Key Elements of the Bundeswehr of the Future Content
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Key Elements of the Bundeswehr of the Future Content I. The security environment 7 II. Demands on the Bundeswehr 10 III. Key elements 15 1. Armed forces planning and capabilities 15 2. Further development of the armed forces’ command and control organisation 19 3. Operational and materiel readiness of the armed forces 27 4. Procurement and in-service support 29 5. Federal defence administration 32 6. Federal Ministry of Defence 35 7. Strategic capacity 37 8. Planning law and funding 39 IV. Next steps 40 Imprint 42 CONTENT 3 The government policy statement of 23 July 2019 identified three priorities of work for the Bundeswehr. First: increase public awareness of the Bundeswehr; second: increase operational and materiel readiness; third: better combine tasks and responsibilities. Specific measures that have since been taken include: free rail travel in uniform, public pledge ceremonies, implementation of initial measures by the procurement organisation working group and the readiness initiative. Our position paper of 9 February 2021 identified the need for change beyond that – the need for thorough adjustments in the Bundeswehr, the defence administration and the Federal Ministry of Defence (FMoD). Annegret Kramp-Karrenbauer As a next step, this document details the need for action and presents the proposals we have developed Federal Minister of Defence on this basis. We offer options for the prompt implementation of those proposals and develop prospects for setting the long-term course in the armed forces, the administration, with regard to procurement and in-service support, and in the Federal Ministry of Defence. The path we have now embarked on has been discussed for quite some time. Numerous internal and external analyses have examined the subject to a sufficient degree. We must now turn those insights into action. These key elements will initiate the necessary steps and concepts. All measures are supported by the FMoD executive group as well as military commanders. The measures we have taken have one common goal: to make the Bundeswehr fit for the future. They intentionally do not resemble previous large Bundeswehr reforms, however. Such disruptive reorgani- sations will not be necessary in the next four to five years. In addition, the steps presented here will not require any additional personnel augmentation. They can all be accomplished within the scope of existing personnel structures. The two official seats of the Federal Ministry of Defence, in Bonn and in Berlin, have served us well, especially during the pandemic. Digital technology and flexible working mean that issues regarding location have become less urgent than they might have been in the past. For this reason, we do not believe there is any need for change in this regard. Within the scope of these key elements, we are assuming the executive responsibility assigned to us Eberhard Zorn and are simultaneously striving to make a contribution to the decisions coming up in the next legisla- Chief of Defence Wilke Photos: Bundeswehr/Sebastian tive period. 4 5 I. THE SECURITY ENVIRONMENT Structural changes in international security nuclear deterrence with respect to security in policy are progressing at rapid speeds. The Europe – and the importance of nuclear sharing combination of emerging powers, revolutionary for Germany along with it. There is relatively technologies, revived ideologies, demographics, little understanding of the rapid development of pandemics and climate change creates a global weapon technologies that permanently change situation that puts German security and defence conflicts and complicate arms control, for policy under considerable pressure to adapt. instance with hypersonic missiles, the militari- Photo: Bundeswehr/Marco Dorow Photo: Bundeswehr/Marco Since 1955, the Federal Republic of Germany sation of outer space and highly complex drone has also been making an important military operations. contribution to ensuring freedom and peace in China’s ambitious and increasingly aggressive Europe. To ensure that this will remain possible power politics, whose objectives include re- in the future, we must make fundamental deci- shaping the rules-based order and interna- sions today. As a tool of national public services tional law, could also become a risk for Ger- and one of the federal government’s foreign many’s globalised economy and is currently policy instruments, the Bundeswehr must not attracting more attention than it used to. The only have modern equipment and display an resulting security risks for our country, however, extraordinary degree of operational and mate- still appear to be too intangible for most. riel readiness. It must also be run efficiently and At the same time, the rules-based multila- dynamically. Funding must be predictable in teral order, whose benchmark is respect for the long term and in line with the more intense human rights, democracy, and the rule of law, threat situation as well as the significantly is increasingly coming under pressure within increased need for the ability to act indepen- the scope of this more intense risk and threat dently in the field of security policy. environment. China, Iran, Russia, and North The public, however, has not yet fully grasped Korea are not the only ones openly defining the changes in the security situation and the themselves as a counter-model to a liberal related need for new political approaches. social order. Other actors are following suit Most people remain unaware of the countless and feel both emboldened and encouraged. cyber attacks on servers, networks and control The increase in non-state actors that violently systems that are directed against Germany, our pursue their own or other power interests, institutions, businesses and citizens every day. overtly or covertly, is consistent with this trend. Too little is known about the massive Russian These developments and a number of others are rearmament happening only a few hundred challenging Germany and Europe, not only politi- kilometres from Germany’s borders. The public cally and economically, but also and especially massively underestimates the significance of with respect to security and defence policy. For 6 THE SECURITY ENVIRONMENT THE SECURITY ENVIRONMENT 7 one thing, the “hard” risks for European secu- such as those regarding the project on modern rity have changed and intensified significantly. leadership development and civic education For another, Europe’s main ally, the United (“Innere Führung – heute”) and the procure- States of America, is increasingly pivoting away ment organisation. They also include numer- from Europe. For this reason, Europeans must ous ideas on reforming command and control become more ready to defend themselves and organisation, for instance from the study phase increase their ability to take military action, of the National General/Admiral Staff Officer both in their own interest and as a partner in Course at the Bundeswehr Command and Staff the Atlantic security space. College and from generals and admirals. Sugges- Based on its geographic location at the heart tions by the chiefs of the services regarding the of Europe, its economic performance and the adjustment of command and control structures fundamental connection between German and as well as analyses by the directors of higher European security, our country has a particular federal authorities and directors-general at the obligation. Germany’s diplomatic and mili- Federal Ministry of Defence were also evalu- tary capabilities are an essential contribution ated. Lastly, considerations by political repre- to empowering a free, independent and safe sentatives and the parliament, as well as parties Europe. In detail, this means: Demands on and parliamentary groups, and insights gained the Bundeswehr will increase – in the short, during discussions with military personnel of medium and long term. This applies to the all ranks within the scope of troop visits were German armed forces’ core mission, protecting taken into account. Germany and German citizens as well as Ger- Our own findings are consistent with external many’s allies, but also to the equally important ones: We need stronger strategic management, task of making a contribution to international more streamlined processes and a focus on the crisis management. essential aspects. We must streamline our struc- To make sure that Germany remains a powerful tures, remedy top-heaviness and confusion over and competitive player in security policy as well responsibilities, and once again create oper- as a reliable partner and ally, the Bundeswehr ationally ready, larger formations. We will only must be even more rigorously geared toward improve our operational and materiel readiness the changed and concentrated requirements if we focus on our core mission and consistently with respect to capabilities, organisation and adapt accordingly. Thiel Photo: Bundeswehr/Christian operational and materiel readiness. To this end, Lessons learned during the COVID-19 pan- a great deal of research within the FMoD’s area demic also confirm this. Our military personnel of responsibility, but also outside of the Bun- have displayed great motivation and outstand- deswehr, has yielded analyses and comprehen- ing accomplishments. At the same time, we sive insights. have realised once more that there is room for A number of study results and recommen- improvement with regard to coordination and dations for reform were taken into account. command and control. They include suggestions from