/CSVR would like to stress that this report is based on the situation observed and information collected between March and August 2003, mainly in Ituri and Kinshasa. The 'current' situation therefore refers to the circumstances that prevailed as of August 2003, when the mission last visited the Democratic Republic of the Congo. This publication has been produced with the assistance of the European Union. The contents of this publication are the sole responsibility of the author and can in no way be taken to reflect the views of the European Union. This publication has been produced with the assistance of the Swedish International Development Agency. The contents of this publication are the sole responsibility of the author and can in no way be taken to reflect the views of the Swedish Government and its agencies. This publication has been produced with the assistance of the Department for Development Policy, Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland. The contents of this publication are the sole responsibility of the author and can in no way be taken to reflect the views of the Finnish Government and its agencies. Copyright 2003 © Africa Initiative Program (AIP) Africa Peace Forum (APFO) Centre for Study of Violence and Reconciliation (CSVR) Forum on Early Warning and Early Response (FEWER) The views expressed by participants in the workshop are not necessarily those held by the workshop organisers and can in no way be take to reflect the views of AIP, APFO, CSVR and FEWER as organisations. 2 List of Acronyms............................................................................................................................... 4 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY....................................................................................................................................... 5 CONFLICT INDICATORS.................................................................................................................................... 6 Root Causes ...................................................................................................................................... 6 Proximate Causes............................................................................................................................. 8 Triggers .............................................................................................................................................. 9 PEACE INDICATORS........................................................................................................................................ 10 STAKEHOLDER ANALYSIS................................................................................................................................ 13 Local Stakeholders.......................................................................................................................... 13 National Stakeholders.................................................................................................................... 15 International Stakeholders............................................................................................................ 16 SCENARIOS.................................................................................................................................................... 17 Worst Case Scenario (less likely)............................................................................................... 17 Middle Case Scenario (most likely)............................................................................................. 17 Best Case Scenario (less likely).................................................................................................... 18 RESPONSE STRATEGIES .................................................................................................................................. 18 Support for the IIA......................................................................................................................... 18 Encouraging Collaboration between Communities................................................................ 18 Addressing Property Rights.......................................................................................................... 19 Effective DDR.................................................................................................................................. 19 Establishment of Law Enforcement Mechanisms..................................................................... 19 Exploring Local Solutions for Peace........................................................................................... 20 Tighter Border Controls............................................................................................................... 20 Sufficient MONUC Presence....................................................................................................... 20 APPENDIX : SURVEY FOR ITURI INTERIM ADMINISTRATION........................................................................ 21 3 List of Acronyms CPV Commission on Prevention and Verification FAC Congolese Armed Forces FAO Food and Agriculture Organisation (UN) FAPC Popular Armed Forces for the Congo FNI Nationalist and Integrationist Front FPDC Popular Front for Democracy in Congo FRPI Revolutionary Front for Ituri IDP Internally Displaced Person IEMF Interim Emergency Multi-National Force IIA Ituri Interim Administration MLC Congolese Liberation Movement MONUC United Nations Organisation Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo OCHA Office of the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN) PIR Rapid Intervention Police PRA People's Redemption Army PUSIC Party for Unity and Safeguard of the Integrity of Congo RCD/Goma Congolese Rally for Democracy/Goma RCD/ML Congolese Rally for Democracy/Liberation Movement TNG Transitional National Government UNDP United Nations Development Programme UPC Union of Congolese Patriots UPDF Ugandan People's Defence Force 4 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Improved conditions in the region of Ituri, Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), are extremely fragile and require continued international attention. It is premature to believe that the threat of violence around the town of Bunia has been fully removed. A medium-term approach should guide intervention in Ituri, to ensure that it does not fall off the public policy radar screen due to the departure of the Interim Emergency Multinational Force (IEMF) and the distraction of other crises on the continent. The military engagement of the first EU peacekeeping force outside the European continent must be followed up by a combined diplomatic and humanitarian engagement in the affected region in order to consolidate the gains of Operation Artemis. Concerted international action – to strengthen the UN presence, help re-install legal and judicial systems, implement demobilisation programmes, revitalise local economies and help with the process of reconciliation – is urgently needed to help resolve the ongoing crisis in Ituri. For the first time in decades, there are prospects for an ethnically integrated Congolese army, a reasonable if imperfect broad-based transitional government and an end to the de facto partition of the Congo by warring factions. However, the success of the peace process at the national level depends on the simultaneous success of peace processes at the local level in areas such as Ituri. Indeed, the situation in Ituri threatens to derail the chances of a unified DRC. The international community, therefore, needs to support the harmonisation of national and local level peace processes. The potential for further conflict should not be underestimated. The IEMF has restored a relative calm in Bunia, but much of the town is deserted, and in the rest of Ituri massacres have continued during the past three months. Underlying causes of the conflict, such as land issues and the control of mineral resources, remain potentially destabilising factors in the region. Moreover, some members of the Hema and Lendu communities continue to support campaigns of ethnic cleansing. There is now, however, a better chance for peace than there has been for years. The Ugandan army has left, a stronger peacekeeping force is being deployed with a mandate for the whole of Ituri, and an ethnically balanced local authority has begun working in Bunia. The DRC at last has a broad-based Transitional National Government (TNG), creating the prospect of an integrated army, combining the former government army with former rebel forces. There should in future be a chance of enrolling some Ituri militiamen into the new national army. MONUC Task Force II should prioritise cutting off supplies of arms. Airspace surveillance by the IEMF has so far had the effect of cutting off supplies from Rwanda to the UPC. While this surveillance is probably positive it urgently needs to be balanced with controls on the Ugandan border, particularly on the few roads that vehicles can use from the border and from Lake Albert. There is currently no effective police force anywhere in Ituri. Nor are there functioning prisons or magistrates. The government, MONUC (United Nations Organisation Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo) and the IIA need to coordinate to establish a legal, judicial and policing system. MONUC should plan to mount joint patrols with Congolese police. MONUC needs a widespread deployment to prevent further massacres. The Ituri militias are very lightly armed, relative to MONUC’s armoured vehicles
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