Introduction

Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik German Institute for International and Security Affairs

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Ambitious Framework Nation: Germany in NATO WP S Bundeswehr Capability Planning and the “Framework Nations Concept” Rainer L. Glatz and Martin Zapfe

Berlin is pursuing ambitious plans for security and defence, with significant potential for the Bundeswehr and European partner militaries. In the long-term, the Bundeswehr could well become Europe’s indispensable army, with Germany as a “framework nation” contributing decisively to NATO’s readiness. This will require the future German gov- ernment to accept an unaccustomed politico-military leadership role. It will also be necessary to increase defence spending for the long term.

A stronger German role within NATO, as Together with the British and French envisioned by the Federal Government, armed forces, the Bundeswehr is to form ultimately requires increased military the backbone of European defence within capabilities. Over the last months, the Ger- NATO. In addition, and primarily through man Ministry of Defence (MoD) has made the much-discussed Framework Nations significant progress in its force and capa- Concept (FNC), the Bundeswehr is to contrib- bility planning with fundamental impli- ute, directly and indirectly, to the future cations for both Germany and NATO. First development of allied forces, and thus to thoughts on how to operationalize the Europe’s capacity to act as part of NATO. strategic aims of its 2016 White Paper were The practical relevance of NATO policy formulated in March 2017 by the MoD’s guidance and capability planning targets Director General for Planning, Lieutenant is now the highest in decades and sets the General Erhard Bühler (the so-called basic parameters of Berlin’s capability “Bühler-Paper”). In the absence of a new planning. and comprehensive capstone “Concept of the Bundeswehr”, this document currently constitutes the effective planning basis The Return of Collective Defence for the armed forces. Any attempt to understand current Bundes- In this process, the German and NATO wehr planning must first start with a look perspective are inseparable. The aim for backwards. For several years now, intense current Bundeswehr planning is twofold: budgetary pressure and operational neces-

Lieutenant General (ret.) Rainer L. Glatz is a Senior Associate in SWP’s International Security Division SWP Comments 35 Dr. Martin Zapfe is head of the “Global Security Team” at the Center for Security Studies (CSS) at the ETH Zurich September 2017

1 sities have forced the Bundeswehr to priori- “Basic Posture” and tize among the core tasks outlined by NATO “Mission Structure” in 2010: collective defence, crisis manage- The tension between officially giving equal ment, and cooperative security. importance to all missions while de facto Since the end of the Cold War, the Bun- prioritizing collective defence is to be rec- deswehr had focused increasingly on inter- onciled through the concepts of “basic pos- national crisis management. In 2011 the ture”, “mission structure”, and “mission MoD’s “Defence Policy Guidelines” deci- “packages”. In principle, the Bundeswehr’s sively set crisis management operations “basic posture” (“Grundaufstellung”) – its gar- as its chief structural determinant. In the risons and the basic order of battle – will process, capabilities for collective defence – remain roughly unchanged. Contrary to as extended national defence – suffered. In some reports, there will be no significant addition, following the financial crisis, increase in strength. The basic posture is budgetary pressure was immense. Signifi- supposed to reflect the primary task of col- cant savings were realised, inter alia, by not lective defence, especially for designated equipping army divisions fully according to units of high readiness. Yet as a general the stated requirements. Where necessary rule all units are supposed to regroup into to equip units for training and operations, “mission structures” (“Einsatzsstruktur”) the required equipment was to be made tailored to task-specific requirements when available through efficient management – called to action. This is to be achieved meaning transferring it from other units through so-called “mission packages” (“Mis- supposedly less in need of it. This invariably sionspakete”) that are intended to bridge any created “hollow structures”. The Bundes- capability gap between the basic force pos- wehr’s brigades, squadrons, and flotillas ture and the operational requirements at should – and could – support those units hand. on operations, but not deploy as organic To illustrate, if an armoured brigade formations. A scenario of collective defence were to deploy to NATO’s eastern border, was, after all, considered highly unlikely. the unit would move swiftly and largely in This planning assumption became obsolete its peacetime composition. If that same bri- when Russia annexed Crimea in 2014. gade were to send soldiers to a stabilisation Consequently, the central tenets of cur- operation, it could swap its organic main rent Bundeswehr planning are a return to battle tanks and infantry fighting vehicles collective defence as guiding paradigm and for protected patrol vehicles externally an energetic effort to fill up the forces’ “hol- stored as “mission packages”. low structures”. While collective defence This system is key to making sense of and crisis management officially remain of the figures circulating in media reports. equal importance, this claim lacks credibil- The Bühler-Paper defines a “national level of ity. Structurally, the Bundeswehr prioritizes ambition” with indeed ambitious targets, high-intensity operations for collective especially regarding the land forces. Much defence. The same single set of forces will like today, the German Army is to have three then have to provide troops for crisis man- divisional headquarters and eight brigades agement operations. That is consequential, by 2032. By that date, however, all of these yet also implies that future missions (like in should be deployable simultaneously for northern Africa) might only be sustainable the purpose of collective defence. Looking by contributing smaller contingents. This beyond 2032, it should even be possible to compromise is the de facto basis for current deploy up to ten brigades in “mission struc- Bundeswehr planning. tures”. However, more important than the mere number of brigades are efforts to re- constitute the Heer’s “hollow structures”. To regain lost operational capabilities, the

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2 field army’s brigades, divisions and corps a revanchist Russia. In its 2015 Political will be reassigned critical support units. Guidance, the Alliance agreed on a new For example, to regain critical indirect fire level of ambition based, inter alia, on an capabilities, rocket and tube artillery is ambitious scenario of conventional collec- to be organically reintegrated into the tive defence (Major Joint Operation – Plus brigades, divisions, and corps through (MJO+)). On this basis, member states and so-called “artillery capability packages” NATO institutions have negotiated targets (“Fähigkeitspakete Artillerie”) of as of now for future force planning. unspecified strength and structure. Germany, for the first time and as the As part of NATO’s Integrated Air and first major member state, accepted the Missile Defense System, the German Air Force outcomes of the NDPP as the basis of its has traditionally been closely oriented own planning. While Berlin continues to towards the Alliance. With its flying plat- retain full control over the process – only forms and ground-based systems, the Luft- those requirements accepted fully or in part waffe is to perform all the core functions form the basis of its planning efforts, and of aerial warfare, while also preparing to even those are merely politically binding – provide the core of a Multinational Air Group this is a significant step, both in terms of capable of up to 350 sorties per day. Addi- symbolism and planning guidance. The tionally, the air force is to regain a credible majority of targets described above are to capacity for naval air warfare. The German be met by 2032. Thus, Germany’s national Navy shall be able to provide at least 15 plat- capability targets are to be in sync with forms and vital support capabilities at all NATO’s planning, in the long term aiming times. Further capability targets are defined at qualitatively and quantitatively suffi- for the cyber domain, special operations cient capabilities across the Alliance. forces, the Joint Medical Service (Zentraler Sanitätsdienst) and Joint Support Service (Streitkräftebasis). Thus, while the army might Towards an “Anchor Army” benefit from significant investments, the On the second aspect: The Bundeswehr is air force and navy are supposed to modern- set to assume indirect responsibility for ize and expand their capabilities primarily the force development of Allied armies. Few on the basis of existing platforms, and only other aspects of current German force plan- secondarily by introducing new systems. ning have received more international In this process, the Bundeswehr consistently attention, and few are plagued by greater subordinates itself under NATO guidance misconceptions, than Germany’s role in the and participates in multinational force FNC. If implemented consistently, and with development. NATO’s role manifests itself strategic realism, this concept has the in two ways: First, through the Bundeswehr’s potential to substantially change the struc- near-complete integration into NATO’s De- ture and character of European armed fence Planning Process (NDPP); and, second, forces within NATO and beyond. through Germany’s often misunderstood Today’s FNC originates in a German idea leadership role in the Alliance’s FNC. of 2013. While NATO adopted the FNC the following year, it still is essentially designed, financed, and implemented by the member Guidance from Brussels states. This results in an inherent flexibility; On the first aspect: With its reorientation yet on the downside, it infuses a confusing toward collective defence, the Bundeswehr ambiguity in terminology. NATO alone follows NATO’s strategic guidance. The effectively knows three different FNC ap- NATO summits in Wales 2014 and Warsaw proaches, each grouped around a respective 2016 were landmarks of an increased Allied framework nation. Parallel to the German- effort to credibly reassure Allies and deter coordinated group, one group around the

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3 UK’s Joint Expeditionary Force aims at a spe- This capability focus was not revolu- cific combined and joint task force for high- tionary in 2013/2014 as similar programs intensity operations; the other, coordinated already existed in both NATO and the EU by Italy and significantly less ambitious, (Smart Defence/Pooling & Sharing). Yet the pro- aims at developing capabilities for stabili- gramme gained new relevance when, in sation operations. In addition, the EU, too, 2015, the FNC defence ministers agreed has decided to launch its own “Framework to link this capability development with Nation Concept” (consciously adopted with- NATO’s strategic-operational response to out the letter -s at the end of “Nation”) in Russia’s aggression. Through this link, the 2015. This analysis uses the term “FNC” clusters no longer necessarily represent exclusively with regard to the group co- stand-alone solutions but can provide capa- ordinated by Germany. bilities directly to the Alliance’s dedicated Processes reflect politics, and thus Ger- rapid reaction forces, such as NATO’s many assumes a central role in the FNC. It “Spearhead”, the Very High Readiness Joint chairs the main steering committees and is Task Force (VJTF) and the enhanced NATO responsible for preparing and following-up Response Force (eNRF). For example, a Role the meetings of FNC defence ministers 2 field hospital stood up in one cluster is where basic decisions are made. supposed be made available for a specific The German-led FNC group has two dis- VJTF rotation, thereby providing clear tinct pillars which are only partially inter- parameters for planning efforts. dependent. Since the beginning, it has focused on the coordinated development of capabilities in so-called “Clusters”; since Developing “Larger Formations” 2015, an additional focus has been placed It is only in the context of the FNC’s “larger developing large multinational formations. To formations” around the framework nation this day, 19 nations have joined Germany. that current Bundeswehr planning can be Out of this group of 20, seven have thus fully understood. Interpreted elsewhere as far committed troops to the “larger forma- essentially creating a “European Army” (pos- tions”, and several others are deliberating sibly even dominated by Berlin), this pillar on this possibility. Formally, both pillars of is first only a plan for multinational force the FNC are of equal importance. Consider- development – although an ambitious one. ing its effects on current Bundeswehr and Following Russia’s annexation of Crimea, NATO planning, the development of “larger NATO was forced to once again lay the formations” is of higher significance. groundwork for credibly deterring Russia. A vital part of any such deterrent rests on credible conventional response options. Capability Development Since 2014, NATO has made significant The primary objective of the FNC’s first progress. The Alliance agreed to establish pillar is the coordinated closure of capa- the enhanced Forward Presence (eFP) in the bility gaps by the participating states. While Baltic States and Poland, a politically bal- the initial identification of these gaps is anced and military necessary step. With the done by NATO, the subsequent steps are eFP now deployed, the focus shifts towards taken by the FNC-members, coordinated by the question of follow-on forces to reinforce Germany. The German FNC has 16 clusters, the still rather weak forces in place. The each dedicated to one capability (such as first “wave” in any conflict would naturally Anti-Submarine Warfare). Members are free be the eFP, the forces of host nations and, to decide in which clusters to participate, possibly, unilaterally deployed formations. and have the alternative of obtaining ob- The eNRF, and especially its “Spearhead”, server status. Each cluster is coordinated is to provide the second wave. Without any by a unit of the German MoD. designated force for the third wave, this

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4 would have to be stood-up from member paradigm that the “basic posture” does not states’ forces as they are. necessarily have to mirror the respective It is here where force development and “mission structure” could apply to the defence planning meet, and it is in this con- FNC as well: Neither is any Allied brigade, text where the second pillar of the FNC is whether Dutch, Czech or Romanian, com- to create effects. The aim of the “larger for- pletely subordinate to the Bundeswehr, nor mations” is twofold. Firstly, to enhance are they permanently stationed in Germany interoperability and harmonise capability and fully integrated into Germany’s force development of Allied forces through close posture. Each state, including Germany, cooperation with designated Bundeswehr retains full sovereignty over its forces and units. Secondly, to secure the basis for com- will ultimately have to decide freely how bat-effective multinational divisions around to equip and whether to deploy its forces. Germany as the framework nation, and thus Naturally, closely linking European forces a basis from which to generate follow-on could lead to de facto dependencies; and, forces – with an eye primarily, but not ex- indeed, the FNC’s success may well depend clusively, to NATO’s east. This is new, and a on coordinated dependencies. As smaller politically and militarily highly ambitious states lose capabilities, their dependency agenda. on the larger framework nation grows – a Germany’s role in these formations and dependency potentially institutionalized structures – whether on land, in the air, or through the FNC. Yet just as all states are at sea – would be significant. A view on the invited to “plug in” parts of their forces to FNC’s timelines and objectives shows the German structures, they retain the explicit integral links with current Bundeswehr plan- right to “plug out” at any point in time. ning. By 2032, and thus in parallel to Ger- This in itself should make it clear that con- many’s national plans, the FNC force pool is cerns about a “German-dominated Euro- to provide three multinational mechanized pean Army” only serve to obscure the many divisions, each capable of commanding up relevant implications of the FNC. At the to five armoured brigades. As of now, two same time, however, this lack of legally of these divisions would be formed around binding cooperation in times of crisis should German divisional headquarters. Indeed, also caution against overblown expecta- for the Luftwaffe, national and FNC-targets tions of efficiency gains through the FNC. are partly identical: The FNC’s envisioned Multinational Air Group is a basic planning parameter for the German Air Force and Critical Implications would rely to more than 75 percent on Of the many implications, six seem most German capabilities. With an eye to the critical for the Bundeswehr and Germany’s navy, the FNC manifests itself most clearly role in the Alliance. in the re-establishment of the well-known regional focus on the Baltic Sea, establish- ing a Baltic Maritime Component Command A Risky Prioritisation around German structures. In any scenario Structurally prioritizing high-intensity of collective defence Germany could thus warfare and collective defence is a logical well become the indispensable framework move that accurately reflects current chal- nation for most of its smaller FNC partners, lenges. Yet, like any prioritization, it carries and NATO as a whole. risks. It is with regard to the nature of the For NATO as a whole, not prioritizing any “subordination” of Allied FNC units under specific region – its “360-degree approach” German structures where the main mis- of Wales – is an acceptable political com- conception arises. Although the Bühler- promise, as its member states’ armed forces Paper’s terms are not used explicitly, its naturally focus on their respective regional

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5 challenges. While Paris, to take one economic growth rates remaining the same. example, focusses almost exclusively on Yet irrespective from politically sensitive counter-terrorism operations in Northern numbers, it seems clear that even invest- Africa and on its own soil, it has kept its ments of 130 billion Euros already prom- presence in NATO’s eFP to a minimum. The ised until 2030 will not suffice to modern- Bundeswehr, however, is prioritizing collec- ise the Bundeswehr while meeting the FNC’s tive defence, yet the “anchor army” will not ambitious objectives. will not be able to refrain from participat- Crucially, the FNC will not help to save ing in potential missions to NATO’s south. money – to the contrary. The concept’s While the triad of “basic posture”, “mis- long-term success might depend on more sion structure” and “mission packages” efficient spending through harmonized might be able to alleviate some strains on equipment of the “larger formations”. Yet the force structure, it cannot be a panacea. the FNC aims at military efficacy first, and Any new stability operation on the scale of efficiency only second. Unlike Smart Defence ISAF, or an escalation of Resolute Support in or Pooling & Sharing, the FNC is a politico- Afghanistan, would come with many of the military investment project. As a framework same challenges around force generation nation, Germany will effectively – if in- and sustainability that the Bundeswehr had directly – finance the capability develop- to consistently overcome since 1990. The ment of allied armies. The FNC is not an MoD’s planning is refreshingly clear. Yet economic but a security policy concept, and policy makers in government and parlia- a politico-military leadership role will not ment have to be aware of the associated come cheap. risks.

Avoiding the “Modernisation Trap” Expensive Plans As a concept aimed at efficacy first, it is The Bundeswehr’s ambitious plans will all the more important that Germany require a further and long-term rise in keeps the FNC focussed on its long-term defence spending. It will be important to goal: developing a balanced force pool from provide planning security that allows for which to generate the forces for any con- long-term projects to be implemented over tingency rather than creating standing and more than one fiscal year. Significant pro- multinational rapid reaction forces. Earlier gress has already been made. The MoD is on efforts of NATO and the EU to develop course towards a budget of 42.4 billion Euros multinational forces in peacetime fell into by 2021, from only 37 billion Euros in 2017. the “modernisation trap”. Both the NRF and What is more, Germany already wants to the EU Battle Groups were successful instru- reach NATO’s defence investment target of ments of force development yet did not pro- spending 20 percent of its defence budget vide effective operational formations. Too on procurement and investments by 2020. cumbersome were their processes, too in- This trend is far more important than flexible their structures, and too complicated the politically sensitive and counterproduc- the political negotiations among troop- tive debate concerning NATO’s “two per- contributing member states. Whenever cent goal”. While member states pledged rapid and decisive action was needed, it fell to work towards spending 2 percent of their mostly to overwhelmingly national forces GDP on defence by 2024 – with varying that were quickly mobilized and deployed. interpretations of this pledge’s binding The “modernisation trap” is inherent in character – Germany is still far from that the FNC’s inclusive approach: interoperabil- threshold, even under the current increases. ity is not a precondition for participation, By 2021, defence spending will likely have but rather is the ultimate objective of co- risen to about 1.3 percent of GDP – current operation. While doubtless necessary to

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6 increase the number of potential partners, tions, the FNC has the potential to strengthen a look at the current “troop contributors” the European pillar not only within NATO, to the FNC’s “larger formations” implies but also beyond the Alliance. that for many of Germany’s Central Euro- pean partners, the long-term modernisa- tion of their forces is paramount. It appears Political Challenges for Berlin critical not to politically overstate the ex- For Berlin, finding itself in a politico-mili- pectations of the “larger formations’” com- tary leadership role is a rather new and bat effectiveness – with the possible excep- unfamiliar experience. Even if the FNC does tion of the Dutch-German cooperation. not legally bind Germany, the Bundeswehr Germany has often, and not without will become one of the most important reason, been suspected by some of its larger armed forces in Europe; and through the allies of regularly favouring military inte- FNC, it will accept an indirect responsibility gration with an eye on political symbolism for the development of Allied forces. It first, and practical concerns only second: therefore seems vital that the political Cooperation for the mere sake of coopera- processes and debates in Berlin begin to tion. The FNC, however, is a systematic and reflect Germany’s growing weight. structured approach to gradually build For the national debate necessary, the European forces within NATO, and to there- 2015 conclusions of the “Rühe-Commis- by indirectly facilitate the generation of sion” contain concrete proposals. After a forces for specific missions. National forces review of the law governing Bundeswehr will continue to be the bedrock of NATO for deployments, the committee suggested many years. Thus, Berlin will not be able to steps to politically increase the binding “cooperate its way out” of its responsibility. character of these cooperation initiatives. In addition, discussing the nature of cur- rent scenarios of collective defence and its Spill-Over Effects to the EU political and constitutional implications, With few exceptions, neither NATO nor the as proposed by the commission, does not EU permanently control forces. That is no appear any less relevant today. downside, however. Through its long-term focus on generating a pool of principally national forces rather than standing multi- Necessity for German Leadership national units, the FNC might contribute Finally, it will need continuous German to European security beyond the Atlantic leadership to fully realize the potential of Alliance. While FNC units may be assigned the FNC and current Bundeswehr planning. to NATO, the FNC’s “larger formations” This is not an empty argument. Any lack of remain under the sovereign control of the leadership by Berlin would likely turn the member states – and may thus also be de- FNC’s strength – its flexibility as an initia- ployed for EU operations, thereby contrib- tive driven by the states – into a critical uting significantly to the EU’s capacity to act. weakness. In the MoD, and within NATO, Coordination with EU-processes is fur- the FNC has to be led with clear respon- ther facilitated by the European Defence sibilities and at high levels. Agency currently holding observer status As of today, the Bundeswehr’s plans as within the FNC. If handled smartly, the outlined above still float about at the lofty new initiatives under the EU’s “Permanent heights of ministerial concepts. Many ques- Structured Cooperation” (PESCO), driven tions remain open, and the Bundeswehr’s forward with great ambitions at the Franco- services are currently tasked with examin- German Council of Ministers in July 2017, ing the manifold implications. Yet should can be fully complementary to the FNC. Germany be willing to shoulder the long- Given current rifts in in transatlantic rela- term political, military, and financial costs

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7 associated with the Bundeswehr’s ambitious Further Reading plans and the FNC – and should the Ger- man public support such a commitment – Rainer Glatz and Martin Zapfe the MoD’s current course has the potential NATO Defence Planning to leverage the Germany’s capability plan- between Wales and Warsaw. ning for its European partners within and Politico-military Challenges of a beyond the Alliance – especially in times of Credible Assurance against Russia crisis. SWP Comments 5/2016, January 2016

Claudia Major and Christian Mölling The Framework Nations Concept. Germany’s Contribution to a Capable European Defence SWP Comments 52/2014, December 2014 © Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, 2017 All rights reserved

These Comments reflect the authors’ views.

SWP Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik German Institute for International and Security Affairs

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Translation by Annabelle Vuille

(English version of SWP-Aktuell 62/2017)

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