Conditions of Military Multinationality the Multinational Corps Northeast in Szczecin

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SOZIALWISSENSCHAFTLICHES INSTITUT DER BUNDESWEHR

Band FORUM International Cahier 24 Volume

Sven Bernhard Gareis Ulrich vom Hagen Sozialwissenschaftliches Institut der Bundeswehr

Per Bach Torben Andreasen Ivan Doulgerof Institut for Miltœrpsykologi, Forsvarsakademiet

Adam Kolodziejczyk Mariusz Wachowicz Wojskowe Biuro Badan Socjologicznych

Conditions of Military Multinationality The Multinational Corps Northeast in Szczecin

Report of the Trinational Research Team

Strausberg Copenhagen Warsaw July 2003 Opinions expressed are solely those of the authors.

Die Verantwortung für den Inhalt liegt bei den Autoren.

Copyright by Sozialwissenschaftliches SOWI 2003 Institut der Bundeswehr All rights reserved Prötzeler Chaussee 20 Alle Rechte vorbehalten 15344 Strausberg ISSN 0177-7599 Tel.: 03341/58-1801 English Lector: Lindsay Cohn Fax: 03341/58-1802 Printed by: www.sowi-bundeswehr.de Wehrbereichsverwaltung Ost Contents

Preface 7

1 The Multinational Corps Northeast as a Research 9 Subject

1.1 The Background of the Establishment of the Corps 10 and the Motives of the Participating Nations

1.2 Organisational Principles and Structure of the 15 MNC NE

1.3 Tasks of the Multinational Corps Northeast 22

2 Research on Military Multinationality 25

2.1 Military Co-operation 25

2.2 Horizontal Multinational Co-operation 26

2.3 Integrated Military Multinationality 28

2.3.1 The German-French Brigade 29

2.3.2 The German-Netherlands Corps 31

2.4 Current Research Situation 35

3 The MNC NE Project: Research Design, 37 Hypotheses and Guiding Questions

3.1 Research Design 39

3.2 The Composition of the Tri-national Research Team 43

3.3 Methods and Instruments 45

5 3.4 Hypotheses and Guiding Questions 51

4 Findings and Results 57

4.1 Purposes and Tasks 58

4.2 National conditions 69

4.3 Intercultural conditions 75

4.4 Leadership 87

4.5 Communication and Co-operation 102

4.6 Cohesion and Organisational Commitment 117

4.7 Social Structure of the HQ and Social Life in the 136 Szczecin Garrison

5 Conclusions and Recommendations 147

6 Literature and Documents 151

Appendices 161

6 Preface

NATO’s Command and Headquarters organization was always char- acterized by the integrated cooperation between soldiers from all countries of the Alliance. Compared with this principle most multinational structures on the level of military units have developed in Europe only since the 1990s. But within about one decade military multinationality became one of the most important strategies for European states to match new military tasks and requirements while simultaneously reducing the size of their forces.

Furthermore, in the process of NATO-enlargement as well as in the framework of various international peace support missions the particular significance of military multinationality became evident for the growing integration of old, new and future allies. Today multinational military bodies and units are an important symbol for an unifying Europe.

Whilst the creation of multinational structures developed dynamically during the 1990s, research on this issue is still at the beginning. In the field of military sociology and psychology there have been some studies on precise definition of all forms of multinational cooperation. Other projects focused on mutual perceptions of soldiers working in multinational units thus providing a valuable basis for further research.

Our study on the Multinational Corps Northeast (MNC NE) in Szcze- cin/Poland takes a more comprehensive approach: For the first time the complex interaction between Danes, Germans and Poles within a common Headquarters was analyzed under consideration of all relevant internal and external framework conditions. As a result some theoretical and practical consequences and recommendations for the further development of military multinationality could be deduced.

This survey was made possible because we succeeded to establish an international and interdisciplinary research team comprising members of the Institute for Military Psychology (Denmark), the Bundeswehr Institute of Social Sciences (Germany) and the Military Office for

7 Sociological Research (Poland). Together with the MNC NE we created and maintained a stable cooperation during a research period of nearly two years.

Although our study opens a comprehensive view on our object by using a variety of methods and approaches it is still an explorative one. Military multinationality as a research field is still in need of theoretical and empirical development. So our report wants to encourage follow-up research and at the same time to show the chances and challenges for the organization of multinational surveys.

Sven Bernhard Gareis Strausberg Ulrich vom Hagen Per Bach Copenhagen Torben Andreasen Ivan Doulgerof Adam Kolodziejczyk Warsaw Mariusz Wachowicz

8 1 The Multinational Corps Northeast as a Research Subject

On September 18, 1999, the Multinational Corps Northeast (MNC NE) – which is maintained in common by Denmark, Germany and Poland – was officially commissioned by Poland’s president Aleksander Kwasniewski, at its headquarters’ location in Szczecin in the Northwest of Poland. The formation of this tri-national corps continued a trend: since the early 1990s, the land forces of numerous European NATO member states have been following the example of their Navies and Air Forces, which had already been partially bound into multinational command and mission structures for decades. De- spite the significant force reductions after the Cold War in Europe, the states of the Alliance and the Western European Union (WEU) perceived an increasing need to create major multinational units consisting of national contingents in order to maintain operational command levels below the integrated NATO command structure. This ‘internationalisation of military life’1 soon extended to such organisational structures as brigades, divisions and Army corps, which had until then been preponderantly purely national domains (some exceptions being e. g. the Danish-German Corps LANDJUT, the German-French Brigade or the German-French initiative which led to the Eurocorps in 1994). The precipitous rise of peace support operations in the 1990s – sometimes including up to thirty different states and conducted under various auspices (e. g. UN, NATO, WEU, ad hoc coalitions) – has underlined the challenge that these multinational arrangements face: not only do they have to maintain structures and headquarters, they must also prove their effectiveness under operating mission conditions. For Europeans at least, multinationality in military missions has become the norm.

The Bundeswehr, along with Danish and other armed forces had already anticipated this development by establishing multinational peacetime structures.2 Within ‘old NATO’, the pacemakers of multinationality were Belgium, Denmark, Germany and the Netherlands. While the smaller states – particularly with their Army forces – assigned large units to the command of only one major multinational –––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 1 Klein/Kümmel 2000: 311. 2 See Bundesministerium der Verteidigung 1999: 24. 9 unit3, by 1999 the German Army forces were, with the exception of two divisions, totally integrated into a whole series of bi-national or multinational corps. The establishment of further multinational corps headquarters – including integrating with a completely new partner like Poland – can thus be considered a logical consequence of the general trend. Nevertheless, the Multinational Corps Northeast in Szczecin, with regard to the background of its establishment, its current tasks, and its future role and functions, has been characterised thus far by a series of particularities which may gain importance as military integration within Europe and the Alliance progresses.

As we discuss below, these particularities make the MNC NE – quite apart from its military functions – a political symbol of the progress- ing integration process in Europe. This double role certainly creates additional challenges for the soldiers and civilian employees of the Corps, compared with what they would face within a purely national duty routine. The question which will be in focus here – especially considering NATO’s latest enlargement round – is whether and under what conditions the principle of deepened integration used in the MNC NE would be fit to serve as a kind of blueprint for future multinational military formations. Considering the many different military identities, traditions, styles of leadership, and training levels that can be expected to come together in such mixed units, multinational structures are likely to form an increasing focus for future military- related social research.

1.1 The Background of the Establishment of the Corps and the Mo- tives of the Participating Nations

Formally and organisationally, the Multinational Corps Northeast emerged from NATO CORPS LANDJUT in Rendsburg/Schleswig- Holstein (Germany). This organisation, maintained in common by Denmark and Germany, no longer had a place in the new command structure of the Alliance (adopted in 1997) and, consequently, was disbanded. It is not the case, however, that the establishment of the –––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 3 Belgium in the Eurocorps, Denmark in NATO headquarters LANDJUT, the Netherlands in the 1st GE/NL Corps. 10 MNC NE is simply a façade for the continuation or resumption of a military unit under another label. From the very beginning, it was hoped by the participating states that this new Corps, far beyond its military-functional tasks and intended use, would contribute to the integration process with new partners in Eastern Central Europe. With its double role as military headquarters and a political symbol, this unit may be compared with the Eurocorps, which was also created in part in an attempt to encourage European integration.4

The establishment of the MNC NE would not have been conceivable without the intensive political and military co-operation that developed first between Germany and Poland and later by including Den- mark. The origins of this co-operation go back to 1990, when Ger- many and Poland established a new era in their relationship. The political-idealistic framework was built on the shared ideals of a re- unified Germany and a democratic Poland, and was focussed on driv- ing the European integration process forward. Two treaties, on the common borderline5 and on good neighbourly relations and friendly co-operation,6 formed the legal foundation for the political and societal work between the two countries. Very soon a comprehensive bilateral approach of co-operation covered numerous fields and tasks of social, economic, cultural and political nature, and a whole series of new instruments and fora were created to deal with these issues.7

From the very beginning, security- and military co-operation had received particular attention within the wide spectrum of common activities. Poland vigorously strove to exchange its long-time position as an ‘inter-European buffer zone’8 for one fully integrated into the –––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 4 Willmann 1994: 57. 5 See Gesetz zu dem Vertrag vom 14. November 1990 zwischen der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und der Republik Polen über die Bestätigung der zwischen ihnen bestehenden Grenze. Bundesgesetzblatt, Jahrgang 1991, Teil II, 1328–1330. 6 See: Gesetz zu dem Vertrag vom 17. Juni 1991 zwischen der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und der Republik Polen über gute Nachbarschaft und freundschaftliche Beziehungen. Bun- desgesetzblatt, Jahrgang 1991, Teil II, 14–1325. 7 Thus, still in 1991 the German-Polish Youth Work was founded and regulations were adopted on regional and border area co-operation. The Europe University Viadrina in Frank- furt/Oder started lectures in 1992/93. Four Euro-Regions were established along the rivers Oder and Neisse. As for the development of German-Polish relations in the 1990s, see Bin- gen/Malinowski 2000; Eberwein/Krenski 2001. 8 Royen 1996: 37–40. 11 Western European and particularly transatlantic structures. Germany, on the other hand, wanting to transform itself from ‘Cold War front- line state’ into the bridge of Europe,9 was keenly interested in a stable and integrated Poland. Germany was one of the first partners ap- proached by Poland in the hopes of securing advice and support, and this not only for geographical reasons. Germany had the experience of its own integration into NATO, and the German armed forces, due to their orientation on the model of Staatsbürger in Uniform (‘citizen in uniform’), corresponded well with the intentions of the democratic government in Poland. Consequently, questions of roles and functions of armed forces, their relations with state and society, and the shaping of their inner structure were in the foreground during a first phase10 of bilateral military co-operation. As with co-operation in other fields, great emphasis was laid on extensive interaction between soldiers of the two countries, covering all ranks, arms and specialisations. A central aim of the common co-operation programs was to allow German and Polish soldiers to become acquainted with one another.

The next phase of German-Polish military co-operation – beginning around 1994 – was characterised by two processes: bilateral contacts became more and more characterised by the transition to a focus on clarifying everyday duty routines, such as logistical procedures, mission, and assignment principles for specific arms and services, and on the shape of military training. Regular meetings and discussions took place between the defence ministers of both countries, as well as the Polish Chief of General Staff and the Inspector General of the Bunde- swehr and their staffs. Both sides worked constructively at shaping the increasingly differentiated fields of co-operation, as well as at developing both the quantity and quality of co-operative work. Consistent with the common European-transatlantic orientation of both countries, this phase also saw the enlargement of the co-operative relations with France (within the so-called ‘Weimar Triangle’, from 1993/94 on), within the program ‘Partnership for Peace (PfP)’ (from 1994 on), and with Denmark (from 1995 on). This multilateral co-operation has been aimed at bringing the Polish armed forces up to NATO standards, and

–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 9 See Gareis 1996: 37–40; Feldmann/Gareis 1998; Feldmann/Gareis 1999. 10 For details regarding the development of German-Polish military co-operation, see Gareis 2001/02. 12 at establishing interoperability for NATO and Polish forces in light of the discussion on opening NATO for new member states11. Poland has always headed the list of promising NATO candidates, and she used the past several years of bilateral and multilateral co-operation for intensive preparation for the expected NATO membership. Poland engaged herself within the PfP as well as in bilateral and trilateral exercises with Germany, Denmark, and France ‘in the spirit of PfP’.

This dynamically developing trilateral co-operation entered a third phase beginning in 1997 with NATO’s decision on the Madrid summit to admit Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary. German-Polish relations now saw more concrete preparations for the formal alliance, such as NATO Preparation Courses and an intensified personnel exchange. In the course of admitting new members, the Alliance also adjusted its command structure, making the German-Danish command obsolete. Given this development, in August 1997 the defence ministers of Germany, Denmark and Poland agreed to form, immediately after Poland’s accession to NATO, a Multinational Corps Northeast, modelled on the German-Danish command and with Headquarters in Szczecin. A Tri-national Working Group constituted in 1998 was charged to elucidate all the structural, training-related, financial and particularly legal questions concerning the Corps’s formation and its dislocation to Szczecin, and to prepare the corresponding agreement between the participating governments: the Corps Convention. At the same time (starting in 1998), Polish soldiers were being trained on the job with the still-existing staff of HQ LANDJUT. Even before Poland joined NATO, on March 12, 1999, a tri-national formation and preparation staff had been constituted and tasked to create – by early Sep- tember 1999 – all the prerequisites for lodging all the elements of the Corps Headquarters in the Baltic Barracks in Szczecin. Since that time, the Headquarters MNC NE has exemplified the results of co- operation and integration between old and new NATO partners.12

–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 11 Gareis 2000. 12 The Italian-Slovenian-Hungarian Brigade should also be mentioned in this context. It was formed by the participating states with similar intentions to those of the founders of MNC NE, and also constituted an alliance-overlapping integration (at least until Slovenia joins NATO, presumably in 2004). See Gasperini/Arnejcic/Ujj 2001. 13 The military and security co-operation between first Germany and Poland, then together with Denmark, was indisputably orientated towards the process of European integration. This did not mean, however, that either the fact of co-operation or the formation of a multinational headquarters was not influenced by practical interests and motives, although these naturally differed from country to country.

In Denmark, there was a pronounced interest to maintain participation in an operative Headquarters on the corps level. Formally, the Subor- dinate Command in LANDJUT had functioned for decades as an integrated NATO Headquarters; in fact, however, it had been for years merely a German-Danish corps staff with a British presence. Had LANDJUT been abolished without any substitute, the Danish Army forces would have been deprived of the opportunity to assign and to train their officers on the important operative level between division and Joint Headquarters – and such a loss could not be in the interest of the Danish Armed Forces.

As for Poland, the Corps constituted both a political symbol and a platform for training up to NATO standards. The stationing of a multilateral headquarters in Szczecin was a significant illustration of Po- land’s affiliation with the Alliance. In a certain sense, it brought a piece of NATO into the country – even though the Corps, as a tri- national creation, has never been an official institution of the Allian- ce.13 But above all, Poland hoped for decisive impulses for the transformation of its armed forces and an accelerated achievement of NATO compatibility. Currently, the MNC NE constitutes the only headquarters where Polish military personnel can train to NATO standards and procedures in their own country, together with other NATO members.

Practically since their inception in the 1950s, Germany’s Air Force and Navy had been integrated into international units. By the 1990s, Germany was also working to integrate her land forces into manifold multilateral arrangements on all command levels, beginning with the –––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 13 The Polish emphasise, however, the association between the Corps and NATO, for example by placing the Corps logo on the front page of the Information Booklet before the background of a NATO wind rose. In the perception and in the language used by the Szczecin public, the MNC NE is firmly established as ‘Corpus NATO’. 14 brigade.14 Germany was thus somewhat less dependent than the other two partners on the practical military aspects of the new corps. How- ever, it is still difficult to determine whether a desire for integration was the dominant concern in Germany’s decision to participate. At any rate, Germany was interested in having a further multinational headquarters that, as Planning Headquarters, would prepare mission scenarios and possibly, in the foreseeable future, also be ready to act as Mission Headquarters. Compared with the other two participating nations, Germany set significantly greater store by the headquarters’ practical strategic usefulness, and less in its function as a training institution.

1.2 Organisational Principles and Structure of the MNC NE

A further characteristic feature of the MNC NE which underscores the integration aspect is the particularly rapid push to establish the headquarters on the territory of a very recent NATO member. All the other major multinational units or headquarters established up to this date could rely upon established co-operation between the participating states, sometimes for periods already spanning decades, as well as a tight network of all-NATO Standardisation Agreements. In the case of the HQ MNC NE, two ‘older’ NATO members had to take a ‘fresh’ one under their wing. It is thus the more remarkable that the three nations determined from the very beginning to apply a much more demanding structural principle of military multinationality than was strictly necessary, namely the principle of ‘deepened integration’.

Fundamentally, four patterns of military multinationality within NATO can be distinguished, according to the durability and intensity of the ties binding the participating military units. • The pattern of permanent or temporary employment is the oldest form of multinational co-operation within NATO. It has been used in the permanent naval task forces and in NATO integrated air defence.

–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 14 See Millotat 1999; Bundesministerium der Verteidigung 2000: particularly 10–13. 15 • The Lead Nation principle designates one nation for the command of a multinational unit, this nation occupying all headquarters billets with only a few exceptions. Thus, all essential staff work, logistics, etc. remain in the hands of one nation. The other participating member states assign their contingents on the basis of operational employment. This principle is used for example in the German-American Corps in Ulm and the American-German Corps in Heidelberg. • In the Framework principle, one nation is in charge, bearing the responsibility of the headquarters’ command, administration and infrastructure/logistics. Nevertheless, the other participating nations also occupy a series of central billets, following a previously agreed-upon ratio formula. They assign troops on the basis of operational employment. The ACE Rapid Reaction Corps in Mönchengladbach works according to the Framework principle. • Finally, on the principle of deepened integration, the number and importance of positions are shared according to the tasks and contributions of the participating nations. Command and other key positions are rotated among the participating states. Troops are designated even in peacetime. Legal responsibility and troop subordination relations, however, stay on the national level. Apart form the MNC NE, e. g. the Eurocorps in Strasbourg, the 1st German-Netherlands Corps in Munster, and the German- French Brigade in Müllheim follow the principle of deepened integration.15

Increased integration in headquarters, staff organisations, and military units is more demanding for the soldiers and civilian employees than purely national contexts are, since mastering the regulations and/or standard procedures of one’s own billet includes taking the characteristics and particularities of servicemembers of other armed forces into consideration. While technical equipment, regulations, and organisational framework are relatively easy to standardise, the establishment of a common conception of terms, working results, and time-frames will depend largely upon mutual understanding and predictability. Deepened integration, in short, constitutes the most demanding form –––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 15 See Lang 2001; Bundesministerium der Verteidigung 2000. 16 of multinational co-operation among both NATO and European allies. There has even been some thought given to a principle of billet- distribution based on the qualifications of individual soldiers rather than national quotas; where there would in fact be no national aspect at all to the framework, but such notions are far from the point of practical implementation.16 Such a level of integration would require not only prior legal framework agreements, but also a far-reaching congruency with regard to military self-perceptions and day-to-day organisation which certainly does not yet exist.

In the integrated headquarters of the MNC NE, as far as the assignment of personnel and financial and material resources are concerned, the three nations are in principle contributing to and sharing equally the functional requirements of the headquarters.

The formation of the MNC NE, its legal status, political and military co-ordination, structure, and mission are essentially stipulated in the three founding documents, namely the Corps Convention, the Agree- ment Concerning Operation of the MNC NE, and the Corps Directive. The Corps Convention, signed on September 5, 1998, by the Defence ministers of the participating states, constituted a Treaty under international law submitted to ratification by the national parliaments. The Agreement Concerning Operation, on the other hand, signed on the day of the Corps’s entry into service, constituted an agreement between the respective Defence Ministries, concretising each national contribution, the mission principles, and the logistical and organisational conditions. The Corps Directive, agreed between the three Chiefs of the Army Staffs (respectively the Army Commanders), de- fines further specifications, from the definition of responsibilities up to the clarification of specific terms. The Standing Operational Proce- dures (SOPs) had been worked out after the formation of the Corps, as a supplement to the set of tri-national agreements, and serving also as a basis for controlling the internal course of duty within the MNC NE.

–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 16 See Prüfert 2002: 257. 17 Article 4, para. 1 of the Corps Convention lists the core elements constituting the Corps: • Multinational Headquarters (HQ MNC NE) serving as corps staff, comprising a multinational communication and information centre as well as a Polish HQ company; • a multinational command support brigade (in peacetime, this unit participates only as a nucleus in the G6 section of headquarters); • the national contributions and contingents (on the basis of other agreements or even case by case. This applies to both troop and material contributions).

Furthermore, the Corps is supported by an Air Operation Co- ordination Centre (AOCC) and a Maritime Liaison Cell (MLC) (para. 2). Unlike the AOCC, which is permanently integrated into the work of HQ MNC NE, the MLC will be established on an ad hoc basis when the mission order of the Corps requires co-operation with naval forces. For those issues remaining on the national level, such as personnel management and administrative affairs, the states establish National Support Elements outside the headquarters structure (para. 3). The other twenty-one Articles of the Convention stipulate all the legal and political questions, from the abode status of the personnel and their families through tax regulations up to data protection and confidentiality.

The organisational structure of the HQ MNC NE’s peacetime establishment (see figure 1.2.1) is comparable to other corps staffs and headquarters within NATO.

18 Figure 1.2.1: Structure of the HQ MNC NE

The Corps is led by the Command Group, comprised of the Com- mander (COM), the Deputy Commander (DCOM), and the Chief of Staff (COS), along with legal advisors and further support elements. Below this level, there are six divisions subdivided into branches. The AOCC stands on the division level. The Polish HQ company is responsible both for providing soldiers for duty with support services as well as fulfilling frame functions such as guard duty and maintenance of the premises. A total of about 130 soldiers and 25 – mostly Polish – civilian employees work in the peacetime Corps. By calling-in the Emergency Establishment Supplement (EES), mostly consisting of planned reservists, in the case of a need for operational employment, the Corps can nearly triple its payroll (up to 390 personnel).

The principle of deepened integration on which HQ MNC NE is based aims at as much equality as possible among participating states with regard to their rights and duties in the common headquarters. This principle is very evident in the personnel appointments throughout all functional levels, as well as in the common working language used. • Rotation of functions within the Command Group: The three command positions of the HQ rotate among the three nations following an agreed schedule. After a Danish Commander, a Polish Deputy Commander, and a German Chief of Staff, the first rota- 19 tion in 2001 led to Poland providing the COM, Germany the DCOM, and Denmark the COS. Beginning in 2004, a German Three-Star General will head the Corps (see table 1.2.1). • Fixed nation-wise assignment of heads of division: The divisions are each headed by an Assistant Chief of Staff (ACOS) with the rank of colonel. Denmark currently heads G1 (Personnel, Social Affairs, Public Relations, Protocol) and G5 (Operation Planning, Civilian-military Co-operation, Budget), Germany heads G3 (Mission Conduct, Exercises, Combat Support) and G6 (Communication, Information Systems, Staff Duty), and Po- land heads G2 (Reconnaissance, Military Security, Military Geog- raphy, Electronic Warfare) and G4 (Logistics, Medical Services) (see figure 1.2.1). • Mixture through the divisions: The heading of branches within the divisions is also regulated by a pre-determined national ratio formula, while, as a matter of principle, the Branch Chiefs come from another nation than the corresponding ACOS (with the exceptions given by each branch in the divisions G3 and G6). The branches in their turn are made up by co-workers from all three states (see figure 1.2.1). • Article 5 of the Corps Convention designated English as the official working language for MNC NE, thus underlining the orientation of the headquarters on NATO practice. More than that, however, an official working language that is not the native language of any of the participating nations – given the common symbolic as well as practical challenges involved – can have integrative functions and effects, even though there are significant differences in the language skills among HQ members.

Table 1.2.1: Functional Rotation within the Command Group Deputy Com- Commander Chief of Staff mander 1999–2001 Denmark Poland Germany 2001–2004 Poland Germany Denmark 2004–2007 Germany Denmark Poland

20 Moreover, one ACOS per nation is charged with the position of Senior National Officer (SNO), with responsibility for all national questions such as personnel and discipline affairs, administration, social affairs, etc. The National Support Elements, settled outside of the HQ structure, are available to the SNOs to support him in these tasks.

In peacetime, HQ MNC NE has no troops at its disposal and functions primarily as a planning headquarters to which, in the case that an operational deployment becomes imminent, the forces necessary to mission fulfilment can be assigned. Each participating nation, however, assigned one Army division to MNC NE (Agreement Article 4, para. 1) for defensive operations according to Article 5 of the NATO Treaty. They also share responsibilities with regard to the units possibly to be assigned as Corps Troops. Each participating country has also assigned one signal battalion to the existing core of a command support brigade within the G6 division (see figure 1.2.2).

Figure 1.2.2: MNC NE and its assigned units

XXX

MNC NE

XX XX XX X

D (DA) 14 (GE) 12 (PL) (MN) CORPS TROOPS CASE BY CASE

EW (DA) DA (DA) (DA)

EW PSYOPS I (GE) (GE) (GE) (GE)

(PL) (PL) (PL) 1 Arty Bn / 6 Arty Bde Engr Bn / 2 Engr Bde Brdg Bn / 9 Bridge Reg

21 1.3 Tasks of the Multinational Corps Northeast

The Corps Convention also stipulated the role and function of the Multinational Corps Northeast and its position within NATO defence and mission planning. Article 3, para. 1 of the Convention determines the three fundamental tasks of the MNC NE: • Preparation and execution of collective defence operations according to Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty. • Participation, with the HQ, in multinational operations of crisis management, including peace support operations under the guidance of the UN, NATO, or other regional agreements, either as Land Component Command in the context of a Combined Joint Task Force, or as an independent Force Command. The troops necessary to the fulfilment of these tasks will be assigned or at- tached to the Corps for these purposes. • Preparation, with the HQ, for humanitarian and rescue missions, including natural disaster relief, and execution of corresponding missions upon demand.

Article 3, para. 2 states that the MNC NE is assigned to NATO, and is subordinated to Headquarters Baltic Approaches/Joint Headquarters Northeast in Karup/Denmark for education and training purposes. Other alignments and arrangements are possible on the basis of ad hoc decisions. This means that the Corps does not belong to NATO’s command structure. Its command and control is incumbent upon the three participating nations, which have in turn transferred this task to a Corps Committee (CC) composed of representatives of the Army commands, respectively by the Chief(s) of Defence.

22 Figure 1.3.1: Subordination of MNC NE

Corps Committee Joint HQ Northeast

XXX Multinational Corps Northeast

On top of a rather ambitious schedule and a dense agenda of training and exercises, the Corps also had to prepare for a swift proof of its capacity in its main tasks, not to mention the adjustment to new conditions and co-workers. Scarcely one year after its entry into service, in the context of the large-scale exercise Crystal Eagle (Autumn 2000), MNC NE was subjected to a NATO standard- according examination of mission readiness for Article 5 operations (collective defence). By Spring of 2002, in the course of the exercise Strong Resolve, the Corps had to prove its capabilities as a Land Component Command within a large crisis reaction operation under the command of NATO headquarters COMSTRIKFLANT (an operative command in the Atlantic). The mid-term goal of the MNC NE is to reach its Full Operational Capability (FOC) as a Low Readiness Forces Headquarters according to NATO demands.

Compared to the two main operative military tasks of Article 5 and crisis management operations, the capability of executing rescue missions and in particular disaster relief did not show many effects on the HQ work. The lack of legal regulations regarding border-crossing for soldiers executing military aid missions in emergency cases is still a limiting factor. The emphasis on disaster relief was of course mainly a result of the river Odra flood disaster in the summer of 1997.

23 Reliable and effective co-operation among HQ MNC NE personnel remains difficult because of the high level of integration and therefore interaction required. Poland not having been a NATO member before, the Polish soldiers and civilian employees could hardly be expected to have mastered NATO standards already at the moment of the Corps’ entry into service. This situation resulted in the necessity for an active effort to integrate the Polish corps personnel into the working procedures and to support them in mastering NATO procedures.17 Due to the fact that it is typical for military personnel to rotate billets regularly, one positive effect to expect is that the experience and knowledge the soldiers and officers gain in HQ MNC NE will benefit the entire Polish Army in its transformation process, when HQ soldiers return to a purely national context after their tour of duty. Thus, the HQ has been functioning as a de facto training place for Polish officers and NCOs, even though this task – so important for NATO compatibility of the Polish armed forces – was not been stipulated in any of the official documents concerning the MNC NE.

–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 17 See Forsvarsministeriet 1999, chapter 3. 24 2 Research on Military Multinationality

Academic research activities dealing with military multinationality have been taking place only since the 1990s. Before this time, the phenomenon had been dealt with mainly from the security-political perspective. The Bundeswehr Institute of Social Sciences Research (SOWI), in co-operation with some European partner institutes in France and the Netherlands, laid the foundations for sociological research on this field by taking essential steps in the direction of examining the phenomenon of ‘military multinationality’. This tradition is being continued at the SOWI, and at the same time is being further developed and conceptualised in the major project on the MNC NE together with partners from Denmark and Poland.

2.1 Military Co-operation

The general phenomenon of military co-operation has a long history, at least among western armed forces. Within NATO, multinationality in a broader sense has always been an element of an integrated and commonly-budgeted military structure, without being explicitly named as such. In general, the more technical or juridical literature and approaches of social engineering differentiate among four levels of standardisation that constitute the means to obtain military co- operation and integration: compatibility (capacity of undisturbed interaction), interoperability (capacity of complementary co-operation), functional interchangeability of military equipment and personnel, and equalisation of equipment and training. Not only are arms and equipment involved here, but the degree of communication between the soldiers of several armed forces is particularly important.18 Lang19 points out the hampering effects that differing military structures, traditions, leadership philosophies, and juridical contexts can have on co-operation.

The use of the term multinationality in a military context was until the end of the East-West-conflict limited to units built up in peacetime on –––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 18 Hahn 1997: 341. 19 Lang 2000a: 5; 2000b: 36; 2001a: 42; 2001b: 757. 25 the basis of bilateral or multilateral agreements, ones which also stipulated the question of financing. A problem with this rather technical use of the term multinationality seems to consist not only in the fact that the level at which it was to be implemented remained vague (i. e. whether it was pertinent to political/strategic, operational, or tactical commands, or to the differentiation between the structures of command and armed forces), but also in that that doubts remained as to whether this term described structures built up in peacetime or whether it described rather arrangements for a particular mission.20 It seems useful to differentiate between the general phenomenon of multinational co-operation between armed forces and the specific concept of military multinationality.

2.2 Horizontal Multinational Co-operation

This form of military co-operation between nations – one which could be described as horizontal in nature – can mainly be found in military alliances or in UN peacekeeping missions. It differs qualitatively from vertical military multinationality (see 2.3), because it is in general simply a conglomerate of units from various nations on an ad-hoc or at least on a non-permanent basis. Within these additive combinations of military units,21 direct contacts between the soldiers from the participating nations occur regularly only at the level of headquarters and liaison cells. In general, the enlisted ranks of the participating nations remain separate. Interaction with soldiers from other nations is limited, if it happens at all. National distinctiveness and forms of organisation are retained.

Especially since World War II, this sort of co-operation is mainly to be found within military alliances. According to Klein and Kümmel22 this more general form of multinationality can be understood as a result of the Cold War and of Globalisation. The internationalisation of the military is reflected in official documents and statements, such as the London Declaration of NATO’s heads of states and governments,

–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 20 Siedschlag 1999: 815f. 21 Keller 2000. 22 Klein/Kümmel 2000: 313. 26 and the North Atlantic Council, which decided at the summit in July 1990 in London that NATO would depend increasingly on multinational forces.23 Furthermore, the NATO Handbook states that “multinational forces demonstrate the Alliance’s resolve to maintain a credible collective defence; enhance Alliance cohesion; reinforce the transatlantic partnership and strengthen the European pillar”.24

With the end of the East-West-conflict, international peacekeeping missions have become more and more significant for UN member states. UN multinational co-operation of armed forces has been the focus especially of US researchers. In 1995, David Segal called attention to the fact that, while the UN undertook 35 peacekeeping missions between 1946 and 1994, more than 40 per cent of those began in 1991 or later.25 Elron et al.26 state that, up to 1997, more than 80 per cent of all peacekeeping operations were conducted by at least 10 different countries, and in some cases more than 40 countries. Evetts27 points out that these multinational missions also present operational difficulties, and the need is to professionalise such missions. She argues that this means increased training and socialisation to produce mutual trust between soldiers, as well as appropriate behaviours and self-representations among soldiers from different nations.

Horizontal multinational co-operation knows particular models of arrangements between armed forces from different nations: The lead- nation-model, as represented in e. g. the bi-national German-American and American-German Corps, respects the national domains of the lead-nation. Neither personnel nor national ways of military thinking are mixed. The Allied Command Europe Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC) and the tri-national Italian-Slovenian-Hungarian Brigade (Multinational Land Force; MLF) represent another model, where one nation is responsible for the overall framework of the multinational formation and is therefore in charge of most organisational responsibilities. This framework-model implies that there will be no permanent deployment of forces outside their usual national assignments. Inte- –––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 23 NATO 1990; Weiser 1992: 61. 24 NATO 1995: 247. 25 Segal 1995: 73. 26 Elron et al. 1999: 76f. 27 Evetts 2002. 27 gration is achieved only to a certain extent through the assignment of additional personnel from the partner countries to the headquarters of the multinational unit.

In the case of the MLF, Italy as the dominating country provides the Commander and most of the facilities for the Brigade Headquarters.28 In peacetime, the MLF consists of a tri-national headquarters only. The designated national units are assigned to their command, but the authority over them is only transferred in the case of missions to be carried out by the MLF. The respondents of a research survey in the MLF demanded the formulation of a permanent and standardised cultural, evaluative, and organisational pattern in order to solve the in- evitable problems of a multinational unit of this kind. 29 Research on this less thorough-going type of multinational military co-operation is necessarily restricted to more abstract issues: since there is very little interaction between soldiers from different nations, academic questions at the individual- or small group-sociological level must be neglected.

2.3 Integrated Military Multinationality

The ambitious and sometimes difficult vertical military multinationality has been developing in Europe since the end of the East-West conflict. The characteristic difference to multinational co-operation between armed forces is the fact of deep interpenetration at multiple levels. In the sense of equal participation, only vertical military multinationality achieves the political aim of deep integration. Therefore this form of military co-operation shall be referred to as military multinationality.

Integrated multinational formations such as the German-French Bri- gade, the 1 (German-Netherlands) Corps, and the MNC NE also stand under a common supreme command in peacetime. This set-up has obviously troubling implications for the notion of national sovereignty, one of whose clearest expressions is found in a nationally con- –––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 28 Gasperini/Arnejcic/Ujj 2001: 81. 29 Gasperini/Arnejcic/Ujj 2001: 202f. 28 trolled armed forces, since troops of one nation are directly com- manded by agents of another nation.

Having said this, it should also be kept in mind that within each of these deeply integrated multinational units, such as the German- French Brigade and the German-Netherlands Corps, the mixed units represent a minority of the personnel. However, the daily problems of lived multinationality have to be managed, since the participating armed forces exhibit some structural and cultural differences which create unavoidable problems. They have e. g. different national concepts of strategic culture,30 different organisational cultures,31 different conceptions of military traditions, different understandings of key military terms, and different concepts of leadership.32

2.3.1 The German-French Brigade

The political decision in 1987 to establish a bi-national brigade came as more or less a surprise to the military leadership of France and Germany. The military value of such a formation was questioned from the moment of its inception. As Bahu remarked in 1990 for the French side, the bi-national brigade resembled more a laboratory, where the defence co-operation of future was to be tested.33 In 1998, General Beck stated that the German-French Brigade was a kind of prototype for the testing of common processes and the co-ordination of daily routines of the troops from two different armies.34 Concerning the question of different concepts of leadership and self-understanding, Beck (1998: 49) was quite sceptical whether the German concept of ‘Innere Führung’, heavily based on democratic values, and the strongly hierarchical and patriarchal leadership style of the French Army could work together. Beck concluded that German and French soldiers in this Brigade live next to each other, but not with one another (Beck 1998: 51).

–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 30 See Longhurst 2000. 31 Hagen et al. 2003. 32 Klein/Lippert 1991: 6; Keller 2000. 33 Bahu 1990: 40. 34 Beck 1998: 48. 29 In 1991, the Bundeswehr Institute for Social Science Research (SOWI), the Observatoire Social de la Défence, and the Centre de Sociologie de la Défence Nationale conducted the first-ever research study on a permanent multinational formation (Klein and Lippert 1991; Klein 1993). In the quantitative survey conducted at the end of 1991 in the German-French Brigade, 823 German and 1320 French soldiers were asked whether in general the Brigade is ‘a good thing, that should be kept like this’, whether it is ‘a good thing, that still needs a lot of changes’, or whether ‘the Brigade should be dissolved, because it will never become something good’.

An overwhelming majority of the soldiers serving in the German- French Brigade regarded their bi-national formation as a ‘good thing,’35 but only one third of the respondents agreed with the statement that the Brigade is ‘a good thing, that should be kept like this’. Therefore Klein36 concludes that the soldiers’ view of the brigade was rather sober than euphoric.

The interviewees had quite concrete ideas with regard to what they considered necessary changes. German rank and file and NCOs saw a possibility of developing mutual understanding in intensive language training for all soldiers, in more common sports events, and in increasing common training activities in garrison. As for their French comrades, a standardisation of legal regulations, more common exercises and manoeuvres, and the establishment of more common Ger- man-French garrisons were the primary suggestions. Contrary to the Germans, a majority of the French also supported a common uniform as well as the elimination of single-nation companies. The German and French officers showed preferences similar to those of their subordinates. They pleaded in general for more common factors in the training as well as its standardisation.37

–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 35 Klein 1993: 10f. 36 Klein 1993: 10. 37 Klein 1993: 11. 30 2.3.2 The German-Netherlands Corps

With the entry into service of the German-Netherlands Corps (1 GNC) in August 1995, the Royal Dutch Military Academy together with the Bundeswehr Institute of Social Science (SOWI) started a project on the new Corps. The project’s aim was to monitor the sociological development of deepened military multinationality in Europe, and particularly to address the question, to what extent the personal contact with people from another nation would contribute to changing perceptions of that nation and its citizens. For this purpose, quantitative surveys were conducted in 1995, 1997, and 2000, covering the complete headquarters and some of the troops. This was particularly un- usual, since until that point there had been no other multinational military formation with such a high degree of integration.

The 1 GNC goes so far as to use an integrated command system, one which consists of a commander from one nation and a deputy commander from the other, who, for a period of three years, are in charge of all German and Dutch members of the Corps Headquarters. The HQ is manned bi-nationally on the basis of parity. This specific concept of ‘deepened integration’ was established in the 1 GNC to provide for effective bi-national management of tasks.

Central findings of this survey are that there is a general mutual sympathy to be found among German and Dutch soldiers, but whereas the German soldiers have shown a consistently high level of sympathy for their Dutch counterparts, the Dutch level of sympathy started out relatively low and has only caught up gradually.38 In 1995, nearly half of respondents found it pleasant or very pleasant to find themselves in a common duty routine with Germans/Dutch soldiers. In 1997, this value remained constant across the total of interviewees, with a slight decrease on the Dutch side. In 2000, the ratio increased. A correlation analysis for 2000 showed that there is a positive correlation between the frequency of contacts and the mutual sympathy evaluation. A subdivision in rank categories showed that, for both sides, the degree of approval is the highest among the officers, followed by the NCOs, with the rank and file at the bottom end of the scale. Except for the –––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 38 Hagen et al. 2003. 31 Dutch rank and file cluster, a clear majority of all the soldiers evaluated the co-operation within the Corps as good or very good.

Nearly the whole Dutch Army has been assigned to the 1 GNC, whereas only a part of the much larger German Army is represented there. Therefore the question of equal rights of both partners can be considered as very important. A strong majority of Dutch respondents gave an affirmative answer to the question of whether Germans and Dutch are partners in the Corps with equal rights and obligations.

A high number – about two-thirds – of the respondents agreed with the statement that their duty in the 1 GNC had weakened prejudices regarding the other nation concerned. Agreement was particularly high on the Dutch side: only one quarter stated no change at all, while just three per cent (of both sides) reported that their prejudices had been confirmed.

A narrow majority of German soldiers indicated that the tone in the Dutch armed forces was more loose and friendly than in the Bunde- swehr. By the same token, a large and significant majority of the Dutch respondents expressed the opinion that the tone prevailing in the Bundeswehr was rougher and more rigorous than in their own armed forces. There was nearly no difference in opinion based on whether or not the individual soldier had experience in co-operation with soldiers from the other nation. As for language issues, one third of the German respondents in the HQ claimed to have basic knowledge of the Dutch language, while half of then had no knowledge at all. On the other hand, half of the Dutch HQ respondents indicated good knowledge of German, one third evaluated themselves as advanced learners, and the rest as beginners. None of the Dutch admitted having no knowledge of the German language at all. Two thirds of German and three quarters of Dutch soldiers declared their intention either to start learning the other language concerned or to improve their knowledge.

With regard to trust in the comrades from the other nation, the answers were quite clear: on the question whether one could trust, in case of emergency, in the help of soldiers from the other nation con-

32 cerned, more than 95 per cent of the respondents from both nations chose the ‘surely’ or ‘in all probability’ options. Mutual trust was particularly pronounced among the Dutch officers. Dutch rank and file, however, expressed a distrust of the German partner which, compared to the other rank categories, was extraordinary high.

Of the 111139 respondents of the 2000 survey, 184 (17 %) had experience with co-operation between German and Dutch soldiers in out-of- area missions. A majority of the German and of the Dutch soldiers evaluated their experience as positive or very positive, with only a minority of respondents evaluating it as negative or very negative.

On a constant level, a high congruency for two out of four of the Hofstede-dimensions used for measuring cultural attitudes could be discovered in the HQ of the 1 GNC. In looking at the first model, which could be called after Soeters & Recht40 the professionalism model, the Dutch soldiers reflect a mixed type characterised by high scores for the dimension Individuality41 and low ones for the Mascu- linity42 dimension. The German soldiers, on the other hand, exhibited the contrary mixed type, showing lower Individualism scores and higher ones for Masculinity. Viewed in the frame of the professionalism model, the different results with regard to these two dimensions document a difference in the manner of how German and Dutch soldiers and civilian employees think of the role of the human being within organisations.43

According to Hofstede, the values that are represented by the dimensions of the co-ordination model (power distance44 and uncertainty

–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 39 Full survey of mixed HQ in Münster and Eibergen; survey in representatively chosen troop battalions of 1 GNC. 40 Soeters/Recht 1998: 175. 41 Individualism vs. Collectivism: Dimension revealing whether life orientation aims at performance, own initiative, leisure times or focuses on working ambience, further training and duty for the sake of a community. 42 Masculinity vs. Feminity: This dimension indicates whether decisive or modest attitudes are desirable. Masculinity characterises a society clearly determining the traditional gender roles of ‘masculine’ strength and ‚‘feminine’ sensibility. 43 Hofstede 1997: 140. 44 Power distance: The measure of perception and acceptance of unequal power distribution in organisations and the society. 33 avoidance45) influence our thinking of organisations.46 Soeters & Recht47 called the latter two dimensions the bureaucracy dimensions, but co-ordination model seems to be the more adequate term. The study conducted by Hagen et al. (2003) leads to the conclusion that Dutch and German soldiers do indeed have in common those cultural norms and values which are responsible for understanding how rules, processes, and structures of decision-finding need to be shaped in order to reach the designated aims. Thus, the armed forces of Ger- many and the Netherlands, represented here by the members of HQ of 1 GNC, constitute a military organisational culture that can be characterised by the network type – although the fact that armed forces in general show a strong tendency towards bureaucratisation must also be taken into account.

The network type is, according to Hagen et al. (2003), to be distinguished from the bureaucracy type only by means of its horizontal organisation, its emphasis on function and communication, and its open-mindedness towards processes of change. Since networks are considered to be the appropriate type of organisation when the goal is to achieve new aims by means of co-operation, these findings support the presumption of a successful German-Netherlands co-operation in the organisational field of military multinationality.

It is thus recommended by Hagen et al. (2003) to maintain the policy of deepened integration and even, if possible, to develop it further. In particular, those soldiers experiencing a great deal of contact with comrades from the other state concerned drew an image that was characterised by motivation, trust, and understanding. This contributes unambiguously to the strengthening of working relations, and thus to success. Furthermore, Hagen et al. regard the establishment of mixed barracks to be worth consideration. The examination of organisational culture, however, did reveal that, in spite of all the common perceptions and ideas of how to structure an organisation and how to keep it running (network type), there are nevertheless differences with regard –––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 45 Uncertainty avoidance vs. ambiguity tolerance: Measure of to what extent uncertain, ambiguous situations are perceived as a threat and the attempt is taken to prevent them by means of formal regulations. 46 Hofstede 1997: 140. 47 Soeters/Recht 1998: 177. 34 to perceptions of the role of the individual within the organisation (occupational orientation). These different attitudes are shown in the opinions expressed by Dutch soldiers – that the armed forces of the Netherlands have for a long time been living the concept of an ‘ethical component of leadership’ as a matter of course. They claim that this goes beyond what exists in Germany under the moniker of Innere Führung. Both the Dutch and the German concepts represent ethical levels for reflection on the service in the armed forces, and therefore these two armed forces have – compared to most other militaries in the world – more uniting them than separating them.

2.4 Current Research Situation

While the initial quantitative survey in the French-German Brigade covered a whole military unit, the research project dealing with 1 GNC focused increasingly on the processes in the HQ, although it did maintain a quantitative approach. Purely descriptive studies were replaced by the examination of specific hypotheses. Theoretical constructs delivered clues for aspects of organisational sociology. How- ever, military-related social research can – and has to – go one step further by appropriately using the whole canon of empirical methods and, if possible, consciously working on an interdisciplinary level. This is particularly advisable when focusing on the specific interactions and processes within a multinational HQ. Such an approach makes it possible to mine the large-scale experience of several disciplines and thus to win new insights from the technical and methodical differences.

Because of the more explorative and general character of research on military multinationality up to the end of the 1990s, much of the con- ceptual work remains to be done. While case studies on military multinationality will to some extent still have explorative character, they will need to become less descriptive and more concept- or theory- driven. On the micro–level, ideas and concepts on intercultural co- operation have already begun to be incorporated into academic research on military multinationality. It is also evident that organisational theory and institutional approaches will become more and more

35 relevant. On the macro-level, approaches of trans-nationalisation within the broader framework of European integration will have to be considered.

36 3 The MNC NE Project: Research Design, Hypotheses and Guiding Questions

As a glance at the research status regarding military multinationality already shows, most of the previous projects focussed essentially on attitudes and mutual perceptions of soldiers from different nations, and to a certain extent on technical-organisational questions and challenges in nationally mixed formations. The processes of communication and interaction between the members of a multinational military formation, however, had yet to be subject to any deeper multi- methodological and interdisciplinary analysis. On the one hand, this circumstance is certainly due to the fact that there was such a small number of multinational units based on principles of deep integration and therefore very few cases of intensive interaction to be studied. On the other hand, it certainly makes sense to study the general and basic frame conditions first before examining the concrete action level of a corps staff or headquarters.

Access to this level of analysis is especially important because the inter-personnel processes affect the quality of co-operation among the multinational headquarters’ members, which in turn influences the efficiency of mission accomplishment in both the daily routine and during missions. Certainly, interaction between the members of such a headquarters is always regulated by a formal standing operating procedure. Social organisations, however, show the characteristic par- ticularity – contrary to technical systems – that these structures do not remain static, guaranteeing again and again the same proceedings and results according to determined parameters. The structures of social organisations rather form channels for processes of communication and interaction, on the shape of which the participating actors have great influence, despite whatever formal hierarchy may exist. The efficiency of organisational structures as well as the effectiveness in achieving given aims and purposes therefore depend decisively on its members and the quality of their interaction. The question implicated here thus leads to the nucleus of the principle of military multinationality: what are the social conditions under which multinational headquarters, staffs, or units can be built up and managed efficiently, what are the professional, cultural, and structural requirements to be taken

37 into consideration, and what measures can be taken on the national level to optimise the training and preparation of participating soldiers and civilian employees?

It is to be expected that the build-up of a common European armed forces as well as further rounds of NATO enlargement will lead to a massive increase in the importance of multinational staffs and units. This fact, already foreseeable in the immediate post-Cold War period, led the Bundeswehr Institute of Social Science Research (SOWI) to reflect on how it might supplement those surveys concerning military multinationality which were either underway or just concluded. It was decided to conduct a case study examining the Multinational Corps Northeast (MNC NE) in Szczecin. A 1999 project draft proposed to start the study simultaneously with the corps’s entry into service, and to distribute a survey aimed at dealing with the development of interaction and communication between Danish, German and Polish corps members.48 Unfortunately, other priorities in the institute’s research planning prevented the project from beginning as planned in Septem- ber of 1999, and it was not until a year later that research and survey work actually got underway. The SOWI initiative to conduct a sociological survey at the MNC NE was met with a remarkable amount of interest at the Bundeswehr Army Staff branch dealing with multinational links, as well as in the MNC NE itself. Once affirmation from the tri-national Corps Committee was received in February 2001 and formal orders were given the following month by the Federal Ministry of Defence, the project could be started. This was certainly not the way the study had been conceptualised, as taking place in the entry phase of the corps, but it did nevertheless find the corps in an interesting phase of its development. The survey period 2001/02 saw elements of consolidation and change. By the beginning of the inquiry phase, the HQ MNC NE member could look back at nearly two years of common work in the daily duty routine and in exercises, but also at the first regular turnover within the Command Group.49 Furthermore, the first personnel changes at the regular working level were also expected. Together with a series of important exercises and examina-

–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 48 See SOWI 1999. 49 This change took place in the spring of 2001, since the three-year tours of duty of the Danish Commander and the German Chief of Staff had begun at LANDJUT in 1998. 38 tions, this situation of personnel turnover presented real challenges for the MNC NE members in the area of efficient interaction and co- operation. Naturally, the research project was conducted in a period of development and change and this report reflects only the situation of the MNC NE during the period covered by the survey.

3.1 Research Design

As already explained in chapter 1, the MNC NE is for a number of reasons unique with respect to other EU and NATO multinational military formations. Particularly remarkable was the choice of a deeply integrative basic headquarters structure. This choice was made despite awareness of the existence of a multitude of asymmetries between Danes and Germans on the one side and Poles on the other with regard to training, as well as material, financial, and not least social conditions. After all, the studies discussed in chapter 2 dealing with the German-French Brigade50 and the German-Netherlands Corps51 showed that realisation of the integration principle is a quite ambitious affair even for long-time NATO partners. Due to military, national, or cultural particularities and differences, the maintenance of professional military standards becomes more difficult than might at first be expected.

Given this background, the immediate practical interest in a study on interaction and co-operation in the HQ MNC NE is three-fold, namely • to examine the interaction of Danish, German, and Polish soldiers in the HQ MNC NE before the background of their respective military cultures, • to analyse the conditions of multinational military integration, • to identify the causes of possible structural deficits and disturbances with effects on the unit’s mission accomplishment.

–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 50 See Klein 1990; 1993. 51 See Hagen/Klein/Moelker/Soeters 2003. 39 The findings thus gained should flow into recommendations aiming on the one hand at optimising multinational co-operation in that particular HQ, and on the other at an appropriate adjustment of training and personnel selection at the national level.

Beyond the purely practical interests, the MNC NE represents an ex- emplary case for academic purposes; one which opens up a view of the possibilities and opportunities, but also of the limits of the development of transnational military orientations, cultures, and identities. This prospect goes farther than simply preparing the members of national armed forces for specific assignments in a multinational surrounding. It is a matter of basic changes of soldierly self-perception when military service is perhaps no longer justified primarily by clearly national tasks (home defence, pursuit of national interests) but rather by abstract objectives on the international scale (regional or global stability, order, human rights). Such reflections are all the more important since the trend towards military multinationality both inside and outside the transatlantic Alliance brings with it military missions which are not in the interest of only one state, but in the collective interest either of the world community or of regional organisations. It is likely that the trend will also lead to an abandoning of the current practice of combining national contingents to form multinational units in favour of fully integrated European armed forces. Indeed, the MNC NE is in a sense a precursor of this development, in both its current composition and task description as well as its role in the integration of new political partners.52 Given this context, the development of a transnational organisational culture at the MNC NE constitutes a further essential question to be dealt with in the framework of this study.

The basic hypothesis of the study is that the HQ MNC NE constitutes a complex social organisation whose elements are the soldiers and employees assigned there. These can be classified into three subsets according to their military-cultural dispositions and identities. It is –––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 52 E. g. on the occasion of the third anniversary of the corps, on September 18, 2002, Lithua- nia, Latvia and Estonia opened liaison offices at the MNC NE. After these states enter NATO (planned for May 2004), these liaison offices will be developed for integrated participation in the MNC NE. 40 presumed here that the influence of these national styles and habits will remain significant beyond other possible cleavages within the organisations (rank, age, function etc.), and possibly even overshadow the formal organisational structures of the HQ. The nearly total lack of research on the influences of personal dispositions on interaction in multinational military institutions, combined with the rapid quantitative increase in such interactions, indicate the appropriateness of a research orientation towards the phenomenon of Lebenswelt (the total sphere of life and experiences).53 The approach of this study therefore tries to reconstruct, essentially from the personal testimony of HQ members, the nature of interactions in the HQ, the factors influencing these interactions, and the possible effects of the character of interactions on the unit’s efficiency. Figure 3.1.1 represents the basic scheme of the survey.

Figure 3.1.1: First Schema of the Research Design

Political- Military Social Framework Life

National Trans- Military national Efficiency Cultures Interaction

Equipment etc.

–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 53 For term and contents of sphere of life/Lebenswelt, see Schütz/Luckmann 1975. 41 As the schema in Fig. 3.1.1 shows, the procedure – in spite of its focus on subjective interpretational patterns of the MNC NE members – is not unstructured. The initial ideas of how to structure the research were based upon document analyses, experiences from other recent studies, and a whole series of exploratory interviews with senior military and civilians associated with the corps. Some possible influencing factors were isolated, such as military-cultural differences, possibly differing perceptions of the corps’s purpose and function, national stereotypes (i. e. perceptions of the other), and the corporate identity of the MNC NE.54 The process was, however, left open for the generation of new questions and hypotheses as new information was collected. During this phase, two further essential conditions for the success and usefulness of the project were added to the research orientation on fields of experience. These were: • Thorough study of the complex interaction in the HQ required co- operation among Danish, German, and Polish academics in a tri- national research team. This co-operation was indispensable not only for practical purposes of access to national resources, but also for research-methodological reasons. For instance, particular difficulties in the attempt to verbalise perceptions and attitudes in qualitative interviews in a foreign language. The same applies to the evaluation of survey data, which must of course take cultural context into consideration. • The sphere-of-life orientation of the study also led to the decision for a more open, qualitative methodological orientation, which aims at gaining a greater depth and density of information than do quantitative measures. Besides their function in gathering data for immediate analysis, the findings of the qualitative procedures should also be used for the elaboration of a questionnaire for a quantitative inquiry, since quantitative procedures are still dominant in military-related sociological and psychological research.

Once the co-operation of their Danish and Polish counterparts was won, the SOWI transferred its initiative over to the tri-national research team. Decisions on the procedures to be used, and the con-

–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 54 See the draft project outline (SOWI 2001). 42 struction/elaboration of the instruments were integral parts of the common proceeding.

3.2 The Composition of the Tri-national Research Team

Even before the tri-national team effort was officially proposed, it became clear that both the Poles and the Danes not only accepted the methodological and practical reasons for creating such an entity, but positively expected to participate in the spirit of rendering a national contribution to the MNC NE’s functioning. The Danish Senior Na- tional Officer’s support of the action facilitated the rapid identification of the Copenhagen-resident Institut for Miltœrpsykologi (Institute for Military Psychology [IMP]) as a potential co-operation partner. The SOWI had already had experience cooperating with the Wojskowe Biuro Badan Socjologicznych (Military Bureau for Sociological Re- search [WBBS]),55 so access to this institution presented no obstacle. It took only one bilateral working meeting with each institution to reach co-operation agreements on the research project NMC NE.

Without this co-operative basis and the collective knowledge it brought to the project, it is safe to assume that the fact-finding phase would have been considerably protracted. Thus it is also appropriate to mention that this co-operation was made possible in large part by the support that both institutes received from their Chiefs or Ministries of Defence, which enabled them to make available the personnel and material resources required for a two-years research process.

At the first tri-lateral working conference in Szczecin, in July 2001, each country was represented by three researchers (this number dwin- dled to seven in the course of the project). The Danish IMP, apart from its delegate, brought into the team two independent psycholo- gists who as reserve officers had manifold experience of multinational military formations. On behalf of the Polish WBBS, two officers of the scientific branch with a background in sociology participated, and SOWI sent one political scientist and one sociologist.

–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 55 In projects such as ‘Security Nation Partnership’ (Spangenberg/Klein 1998). 43 In addition to different nationalities represented, the research team also covered a large spectrum of disciplines and (given the research focuses of the participating researchers) even sub-disciplines. Consid- ering the complexity of the research subject, this was an obvious strong point of the team, since it allowed a very differentiated and multi-faceted analysis of interaction in the HQ. This advantage, however, could be achieved only at the price of long and intensive adjustment processes within the research team itself. In addition to the language challenges (English as working language), there were problems of technical jargon and differing research traditions of the participating institutes, which had strong effects on such decisions as which research procedures to employ and how to formulate questions or hypotheses. Perhaps humorously, significant similarities between the interaction conditions within the team and those of its research subject MNC NE became obvious. There were repeated irritations about the presumed or real (national) interests at work in the project, its purpose and orientation, the use of national networks parallel to the team structure, different frames of understanding, the predominance of certain points of view, etc. This challenge was handled through the mutual obligation of maximum – sometimes even relentless – openness, self-reflection, and self-control that were demanded and realised in regular or ad hoc meetings (each team member had the right to call a meeting). Only thus was it possible to create an intensive trustful relationship and a productive working atmosphere in a short time, as well as to maintain them through to the conclusion of the project. After only one constituting meeting of the team in Szczecin, in July 2001, where the debates were rather heated, it was possible to build up a common working platform. The quality of this co-operation showed up not at least in observing the very restrictive time-line, where not only the survey and evaluation phases within the team had to be co- ordinated, but also to be harmonised with the agendas of the HQ MNC NE as well as the Corps Committee. Moreover, all the three participating institutes had to observe national restrictions and regulations. Nevertheless, the project was indeed brought to conclusion

44 within the given period of twenty-four months, from orders given to report presentation.56

3.3 Methods and Instruments

The very first draft of the project structure, based upon only a few sounding talks in the MNC NE and the Federal Ministry of Defence, recommended a research approach comprising several diverse methods. This was intended on the one hand to address the complexity of interactivities in the HQ, and on the other to make up for the almost total lack of comparable existing studies. A third purpose was to get away from the quantitative analysis that has dominated military- related social research by introducing qualitative procedures such as participating observation or semi-structured interviews. The point was not to build up a contrast between qualitative and quantitative methods, but rather to emphasise their complementarity.57 Taken together, qualitative and quantitative methods were more likely to yield a broader and simultaneously deeper picture of interaction in the HQ. The proposed mixture of methods constituted an enlargement of internal research tradition for all three participating bodies. Nevertheless, a rapid consensus on the appropriateness of this complex procedure was established within the research team, even though it produced further challenges regarding the harmonisation of the instruments to be used. After all, seven researchers from different disciplines, coming from three countries, had to get the aims, contents, importance, and formu- lations of instruments clear in their minds – in a foreign language – then to translate these into their own languages, to use them when dealing with their compatriots in the HQ, to evaluate the data, and, finally – again in the foreign language – to present, and discuss the results, and write them up as common findings. The harmonisation of the procedures and instruments58 to be used in the course of the project required by far the largest portion of time and work. Each proce- –––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 56 Constituting the research team and maintaining its operability beyond the outlined differences could nearly be considered as constituting an independent project within the superior research aim. 57 See Marotzki 1999: 126. 58 Regarding requirements and possibilities of harmonising international survey instruments, see Meulemann 2002; Bechtold/Günter 2002; Glagow 2002. 45 dure and/or instrument had been prepared during a one-week working conference, where literally every important term had been discussed. Moreover, all the survey phases (except for the poll by questionnaires) had been co-ordinated such that the complete team was present in Szczecin. This made it possible to meet daily to discuss experiences and to adjust the instruments and procedures where necessary. The same procedure was used for the evaluation and report phases. The following section explains the procedures and instruments employed. a) Evaluation of Documents and Data After the initial explorative interviews, systematic contacts were made with the MNC NE concerning the evaluation of relevant documents, papers and data, including the treaties and agreements mentioned in Chapter 1 as constituting the basis for the work of the HQ. Synoptic data were evaluated on issues such as the socio-demographic structure of the HQ and the willingness of soldiers and employees to move to the Szczecin garrison. The press department made available several files with a very detailed chronicle of the Corps, complemented by a large-scale press review (including the English translations of Polish press items) and a certain number of scientific articles. This analysis was supported by senior officers of the Corps instructing the research team. Moreover, throughout the whole examination phase, the HQ member was accessible and willing to give information. Thus, the ‘paper situation’ of documents and data could be supplemented with practical experience directly from the HQ. Such a procedure generally succeeded in guaranteeing within the tri-national research team a common knowledge level of the MNC NE structure, thus encouraging the development of further questions. This led to the early detection of a phenomenon that gained in importance over the course of the study: the discrepancy between the emphasis given to the integration aspect in numerous personal statements, and the fact that this aspect is totally lacking in all the official documents.

46 b) Participating Observation A particularly appropriate method for gaining deep insights in a relatively short time-frame was that of observation by participation.59 For this purpose, the research team was to integrate over a certain period into the life sphere of the MNC NE, in order to capture and to analyse the framework and the conditions of multinational co-operation in the HQ by means of personal observations and talks with the HQ members. This project section had to be planned in a particularly careful manner, since participating observation is always confronted with the problem of mixing up perception and interpretation on the one hand, and of a decreasing distance between researcher and research subject on the other.

Thus, the observation period was fixed for the second half of Novem- ber 2001, when, during a two-week command post exercise, the HQ became supplemented to a strength of about 500 personnel from 25 countries. The goal was to observe the HQ personnel interactions under exercise conditions. This exercise represented a particularly good opportunity for observation because of the fact that it was only under these conditions that the entire HQ was gathered together over a longer period in a confined space. Moreover, it seemed to present a good opportunity for an easy integration of the research team itself. In their capacity as active duty officers (Poland) or reserve officers (Denmark, Germany), the members of the research team wore uni- forms over the observation period, and were thus able to submerge themselves in the exercise events to a certain extent. As such, they were perceived less as foreign bodies than they would have been had they been in civilian clothes. The team divided into two groups with members from each participating state. Each group was charged with the observation of two Headquarters divisions. They participated in all central events, such as briefings and analyses. The observations were logged and exchanged in the two daily meetings the group held.

In order to observe the ethical and legal requirements regarding vol- untariness of participation in the survey and confidentiality of data, the general information given by the corps leadership on the presence

–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 59 For an explanation of the procedures used, see Lueger 2000, chapter 4; Legewie 1995. 47 of the research team in situ was supplemented by an explicit letter of introduction at every working place of the corps. In addition, the members of the research team introduced themselves in the units to be observed, and underlined once again the high value laid on voluntari- ness and confidentiality. The assumption is that a high level of openness throughout all the divisions and units was encouraged by these measures. Various meetings and talks offered insights into the practical work of the HQ, but it became clear later that it would have been better to have conducted the participating observation only after the conclusion and evaluation of the semi-structured interviews. The knowledge gained in those interviews would have made an even stronger focussing and systematisation of participating observation possible. c) Semi-structured Interviews In total, 32 semi-structured interviews were held during Decem- ber 2001. The research team strove to create a form of interview that left the respondents space to verbalise their perceptions and interpretations, while at the same time trying to cover a number of common topics. Semi-structured interviews, which are essentially conversations pre-structured by the researcher, are a compromise between a purely narrative conversation and a standardised interview with a high theory-led steering element.60

The interview guideline (see Appendix 1) was commonly developed in the research team on the basis of experience gained during the previous research process. It comprises 10 categories, each one of those subdivided again into question/conversation items. The guiding theoretical background of each category is fixed in a further column. It was attempted to cover all ten categories during an interview, the se- quence being left dependent on the course of the interview. The interview partners had been chosen randomly, by using a formula that took their place in the hierarchy and their sphere of duty within the HQ as well as their nationality into consideration. The sample is thus quite representative. The randomly chosen interviewees were asked for their voluntary participation and were guaranteed full confidentiality for –––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 60 On semi-structured interviews, see Huber 2001: 106f; Witzel 1982, chapters II and III; Hopf 1995: 177–182. 48 anything they might say during the interview. There were only two refusals to participate. The interviewees were also allowed to choose whether the interview was logged by tape-recorder or by hand. With three exceptions, interviews were tape-recorded and then transcribed. The interviews were carried out by the research team-members themselves, and the average duration was a little bit more than one hour. The course of the conversations, the respondents’ reactions to interview situations, and the applicability of the guideline were all discussed in daily meetings. The respondents were generally open and communicative, and the interview guideline turned out to be comprehensive and flexible.

The interviews having been conducted in the native language of each interviewee, the transcriptions also had to be translated into English. Due to rather significant differences in equipment and resources of the three institutes, the translation process could not be standardised, and the members of the research team chose quite different methods. Some transcribed the interviews word for word and then made a full translation into English, while others merely wrote summaries in Eng- lish of the main points to come out of the interview. In this kind of situation, the exact harmonisation of the interview guide proved to be decisive for allowing a systematic contents-analysis. The guide required information to be categorised, thus guaranteeing comparable data in spite of different documentation techniques. d) Expert talks Again and again, specific questions concerning very different issues in the HQ emerged, making it necessary to consult experts in order to clarify the issues. This took place partly informally (e. g. on matters of the definitions of specific terms), but for issues such as communication management or social life at the Szczecin garrison, more comprehensive questions arose which had to be discussed in a second round with the competent section chiefs. Conversations with the Senior Na- tional Officers, the heads of division (ACOS), as well as the members of the Command Group constituted a further focal point of this second interview round. No standardised structure was agreed upon or considered necessary for these conversations; they were oriented accord-

49 ing to the issues to be discussed. In total, 14 consultations with experts took place. e) Quantitative Survey A poll among the HQ members by means of a standard questionnaire constituted the largest research step within the project, and simultaneously the conclusion of the phase of data-collection. This instrument was developed nearly completely by the members of the research team. Only for the scales concerning cohesion61 and organisational commitment62 were existing instruments taken up and modified for specific application. Numerous findings from the previous research steps went into the making of the questionnaire; the individual scales and items are essentially operationalisations of the new or reformulated guiding questions and hypotheses (see the following para- graph).

As had been the case with the interview guide, the most careful attention was paid to the ‘input harmonisation’ of the questionnaire. For this purpose, a common English master version of the instrument was developed that simultaneously determined all the technical prerequisites and standards for a later electronic data collection and SPSS63 evaluation. Of course, the meaning of English terms in each of the three respective mother tongues of the HQ members had to be taken into consideration in this process. As in the other project phases, the questionnaire was also supposed to offer an opportunity for the respondents to express their ideas in their own languages, but instead of a re-translation procedure normally used in cross-national surveys,64 the English master version was discussed within the research team, item per item, term per term, thus ensuring that the national versions used terms of equivalent meaning. The national versions thus elaborated were submitted to a pre-test (four respondents per nation) serving to examine comprehensibility as well as the time needed to fill out a rather voluminous questionnaire. For this purpose, the respondents filled in the questionnaire, then gave their feedback to the researchers –––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 61 See Podsakoff/MacKenzie 1994: 702–713. 62 See Meyer/Allen 1997. 63 Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS), used for the analysis of statistical material. 64 See Glagow 2002: 66. 50 in a personal interview. In a common meeting following the pre-test, the final English master version of the questionnaire was further modified and then translated into the final national versions.

Data were collected with the support by the administrative personnel (after a short instructional session) of the different HQ divisions, the national elements, and the HQ company. They distributed 300 questionnaires, re-collected them, and sent them to the SOWI for data evaluation. Participation in the questionnaire was voluntary; the questionnaires were individually filled in over a period from Mid-June to Mid-July 2001. The total response rate ran up to 60 per cent, and within the staff of the HQ the figure was a remarkable 82 per cent. Electronic data evaluation of the standard-labelled questionnaires was done by the SOWI scanner equipment. The standard SPSS data set then was sent to the members of the tri-national research team.

3.4 Hypotheses and Guiding Questions

The study’s reference to the field-of-life in the HQ as well as to the perceptions and interpretations of the HQ-members required an open and flexible research design which could be further changed and developed during the course of the survey. As the researchers’ understanding of the dynamic in the HQ grew, some hypotheses and guiding questions had to be revised, and some new ones had to be added. Indeed, the realisation of the research project led to the identification of seven major centres of interest, which increasingly influenced the development of the different instruments, especially the questionnaire for the quantitative survey in the Corps Headquarters. The centres of interest thus identified and used for analysis were: a) Purposes of the HQ One benefit of the project’s openness during its explorative phase was the fact that a fundamental change of perspective was possible – and such in fact became necessary. The initial deliberations and assumptions had considered (national) military-cultural dispositions and identities as one of the most significant independent variables expected to have a major impact on interaction among HQ-members. 51 However, in the course of the project’s development, there appeared a good deal of evidence to suggest that the focus should be shifted rather to the political-military framework of the HQ. Already in the founding documents of the HQ, a discrepancy was to be found between the military purposes of the HQ and the informal requirements of multinational integration, esp. of a new NATO-member. After having participated in the ‘Baltic Confidence’ exercise and after having conducted the first series of qualitative interviews, the research team was struck with the impression that this discrepancy was experienced by a number of HQ-members as a lack of ‘role clarity’, and consequently as a lack of clear guidelines for their work. It seemed, in short, that military-cultural dispositions were especially likely to have significant effects on interaction in situations of doubt and uncertainty, giving the individual a guideline lacking in the formal structure, but also reinforcing disintegrative patterns of behaviour.

The reformulated hypothesis assumes that there is a considerable lack of role clarity on all levels of the HQ resulting from an insufficient description of the HQ’s tasks and functions. The vacuum thus caused is filled in by individual interpretations flowing from both hierarchical position and nationality. The impact of these uncertainties should be found in perceptions of the HQ’s purposes as well as in the circumstances determining the daily work of the members of the HQ. b) National Conditions and Circumstances National conditions and circumstances can not be disregarded when it comes to multinational co-operation. As just explained, it was the initial assumption that these conditions would be a primary explana- tory variable. This theory had to be slightly refined, however, to account for the fact that the impact of nationality seems to have worked mainly through the political-military institutional framework (or lack thereof). Among the major points of tension were the different expected values of serving in the HQ for one’s own career opportunities, regulations in working hours, and differences in pay and allowances. The research team then formulated the theory that these factors affect multinational interaction through the mechanism that soldiers and co- workers, in daily interaction, will tend to compare their own national

52 systems with each other, and may in many cases react with at least partial dissatisfaction. c) Cultural Dispositions The questions of self-perception, stereotypes, and prejudices are some of the classical and most fundamental within the theory of social interaction. The works of James, Cooley, and Mead created a base line for these concepts, which has been continued by Goffman, among others.65 Self-perception is the key element for creating relations with others, including communication. But negative stereotypes and prejudices (having among others cultural roots) may cause disturbances in interactions and may jeopardise the performing of common tasks. The specific conditions for performing in a multinational environment require awareness of aspects of cultural interaction including perceptions of self and other.

The Danish and German self-perceptions seem to correlate with their images in the eyes of the other nationalities. The self-perception of Poles in the HQ, however, is generally different from the perceptions of the Poles expressed by Germans and Danes. So the question is raised, whether it is possible – on the basis of these data – to analyse possible consequences of such differences in the interactions within the HQ.

Are there any features characteristic to all nations? What are they like? Which features are mostly different from state to state? How much does a more positive or more negative perception of others affect the work evaluation and co-operation within HQ? If two thirds of the personnel claim that there are some issues which nobody discusses in the HQ, how does this affect the relations with colleagues from other countries and what is the cohesion and relationship inside the group like when such taboos exist?

–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 65 See James 1890; Cooley 1964; Mead 1964; Goffman 1959. 53 d) Leadership Organisations can be understood as more or less permanent frames within which leadership activities take place. The already-mentioned lack of role clarity throughout the HQ – related to uncertainty about the purpose of the MNC NE at one end and subsequent uncertainty about work processes and roles within the HQ at the other – seems to have a profound impact on organisational life and the reality of leadership. Observations made during exercise BALTIC CONFIDENCE 2001 and the findings made during semi-structured interviews made this evident. Thus, it is hypothesised that perceptions of leadership and formal decision-making structures are influenced e. g. by informal networks operating parallel with these official structures. These networks seem to be competing with official leadership, and are upheld by individuals navigating in apparently uncertain and inefficient organisational waters.

Various other factors, such as the distribution of information, decision-making processes, and consistency between what the leadership says and does, can be understood as components of leadership. These and other factors will be examined and linked to a conception of leadership as a variable in the HQ. e) Communication and Co-operation Based on the observations made during the exercise BALTIC CONFIDENCE in November 2001, it was possible to formulate hypotheses concerning co-operation and communication in the daily work of the HQ. There seemed to be no reason to question the staff’s willingness to co-operate, but it was clear that co-operation was ham- pered by other factors such as differences in language skills, personal qualifications, and feelings of competency. Later on, the hypothesis evolved to include the notion that the clarity of the tasks at hand is connected to the personnel’s ability to co-operate effectively. Fur- thermore, it was observed that interaction within national spheres was very frequent, especially when the pressure rose. This led to reflections on the question of how elaborate these apparently nationally- defined networks were, how and why they were activated, and if a

54 stereotypical perception of the other nations could have an effect upon these networks and upon co-operation in general.

With regard to communications and information systems, it was reported by members of the HQ and eventually became obvious to the research team as well that these systems were not efficient. It was thus decided to look into these matters not from a technical perspective, but from the point of view of the user, so as to clarify to which degree the user felt adequately informed or was able to retrieve the information that he felt was needed. f) Cohesion and Organisational Commitment Most European countries’ armed forces have units involved in multinational forces, be it in ad-hoc deployments or on a regular peacetime basis. For all the above mentioned reasons, and in order to maintain coherence, multinational operational units like the HQ MNC NE have a special interest in positive cohesion and commitment among their members. Intercultural co-operation and communication are heavily influenced by the extent of cohesion in and commitment to such a multinational formation.

In the course of the project, emphasis was put on the differentiation between horizontal and vertical cohesion in the HQ, since the central dimension of trust in direct superiors and peers is influenced partly by different factors than trust in higher superiors. On the level of the smallest unit, we use variables such as frames and codes, information distribution, level of empowerment, interdependency, leadership, distribution of power, decision making and social praxis.

Effective, continuous, and normative commitment within the HQ are shaped in different ways, since the reasons for belonging to the HQ are based on occupational perspectives which can vary slightly or a great deal from soldier to soldier. It is therefore necessary to differentiate between those dimensions of commitment.

The degree of cohesion and commitment in the HQ is the product of six factors: political-administrative frame, leadership, culture, national preconditions, communication and social environment. Therefore the 55 constructs of cohesion and commitment frame the other factors, which serve for the examination of the social interactions within the HQ. g) Social Structure and Life in the Szczecin Garrison Competence in a mutually intelligible language is both one of the basic prerequisites and one of the most demanding challenges for a person’s integration into a context of international interaction. The larger the national differences in language capability, the greater the probability that difficulties – possibly even a thorough breakdown in communication – will arise. Since not only the military and civilian members of HQ, but also their families, must live together in the Gar- rison, the problem of mutual intelligibility crops up often.

Besides language skills, the huge gap in pay and allowances between Danes and Germans on the one side and Poles on the other might turn out as a considerable hurdle for multinational social life in the Szcze- cin garrison.

The International School, which is attended by children from all three nations, might play an important role in pushing multinational social interaction forward.

These seven major centres of interest will be analysed in the following section. Since the social organisation of the HQ is a complex one characterised by various interrelated dimensions, these focal points cannot be distinguished sharply from each other. Some major factors may play an important role in more than one dimension.

56 4 Findings and Results

The results and findings to be discussed in this chapter are based on the comprehensive data gathered by the various methods and instruments described above (chapter 3.3). Note, however, that the figures and tables refer mainly to the results of the quantitative survey. For a better understanding of the statistical evaluation of this survey, some preliminary explanation seems appropriate.

The multinational staff personnel in Szczecin comprises some 400 persons, including the HQ MNC NE, the National Support Ele- ments, the Polish HQ Company, and other administrative and logistical bodies. The research project concentrated on the interaction processes within the HQ itself, also taking into consideration some aspects concerning those elements immediately surrounding the Corps Staff. Thus it was decided to include the national elements and those pla- toons of the HQ Company which are in permanent contact with the HQ. In an attempt to get a comprehensive and representative sample, a total of 300 questionnaires were distributed. Of these, 181 questionnaires were sent back, equalling 60 % of the relevant population. The HQ’s peacetime establishment comprises 156 positions, of which 132 were occupied at the time of the survey. 108 (81.8 %) questionnaires were filled out by HQ members. Considering the unusually high response rate in the HQ, it is legitimate to treat these results as if they were those of a total survey. Another 44 questionnaires were answered by the members of the National Support Elements, and 29 came from the HQ company. As far as the national elements are concerned, this data seems sufficient for a rough analysis of at least larger trends and tendencies. The HQ company, however, was excluded from further analysis due to the small number of respondents.

Within the HQ itself, 91 out of 108 respondents were military members and 17 were civilians, most of them being Polish support staff. Where necessary, the distinction between military and civilian personnel was noted and analysed. For the quantitative analysis, survey respondents were grouped into three categories: military personnel of the HQ (N = 91), HQ personnel (N = 108) and HQ personnel plus Elements (N = 152). Since participation in the survey was voluntary,

57 the respondents were free not to answer certain items, and the N may thus differ slightly from item to item. We therefore included the relevant N in all figures and tables. Due to the small size of the HQ MNC NE, the overall N is relatively small and the N for groups and sub-groups normally did not exceed 100. Because of this, it varies from case to case whether per centages or absolute numbers are given.

4.1 Purposes and Tasks

One of the key assumptions in academic research on military multinationality is that differences in national military cultures are the primary factor hampering co-operation and interoperability. In this context, military culture is perceived as a stable concept of collective patterns of attitudes and behaviour shaped by various societal, institutional, and traditional characteristics. These are expressed by norms, codes of conduct, mechanisms, and practices within the social sub- system of the military. Most research projects (see chapter 2) have therefore concentrated on this issue and tried to assess this impact, to identify its sources and specifics, and to formulate recommendations for improvement. It was the plausibility of this assumed relation between cultural differences and hurdles for multinational co-operation which also guided the deliberations within the Tri-national Research Team when sketching the first drafts of the research design. The focus was on differences in military cultural dispositions and identities (see para. 3.1).

But already in the initial phase of exploratory data-collection, the researchers were confronted with the necessity of re-adjusting their ideas concerning the factors determining the quality of interaction among the members of the HQ MNC NE. Evaluation of the founding documents of the MNC NE showed that three major military tasks were laid down in these conventions (collective defence, crisis reaction/peace support operations, disaster relief), and that all agreements and prescriptions of guiding structure, capabilities and work of the MNC NE were tailored to the achievement of these tasks. But there was no mention in any of the documents of what was probably the HQ’s most challenging mission, namely to integrate the Polish Armed

58 Forces into NATO. Despite this silence, this task exists, and was highlighted by practically all interview partners regardless their rank or position within the organisation of the HQ. This task also has an impact on the everyday tasks of the HQ, but this obligation was of course not reflected in job descriptions, time budgets, or other sources to which members were likely to look for task guidance. It very quickly became clear – and the initial impression was only reinforced by the experience of participatory observation during the exercise BALTIC CONFIDENCE and by the qualitative interviews – that many members of the HQ keenly felt the lack of guidelines for their behaviour within the multinational environment. They saw themselves in a dilemma, having on the one hand to fulfil professional military functions at a relatively advanced level, and on the other to give support and training to their Polish colleagues who still were in a learning stage.

Thus, the focus of the research shifted slightly to include the impact of the political-military framework. It was our assumption that the legal and structural characteristics of the MNC NE fail to give its members sufficient role clarity and security, and furthermore that this lack of role clarity would have impacts on various areas of HQ co-operation. Based on that, we theorised that national military-cultural characteristics would be more likely to have an impact on behaviour when they were filling a vacuum left by the political-military framework. Na- tional military culture thus becomes an intervening variable, unfolding its influence mainly in situations of doubt or stress; unlike an independent variable, military culture by itself probably does not create such situations.

59 Figure 4.1.1: Revised Schema of the Research Design

Social Life

Trans- Political national Effi- Military National Inter- ciency Frame- Military action work Cultures

Equipment etc.

Given this re-formulation, one of the guiding questions became “how do members of the HQ think about their organisation and its purposes?” Several military interviewees mentioned that they did not consider themselves to be working in a military formation at all, but rather to be fulfilling a function of a more or less political character. This was not criticised by these interviewees, on the contrary, some of them even saw the opportunity to contribute to the process of Euro- pean integration as a special motivation. Nevertheless, it was remarkable to hear officers talking in terms of political symbolism about a forces headquarters which was officially charged with explicitly military missions.

In the quantitative survey, therefore, one of the first items deals with that particular question. The members of the HQ were asked whether they considered the purpose of their HQ to be more political or more military. The results are significant: 88 % of the HQ-personnel be- 60 lieved themselves to be working in an organisation built up for mainly political reasons. None of the Danish respondents, only seven per cent of the Germans, and only a bit more than one quarter of the Polish HQ-members saw a predominantly military role for the MNC NE. There was no significant differentiation e. g. among ranks or divisions of the HQ. This finding should trigger some serious deliberations on the possible consequences of this widespread perception for the daily work in the HQ.

Figure 4.1.2: Purposes of MNC NE

N = 90 The purpose of the HQ MNC NE is ... NDAN = 29 NGE = 28 more political NPL = 33 more military 100 % 100 93 %

80 73 %

40 27 % 20 7 % 0 DAN GE PL

Closely related to the question of purpose are those of concrete tasks and missions. As a result of the findings in the explorative phase of the project’s development, two items were integrated into the questionnaire asking for perceptions of these ‘written and unwritten’ tasks and their significance for the daily work of the HQ-members. Again the pattern of response was overwhelmingly clear:

61 Figure 4.1.3: Written and unwritten tasks for the MNC NE and their significance for every day work (assessments of ‘very important’ and ‘rather important’)

tasks of MNC NE 100 91% significance for every day work 84%

74% 80 70% 63% 62% 61% 55% 55% 55% 55% 60

40 25% 28% 28%

0 contact Integra- disaster exercising field PSO Eastern tion of relief Art. 5 national academy Europe Poland forces

In the perception of the members of the HQ, the ‘unwritten’ tasks are of even higher significance for the HQ and for the individual’s daily work than the official tasks. The (unwritten) task of integrating the Polish armed forces into NATO military structures is perceived as the most important one – not only by the Poles themselves (93 %; daily work 86 %) but also by the Danes (93 %; daily work 86 %) and – with a slight difference – by the Germans (86 %; daily work 81 %) as well. Together with the results from the alternative response: ‘creating contacts with Eastern Europe’, there is a considerable consistency in the perception that the HQ is serving primarily political functions.

But a closer look at this catalogue of tasks shows some interesting details: Peace Support Operations are considered as a ‘very important’ or ‘rather important’ task by only 57 % of the German and 61 % of the 62 Danish HQ members, while a full 88 % of the Polish respondents evaluated them as very or rather important. A similar pattern is to be seen in regard to collective defence according to Art. 5 of the NATO- Treaty. 56 % of the Danes and only 43 % of the Germans are convinced that this is a ‘very or rather important’ task of the MNC NE, whilst the Polish score is at 85 %. On the other side, 93 % of the Dan- ish HQ-personnel emphasise ‘creating contact with Eastern Europe’, compared with 79 % of their Polish colleagues. The Germans stood between the others with 83 %. Since no significant differences in the perception of the MNC NE’s tasks were related to rank or staff unit, nationality appears to be the best remaining explanation for the differences observed in interpretation. The Polish members of the HQ put much more emphasis on the practical military employability and capability of this organisation, whereas the Danes and the Germans tended towards a more political interpretation – at least as far as perceptions on the working level are concerned.

Polish emphasis on military tasks and duties – expressed in the strong acknowledgement of the ‘official’ tasks – and Danish and German orientation on integration of their Polish colleagues, would seem to provide a good basis for complementary interests and efforts within the HQ. Despite this, in the course of the research it seemed more and more evident that the obligations associated with integration tended to be neglected in comparison with the ‘written tasks’.

As the research team participated in the exercise ‘Baltic Confidence’, it became evident that instructions and briefings were presented mostly by German and sometimes by Danish officers. Their Polish colleagues did so only on exceptional occasions. The picture in meetings, evaluations, and situation reports over the course of the exercise was similar: if an order had to be fulfilled under pressure or under exercise conditions, integrative approaches and efforts seemed to be abandoned in favour of a quick and primarily national military solu- tion to the problem. A German officer brought this observation into sharp focus by saying: “If things must go fast, the Poles get by- passed.”

63 Given these attitudes, which were confirmed by several interview subjects, statements of superior officers claiming that military professionalism and integrative processes must be given equal weight in every case appear to a certain extent to be wishful thinking. This is because when under pressure or in doubt, individuals may be placed in a dilemma. The tendency is then to overcome feelings of uncertainty by individual interpretations of the situation, i. e. by resorting to nationally- or culturally-conditioned patterns of behaviour. This may help the individuals to regain stability and orientation on the one hand, but on the other hand, disintegrative effects upon the multinational structure tend to get reinforced.

An important example of the disintegrative effects of a fallback to national patterns of behaviour is the existence of and the frequent recourse to informal national networks. These networks exist parallel to the official structure of the HQ and its formal operational procedures. The more the HQ-members get accustomed to resorting to these informal national groups for solutions, the less they are forced to work at making multinational interaction successful (see also chapter 4.6). The data show that Danes and Germans are very conscious of these networks and their usefulness, while the Poles seem to be less involved in such informal structures.

Figure 4.1.4: Do unofficial networks exit in HQ? (N = 90)

yes no 90% 100 82% 80 71% 55% 60 45% 40 29% 18% 20 10% 0 DA GE PL total

64 88 % (56 out of 64) of those HQ-members who recognised the existence of unofficial networks think that they are based on nationality. If asked, under which circumstances these networks are activated, a majority (33 out of 64) believes that they primarily serve national interests. Data also show that at least some 21 respondents believe that these networks are activated in situations of stress. It seems reasonable to assume that improved role clarity and guidelines for the daily mi- nutiae might serve to lessen both the need and the tendency to resort to such informal and exclusively national networks.

Given the argument that role and task ambiguity lead to dilemma and uncertainty, it could be hypothesised that the HQ members would privilege the official (military) tasks, where clear guidelines exist, over the unofficial (integration) tasks, where there is less clarity. In fact, a considerable number of interviewees reported that an intensive official schedule for the achievement of the mainly military goals ‘collective defence’ and ‘peace support operations’ left only too little room for integrative co-operation. One interesting finding was the answer to the obvious follow-up question of where the HQ members thought this schedule and time pressure were coming from: the Danes and the Poles both attributed these things to the ambitious pursuit of military professionalism by the Germans, and responsible German officers also admitted that they considered the phenomenon at least partly ‘home-made’. As the following table shows, huge minorities of the Danes and the Germans fear that the HQ will not be able to achieve its goals within the given time frame. Only the Polish HQ- members are overwhelmingly optimistic that the MNC NE will perform successfully.

Table 4.1.1: Meeting Requirements in Given Time Frame Denmark Germany Poland Total Is the HQ able to yes 14 17 27 58 meet its require- 56 % 61 % 79 % 67 % ments in the given no 11 11 7 29 time frame? 44 % 39 % 21 % 33 %

65 Thus there is at least the perception, and very possibly the reality, of nationally-influenced interpretations of ambiguous situations on the organisational level of the HQ which have an impact on the prioritisation of tasks and missions. It seems appropriate to recall that superior officers at all levels of the MNC NE also have a special responsibility to foster and sustain multinational interaction and not to encourage the formation of informal national networks. Superiors must also be aware that their priorities, whether intentionally or unintentionally expressed take on significance for their subordinates of their own nations. Fur- thermore, the stronger that superior’s influence over individual career opportunities, the more importance his stated priorities take on for his soldiers. It can practically be taken for granted that a large majority of subordinates, finding themselves forced to choose between multinational engagement and personal career opportunities, will pursue the latter (see chapter 4.5). So it must be asked whose interpretations might be the predominant ones. The interviewees drew a very clear picture, which was substantially confirmed by the responses on the questionnaire: a bare majority (in the interviews it tended to be a minority) considered the three nations of the HQ as equal. The Danes were the most sceptical group, while the Poles seemed to be quite satisfied with the extent of equity among participating states.

66 Figure 4.1.5: Do you think that Danish, German and Polish soldiers are equal partners within the HQ MNC NE

N = 90 N = 29 yes DAN NGE = 28 no NPL = 33 100

80 70% 62% 64% 60

38% 36% 40 30%

0 DAN GE PL

Total: 58% believe that the three nations are equal partners 42% don’t think that the three nations are equal partners

Those of the HQ-members (more than 40 %) who do not consider the three nations as equal partners consider the Germans to be the predominant group. It is interesting that even the Germans see themselves in this role, as demonstrated by an often-cited saying: “Some cannot, some don’t want to and some have to do the job.”

67 Figure 4.1.6: If not equal, who is predominant?

N = 37 1 7

DAN GE

29 PL

Central Findings • A combination of written and unwritten purposes and tasks of the MNC NE puts its members into dilemmas and role conflicts. • Ambiguous situations tend to be interpreted by resorting to national patterns of behaviour. • The lack of role clarity may be strengthening a tendency towards recourse to informal national networks and consequently to disintegrative effects. • Priorities and hierarchy of the MNC NE’s tasks seem to be open to national interpretation as well.

68 4.2 National conditions

The soldiers of the three member states of the MNC NE work under different nationally-derived conditions, which influence both organisational and social life. These national rules and regulations have been integrated into an organisational system that tries to create a common platform for the harmonisation of the activities within the HQ. Since the national administrative systems still prevail in other areas, the differences between national conditions are a potential source for friction and frustration. This friction and frustration stems not only from the perception of the advantages or disadvantages of the other two systems, but also from the realisation of the limitations of one’s own system. It thus becomes necessary to identify and describe the areas in which friction arises, and how this affects daily work and social life.

Poland only recently (in 1999) became a member of NATO, whereas Denmark has been a member since NATO’s creation in 1949, and Germany since 1955. Obviously, the perception of belonging to NATO is deeply rooted in both the Danish and German Armed Forces – whereas Poland is still in the process of changing its procedures, structures, size, tactics, and so forth. Seen from a theoretical stand- point, it is a reasonable assumption that Polish self-perceptions during this process may be marked by feelings of uncertainty and maybe even vulnerability. In the past, Denmark and Germany viewed Poland, a member of the Warsaw Pact, as a potential enemy, and were viewed in turn as potential enemies themselves. Both sides’ armed forces have had to adjust their thinking on this point. This is made even more difficult by the fact that the Polish Armed Forces are not yet fully acquainted with NATO procedures, and as such not yet perceived as an equally strong ally.

Based upon these historical differences, it can be expected that the difference in the military background and traditions is a source of greater friction between Poland and the two other members than between Germany and Denmark. Having said this, it must also be mentioned that much of the friction stems from the relativity of the issues: the Polish soldiers may consider themselves very flexible in compari-

69 son with their previous situation, but they are perceived as inflexible by the Danes and Germans, who are comparing the Poles to themselves and other NATO members. Both the Danes and the Germans perceive themselves as being very flexible, but are not perceived as such by the Poles. These issues of cultural perceptions and self- perceptions will be dealt with in more detail in chapter 4.3.

Following up on chapter 4.1 concerning the purpose of the MNC NE, it might be argued that one reason why the integrative purpose seems to overshadow the other, more formalised aims, is also grounded in national conditions. As noted above, HQ MNC NE serves as a training ground for the Polish soldiers for both language skills and internalisa- tion of standard NATO procedures. It is worth mentioning that the HQ represents the only possibility for Polish soldiers to train the above mentioned skills without having to go abroad. Similarly, the HQ represents the only opportunity for the Danish soldiers to train at a multinational corps level, thus also serving to some extent as a unique training ground for Danish soldiers. The German soldiers, on the other hand, have multiple other opportunities for serving in multinational corps HQs within Germany. The data are not conclusive as to whether or not friction arises from this particular difference in national conditions. But considering that interviewees from all three nations often mentioned a German habit of pushing things ahead, it does seem to be at least an indirect cause. Apparently, German soldiers have a different attitude towards process- or training-oriented approaches than Danish and Polish soldiers.

The data are conclusive, however, concerning the working conditions within the HQ, although there are differences in the level of satisfaction within the specific working conditions. One of the national conditions of major impact on social interaction and job satisfaction is payment and allowances. As Herzberg66 states, when an individual is satisfied with his payment, it is no longer a motivational factor for the individual, but becomes rather a maintaining factor. He implies that the perception of insufficient payment can act as a de-motivational factor.

–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 66 Herzberg 1968. 70 The results from the semi-structured interviews in fact indicate that the difference in payment has an impact upon the staff members’ opportunities and inclination to participate in social activities. Likewise, this situation also has the consequence that the well-paid group of HQ personnel are reluctant to place lesser-paid members in situations that could lead to the latter’s embarrassment.

Figure 4.2.1: Satisfied with pay and allowances

100 Total: N = 90

80 70%

60 44% 40 35% 28% 26% 21% 21% 17% 20 14% 12% 4% 3% 6% 0 DA GE PL

satisfied rather satisfied neither/nor rather dissatisfied dissatisfied

Due to round-up operations, deviations up to 1 per cent may emerge.

Only one German soldier reported being rather dissatisfied with the pay and allowances, whereas one third of the Danish and more than half of the Polish soldiers reported being rather dissatisfied or dissatisfied with their pay and allowances. It should also be noted that the majority of the respondents reported that salaries and differences in salaries cannot be discussed or mentioned in front of members from other countries. It seems that there is a notion that open discussion of salaries might raise the problem of the disparities in pay, and create further embarrassment and problems. It can be safely concluded that the disparity in pay and allowances does affect interaction in the spheres of both work and social life, and that this indeed causes friction and frustration for members from all three countries, because they

71 feel limited in how they can interact with their colleagues in a way that they would not be limited if they were in a purely national context.

Another administrative aspect that shows appreciable differences is the regulation of working hours.67 The Danes, for example, get compensation for working overtime or during weekends. The Germans get compensation for travel days to and from Germany in connection with the start and the end of holidays and for visits to the dentist in Ger- many. The Poles are allowed to travel during working hours in relation to weekends. Further aggravating these discontinuities are widely diverging traditions concerning the administration of the rules. In some areas, the rules are enforced, in others, they are far more loosely interpreted. Despite these discrepancies, members from all three states end up working about the same number of hours per year on average. The real difficulties – and sometimes annoyances – arise out of the irregular and sometimes surprising ways the planning and conduct of the HQ’s daily order of duty is carried out.

The very fact of being assigned to serve at the HQ represents another issue within working conditions, concerning the different significance such a post carries in each state for an individual’s career path.

–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 67 Oral information by the HQ MNC NE, March 2003. 72 Figure 4.2.2: Importance of belonging to the HQ for improved career opportunities

Total: N = 91 100

60 43% 44% 38% 35% 38% 40 17% 21% 20 14%14% 12% 3% 7% 7% 3% 3% 0 DA GE PL

very important rather important neither/nor rather unimportant completely unimportant

The results in the table above indicate that serving in the HQ could have an impact on the individual soldier when he or she returns home. One fifth of the Danish, one third of the German, and the vast majority of the Polish soldiers reported that service in the HQ was important or rather important for the improvement of their career opportunities within the national context. The obvious conclusion to draw is that the motivation of Polish soldiers to apply for HQ service is higher than for German or Danish soldiers. In itself, this difference does not necessarily cause international friction. It can, however, be assumed that there is a connection between the career significance of serving in the HQ, the national appraisal systems, and performance in the HQ, which was expressed by the quotation mentioned in chapter 4.1: ‘Some cannot, some don’t want to, and some have to do the job’. If this connection exists, it is reasonable to think that a HQ member whose national appraisal system does not credit multinational service, does not see serving at the HQ as a career opportunity. This has implications for the different fields of interaction throughout the HQ.

73 Despite all the reported differences in experience with working conditions at home and in the HQ, there is little difference in the reported level of satisfaction with the current and overall working conditions in the HQ.

Figure 4.2.3: Satisfied with working conditions

Total: N = 91 100 79% 80

60 54% 38% 38% 36% 40 21% 20 14%10% 7% 4% 0 DA GE PL

satisfied rather satisfied neither/nor rather dissatisfied

The huge majority of the respondents are either satisfied or rather satisfied with their working conditions. While the Danes rank the low- est (albeit still at a very high level), every Polish soldier indicated that he was either satisfied or rather satisfied. In evaluating the present working situation, the individual usually takes past experiences, expectations prior to arrival, and modifications based upon the meeting with reality into consideration.

74 Central findings • A third of the Danish soldiers and nearly half of the Polish soldiers report being rather dissatisfied or dissatisfied with their pay and allowances. • More than half of the respondents report that salaries and differences in salaries cannot be discussed or verbalised in front of members of the other nations. • Approximately 20 % of the Danes, 40 % of the Germans and 80 % of the Poles report that service in the HQ is important or rather important for the improvement of own career opportunities within the national context. • More than 75 % of the respondents are either satisfied or rather satisfied with their working conditions.

4.3 Intercultural conditions

There have been many approaches to the phenomenon of culture by anthropology, philosophy, psychology, sociology, and even econom- ics, but even so there is still no commonly agreed-upon definition of this complex concept. A basic understanding of culture comprises sets of rules, norms, values, and principles on which individuals, groups, organisations and societies orient themselves.68 On the micro-level of analysis, culture affects the thinking, the feeling, and the behaviour of individuals as well as small social groups.

The primary socialisation process of every human being starts in early childhood, where values and attitudes are adapted. At the same time, intercultural relations to other groups and societies contribute to the process of shaping the more or less conscious attitudes of individuals

–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 68 See Schein 1985. 75 within a group or society.69 This happens when individuals are confronted with other cultures and thereby possibly made aware of their own cultural backgrounds.

The encounter of two or more different cultural groups can create a disturbance, since perceptions of ‘normality’ might be challenged. Possible forms of individual reaction can be confrontation, co- operation, or ignorance. Which of these outcomes is likely to happen depends on many factors: stereotypes, the aim of common activities, principles of co-existence, openness, variety and similarity including attitudes and skills of the group participants, etc. Intercultural communication influences organisational efficiency, because such elements as interpersonal communication and group atmosphere result directly in the functioning or malfunctioning of social structures. In the MNC NE, three different national concepts of (military) culture are brought into a mutual relationship, and the question is how this encounter is dealt with by the HQ members. In this context openness for other cultures and appreciation of co-operation with people from other nations can be considered as a prerequisite for multinational interaction oriented on common perspectives and goals.

–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 69 Attitudes are normative and consist of beliefs (cognitive associations with concepts) and feelings (affection). Attitudes must thus be differentiated from ‘opinions’, which are more superficial, which change more easily, and which can be verbalised. (Wiggins/Wiggins/van der Zanden 1994) 76 Table 4.3.1: Appreciation of the opportunity to serve with other nations Crosstabulation

nationality Danish German Polish Total service with I like it very Count 27 35 41 103 soldiers from much. % within nationality 84,4% 74,5% 63,1% 71,5% other nations I like it. Count 4 10 21 35 ... % within nationality 12,5% 21,3% 32,3% 24,3% I do not care. Count 2 2 4 % within nationality 4,3% 3,1% 2,8% I dislike it. Count 1 1 2 % within nationality 3,1% 1,5% 1,4% Total Count 32 47 65 144 % within nationality 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0%

When directly asked about their attitude toward doing service with soldiers from other nations, the HQ members gave an unequivocally positive answer: More than 95 % declared that they like or very much like their multinational service in the HQ. Based on data from the quantitative survey, the level of positive attitudes (see Table 4.3.1) is linked to a positive evaluation of the situation in the HQ based on co- operation among the soldiers, ways of conflict solving, the feeling of belonging to the organisation, and the relations with soldiers of other nationalities (see also chapter 4.6).

Although there is a common positive assessment of the multinational co-operation within the HQ, the attitudes towards colleagues from other nations are nevertheless shaped by stereotypes. Stereotypes can be regarded as constructions derived from the individual’s cultural context. Stereotypes cannot easily be substituted with other perceptions because they are deeply rooted in the awareness of and relationship with the values and socio-cultural attitudes of the individual’s original (cultural or societal) background. This is the reason why stereotypes are not changed easily even when relevant positive or negative experience is made. The assumption could therefore be made that the degree of cultural coexistence and geographical and historical relations are formative for amount and kind of stereotypes. Thus the

77 stereotypes between Denmark and Poland seem to be less intensive than the stereotypes prevailing between Poland and Germany.

In the quantitative survey, the HQ personnel were asked to assess a series of characteristics of the members of one’s own country as well as of the other two. Figure 4.3.1 shows the 26 characteristics which were assessed by the HQ personnel, and that there were some distinct differences in the self-perception of the HQ personnel. But it is even more interesting to compare the self-images of each country with the other-images the other countries had of it. This analysis seems to be important because it can be assumed that possible discrepancies between the self-concepts of members of a nation and its perception by the others have an impact on communication and co-operation.

Ten characteristics considered crucial for an individual soldier’s performance in his or her multinational working context, and which might constitute major sources of misunderstanding, were selected for a closer look. The not very astonishing result was that each nationality tended to consider itself in a more positive way than it was perceived by the others. But there are distinct differences between the three patterns of self- and other-perception: Figure 4.3.1 shows that major differences (more than one point on the scale) between the self-images of the Germans and their perception by Danes and Poles exist in the dimensions of being ‘proud’, ‘flexible’, and ‘independent’. The Danish soldiers did not see the Germans as ‘acting on [their] own initiative’. In other categories like being ‘competent’, ‘ambitious’, ‘qualified’ and ‘responsible’ self-and other-perceptions of the German HQ-members are almost identical.

As far as the Danish soldiers are concerned, figure 4.3.3 draws a similar but all in all less consistent picture: The positive self- assessment of the Danes concerning dimensions like being ‘flexible’, ‘dutiful’, ‘independent’ and ‘acting on one’s own initiative’ are not shared by the German and Polish soldiers. The Germans’ view of the Danes also differs in the field of being ‘responsible’. Smaller differences occur in more or less all other categories.

78 In the case of the Polish military HQ members, the mutual perceptions are the least coherent ones. In seven out of ten categories, there are major differences between the Polish self-image and the other-images held by Danes and Germans. Again the largest gap is between the assessments of being ‘flexible’ and ‘acting on one’s own initiative’.

79 80 Figure 4.3.1: Self perception of Danish, German and Polish soldiers in comparison (all 26 categories)

Denmark 2 Germany Poland

t l t t t r t s le d d s le n u n e n ic n n s le s d le e i ic n te y ic ie b u te u b a if a iv e tr e e u b u ie b iv fa t e a th t it a ro n ro i g t r t t n g p o a io if i t e d r r lis r li e o x o u le ia e e li o e i it l s a rg u o o e p i le r d it p c i g c b a n rv e n c w a h r r m f r to n o d a o u o e e c t u t o u a i m r s m q p s n p a s id u r h n o g u a s e e u v a e c e o e n d tr i n w w c r o in d i o o c in g p n in o v g e n li ti e c b a

mean: 1 = very untypical; 5 = very typical (N = 85)

80 Figure 4.3.2: Self perception of German soldiers and their perception by Danish and Polish soldiers (selected categories)

Denmark

2 Germany Poland

d d e l e t s d e t u e l fu v n u e l n o t ib ti ti te o fi ib e r n x u a e ti li s d p e e d ti i a n n ri fl i p b u o e o in m m q p p r o a s e e n c e d w w r in o o p n o g n ti c a

81 Mean score: 1 = very untypical; 5 = very typical (N = 85)

81 82 Figure 4.3.3: Self perception of Danish soldiers and their perception by German and Polish soldiers (selected categories)

Denmark 2 Germany Poland

d d e l e t s d e t u e l fu v n u e l n o t ib ti ti te o fi ib e r n x u a e ti li s d p e e d ti i a n n ri fl i p b u o e o in m m q p p r o a s e e n c e d w w r in o o p n o g n ti c a

Mean score: 1 = very untypical; 5 = very typical (N = 85)

82 Figure 4.3.4: Self perception of the Polish soldiers and their perception by Danish and German soldiers (selected categories)

Denmark 2 Germany Poland

d d e l e t s d e t u e l fu v n u e l n o t ib ti ti te o fi ib e r n x u a e ti li s d p ie e d ti i a n n r fl i p b u o e o in m m q p p r o a s e e n c e d w w r in o o p n o g n ti c a

Mean score: 1 = very untypical; 5 = very typical (N = 85) 83

83 At this point it cannot really be assessed whether these perceptions are based on substantial evaluation, and whether or not they are justified or valid. What becomes obvious from the survey, however, is that there are different implicit and explicit self-concepts – especially of flexibility and initiative, but also in the other categories as well. We assume that these different self-concepts are related to the cultural background of the respondents, who assess their own characteristics as well as those of their colleagues according to their (national) habits and values.

Finally, and most importantly, these differences also might reflect different concepts of work, and thus have a strong impact on interaction and co-operation within the HQ (see chapter 4.5).

“If I say to a Polish colleague he should show some initiative, then I mean, that he should do something on his own responsibility. But he will try everything to get into compliance with the original plan, even if this plan has become obsolete.” (GE) “The PL have a different perception of work than the DA or GE. This results in my opinion that people know which tasks should not be given to PL simply because they would not be solved. […] This difference in perception of work is due to the cultural difference or background.” (DA) “Poles are used to intensive and non normalised way of working. Germans, but especially Danes, emphasise planning. Sometimes it is arduous. A big pile of documents is made this way. Then, it is always not enough time to read it.” (PL)

The different perceptions of relevant characteristics became evident in the survey, and all the interviewees spoke quite frankly about their stereotypes. But the question is whether these differences can be discussed openly, or whether they become taboos. A taboo in this context is considered as a relevant matter which is obvious to all participants in an interaction process, but which is excluded from discussion for whatever reasons. When asked about the existence of such taboos within the multinational community of the HQ, the different pays and allowances were the only relevant point which was men-

84 tioned by most interviewees. Nevertheless, the behaviour visible during BALTIC CONFIDENCE as well as the analysis of the interviews supported the hypothesis that different culture-based concepts practically enforce tabooisation of existing differences within an organisation which should be striving for harmony and consensus.

For this reason, an item was integrated in the questionnaire that not only asked about the existence of taboos, but also offered a series of potential taboos for evaluation. 72.2 per cent of HQ members confirmed that there are issues which cannot be discussed openly in a multinational setting.

Figure 4.3.5: Taboos (in total numbers)

Issues that cannot be discussed or expressed

Salaries 85

National prejudices 56

Differences in qualifications 49

Differences in language skills 36

History 36

Conflicts related to work 28

National agendas 28

Politics 14

Problems related to HQ 11

Other issues 8

0 20406080100

Eighty-five out of 109 respondents thought that the differences in pay and allowances could not be addressed while all three nationalities were present. This topic was handled more hesitantly by Germans and Danes than by Poles. But 56 % of the respondents said that national prejudices were kept under the carpet, and nearly half of the respon- 85 dents said that differences in qualifications were taboo. The gaps that could be seen between the self-concepts of the HQ members and the perception by their colleagues are of decisive significance in this context. Together with some other relevant topics, which are seen as taboos by roughly one third of the HQ members, this observation gives reason to assume that avoidance of conflict is one of the major characteristics of multinational interaction within the HQ. As a consequence processes of disintegration (see chapter 4.1) by with-drawal into national realms of stability and ease of communication are probably enhanced. “I hope that the differences between the Poles and the Germans can be dealt with, but it is taboo.” (DA) “The Poles earn much less than we do. They would not complain about it, because they are much too proud. But there is a difference between one coming to work in a Polski Fiat and another one in a Mercedes or Audi. This causes social problems like envy, although that does not come to the surface.” (GE) “For instance the Germans were surprised why the Poles can’t fill up all the posts in the HQ, they did not understand that a Polish soldier needs to get an order, to be appointed and to have a written consent. The Danes were laughing while hearing things like these.” (PL)

Central Findings • HQ members highly appreciate co-operation with soldiers from other nations in the MNC NE. • Mutual perceptions are shaped by different culture-based self- concepts and stereotypes in central dimensions of daily co- operation. • Different perceptions tend to be treated as taboos, thus hampering multinational interaction between the HQ members.

86 4.4 Leadership

Leadership is an elusive concept, and it has proved very difficult to arrive at an agreed upon and precise definition of leadership. Indeed, Bass70 suggests that there are almost as many definitions of leadership as there are people who have tried to define the concept. Apart from this, leadership must also be differentiated from the concept of management, which relates to influence on systems, rules, directives and regulations, etc. The very phenomenon of leadership can be very different depending on the level it is carried out – i. e. first-line leaders vs. high-ranking leaders.71

Nevertheless, leadership involves influence in one form or another, and presupposes the existence of followers. What leaders do is to influence the behaviour, beliefs, thinking, and feelings of other group members in an intended direction.72 Thus, leadership can – although this still leaves important questions regarding the nature of leadership unanswered – be understood as social activities, through which common efforts are co-ordinated towards common goals. A prerequisite for the phenomenon of ‘effective’ leadership is therefore (among other factors): social interaction, known goals and timeframes, clear work roles and knowledge of tasks, distribution of information and guidance, control and acceptance, allocation of time and resources, the initiation of corrective actions if necessary, etc.

In larger work units, organisation is a prerequisite for co-ordinated leadership.73 To organise means to ‘bring to order’ – which stems from the Greek word ‘organon’, which relates to the English word ‘tool’ – and in this context it means to bring order in who does what, how, and when. When organisation is discussed in this report, it is in reference to a more or less permanent frame shaping HQ activities.

As stated in the section concerning ‘purposes of the MNC NE’, there seems to be a considerable lack of role clarity and maybe even role conflict on all levels of the HQ. And this lack of clarity – related to –––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 70 Bass 1960. 71 FKOPUB 1998: 180–183. 72 Katz/Kahn 1978. 73 Petersen/Sabroe 1984. 87 uncertainty about the purpose of MNC NE on the one hand and subsequent uncertainty about work processes and roles within the HQ on the other – seems to have a profound impact on life within the HQ, as individuals by themselves engage in various interpretations about their own roles and the HQ as a formal organisation. There can be no doubt that these matters have an impact on leadership – and on the perceptions of leadership within HQ MNC NE. Observations made during exercise BALTIC CONFIDENCE 2001 as well as interviews made this evident. Thus, it is hypothesised that perceptions of leadership and formal structures are heavily influenced by e. g. informal networks operating parallel with official organisational structures – structures that are upheld by individuals navigating in perceived uncertain and inefficient organisational waters. One idea is that if individual HQ members cannot engage in activities which make sense to them within the frame of the official HQ organisation, they will look elsewhere for meaning, sense, and purpose – in short: new, unofficial frames for carrying out perceived necessary organisational activities.

Furthermore, factors such as e. g. the distribution of information, decision making processes, consistency between what leadership figures say and do, changes in decisions, and information about those changes, can all be understood as components of leadership within the HQ. These and other factors will be examined in the following para- graphs, and linked to a conception of leadership as a variable in the HQ.

The purpose of this section is not to judge the quality of leadership activities within the HQ, but only to try to understand under what conditions they take place, and how it has an impact on the HQ members. When referring to leadership in this section it is understood as leadership carried out on all levels. Beginning with perceptions of ideal leaders and the respondents’ own leaders, the following unfolds:

88 Table 4.4.1: Perception of ideal leader vs. own leader

Perception of ideal leader Perception of own leader Most important Most characterising • Open-minded • Open-minded • Co-operative • Co-operative • Eloquent • Trust subordinates • Diplomatic • Straightforward • Trust subordinates • Tolerant Least Important Least characterising • Controlling • Controlling • Directive • Directive • Charismatic • Charismatic • Get things done • Eloquent • Empathic • Patience

In general, there seems to be a correspondence between the picture of the ideal leader and the perception of the respondents own leaders. It is important to note that there is no appreciable difference in this correspondence among divisions and branches, or by nationality.

On the subject of agreement and disagreement with the HQ leadership, the following picture reveals itself. Approximately one third of the respondents (32 %) report that HQ personnel very often or often express disagreement with their superiors, which in itself could constitute a problem if not handled adequately. However, it has not been revealed whether or not the respondents just disagree – or if their dis- agreements actually affect work while tasks are being solved.

89 Figure 4.4.1: Disagreement with superiors? (N = 91)

60 52% 50% 50%

40 35% 28% 21% 18% 20 14% 7% 9% 3% 3% 4% 3% 3% 0 DA GE PL

very often often sometimes rarely very rarely

Only approximately one fifth of the respondents (18.6 %) report that HQ personnel rarely or very rarely disagree with their superiors. As figure 4.4.1 shows, the German and the Polish respondents constitute the group which reports that HQ personnel often or very often express disagreement with their superiors (39.3 % resp. 38.2 %), whereas only 17.2 % of the Danes reported the same.

For organisational leadership to be effective, information is an important factor. Information serves as a foundation for the frame of understanding, in which leadership activities are carried out. Two fifths of the respondents (40.4 %) reported that appropriate information is only sometimes or rarely received in due time. The reasons for these perceptions were not a focus of the research. However, in order for the individual HQ member to be able to fulfil his function, he must be able to engage in activities which make sense, for which he theoretically needs appropriate information. Information stemming from leaders and leadership activities is here very crucial, as it affects all levels within the HQ. One can only imagine that a lack of timely information may also influence attitudes towards HQ leadership. The individual 90 soldier may also experience a change in his conditions due to orders, directives, etc., but without any insight as to why conditions have changed. This is highly likely to have an impact on group settings, resulting in lesser degrees of internal co-ordination, as not all group members receive information at the same time. This is clearly not an optimal situation for an organisation which only functions properly if all parts are co-ordinated in a synchronised manner.

Figure 4.4.2: Appropriate information in due time (N = 89)

60 50% 44% 38% 40 35% 35%

24% 23% 23% 21% 20

3% 4% 0 DA GE PL

always often sometimes rarely

When 40 per cent of the respondents report that information is only sometimes or rarely received in due time, it can be assumed that decisions made before information is at hand must be changed when the information is received.

91 Figure 4.4.3: How often are decisions changed? (N = 91)

100

60 50% 41% 43% 36% 40 35% 35% 24% 21% 20 9% 3% 3% 0 DA GE PL

always often sometimes rarely never

Interestingly enough, one in every four respondents (28.6 %) reported that decisions are often or always changed. Two fifths of the respondents (42.9 %) reported that decisions are only sometimes changed. One fourth (28.6 %) of the total population reported that decisions are rarely or never changed. Figure 4.4.3 shows that there are considerable differences between the Poles on the one side and Danes and Germans on the other side. It cannot be seen as a positive or negative quality in itself that decisions are either changed or not, as this depends on a multitude of factors within the military context. Even good plans may need to be changed when it is seen how they work when put into effect. However, it is worthwhile to consider these results in combination with the reports about whether people are informed in a timely and adequate manner when changes do occur.

Only a little more than 64 % of respondents reported that they were always or often informed in a timely and adequate manner when decisions were changed. When the results are differentiated by nationality, we see that only 43 % of the Danes reported that they were always or often informed about changed decisions, while the figures were approximately 64 % for the Germans and around 82 % for the Poles. Differentiating the results by rank showed no appreciable affect. It can

92 be assumed that it is problematic for an organisation if more than one third of its members report that they are informed about changes only sometimes or rarely.

Figure 4.4.4: Is Information about changes received in due time? (N = 90)

60 50% 43% 44% 39% 38% 40 32%

20 14% 14% 12% 4% 4% 6%

0 DA GE PL

always often sometimes rarely

It is therefore interesting to see how the decision making processes in the HQ are defined. The respondents reported as follows:

93 Figure 4.4.5: Decision making process takes place through... (N = 91)

80 68%

57% 60 45%

40 35%

20% 20 14% 14% 14% 10% 7% 9% 3% 3% 0 DA GE PL

superiors teamwork specialists others there are not made any decisions

Overall, only approximately one quarter of the respondents (23.1 %) reported that decisions were made primarily by superiors. A much larger percentage, around 57 %, believed that decisions were made through a team effort. Without making the claim that leadership and decision-making are co-terminous, we might draw the conclusion from these data that leadership within the HQ is not performed en- tirely by the appointed leaders, but that leadership functions like decision-making are also carried out through an institutionalised group effort.

The question, however, is whether ‘teamwork’ is the only alternative milieu for leadership functions within the HQ. The answers to the question “In your opinion, do unofficial networks that work parallel to the formal staff organisation exist in the HQ MNC NE?” point to something interesting:

94 Table 4.4.2: Do unofficial networks exist in HQ? (N = 90)

Denmark Germany Poland Total yes 90 % 82 % 45 % 71 % no 10 % 18 % 55 % 29 % The data reveals that more than two thirds (71.1 %) of the respondents think that unofficial networks operate parallel to the formal staff organisation within the HQ. Furthermore, these unofficial networks are believed to be shaped by specific factors indicated in the figure below.

Figure 4.4.6: Factors constituting unofficial networks ...

nationality 5858

social contacts 2222

rank 18 18 total scores

english language 1414 skills

other 8 8

00 2040608020 40 60 80

If these networks are in fact functioning parallel to official organisational structures, it may also be the case that designated leaders in the official organisational structure are filling double roles, by unfolding competing leadership activities within the unofficial networks. This could have a significant impact on the HQ MNC NE – one that goes well beyond the scope of this research. What we can say, however, is that the factors which constitute and activate these unofficial networks 95 are in direct competition with leadership within the formal staff organisation for the right to set the guidelines for activities within the HQ.

Theoretically, at least, this could constitute a real problem for the operation of the official HQ. In particular, it could strengthen the perceived disparities between what leadership officially ‘says’ and what leadership in reality does. Leadership is a social activity, and is one of many guiding factors within organisations. It is important to remember that networks work across organisational structures, and may influence decisions made by official leadership channels. The table below shows under what conditions HQ members believe these unofficial networks are activated.

Figure 4.4.7: Networks activated ...

to serveto serve national national interests interests 33 33

alwaysalways active active 22 22

underunder time time pressure pressure 20 20 total scores in thein the case case of of rumours rumours 14 14

for protection of 13 for protectionorganisational of organisational image image 13

for protectionfor of individualprotection image of 7 individual image 7

underunder other other circumstances circumstances 7 7

00 20 20406080 40 60 80

96 As can be seen, respondents report that unofficial networks are activated for a number of reasons. When looking at the Danish respondents, it is interesting to notice that a lot of them state, that the unofficial networks are always active. German respondents state that unofficial networks are primarily activated in order to serve national interests, when respondents are under time pressure and for the protection of the organisational image. The Polish respondents state that unofficial networks are primarily always active, and that they are secondar- ily activated in order to serve national interests. Interesting enough, no Danish respondent reports that networks are activated in order to pro- tect the organisational image. It is an important point to notice, however, that it is not possible to test whether all respondents acknowl- edging the existence of the unofficial networks are part of such – or whether they just think such unofficial networks exist.

Linking the above stated to the ‘leadership’ variable, it should be noted that it is impossible to conclude whether leadership within HQ allows for these networks to operate parallel with the formal staff organisation, whether leadership within HQ is unaware of the existence of these networks – or whether leadership within HQ is not able to suppress or control these networks. However, data collected during interviews indicate that almost all organisational members are aware of the existence of unofficial networks – or as one responded: “Yes. Very much. Very clearly. [...] the areas where it is most apparent, is in the areas run by [nation mentioned] leaders.” Likewise, one respondent answered the following when being addressed about the overrul- ing of superiors by usage of national channels: “If I consider something as being very important and if I’m very keen to realise it, I don’t care for the chain of command.”

Another respondent, when asked whether the unofficial networks had an impact on work within HQ, stated: ‘Decisively’ – and in relation to a question regarding the effect that this awareness could have on the organisation: “[…] this has the impact that every two months we try to stop and ‘get it right’ officially […] but once we get ‘pressed’ again, then it’s back to the unofficial way. And the problem is ever present: we have to deliver results.”

97 Another area which can give insight into leadership as a specific phenomenon within HQ is whether or not there seems to be a consistency between what HQ leadership does and says – something which in organisation theory is often described as differences between espoused theories and theories-in-use. The research team made a distinction between the consistency of the nearest superiors and that of the (more removed) HQ leadership. Figure 4.4.8 shows the perceptions of consistency between what the nearest superiors say and do.

Figure 4.4.8: Consistency between what your nearest superior says and does

Total: N = 90

100

80 56% 60 52% 41% 38% 40 32% 26%

20 7%10% 7% 11% 9% 3% 4% 3% 0 DA GE PL

high rather high neither high nor low rather low low

A clear majority (71 %) of the respondents report a high or rather high consistency between what their nearest superior says and what he actually does. By the same token, however, one third of the respondents stated that there was middling to low or very low consistency between what their nearest superior says and does.

98 When looking at how the different nationalities responded, the picture looks as follows: • 12 out of 29 (45 %) Danes reported that there was a high or rather high consistency, • 16 out of 27 (58 %) Germans said that there is a high or rather high consistency, and • 30 out of 34 (88 %) Poles stated that there is a high or rather high consistency.

The following table shows how HQ members perceive the consistency of HQ leadership in what they say and do.

Figure 4.4.9: Consistency between what HQ leadership says and does

Total: N = 90

100

60 48% 41% 35% 38% 40 31% 28% 19% 19% 11% 12% 20 7% 9% 4% 0 DA GE PL

high rather high neither high nor low rather low low

A clear majority (71 %) of the respondents reported that there was a high or rather high consistency between what the HQ leadership says and what it does. However, the remaining 29 % stated that there is only middling, low, or very low consistency. Roughly two thirds of the respondents of all three countries reported that there was a high or

99 rather high consistency between what the HQ leadership says and actually does.

Without going into lengthy theoretical elaboration, it should still be noted that the greater the incongruence between what is being said and done by the nearest superior, the more murky the organisational waters become, and the greater likelihood of uncertainty within the individual himself.

Except for the Polish soldiers, who reported a lower degree of consistency between what HQ leadership says and does (79 %), than that of their nearest superior (88 % high or rather high) – both Danes and Germans reported a noticeably higher consistency between what the HQ leadership does and says, than what their direct superiors say and do (Danish soldiers: 66 % for HQ leadership as opposed to 45% for the direct superior; German soldiers: 66 % and 58 %, respectively).

At first glance, the percentages affirming consistency in HQ leadership seem high, but it is worth noticing that more than one third of the total population are not willing to characterise the leadership as being more consistent than inconsistent. If such large numbers of subordinates perceive leadership as officially saying one thing, but doing otherwise, it is reasonable to think that this might have adverse affects.

This section could be summed up approximately thus: overall, HQ members reported a high degree of consistency between their ideal of leadership and the reality embodied by their immediate superiors. However, the uncertainty about the purpose of HQ MNC NE and subsequent uncertainty about work processes and roles within HQ also had an impact on life, as individuals tended to interpret their roles and the meaning of the HQ as a formal organisation for themselves. This lack of clarity would seem to be enhanced by the fact that one third of the respondents perceived incongruity between what leadership officially says and in reality does. On top of this, and as already indicated in the introduction to this section, leadership and formal structures are heavily influenced by informal networks operating parallel to them. Thus, if individual HQ members cannot engage in meaningful activi-

100 ties within the official HQ organisational structure and in relation to what leadership officially states, then they will look elsewhere for meaning, sense, and purpose. In short: they will most probably engage in activities within unofficial frameworks. It is then through these that they will carry out the organisational activities they perceive to be necessary. This is considered as a ‘normal reaction’ to the circumstances, which are not perceived as ‘normal’. Furthermore, it seems that distribution of information, processes related to decision- making, and situations where changes in decisions occur, could be improved. In fact, changes in these areas are a prerequisite for any organisation wishing to operate in a more efficient manner.

In the introduction to this section, we stated that ‘effective’ leadership required – among other factors – social interaction, known goals and frameworks, clarity concerning roles, knowledge of tasks to be solved, distribution of information, and so forth. The results in this section indicate that leadership activities in the HQ are not carried out under conditions even approaching this ideal. In the sense of leadership as ‘who does what and when’, leadership in the HQ MNC NE is a highly multifaceted phenomenon.

101 Central findings • Relatively high consistency between respondents’ perceptions of ideal leaders and their immediate superiors in HQ. • Uncertainty about the purpose of MNC NE and roles within HQ has an impact on life within HQ, as individuals by themselves engage in various interpretations about e. g. their own roles and the HQ as a formal organisation. • Inconsistency between what leadership says officially and actually does perceived by one third of respondents. • Informal networks operating parallel with official organisational structures influence leadership and formal structures. • Distribution of information, processes related to decision making, and situations where changes in decisions occur, could be improved. • Leadership activities are carried out under non-ideal conditions.

4.5 Communication and Co-operation

In the day-to-day work of the HQ, the personnel must interact in many different ways. Some of these interactions can be characterised as co- operation, others contribute indirectly to co-operation, and others are necessary prerequisites for co-operation to take place. There are also types of interaction which actually hinder co-operation. This chapter will identify and differentiate among these kinds of interaction, and evaluate how the inhibiting interactions can be either reduced or al- tered to enhance the interactions that facilitate communication and co- operation.

In a multinational setting such as the HQ MNC NE, there are a number of requirements that need to be in place in order for co-operation to happen. During exercise BALTIC CONFIDENCE 2001, the research team was able to observe situations that could be characterised 102 as efficient co-operation, characterised by some of the following elements: • An overarching aim serving as the guideline through which all underlying aims were co-ordinated. • A formal structure which subdivided the overall task into its func- tionalities, and thereby assigned sub-tasks or derived tasks to the members of the group. • Formalised working processes which gave the members clarity as to what to expect from each other and what was expected of them. • A common language as a prerequisite for exchanging opinions, etc. • An accessible information system that provided and distributed the information necessary for performing a function, as well as the information produced by the member in his function. • A willingness to participate in the processes, and if necessary to assist others.

These points constitute some of the apparent requirements for communication and co-operation. But there are still more require-ments which contribute to the foundation for co-operation that need to be fulfilled. Among these are knowledge and understanding of each other, which are needed in order to be able to foresee the consequences of one’s own actions upon the others, and if necessary to adjust one’s course accordingly. In short, the group needs a feeling of cohesiveness and of capability for the fulfilment of the given tasks, not to mention the ability to solve conflicts within the group if such should arise. For optimal co-operation to take place, the leaders should serve as gatekeepers, providing the group with resources sufficient to meet the goals, time schedules, and information processes, either directly or indirectly. Each individual needs to feel able to perform what is demanded of him, and must in fact possess the qualifications and skills required.74

–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 74 These requirements are also mentioned by other authors when discussing co-operation. See Triandis 2002; Kristensen 2002; Oliver/Montgomery 2000; Rummler/Brache 1991. 103 The above-mentioned could serve as frame for understanding co- operation, and to distinguish co-operation from mere parallel work. These factors will be analysed here by looking at the HQ through three dimensions: the individual, the group, and the organisation. This can create a frame for understanding how communication and co- operation work within the HQ, and how to deal with the factors that hinder these. However, before this can be done it is necessary to look at one the most important characteristics of this HQ, determining both communication and co-operation: language.

Language As mentioned earlier it is vital for co-operation that the participants receive the appropriate information in due time. Distribution of information is dependent on at least two basic factors, the first being a formalised process or system through which the members of a group can gather, accumulate, process, and redistribute information to other members. Second, the members must be able to communicate in a language that permits the transfer of information between them. This chapter will focus upon the second factor.

The official working language being English, it is fortunate that only a few soldiers self-identified a lack of oral or written skills.

Table 4.5.1: Language skills

Knowledge of English related to job performance fluent good acceptable understandable bad Speaking 30.8 42.9 18.7 7.7 0.0 Listening 37.4 48.4 13.2 1.1 0.0 Writing 19.8 45.1 24.2 8.8 2.2 Reading 38.5 44.0 13.2 2.2 2.2 The figures are percentages of the HQ military population: N = 91.

104 Even more interesting, however, is the perception of a correlation between language skills and level of influence:

Table 4.5.2: Language skills and power distribution com- do not pletely rather nei- rather agree agree agree ther/nor disagree at all Those who perform best in English have the 22.0 45.1 19.8 6.6 6.6 greatest influence The figures are percentages of the HQ military population: N = 91.

English skills, according to more than two thirds of the respondents, can serve as a power tool. This in turn widens the differences among the nations, as both the Germans and especially the Danes reported greater mastery of the English language than did the Poles.

In an attempt to avoid what was done in the German-French brigade HQ, where both languages are maintained and used by their respective nations, a common fourth language was instituted here, and was supposed furthermore to serve an integrational function by giving all HQ personnel the same (dis-)advantage of working in a foreign language. However, since there are national differences in the perceived ability to use the English language, and since this can be used as a tool to gain more or less influence, it could be argued that a common language could equally well disintegrate as integrate by distorting the official distribution of power as represented by the formal distribution of rank.

105 The Individual dimension Skill qualifications are a prerequisite for co-operation in a professional context. The individual dimension focuses on analysing the individual’s ability to co-operate. By their own estimation, more than 96 % of the personnel at the HQ feel sufficiently qualified for the function they are performing.

Table 4.5.3: Qualification (self assessment)

How qualified do you feel in your function? very rather rather qualified qualified sufficient unqualified unqualified HQ military 24.1 41.4 31.0 2.3 1.1 personnel Per cent of the military personnel in the HQ. N = 91

However, when they are asked how often they feel uncertain in their function, the picture becomes a bit less clear.

Table 4.5.4: Uncertainty in function

How often do you feel uncertain in your function? very rarely rarely sometimes usually rank and file 25.0 50.0 25.0 NCO 83.3 16.7 Senior NCO/WO 25.0 50.0 25.0 Junior Officers 54.5 36.4 9.1 Senior Officer 19.6 41.3 39.1 Per cent of the military personnel in the HQ. N = 91

One third of all personnel in the HQ at some point feel uncertain about their function. This does not necessarily mean that they are not competent after all. It can also be a consequence of the lack of role clarity within the HQ (as we discussed in chapter 4.1). This interpretation is supported by the fact that a significant number (16 out of 45) of the senior officers feel that they get the appropriate information in due time only rarely or sometimes (table 4.5.5). 106 Table 4.5.5: Availability of information

Appropriate Information in due time always often sometimes rarely rank and file 1 3 NCO 1 3 1 1 Senior NCO/WO 5 8 6 4 Junior Officers 3 3 2 3 Senior Officer 4 25 11 5 Total no.14392313

That 16 out of 46 senior officers are sometimes or often in doubt as to what actions to take only emphasises how questionable the meaning of the initial data set (regarding feelings of competence) is.

Table 4.5.6: Uncertainty concerning tasks

How often are you in doubt concerning what to do? never rarely sometimes often rank and file 3 1 NCO 3 3 Senior NCO/WO 4 16 4 Junior Officers 4 6 1 Senior Officer 1 29 14 2 Total no. 8 55 25 3

It can be argued that the lack of clarity concerning the purpose of the MNC NE described in chapter 4.1 could be the reason why so many of the senior officers describe themselves as being in doubt. It could be argued further that this uncertainty is the effect of individuals who were militarily trained and who are operating in an ostensibly military environment are actually being required to perform in a political field (at least from their own perspective). This problematic should be most clear at the top level since it is at this level where the politi-

107 cal and military agenda clash. As a high ranking respondent said during an interview: 75 “I have some difficulty in seeing not only the light at the end of the tunnel – but the actual tracks too [the respondent uses a train metaphor to describe the HQ].”

The perceived discrepancy between what leadership in the HQ says and does could be seen as another result of this lack of clarity. Not only must they operate under unclear goals and purposes, but also under a scarcity of the information which they believe to be necessary to their functions. The senior officers perceive themselves as being inappropriately informed, and it can be extrapolated that they also, as a consequence, feel unable to make the decisions needed or feel they have to alter their decisions more often than desired.

In sum, the factors on the individual plane which contribute to effective co-operation are not present in satisfactory levels. This does not mean that co-operation does not take place, but that co-operation would improve if there were more clarity or unity of purpose. That would create an overarching aim to serve as the guideline by which all underlying aims are co-ordinated.

The Group dimension Although the individuals’ self-perceptions of competence forms an important basis for co-operating with their colleagues, it is in the group dimension that co-operation actually takes place. As stated in the beginning of this chapter, a cohesive group will co-operate better because of the acknowledged interdependency. This issue of cohesion within the HQ will be analysed more in depth later in chapter 4.6 concerning organisational commitment and cohesion. This chapter will concentrate on how the individual perceives his own workgroup and its functioning by analysing perceptions of how intra-group conflicts are dealt with.

–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 75 Internal transcriptions for the usage of the research team only. 108 Nearly half of all the military personnel in the HQ feel that conflicts are not adequately managed; either that they are not managed at all, or that they are handled ‘covertly’ – not including the individuals involved and not being open about the conflict’s nature or existence.

Figure 4.5.1: How are conflicts in the context of international co-operation managed?

Total N = 85

100

80 70%

60 40% 44% 41% 40 32% 28% 21% 15% 20 9%

0 DA GE PL

overtly not at all covertly

This perception of the handling of conflicts within one’s own workgroup is very problematic, since it undermines the credibility of the group’s potency and ability to manage and regulate itself.76 Further- more, these perceptions do not differ significantly either by rank or by nationality.

As conflicts often arise from differences in opinion, it is interesting to notice that the respondents themselves withhold their opinion in order to achieve a specific result. This could imply that the respondents choose not to manage certain conflicts overtly because they have a higher priority. It is not possible to know which situations the respondents were thinking of when they answered the questions – these re- –––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 76 Kirkman/Rosen 1999. 109 sults are merely the respondents’ perceptions. It is however striking to see from the table 4.5.7 how many incidents that could lead to a conflict of opinion (in the respondent’s eyes) do not become explicit, which indicates that the conflicts are either not dealt with at all or are managed covertly.

Table 4.5.7: Own opinion and decision making

Withhold own opinion when superior has made a decision never rarely sometimes often always Total Count 5 17 25 20 20 87 Per cent 5.7 % 19.5 % 28.7 % 23.0 % 23.0 % 100.0 %

Withhold own opinion when it could create disagreement in group never rarely sometimes often always Total Count 22 25 18 19 7 91 Per cent 24.2 % 27.5 % 19.8 % 20.9 % 7.7% 100.0 %

Withhold own opinion when I want to support a consensus decision never rarely sometimes often always Total Count 12 13 23 27 15 90 Per cent 13.3 % 14.4 % 25.6 % 30.0 % 16.7 % 100.0 % Counts and percentages of the military population in the HQ.

It seems clear from this data that the prerequisite for co-operation in the group dimension, i. e. to be able to solve intra-group conflicts, is only partially met. It also appears that there is no standardised or generally agreed-upon way of handling conflicts. It could be the lack of a unifying aim that co-ordinates and aligns the efforts of the work- groups. Another reason could be the cultural bias (as seen in chapter 4.3) that prevents an open dialogue among members, and replaces it with inappropriate politeness and considerations based on mere beliefs about others instead of knowledge. Despite all this, 71.4 % of the respondents believe the co-operation between the different nationalities to be good or very good (figure 4.5.2).

110 Figure 4.5.2: Co-operation among nationalities in HQ

Total: N = 91

100

80 68% 56% 60 48% 38% 40 27%

20 11% 14% 12% 3% 10% 7% 6% 0 DA GE PL

very good good neither good/nor bad bad

This result is represented in all divisions. Based on the theory, we would assume that the respondents’ impressions of the quality of co- operation within the HQ are based on comparisons with other HQs and previous experience with multinationality. The perception would therefore not only be an expression of how co-operation is evaluated within the HQ under its present structure, it might be also compared with what goes on in other multinational, bi-national, or even national HQs that work under other circumstances. As some interviewees said: “The HQ has come a long way, and compared to other similar HQs like the GE-FR brigade HQ or the Eurocorps HQ, we are well off in the sense that we follow the NATO standards and use English as the working language.” “There is a good co-operation and the results work […] The reason why it works is because of the willingness to accept each other, lis- ten and communicate with each other and importantly to take the time to do so.”

111 In the last extract the respondent mentions a critical factor that the research team also observed during the EX BALTIC CONFINDENCE in November 2001: the time factor. This issue is further elaborated by this interviewee: “Sometimes during exercise the product can overshadow the process at the expense of the Poles – not all of them but most of them.”

It is not a question whether there exists a willingness to co-operate with other nations, but rather what the extent of that willingness is. As mentioned in chapter 4.2, the members of the HQ serve under different national conditions with respect to their careers. It can therefore be assumed that the members of different nationalities value process versus product distinctions differently. The following situation, observed during exercise BALTIC CONFIDENCE in 2001, exemplifies this point: A LTC (from one nation) came in and took over due to the fact that a COL (from another nation) asked for some information that the LTC possessed, at which point the latter took control in order to meet his agenda (getting work done fast so that the branch would be ready for STRONG RESOLVE 02).77

This shows that time pressure and different valuations of process versus product may be a threat not only to the general co-operation process, but also to the formal chain of command. It has been mentioned before that there are competing structures within the HQ. Some of them are unofficial structures which arise out of perceived needs for efficiency, and others are based on nationality and social bonds.

When directly asked about how often national as opposed to functional colleagues are involved, it is therefore not surprising to see that only a minority of the respondents never involve national colleagues instead of the colleagues they should involve based on the official functional structure.

–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 77 Extract of the observation schemes of the 15th of November made during EX BALTIC CONFIDENCE 2001. 112 Table 4.5.8: Involvement of national colleagues How often are national rather than functional colleagues involved? never rarely sometimes often always Total Count 12 21 41 15 1 90 Per cent 13.3 % 23.3 % 45.6 % 16.7 % 1.1 % 100.0 % Counts and percentages of the military population in the HQ.

This practice is not confined to a certain rank group, nation, or division but is spread throughout the HQ. Thus it is needed to consider the possibility that there exist other networks in the HQ, networks that overtake the formal structure for many different reasons and at many different times. This issue will be evaluated next.

The Organisational dimension As was stated in chapter 4.4, a majority of HQ personnel acknowledge the existence of unofficial networks which compete with the formal structure. These networks are reported to be either always active, or to be activated primarily for two reasons: to serve national interest or because of time pressure. These reasons are also seen in the origins of the networks: nationality, social contacts, or ranks. All three can serve to disrupt the normal chain of command or serve other aims and objectives than those officially stated.

The HQ might therefore not only be divided into the different divisions and branches on a horizontal level and into the rank and command structure on the vertical. For the analysis, it is also necessary to include these unofficial networks, which work alongside the official structure. During the exercise and the interviews, several respondents referred to the unofficial networks as dividing the HQ into the command level, the decision level, and the working level.

At the ‘command level’ they perceive themselves and are perceived by the other two levels as being the ones who are in charge of the HQ and the MNC. To this end they meet on a daily basis in order to agree upon the way ahead for the MNC. It is at this level that the different tasks and aims both political and military are being decided and pri- 113 oritised. There are three explicit goals (ART. V, CRO/PSO and disaster relief), and one semi-unofficial (the integration of Poland), the latter being a politically sensitive subject and dividing the member countries into two camps.

There is within the CMD group a perceived necessity to reach unani- mous decisions. This can take a great deal of time, because of the differences in background and nationality – time in which the CMD group is regarded as by the lower levels as inactive and ineffective in reaching the aims set for the MNC. Furthermore the CMD group seems to be unwilling to expose differences in opinion to the rest of the HQ because of the danger of making national differences explicit, which could impede the multinational co-operation in the lower levels.

At the ‘decision level’, consisting of the ACOS of the different divisions with the COS as a partner, the apparent inactivity at the ‘command level’ leaves them in a vacuum that they feel must be filled if the HQ is to be run at all. They perceive themselves as being the ones who run the HQ on a daily basis. The different respondents report that there is a power struggle among the ACOSs partly due to the apparent indecisiveness at the ‘command level’.

Some ACOSs feel themselves to be – and in fact are – more influen- tial than others. G3 and G5 are the divisions who do the planning and decide how to concretise the aims set by the CMD. The initiative lies with these divisions, creating an uneven balance not only among the divisions, but also among the member states: GE and DA lead these divisions, shutting PL out of the centre of gravity.

The fact that the ‘command level’ does not take control also leaves a power vacuum at the ‘decision level’, possibly allowing the individuals at this level to set their own goals and priorities, which may not always accord with overall HQ aims.

The ‘working level’, despite being the largest in terms of numbers, consists of the lower ranking branch chiefs and other staff officers and therefore enjoys only limited official influence. The respondents from this level complain and speculate about the other higher levels. It is

114 also at this level that the spread of rumours is the most lively, partly due to lack of information, but also due to prejudices towards the other nationalities and divisions.

It is at this level that the lack of clear prioritisation between the political and military aims is the most obvious, since it is at the ‘working level’ that the aims have to be put into practice. There is also a bigger spread at this level in perceptions of the overall aim of the HQ. Be- cause of the difference in the goal perception, different aspects of multinational co-operation are stressed. The problems of multinational co-operation are seen as effects of actions taken by individuals at either the ‘command level’ or the ‘decision level’.

This lack of clarity and command is part of the reason why members of the HQ at the ‘working level’ seem to feel they have to use unofficial networks and national contacts. They perceive it at a way to handle the apparent confusion on the official decision-making levels.

There is also the existence of the formal national networks, comprising the senior national officers, national elements, and the respective national members working at the HQ. It is through these channels that national tasking in regards to requirements set by the member states is performed. These tasks include career planning, unions, economy, and salaries.

As will be see in chapter 4.7, the issue of national networks also has a foundation in the social life of the Szczecin Garrison. This informal national network consists of all people both military and civilian living in the Szczecin area. Within this network, the main topics are housing, school, social conditions, and integration into Polish society. As such, this network has nothing to do with the HQ, but given that it is comprised of the same people, and that the HQ has an interest in its personnel’s general well-being, it cannot be considered wholly separate.

There are probably many different reasons for the respondents to use networks and contacts other than the formalised ones given in the structure of the HQ. Each of these competing networks serves to meet

115 different needs, and it will be difficult to remove them unless the formal structure assumes responsibility for those needs.

In sum, a number of new points have been clarified: English as the common working language integrates the personnel through the creation of a common platform for communication across the national barriers, but at the same time, language skills are perceived as a power tool that potentially disrupts the formal distribution of power and authority in the HQ.

The lack of clarity about the purpose for the MNC NE affects the personnel on an individual level, and therefore throughout the HQ. Co- operation is currently suffering, and could possibly be enhanced if there were more clarity or unity regarding the MNC NE’s purpose. If there were an overarching, commonly agreed-upon purpose, more conflicts might be dealt with in an open forum, again enhancing co- operation and communication. Lastly, keeping in mind that the members activate unofficial networks as a last resort to meet the aims and objectives demanded of them, the usage of these networks hampers the official organisational structure. Attention to the previous points could result in the unofficial networks becoming obsolete or at least less essential.

116 Central findings • The common working language (English) does not serve solely as an integrating factor, it also distorts the formal distribution of power. • The requirements for the individual soldier to contribute to co- operation are not fully met. Co-operation would improve if there were more clarity or unity as to the purpose of the MNC NE. • The group level does not manage conflict efficiently enough. Too many of the members feel that conflicts are not dealt with or inadequately managed. • The existence of unofficial networks serving national or other interests disrupt the functioning of the formal organisation charts and chains of command, thereby leaving the question of who ‘runs’ the HQ unanswered.

4.6 Cohesion and Organisational Commitment

Research on cohesion and organisational commitment goes all the way back to the roots of military psychology and military sociology as independent disciplines. Then, the questions were: why do soldiers fight, and what keeps the military organisation together in the extreme social situation of war? Even today, under political circumstances which, at least in Europe, essentially ignore the possibility of traditional warfare, cohesion in the military and organisational commitment to the military still matter. In the case of military multinationality, the academic interest in cohesion and commitment seems to be particularly intense, since – for the past 200 years or so – militaries have been primarily nationally defined, and have constituted a major defining institution for national sovereignty. Therefore the question arises, how parts of nationally defined armed forces and their soldiers work in a multinational environment. In the self image of most armies, their own central purpose is still the protection of the national sover-

117 eignty and national territory of their homelands.78 But with the ongo- ing process of European integration, this form of legitimisation seems to be undergoing a change. Most European countries’ armies are involved in some way in multinational forces; be it in ad-hoc deployments or on a regular basis. Since the centripetal forces of a commonly shared national heritage cannot exist in multinational units, it is to be expected that the cultivation of cohesion and commitment are even more important for such military organisations. Because of the above-mentioned reasons, as well as the need to uphold coherent fighting capabilities, multinational formations like the MNC NE have a special interest in creating positive cohesion among their members, and commitment to their organisation.

The abstract term ‘cohesion’ is known to the military world as com- radeship, which most often signifies trust in one’s peers in rank, but also includes trust in one’s superiors and subordinates. The concept of military unit cohesion is based on the notions of trust and solidarity in the primary group.79 It is similar to the concept of esprit de corps, which becomes relevant on the level of the larger military institution to which the soldier is bound. The second concept that will be applied here is that of commitment: it is closely related to concepts like motivation, occupational content, and involvement, but goes beyond them because it is more global, and thus more stable in the face of day-today work experience. The other three concepts or constructs can be rather regarded as correlates, which partly determine the broader concept of commitment. Some psychological approaches of combat morale (Manning 1991: 458) are quite similar to approaches of organisational commitment, in both denotation and connotation.

Military psychological and sociological literature most often simply uses the term ‘commitment’, without further distinguishing between different approaches to and concepts of it. Concepts of commitment can be differentiated first by those which understand commitment in regard to a personal attitude towards an organisation (organisational commitment), and those which conceptualise commitment in relation –––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 78 Now that armed forces no longer operate only in areas of responsibilities, but also in areas of interests, the question of self-legitimisation is becoming even more complicated for the individual soldier. 79 Manning 1991: 458. 118 to individual behaviour. In this report, the concept of organisational commitment (attitude) will be used. Secondly, one has to distinguish among three dimensions of organisational commitment, which Allen & Meyer (1990) introduced and which have meanwhile become generally accepted as for the useful integration of a couple of other different approaches. This tri-dimensional approach consists of ‘affective commitment’, ‘continuance commitment’ and ‘normative commitment’. For the quantitative part of this research project, specific item- batteries on the dimension ‘affective commitment’, which mainly represents aspects of occupational content and perceived organisational fairness, were used. ‘Continuance commitment’ is much more characterised by an unmotivated attitude towards the organisation, where e. g. a situation of not being capable to leave the organisation due to the lack of other possibilities creates rather a dependency on the organisation. Therefore it represents a factor in the maintenance of the individual’s steady commitment to an organisation. ‘Normative commitment’ can be understood as a more idealistic motivation towards participation in an organisation.

The concept of military unit cohesion was introduced by Shils and Janowitz (1948), who focused on the question of why even separated units of the Wehrmacht fought vigorously until the very end of World War II. Their and Stouffers et al. (1949) explanation for this phenomenon was the extreme cohesion within the primary group of those military units. Military unit cohesion consists of the relationship between soldiers within the same rank group (horizontal cohesion) and the relationship towards the superior/subordinate (vertical cohesion). What is beyond the formal structures of the military is comrade- ship. It can play a major role concerning the specific positive or negative quality of military unit cohesion.80

It remains unclear in the academic debate whether, in a multinational context, cohesion and commitment are fed from other sources than in a national context. The fact that research on the multinational organisation of the military is still at an explorative stage81 and that comparative research on the military concerning this issue did not really –––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 80 Roghmann/Ziegler 1977: 149, 169f. 81 See chapter 2. 119 exist until this study, only adds to the confusion. Given the specific conditions and circumstances under which military multinationality is happening, it seems most probable that differences to the national context will be observed. The first step, therefore, is to describe the phenomenon of cohesion and commitment in a multinational context. The second step is to draw analytical conclusions.

The ways in which cohesion and commitment are expressed and the forms which they take are expected to be similar to the national context. Successful co-operation and communication are regarded as indi- cators for the existence of positive cohesion and commitment, while at the same time being factors which mould and reinforce cohesion and commitment. Although the individual will for co-operation and communication is relevant as a basic precondition, the mere intention to belong is not sufficient for the actual existence of cohesion and commitment. In this regard, contradictions between the general statements in the interviews and the quantitative survey are helpful: Most of the interview partners stated that conflicts are being solved in an open and direct manner. In the quantitative survey, however, 47 % of the HQ personnel agreed with the statement that conflicts are solved covertly or not at all. Such a contradictory result might be interpreted as a wishful thinking for harmony, but in fact it indicates behavioural uncertainty among the members of the HQ. On the one side, it seems that the HQ’s personnel is not willing to admit in the situation of an interview the existence of conflicts, on the other side, conflicts in co- operation of course exist, but half the personnel states that they are not openly or even not at all dealt with.

120 Figure 4.6.1: How are conflicts in the context of international co-operation managed? (N = 85)

100

80 70%

60 44% 40% 41% 40 32% 28% 21% 15% 20 9%

0 DA GE PL overtly not at all covertly

The phenomenon of the negation of conflicts is familiar not only to the specific research on intercultural communication and co-operation, but also to sociology, where Eder (1999) calls it the paradox of intercultural communication. Because of the boundaries of inter- subjective understanding, there are circumstances where more intercultural communication means less understanding. We assume this to have a huge impact on military cohesion in the multinational context. Eder argues that we have to accept that human beings tend mostly not to understand each other. Therefore the very idea of consensus is fiction, which as a result leads to destructive results, because both sides will try to push through their view of the supposed ‘common’ understanding.82 He demands therefore not to make the classical consensus the aim of communicative interaction, but dissent. Eder states, that we have to accept dissent as the normal although paradoxi- cal condition for communication and interaction in order to avoid the destructive results of the classical ideal of consensus. He introduces a new concept of consensus, one which is only formally determined as rules allowing for communicative dispute, where no one can be forced

–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 82 Eder 1999: 77. 121 to share given morale obligations.83 But exactly this seems to be most unlikely in intercultural interactions, where the actors are rather keen on good understanding and conflict-free co-operation. Military multinationality takes place under precisely these circumstances, where soldiers from various national, cultural, and organisational cultural backgrounds try actively to co-operate with each other. A German officer stated: “Here we are used to give proposals for improvement together with critical remarks. But the disadvantage is, that in this friendly multinational language, bad products or bad developments appear much better or more beautiful than they deserve to. Then people are told that they have made such efforts, that these efforts are very much appreciated, instead of telling them clearly – in a calm and friendly but clear way – that their product didn’t fulfil the requirements. I can’t bring things forward, if I try to avoid such uncomfortable situations.”

Intercultural co-operation that frees itself from the classical ideal of consensus might be able to create situations where social interaction is more pessimistic about power and inequality of actors, but at the same it helps to avoid false fictions and illusions. Taboos that go hand in hand in hand with the classical ideal of consensus might be reduced, too.

It is common in intercultural situations for there to be issues that cannot be mentioned to members of other nationalities. It is therefore not surprising that such taboos are also widespread in the HQ, and they can be expected to influence cohesion within the respective units. Of all soldiers in the HQ, two thirds agreed that there are topics that are considered to be taboo in the presence of soldiers from the other two nations. This opinion is found among the soldiers of all the three nations to an equal extent. The main taboos are in order of their strength: salaries, professional qualifications, national prejudices, and language skills.

–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 83 Eder 1999: 78. 122 Figure 4.6.2: Are there issues one can’t discuss?

N = 90 100 NDA = 29 NGE = 28 N = 33 80 69% PL 64% 63% 60

36% 36% 40 31%

0 DA GE PL

yes no

Horizontal cohesion Each soldier is integrated into an organisational unit, which can manage to reach its goals only through common effort, and that in turn helps the soldier to fulfil his basic professional needs.84 The specific cohesion of a military unit on the level of the soldier’s function is called horizontal cohesion. Views on one’s own unit within HQ divisions are positive. For most soldiers in the HQ, the branch or the division is the relevant military unit for the purposes of horizontal cohesion. A German officer confirmed this: “In the multinational environment, it is not the HQ that has an impact on the people working here, it is the division.”

The results of a specific item battery85 on horizontal cohesion showed that the soldiers did indeed perceive their units this way, and in general gave quite positive pictures concerning horizontal cohesion within the HQ (although it must be remembered that the HQ as an organisation is more than the sum of its units). The soldiers of the HQ were asked for their perceptions of several items which can indicate some- –––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 84 Manning 1991: 457. 85 Three of the nine items were taken from Podsakoff/MacKenzie (1994: 702–713) and were adapted to the specific military vocabulary. 123 thing about the level of horizontal cohesion within their respective units. A majority (69 %) of the interviewees agreed completely or rather completely with the statement that members of the unit were content with each other. There seems to be general trust in the each others’ work, since nearly three quarters (73 %) of respondents agree completely or somewhat with this statement, although the Danish soldiers were far more sceptical on this particular issue than soldiers from the two other nations. Furthermore, on average there seems to be a high degree of trust – the central element of cohesion – within the various units. A strong majority (84 %) of the soldiers of all three nations stated that they completely or rather trust each other in their units. Again, the Danish soldiers were more reluctant to agree than the rest, while the Polish soldiers agreement was far above the average. A Polish officer said: “We understand the importance of the tasks given to us, while performing them. We work together, there is a great mutual understanding and help. In spite of a big number of tasks, we perform them because we understand each other.”

Figure 4.6.3: Trust in each others work

N = 90 N = 29 100 DA NGE = 28 80 NPL = 33

60 54% 35% 38% 35% 40 28% 28% 29%

20 10% 15% 7% 7% 6% 6% 4% 0 DA GE PL

agree rather agree neither/nor rather disagree disagree

124 A full 58 % of the soldiers in the HQ agreed completely that they are co-operative in their unit, and some 30 % more rather agreed with this statement. This extremely strong result of 88 % agreement is underlined by the near evenness of the answers among the three nations, an agreement which can be found in hardly any of the other answers to statements about cohesion. One exception might be the agreement found on the question of whether comrades in the unit care about what each other thinks, where 79 % completely or rather agreed. Concern- ing the question of whether the others cared about what one feels, the answers were very uneven. Although in general 65 % completely or rather agree that this is the case in their unit, 41 % of the Danish soldiers said that this was neither/nor or even rather not the case. 29 % of the Polish soldiers, and only 18 % of the German soldiers, said neither/nor concerning this statement.

On the question of whether the people in one’s unit praise each other for a job well done, the answers are equally heterogeneous. Of the small majority (57 %) that completely or rather agreed, a large number of Germans completely agreed, and a large number of Polish and Danish soldiers only rather agreed. It seems especially significant that one third of the Danish soldiers said neither/nor, and another third said that they rather do not agree with this statement. This shows how very different especially Danish and German views on the question of praise in the HQ are. Such a difference in the perception on a central element of interactions at the workplace can cause a great deal of misunderstanding.

A large majority (79 %) agreed with the statement, that in one’s unit they stand up for each other. Half of these agreed completely, and the rest rather agreed. But again the pattern appears that the Danish soldiers are more sceptical and the Polish soldiers are more enthusiastic. The Polish enthusiasm becomes especially evident concerning the statement, if people in the unit care for each other (figure 4.6.4). Twice as many Polish soldiers as either Danish or German soldiers agreed completely with this statement. One third of the Danish and German soldiers even stated neither/nor or rather not. But altogether three-quarters of the soldiers of all the three nations agreed completely or rather with this statement.

125 Figure 4.6.4: Members of the unit take care of each other

N = 90 N = 29 100 DA NGE = 27 N = 34 80 PL

60 53% 41% 41% 39% 40 33% 21% 26% 17% 21% 20 6% 3% 0 DA GE PL

agree rather agree neither/nor rather disagree disagree

While the questions above focused on the perception of the interpersonal behaviour of the members of a unit, another focus was put on the perceived activities and processes within the respective unit. Again it has to be emphasised, the survey asked specifically for the individual soldier’s perception of reality, and not for his normative expectations. A plurality of soldiers among all the three nations (45 %) said that it was rather important in their daily work to reach common decisions. This can be regarded as a very important result, since it indicates that this central issue of military multinationality stands indeed in the centre of the soldiers’ work. At the same time, one quarter said it was very important, while another quarter said it was neither important nor unimportant to find common decisions. The same balanced image can be found concerning the importance of reaching the objectives and deadlines, where a plurality among all three nations (47 %) found this very important for their daily work.

Since the HQ as an organisation serves not only operational, but also training purposes, the importance of learning can be considered to be very high. The opportunities and willingness to learn from one’s comrades is also an indicator of the quality of cohesion in a unit (figure 4.6.5). In the HQ, this aspect meets with very different assess- 126 ments. For nearly half the personnel, it is a rather important issue in their daily routines. However, half the Polish soldiers state that learning from their comrades is a very important part of their daily work, while for about one third of the Danish and German soldiers it is neither important nor unimportant, or even a rather unimportant part of their work to learn from comrades. There is clearly an unbalance among soldiers of different nationalities.

Figure 4.6.5: To learn from colleagues in my unit

N = 90 100 NDA = 28 NGE = 28 80 NPL = 34 57% 53% 60 46% 40 27% 25% 21% 21% 14% 14% 20 7% 7% 4% 4% 0 DA GE PL

very important rather important neither/nor rather unimportant completely unimportant

It is also not enough that there be a willingness to learn. There must also be someone present who is able and willing to share his or her experience with others. Soldiers of the HQ were therefore asked to which extent it is part of their daily work to share their own experience with others (figure 4.6.6). One quarter of all the soldiers in the HQ perceived this to be a very important task, half of them regarded it as rather important, and one fifth as neither important nor unimportant. The fact that one third of the Danish soldiers perceived sharing their experience with others as neither important nor unimportant indicates that they don’t observe this in their environment, and may further indicate that a large number of them might not act in such a way themselves because they feel it is not demanded. The idea that such behaviour is in fact necessary went through the interviews with the Danish soldiers like a scarlet threat. However, in general the data

127 indicate that sharing one’s experience is regarded to be important, although not very important. This speaks for a rather positive quality of cohesion within the respective units of the HQ.

Figure 4.6.6: To share my experience with others

N = 90 100 NDA = 29 NGE = 28 80 NPL = 33 57% 58% 60 38% 40 28% 31% 25% 14% 21% 15% 20 3% 4% 6% 0 DA GE PL

very important rather important neiter/nor rather unimportant completely unimportant

Last but not least there is the specific phenomenon of contentedness among soldiers of the same rank group as an aspect of horizontal cohesion. Both the qualitative interviews and the quantitative survey provided evidence that the soldiers of all three nations in the HQ are equally content with their comrades of the same rank group. The enormous majority (91 %) of them stated that they were content or rather content with those comrades in the HQ.

Vertical cohesion Performance, behaviour, and feelings of the soldier are to a large extent shaped by the hierarchical relation of superiors and subordinates (Bröckling 1997: 11). This phenomenon is referred to as vertical cohesion. Seventy-three per cent of all the soldiers in the HQ said that they were content with their direct superiors, although the figure for the German soldiers was only 59 %. All in all, it appears that direct superiors in the HQ are appreciated. Furthermore, the qualities the soldiers in the HQ demanded of a superior in a multinational context 128 came very close to the soldiers’ perceptions of the realities of their own direct superiors. The soldiers expected the ideal superior in a multinational context to be open, while the least important attribute cited was ‘controlling’. It is precisely in this way that most of the soldiers evaluated the performance of their direct superiors. Furthermore, two thirds of the soldiers completely or rather agree with the statement, that the words and deeds of the direct superior are consistent with each other. However, only among the Polish soldiers did a majority agree completely with this statement, while majorities of the Danish and German soldiers only rather agreed, and there was even a slight tendency to answer that superiors were neither primarily consistent nor inconsistent.

Figure 4.6.7: Consistency between what your nearest superior says and does

N = 90 100 NDA = 29 NGE = 27 80 NPL = 34 56% 60 52% 41% 38% 40 26% 32% 10% 20 11% 9% 3% 7% 7% 4% 3% 0 DA GE PL

high rather high neither high nor low rather low low

With 71 % of the soldiers in the HQ saying that they consider what the leadership of the HQ says and actually does to be consistent, there seems to be a relatively high degree of vertical cohesion with immediate superiors. Of those 71 %, there were 31 % who completely agreed and 40 % who rather agreed. Once more, the Polish soldiers were more enthusiastic than their Danish and German comrades, who again evinced a tendency towards a neither/nor attitude. There were no significant differences in perceptions found between the rank groups. 129 Figure 4.6.8: Consistency between what HQ leadership says and does

N = 90 100 NDA = 29 NGE = 27 80 NPL = 34

60 48% 35% 41% 38% 40 31% 28% 19% 19% 11% 20 9% 12% 7% 4% 0 DA GE PL

high rather high neither high nor low rather low low

German and Polish soldiers were much more likely than Danish soldiers to report that soldiers of the HQ contradict their superiors openly. Because in principle all soldiers share the same work conditions, it seems likely that this difference in perception is the result of different national understandings of ‘open contradiction’. A Danish soldier might think that another soldier is simply expressing an opinion, while German and Polish soldiers might interpret the same behaviour as open contradiction. This might indicate that while the degree of vertical cohesion is relatively similar among countries, the practices that express cohesion can still be quite different.

Organisational Commitment The concept of organisational commitment describes a longer-term established, basic, and stable attitude towards one’s own organisation.86 As mentioned above, affective commitment was the focus of the quantitative survey. In order to extract the appropriate information, an item battery87 with two negative and two positive statements concerning affective commitment was used. –––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 86 Moser 1996. 87 The four items were taken from Meyer/Allen (1997) and modified to military terms. 130 There are slightly different national attitudes on commitment to be found: three quarters of the soldiers in the HQ completely or rather agreed with the positive statement that they ‘feel like part of the family in the HQ’. Majorities of the Danish and Polish soldiers completely agreed with this statement, while the majority of the German soldiers answered only that they ‘rather agreed’. Again, a majority (69 %) of the soldiers completely or rather agreed with the positive statement, that they have a ‘strong sense of belonging to the HQ’ (figure 4.6.9). But this time it was the Danish soldiers who agreed at a rate of only 50 %, while the other half of them said neither/nor or even that they rather disagreed. This indicates that there are two different ways to express affective commitment to the HQ, because the answers of the German and Danish soldiers to two apparently similar questions show two different patterns. Obviously, the idea of being part of a family in one’s organisation attracts Danish soldiers (at least those in this sample) more than German soldiers, while it is the other way round concerning the idea of belonging to the organisation.

Figure 4.6.9: Strong sense of belonging to HQ

N = 90 100 NDA = 29 NGE = 27 N = 34 80 PL

60 50% 41% 36% 36% 35% 40 29%

14% 14% 15% 20 7% 9% 7% 7%

0 DA GE PL

agree rather agree neither/nor rather disagree disagree

131 The first of the two negative statements concerning commitment, that ‘the HQ has no personal meaning’, was either completely or somewhat denied by 78 %, but the extent to which the Germans and Poles dismissed this statement was much stronger than on the Danish side. Similarly, although 81 % of respondents completely or somewhat denied that ‘working in the HQ is just a job for me’, twice as many Germans as Danes or Poles dismissed this statement ‘completely’. There also appeared to be a gap between NCOs and officers (figure 4.6.10). NCOs show a much more pragmatic attitude towards their work in the HQ. Only one third of them disagreed or rather disagreed with the statement that work in the HQ is just a job, while nearly three quarters of the officers disagreed or rather disagreed. It is hard to say whether this is specific to the situation in this particular HQ, to HQs in general (where NCOs always represent a minority), or actually common to the NCO corps of all armed forces in general.

Figure 4.6.10: Working in HQ is just a job for me

N = 90 100 NO = 56 NNCO = 30 80 75% NRF = 4

60 43% 37% 40 27% 30% 25% 20% 17% 18% 20 7% 2% 0 rank and file nco officers

agree rather agree neither/nor rather disagree disagree

132 The results of the item-battery above were further confirmed by the response to the question of whether, if the soldier had to decide again, he or she would come to the HQ again (figure 4.6.11). Half of the respondents replied that they would come back ‘without hesitation’. However, while sixty per cent of the German and Polish soldiers said so, only one third of the Danish soldiers did. Around one third of each of the three nations said that they would ‘most probably’ come again to the HQ. The Danish soldiers were far more likely than the others to choose one of the less positive options (likely, rather not, definitely not). It is hard to say whether in the context of the HQ MNC NE this item says more about affective commitment or about continuance commitment. The problem – mentioned by several of the soldiers – is that the German and Polish armed forces are both in the midst of awkward fundamental reform processes, which can essentially be avoided by going to an international HQ. Therefore, at least in the German and Polish case, this item may be much more about the need to stay in this specific organisation because of the difficult conditions in the organisations at home. In the case of the Polish soldiers, the threat of losing one’s post due to the immense reduction of the Polish armed forces may add further to the need to become internationally qualified: it is one more safeguard against being fired. The perspective of being sent the next time to Brussels, Rome, etc. could also be regarded as a factor for affective commitment to this organisation, since it provides practically the only means for such an assignment.

133 Figure 4.6.11: If I had to decide again to come to HQ I would come again ...

N = 90 100 NO = 56 NNCO = 30 80 NRF = 4 61% 62% 60 38% 35% 32% 40 30% 14% 20 7% 7% 7% 6% 3% 0 DA GE PL

without hesitation most probably likely rather not definitely not

Normative commitment develops, according to theory, from organisational commitment values, which in turn stem from idealistic motives that develop through long term processes and which often develop before the organisation is entered, if anything contributing to the decision to become part of that organisation. In the case of the HQ MNC NE, the idea of supporting the process of integration of the east- central European countries was the main such issue. Not only was it mentioned often in the interviews (especially by German interviewees), but a survey item concerning the importance of several possible reasons for being part of the HQ supported those findings. For a majority of all soldiers in the HQ, it was very important or rather important to contribute to the European integration of the eastern Euro- pean countries through their participation in the HQ. There were no major differences to be seen in this attitude among ranks. However, there was a significant difference among how the various nationalities perceived the importance of this goal. While only half of the Danish respondents considered this aspect of belonging to the HQ to be important, fully 81 % of the German soldiers considered it important. A clear majority (70 %) of the Polish soldiers also considered their own integration into Europe as an important aspect of their work in the

134 HQ. Normative commitment appears to be predictive of positive outcomes, although not as strongly as affective commitment.

All in all, the results demonstrate that there is a pretty high level of organisational commitment to the HQ among the soldiers. At the same time, it becomes obvious that there are significant differences among soldiers of different nationalities in their general commitment to the HQ. Grosso modo is that the organisational commitment of the Danish soldiers lies well under the average, while that of the Germans is slightly above the average and the Polish soldiers are somewhere in between.

A huge majority (71 %) of the surveyed soldiers stated that co- operation among nationalities was very good or good. Among the third of soldiers who stated that the co-operation was neither good nor bad, or rather bad, the Danish soldiers formed the largest group. The figures indicate that almost half the Danish soldiers in the HQ have problems with the way things are done on the HQ MNC NE. 88 A Danish soldier expressed it in an interview thus: “We don’t really talk, you know. Things are just the way they are. Here all that matters is just delegating out as much work as possible. That’s what it‘s all about, really. In this way people can minimise their own workload. I don’t like it this way.”

With this in mind, the constantly reserved attitudes of the Danish soldiers concerning horizontal cohesion and affective commitment might have to be understood as a lack of what they perceive as normal. A Danish officer said: “We lack not the political, more the daily things. I have some difficulty in seeing not only the light at the end of the tunnel – but the timetables.”

–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 88 Since, in some areas of the literature, “[...] how things are done in a military organisation” (Center for Security and International Studies [CSIS] 2000: xviii.) is how ‘military culture’ is understood, such a finding could indicate the serious problem that one element in the multinational force is rejecting the force’s military culture. 135 The indication is that there still needs to be a great deal of effort in- vested in the further development of the HQ’s cohesion and commitment. In an intercultural environment like this, there cannot be one single way to build and rebuild the necessary trust among soldiers once and for all. A false consensus will often hinder rather than help the further evolution of a multinational esprit de corps. More openness, and especially more willingness to tolerate dissent, may in the end support the creation of deep trust on all sides. That in combination with the already existing broad will for multinational co-operation might open up the path for deepened military multinationality.

Central findings • Vertical cohesion in the units of the HQ organisation is high. People seem to trust each other. • Horizontal cohesion between subordinates, and vertical cohesion with both direct and indirect superiors in the HQ are high. Polish soldiers demonstrated more enthusiasm than their Danish and German comrades. • Organisational commitment in the HQ is less pronounced than cohesion, but in general quite positive. Still, there are distinct differences among the three nations concerning the degree of organisational commitment.

4.7 Social Structure of the HQ and Social Life in the Szczecin Gar- rison

It was Lang89 who directed the focus of academic research to the communal character of military life90, which one could describe by its degree of hierarchy and formal regulations which demand control and discipline. According to this concept, these features seem to be some of the important characteristics of military as compared to civilian life.

–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 89 Lang 1965. 90 See Snider 1999: 15; Recht/Soeters 1998: 172. 136 These characteristics can be understood as important aspects of the specific culture connected with military organisations.

From the perspective of its social life, the HQ MNC NE is a unique organisation with its own stratification system, including positions, roles, and networks, in which one can distinguish formal and informal microstructures. The HQ represents a formal bureaucratic organisation based on the division of competence and oriented towards the goal of achieving both official and unofficial results. National backgrounds also play an important role in the shaping of different groups within this organisation (see chapter 4.3). Social networks are crucial components to the HQ. Military multinationality can be regarded as a collective activity based on a common, permanent political and strategic basis. Finally, the HQ resembles a special cultural laboratory in which three historically shaped types of national and military cultures exist together and influence each other’s ways of thinking, life, and activities.

Social structure The HQ MNC NE forms the nucleus of the multinational military community in the Szczecin garrison, to which the three National Sup- port Elements and the (Polish) HQ-company also belong. The entire community totals about 400 persons: 43 Danes, 76 Germans and 284 Poles.91 The differences between them are in the first instance due to national regulations and obligations, as can be seen from the different sizes of the National Support Elements (Danish: 6 persons, Ger- man: 26 including a civilian administration, and Polish: 52). As the host nation, Poland has to provide personnel for various organisational and administrative functions. In the HQ itself, the distribution of personnel is as follows:

–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 91 As of the end of February 2003; source: MNC NE G1. 137 Table 4.7.1: Structure by status and nation92 Nationality Structure by Status Total Danish German Polish Generals+ADCs (rotating) 2 2 2 6 Officers 22 22 28 72 NCOs 12 21 16 49 Privates 2 2 4 Civilians/local personnel 3 22 25 Total 37 50 69 156

The founding generation of MNC NE, coming out of the NATO CORPS LANDJUT in 1999, saw itself strongly in the role of pioneers building up something new and very special. In the interviews, a ‘spirit of Szczecin’ was mentioned frequently to describe the mood and the motivation of the start-up period. Nevertheless – in the words of some interviewees – step by step, the HQ is about to become a normal military organisation with its regular tours of duty and the fluctuation of personnel which is typical for the armed forces. After the initial period and first experiments, common procedures and conventions have been established, routines have been trained-up, and a mentoring system has been created for newcomers in order to facilitate their integration. Not least, questions of housing and schooling have been largely settled (in spite of the persistence of some problems like the necessity to create a new international school in 2002). Al- though some interview partners engaged in some nostalgia over the exciting and interesting times of the beginning, the process of nor- malisation seems to be going on without significant friction.

–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 92 Multinational Corps Northeast, Information Booklet 2001: 14; MNC NE G1. 138 Table 4.7.2: Time of belonging to the HQ/fluctuation93 From the beginning 60 (incl. previous assignment to LANDJUT) since 2000 17 since 2001 36 since 2002 23

The presence of the families of the HQ members has a special significance for social life in a foreign environment, as Szczecin is for the Danes and the Germans (see below). Although most HQ members reside in Szczecin together with their families, there are also a number of persons who have to shuttle back and forth between Szczecin and their homes. It is noteworthy that fewer Danes than Germans or Poles leave their families at home and accept an assignment in Szczecin. This might be due to national habits or constraints. In Germany, shut- tling has become more and more part of the professional image of soldiers. In Poland, regulations prohibit soldiers to return to their for- mer housing facilities after a tour of duty in the HQ. Furthermore the wives of the Polish soldiers do not see chances for finding an adequate substitute for their jobs in Szczecin.

Table 4.7.3: Residence in/outside Szczecin94 Danish German Polish Nationality Nationality Nationality Married/partnership 35 39 75 Residence in Szczecin Single 52531 Residence in Szczecin Married/partnership Residence outside 31011 Szczecin (home region) Total 43 74 117

–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 93 As of August 2002; source: MNC NE G1. 94 As of February 2003; source: MNC NE G1. 139 Language skills According to Spradley and Philips,95 language skills have a crucial impact on interactions in an intercultural context; on structures of power and influence as well as on the social relations outside the work context. In the MNC NE, both HQ members and their family members have to perform in a foreign language in order to participate in any form of multinational interaction. Therefore, language skills are decisive for the quality of social life within the community of theHQ. The relevant self assessment of the HQ-members is as follows:

Table 4.7.4: Language skills in English (self assessment in per cent, N = 152) Speaking Listening Evaluation DA GE PL DA GE PL fluent 47.1 24.5 25.4 47.1 36.7 34.8 good 47.1 38.8 20.4 41.2 46.9 36.4 acceptable 5.9 20.4 23.9 11.8 10.2 24.2 understandable 0.0 14.3 14.9 0.0 6.1 3.0 bad 0.0 2.0 1.5 0.0 0.0 1.5

Writing Reading Evaluation DA GE PL DK GE PL fluent 29.4 14.3 22.4 55.9 32.7 34.8 good 52.9 36.7 34.3 29.4 49.0 36.4 acceptable 14.7 30.6 19.4 14.7 12.2 18.2 understandable 2.9 12.2 16.4 0.0 2.0 7.6 bad 0.0 6.1 7.5 0.0 4.1 3.0

According to these findings, a large majority of the HQ-members consider themselves as fairly well-trained in English. The distribution of these self-assessments reflects the general perspective shared by all HQ members, that the Danes perform best in English, followed by the Germans, and then the Poles.

However, the HQ members themselves are not the only participants in the social life of the Szczecin garrison. They can continue to use Eng-

–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 95 Spradley/Philips 1972. 140 lish with one another during leisure time or at social events, but the situation is different for their spouses. Although the Danish interviewees evinced no particular worries about their family members having difficulties in multinational communication because of language, some Germans and Poles expressed such concerns. Merely hesitant participation in common events, or even complete withdrawal into the national realm, might result from such difficulties. This problem is especially acute for members of the German and Polish support elements, who belong to the multinational community of the HQ, but whose jobs do not require elaborate skills in English. These persons may very well feel somewhat excluded from multinational social life.

Another aspect related to language is the HQ’s presence in the city of Szczecin. The surrounding Polish community generally does not speak English, and the Danes and Germans have no skills in Polish – even with the fact that some members of the German contingent have Polish roots or are married to Polish partners. These limitations turn out to be a high hurdle, not only for the integration of the HQ- personnel into the life of the Szczecin community, but also for everyday life and leisure time.

Social environment Multinational integration involves more than the interaction in the daily work environment. For members of two of the three nationalities, serving in the HQ means an assignment abroad, and many Polish HQ-members also come from other regions of Poland. The limitations on social contacts, mutual interdependence, exchanges of experience, and even the involvement of the families all play more important roles here than they would if these personnel were stationed closer to home. Furthermore, Szczecin does not appear to be a very attractive city for a number of Danish and German interviewees. Institutions like the Offi- cers’ and NCO’s clubs, the Ladies’ Club, and so forth, thus seem to serve not only as platforms for community-building, but as indispensable opportunities to maintain a satisfying social life.

141 Language skills are of course not the only constraints on social life. It must be acknowledged that one of the most significant hurdles is the huge gap in pay and allowances between Danes and Germans on the one side and the Poles on the other. Throughout the interviews, these differences were considered to be the biggest taboo, and it was repeatedly mentioned how difficult it is for Danish or German HQ-members to invite a Polish colleague and his wife/family into their homes. Danes and Germans reported not only that they fear to embarrass their Polish peers, but they are also shy to accept Polish re- invitations, thinking of the unaffordable costs incurred in hosting an evening party. Thus, social life in the multinational community takes place largely in the clubs or similar institutions, where costs and fees can be kept below a certain level without causing a loss of face or embarrassment on any side. For these purposes, a social and welfare fund was created to give support to common events, including those outside the clubs or the barracks.

Besides economical differences, there also seem to exist some barriers in the form of differing national styles and habits. Some German interviewees perceived the Danish community as rather self-reflexive and even separated from their co-workers of other nationalities. The data from the questionnaire show that social life is indeed focused around one’s own nationality, and this effect can be observed on the occasion of practically any visit to one of the clubs, be it during breaks or informal evenings: the members of each nation stick together; mixed tables or circles are rare. But at the same time, a considerable amount of interaction with other nations was also reported:

Table 4.7.5: Spending Leisure Time with ... (in total numbers)

Danes say Germans say Poles say up: often/ sometimes with 11 17 27 down: rarely/never Danes 2 16 17 with 15 18 18 N: 90 Germans 14 9 16 NDA: 29 with 13 17 24 NGE: 27 Poles 16 10 10 NPL: 34

142 These data disagree with the impressions given in the interviews, that certain nationalities are more reluctant than others to socialise internationally. It seems likely instead that the perception of the close coherence of the Danish community (which coherence very clearly exists) might lead to such impressions. Whatever the reality of the situation, even rumours of such behaviour might have an impact on social life by becoming a self-fulfilling prophecy. At least according to the quantitative data, the Danes claim to have more contact with the Ger- mans than the other way round.

All in all, there does seem to be a multinational social life outside the context of work, but it isn’t very lively. It is mainly the Polish contingent that claims more frequent activities together with colleagues from the two other nations, yet it is the Danes who are more convinced that there is an international social life outside of formal events. These different perceptions must certainly be due to the habits and conventions of the members’ national cultures. If people are accustomed to an intensive social life in their national units, they might perceive a lack of common activities here, and vice versa.

Parallel to the interaction processes taking place within the HQ, there is also a process of integration with the Szczecin community, its authorities, and its institutions. This integration process can be followed by evaluating the lists of persons invited to meetings and social events in the HQ, as well as of HQ MNC NE representatives participating in Szczecin community events. One finds persons of various backgrounds and interests on these lists: the representatives of academic, educational, or business circles. MNC NE members also engage in co-operation with local authorities, and participate in many social events and anniversaries. The leadership and staff of HQ have established manifold relations with the authorities of Szczecin, and are engaged in the social life of the city, e. g. in support for orphans.

The staff of the HQ comprises a unique tri-national social institution and is a visible element of the Szczecin garrison’s social landscape. From the inception of the idea to have a tri-national unit stationed in Poland, it was of great interest how the staff of Multinational corps and especially the Germans would be perceived by the city and by the

143 region of West Pomerania. A comment to this effect was made by a Polish officer during an interview: “I remember that, during the first PfP manoeuvres attended by Germans in 1994, the questions of journalists were focused on the problem that the German soldiers were on our territory. Nowadays, there are no such questions. It is gone three years from that time and this matter has just become normal. But while the Corps was created and the Agreement signed, this factor was taken into account. The legal construction of the Agreement, that a Dane would be the first Commander of the Corps, the second a Pole, and the third a Ger- man, was not made incidentally. Discussions were continued and people were getting familiar with that question to avoid troubles with the Poles’ acceptance of Germans.”

International school One important aspect of the integration of the families was that of an adequate school for the children. An international school had been created to begin at the same time that the HQ entered service, teaching according to a British curriculum. It was also foreseen that this British International School Szczecin (BISS), a subdivision of a Warsaw based institution, should play an important integrative role for the HQ. It was financed by fees paid by the Danes and the Germans, such that for every two fee-paying students, one gratis place was open to a Pol- ish one. The BISS was replaced by the Szczecin International School (SIS) in summer 2002, which continues to work under comparable conditions.

144 Table 4.7.6: Kindergarten and school opportunities96 (in total numbers)

Danish German Polish Total Polish Kindergarten 3 6 8 17 Szczecin International 23 18 20 61 School Polish School 0 0 68 68 German School 0 1 0 1 no kindergar- 7162548 ten/school Total 33 41 121 195

It was clear from a number of interviews that many personnel considered this question to be decisive for the HQ and its future. Those interviewees’ argument was that the HQ might fail to attract well- qualified personnel if these persons had to make a decision between an assignment in Szczecin or a satisfying school for their children.

However, only about one quarter of the multinational community around the HQ thought that the school was very important (table 4.7.7). More than 60 % were indifferent or thought it unimportant. When the results are differentiated by nation and rank, it turns out that more than 50 % of the Danish contingent consider the school to be very important. This corresponds with the fact that the Danish HQ members were less willing than the others to serve in Szczecin separated from their families (see table 4.7.3). But at the same time nearly 40 % of the Danes considered the school to be ‘very unimportant’. The results for Germans and Poles were not nearly so polarised:

–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 96 HQ MNC NE G1, March 2003. 145 Table 4.7.7: Importance of the International School (in per cent) The International Danes Germans Poles Total school is N: 144 very important 51.6 23.9 17.9 27.1 important 6.5 8.7 14.9 11.1 NDA: 31 neither/nor 3.2 26.1 10.4 13.9 DGE: 46 rather unimportant 0 6.5 10.4 6.9 NPL: 67 very unimportant 38.7 34.8 46.3 41.0

About 36 % of the officers considered the school very important, and 34 % as very unimportant. NCOs showed similar results. The school was of less relevance for the rank and file soldiers and the civilian co- workers. Obviously, the school is perceived as an important factor primarily by the persons directly concerned. The sentiment expressed in the interviews is supported by the quantitative findings: families with children might make a choice against an assignment in Szczecin if there is no adequate school.

Central findings • Language skills for the spouses are important for social life outside the context of daily work. • Lacking language skills in Polish makes it difficult for Danes and Germans to integrate themselves into the civilian community of Szczecin. • Social life is concentrated within the circle of one’s own nationality. Multinational social life exists, but is not considered as very lively. • Integration of the MNC NE in Szczecin seems to be successful. • The International School is perceived to be indispensable by the persons directly concerned.

146 5 Conclusions and Recommendations

The general conclusion that can be drawn from the survey is that it is fully possible to organise successful and effective multinational military bodies – as long as some essential requirements are fulfilled. The HQ members’ preparedness and willingness to co-operate with colleagues from other nations is high, and unit cohesion within the branches and divisions is strong. Due to a conviction, shared by most members of the HQ, that service for the (political) goal of European integration is important, there is a considerable level of commitment to the MNC NE. Despite some existing differences between the three nations involved, and despite persistent hurdles, there seems to be a broad acceptance of the organisational principle of deepened integration. Given the exceptional preconditions necessary for the establishment of an HQ under the auspices of such a challenging organisational principle, these findings are not self-evident. This is all the more relevant if one considers whether and how the experiences from the Szczecin-based MNC NE could be used for future multinational units. Once NATO has accomplished its second round of enlargement, including another seven members, new HQs comparable with the MNC NE might be established. The EU, too, is planning on creating common force–structures, which certainly will comprise multinational command bodies.

Some recommendations concerning essential requirements for a multinational military setting can be deduced from the results of this study. These recommendations should be valid for the re-examination of certain structures and interaction procedures in the MNC NE, as well as for the establishment of new multinational units.

Multinational military bodies which have to cope with distinct differences concerning military culture, experience, or equipment always have an integrative mission in addition to the official military tasks. For an initial period of time, this integrative mission might even dominate the military ones, because it contributes directly to the creation of the common ground necessary for multinational co-operation. To acknowledge this double function would be a major step towards realising the complex ideal of military multinationality. In the light of

147 the findings in this study, it would seem to be indispensable to anchor this integrative mission in the founding documents of such a multinational body, as well as in the standard operational procedures and so on. Thus, misunderstandings and role conflicts resulting from a lack of clarity or inherent contradictions between different tasks might be avoided.

It would be helpful to think about concrete measures, programs, or procedures by which the more or less diffuse task ‘integration’ might be specified and become rooted in the daily work within the HQ. For example, the common language courses, tactical training, or introduction to standard procedures could all be enhanced. Such programs should in principle be made obligatory for the entire HQ, and then simply adapted to the particular needs of the divisions and branches. It seems to be essential to develop a common understanding of the value of ‘integration’, thus guaranteeing a co-ordinated implementation of integrative processes throughout the unit.

Of course, the organisation of such programs takes time, and time is always a scarcity in a military context. Nevertheless it is crucial to produce clearly-defined time-frames for the implementation of integrative programs. This recommendation rests on long-time experience with the working conditions of the military, which indicates that if time pressure is too great during initial periods, it leads to overload problems and sub-optimal achievement of goals and tasks, in the end causing everything to take longer than it should have. Well-prepared and reasonably followed, such time budgets for integration need not be a contradiction to even ambitious military goals. On the contrary, by avoiding the time-consuming and often frustrating procedures of ‘learning by failing’, such time budgets might turn out to be prerequisites for a secure achievement of goals within a realistic time frame.

Common awareness of the significance of integrative efforts might be increased by anchoring assessments of the progress of integration in all reports about the HQ’s work, and especially in the field of internal and external evaluation. It might for example be a good idea to include a well-defined notion of ‘integration’ in the criteria for ‘leadership’ or ‘organisational competence’ in the national appraisal systems.

148 This might help to increase the willingness of soldiers and civilians involved in multinational co-operation to engage themselves in integrative processes. The phenomenon of by-passing the members of other nations, especially in stressful situations or in cases of doubt, might be diminished. But first the tendency to rely on informal national networks must be reduced. While these networks do help individuals to overcome ambiguous situations (by the application of national procedures or interpretation), they inhibit international integration and co-operation.

‘Effective’ leadership requires positive social interaction, clear goals and frameworks, role clarity, knowledge of tasks, and distribution of information. Leadership activities in the HQ MNC NE are carried out under less than ideal conditions. In the light of the specific circumstances, leadership in the multinational context has to be understood as a multifaceted phenomenon, that demands further professional qualifications from the military leader. As far as the common understanding of integration as an essential task of a multinational military headquarters is concerned, senior national leaders must always be aware of their specific responsibility for the entire organisation. The hierarchies of what is important or unimportant for a multinational HQ, which the senior leaders express explicitly or implicitly, intentionally or unintentionally, are of paramount significance for the behaviour of their (national) subordinates. This impact increases propor- tionally with the superior’s influence on individual careers, and in cases of doubt a subordinate will tend to behave in a way she or he considers as consistent with the superior’s. The measures recommended above therefore also might serve as a scale for the national leaders to check their own behaviour and their impact on their subordinates.

In an intercultural environment like the HQ, there are only better or worse working approaches and solutions for multinational co- operation. These must be constantly re-evaluated. Trust is the basis for the further evolution of a multinational esprit de corps, which exists somehow superstructured on unit cohesion and organisational commitment in the sphere of deepened military multinationality. Openness and willingness to tolerate dissent are, in the multinational context, the

149 best way for the creation of trust on all sides. Such an approach combined with the already broad will for multinational co-operation makes deepened military multinationality a manageable and worthwhile challenge. As a concrete measure, there might be helpful guided seminars in which the HQ-members become encountered with their own self-perceptions and the mirror of xeno-perception by their peers from the other nations.

Acceptance and practice of integration in multinational forces structures is crucial because it determines the operability of such a body. A multinational HQ and military unit must rely on the ability of its subordinate structures and respectively its personnel to co-operate effectively and trustworthily. So investment in the ‘soft’ skills of multinational interaction is valuable for the achievement of ‘hard’ military goals as well.

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160 Appendices

1. Interview Guideline

Date: Interviewer: The Respondent Place and time of interview: Name, Rank, and Function:

Topics Theoretical background 1. Presentation Written presentation to be produced a. Aim and purpose of the interview in connection to the research project b. Presentation of the interviewer c. Ethics d. Topics to be covered and time 2. Arrival (soldier) Variables on the individual level a. Expectations within the military context b. Preparations, voluntari- - Motivation ness, qualifications c. Function 3. Arrival (family) Variables on the individual level Family within the private context i. School systems - Expectations ii. Work situation - Motivation for spouse - Social-economic life iii. Contacts with friends iv. Contacts with the community in Szczecin

161 Topics Theoretical background 4. Personal development Variables on the individual level a. Description of a typical within the military context work day - Functional conditions b. Personally experienced - Self efficacy differences between - Feelings of competence past and present - Developmental learning assignment - Qualifications (knowledge c. Handling the environ- and skills) ment - Navigation in social contexts i. Personal ii. Professional iii. Language d. Career opportunity e. Personal expectations and wishes f. Commitment 5. Ideal soldier (same rank) Variables on the individual level and stereotypes within the military context a. Nationally - Goals b. Multinationally - Needs c. Stereotypes for the other - Values and norms nations - Self perception i. Qualifications/ Variations between nations and settings education Parameters for comparison ii. Precision and punctuality iii. Attitude towards work iv. Level of independence v. Humour vi. Relations vs. Result d. Development of stereotypes

162 Topics Theoretical background 6. One’s own unit/group/ Variables on the group level within section the military context a. Integration - Frames and codes b. Cohesion - Information distribution/ c. Level of information sharing/amount (technical flow vs. Personal) d. Commitment - Level of empowerment e. Conflict management - Interdependency i. Participation in - Leadership decision making - Distribution of power ii. Informal struc- - Decision making tures - Social praxis iii. Regulations iv. Interpersonal f. Role clarity 7. Co-operation Variables on the group level within a. Internally with the the military context branch - Comparison to previous b. Externally between experiences branches - Establishing of a ‘unique’ c. A successful example of organisation tri-national co-operation - Difference between espoused and reasons for theories and theories in use d. An unsuccessful example of tri-national co-operation and reasons for e. Between the HQ and other organisations

163 Topics Theoretical background 8. Challenges, chances and Variables on the individual level risks within the military context a. Language - Empowerment b. Multinational contexts - Autonomy c. Commitment d. If activated in present function, how would the individual perform? Strengths and weaknesses e. If activated in present structure, how would the HQ or section/ branch? i. Strengths and weaknesses ii. Interaction between HQ and o- thers iii. Interaction within the HQ 9. Future a. Expectations and wishes i. Personal ii. For the HQ b. Level of satisfaction with the assignment i. Personal ii. Professional iii. Location c. HQ in 2 years 10. The respondents’ ending comments

164 2. Questionnaire (Master version in English)

1. The MNC NE headquarters in Szczecin was officially commissioned on September 18th, 1999. Since when have you been assigned to the MNC NE, or did you already belong to LANDJUT? belonged to LANDJUT assigned to MNC NE in 1999 in 2000 in 2001 in 2002

2. What is your marital status? single (no firm relation) partnership/life companionship married divorced

3. Have you any children in the following age groups? Up to kindergarten Kindergarten/Pre-school Primary school Secondary school

4. Where does your family/partner reside? They live in Szczecin. They live in home country/city/village. I am single.

165 5. How important to you are the following reasons for working in the multinational headquarters MNC NE? very im- rather neither/ rather com- portant im- nor unim- pletely portant portant unimportant a) to have more real leisure time/free time b) to improve my job situation c) to have more influence and power d) to learn/improve Eng- lish e) to contribute to Cen- tral and Eastern Euro- pean countries’ integration into Europe f) to be part of the build- up process of a multinational unit g) to improve career opportunities h) to improve my in- come i) to broaden my hori- zon by serving in a multicultural setting j) to learn NATO rules and procedures k) to have more responsibility l) Other, please state:

166 6. Do you think the purpose of the MNC NE is of a more political or a more military nature? more political more military

7. There are official tasks of the MNC NE. Furthermore some might say that there are additional objectives as well. Please assess the following according to their importance for the MNC NE. very im- rather neither/ rather com- portant im- nor unim- pletely portant portant unimportant a) Creating contact with Eastern European countries b) PSO, CRO c) Integration of Poland into NATO d) Disaster relief e) Art. 5 Missions f) Creating a frame for exercising national forces g) Serve as a field academy h) Other, please formulate:

167 8. There are official tasks of the MNC NE. Furthermore some might say that there are additional objectives as well. Please assess the following according to their importance for your daily work in Szczecin. very im- rather neither/ rather com- portant im- nor unim- pletely portant portant unimportant a) Creating contact with Eastern European countries b) PSO, CRO c) Integration of Poland into NATO d) Disaster relief e) Art. 5 Missions f) Creating a frame for exercising national forces g) Serve as a field academy

9. In your opinion, is the HQ able to meet its requirements within the given time frame? yes no

10. Do you think that Danish, German and Polish soldiers are equal partners within the HQ MNC NE? yes (continue with item 12) no (continue with item 11)

11. If you do not think that the soldiers from the three nations are equal partners, which nation’s soldiers do you consider as being predominant in the HQ MNC NE? Danish Germans Polish

168 12. What is your attitude towards your service together with soldiers from other nations? I like it very much I like it I do not care I dislike it I dislike it very much

13. In the following, you find a list of qualities which generally can be applied to soldiers. Please, assess for each quality how typical it is for Danish soldiers in the HQ MNC NE. Just one mark per line. 54321 5 means that the quality concerned is very typical, 1 means that it is not typical at all. a) Believing in Authori- ties b) Reliable c) Proud d) Power oriented e) Humorous f) Flexible g) Arrogant h) Dutiful i) Tolerant j) Acting on own initiative k) Competent l) Egocentric m) Diligent n) Open o) Courageous p) Sociable q) Ambitious r) Qualified s) Responsible t) Conservative u) Fair v) Energetic 169 w) Independent x) Accurate y) Trustworthy z) Individualistic

14. Please, assess for each quality how typical it is for German soldiers in the HQ MNC NE. 54321 a) Believing in Authori- ties b) Reliable c) Proud d) Power oriented e) Humorous f) Flexible g) Arrogant h) Dutiful i) Tolerant j) Acting on own initiative k) Competent l) Egocentric m) Diligent n) Open o) Courageous p) Sociable q) Ambitious r) Qualified s) Responsible t) Conservative u) Fair v) Energetic w) Independent x) Accurate y) Trustworthy z) Individualistic

170 15. Please, assess for each quality how typical it is for Polish soldiers in the HQ MNC NE. 54321 a) Believing in Authori- ties b) Reliable c) Proud d) Power oriented e) Humorous f) Flexible g) Arrogant h) Dutiful i) Tolerant j) Acting on own initiative k) Competent l) Egocentric m) Diligent n) Open o) Courageous p) Sociable q) Ambitious r) Qualified s) Responsible t) Conservative u) Fair v) Energetic w) Independent x) Accurate y) Trustworthy z) Individualistic

171 16. Do you feel that there are issues that you cannot discuss with or air in front of personnel from other nations? yes (continue to question no. 17) no (continue to question no. 18)

17. If yes, which issues? Salaries History Differences in qualifications Differences in language skills Politics National agendas Conflicts related to work Problems related to HQ National prejudices Other issues

18. All in all, how qualified do you feel in relation to performing your function? Very qualified Rather qualified Sufficient Rather unqualified Unqualified

19. How often do you feel uncertain as to the content of your function? Very rarely Rarely Sometimes Usually Always

172 20. How often, in your experience, do subordinates in the HQ MNC NE express disagreement with their superiors? Very often Often Sometimes Rarely Very rarely

21. To what degree do you feel that there is consistency between what the leadership of the HQ say and do? High Rather high Neither high nor low Rather low Low

22. To which degree do you feel that there is consistency between what your nearest superior says and does? High Rather high Neither high nor low Rather low Low

23. How often do you feel you receive the appropriate information in due time? Always Often Sometimes Rarely Never

173 24. The decision making process in my daily work is primarily handled through: Superiors Teamwork Specialists Others there are no decisions made – things develop in another manner

25. Please assess the following statement: Decision making in HQ MNC NE is very time consuming. Agree Rather agree Neither/nor Rather disagree Disagree

26. How often are decisions changed? Always Often Sometimes Rarely Never

27. Please assess the following statement: In case of changes, people are informed in a timely and adequate manner. Always Often Sometimes Rarely Never

174 28. In which situation would you withhold your own opinion? never rarely some- often always times a) When my superior has made a decision. b) When it could create disagreement in the group. c) When I could not express it in English. d) When I want to support a consensus decision.

29. Please rate the extent to which you agree or disagree on the following statements: Agree Rather Nei- Rather Dis- agree ther/ disagree nor agree a) I feel like ‘part of the family’ in the HQ. b) The HQ has no personal meaning to me. c) I feel a strong sense of belonging to the HQ. d) Working in the HQ is just a job for me.

175 30. Please rate the extent to which you agree or disagree on the following statements: Agree Rather Nei- Rather Dis- agree ther/ disagree nor agree a) The members of my unit are co-operative with each other. b) The members of my unit know that they can depend on each other. c) The members of my unit stand up for each other. d) The members of my unit trust in each others work. e) The members of my unit praise others for a job well done. f) The members of my unit take care of each other. g) The members of my unit are interested in what I think about things. h) The members of my unit are interested in what I feel about things. i) The members of my unit are satisfied with each other.

176 31. How do you assess the importance of the following requirements for a military leader in multinational contexts? The ideal leader in a multinational context should be: Choose the five most important a) Patient b) Empathetic c) Open minded d) Straightforward e) Determined f) Charismatic g) Directive h) Co-operative i) Tolerant j) Open for other cultures k) Diplomatic l) Eloquent in working language m) Able to handle conflicts n) Controlling o) Delegating p) Able to push things through q) Confident in his subordinates

32. In the HQ MNC NE my direct superior can be characterised as ... Chose the five most Chose the five least predominant charac- predominant characteristics teristics a) Patient b) Empathetic c) Open minded d) Straightforward e) Determined f) Charismatic g) Directive h) Co-operative 177 i) Tolerant j) Open for other cultures k) Diplomatic l) Eloquent in working language m) Able to handle conflicts n) Controlling o) Delegating p) Able to push things through q) Confident in his subordinates

33. How do you assess your English abilities in regard to performing your duties? Fluent Good Accept- Under- Bad able stand- able a) Speaking b) Listening c) Writing d) Reading

34. How do you assess the following statement in relation to the daily work in the HQ: Those who are best qualified to perform in Eng- lish usually have the greatest influence. Completely agree Rather agree Neither/nor Rather disagree Agree not at all

178 35. How much do you focus on the following matters in your daily work? very rather neither/ rather com- impor- impor- nor unim- pletely tant tant portant unimportant a) To reach common decisions b) To reach the objectives and deadlines c) To learn from my colleagues d) To share my experience with others e) To reach the optimal solu- tion f) To fulfil my function

36. How often are national colleagues involved instead of the functional assigned people? Never Rarely Sometimes Often Always

37. When solving specific tasks related to your function, how often are you in doubt concerning what to do? Never Rarely Sometimes Often Always

179 38. In your experience when HQ personnel are not able to solve given tasks, how often do they look for assistance from a colleague? Always Often Sometimes Rarely Never

39. In your experience, when co-operation takes place, how are conflicts managed? Overt Not at all Covert

40. How do you assess the co-operation between the soldiers from the three nations in the MNC NE in Szczecin? Very good Good Neither good nor bad Bad Very bad

41. In your opinion, do there exist unofficial networks that work parallel to the formal staff organisation of the HQ MNC NE? yes (continue with number 42) no (continue with number 44)

42. What is the most important factor that unofficial networks are based upon? nationality rank English language skills social contacts other factors

180 43. When are these unofficial networks activated? only under time pressure always active in the case of rumours for protection of individual image for protection of the organisational image to serve national interests under other circumstances

44. Concerning my professional qualifications I regard myself in the HQ MNC NE as ... overcharged sometimes overcharged charged sometimes undercharged undercharged

45. Concerning the daily amount of work I regard myself in the HQ MNC NE as ... overcharged sometimes overcharged charged sometimes undercharged undercharged

46. Does it happen, that you have to work after your regular times of duty? regularly often sometimes rarely never (continue to item 48)

181 47. The prolongation of my daily working time is due to ... I totally I rather neither/ I rather I totally agree agree nor dis- dis- agree agree a) my tasks b) the times of duty c) my boss d) my personal style of work e) the habits within my team

48. Please rate the importance of the BISS for your working at the HQ MNC NE. very important rather important neither/nor not so unimportant very unimportant

49. Do you pass your leisure time together with ... Often Some- Rarely Never times a) Polish soldiers b) Danish soldiers c) German Soldiers

50. Do you pass your leisure time together with soldiers from all three nations? Often Sometimes Not at all

51. Please assess the following statement: There is a regular multinational, social life beyond official events. I totally agree I rather agree neither/nor I rather disagree I totally disagree 182 52. If I had to decide again to come to the HQ MNC NE, I would come again ... without hesitation most probably likely rather not definitely not

53. How satisfied are you with ... satis- rather neither/ rather dis- fied satis- nor dissatis- fied satisfied fied a) Comrades of the same rank b) Current job activities c) Next superior d) Personal development opportunities e) Pay and allowances f) Working conditions

Please, indicate the following personal data. All data will serve only statistical purposes and will not violate the guaranteed anonymity.

54. What is your nationality? Danish German Polish

183 55. To which rank Rank and file category do you NCO belong? Senior NCO/WO Junior Officers(Lieutenant up to Captain) Senior Officer Civilian

56. To which divi- Command group, Legal Adviser, Chaplain sion or unit do G1 you belong? G2 G3 G4 G5 G6 AOCC National elements HQ COY Other

Ending comments

57. Maybe this questionnaire lacks some aspects and problems you consider important. If so, you have the opportunity to indicate it. Thank you for any suggestion or advice.

Many thanks for your kind co-operation.

184