Justice Strategy for Bunia-DRC
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STRATEGY FOR RAPID RE-ESTABLISHMENT OF A CRIMINAL JUSTICE CAPACITY IN BUNIA DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO DPKO Civilian Police Division August 2003 TABLE OF CONTENTS Executive Summary..……………………………………………………………. 1 Introduction.…………………………………………………………………….. 2 Objectives………………………………………………………………………. 2 Current Situation ………………………………………………………………... 3 Key Issues. ………………………………………………………………………. 4 Strategy for Rapid Re-establishment of a Criminal Justice Capacity in Bunia…………………………………………………………………….. 7 Phase 1: Pre-trial Detention Capacity. ………………………………….. 7 Phase 2: Basic Functioning of the Criminal Justice System …………... 10 Recruitment and Training of Local Staff.………………………………………. 11 Rehabilitation of Current Facilities and Provision of Equipment ……………… 13 International Personnel – Advisory and Training Roles.……………………….. 13 Accountability Mechanisms – Code of Conduct and Monitoring.……………… 14 Conclusions.…………………………………………………………………….. 15 Recommendations ……………………………………………………………… 15 Annexes Annex 1: Individuals and Organizations Consulted Annex 2: Terms of Reference Annex 3: Current Situation of the Police, Judicial and Corrections Systems in Bunia Annex 4: Detention and Review Process Annex 5: Capacity of Military Component for Extraordinary Pre-Trial Detention and Review Annex 6: Rapid Re-establishment of Pre-Trial Detention Capacity – Additional Options Considered Annex 7: Prison Concept of Operations Annex 8: Prison Infrastructure Rehabilitation and Equipment Needs STRATEGY FOR RAPID RE-ESTABLISHMENT OF A CRIMINAL JUSTICE CAPACITY IN BUNIA, DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO August 2003 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY The police, judicial and corrections systems in Bunia are not currently functioning. The international civilian and military presences authorized by the Security Council for limited tasks are not able to fill the void and, as a result, there is almost complete impunity for abduction, rape, murder and other serious crimes reportedly being committed there on a regular basis. This document provides a two-phase Strategy for the rapid re-establishment of the criminal justice system in Bunia. Phase 1 establishes initial local capacity for the pre-trial detention of criminal suspects – including those that might be detained by the international military presence as it carries out its mandate in Ituri. It could be implemented within seven to ten days after a decision to do so and deployment to Bunia of all necessary resources. Phase 2 provides for development of a local police service, expanded judicial capacity – including the capacity to conduct trials – and enhanced prison capacity. This phase builds on Phase 1 but is not dependent on it and could be implemented within twelve to sixteen weeks of the full deployment of the necessary resources to Bunia. It is underpinned by the recruitment and training of local staff, rehabilitation of current facilities, provision of equipment, deployment of international personnel, and implementation of accountability mechanisms including a code of conduct and a human rights monitoring programme. The Strategy is premised on the resolution of nine strategic issues, key among these are: successful coordination of donor efforts; the selection of police and prison personnel; the quick transfer of judges and prosecutors to Bunia; the payment of local salaries; and, support from the IEMF and/or MONUC’s military component as they work within their mandates to help stabilize the security conditions in Bunia. Implementation of both phases of the Strategy should begin at the same time. Both should be led by MONUC and will require the active support of the Government of National Unity, the Ituri Interim Administration, and the international community. Effective consultation and collaboration with a full range of professional and civil society actors is also paramount to its successful and sustainable implementation. INTRODUCTION This Report is the product of an assessment of the criminal justice system in Bunia conducted by police, judicial and corrections advisors1 from the Civilian Police Division of the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO/CPD) from 8-24 July 2003. (The Assessment Team’s terms of reference are set forth in Annex 1.) The assessment was closely supported by MONUC personnel who organized and participated in the mission, provided insights and guidance, and who participated in formulating the resulting recommendations. The Assessment Team based its recommendations on preparatory work conducted before deployment and on consultations with a wide range of parties – national, international and UN system partners in Kinshasa, Kisangani and Bunia (See Annex 2). The recommendations draw, in particular, on the “Evaluation du Système Judiciare et Pénitentiaire de Bunia” (25 June 2003) prepared by the MONUC/Bunia Human Rights Section, OHCHR’s draft “Projet sur la Restauration du Systeme Judiciaire en Ituri”, and numerous other useful documents from MONUC’s civilian police component. In the corresponding sections below, this Report: (1) sets forth its two main objectives; (2) assesses the current situation in Bunia; (3) identifies and addresses the key issues faced; (4) offers a two-phased “Strategy for Rapid Re-Establishment of a Criminal Justice Capacity in Bunia”; and (5) provides recommendations on steps needed to implement the Strategy. OBJECTIVES The Strategy and Recommendations below are offered to provide technical guidance to the Ituri Interim Administration (IIA), the Government of National Unity, other national actors, and the international community on steps needed to achieve the following two objectives2: · Quick set-up of a system of arrest and pre-trial detention of those found to have committed a serious criminal offense that threatens the security of the peacekeeping operation or the civilian population; and · Re-establishment of a minimally functioning local police, judicial and corrections structures with capacity to provide basic policing, conduct pre-trial detention hearings, detain prisoners, complete criminal investigations, and hold some criminal trials. 1 The CPD/DPKO Assessment Team consisted of: Mr. Sani Abdoulaye, CPD Desk Officer for MONUC; Ms. Isabel Hight, Corrections Officer in CPD’s Criminal Law and Judicial Advisory Unit (CLJAU); and Mr. Robert Pulver, Judicial Officer in the CPD/CLJAU. The Assessment Team conducted the assessment, developed these recommendations, and drafted this Report with strong substantive support from: Mr. Stephane Jean, Legal Advisor to the MONUC Police Commissioner; and Mr. Benjamin Hounton, MONUC Human Rights Officer. 2 Longer-term strategies are not addressed in this paper, but will be necessary to provide for the complete functioning and development of the criminal justice system in Bunia. As recommended in the Secretary General’s Second Special Report (S/2003/566 of 27 May 2003, para. 72), the European Union, UNDP and OHCHR plan to begin a detailed nationwide rule -of-law assessment as early as September 2003. This assessment is likely to lead to a larger, nation-wide rule-of-law approach being developed in early to mid-2004. - 2 - CURRENT SITUATION Bunia is currently without functioning police, judicial or corrections systems and a culture of impunity persists. MONUC’s mandate does not expressly provide for it to undertake executive policing, judicial or corrections responsibilities and the IEMF interprets its mandate to exclude arrest or detention of criminal suspects3. As a result, neither the IEMF nor MONUC are in a position to perform basic policing activity or to apprehend and detain for any period of time those believed to have committed serious crimes, including those caught en flagrante. Of an estimated 300 police previously stationed in Bunia, approximately 150 have been located and are available for re-engagement. Approximately thirty-five former court officials – including one judge, several judicial police officers, registry officers, process servers and other clerical support staff – are also present and appear eager to take up their positions. (One prosecutor formerly serving in Bunia is also available, but may not have been properly appointed. The same may well be true of some other staff). At least two defense lawyers are also present and appear to be available. Eleven previous prison staff including the management are similarly available for work. Of the four police stations, three appear structurally sound and warrant rehabilitation, the fifth requires demolition. Of these four, the headquarters building is the least damaged. The tribunal is in good condition and the prison in a state of severe decay and dilapidation. All require reconnection of electricity, water, installation of security grilles and lockable doors at a minimum. The prison requires the most extensive work. Almost all office, security and other equipment necessary to the functioning of the criminal justice system has been looted, lost or destroyed. According to those interviewed, no staff in Bunia have been paid salaries since July 1998. Many are acknowledged by the local population to have accepted bribes and favors and engaged in corrupt practices, and a number from all three systems are said to have been closely aligned with militia groups. It is widely believed that because of this alignment, or because of the conflict and their own ethnic and other affiliations, the previous judges and the prosecutor may be unable to dispense justice in an unbiased and impartial way. The majority of police have never received police training and none has been offered