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DOCUMENT 1183 26th April 1989

ASSEMBLY OF WESTERN EUROPEAN LINION

THIRTY.FIFTH ORDINARY SESSION

(First Part)

State of European security - intervention forces and reinforcement for the centre and the north

REPORT

submitted on behalf of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments by Mr. Speed, Rapporteur ASSEMBLY OF WESTERN 43, avenue du Pr6sident-Wilson,75775 Paris Cedex 16 - Tel. 47.23.54.32 Document 1183 26th April 1989

State of European security - intewention forces and reinforcemcnt for the centre and the nonh

REPORT I

submitted on behalf of the Contmittee on Defence Questions and Armaments2 by Mn Speed, Rapponeur

TABLE OF CONTENTS RAPPoRTEUR's Pnrrncr

Dnerr Rrcouunr.rparloN on the state of European security - intervention forces and reinforcement for the c€ntre and the north

Expr-aNnronv M ENIoRANDuN,I submitted by Mr. Speed, Rapporteur I. Introduction IL Geography IlI. in the area (a/ Norwegian forces @/ Danish forces (c) German forces (Northern ) (d) lcnland IV. Assistance from the allies Y. The Nordic balance VI. Reinforcements VIl. Command and conuol - northern region VIII. Specific forces (a,) British concepts of air mobility (b) The French force d'action rapide (c) The United Kingdom- landing force (i) The British contribution (ii) The Dutch contribution (iiil Equipment (iv) Tratrrrng (v/ Amphibious shipping issue (d) Tbe Franco-German (e) The NATO airborne early-warning force IX. Conclusion

APPENDIX Motion for a recommendation on the exchange of armed forces personnel between the national units of the individual member nations l. Adopted unanimously by the committee. 2. Members of the committee: Mt. Kittelmann (Chairman); MM. de Beer (Alternate: Maris), Fourr0 (Yice$ztrmen); Mr. Alloncle (Alteraate: Baumet), Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman, MM. Cariglia (Alternate: Mezzapesa), Cox, De Decker, Derycke (Alternate: Kempinaire), Ewing, Fiatdrotti, Fillon, Fioret (Alternate:. Fassino), Irmer, Jung Konen, de Kwaalstenia, ivlrs. Lalumidre, MM. Pecchioli, Scheer, Sinesio, Sir Dudley Smith, MM. Speed, Steircr, Steverlynck (Alternate: Uyttendaele), Sir John Stokes, Mr. Zierer. N.B. ?"fte names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics. DOCUMENT I183

Rapporteur's Preface

In preparation for his report:

The Rapporteur took part as an observer (on 22nd and 23rd September 1988) in the exercise Free Lion in the Federal Republic of Germany. He also had the following interviews: llth October 1988

Headquarters of the rapid action force (FAR), Maisons-Laffitte, Henry Pr6aud, Commanding Officer, FAR. The Rapporteurwas also invited to the presentation of the FAR at Canjuers, near Draguignan, on 25th October 1988.

9th and 10th November 1988

SHAPE, Mons, General John R. Galvin, Army, Supreme Allied Commander, Europe; General Sir John Akehurst, United Kingdom Army, Deputy Supreme Allied Commander, Europe; Vice Fiorenzo Rosso, , Deputy Chief-of-stafl Support; Rear Admiral James Weatherall, Royal Na"y, Deputy Assistant Chief-of-staff, Operations; Minister Counsellor Don Gelber, Special Assistant for International Affairs; Mr. Harry Brown, Special Assistant, Strategic and global events; Nick Paige, Royal Nar.y, Deputy United Kingdom National Representative; Col. Farrar-Hockley, United Kingdom Army; Lt. CoL Heidler, Danish Army, Operations ; Commander Rath, , Policy Division. l4th December 1988

Ministry of Defence, The Hague, Netherlands Mr. Frits Bolkestein, Minister of Defence; Rear Admiral H. van Foreest, Director of Personnel, RNLN; Commodore J.W. Stuurman, Deputy Chief Operations, Naval Staff. Headquarters HNLMC, Rotterdam, and Royal Netherlands Marine , Doorn -General Willem J.I. van Breukelen, Commandant RNLMC; Col. G.G. \{ssnink, RNLMC, Commanding Officer, Marine Barracks, Doorn. l1th December 1988

Dutch Parliament, The Hague Mr. W.F. van Eekelen, former Minister of Defence. The Rapporteur was invited to attend the inauguration ceremony of the FrancoGerman brigade which took place in Bhblingen, Federal Republic of Germany, on l2th January 1989. 2 DOCUMENT I I83

After the ceremony, discussions were held with: General Gilbert Forray, French Army, Chief of the ; Lieutenant-General Henning von Ondarza, , Inspector of the ; Brigadier-General Helmut Willmann, Ministry of Defence, ; Brigadier-General Jean-Pierre Sengeisen, French Army, Commandant, Franco-German brigade; Colonel Gfinther Wassenberg, Germany Army, Deputy Commandant.

24th January 1989

Headquarters 24th Airmobile Brigade, Catterick, Uniled Kingdom Brigadier A.I.G. Kennedy, OBE, Commanding Officer; Major Charles Sloane, Gordon Highlanders, Chief-of-Staff.

7th February 1989

NATO Air Base, Geilenkirchen, Federal Republic of Germany Col. C.M. van den Hoven, RNLAF, Deputy Commander; Col. Eugene Deibert, USAF, Assistant to the Commander for Special Projects. In the course of his visit, the Rapporteur was given an in-flight demonstration of the NATO AWACS (airborne warning and control system).

The committee as a whole held meetings and was briefed as follows:

Norway

13th June 1988 Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Oslo Mr. Dagfin Stenseth, Director, Planning Department.

Storting, Norwegian Parliament, Oslo Mr. Thor Knudsen (Conservative), Vice-Chairman of the Committee on Defence; Mr. Rikard Olsvik (Labour Party), Elected Secretary of the Committee on Defence; Mrs. Marit Lovvig (Conservative), member of the committee; Mr. Age Ramberg (Christian Democrat), member of the committee; Mrs. Aud Blattmann (labour Party), member of the committee; Mr. Hans J. Rosjorde (Party of Progress), member of the committee; Mrs. Kaci Kullmann Five (Conservative), member of the committee; Mr. Jan Petersen (Conservative), member of the committee; Mrs. Ingeborg Botnen (Labour Party), member of the committee.

Institute for Defence Studies Mr. Olav Riste, Director of the Institute; Mr. Rolf Tamnes, senior research associate; Lt. General Tonne Huitfeldt, Strategic Studies Co-ordinator; Dr. Tomas Ries, research fellow; Mr. Ragnvald Solstrand, Director of the Defence Research Institute; Vice Admiral C. Lutken, research associate; Dr. Finn Sollie, expert consultant; Captain Gjelsten, Naval Staff College; Mr. John Kristen Skogan, research fellow, Institute of International Affairs.

MS CARNEVAL, Oslo Fjord Mr. Johan Jorgen Holst, Minister of Defence.

3 DOCUMENT I I83

14th June 1988 Ministry of Defence, Oslo Mr. Finn Molvig, Drector-General, Ministry of Defence; Rear Admiral Per Sollien, Headquarters Defence Command; Mr. Tom Eidesen, Policy Division; Captain Arne Sperbund, Headquarters Defence Command.

Headquarters Allied Forces Northern Europe, Kolsas Rear Admiral ICJ. Steindofl GE N, Chief-of-Stafl AFNORTH; Major-General J. Schriver, DA A; Rear Admiral J. Ruth, DA N; Brig. General P.J. Rowe, USMC; Brig. General D.R. Williams, CA AF; Colonel J.M. von Radowitz, GE A; Colonel L. Ness, NO A.

CS FINNMARKEN (at sea) Commodore Per Anton Enghaug, Commanding Officer, Narvik Naval District.

15th June 1988 Headquarters Defence Command Northern , Reitan Brigadier Alv Midthun, Chief-of-Staff; Colonel Per Bothun, No AF, Deputy Chief-of-Staff Plans and Operations; Captain (N) Torbjorn Romul{ No N, Allied Naval Forces North Nonray.

Bodo Main Air Station Brigadier Egil Omdal, No AF, Commanding Officer Bodo Main Air Station; Major Rolf Noel, No AF, Commanding Officer 331 .

Denmark

16th June 1988

Foreign Ministry, Mr. Uffe Ellemann-Jensen, Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Folkaing (Danish Parliammt), Copenhagen (morning) Mr. Bjoern Elmquist (Liberal), Chairman of the Foreign Atrairs Committee; Mr. Hans Haekkerup (Social Democrat), member of the committee; Mrs Ritt Bjerregaard (Social Democrat), member of the committee; Mr. Anker Soergensen (Social Democrat), member of the committee; Mr. Hanne Severinsen (Liberal), member of the committee; Mrs Connie Hedegaard (Conservative), member of the committee; Mr. Per Stig Moeller (Conservative), member of the committee; Mr. B. Bollmann (Centre Democrat), member of the committee. (afiernoon) Mr. Knud Enggaard, Minister of Defence.

17th June 1988 Defence headquarters, Vedbaek Lieutenant-General Joergen Lyng, Acting Chief of the ; Lieutenant-Colonel O.L. Kandborg; Major T. Kruger; Commander L. Kragelund; DOCUMENT I I83

Major B. Cornelius; Major O. Kruger; Major T.E. Vimmerslev; Colonel S. Schriver.

Stevnsforta Major-General H. Havning; Commander (SG) P. Garde.

Iceland

20th June 1988

NATO base, Keflavik Rear Admiral Eric McVadon, {JSN, Commandant of the Defence Force; Colonel L. Aikman, Operations Officer; Lieutenant-Colonel R. St. Iaurent, Logistics Officer.

21st June 1988 Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Reykiavik Mr. Helgi Agustsson, Deputy Permanent Under-Secretary; Mr. Stula Sigurjonsson, First Secretary of the Defence Department. Althingi (Icelandic Parliament) Mr. Johann Einvardsson (Progressive Party), Vice-President of the United Althingi; ffi. drdlohannsson (Soclat Democraii.Deputy Chairman of the Committee for Foreign Affairs; Mr. Pall Petursson (Progressive Party); Mr. Ingi Bjorn Albertsson (Citizens Party).

Pingholt Mr. Hannes Hafstein, Permanent Under-Secretary, Ministry for Foreign Affairs.

United Kingdam

3rd November 1988, London The Hon. Archie Hamilton, MP, United Kingdom Minister of State for the Armed Forces'

4th November 1988, HQ RAF Strtke Command, High Wycombe Air Chief Marshal Sir Patrick Hine, KCB, FRAeS RAF, Air Officer Commanding in Chief; Air Vice Marshal Anthony Woodford, Chief-otStaff.

France

6th February 1989, Paris Mr. Jean-Pierre Chevdnement, French Minister of Defence.

Federal Republic of Germany

25th and 26th April 1989, Bonn Mr. Helmut Schifer, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs; Mr. Alfred Biehle, chairman of the Parliamentary Defence committee; Mr. Willy Wimmer, Parliamentary State Secretary. The committee and the Rapporteur wish to express their special thanks-tq all the ministers, offi- cials and senior officers who brie6d the Rapporteur oi the committee and replied to questions, an-d_als-o i" purtii"t-, to the Secretary of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, Mt. C.R.IC Cameron.

5 DocuMEr\-r 1183

Draft Recommendation

on the state of European security - intemention fotces and reitforcemeat for the centre and the north

The Assembly,

(i) Welcoming the improved relations between NATO and countries, the Soviet with- d**4 from and the arms reduction agreements that have been achieved or are being nego- tiated; (y' . Noting-nevertheless that the USSR and its allies are slill maiataining a high level of arms pro- duction and that the present disarmament agreements have been reacheA by NATO maintaining its own high level of security and unity of purpose; (iiy' Recognising that it will be politically difficult to maintain western defence budgets in real terms, let alone increase them; (iv) Underlining therefore the increased urgency of making as cost eflective as possible existing pro- curemenL personnel, and command, control and communication systems; (v) .Stresslng the key strategic importance to NATO of reinforcement and resupply from North America to Eu_rope, which itself can act as a deterrent in time of tension, and increases iheimportance of the northern flanh

Rrcouueuns rHAT rns CouNclr,

Urge member governments to recommend to NATO: l. That the highest priority be given to improving command, control and communication systems: (a) frrstly, aircraf identification friend or foe'(IfF) systems, to achieve a high-grade common standard in NATO air operations which is now long overdue; (b/ secondly, in interoperability of tactical radio equipment between multinational units; (c) thtdly, in communication, tactics and doctrine, for better control of the land/air battle; 2. That France be encouraged to join the United Kingdom in taking part with its four Boeing E-3 AWACS ab initio in the training and development of the teams destined for the alliance air de6nce system aircraft; 3. That in view of the importance of the northern flank in securing maritime and air superiority for transaflantic reinforcement and resupply, the United Kingdom and ihe Netherlands should reach an early decision on new amphibious ships; 4. That in view of the withdrawal of Canadian forces from the northern flank, apart from their replacement by other allies, consideration should be given to the skilled elements of the force d'action rapide being assigned to Norway; 5. That stiU greater efforts be made on weapon and ammunition standardisation, interoperability of equipment and more cost-effective joint procurement ventures; 6. That through the member countries of WEU the following steps should be taken to give practical expression to the European pillar of defence: (a) encourage more multinational units such as the United Kingdom-Netherlands landing force and the Franco-German brigade; (b) take specific action to allow at an individual level the exchange of military personnel between countries to enhance their awarenessof European co-operation, give themgreater opportunity for travel and a more interesting work environment, and serve ai a useful iecmiting incentivi: at a time when the demographic levels are making recruiting most difficult; l. That proper recognition and understalding be given to greater concepts of speed and flexibility in European force.s meet to the c,h?lglng situation in Europe. The doctrines and equipment-could which underly the force d'action rapide and. 24 Airmobile Brigade are good examples that be emulated and enhanced throughout the alliance (although dedicated lift capacity for 24 Brigade is an essential priority). DOCUMENT 1 I83

Explanatory Memorandum

(submitted by Mr. Spee4 Rapporteur)

I. Introduction indications that we may be about to enter a state of" super-detente " in Europe and nobody hopes I . l. In recent years, the Committee on Defence that this may be so more fervently than your Questions and Armaments has produced a range Rapporteur. of reports concerning various aspects of Euro- pean security: 1.4. However, whatever oneos hopes for the future, there is no escaping today's realities * - The state of European security ", which remain major preoccupations for we November 1982, Rapporteur: Mr. Western Europeans, especially where our defence Blaauw (Document 936), looked at mar- is concerned. We all trust that the present spirit itime surveillance, certain national con- of good-will and openness will prevail and be tributions 1s allied defence and conven- translated into genuine acts to reduce and even- tually remove any perceived threat. That tional weapons and NATO strategy; * o trust " will be eroded, however, if capabilities - European security and burden-sharing are not modified to match recently-declared in the alliance ", November 1983, intentions. In another report (" Current aspects Rapporteun Mr. Wilkinson (Document of arms control ", Rapporteur: Mr. de Beer), 959), dealt with a perennial subject being prepared in parallel with this one, these under the headings ofl the concept of changing dimensions and relationships are allied defence, measuring and com- examined in detail and recommendations made paring the defence effort, the transat- which should help achieve' super-d6tente " eyen lantic debate, the European pillar and more quickly, if implemented by the Council. defence production; 1.5. Meanwhile, the Committee on Defence - ' The state of European security ", May Questions and Armaments has also to consider 1984, Rapporteun Sir Dudley Smith the present setting, where in the context of (Document 971), considered the impli- reducing working populations, sometimes fal- cations of membership of NATO, the tering national economies and changing public status of indiyidual countries and attitudes towards defence, the governments of intermediate-range nuclear forces; member countries and other NATO allies have to make important decisions in order to secure - 'The state of European security - the the best use of diminishing resources. central region', I0l{ay I 985, Rapporteur: Dr. Miller (Document 1018), reviewed 1.6. In 1988, the committee was invited by the levels of forces in the central region and governments and parliaments of , the r6le of allied forces on the central Iceland and Norway to make a fact-finding visit front. to those countries to see some of the problems of the " northern' areas at first hand and for Other reports have provided regular updating of exchanges of views on the state of European the situation in the Mediterranean (the southern security. Although none of the countries con- flank) (the latest being Document 1073, October cerned is a member of , 1986, Rapporteur Mr. Kittelmann), and further it is worthy of note that the visit took place in the afield. run-up to and 's membership of the organisation and that a great deal ofinterest 1.2. The aim of this present report is: was shown in Denmark and Norway, by both (a) to examine aspects of allied rein- parliamentarians and the media, in the condi- forcement for the central region and tions for WEU membership. This subject is con- the north, in the light of current ideas sidered further in a current report being prepared regarding intervention forces generally by the General Affairs Committee on 'The and bi- and multilateral co-operation future of European security'', Rapporteur: Mr. in particular; van der Sanden. (b) totignt;ght various problem areas and propose possible solutions. II. Geography 1.3. Producing such a report as this in the context of today's rapidly evolving political situ- 2.1. Alliance interests in the northern flank ation is no easy matter. Initiatives and proposals area centre on NATO's Northern European abound, for example, as East and West Command which is one of the major subordinate maneuwe on the arms control scene. There are commands of Allied Command Europe. This is a DOCUMENT I183 region of contrasts. From Kirkenes on the an infinite number of landing areas, pro- Barents Sea to the River Elbe, the command tection from the elements and the enemy, stretches for 2 800 km and comprises Norway, and allows us a waterborne means of tac- Denmark and Schleswig-Holstein and Hamburg tical and logistic movement.' north of the Elbe in the Federal Republic of 2.4. Norway (323 886 sq. km) has a population Germany. In the north borders the Soviet it of just over 4 alillion, Denmark (43 069 sq. km) Union and Finland; to the east is neutral has a population of 5 million and Schleswig- and the , while the south-east boundary Holstein and Hamburg (16 zmO sq. km) together is the . The Norwegian have a population of 4.5 million. Thus, the popu- archipelago of Svalbard, the island of Jan Mayen lation of the whole area amounts to about 14 Danish territories and and the of million compared to the more than 100 million the Farses are all under the responsibility of the inhabitants both the central and southern Commander Atlantic in Supreme Allied regions of NATO in Europe. (SACLANT) and so is the major part of the Nor- wegian economic zone. Iceliand also has a key 2.5. The Northern European Command would geographical position and r6le in alliance be of crucial importance in a war between the defence. Warsaw Pact and NATO. It stretches across a 2.2. The coastline of Nonray runs for thou- third of the European NATO area, dominates the sands of kilometres with its hundreds of large sea routes from the Baltic in the south and in the north from the Barents Sea into the Atlantic. It and small fiords and inlets. The land area of the country presents a rugged picture with innu- also sits astride the direct air routes from Central merable hills, vallsys and mountains an4 for Russia to the North American continent. It pro- both geographical and economic reasong rail vides important early-warning facilities and and road communications are limited. On the would constitute an important base for allied whole the area is very narrow with many fiords counter-offensive operations. and south of Narvik, for example, Norway is no more than 7 km wide. Denmark and Schleswig- Holstein on the other hand present a contrast III. Defence forces in the arua with flat plains and only a few natural defence barriers. Compared with Norway their rail and (a) Norwegian forees road communications are good. 3.1. In Norway military training of soldiers 2.3. The Commandant General of Britain's and partly also of non-commissioned officers is Royal Marines, Sir Martin based on general . A certain per- Garro4 in an interview for NATO's Sixteen centage of regulars is recruited for special units Nations, sums up the situation in the north: and tasks. The national service period is " The problems that we face in oper- 12 months (plus four call-ups for refresher- ations are those out of our control. Firsfly training) for the army and 15 months for the climate, which means that all our men navy and the . have to be trained and equipped to fight in The Norwegian land forces will amount to the Norwegian winter. is not so much 3.2. It 225000 men mobilisation. The the cold which is the problem rather some on but standing land forces are, however, limited to the variation in conditions caused by the effect Stream. North North Norway. These forces are well-trained and of the Gulf In -equipped and the brigade North Norway Norway January and February, for in in (Troms) is supported by medium tanks and example, the temperature may be 30 0C - medium artillery. In South Norway the standing or lower, or it may be + 5 0C and raining. units consist of His Majesty the King's guard bat- A cold dry man can figbt indefinitely, a talion, one medium tank squadron and some wet man rapidly become a cold will other minor units. On mobilisation, an addi- casualty. The terrain, particularly in the tional 12 will be called up. The local north, is rugged. This makes cross-country defence forces mobilised battalion or movement difficult and tends to canalise in company groups comprise another 100 000 men. vehicles and tracks along valleys, which of To this should be added some 85 000 men of the course favours the defender. Inland com- . munications, road and rail, are tenuous. The main trunk road, the E6, running 3.3. Types of aircraft at present in use in the from Finmark to Oslo is in places tortuous Royal Norwegian Air Force are the F-16, F-5, and wlnerable, and the single track P-3B Orion (maritime patrol), C-130H transport railway snniag north from Oslo termi- and the UH-1B Sea King (SAR) and Lynx heli- nates at Bodo, some two-thirds of the way copters. At present the air force has five up Norway. The coastline is vast some squadrons of combat aircraft. In addition, there 13 000 km long indented by innurnsla6ls are one squadron of for army support fords and scattered with some 150000 and one transport squadron. Norway is partici- islands. This coast does however give us pating in NATO's airborne early-warning project DOCUMENT I 183 and has a forward-operating facility for the force all supported by artillery, engineers and anti-tank of l8 aircraft at Oerland air base at Trondelag units. Their equipment totals 200 medium tanks, (Mid-Norway). A number of airfields have been 48 light tanks, 650 armoured personnel carriers, built in Norway, financed nationally and under 72 self-propelled howitzers and a number of heli- the NATO infrastructure programme. Others copters. have been and are being extended and modern- 3.7. For the Danish navy the following ised. minimum force objectives are established: two 3.4. The main operational area for the Royal destroyers, three corvettes, five fishery-protec- Norwegian Navy is North Nonray. The Nor- tion ships with helicopters, 16 fast patrol boats, wegian naval forces consist of five , two three submarines, seven mine-layers, three mine- corvettes, 14 submarines, 46 fast patrol boats sweepers, eight small submarine-hunting vessels, (missile and torpedo/gun boats). two mine-layers, 26 other vessels and light helicopters (although nine mine-sweepers and one mine-hunter, seven not all ships are in commission continuously). A landing craft and a support ship. Naval manning new construction programme to meet these in peacetime is at 700/0. The main naval base is at objectives is now in progress. Naval shore estab- Haakonsvern in Bergen on the west coast (South lishments include three naval bases, fortresses, Norway). In North Nonvay there are smaller coastal and mobile radars and combat divers. bases at Ramsund and near Tromso (Olavsvern) Wartime personnel strength is about 10 0@ to and a substantial number of coastal artillery for- which should be added some 4 300 navy home tresses. The coastguard has its main base at guard men and women. Sortland North Norway. Five coastguard in 3.8. units are available three of them carrying a helicopter, are ships, in a high state of preparedness in peacetime. manned military personnel. by There are now 89 fighters in four squadrons of F-16 and two squadrons of F-35 Draken. Addi- tionally, the air force maintains eight l-Hawk (b) Danish forces missile squadrons and a number of transport and Denmark one-third of the peacetime inspection'planes and rescue helicopters. The air 3.5. In force's activities are supported by a modern anny are volunteers, whereas the augmentation control and warning system and the Danish air force and the mobilisation force consist of con- defence system operates within the framework of with a training of nine to 12 months. Con- scripts defence ground environment scripts can be called up for refresher-training for NATO's air (NADGE) system. NADGE operates 24 hours a atotal of 60 days during the first nine years after high state of readiness and consists, in their initial training period. Beyond this, they day in a to the planes and missiles, of a control can be called up for short-time musters. The addition and warning system which includes a number of Act of 1985 provides for a per- radar stations, for example, one on Bomholm sonnel peacetime strength of the army of 13 000 well to the east. Denmark also participates in the men, 7 000 of whom form the staading force NATO airborne early-warning project in which consisting of volunteers only. The 6 000 soldiers long-range surveillance and early warning is of the augrnentation force are in a high state of made possible by airborne radar coverage. readiness and can be called up at very short notice without implementing any alert or mobilisation measures. In a time of tension, the (c) Gernwt lorcu (wrthern Germany) standing force, reinforced by the augmentation force, form the covering force of about will 3.9. The military forces of the Federal 13 men. The strength of the wartime 000 total Republic of Germany stationed in Schleswig- mobilisation of the field army reserve army, after Holstein and Hamburg, north of the River Elbe, local defence forces, is about 72000 and the consist offorces ofall three services (halfofthem and men and a home guard of approxi- officers are conscripts with a service period at present of mately 78 000 or all in all 150 000 men. - 15 months, increasing shortly to 18 months). The 3.6. The peacetime standing force is organised army is primarily represented by the Sixth in five annoured infantry brigades - the three in Armoured Infantry Division (headquarters at Jutland forming a division, two battalions and Neumunster) with about24 000 men (peace- and the combat goup. These are partly wartime strength) which is the largest in the manned but they possess all thek operational Bundeswehr. This division consists of two equipment. The requisite fue-power and heavy armoured infantry brigades, one armoured equipment is thereby maintained at n high stsfs brigade and the Home Defence Brigade 51 (the of readiness and the integration of mobilisation latter due for disbandment under the " army forces is consequently made easier. After mobil- 2000' project). Besides conventional artillery isation, these forces would be built up to full battalions, the artillery regiment of the Sixth wartime strength. Two brigades would be formed Armoured Infantry Division includes a Lance - three regimental combat teams and seven battalion. An air defence regiment forms also regions with from one to four infantry battalions part of the divisional troops. DOCUMENT 1I83

3.10. Air forces in Schleswig-Holstein assigned of two new stations on the north coast, as well as to Northern Europe Command include two light shelter hangars for fighter aircaft and protective fighter bomber squadrons at Husum and two all- facilities for the command and control functions weather reconnaissance squadrons at leck. at the headquarters. The new measures also Types of aircraft at present in use are the include Dutch P-3C maritime surveillance air- Alphalet and the RF4E. The German naval craft with crews and maintenance personnel sta- forces consist of seven destroyers, nine frigates, tioned at Keflavik on a rotation basis and also a six of them with helicopters, five smaller anti- number of allied staffofficers who are integrated submarine patrol boats, 40 fast patrol boats, 57 into the staffof the defence force. There are cur- mine-sweepers/hunters, 19 landing craft. and, 24 rently Americans, Canadians, , Dutchmen, submarines. In addition, the German naval air Norwegians, and now a British officer, working arm has three attack squadrons and a reconnais- in the Iceland Defence Force headquarters. sance squadron equipped with the sophisticated 3.14. The base Tornado aircraft and two reconnaissance NATO at Keflavik, including the squadrons of Breguet-Atlantic maritime patrol defence force, plays a vital r6le as far as air defence, aircraft. Additionally, the naval air arm operates maritime surveillance and early warning for the whole 22 Sea King helicopters in the Norwegian Sea area are concerned. In an emergency, the base would r6le, 19 Dornier-28 liaison aircraft and 12 Sea be of decisive Lynx helicopters which operate from the six importance for maintaining communication frigates. The naval wartime personnel strength is across the Atlantic and for bringing forward rein- 62 500. forcements to Norway and to Denmark. 3.11. In order to relieve NATO land forces of certain tasks, units of the territorial army which IY. Assistance from the allits in peace and war are under national command and control are formed in Schleswig-Holstein 4.1. The defence forces of the Northern with a wartime strength of about 20 000 men. European Command are limited in number and Their r6le will be considered further on in this it is appreciated that they would need assistance report when the Franco-German brigade is men- from the outside to resist a powerful and deter- tioned. mined aggressor. 4.2. The strategically important area of north (d) Iceland Norway has liule by way of permanent infra- structure, such as roads, ports, or hospitals, to 3.12. As Iceland has no mililary forces of its support either a large permanent garrison or a own, a defence agreement was concluded with large inllux of reinforcements. In addition, the United States in l95l under which the although Norway's sgading forces are by pro- United States undertakes the defence of Iceland portion of population as large of those of the on behalf of NATO. The Iceland Defence Force United States, the country cannot be adequately is established at Keflavik, outside Reykjavit the defended without intensive mobilisation and capital of Iceland. This force comprises a strong reinforcement from outside. In the area of squadron of 18 F-15 Eagle interceptors and a the Baltic approaches the infrastructure is admit- squadron of two E-3A Sentry AWACS aircraft tedly much more developed, but the total popu- (airborne early warning). For maritime surveil- lation is still small and an adequate defence can lance and anti-submarine operations, the force only be achieved by the timely arrival of suitable also operates a squadron of nine P-3C Orion reinforcements. maritime . In addition, there 4.3. Firstly, mention should be made of NATO are three HH-3 search-and-rescue helicopters deterrent forces which mlght be deployed to the and two C-130 for search operations, as well as a area early in a period oftension. These are: KC-135 tanker. A special unit is responsible for defence of the affield until the arrival of desig- (a) thLe Allied Command Europe Mobile nated reinforcements from the United States. A Force (air and land); unit of the United States anny reserve has been (b) trained and prepared to move the Standing Naval Force Atlantic to Iceland in times (STANAVFORLAN',T). of crisis or in war. In the defence force there is a total of about 3 100 men. In addition, some Both these forces have a primary deterrent r6le I 100 Icelanders are employed by the force. in demonstrating NATO's solidarity and making it quite clear that an attack 3.13. So as to counter the growing Soviet threat against one membei is an attack against all. in the Norwegian Sea over the past years, Iceland has approved SACLANT's plan for improv- 4.4. SACEUR's rapid reinforcement plan allo- ement of maritime surveillance, radar coverage cates priorities for the arrival of reinforcements and air defence of Iceland. These improvements in Europe and the following forces from outside include modernisation of existing radar stations the command area might be expected in time of on the southern coast oflceland and the building tension: l0 DOCUMENT I I83

- from the United Kingdom an anny and cultural links. The " non-nuclear " and brigade (United Kingdom mobile force) 'non-basing nuclear " policies of Norway and for operations in the Baltic approaches; Denmark receive considerable comment, but in reality they reflect an agxeement which was made from the United Kingdom and the - as far back as 1949, accepted then by all parties, Netherlands together an amphibious and in part served to show the consideration that force consisting up four marine of to Norway and Denmark feel owed their infantry battalions own is to with their Nordic neighbours. combat and logistic support. This force is trained and equipped for cold weather 5.2. In military terrns it is important to operations and exercises in Nonray remember the effect on the defence of the annually during the winter months; northern region of developments in Sweden and Finland. present probably from the United States a strong marine At the Soviets stand to - gain expeditionary force which mlght consist lose more than they would by any incursion of up to 50 000 men with 160 fighters by land or air into Swedish territory. However, continued defence budget have (including air squa- cuts in the weakening drons), and ground attack aircraft, 50 resulted in a considerable of the past The attack and 180 transport helicopters, 70 Swedish forces over the two decades. tanks, 100 artillery pieces and a pow- cost of " armed neutrality " is high and it planned erful anti-tank and anti-air capability. It remains to be seen whether current and is hoped that strong air support from expenditure will be sufficient to provide the form guarantee the North Atlantic Carrier Battle Group of that the Swedes have hitherto relied would also be available; on. - from an air-sea transportable 5.3. In Finland last year a 100/o increase in the brigade group fully Arctic-trained and defence budget was announced. This is particu- -equipped (some 5 000 men). However, larly unusual at a time when most other nations as announced in the Canadian white are finding difficulty in maintaining even present paper in 1987, it is intended to levels of defence expenditure. withdraw this commitment to north 5.4. In spite of their respective positions, both Norway later this year and instead the Finns and the Swedes must present an increase Canadian presence in southern unknown quantity to a potential aggressor. The Germany. The hope is to replace the routes through and over Sweden and Finland to CAST brigade with a NATO composite the northern region present an attractive propo- force of four battalions (two artillery, sition perhaps, but the possible hazards of any two infantry), plus a helicopter incursion would be difficult for the Soviets to squadron. These forces would be sent quantiS and, in reality, they add yet another from Canada, the Federal Republic, the unknown for their military planners. It is true, United Kingdom and the United States, however, that the possibility of a major assault and should result in a slightly increased on southern Norway during the early stages of a overall capability, although co-ordina- conflict might well be increased as Swedish tion will be more of a problem. defences weaken. potential 4.5. The northern flank is the 5.5. C.ommander-indhiefAllid Forces Northern 'o Achilles Heel ' of the alli4ass, rrnless adequate Europe considers that his forces are outnum- forces are forthcoming to support the Northern bered by the Soviet and Warsaw Pact arsenal European Command. Elements of the NATO which with increasing sophistication and tech- airborne early-warning force, as well as the nical advances has caught up with the West in United States strategic air command aircraft most areas. In the northern area the Soviet aims from adjacent commands, are essential. Thus, to are assessed as being firstly to safeguard their an aggressor, these forces represent a joint just strategic submarine force and its bases on the NATO defence organisation and not the Kola peninsula and then to contest NATO's vital fimited national defence assets of Denmarlg part sea-line of communication across the North Norway and the northern of the Federal Atlantic. It is felt that they would want at the Republic of Germany. very least to control the vital airfields and port installations in north Norway. Y. The Nordic balance 5.6. The allied concept of defence is firmly based on the defence and denial of these areas 5.1. In this northern region, the Scandinavian which are seen as crucial to probable Soviet dimension or Nordic balance must also be objectives. In the Baltic area, the Warsaw Pact examined. The relationship between the NATO initial aims would surely be to gain control of the countries of lceland, Denmark and Norway with straits, firstly thsrrgh air superiority and even- Finland, and especially Sweden, cannot be tually to drive a wedge between the north and ignored. It is based on long-standing historical central regions of Allied Command Europe, thus ll DOCUMENT II83 gving access to the reinforcement and resupply increase. In this respect, we are more for- bases in the United Kingdom and rear areas. tunate than our partners in the central 5.7. In the Baltic approaches the allied concept region - we have considerably more room is full forward defence, both on the land where to fly in than they do. Nevertheless, there the forward areas offer the best positions for are real concerns over environmental defence and at sea in the Baltic itself. South issues, especially in north Norway, Norway is the Commander-in-Chiefs base, pro- Zealand and Schleswig-Holstein. The viding a secure area in which to receive rein- requirement for realistic training by all our forcements and supplies for redeployment to reinforcing nations puts a great strain, not either north or south of the area, as necessary. only on the local area and population, but also on the relatively small staffs and The Commander-in-Chief Allied Forces 5.8. forces of the local commanders. Northern Europe (General Sir Geoftey Howlett), in an article for " NATO's Sixteen Nations ", has The declining figures of available man- recently summed up his main preoccupations power will put gtreater pressures on the under the heading * Future considerations ": armed services of all our nations. 'The viability of the allied defence of the Germany has had to increase the period of northern flank will, as with the rest of service of her conscripts to maintain ade- Europe, depend to a major extent on the quate force levels and, once again, these outcome of current and future changes in sort of measures are only likely to be East-West relationships. For the past 40 acceptable to the public for as long as they yeani our security has been based on a firm can be convinced of the necessity, which defensive posture, based very strongly on means the threat. the ultimate deterrent of nuclear weapons. During what will be a politically and mili- In the past few months, the basic tenet of tarily uncertain period, the strategic our defence has been questioned- The with- importance of the northern flank will be drawal of interrrediate-range nuclear forces undiminished. In the face of the certainty from Europe has had little direct effect on of a continued decline in resources and the northern regon, since none were posi- assets, we must strive to improve our tioned on our tenitory. However, within capability rather th-n expect increases in weeks of the sigring of the INF treaty, the numbers. The basic defence concept will stratqgic picture did change, and we saw a not change, but we must ensure that our new deployment of Yankee-class Soviet sub, forces are manned, traine4 equipped and marines, in the north Norwegian and supplied to enable us to sustain operations Barents Seas, newly converted to fire sea- over a lengthy period. Perhaps we may launched cruise missiles. need to place a greater emphasis on mobile The concepts of 'glasnost' and 'perestroika' and flexible forces, such as marines or should be welcomed as an indication that heliborne troops, and if we are to make the the Soviets at last recosnise values which best use of support from external maritime western society has long upheld, or, more and air forces, we must ensure that we likely, respect our 40 years of reasonable have the appropriate command and solidarity. The suddenness of the change control arrangements ready and in being. has, however, been disarming, figuratively Above there remains the need not yet literally. all, to if It is only natural that inform public opinion in the northern the western public should want see to an region of a continued requirement for sub- elimination of the means of their stantial investment in defence. They must destruction. be convinced that the threat has in no way Our main task in the immediate future is to diminished, and that until it has done so, maintain a positive effort in the field of any lessening of allied determination and public information in order to avoid mis- resolve could prove fatal- conceptions about NATO strategy, to dis- prove myths, such as those concerning the Your Rapporteur can but strongly echo General r6le of nuclear weapons or nuclear-free Howlett's sentiments, especially concerning zones. mobile and flexible forces and appropriate command and control arrangements. What Budgetary constraints are not new within might some of the possibilities be to try and NATO as a whole or the northern region improve the situation? in particular. We have always had to make economies and take difficult decisions, public perception but, with a of a dimin- VI. Reinforcements ishing threat, this will become even more difficult. 6.1. The vast area and the small indigenous Pressures on training, particularly low- population mean that the northern region is level flyrng training, will no doubt forced to rely heavily on reinforcements to create t2 DOCUMENT I I83 a credible and capable defence. These reinforce- YII. Command and control - northem region ments are not only necessary militarily, but espe- cially politically, as they provide essential extra 7.1. Command and control arrangements are defensive assets and, more particularly, a dem- probably more complicated in the North onstration of the alliance's intention to defend its European Command than in any other region of territory. Allied Command Europe. Whilst Headquarters Baltic Approaches in Jutland is a fully estab- lished allied headquarters in peacetime, in changes in reinforcement planning 6.2. Several Norway the two commands will remain under have taken place in the past two years. In north national control until transfer ofauthority occurs Nonvay, while only one brigade and a strong gar- * during transition to war. The present arrange- rison force are available as ready " forces, Nor- ments seem to work well during exercises, but wegian gtround forces can quickly mobilised be workable, is not ideal. is pure the system, although It and deployed. In terms of numbers, they are important that the command structure within reasonably strong and, while extra land forces the region is seen to be a reliable organisation, would be important, especially from a political particularly when it might affect the confidence viewpoint, the real necessity is for sophisticated particularly, of the reinforcing nations. The system is further weaponry and, more air-power. complicated the number and nature of reinforcement plan should by SACEUR's rapid adjacent commands. To the south there is produce increase in available air assets a fourfold AFCENT with an overlapping tactical air force time. addition, SACLANT's in a short If, in At sea, close liaison must be kept with Atlantic boundary. striking fleet could cross the and operate CINCHAN and CINCEASTLANT. In the air, planned from the Norwegian coast, as close to CINCUKAIR'S area is adjacent and, when the assets well increased by a the original could be striking and amphibious fleets arrive in the factor of eight. For the land battle, after the with- areas, the command and control arrangements, Canadian air/sea-transported drawal of the particularly air space management, become very Norway's dedicated land rein- brigade - only complex. Even the necessary physical means of forcements plans are now hand to form a - in communication and transmission of information * force " with units from new NATO composite to overcome the potential difficulties and make several nations (see Chapter IV). This will the best use of these various assets is still lacking. provide necessary indications multina- the of A great deal ofwork has been done, such as the dedication to the alliance and support for tional development of a co-ordinated concept of opera- However, reception ilTangements for Norway. tions between AFNORTH and the striking fleet potential reinforcements, as United such the and, through an improved command structure, Corps Fourth Marine Expedi- States Marine for land forces in northern Norway, but a great Brigade Kingdom- tionary and the United deal remains to be done. Netherlands amphibious force, still show some deficiencies. In particular, the ability to conduct 7.2. The same problems from the northern the mine counter-measure operations and anti- region are found throughout the alliance. Most of submarine warfare escort duties necessary to the time there is a sincere willingness among the ensure their safe arrival, must be considerably people concerned to co-operate (this was improved. Unfortunately these are deficiencies particuarly true of the Dutch sponsored exercise which are equally apparent in other areas of the Free Lion, to which your Rapporteur was invited alliance. as an observer in September 1988) and it is increasingly important that the exchanges of per- sonnel take place between allies to prepare that and Schleswig-Holstein there 6.3. In Denmark co-operation (see Appendix). are similar overall requirements. Maritime resources here, coupled with the powerful 7.3. There are many technological develop- German naval air arrn, are probably strong ments, some of which are being brought into enorrgh to give a good account of themselves in service faster occasionally than they may be the Baltic. The main problem concerns the vital assimilated (the report by the Committee on Sci- land battle in Schleswig-Holstein. Even if the entific, Technological and Aerospace Questions Jutland Division and the United Kingdom on " New technologies and their implications for mobile force could reach the defence area in time European defence ", Rapporteur: Mr. van der to support the strong Sixth German Division the Werfl refers), but there is a desperate need for alliance's ability to hold the overwhelmingly progress in particular areas of command and superior strength of the Warsaw Pact conven- control (especially communications and' identi- tional forces for any length of time must be ques- fication friend or foe'{Ittp; systems), if concepts tioned. The Ninth United States Infantry such as close air support or air-mobility of forces Dvision is supposed to reinforce this particular are not to become dismal failures of misunder- area, but even with that the Commander Baltic standing These are real preoccupations which Approaches will probably still need a further affect all levels, from supreme allied com- manoeuwe force, preferably an armoured one, if manders to soldiers... The technological a cohesive defence is to be maintained. aspects ofthis vital problem area are being given

13 DOCUMENT II83

timely consideration in another report of the 8.5. The success ofthis trial over the past four Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aer- years has produced a doctrine for airmobile oper- * ospace Questions on Developments in ations, and identified procedures and equipment, command, control, communications and intelli- which will allow these operations to be gence ", Rapporteur: Mr. Hill. developed into the next century. 24 Brigade has now begun conversion to the airmobile r6le in place of 6 Brigade; it will include an Army Air YIII. Specifrc forces Corps regiment equipped with both anti-tank and utility Lynx helicopters supported by the (a) British eoiltelrts ofair mobility)l RAFs troop-carrying and heavy-lift helicopters. The EH-101 is intended to succeed the Puma in 8.1. Your Rapporteur is the first to wish Mr. these r6les in the 1990s, provided it fulfils the Gorbachev well in his efforts to restructure and necessary criteria. reorientate his military doctrine for a more defensive posture, but at present the Warsaw 8.6. As yet, unlike the French force d'action Pact relies heavily on the concentration of rapide, 24 Brigade's helicopter assets are not ded- massive force to overwhelm an opponent's icated solely to its needs; which is not the most defences and achieve a breakthrough. A concept satisfactory situation, given the range of battle- to counter this threat is obviously essential, field imperatives which are already apparent. therefore, and the more flexible the defence, the Reaction time is paramount for successful action better. and any airmobile unit's ability to block an attack or strike quickly. 8.2. A key element of alliance defence is the ability to stop enemy forces, particularly their 8.7. British and German Ministries of Defence armoured divisions, should they penetrate the are presently considering ways and means front line, using mobile reserves with a powerful towards greater bilateral co-operation and one anti-tank component. such avenue with good potential may be the for- mation of an Anglo-German airmobile division Helicopter-borne forces are ideal for this * 8.3. (the beginning of Chancellor Kohl's European purpose. The axis of an enemy advance would Division "?). Such a possibility, based on the not be known until very shortly before his attack German Anny's 'Bundeswehr 2000' concept began. Until then the defending forces would be and the ideas being developed in Britain's 24 faced with several possible lines of attack; and Brigade, would not only result more the task of identifoing the main axis of advance in a coherent use of scarce resources (both human would be made more difficult by the enemy's use and material), but might have very far-reaching of feints and deception to disguise his intentions. consequences which would be particular To be effective, allied arrroured reserves would of interest to us in Western European Union. have to be committed early to the battle, possibly before the enemy's intention was clear, whereas airmobile forces could be held back and moved (b) Ihe French force d'action rapide position when swiftly into required. 8.8. Created in 1985, some 46 O00-strong and 8.4. In 1984, 6 Brigade of l(BR) Corps, based including the 4th Airmobile Divison, the force at Soest, was tasked with conducting trials of a d'action rapide (FAR), or 'rapid action force', doctrine for airmobile operations in close is steadily becoming the outward and visible sign co-operation with the RAF. The doctrine, as of French commitment to her ellies. developed, involved the use of RAF Puma and 8.9. The FAR mustem the following equipment Chinook helicopters to move men and equipment into concealed positions behind the 240 helicopten (Fumas and Gazelles, NATO front line at the point where an imminent including 90 Gazelles mounting the Hot enemy breakthrough had been identified. The missile); infantry is armed with Milan - the army's 820 arrroured vehicles (210 with guns); medium-range man-portable anti-tank system. 110 Hot missile launchers mounted on They are supported with TOW - the longer- armoured vehicles; range wire-guided anti-tank missile. The consid- 500 Milan anti-tank missile systems; erable anti-tank power of these combined forces 230 artillery (155 mm) and mortar (120 would be brought to bear on the enemy as the mm) pieces; allied front line was breached. The aim would be 4 000 APILAS anti-tank rocket systems. to disrupt and halt the armoured advance, allowing time for allisd tanks to move in and 8.10. As well as a headquarters element, the complete the destruction of enemy formations or FAR includes communication and command force a retreat. ulits, a logistic brigade and a total of five divi- slons: l. See United Kingdom statement on the defence estimates - the 4th Airmobile Division; 1988. - the 6th Light Armoured Division' t4 DOCUMENT II83

- the 9th Marine Infantry Division; Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic when at - the I lth Parachute Division; sea. By its amphibious nature, it is a mobile force - the 27th Alpine Division. and, thereby, not dedicated to a single deploy- ment area, for example, northern Norway, even The headquarters are at Maisons-Laffitte and the this is where the force exercises most fre- divisions are based at Nancy, Nimes, Nantes, if quently. Plans to withdraw the Canadian air-sea Toulouse and Grenoble. transportable brigade from Nonvay have 8.1l. The French Government sees the FAR as renewed political interest in the issue of force reinforcing European security and demonstrating dedication, although dedication to one French willingness to support her allies. The deployment area is not always desirable from a essential plus factor of the FAR is its potential military point of view. However much it can capacity to intervene quickly, thanks to its own demonstrate political commitment, it could integrated helicopter lift and essential mobility. deprive an amphibious force of its flexibility and The necessary logistic support to give the FAR make its deployment too predictable. 'longer legs' and increased sustainability now must follow if the force is really to take its place (i) The British contribution alongside the allies. 8.16. The British Royal Marines are some consideration where 8.12. This vital of "just 7 O0O-strong (all regulars) split into two forma- (and when) might alliance * the FAR fit in' in tions: " commando forces - and training, probably remains terms is crucial, but reserve and special forces " (which also controls unsolvable politically for the present. Joint exer- nearly 1 200 Royal Marines reservists). The bulk cises involving elements of the FAR have taken of the operational units serve with the 3rd Com- place (especially in co-operation with Germany mando Brigade and consist of three Royal 1987) and are Kecker Spatz in the autumn of Marine Commandos plus a RM Air Squadron projected (although with British forces also not (Gazelle helicopters) and a Royal Artillery com- where such co-operation would be most useful, mando regimeng as well as the usual support ele- Increased Franco-British co- in NORTHAG). ments. The prime r6le of these'o sea-soldiers " is the airmobile domain, given present operation in to project maritime power ashore and to this end ideas sides, would be logical and feasible on both regular exercises are undertaken with many other might produce a spin-off into other realms, and NATO allies (including Norwegians, Danes, procurement well. such as equipment as , Americans, Canadians and the 8.13. One particular area where some elements French), but particularly the Dutch through the of the FAR have been involved on a bilateral United Kingdom-Netherlands landing force. basis concerns alpine troops. Both last year and again in 1989, detachments of the 7th battalion (ii) The Dutch contribution of the Alpine Division have exchanged combat sections with their Norwegian opposite numbers. 8.17. The Royal Netherlands Marine Corps has Given also the historical association of the a current strength of roughly 3 000 officers and French with Narvik, this type of initiative is to enlisted men; about 850/o of the corps consists of be strongly encouraged, even if not developed regular personnel and l5o/o are conscripted formally. The presence of French forces in national servicemen. Nearly all officers and non- northern areas (and including eventually naval commissioned officers are regulars with initial and air force elements) would be very welcome terms of service of seven years and four years from every point of view. respectively. This high percentage of well-trained personnel enables the corps to expand its ranks quickly by calling up approximately 4 000 (e) The United Kingtum-Naherlands landing force reserves when necessary. The corps is augmented by men from the fleet - medical, dental,logistic, 8.14. The force is the first permanent form ofbi- lsligious and administrative personnel. national co-operation between the amphibious forces of rwo NATOflMEU member nations. In 8.18. The largest unit in the RNLMC is an 1972 a memorandum of understanding was amphibious combat group (ACG). An ACG is a signed between the British and Dutch Govern- battalion-sizs lighl amphibious infantry unit ments and Royal Netherlands Marine Corps with ligbt supporting arms. The ACG is not forces were assigned to the United Kingdom- vehicle-dependent for it has no tanks, heli- Netherlands landing force for NATO operations. copters, or armoured amphibious vehicles. Small Co-operation and integration between the two landing craft usually support amphibious opera- corps have developed to such an extent since tions. In mountainous terrain, the group operates 1972 that organisation, equipment and training on foot or on skis and snow-shoes. [n peacetime, are basically identical. two ACGs are operational; in wartime, a third would be mobilised. 8.15. During times of conflict or war, the United Kingdom-Netherlands landing force (roughly a 8.19. Within the United Kingdom-Netherlands brigade-size unit) is under the command of the landing force, the RNLMC elements are: l5 DOCUMENT I I83

(a) the first amphibious combat group, " sister corps " and this is a model of its kind trained for operations in mountainous which fully satisfies the suggestions in the and Arctic regions; motion for a recommendation proposed by a number of colleagues in the Assembly (see (b) the Whiskey Company from 45 Com- Appendix). This is an excellent means of mando (the 'cold weather com- improving alliance relationships in an eminently pany parachute-capable; "), small but practical way. (c) the special boat , trained in (v) amphibious reconnaissance and under- Amphibious shipping issue water demolition in Arctic waters in 8.24. The 1972 memorandum of understanding winter; agreed that the United Kingdom would provide shipping for the United Kingdom-Netherlands (d) the landing detachment, trained craft landing force. The replacement of the two British to support amphibious operations with helicopter carriers HMS Hermes and HMS their assault landing craft. - Bulwark - by the Invincible-class ASW carriers may have produced, in theory, greater lift for (iii) Equipment amphibious forces. However, these ships are 8.20. Equipment policy focuses on improving unlikely to do more in a time of tension than quickly land a revert standardisation and interoperability. Whenever force and then to their main possible, the RNLMC procures British Royal ASW r6le. This would leave the landing force coast-bound means redeploy by Marines equipment, but some equipment differ- without the to sea. Britain's assault ences do remain. For example, the RNLMC is In addition, Great ships - HMS Fearless HMS Intrepid are ageing equipped with the Dragon anti-tank system, the and - and need drastic updating, if not replacement, in Stinger anti-air missile, the 120 mm mortar and the FN-762 mm rifle, but the British Royal the 1990s. Marines use the Milan anti-tank system, the 8.25. Feasibility studies concerning extending Javelin air defence missile, the 105 mm light gun the service life of the two ships, as against con- and the new SAR-80 5.56 mm . The structing a new design ship, are under-way and mountain and Arctic equipment (e.g. windproof parallel studies il's sanmining helicopter lift and and wetproof clothing, cookers, tents), most the aviation support ship concepts. Amphibious radio equipment" Arctic rations and over-snow ships require extensive command, control and vehicles, howeveE are identical. communication facilities to co-ordinate the air and surface aspects of this specialised type of perennial problem 8.21. Although the alliance of warfare. Consequently, they are too valuable to standardisation/interoperability is solved to a carry the bulk of war supplies. Merchant ships partner's large extent by simply adopting one's taken up from trade (STUFT) are more suitable equipment, occasional hiccups remain and one for this purpose (although with obvious draw- such concerns the vital area of communications, backs when it comes to a beach landing). They so important for command and control, as men- are hired in peacetime and would be comman- tioned earlier. The Dutch were careful to adopt deered in wartime. Within the United Kingdom- the British'Clansman " radio system some time Netherlands landing force, one-third of the ago, and may have difficulty in procuring its suc- amphibious task force are ships taken up from cessor 'Ptarmigan " as quickly as they might trade. wish: your Rapporteur hopes that a satisfactory arrangement will be forthcoming which will 8.26. Amphibious shipping is a matter of great permit the excellent co-operation of past years to concern in both Britain and the Netherlands at continue as effectively in the future... present. The Dutch navy has developed a concept for a landing-ship dock (LSD)-type ship. (iv) Training This new ship would be able to transport an ACG for longer periods at sea and would have 8.22. The assumption that a unit able to operate docking and flight deck capabilities. As with under the physical and mental demands of Arctic plans for replacing British LPDs and in addition conditions in northern Norway could operate in commissioning two aviation-support ships 2, any other part of the world proved to be true in nothing yet appears to have been decided. 1982, during the Falklands conflict. Mountain- and Arctic-trained each RNLMC units deploy (d) autumn to northern Scotland for mountain and The Franco-German brigadc cold-/wet-weather operations. In winter, they 8.27. The creation of the Franco-German deploy for three months to northern Norway for brigade should be seen in the context of Arctic operations and ski-training. enhanced co-operation between the two coun- 8.23. There is an arrangement by which Dutch and British Royal Marines and United States 2. See "Naval aviation", Document 1139, gth May 1988, Marines are able to serve in postings to their Rapporteuc Mr. Wilkinson. t6 DOCUMENT II83 tries in security and defence matters. The brigade and logistic co-operation and interoperability in will be stationed in the B6blingen area south of the Centre Europe sector and principles appli- Stuttgart. The first general to command this cable to the training of formations composed of regular army brigade is French and his successors units of different nationalities. [t will also be will be German and French in turn. His second- given specific tasks including operations in the in-command, presently a German officer, will joint defence context (in the area of NATO's also alternate German/French every two years. Central Army Group and Iandsouth). 8.28. The brigade will be configured to conduct 8.31 At present, the headquarters element is in combined operations and therefore includes place in Bdblingen and consists of only 50 infantry, artillery, armoured and engineering officers and men. Their task is to work out the units. Its 4 200 soldiers will be stationed in the various 6sdalities of making a political gesture following garrisons: into military reality. Discipline, working rou- tines, pay and allowances, uniform, etc., have to joint - brigade headquarters in BobLingen be compatible equipment also, beginning with jointheadquartenicompany as from October 1989 - the different types of radio systems in service in - German infantry battalion the French and German armies. H RSlf"dE[*, ,r* 8.32 The particular advantage of this political French reconnaissance in B6blingen - gesture is that is having practical military con- squadron as from October 1990 it sequences and may succeed in making progress - French infantry regiment in areas where the NATO Standardisation Com- ;1 B;#tffiHfB8, mittee has had only meagre results. The idea of - French light armoured in Donaueschingen forming similarly bilateral brigades has also been regiment as from October 1990 formulated by a number of other countries, and - German engineer companv the various stages of the Franco-German expe- lt B3#"oTfl,Hf%r, rience (brigade constituted by October 1990, first - French logistic company in Donaueschingen manoeuwes at the beginning of l99l) will be ofthejoint logistic battalion as from October 1989 watched with great interest. - German artillery battalion ;x HS;| el#S, (e) Tlu NATO aiftorac early-waning force - joint logistic battalion in Stetten (except one French logistic as from October 1989 8.33 In the early 1970s, studies directed by company) NATO's major military commanders showed - Germananti-tankcompany that an airborne early-warning (AEW) radar lt itll.6.ro*, ,r,, system would significantly enhance the alliance's - French trainine unit air defence capability. In December 1978, the lt iTffro.ro*, ,r, Defence Planning Committee signed a memo- 8.29 France will deploy two further regiments randum of understanding to buy and operate a in the Federal Republic so as to set up this NATO-owned AEW system. By this decision the brigade. Because of the timescale, a regiment of member nations embarked on NATO's largest the French forces in Germany will be placed commonly-funded acquisition programme. under the authority of the brigade. As from 1991, 8.34 The force was established in January 1980 a French regiment will be transferred from and granted full NATO command headquarters France to a garrison in the south-west of the status by NATO's Defence Planning Committee Federal Republic. With the transfer of these two on lTth October 1980. Force Command Head- regiments, the brigade will receive additional quarters is collocated with Supreme Head- conventional combat forces for joint defence quarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) in purposes. (These two regiments will be seconded Mons, Belgium. While the force supports all from the force d'action rapide.) three major NATO commands Allied (ACLANT), Atlied 8.30 The German units in the brigade will be Command Atlantic Europe (ACE) and Allied Command mainly in Bdblingen as they come from Command stationed (ACCHAN) the 55 Territorial Brigade, which would have Channel - SHAPE exercises admin- been disbanded under the Federal Republic's istrative control of the force. * Army 2000 " plan. (The territorial brigades 8.35 The NATO E-3A component of the were set up originally to guard key points and, as command includes 18 Boeing NATO E-3A air- such, are part ofthe very few forces the Federal craft. In addition, the British Govemment is Republic does not commit to NATO.) In acquiring seven Boeing E-3D Sentry Mk I. The peacetime, the brigade's training prog;ramme will will form a second component be drawn up by the Franco-German military in the early 90s which \{,ill be manned by British co-operation group and the general commanding Royal Air Force personnel. The NATO E-3A the brigade will be in charge of implementation. squadrons are manned by integrated interna- The brigade, an experimental formation, will tional crews from 1l nations (Belgium, Canada, study and test options for tactical, operational Denmark, Germany, , , the Nether- t7 DOCUMENT I 183

lands, Norway, Portugal, and the United air surveillance, it provides economical commu- States). Some 2 500 military and civilian per- nications support for air operations, including sonnel are now serving with the force. The E-3As counter-air, close air support, rescue, reconnais- have been operating from the main operating sance and as well as surveillance and base (MOB) at Geilenkirchen, Germany, since control. Aircrews can exchange information with February 1982. Forward Operating Bases (FOBs) ground- and sea-based commanders, since the are located at Trapani, Italy; Preveza, Greece; E-3A uses maritime mode radar to detect and Konya, Turkey, and a forward operating location monitor enemy shipping. (FOL) at Oerland, Norway. When the unit 8.40. The AEW radar is able to 'look down' becomes operational, the main operating base (MOB) and separate moving targets from the stationary for the British component will be RAF ground clutter that confuses other radars. It adds Waddington in Lincolnshire, United Kingdom. the ability to detect and track enemy aircraft 8.36 France is also buyrng four of its own operating at low altitudes over all terrain, and to AWACS and already has a liaison officer at identifr and give directions to friendly aircraft Geilenkirchen who has flown numerous mis- operat'ng in the same area. In addition, its sions with the integrated crews. It is understood, mobility allows it to be deployed rapidly where it however, that the first French t€ams are to be is most needed, and makes it far less vulnerable trained in the United States which seems an to attack than ground-based radar. u'rnecessary step, especially as they will then have to be cross-trained for the European theatre IX. Conclusion where they will operate. Much better that both aircraft and crews should take part from the start 9.1. The committee's principal conclusions are in the alliance air defence system (as France has set forth in the draft recommendations which done hitherto in the ground-based system). For- reflect the chanFng political, defence and eco- tunately, there are signs that such a step may be nomic scene against which decisions are taken by being considered at the highest level (the member governments. This report has as its title French Minister of Defence, Mr. Jean-Pierre 'State of European security intervention Chevdnement, speaking in Paris recently has forces and reinforcement for the centre and the stated: north ", and it is obvious that the centre-north of o France, which any event intends to the European NATO area still occupies the in place planning retain freedom decision, not important in alliance discerned its of does previous belong to the integrated militaly structures by rapporteurs of the Committee on Defence and does not intend to return to them, Questions and Armaments. What is changing however, although it wishes to improve co-oper- is the emphasis now on ation with its allies, for instance regard co-operation, not only in the realm of arma- in (where to surveillance of airspace.'). ments some 53 current projects involve three or more allied nations), but more especially 8.37. Given the success of the tri-nation (United in terms of people: men and women working Kingdom, Federal Republic of Germany and together, between nations, to ensure a joint Italy) Tornado training unit at RAF Cottesmore defence in the most cost-effective way. in the United Kingdom, and the four-nation The process should encouraged (Federal Republic of Germany, Netherlands, 9.2. be and amplified. This is the type of practical initiative Denmark and Canada) Lynx helicopter simu- which the WEU Council might initiate an lator training establishment in the Netherlands, a in attempt to improve at least one aspect the similar joint training initiative where AWACS is * of European pillar's " efficiency and effectiveness concerned would be a positive step. in contributing to the alliance as a whole. As a 8.38. Italy is reported to be considering start, the now-regular meetings of deputy chiefs investing also in AWACS and, should this be the of defence staffs should examine the recommen- case, the AEW force in Europe will be second- dations on the exchange of armed forces per- to-none in its potential, not only for standard sonnel between the national units of the indi- radar surveillance, but also as an alliance contri- vidual member nations (see Appendix) and bution towards successful confidence-building report to the Council on the ways and means for methods (even some aspects of verification could implementation, as well as proposing the various be covered by the system). steps necesmry and a timescale to suit. 8.39. When operating at an altitude of 30 000 9.3. In parallel, those member nations which feet (9 000 metres) a single aircraft can continu- still use a system of national service should look ously scan more than 312 000 square km at the practicalities of doing such 'national (194000 square miles) of Earth's surface. Oper- service' in another member country, or at least ating well within western airspace, such aircraft a proportion ofthat service, to inculcate a sense will provide early warning about low-flyrng of European co-operation and responsibility in intruders into the NATO are4 as well as high- the defence field amongst those young people on altitude coverage extending deep into Warsaw whom the future of our continent will soon Pact territory. While the force's principal r6le is depend. r8 APPENDIX DOCUMENT I183

APPENDIX

Exchange of arned forces personnel baween the national units oI the individual member nations

MOTION FOR A RECOMMENDATION

tabled by Dr. Hitschler and others under Rule 28 of the Rulcs of Procedare (7th December 1988, Document 1171)

The Assembly,

(t) Believing that additional measures must be adopted to promote partnership relations between the individual member nations of WEU;

(it) Expressing its satisfaction at the creation of a joint Franco-German brigade which was initiated by the formal decision on 13th November 1987 (formalised by an exchange of letters, dated,22td January 1988) by the heads of government of the two nations; (iit) Regretting the absence of similar arangements on the same scale between the other member nations; (iv) Asking for efforts to be undertaken aiming at enhancing co-operation between the units of the other member nations, in order to strengthen and consolidate partnership relations, in particular to improve mutual understanding through daily co-operation and the dismantling of language barriers, in order to thus achieve an intermeshing of forces not only through liaison officers,

Rrcorrtpmvos rHAT rng CouNclI-

Take the initiative for the creation of exchange opportunities beyond the framework of integrated headquarters and other available opportunities, in order for a great number of officers, non- commissioned officers and other ranks to have the chance of doing duty for a limils6 period of their service in units of allied armed forces. Signed: Hitschler, Pfuhl, Unland, Martino, Steiner, Kittelmann, Milller, Niegel, Klejdzinski, Pack, Seitlinger, Scheer, Reddemann.

L9 IMPBIMERJE O ALENCONNAISE Rue Edouard-Belin: 2e trimestre 1989 No d'ordre: I1034

PRJNTED IN FRANCE