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Security Aspect of Turkey – EU Relations

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Security Aspect of Turkey – EU Relations CENTRE INTERNATIONAL DE FORMATION EUROPEENE INSTITUT EUROPEEN DES HAUTES ETUDES INTERNATIONALES DIPLOME DES HAUTES ETUDES EUROPEENNES ET INTERNATIONALES Trilingual Branch Security Aspect of Turkey – EU Relations Ceyhun Emre DOĞRU Research Directors: Claude Nigoul Dr. Matthias Waechter Nice, May 2009 TABLEOFCONTENTS INTRODUCTION 1 DEVELOPMENTOFSECURITYRELATIONSINHISTORICALCONTEXT 3 A.TurkishForeignPolicyandItsFoundingPrinciples 3 B.ColdWar:APragmaticRapprochement 5 C.ThePost-ColdWarPeriod 7 I.TransformationoftheTurkishSecurityPolicy 7 II.Re-EmergenceofEuropeandtheESS 10 a.ImplicationsoftheMaastrichtTreaty 10 b.AnAppraisaloftheESS:TheContextandNature 11 D.AssessmentoftheHistory:ChangingFormofthePermanentInterdependence 20 SECURITYPOLICIESANDMUTUALCONTRIBUTIONS 22 A.ComparisonofSecurityUnderstandingsoftheEUandTurkey 22 I.Europe:HumanSecurity 22 II.Turkey:TraditionalStateSecurity 25 B.CommonForeignandSecurityPolicyoftheEU 27 I.HowtoAnalysetheCFSP 27 II.CFSP:InSearchofPolitisation 28 III.Efficiency–Consistency 31 C.TurkeyandCFSP:AnInteractioninProgress 32 I.EuropeanizationoftheTurkishSecurityPolicy 32 II.Turkey’sContributiontoCFSP 33 MUDDLINGTHROUGHINDEFENCEANDMILITARYASPECT 36 A.TurkeyinNATO 36 I.TransformationofNATOandTurkey 36 II.TurkeyandDifferentNATOPolicies 39 B.NATO–EURelations 41 I.EUinNATO:ESDIandESDP 41 a.EstablishmentofESDP:WhatAutonomyvis-à-visNATO? 41 b.EuropeanPillarwithinNATO:theBuildingofESDI 43 II.LegalBasisofCurrentRelationshipanditsOutcomes 43 a.FromWEUAgreementstoBerlinPlus 43 b.BerlinPlusinPractice 44 III.CompetitionorCo-operation:ChallengesandOpportunitiesforNATO-EU Partnership 46 a.IsThereStillaCommonUnderstanding? 46 b.HardPowerorSoftPower:AQuestionofSubsidiarity 48 c.TheUSandanAutonomousESDP 50 d.DifferentApproacheswithintheEU 51 e.TheEUasaDefenceAlliance? 52 IV.Turkey’sPerspectiveonNATO–EUCooperation 53 C.TurkeyandESDP 55 I.AnAppraisalofESDPandOperations 56 II.Turkey’sContributiontoESDPandChallenges 58 D.ClearingUptheOpportunities 59 CONCLUSION 61 i Abbreviations ASEAN-TheAssociationofSoutheastAsianNations CFSP–CommonForeignandSecurityPolicy EDA–EuropeanDefenceAgency ENP–EuropeanNeighborhodPolicy EPC–EuropeanPoliticalCo-operation ESDI–EuropeanSecurityandDefenceIdentity ESDP–EuropeanSecurityandDefencePolicy ESS–EuropeanSecurityStrategy EU–theEuropeanUnion IAEA–InternationalAtomicEnergyAgency Mercosur-SouthernCommonMarket( MercadoComúndelSur ) NAC–NorthAtlanticCouncil PSC–PoliticalandSecurityCommittee NATO–NorthAtlanticTreatyOrganization PfP–PartnershipforPeace PKK–KurdistanWorkers’Party( PartiyaKarkerênKurdistan ) UN–theUnitedNations UNDP–UnitedNationsDevelopmentProgramme UNSC–UnitedNationsSecurityCouncil US–UnitedStatesofAmerica WEU–WesternEuropeanUnion WMD–WeaponsofMassDestruction ii INTRODUCTION Relationsbetweenpoliticalorganizationstouchupon,ifarenottotallybasedon,thesecurity domain.ThereasonthatthisresearchisundertakenistoanalysethispartofTurkey–EU relations. Started in 1963, the relationship between Turkey and the EU has undergone significant changes throughout years and covered various domains, such as political, economic,andcultural.Thiswork,however,confinesitselftoexplorethesecurityaspectof thisprocessandaimsatcontributingtothegeneraldebateaboutTurkey’sEUbid.Tothis end,twomainquestionsareposedinordertoshedlightonthesubjectmatter:Towhatextent dotheEUandTurkeyneedeachothertopursuetheirsecuritygoals?CanTurkeybringan addedvaluetoEU’sambitionofbecomingaglobalsecurityactor? By researching the answers to these questions, this work argues that the security considerationsofTurkeyandtheEUarehighlycompatibleandaninterdependentapproachis therefore needed to address common risks and threats that they are confronted with. Corollary,acostandbenefitanalysisisinevitablewhosesequencewillbeincludedinthe decision making process for Turkey’s EU membership. To this aim, impediments and incentives for advancing the co-operation are duly analysed and necessary points are discussedforfurtheranalysis. Thestructureofthisworkisdividedintothreemainparts.First,historicaldevelopmentof Turkey–EUsecurityrelationsishandled.ThefoundingprinciplesofTurkishforeignand security policy are explained to understand the deep rooted ideological basis of Turkey’s 1 Westernismchoice.Subsequently,reasonsofmutualengagementandtransformationsofthe relationship are analysed in the Cold War and post-Cold War contexts. The second part beginswithacomparativeanalysisofsecurityunderstandingsofbothTurkeyandtheEUand highlightsthedistinctionbetweentraditionalstatesecurityandhumansecurityrespectively. Next,CommonForeignandSecurityPolicyoftheEUisassessedandTurkey’spositionin CFSPconsiderationsispointedoutfromvariousperspectives.Inthethirdpart,themilitary anddefencedomainofrelationsisputforward.Therefore,therelationshipwithinNATOis examined from a legal aspect and different arguments are discussed. Afterward, European SecurityandDefencePolicyandTurkey’scontributionsaswellasreservationsareseparately argued. In the end of every main chapter, a general assessment section takes place to emphasizethemostimportantpointsofcasuallinks. Themethodologywhichisfollowedinthisworkisthecollectionandinterpretationofmostly primarysources(legalprovisions,institutionalreports,governmentdeclarations,speechesof theMinistryofForeignAffairsetc.).Thepoliticalnatureofthesubjectanditscoveringof everchangingdynamicscompelledtoscrutinizenewssources.Theinputsofthelibraryand internet research are inserted into the examination to enrich the discussion points. These discussions are based on normative explanations and do not necessarily aim at finding concreteresultsbutpreciselypointingoutpoliticalchoicesandtheirpotentialoutcomes. Igreatlyacknowledgetheassistanceofthesupervisorsofthisresearch,Mr.ClaudeNigoul and Dr. Matthias Waecheter in determining the proper structure and pertinent questions to explorethesubjectmatter.Prof.MatthiasJoppandMs.ElfreideRegelsbergerbestowedtheir valuableadvisesforthefurtherresearchonCFSPandESDPissues. 2 DEVELOPMENTOFSECURITYRELATIONS INHISTORICALCONTEXT FromPrinciplesto21 st Century A.TurkishForeignPolicyandItsFoundingPrinciples Establishedin1923withtheLausanneTreaty,themodernRepublicofTurkeyisthebiggest inheritorofmulti-ethnicOttomanEmpire.ThefoundationsofthenewRepublicwerelaidat thefinalphasesoftheXIX.Centurywithconstitutionalistmovements.However,Turkeyasa nation-statewasbornafterthecostlyWaroftheIndependence(1919–1923),whosehero, MustafaKemalAtaturk,becamethefounderofTurkeyandoverwhelminglyregardedasthe mostambitiousreformistleaderofhisperiod. To understand the foreign and security policy of Turkey, examination of domestic and externalfactorsisimperative,thusbothhavedecisiveimpactsondecisionmakingprocesses. Therefore, domestically, national identity building of the state, founding principles of the foreignpolicyanddeterminationofintereststhroughthisidentityperspectiveareinterlinked. As to external factors, geographical situation, neighboring countries and international developments give a clear perspective for foreign policy outcomes and periodical state behaviors. 3 State identity of the Republic has been formed by two main principles: Secularism and Westernism .1Theformerconceptimpliesbothdomesticandexternalrepercussions.Inorder to preserve the modern republic’s contemporary political system, secularism had to be protected against religious influence of Ottoman heritage. In external relations, secularism approachwasconsideredasthebasisofrationalistdecisionmaking,whichhasnoaffiliation withreligiousconcernsandprovidesalargescaleofpoliticalchoicesforgovernments.The latterconcept,Westernism,enlightensthewholecourseofTurkishforeignpolicyuntiltoday. Sinceitsfounding,Westernismpointsouttheoutrightacceptationbythewesterncommunity throughtakingpartintheirorganisations. Kemalist ideologyaims‘toreachthecontemporary civilisations’.Theseprinciples,fromarealisticperspective,complywiththerequirementsof conjuncturaldevelopmentsattheearlystagesoftheXX.Century.Inaworld,dominatedby Westernpowers,Turkeymadearationalchoicebyacceptingtheirbasicprinciples. Since its establishment, Turkey’s security has been shaped by two main determinants: its geography and historical background. 2 As regards the geopolitical situation, Turkey has always been in an uncomfortable area; surrounded by regions with protracted conflicts, MiddleEast,CaucasianandBalkansandhasobligedAnkaratomakecriticalchoices.Asto the historical background, Turkish people carried the feelings of being reduced from an Empiretoanationstate.Bythesametoken,theWar of Independence entailed the strong emphasisofnationalsovereigntyandfightagainstforeignintervention. Based on these principles, in the inter-war period, Turkey’s foreign and security policy molded four outcomes 3: Preserving the status quo , shunning joining any alliances and attending conferences with religious agenda, building strong relations with the West and rejecting imperial or irredentist policies. Disputed border with Iraq, which was a British colonyatthattime,hasbeenfixedbythedecisionoftheLeagueofNationsin1926atthe expense of Turkish interests. In the pre-war period, Turkey had to follow a more active policy.Theestablishmentof BalkanEntente, wassignedbetweenTurkey,Greece,Romania andYugoslaviain1934.Similarly, SaadabadPact ,in1937wasestablishedamongIran,Iraq, 1HasanUlusoy, OnePolicy,ManyIdentities–TheConsistencyofTurkey’sForeignPolicywithSpecial EmphasisonitsSecurityDimensioninthePost-ColdWarEra, (Istanbul: TheIsisPress,2007),75-82. 2RepublicofTurkey,MinistryofForeignAffairs,
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