Food for thought 02-2019

Possibilities and Challenges to the Creation of a Cooperative European Defence System

AN EXPERTISE FORUM CONTRIBUTING TO EUROPEAN CONTRIBUTING TO FORUM AN EXPERTISE SINCE 1953 ARMIES INTEROPERABILITY European Army Interoperability Center This paper was drawn up by M. Francesco Pettinari, European Defence Researcher, under the supervision and guidance of the Head of the Permanent Secretariat. This Food for Thought paper is a document that gives an initial reflection on the theme. The content is not reflecting the positions of the member states, but consists of elements that can initiate and feed the discussions and analyses in the domain of the theme. It was drafted by the Permanent Secretariat of Finabel.

INTRODUCTION

The European security environment has been sented by an approach to military cooperation subject to a large amount of changes within among countries which has the potential to the last two decades. For this reason, the crea- be a ‘game changer’ for the future of Europe- tion of a structured European defence system an defence. NATO launched this initiative in has become a primary necessity for Europe- 2014: The Framework Nations’ Concept. an states. Being involved in a highly volatile security environment and facing a myriad of This paper aims to give an overview of the economic, political, and practical problems, current status of the cooperative system for European countries started to understand guaranteeing European security and defence, that the only way to form a structure that addressing the essential requirements for the could give them sufficient means to guarantee creation of an effective system, the principal their security must be cooperative in nature. obstacles to its creation, and the main features of what is considered to be one of the most These countries have begun to organise them- successful examples of military cooperation, selves within clusters that are intended to em- launched up to date. This paper is divided power them by providing enough resources to into four chapters. ensure efficient deterrence and defence capa- bilities and, therefore, to guarantee their secu- The first chapter addresses the new require- rity in broader terms. Despite the existence of ments for the European defence system. well-structured international institutions such It presents the three most urgent issues un- as the European Union and the North Atlan- dermining European stability, and the new tic Treaty Organization (NATO) that play a requirements this entails. The last part of this leading role on the European stage, nations so chapter lists the three most essential elements far seem to be reluctant to gather together and for the future of European defence, and out- to cooperate within these large institutions, lines the effect of the new threats faced by Eu- preferring to maintain a leading role in the rope today. European defence integration process. In the second chapter, the focus moves on to However, both the European Union and the role of the European Union and NATO in NATO can play essential roles in guiding organising and assisting the European defence and supporting this process, and have already integration process. This chapter addresses the launched many initiatives aiming to do so. main obstacles to an integration deeply guid- The most crucial of these initiatives is repre- ed by one – or both – these institutions, and

Possibilities and Challenges to the Creation of a Cooperative European Defence System 2 gives a description of the most probable way of Russian assertiveness crushed these dreams in which a structured and cooperative system and brought European governments back to for European defence will be created. The reality. What appeared to become more and second chapter evaluates the current existing more clear to Europeans was that hard power initiatives established by both the European – a concept which had remained out of the Union and NATO. European public security debate for a long time – can no longer be underestimated, and The third chapter is devoted to presenting the in fact, will be needed to some degree. Framework Nations’ Concept. This section describes the main aims and features of this This assumption does not aim to undermine initiative, illustrating the status of the already the efforts that European countries – especial- existing initiatives created. The last paragraph ly under the guidance of the European Union of the third chapter presents and comments (EU) – made in critical areas such as the Bal- on the reasons that make the Framework Na- kans or the Horn of Africa where the situation tions’ Concept the most successful attempt could have been much worse had Europeans so far to create an efficient European defence not intervened. In fact, the “soft military system. The fourth and fifth chapter of this power” used by European states to carry out paper contain the conclusion and some rec- limited stabilisation missions has proven to be ommendations deriving from the analysis en- effective. However, it is now clear that the EU closed in the previous sections. is seeking to achieve higher strategic autono- my, and greater capabilities to be able to act within and beyond its borders, as stated in the THE NEW REQUIREMENTS European Union Global Strategy released in FOR EUROPEAN SECURITY June 20161, and that this attempt will involve AND DEFENCE even non-EU members. Another aspect of the utmost relevance is rep- After having experienced two decades of rela- resented by the fact that the current political tive calm, in which European States’ security and economic environment has made it nec- did not seem to be threatened by external ac- essary to create new strategic, and operational tors or transnational phenomena, the last ten thinking to ensure the required capabilities in years brought on the re-emergence of Europe- order to guarantee European security. The es- an Security and Defence. It has now become tablishment of this new way of thinking was a forefront topic in the agenda of national – and still is – profoundly influenced by many governments and International Organisations. issues, most notably by the divergences in Indeed, if the end of the Cold War gave Euro- threats perceived by states, as well as the con- peans the illusion that they could decrease the tinuous cut-off of military expenditure that attention placed on their defence and security affected Europe since the fall of the Berlin systems, the emergence of transnational ter- Wall, and the United States’ request for fairer rorism, the instability of the European South- burden sharing in providing funds for Euro- ern border and the consequent mass migration pean defence within NATO. While the U.S. flows, as well as – more recently – the revival has placed increased emphasis on European

1 European Commission, “A Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign and Security Policy”, Brussels, June 2016.

Possibilities and Challenges to the Creation of a Cooperative European Defence System 3 states developing an independent – or at least new transnational terrorism. Due to the un- partially autonomous – defence system, di- predictable and non-territorial nature of this verging priorities and decreased budgets made phenomenon, it is difficult to create military it clear that the old ways in which nations operations and capabilities to combat against used to increase their security are no longer it. Many countries have created special units suitable options. In this evolving scenario, the and/or tasked already existing ones to prevent need for specialisation2, cooperation, and in- and challenge terrorist groups, but this did not teroperability among national Armed Forces considerably augment their military capabili- (AFs) is now in the spotlight. ties in this field. However, the countries that suffered the most from numerous terrorist attacks – namely the United Kingdom (UK) The New Security Environment: and France – have had to reduce the number Different Threats of military personnel and means that could and Countries’ Priorities have been devoted to other actions or tasks, including the ones that historically represent- ed the core capabilities of these states’ armed Nowadays, European countries are facing a forces (AFs). In particular, these two coun- much more unpredictable and volatile secu- tries have always preferred “interventionist rity environment. The stability of Europe as capabilities, rapidly deployable, supported by a whole is potentially affected by a vast va- their own strategic reconnaissance assets and riety of factors. All these factors are not per- capable of delivering heavy firepower”3, and ceived in the same way by different countries. these qualities continue to strongly character- Countries will always be primarily interested ise both the Forces Armées Françaises and Her in facing the threats they consider to be more Majesty’s Armed Forces. immediate. Threat perception of a country is well entrenched in its geographical position, A second factor that potentially undermines history, and geopolitical interests. Moreover, European stability is the migration flows and thanks to increasing relevance of the new the migration routes that cross Europe. Land- means that guarantee an easier and broader based routes can be somewhat easily regulated, participation in the socio-political life of a or at least patrolled through the employment country, even the internal public opinion has of border police or – as already done in some gained an essential role in shaping national European countries – with national AFs tak- defence policies. In the next part, I will dis- ing on a complementary role. The sea-based cuss the three crucial elements that jeopardize routes are much more controversial, and it European stability, creating different reactions can be quite difficult to regulate them. For among states can be identified. example, the geographical position, together with an increase in debate and awareness of The first element behind the unstable nature public opinion, forced Italy to be more and of the European security environment is the more concerned about its border security. As

2 In this paper, the word specialisation is used in a way that has a long tradition within the International Economic theories. For the aim of this paper, the term specialisation is intended to describe the tendency to make the armed forces more oriented towards some specific assets and capabilities, with the aim to make them perfectly suitable to face a limited number of issues. 3 Zandee D. “Core Groups: The Way to Real European Defence”, in Security Policy Brief No. 81, Egmont Institute, February 2017.

Possibilities and Challenges to the Creation of a Cooperative European Defence System 4 a result, the Italian Armed Forces appear now- What appears clear is that European coun- adays more oriented towards naval operations tries are trying to specialise and to give their and border patrol than in the past4. Moreover, military apparatus a more concentrated and since it is clear that the flow of migration will specialised spectrum of capabilities, to better not cease unless the socio-political situations cope with the most immediately perceived in the migrants’ countries of origin are ame- threats and/or to achieve certain geopolitical liorated, Italy has a high strategic interest to- interests, alongside decreased budgets. Euro- wards stabilisation missions outside of its own pean governments long ago gave up on attain- borders, and the Forze Armate Italiane need ing full-spectrum capability for their national to have the capacity to carry out such oper- AFs. The new threats to European security ations. sped up a process of specialisation that was already underway as a necessary consequence The third and more recent facet that jeop- of the military spending cuts made by almost ardizes European security – potentially even every European government after the end of to the extent of territorial integrity – is re- the Cold War, further reinforced after the newed Russian assertiveness which worrying- outbreak of the economic crisis that reached ly increased after Russia’s illegal annexation of Europe in 2009. Specialisation is then the first Crimea in 2014. For clear historical and geo- keyword that can be derived from this anal- graphical reasons, Russian’s new stance is per- ysis, and one of the most essential elements ceived as particularly threatening in the East- that is currently influencing the European de- ern European flank, especially in the Baltic fence integration process. States, and in Poland for example. This made it necessary for these countries to list territo- rial defence as a top priority in their National The Long-Term Effects Security Strategies, immediately followed by of Military Budget Cuts other countermeasures to Russian interfer- ence in the democratic life of these countries. For more than two decades the national mil- itary structures of most European countries Focus has been especially placed on the cyber have had to face an implacable internal en- domain and the prevention of the spread of emy, presenting itself in the form of budget fake news and propaganda. The states that feel cuts. Indeed, after the fall of the Berlin Wall threatened by Russia recently started to con- that signified the end of the Cold War, the centrate on the modernisation of their land investments that European national govern- forces (mostly Poland) and special forces (par- ments pledged to the military experienced a ticularly the Baltics). This will to modernise continuous and marked decrease. As reported and improve land forces does not apply solely by the United Nations, the military expend- to Poland. Indeed, the German Bundeswehr iture of the whole European area fell from is following a similar path, even if Germany’s 2.5% of the area’s gross domestic production general wish is to maintain a spectrum of ca- (GDP) in 1991 to 1.5% of the area’s GDP in pabilities as large and complete as possible5. 20166.

4 Drent M., Wilms E., Zandee D., “Making Sense of European Defence”, in Clingendael Report, Clingendael Institute, December 2017. 5 Zandee D. “Core Groups: The Way to Real European Defence”. 6 United Nations, Military Expenditure (% of GDP), available at http://data.un.org/

Possibilities and Challenges to the Creation of a Cooperative European Defence System 5 The economic crisis affected both large and small Eu- ropean states, and its re- percussions were widely felt around the continent. Looking at the effects produced in certain countries, the situation becomes even more clearer. On average, medium-sized countries cut their military expenditure by 10-15%, while bigger countries (such as Germany and the UK) applied a cut of “only” 8%7. Immediately after the outbreak of the crisis, At the dawn of the 21st century the low- smaller countries such as Latvia and Lithua- threat level perceived by many Europe- nia implemented huge cuts to their military an countries could justify this decreasing budget (21% and 36% respectively), but trend, yet another plausible explanation for these cuts were recovered in part by the sub- the continuous decline in military spend- stantial increase in their military expenditure ing can also be found in the repercussions following the Russian annexation of Crimea. of the economic crisis that reached Europe in 2009. Yet, even if the emergence of the One of the most direct effects of the budget threats mentioned above could have justi- cuts implemented by national governments fied a consistent increase in military spend- after 2009 was the reduction of military per- ing, this would seemingly still not have oc- sonnel. As many as 160,000 soldiers were dis- cured due to a lack of economic resources. charged between 2009 and 2011. For many Internal public opinion could also be seen European countries, the cuts have also taken to have contributed to this downwards on the form of missed acquisitions of new ca- trend, as public opinion in certain areas was pabilities, or in the attempt (not always suc- decidedly against the possibility of increas- cessful) to scale-back outdated military pro- ing military defence spending. In fact, in grammes, such as the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter Italy and Germany, public opinion firmly aircraft or the Typhoon fighter jets. However, opposed every attempt to increase the mili- “the largest equipment cuts have taken place tary budget, arguing that, in a time of crisis, in small and medium-sized EU states, some of the government should firstly guarantee the which have cancelled entire military capabil- economic wellbeing of its citizens. ities. For example, the Netherlands and Den-

7 Mölling C., “The Implications of Military Spending Cuts for NATO’s Largest Members”, Center on the United States and Europe at Brookings, July 2012.

Possibilities and Challenges to the Creation of a Cooperative European Defence System 6 mark are eliminating their main battle tanks. 90 helicopter project, common air policing, Denmark is also getting rid of its submarines the creation of a combined Benelux Arms and land-based air defences”8. Control Agency, and the initiation of a Bene- lux Para Training Centre. The level of collab- The consistent reduction in the share of gov- oration reached by the Benelux nations is a ernment budget allocated to the military strong one, and it seeks to bring the militaries field, experienced by almost every country of the participants closer together. in Europe, reduces the military capabilities at their disposal, with a consequent decrease A similar level of close cooperation can in the countries potential to initiate military also be identified when looking at the Ger- operations. However, these cuts also opened man-Dutch tank battalion and the Strategic a window of opportunity for cooperation Airlift Capability. In these clusters, the op- among European states. Indeed, being forced erational divisions are deeply integrated and to select which of their military capabilities there is a mutual dependency in their poten- had to be maintained (and in more than one tial deployment. A lower level of bilateral co- case, reinforced) and which ones had to be operation can be identified in the binational reduced, or completely dismantled, European Franco-British Combined Joint Expedition- countries faced an additional need for special- ary Force, in which the parties are free to isation, which resulted in closer cooperation withdraw their contribution and to deploy among neighbouring and allied nations. Ex- forces nationally. The military capabilities amples of this cooperation flourished all over placed under the control of bi- or multina- Europe, and many countries have grouped tional joint headquarters such as the Euro- themselves into so-called clusters, as we shall corps, the 1st German-Netherlands Army look at below. Corps, or the German-Polish Multinational Corps Northeast create links that are similar These clusters are characterised by different to the abovementioned Franco-British’s one. purposes and present various grades of inter- In fact, these formations usually train and dependence. For instance, a joint declaration exercise together, but their joint deployment made by the Ministries of Defence of the is not guaranteed, as it is dependent on the Benelux countries (Belgium, the Netherlands, countries’ political will. However, these clus- and Luxembourg) in April 2012 stressed the ters often represent the core capabilities for need to “increase military efficiency by bring- EU or North Atlantic Treaty Organization ing national forces together, sharing costs (NATO) operations10. where possible and increasing the output of operational capacities”9. Within this cluster, Clusters among European states formed as the already existing naval cooperation (Be- a consequence of the specialisation process NeSam) was used as an example for following triggered by the military budget cuts. The ne- actions such as the establishment of the NH- cessity to renounce parts of national military

8 Mölling C., “The Implications of Military Spending Cuts for NATO’s Largest Members”, p.6. 9 Joint Declaration of the Ministries of Defence of the Benelux Countries, BENELUX-verklaring over samenwerking op defensievlak. (BENELUX declaration on cooperation in the framework of defence.) Brussels, 18 April. Available at http://www.rijksoverheid.nl/ documenten-en-publicaties/convenanten/2012/05/14/beneluxverklaring-over-samenwerking-op-defensievlak.html. 10 See also Drent M., Wilms E., Zandee D., “Making Sense of European Security”.

Possibilities and Challenges to the Creation of a Cooperative European Defence System 7 assets, coupled with the need to maintain spe- era. After the collapse of the USSR at the be- cific capabilities standards forced countries to ginning of the 1990s, NATO started to in- find new and innovative ways to fulfil their crease its Alliance, to its current composition needs in the military domain. This also means of twenty-nine countries, most of which are that the European defence integration process European. For a while, the United States did likely acquired a new and perhaps decisive not give up its role as the first contributor to impetus. Thus, cooperation is the second key- European defence through NATO, politically word that must be taken into account when supported by the direct involvement of U.S. looking at the European defence integration political leaders such as President George W. process. The recent increase in defence spend- Bush11. Nonetheless, the request for fairer ing in many European countries is expected burden-sharing has always been present in to increase the capabilities of many European regards to NATO. In recent years however, AFs. Thanks to the aforementioned special- especially after the election of U.S. President isation process, the countries would be able Donald Trump, and the current Presidency’s to rely on ameliorated and a larger range of declarations on this topic, Europeans have be- military capabilities that could be used in a gun to perceive this request as a more pressing more effective manner through this increasing issue. awareness of the effectiveness of this coopera- tive way of organising armies. An essential official NATO stance towards fairer burden-sharing and the solicitation for European States to become the leading pro- U.S. Partial Disengagement: vider of their own security was taken at the The Call for Europe NATO Wales Summit held in Newport in 2014. The Allies, NATO’s Member States, Since the immediate aftermath of the Second agreed on the 2% guideline which requires World War, European security and defence NATO Member States to invest at least 2% have been primarily guaranteed by external of their GDP in defence expenditure within a actors. During the Cold War, the west was decade12. However, at the beginning of 2018, led by NATO, spear headed primarily by the only eight out of twenty-nine Allies reached U.S., and the East was led by the Warsaw – or were close to – this benchmark. This re- Pact, spear headed primarily by the Union quest for a higher defence spending was pri- of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR). These marily intended to make sure that the whole two powers were at this time the most im- Alliance would maintain appropriate means portant actors and providers for European to provide concrete and credible defence and defence capabilities. European nations were deterrence capabilities. it also revealed the only able to garner partial contribution, as Alliance’s concerns regarding the vacuum they struggled to recover from the enormous created in the European defence system by expenses and devastation suffered during the gradual disengagement of the U.S. (sped the Second World War, and this trend nev- up by the new Presidency’s declared stance). er fully changed throughout the Cold War This is coupled with the inability of European

11 A clear example of this tendency is the one represented by the speech made by President G. W. Bush in Vilnius (Lithuania) in November 2002. 12 North Atlantic Treaty Organization, “Wales Summit Declaration”, Newport, Wales, September 2014.

Possibilities and Challenges to the Creation of a Cooperative European Defence System 8 countries to replace the U.S.’s previous prima- operation, and deep military interoperability. ry role without working together13. In fact, the call for European states to provide assets for NATO’s tasks and remits must in- An even more relevant signal of NATO’s, and clude the operational side, and this, in turn, indirectly the United States’, desire to see a cannot exclude deep military interoperabil- stronger and more capable European defence ity. European contributions should ideally system is the one represented by the so-called be made primarily in a cooperative manner 50 percent guideline. This concept was initial- through increasingly coordinated allocation ly introduced by the former NATO Deputy of specialisation of national AFs, in the in- Secretary General, Alexander Vershbow, in a terest of efficiency and effectiveness. Hence, speech at the Annual Security conference of military interoperability is the third key phrase the Norwegian Atlantic Committee that took that must be taken into account whilst analys- place in Oslo in 2013. During his speech, ing the current state of the European defence Ambassador Vershbow explicitly expressed integration process. the aim to achieve a fairer burden-sharing among the Allies14. According to the 50 per- cent guideline, more than 50% of the assets THE ROLE OF INTERNATIONAL required for each NATO capability cannot ORGANISATIONS IN THE be provided by one single NATO country. EUROPEAN DEFENCE The NATO Defence Planning Process is the INTEGRATIONS PROCESS mechanism responsible for making sure that the 50% quota is respected and that all the re- quired defence capabilities of the Alliance are The issues described in chapter one makes it represented, coming from contributions from clear how it is necessary for European states to all Alliance members. The limitation of the develop an integrated defence structure that assets provided by a country clearly encour- should be based upon cooperation between ages European Allies to contribute to NATO’s countries. In a world where this is existing, tasks and capabilities, in a deeper and more vital international organisations, that count profound manner, moving away from the most European countries amongst their time in which the United States were the pri- members – namely the EU and NATO – roles mary asset contributors, for the vast majority would need to be addressed and evaluated by of NATO assignments and tasks. the institution.

The two aspects explained above show how Defence and security policies are of the ut- the gradual U.S. relinquishment of their pre- most importance for many countries and, vious primary role as provider for European therefore, it is highly unlikely that decisions security and defence requires European states in these fields will ever been taken solely and to take concrete actions towards an increase entirely at an EU or NATO level. Within the in their military responsibilities, which can statutes of the two institutions, it is clearly only be achieved through specialisation, co- stated that defence and security policies shall

13 See also Techau J., “The Politics of Two Percent: NATO and the Security Vacuum in Europe”, Carnagie Europe, September 2015. 14 Ambassador Alexander Vershbow, former NATO Deputy Secretary General, “Closing the Gap: Keeping NATO Strong in an Era of Austerity”, speech at the 48th Annual Security conference of the Norwegian Atlantic Committee, Oslo, Norway, February 2013.

Possibilities and Challenges to the Creation of a Cooperative European Defence System 9 remain in the hands of the members, remain- In a declaration from the Council of the EU in ing resolutely under their jurisdiction. It is December 2010, EU Member States defined clear then that international organisations will the “Pooling & Sharing” (P&S) approach as a not try to encroach upon this area of Member way to improve the efficiency of their already States’ sovereignty. Under the EU framework, existing military responsibilities and capabil- defence and security policies are exclusive ities and to encourage satisfactory results in competences of Member States, with the EU a cooperative manner15. As defined by the being able to play only a supportive or advi- European Defence Agency (EDA), P&S is an sory role. NATO, as a military alliance, is by “EU concept which refers to Member States-led nature composed of independent parties that initiatives and projects to increase collaboration voluntarily agreed to support and defend one on military capabilities. The pooling of capabil- other using the means they consider to be ities occurs when several Member States decide most appropriate. However, as the decision to to use capabilities – either nationally owned or participate in joint and mutually dependent multi-nationally procured – on a collective basis. defence architectures will ultimately remain Sharing or more precisely role-sharing is when in the hands of the Member States, both the some Member States relinquish some capabili- EU and NATO can use their supportive and ties with the assumption or the guarantee that advisory roles to consistently contribute to, other countries will make them available when and encourage, the achievement of a func- necessary” 16. tioning integrated structure. Theoretically, the P&S approach should en- able EU Member States to develop full-spec- The Theoretical Frameworks trum military capabilities, with the primary and Concrete Actions Introduced objectives being “improved sustainability, by the EU and NATO interoperability, and cost-efficiency”17. How- ever, as yet the concrete outcomes remain unsatisfactory, at least at an EU level. Indeed, The will to develop a cooperative European there is the question whether or not, bi- and defence structure that takes into account the multilateral cooperation, already described countries’ priorities and the specificities of above, can be considered to be a successful their national AFs, whilst aiming for a more application of the P&S approach, as often efficient allocation of military budgets was cooperative initiatives are used to achieve na- recently underlined by the EU. The EU elab- tional objectives, while the role of the EU re- orated its own theoretical framework, aiming mains marginal. The EU Battlegroups provide to point to the primary needs for an effective a strong example of this. These battlegroups defence integration process as well as solu- were established in January 2007 as military tions for guaranteeing the maintenance of an units adhering to the EU’s Common Security appropriate set of responsibilities and corre- and Defence Policy (CSDP), placed under the sponding capabilities for European countries. direct control of the Council of the EU. So

15 Council of the European Union, “Conclusion on Common Security and Defence Policy”, 3130th Foreign Affairs Council Committee, Brussels, 1st December 2010. 16 European Defence Agency, “EDA’s Pooling and Sharing”, 30th January 2013. 17 Ibidem.

Possibilities and Challenges to the Creation of a Cooperative European Defence System 10 far, eighteen multinational battlegroups have ness, although positive outcomes are expect- been established through the joint efforts of ed. From an operational point of view, the all the EU Member States (with the exception establishment of this fund can facilitate the of Denmark and Malta), as well as five non- potential future amalgamation of military EU countries such as FYROM/Macedonia, operators thanks to the fact that they would Norway, Serbia, Turkey, and Ukraine. Yet, – at least partially – rely on the same equip- despite their wide multinational nature and ment and training facilities provided by the their supposed role as the “military branch” of joint use of the financial resources coming the European Union, these battlegroups have from the Commission. Similarly, at a stra- not yet been actively deployed, and many ex- tegic level, the European Defence Fund can perts have questioned their operational capac- be perceived as a highly welcome first step ities18. towards the “strategic independence” the EU is aiming for. Yet, the achievement of Another relevant example of the EU’s wish to this goal would surely imply increased in- boost a coordinated and multinational system vestment from the states, with supervision for European defence in line with the P&S coming from Brussels intended to make sure approach is represented by the introduction of that duplication and ineffective budget allo- the European Defence Fund. First introduced cations are avoided21. by EU Commission President, Jean-Claude Juncker, in September 2016 and accepted by Just as this development is ongoing in the the European Council three months later, this EU, NATO has also developed a theoretical fund was officially established in 2017. The framework. The Smart Defence concept aim aim of this fund is to “coordinate, supplement is to achieve a better allocation of resources and amplify national investments in defence and to empower allies to rely on shared capa- research, in the development of prototypes bilities. It also aims at increasing the possibil- and in the acquisition of defence equipment ity of facing the potentially emerging threats and technology”19 in order to “support Mem- in this new and uncertain security environ- ber States' more efficient spending in joint ment. An additional reason that lies behind defence capabilities, strengthen European NATO’s motivation for this framework is its citizens' security and foster a competitive and wish for achieving fairer burden-sharing with- innovative industrial base”20. in the Alliance, as mentioned before, which is part of its attempt to close the enormous Due to the very recent establishment of this military spending gap existing between the fund, we cannot yet evaluate its effective- United States, and European Allies.

18 On this point see, for instance, Reyckers Y., “EU Battlegroups: High Costs, No Benefits”, in Contemporary Security Policy, Volume 38 Issue 3, 2017. 19 European Commission, “A European Defence Fund: €5.5 Billion per Year to boost Europe’s Defence Capabilities”, European Commission – Press Release, 7th June 2017. 20 European Commission, “European Defence Action Plan: Towards a European Defence Fund”, European Commission – Press Release, 30th November 2016. 21 Both the operational and the strategic considerations are partially inspired by the ones of Camporini V. and Zandee D. contained in Camporini V., Hartley K., Maulney J.-P., Zandee D., “European Preferences, Strategic Autonomy and European Defence Fund”, Ares Report 22, November 2017.

Possibilities and Challenges to the Creation of a Cooperative European Defence System 11 Introduced at the 2011 Munich Security integration process suffers from numerous Conference by the (at that time) NATO issues. Indeed, there are many political and Secretary General, Anders Fogh Rasmussen, practical barriers that prevent the creation of the Smart Defence concept can be consid- a fully cooperative system for European de- ered as a “pooling and sharing” initiative at a fence. NATO level. Indeed, as defined by NATO, Smart Defence is “a concept that encourages The political barriers are mostly a part of Allies to cooperate in developing, acquiring countries’ unwillingness to give up part of and maintaining military capabilities to meet their sovereignty in the military field. This current security problems following the new attitude from national governments has deep NATO strategic concepts. Therefore, NATO historical roots, as does the maintenance of smart defence means pooling and sharing ca- the capability to defend themselves, as well as pabilities, setting priorities and coordinating the power to decide either to deploy or not to efforts better”22. Through this concept, “allies deploy their national armed forces, have al- are encouraged to work together to devel- ways been considered as primary rights of na- op, acquire, operate and maintain military tional decision makers, if not the most impor- capabilities to undertake the Alliance’s core tant ones. Therefore, the partial loss of these tasks”23. powers and the increasing interdependence with other countries represent key concerns The concept of Smart Defence works as a for national governments. However, with the guideline for the defence planning of NATO changing security environment, coupled with members and partner nations, and it is based the long-term effects of the economic crisis as on the three primary needs for European described in chapter one, the chances of over- national Armed Forces identified in the first coming the political barriers appear higher chapter: specialisation, cooperation, and mili- nowadays than at any other time in the past. tary interoperability. Therefore, the European Without this, it is almost impossible to find a Union clearly stated its will to coordinate the common ground for all members of the EU operations conducted within the Pooling & and NATO. Nonetheless, at least cooperation Sharing framework with the NATO Smart among like-minded countries that share some Defence concept. common strategy priorities seems to be be- coming easier.

Main Obstacles to a Defence Two of the most critical factors that influence Integration at an EU/NATO Level Member States’ inclination to rely on shared and interdependent capabilities are trust and Although both the Pooling & Sharing and reliability. These elements are affected by a the Smart Defence concepts have great po- large variety of factors such as “cultures and tential to boost the European defence inte- tradi­tions with regard to the use of force, in- gration process, the potential for the EU and ternational political orientation, the sizes of NATO to lead an in-depth European defence the armed forces and a willingness to deploy

22 North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, “Smart Defence”, in NATO Review Magazine, available at https://www.nato.int/docu/review/ topics/en/smart-defence.htm 23 North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, “Topic: Smart Defence”, available at https://www.nato.int/cps/ua/natohq/topics_84268.htm

Possibilities and Challenges to the Creation of a Cooperative European Defence System 12 armed forces”24. A clear example of the will to EU’s CSDP, allows the participation of non- establish cooperation with their counterparts EU members. This means that, with the UK can be identified in the French interest for being a member of EI2, the spectre of Brexit creating the European Intervention Initiative will not be reason for concern for their mem- (EI2)25. The primary aims of the EI2 were to bership. The primary interest is to rely on establish a common European defence doc- partners that, sharing common interests and trine capable of bringing together the plan- cultures, would not prevent the fulfilment ning, support, and intelligence dimensions, of the mission the coalition was created for, whilst also giving the signatories the possibil- aided by the fact that it is independent from ity to rely on rapidly deployable and efficient participation in already existing international multinational battlegroups to be used for ac- bodies. tions such as natural disaster relief, military intervention in a crisis scenario, and evacua- The practical barriers to the creation of a tion of citizens from hotspots. The nature of more cooperative defence structure for Eu- EI2, which is completely independent of the ropean countries are mostly connected to

24 Drent M., Zandee D., Casteleijn L., “Defence Cooperation in Clusters. Identifying Next Steps”, in Clingendael Report, Clingendael Institute, October 2014. 25 The European Intervention Initiative was signed firstly introduced by the French President, Emmanuel Macron, in 2017, and was later officially signed on Monday 25th June by the Ministries of Foreign Affairs of nine EU Member States. The signatory countries were Belgium, Denmark, Estonia, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, and the United Kingdom.

Possibilities and Challenges to the Creation of a Cooperative European Defence System 13 the difficulties in harmonising the defence The countries participating in these clusters – planning processes (DPPs). The DPPs, as an motivated as they are by similar strategic ob- integral part of the national defence policy, jectives – quite recently started to systemat- are mainly carried out at on a state level and ically review and compare their DPPs, using are quite unique, differing from case to case. these opportunities to deepen their coopera- The defence policies adopted by the countries tion. This method is based on the data collec- are designed to translate strategic national tion of national priorities, that is subsequently objectives into practice and are strongly de- made available to the relevant partners. This pendent upon multiple factors, such as the resembles the initiative the EDA tried to present international and internal political adopt in 2014: the EDA’s Collective Database climate, and the relevant country’s culture (CoDaBa). CoDaBa was intended to collect and capabilities. As a consequence, it is not information from the EU Members partici- yet possible to aim for a true alignment of pating in the activities of the EDA in order to defence policies since the situation in each use potential windows of cooperation. How- country differs widely and could potentially ever, the reluctance of countries to provide undermine the authority of certain states, de- their medium to long term plans negated the priving national governments of one of their efficiency of this program. most important powers. However, countries that share strategic objectives and priorities As already seen when looking at how to over- would still be able to pursue similar defence come the relevant political barriers, coopera- policies, facilitating the creation of clusters in tion amongst a small number of like-minded relation to DPPs. countries is far easier than cooperation at the EU/NATO level. This assumption is only re- National DPPs can be adjusted in order inforced by the numerous bi- and multilateral to establish military cooperation. Indeed, cooperation which already exist. DPPs are constantly affected by considerable changes due to a shift in internal political and economic developments. This flexibility The Role of the EU and NATO in could make it easier to align certain DPPs Facilitating Cooperation and bring them under the umbrella frame- work of these clusters. Notwithstanding the Even if Member States are to remain the most multiannual nature of the DPPs, they can be prominent actors within the European defence jointly adopted by clusters in order to consid- system, the role of the EU and NATO cannot erably increase their efficiency. For instance, be underestimated since “the definition of in- relying on the same equipment and training ternational levels of ambition – including the facilities, armed forces can reach the highest required level of forces, both quantitatively level of interoperability and carry out joint and qualitatively – is the primary responsibil- operations more effectively. The Benelux and ity of the EU and NATO”26. Indeed, one of the German-Dutch cooperation already de- the most important issues regarding the crea- scribed in chapter one, provides two good ex- tion of clusters of like-minded states is repre- amples of progressive alignments of national sented by the fact that they could be used to DPPs. pursue strictly nationally defined objectives,

26 Drent M., Zandee D., Casteleijn L., “Defence Cooperation in Clusters. Identifying Next Steps”.

Possibilities and Challenges to the Creation of a Cooperative European Defence System 14 thus undermining the participation of inter- monised to enable Allies to provide the required national organisations or reducing efficiency forces and capabilities in the most effective through unnecessary duplication. Therefore, way”29. The main aims of the NDPP are to it is of the utmost importance for these insti- encourage the acquisition of the necessary ca- tutions to develop mechanisms to avoid du- pabilities by Allies, while minimising duplica- plication and to make sure that, through the tion and maximising efficiency. Similar to the capabilities developed on a single state level, EU’s CDP, the NDPP can be considered as it would be possible to rely on sufficient ca- a framework that facilitate the harmonisation pacity to attain the strategic objectives. Both of national defence policies and DPPs among the EU and NATO have developed specific NATO Member States, without undermining mechanisms for this purpose. their national sovereignty.

The European Union, through the European From this analysis of the two frameworks de- Defence Agency, endorsed a Capability De- veloped by the EU and NATO, which do not fence Plan (CDP) in 2008. As defined by the attempt to substitute or impose directives on EDA, the CDP “is the ‘overall strategic tool’ in national decision-makers, these institutions the package of the four long-term strategies. It are clearly interested in supporting national defines future capability needs from the short DPPs, leaving rooms for independent coop- to longer term” with the final aim being “to eration within clusters. As a matter of fact, contribute to improving the military capabili- the cooperation in clusters tend to be usually ties needed for Common Security and Defence easier and more effective. Therefore, the EU Policy operations in the future”27. However, the and NATO have shown interest in carrying EDA clearly stated that the CDP is not a su- out operations with the goal of “clustering pranational defence planning process. It is in- the clusters”30, assuring efficiency, and co- tended to inform national decision-makers on herence, whilst avoiding unnecessary dupli- the needs and actions taken by the Union to cation. prevent duplication. Moreover, the CDP was intended as a tool to discover opportunities to As of yet, the form that a cooperative Euro- pool and collaborate among Members, estab- pean defence system will assume has still not lishing a capability-based approach to force been concretely defined and decided upon. and capability planning28. Nonetheless, the primary role played by the states that wish to decide to either cooperate The NATO Defence Planning Process or not, as well as the choice to select their (NDPP) acts in accordance with the NATO partners, means there is a danger that there Strategic Concept and is intended “to pro- would be a lack of space for a true suprana- vide a framework within which national and tional entity, such as the long-discussed Eu- Alliance defence planning activities can be har- ropean Army.

27 European Defence Agency, “Strategies: Capability Development Plan”, available at https://www.eda.europa.eu/what-we-do/our-current-priorities/strategies/Capabilities 28 Ibidem. 29 North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, “Topic: NATO Defence Planning Process”, available at https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_49202.htm 30 Drent M., Zandee D., Casteleijn L., “Defence Cooperation in Clusters. Identifying Next Steps”.

Possibilities and Challenges to the Creation of a Cooperative European Defence System 15 THE NATO FRAMEWORK NATIONS CONCEPT: THE FUTURE OF EUROPEAN DEFENCE?

As seen in the previous chapters, the new vol- the international organisations’ efforts will be atile security environment and the consistent devoted to organising and encouraging the military budget reductions experienced by creation of collective capabilities and their most European countries has made it necessary joint use, as well as to ensure military interop- to adopt innovative and cooperative methods erability among national armed forces with- to provide for the guarantee of security and in clusters. Furthermore, both the EU and defence of European countries. Faced by these NATO will likely be interested in coordinat- issues, countries did not turn to internation- ing the collaboration among clusters in order al institutions such as the European Union or to make sure that the organisations would be NATO – or, at least, these institutions did not able to rely on adequate capabilities to pursue suddenly take on a leading role. Instead, what their strategic objectives. was preferred was the free establishment of co- operation among partner countries which were NATO has more experience in coordinating considered to be like-minded and reliable. military cooperation among states than the EU. This is clearly shown by the fact that the This preference led to a situation in which most successful example of multilateral coop- countries selected their partners on an ad-hoc eration among European countries, is taking basis, sharing with them only the capabilities place under the aegis of this Alliance. In fact, needed to accomplish a specific mission. This, the Framework Nations’ Concept (FNC), in turn, is motivated by the nation’s interest in which was first introduced to NATO by Ger- avoiding the creation of multinational agree- many in 2013, with the aim of bringing the ments that include a large number of partic- topic of defence cooperation among allies to ipants as this could involve too many states the forefront, has continuously increased its with differing strategic priorities and military members and efficiency. and/or political culture. Within this kind of coalition, the possible – and probable – re- sult is an unreachable consensus over every The NATO’s Long Tradition in kind of deployment or action, including the Supporting Cooperation among Allies provision of capabilities. Therefore, the role of the international organisations influencing NATO has a long tradition of support and the European political and military scenarios coordinated cooperative efforts among its – namely the EU and NATO – is relegated Member States. Indeed, both during and af- to a purely supportive one, while voluntarily ter the Cold War, the Alliance encouraged its created clusters of like-minded countries are members to form clusters that share some of expected to lead an integrated and coopera- the key features of the ones created within the tive European security and defence system. Framework Nations Concept.

In this scenario, it is possible to expect that Immediately after the creation of the Supreme EU and NATO efforts towards the establish- Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) ment of a European defence architecture will in 1951, some multinational military forma- be mainly oriented towards the overall control tions that presented the “framework nation” of cooperation among countries. Particularly, features were established. These formations

Possibilities and Challenges to the Creation of a Cooperative European Defence System 16 were mostly devoted to the defence of West the Allied Rapid Reaction Force that, under Germany and were built around the two the guidance of the UK, brought together NATO military superpowers of the time: divisions from sixteen different countries. Af- the United Kingdom and the United States. terwards, examples of NATO multinational The UK led two joint initiatives: the North- cooperation created around the efforts of a ern Army Group (NORTHAG) with the framework nation flourished and initiatives participation of Belgium, the Netherlands, led by Canada, Germany, the United King- and Germany after the establishment of the dom, and the United States were agreed upon Bundeswehr in 1955; and the 2nd Allied Tac- at the 2016 NATO Warsaw Summit. tical Air Force (ATAF) which saw the same participants of the NORTHAG, as well as The country that serves as a framework nation the United States (albeit with a limited role). usually has certain duties. It must contribute The U.S.-led initiative related to the defence to almost two thirds of the peacetime budget, of West Germany was named Central Army as well as host the headquarters and provide Group (CENTAG) and resembled more a command facilities, information systems, and bilateral cooperation between the U.S. and logistical support. The cooperation among France. For marine forces, the U.S. played the NATO Allies organised under the guidance of role of a framework nation for a truly mul- a framework nation proved to be very effec- tilateral initiative named STRIKFLTLANT tive, allowing the possibility to avoid consist- which brought together fleets from Canada, ent cuts that would have followed the reuni- Denmark, France, Germany, the Nether- fication of Germany, which made the NATO lands, Portugal, and the United Kingdom. “forward defence” outdated. Moreover, this The cooperation created in this early stage configuration promotes military interoper- of the Cold War were put under the direct ability and a familiarisation with the Allies’ control of the NATO Command Structure military cultures and procedures, as well as through the actions of specific multinational the acquisition of shared capabilities. headquarters. The development of common capabilities was not a primary aim. Howev- NATO’s long tradition in facilitating, sup- er, due to practical necessities, this aspect was porting, and even guiding cooperation among often considered, and the acquisition of com- Allies under the guidance of a framework patible and interoperable capabilities came as nation helped generate a climate in which it an almost natural outcome. was possible to push for a more ambitious ap- proach, resulting in the Framework Nations After the end of the Cold War era “framework Concept agreed in 2014. Indeed, thanks to nation arrangements among Allies gradually the many positive outcomes derived from the became the norm for organising multina- cooperation established in the past, European tional headquarters and force structures, as a Allies started to consider gathering together means to ensure that the Cold War’s legacy of in a more structured way to achieve the goal cooperation would endure in Europe’s new se- of ensuring an effective European defence curity environment”31. In 1992, NATO creat- system. This cooperative system – in accord- ed the first post-Cold War joint initiative with ance with NATO’s priorities and objectives –

31 Ruiz Palmer D. A., “The Framework Nations’ Concept and NATO: Game-Changer for a New Strategic Era or Missed Opportuinity?”, NATO Research Paper No. 132, NATO Defence College, July 2016.

Possibilities and Challenges to the Creation of a Cooperative European Defence System 17 would ensure the acquisition of capabilities, fence system, and the clusters created within guaranteeing the fulfilment of the Alliance’s this framework follow a pragmatic approach. strategic objectives and the partial strategic Indeed, even if NATO officially adopted the independence of the European Allies32. FNC, it would still be funded, organised, and driven by single countries. These nations can “cooperate voluntarily in a highly agile format The Framework Nations Concept: while retaining their full sovereignty wherever Main Features and Aims they choose to do so and – in the best-case scenario – they do so with NATO coordina- After Germany first introduced the Frame- tion and while adding the greatest possible work Nations Concept (FNC), it was of- value for the Alliance”33. ficially adopted by NATO in the run-up to the 2014 Wales Summit. The principal aim The form of the clusters created within the that motivated Germany in proposing FNC FNC is unique and deserves closer analysis. was to make sure that existing capability gaps Intended to reduce the inequalities in burden within the Alliance would be addressed – and sharing among European states, the FNC eliminated in the long-term by creating clus- calls for the participation of larger and small- ters of European NATO members, wherein er countries that can together provide and/or the necessary capabilities are made available develop the required capabilities or combat in a cooperative manner. Operating in this formations. Larger states serve as “framework way, Germany wanted to achieve fairer bur- nations” within the clusters, providing the den sharing among the European Allies and group with the essentials in regard to logis- the United States, as well as a more efficient tics, infrastructures, controls, and personnel, allocation of resources. This would ultimate- etc., while smaller countries usually contrib- ly allow Europeans to develop full-spectrum ute their specialised capabilities, providing military capabilities, that could also be made engineers, technical facilities, and the like. available for attaining NATO’s strategic ob- Larger European countries can decide to be- jectives. The capabilities provided by the come framework nations for a cluster that is different clusters would follow the require- oriented towards the provision of certain ca- ments stated in the NATO Defence Planning pabilities and military personnel devoted to Process and, therefore, could present higher specific objectives. Not all of NATO’s Allies certainty of avoiding overlap and unnecessary have to participate in every cluster. They are duplication, and the inefficient allocation of free to decide to join one, whilst opting out of resources. Moreover, the FNC also aims to others. Up until now, only European NATO create or make available combat formations Allies have agreed to take part in a cluster cre- for military operations that can be conducted ated within the Framework Nation Concept by NATO, as well as by the countries partici- while the United States and Canada have not pating in the different clusters. participated. Participation in the activities of the clusters is not restricted to solely NATO’s The FNC represents a key element in the official members, as NATO Partners can also creation of a truly cooperative European de- join the activities of the clusters.

32 Ibidem. 33 Glatz R. L., and Zapfe M., “NATO’s Framework Nations Concept”, in CSS Analysis in Security Policy No. 218, December 2017

Possibilities and Challenges to the Creation of a Cooperative European Defence System 18 The Current Existing Applications of and Finland that later actively joined some of the Framework Nations Concept the initiatives). The activities carried out by this cluster regarding capability development After its introduction in 2014, three initia- have been divided into four categories: De- tives based on the Framework Nations Con- ployable Headquarters; Joint Fires; Air and cept approach have been launched. Three of Missile Defence; and Joint Intelligence, Sur- the biggest European members of NATO veillance, and Reconnaissance. (Germany, the United Kingdom, and Italy) decided to act as framework nations for clus- After signing the official document that ters that were created, each following a differ- brought this cluster into being (the Letter of ent path. The differences in the introduction Intent signed by the Ministries of Defence of of the three groupings were partially due to the participating nations at the 2014 Wales the different aims that motivated their crea- Summit), focus was placed on the creation of tion, which reflect the strategical priorities of multinational formations. Participating na- the leading country, as well as the ones of the tions were invited to contribute to the estab- participants. lishment of combat formations and smaller specialised units. According to the declaration The cluster that has Germany as the leading of intent from the different Ministries of De- nation is of a broader nature, and as many fence participating in this cluster, by 2032 it as fifteen NATO Allies decided to join. The should be possible “to build up three multina- countries participating in the activities of this tional mechanised divisions, each capable of cluster are Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, the commanding up to five armoured brigades”34. Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Hunga- The inclusion of some formations of the ry, Luxembourg, Latvia, Lithuania, the Neth- Dutch Army within the Bundeswehr divisions erlands, Norway, Poland, Romania, and Slo- is a clear example of the effectiveness of this vakia. Composed of a large amount of coun- approach. tries, the German-led cluster foresees a dual- istic approach in its activities. Indeed, while The UK-led cluster was created in 2014, in the supervisory body is formed by Ministries order to allow the participation of eight coun- of Defence from all of the participants, at a tries in the Joint Expeditionary Force (JEF), working level it is organised in a “sub-cluster” already existing within the British Army. The manner. Within this broad group of nations, countries participating in this group are Den- specific “task forces” have been introduced, to mark, Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, the guide the activities in capability development, Netherlands, and Norway. Sweden, which and the provision of interoperable military is not a NATO country, has also cooperated capabilities and personnel. Only countries within the UK-led cluster. The main aim of interested in the attainment of specific objec- the JEF is to conduct high-responsiveness ex- tives and capabilities – represented by nation- peditionary operations, and it is supposed to al Subject Matter Experts (SMEs) – partici- reach full operational capacity by 2018. The pate in the activities of the sub-clusters, which UK, acting as the framework nation, provides also allowed the involvement of some observ- the operational headquarters and has the right ers among non-NATO countries (like Austria to direct any potential engagement. The other

34 Glatz R. L., and Zapfe M., “NATO’s Framework Nations Concept”.

Possibilities and Challenges to the Creation of a Cooperative European Defence System 19 participants are encouraged to provide mili- is guided by a Coordination Board that brings tary personnel, as well as staff officers, and to together representatives from all the partici- support the operations of the JEF. pants, as well as three specific working groups that concentrate on training, exercises, and According to the Memorandum of Under- stability policing. standing signed by representatives of the participating nations in 2015, the creation of multinational forces for the JEF is driven by The Potential of the Framework a JEF Development Board, and by specialised Nations Concept working groups, that are dealing with issues such as communication within the group, The Framework Nations Concept has the po- and the sharing of information. Although not tential to be a template for the development of a pure NATO structure, the JEF represents an efficient European defence architecture. In- the UK’s core contribution to the NATO Re- deed, through this approach it can be possible sponse Force, and its orientation is strongly to overcome many of the difficulties listed in in accordance with NATO standards. The UK the previous chapters, increasing the efficiency has another bilateral cooperation with France of an integrated and cooperative system that (the Combined Joint Expeditionary Force) can guarantee European security and defence. which is intended for similar purposes to that of the JEF, but the participation in this initia- The first positive aspect of the FNC is its abili- tive is limited to the two countries. ty to put into practice the concepts of Pooling and Sharing Concept created within the Eu- The third and last cluster created within the ropean Union framework and the Smart De- FNC is the one led by Italy. Four NATO fence Concept created within NATO’s frame- members (Albania, Croatia, Hungary, and work. These two concepts have remained at a Slovenia) have joined the Italian-led clus- theoretical level, whilst the FNC has a rela- ter, as well as Austria, which is not part of tively strong practical side, allowing the possi- NATO. Following an initial meeting among bility to develop concrete initiatives following the Ministries of Defence of the participating its guidelines. The P&S, the Smart Defence, nations held in Venice in 2014, participants and the FNC have similar roots. Indeed, all signed a Letter of Intent one year later, agree- these concepts were established to address ing to two main aims. The first objective of issues related to military budget cuts experi- this cluster is to develop capabilities to carry enced by many European countries, and the out stabilisation missions, and to support lo- related implications for military capabilities. cal police authorities, and/or armed forces in The FNC can be considered as a means to ap- third countries. This makes it clear that the ply the principles of the Pooling & Sharing efforts of the Italian-led grouping are mostly and Smart Defence Concepts, whilst aiming oriented to the Southern European border, to give a practical answer to the problems and the Middle East. The second objective of faced by the various national armed forces. this cluster, is to build up a rapidly deployable multinational force. The creation of this clus- The second aspect to consider, as well as an- ter is rooted in the already existing Defence other advantage of the Framework Nations Cooperation Initiative, which was signed by Concept, is the voluntary nature of participa- all the participants to this FNC grouping tion. This aspect is crucial because – as seen in (with the exception of Albania). This cluster chapter two – countries are usually reluctant

Possibilities and Challenges to the Creation of a Cooperative European Defence System 20 to start cooperation with a large number of The European defence system can benefit counterparts. The possibility of forging clos- from the FNC in a third aspect. The coop- er cooperation with only those countries that eration within clusters can boost military in- are considered to be like-minded and/or that teroperability in a unique manner. Acquiring share similar strategic priorities, means states and providing capabilities cooperatively can are more interested in cooperating. The FNC give Europeans the chance to rely on the same also gives countries the chance to take on an equipment and training facilities, allowing active role in military activities (from capabil- the creation of a shared military culture. This ity development, to potential active deploy- can increase the effectiveness of military op- ment) which are aimed solely at pursuing erations carried out by European states on a strategic objectives they considered to be of multinational basis, as well as the ones guided the utmost importance. It is only natural that by both NATO and the European Union. nations are far more interested in contribut- ing to the development of military capabili- ties that address the issues they consider to be more pressing. This, in turn, can make it eas- ier to develop full-spectrum military capabili- ties that could empower Europeans to reduce their dependency upon the U.S., achieving fairer burden-sharing within NATO.

Moreover, within the clusters created follow- ing this approach, the participants maintain their full sovereignty, but the guidance from an international organisation such as NATO aids in avoiding the inefficient allocation of resources or unnecessary duplication. Follow- ing the FNC approach, it could be possible to develop a European defence system which can be accepted by countries; without losing the benefits derived from a centrally planned cooperation. To give an illustrative example, we shall look at the case of the German-led cluster. Through this cooperation, Germany – as well as the other participants – can make concrete use of their existing specialised mili- tary capabilities, whilst cooperatively provid- ing new ones. This gives the participants the capacity to confront the threats they perceive to be most immediate (e.g., the Baltic States and Poland can contribute to the creation of combat formations that can be used for deter- rence and defence in NATO’s Eastern flank), without losing resources in actions they are perhaps not interested in.

Possibilities and Challenges to the Creation of a Cooperative European Defence System 21 CONCLUSION

The new threats to European security and sta- The existence of renowned and well-struc- bility forced European countries to specialise tured international institutions operating and tailor their military capabilities, in order on the European stage, such as the EU and to still be able to properly face the threats they NATO, can encourage cooperation among consider as more immediate. Threat percep- European countries to take place within tion differs considerably among countries, the framework provided by one, or both, of and this, in turn, influences the military ca- these institutions. This has not yet happened pabilities that different countries maintain because of certain political and practical im- and the ones they are ready to dismantle. pediments. States do not always look at every The impossibility of maintaining full-spec- country as a potential partner, deciding to trum military capabilities is reinforced by the establish cooperation only with those na- military budgets cuts, as we saw. Europeans tions that are considered to be like-minded are realising that the only way to guarantee and which share the same strategic objectives. the maintenance of certain military capabil- Collaboration within institutions ities, and safeguard their strategic interests that are comprised of 28 (the is through the cooperation with their neigh- EU) and 29 (NATO) mem- bours and peers. Given the fact that military bers are exceedingly dif- cooperation usually implies an operational as- ficult to establish, due pect, the need to increase military interopera- to a lack of trust and bility has gained the spotlight. This need was reliability among also reinforced by the United States’ partial countries. disengagement from European defence, which has pushed Europe to realise it must become the leading actor in the provision of its own security. Thus far, it seems possible to describe three main char- acteristics of the new European defence ar- chitecture: it must be cooperative in nature; the cooperation must be es- tablished by countries that have already start- ed a specialisation process for their nation- al armed forces and it must place an increase in military interoperability as a top priority.

Possibilities and Challenges to the Creation of a Cooperative European Defence System 22 This does not mean that there is no existing The EU and NATO can play a supportive role cooperation within these institutions (NATO to the formation of these clusters, guarantee- is after all a military alliance, by definition a ing a centralised overview of the process in cooperation among countries), but at a prac- order to avoid duplication or the ineffective tical level it is easier to establish collaboration allocation of resources. Following this, the amongst a smaller number of states that vol- new cooperative European defence system untarily decide to cooperate. This is reinforced could then be guided by single countries with by the fact that it is difficult to overcome the the international institutions serving as over- practical barriers to military cooperation, espe- all supervisors. cially concerning the provision and/or acqui- sition of shared capabilities. Indeed, since this The Framework Nations’ Concept introduced latter aspect is deeply rooted within the nation- to NATO in 2014 seems to have the potential al defence planning process, an integral part of to solve most of the issues presented in this the national defence policy, it is highly unlikely paper, and it could represent the general ar- that it would be possible to substitute or har- chitecture upon which it would be possible to monise these elements at a signifi- create the future European defence system. As cant number of countries. States a highly pragmatic approach that leaves states that share military culture, free to decide either to cooperate or not, the and/or strategic objectives, clusters created following the FNC directives are much more interest- are attracting a large number of European ed in starting a joint countries. As it is also devoted to the acqui- defence planning sition/provision of the capabilities required process. to pursue specific strategic interests, these clusters facilitate the cooperation among like-minded countries that share simi- lar priorities. The FNC’s clusters can be beneficial for both bigger and smaller European countries. Larger countries can make use of their remaining ca- pabilities, using them more efficient- ly thanks to the participation of smaller states that can, in turn, aim to attain strategic objec- tives that would be utterly unattainable without this co- operation. Additionally, from an economic point of view, the ben- efits can be great for both the larger and smaller countries since, through the FNC, it would be possible to exploit the advantages derived from increased efficiency

Possibilities and Challenges to the Creation of a Cooperative European Defence System 23 and burden-sharing. Through this kind of cooperation, countries can further specialise their armed forces as they can rely on their partners to provide missing assets, allowing access to a larger spectrum of capabilities. Military interoperability will also be increased to a considerable degree. Armies that have to cooperate in specific missions and work towards particular objectives can rely on the same equipment and training facilities, with the possibility to train together and familiar- ise themselves with different military cultures and procedures with their comrade in arms. This can boost interoperability immensely. This bottom-up approach, as entailed in the FNC will ultimately facilitate cooperation among highly specialised national armed forc- es, with increased military interoperability as a natural outcome; whilst also avoiding du- plication and the ineffective use of resources thanks to the general overview provided by the international institutions.

Possibilities and Challenges to the Creation of a Cooperative European Defence System 24 RECOMMENDATIONS

Several recommendations derive from the Intervention Initiative can be seen as a po- analysis conducted in this paper. tentially dangerous element. Although this initiative can enact positive impacts on 1. The general supervision of NATO should military interoperability among European remain. Due to its long tradition in sup- states as a fast and effective way to inter- porting and facilitating joint efforts of its vene in the case of a crisis, the lack of a cen- members, NATO can adequately provide tral supervisor is problematic. Indeed, if guidelines and suggestions. Yet, it should the participating countries would acquire not aim to become the exclusive leader as or develop specific capabilities that were al- cooperation with the EU is needed, due to ready made available by another joint ini- its intense political ties with most of the tiative, these efforts would be made redun- European governments. dant. All European countries have certain ties to the NATO Defence Planning Pro- 2. The European Union, through the Euro- cess and/or the EDA’s Capability Defence pean Defence Agency, should take on a Plan, allowing for the possibility to avoid more active role in the European defence duplication ex-ante, but this is not guaran- integration process. Therefore, the Capa- teed to happen. Therefore, even though the bility Defence Plan should be reinforced, complete absence of a central and general and conducted in cooperation with the supervisor would considerably speed up NATO Defence Planning Process, to guar- the decision process, the possibility of un- antee complementarity and avoid duplica- necessary expenses and efforts represent an tion. The reinforcement of the Capability unnecessary risk. Defence Plan would entail more structured cooperation amongst European countries 4. The funds provided by the European Un- participating in the activities of the Eu- ion to develop and/or acquire further mil- ropean Defence Agency. The creation of itary capabilities jointly amongst Member additional clusters can represent the core States should be reinforced in order to give capabilities of the EU Battlegroups as a a considerable impetus to the European potential outcome. In the long-term, these economy. Therefore, both the EU Capabil- clusters would ultimately allow the EU to ity Development Plan and the EU Defence rely on efficient and interoperable means Fund could be seen as welcome initiatives, of hard power that could be used for pur- and these funds should be reinforced and suing the CSDP’s and EU’s Foreign Policy expanded. goals. However, it should be made clear that these clusters among states, that vol- 5. Since the clusters created following the untarily accept to pool, and share specific Framework Nations’ Concept approach capabilities, would be no means result in proved to be effective, other European the implementation of a European Army. countries should take part in these initi- atives, as well as create new ones. Ideally, 3. Countries should avoid the creation of in- larger countries such as Spain, and France itiatives which are entirely independent of should guide clusters that can be oriented a central institution that could guarantee to the attainment of some of their strategic efficiency. This means that the European priorities. The form that these new clus-

Possibilities and Challenges to the Creation of a Cooperative European Defence System 25 ters would assume can be arranged on the tion regardless of their size (Estonia is a priorities and means of the countries that good example of a framework nation for would serve as the “framework nation”. cyber-related activities). In these domains, Spain would probably be more interested the required investments, personnel, or in naval patrolling (complementing the military means are not unduly high, as Italian-led cluster), while France would there is more a need for specialised units, likely be more interested in pursuing aims engineers, and so forth. The creation of that are similar to the ones of the Euro- clusters guided by countries specialised in pean Intervention Initiative (complement- the cyber and hybrid domain could ulti- ing the UK-led cluster). Moreover, Turkey mately allow a consistent increase in the could become a “framework nation” for a efficiency of European states’ ability to face cluster that can partially resemble the Ital- these new threats, allowing a better alloca- ian-led one (but with a more intervention- tion of resources and the sharing of best ist nature in relation to operations in third practices and defensive systems. Although countries, especially in the Middle East). cyber and hybrid threats are supposed to On the other hand, smaller countries that affect most of the countries in a similar share some of the strategic priorities with manner, states that share similar critical states already participating in clusters infrastructures or that are the most prob- should take on a more active role (Greece able targets of illegal activities (such as for instance could add its efforts to the Ital- fake news and foreign propaganda) could ian-led cluster). gather together to achieve higher defence capabilities and resilience. 6. In order to build trust among countries, to allow a real and deep defence integration process, the involvement of national politi- cal authorities should be reinforced at each stage of the negotiation process and for all the decisions taken at a multinational level. National parliaments and government au- thorities will retain the national sovereign- ty, in the military field, and the decision to cooperate or not, shall of course strictly remain within their jurisdiction. Ensuring each phase of the integration process is as transparent as possible, will ultimately cre- ate a more profound sense of trust between countries, facilitating cooperation.

7. Also, non-traditional military domains, the cluster approach could have additional positive impacts. For instance, in the cyber and hybrid domain, the creation of clus- ters although difficult, could reap benefits. Countries that currently have the lead in these domains could act as framework na-

Possibilities and Challenges to the Creation of a Cooperative European Defence System 26 BIBLIOGRAPHY

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Possibilities and Challenges to the Creation of a Cooperative European Defence System 27 Created in 1953, the Finabel committee is the oldest military organisation for cooperation between European Armies: it was conceived as a forum for reflections, exchange studies, and proposals on common interest topics for the future of its members. Finabel, the only organisation at this level, strives at:

• Promoting interoperability and cooperation of armies, while seeking to bring together concepts, doctrines and procedures; • Contributing to a common European understanding of land defence issues. Finabel focuses on doctrines, trainings, and the joint environment.

Finabel aims to be a multinational-, independent-, and apolitical actor for the European Armies of the EU Member States. The Finabel informal forum is based on consensus and equality of member states. Finabel favours fruitful contact among member states’ officers and Chiefs of Staff in a spirit of open and mutual understanding via annual meetings.

Finabel contributes to reinforce interoperability among its member states in the framework of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), the EU, and ad hoc coalition; Finabel neither competes nor duplicates NATO or EU military structures but contributes to these organisations in its unique way. Initially focused on cooperation in armament’s programmes, Finabel quickly shifted to the harmonisation of land doctrines. Consequently, before hoping to reach a shared capability approach and common equipment, a shared vision of force-engagement on the terrain should be obtained.

In the current setting, Finabel allows its member states to form Expert Task Groups for situations that require short-term solutions. In addition, Finabel is also a think tank that elaborates on current events concerning the operations of the land forces and provides comments by creating “Food for Thought papers” to address the topics. Finabel studies and Food for Thoughts are recommendations freely applied by its member, whose aim is to facilitate interoperability and improve the daily tasks of preparation, training, exercises, and engagement.

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