Nuclear Learning and U.S.-Soviet Security Regimes Author(S): Joseph S

Home , Robert Jervis

Nuclear Learning and U.S.-Soviet Security Regimes Author(s): Joseph S. Nye, Jr. Reviewed work(s): Source: International Organization, Vol. 41, No. 3 (Summer, 1987), pp. 371-402 Published by: The MIT Press Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2706750 . Accessed: 19/09/2012 10:04

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http://www.jstor.org Nuclearlearning and U.S.-Soviet securityregimes Joseph S. Nye,Jr.

1. Internationalrelations theory: learning and regimes

Willstable nuclear deterrence last forever? Human fallibility suggests that it willnot. Variousschemes have been proposedto deal withthis problem. Mostprominent have been proposalsthat focus on weapons.Less thought has been givento transformingthe U.S.-Soviet politicalrelationship, yet thehostility in that relationship, not the existence of nuclear weapons per se, presentsthe gravest threat. Moreover, even technicalsolutions to thenu- cleardilemma will require major improvements in the U.S.-Soviet political relationshipif they are to have a stabilizingeffect on deterrence. The dominantRealist strand of internationalrelations theory is not en- couragingabout the prospects of transforming U.S.-Soviet relations.Real- ism,which traces its rootsto Thucydides,portrays an anarchicworld in whichstates compete for power in the contextof an intensesecurity dilemma.The steps theytake to enhancetheir military security make the competitorsfeel more insecure. A balanceof power is essential,but difficult to maintain.An importantpart of Realisttheory focuses on powertransi- tionsin which shifts of relative power among rising and declining states tend to precipitatemajor wars. There have been a dozensuch general wars since theconsolidation of themodern state system almost four centuries ago.1 If thistheory still holds in the nuclearera, the prognosisfor the futureis

I am indebtedto AlexanderGeorge for permission to use thepapers of the Stanford Project on U.S.-SovietEfforts to Cooperate on SecurityMatters; to attendees at theHarvard Avoiding NuclearWar Project Conference in July 1986; to HaywardAlker, James Blight, Robert Bowie, PeterHaas, StephanHaggard, Stanley Hoffmann, Robert Jervis, Robert Keohane, William Ury,Ted Warner,and David Welchfor detailed comment; and to WilliamJarosz for both commentsand researchassistance. 1. See Jack Levy, War in the Modern Great Power System,1495-1975 (Lexington: Univer- sityof KentuckyPress, 1983).

InternationalOrganization 41, 3, Summer 1987 ? 1987by theWorld Peace Foundationand theMassachusetts Institute of Technology 372 InternationalOrganization gloomy.A moreoptimistic version of Realism stresses the structural stabil- ityof bipolarsystems, but this theory tends to be quitestatic and tellsus littleabout how changemay occur.2 Moreover, even stablebipolarity does notpreclude the breakdown of deterrencethrough accident. In a domainas complexas internationalrelations, it is notsurprising that thepower of theories is limited.Generalizations are based on a smallseries ofevents which have multiplecauses at severallevels of analysis. Strategic interactionis inherentlyindeterminate, and we mustconsider domestic as wellas systemiccauses. Realismis themost parsimonious and maybe the mostuseful first approximation, but it does nottake us veryfar. Even at the structurallevel, it needs to be supplementedwith other theoretical models.3 Few structuralexplanations have sufficientpower to allowus to ignorethe domesticnature of the statesin the system.The mostinteresting explana- tionsusually involve the interaction between the constraints of the internationalsystem, the nature of thedomestic societies, and thepolicies of the majorstates. A secondarybut important strand of internationalrelations theory is the "Liberaltradition," which stresses interactions among states and societies, and the developmentof normsand institutions.4In theirsimplest forms, Liberaltheories have been easily discredited. The propositionthat the gains fromcommercial transactions would overcome the problems inherent in the securitydilemma and makewar too expensivewere belied in 1914.Hopes thata systemof international law and organizationcould provide collective security,which would replace the need for self-help inherent in thesecurity dilemma,were disappointed in 1939.Nonetheless, the sharp opposition be- tweenRealism and Liberal theoriesis overstated.In fact,the two ap- proachescan be complementary.Sophisticated versions of Liberaltheory addressthe ways statesdevelop international norms, which interact with domesticpolitics of the states in an internationalsystem so thatthey trans- formstates' definition of their interests. Transnational and interstate interac- tionsand normslead to new perceptionsof interestsand new coalition possibilitiesfor different interests within states. The issue of how statesdefine their interests and how theirinterests changehas alwaysbeen a weak pointin Realisttheory. One of the most interestingquestions in internationalrelations is how stateslearn. How do nationalinterests become defined and how do thosedefinitions change? Can cooperationbe learned?Realist theories maintain that states learn by re- spondingto structuralchanges in theirenvironment, or, to put it in game theoryterms, they adjust their behavior to changesin the payoffmatrix.

2. KennethWaltz, Theory of International Politics (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley,1979). 3. RobertKeohane and Joseph S. Nye,Power and Interdependence (Boston: Little, Brown, 1977). 4. See Kal J. Holsti,The Dividing Discipline (Winchester, Mass.: Allen& Unwin,1985). Nuclearlearning 373

Whenmutual interests or thelong shadow of the future suggests that rewards forcooperation are great,states may alterthe strategiesby whichthey pursuetheir interests. In thissense, cooperation can be learned.Although thisis oftena satisfactoryand parsimoniousexplanation, its shortcoming is thatit does notshow how interests themselves may be redefined.Successive governmentsor differentleaders may perceive the same situation in totally differentways. Bismarckand the Kaiser definedvery different answers to similargeopolitical situations. Nor does Realisttheory focus on how groupswithin societies can use partnersin transnationalcoalitions or trans- nationalnorms and institutionsto advance or retardthe learningof new interestsby theirown governments.The moresophisticated variant of the Liberal theorycan providea usefulsupplement to Realismby directing attentionto theways domestic and internationalfactors interact to change states' definitionsof theirinterests. To say thatstates act in theirself- interestis merelytautological unless we can reasonablyaccount for how suchinterests are perceivedand redefined. Both Realism and Liberalism can contributeto such an account.On the principleof Ockham'srazor, one should"try Realism first." But sometimessatisfactory explanation requires thatRealism be supplementedby Liberaltheories. The majordevelopments in theLiberal tradition of internationalrelations theoryin thepost-1945 period occurred in regionalintegration studies. Karl Deutsch studiedthe developmentof pluralisticsecurity communities groupsof stateswhich develop reliable expectations of peacefulrelations and thusovercome the security dilemma that Realists see as characterizing internationalpolitics. Ernst Haas focusedon theuniting of Europeand the transformationof Franco-German hostility into a postwareconomic and politicalcommunity. Subsequent scholars extend these perspectivesto otherregions.5 5 What these studies have in commonis a focuson how in- creasedtransactions and contactschange attitudes and transnationalcoali- tionopportunities, and how institutions help foster such processes. In short, theyfocus very directly on thepolitical processes of learning and the redefi- nitionof nationalinterests, and on theways thatinstitutional frameworks and regimesfoster such processes. In a sense,the development of regional integration theory outstripped the developmentof regionalcommunities. Predicted changes were slower than expected.This discrepancy may account for the declining academic interest in the subjectduring the 1970s.However, the transformationof Western Europeinto a pluralisticsecurity community is real, and many insights from integrationtheory transferred to the growingand broaderdimensions of internationaleconomic interdependence in the early 1970s. Studies in trans-

5. Karl Deutsch et al., Political Communityand the NorthAtlantic Area (Princeton,N.J.: PrincetonUniversity Press, 1957); Ernst Haas, The Unitingof Europe (Stanford, Calif.: Stan- fordUniversity Press, 1958); Joseph S. Nye,Peace in Parts(Boston: Little, Brown, 1971). 374 InternationalOrganization

nationalrelations and interdependencebroadened the conceptions of how nationalinterests are learnedand changed.Some studiesexplicitly ad- dressedthe conditions under which assumptions of Realism were sufficient or neededto be supplementedby a morecomplex model of change.6They devoteda good deal of attentionto the role of internationalinstitutions ratherthan focusing primarily on theformal and universalistic organizations such as the UnitedNations. The conceptof regimewas borrowedfrom internationallaw and broadenedto incorporatethe whole range of principles, norms,rules, and procedureswhich constrain states' behaviorand aroundwhich actors' expectations converge within a givenissue.7 A richset of studiesapplied the conceptof regimesto a broadrange of behaviorin internationalpolitical economy.

2. Securityregimes

Currentpolitical concerns have alwaysstrongly affected international rela- tionstheory. The early1980s proved no exception.With worsening U.S.- Sovietrelations and increasedfears of nuclearwar, military studies again becamethe central focus of attention.Some evenargued that the focus on interdependenceand regimesin the 1970swas mistaken.In fact,the progress of thetheoretical studies of interdependenceand internationalregimes continued,but tended to be appliedonly to thearea ofinternational political economy.The fieldof internationalpolitics split into two literatures, one in militarysecurity rooted in the Realist tradition, and the other in international politicaleconomy, incorporating some insightsfrom the Liberaltradition. Each tendedto ignorethe concerns of theother. Only recently have there been effortsto bringthese two back together.8 Mosttheorizing about international regimes occurred in thearea ofinter- nationalpolitical economy, and so hadunfortunate effects for application to securitystudies. For example,the concernwith the role of the dominant actorwithin an N-persongame ("hegemonicstability theory") made the theoryseem irrelevantto bipolarU.S.-Soviet relations.The conceptof a regimebecame identifiedwith Liberal internationalrelations theory, al- thoughit couldalso fiteasily with Realist theory.9 Egoistic self-interest can lead statesto createregimes in securityas well as economicissues. The difficultyof ascertainingintentions and the largestakes at riskin case of

6. Keohaneand Nye,Power and Independence. 7. StephenKrasner, ed., InternationalRegimes (Ithaca, N.Y.: CornellUniversity Press, 1983).Krasner's definition distinguishes between principles, norms, rules, and procedures. Thesedimensions tend to be ones of levelof abstraction;they often blend into each otherin practice.See OranR. Young,"International Regimes: Toward a NewTheory of Institutions," WorldPolitics 39 (October1986), p. 106. 8. See thespecial issue of WorldPolitics 38 (October1985), edited by KennethOye. 9. RobertKeohane, After Hegemony (Princeton, N.J.: PrincetonUniversity Press, 1984). Nuclearlearning 375 defectionmay be higherin mostsecurity issues than it is in mosteconomic issues,but this is notalways true. 10 Such differencesare mattersof degree. A successfulsecurity regime must involve "timelywarning" of major changesso thatstates are nottotally vulnerable to defection;but regimes are notconfined only to economicissues. A fewinteresting attempts have appliedthe concept of internationalre- gimesto theU.S.-Soviet relationship."But the concept has oftenbeen used loosely.Practices and policieswere not alwaysdistinguished from norms and rules.We are toldthat a regimeof primitiverules ("no directconflict betweenthe superpowers,""no use of nuclearweapons," "respectfor spheresof influence")has helpedexplain the absence of nuclearwar. But the rulesare moretacit than explicit. Their existence is inferredfrom the absenceof war,which is, in turn,attributed to theexistence of suchrules. Thus thisconcept risks tautology by usingthe same evidenceto establish boththe cause and theeffect of theregime. RobertJervis has attackedsuch effortsto categorizethe U.S.-Soviet securityrelationship as a regime.If cooperationcan be explainedon the basis of short-runself-interest, such as avoidingthe disproportionate costs of nuclearwar, thenregimes become a redundantexplanation. In Jervis's view, "the linksbetween states' restraintand theirself-interest are too directand unproblematicto invokethe concept." 12 The rulesand practices of prudencewhich characterize the U.S.-Soviet relationshipare bothtoo vagueand too directlyrelated to theirobvious short-run self-interest to merit beingcategorized as rulesof a regime.Moreover, he arguesthat the partici- patingnations' preference for the statusquo is a necessarycondition for a securityregime, and thatthe UnitedStates' and Soviet Union's different perspectivesin ideologicalinterpretation of eventsmake the independent restrainingforce of ruleshighly improbable. However,the skeptics'judgment may be premature.The critiquesare justifiedwhen applied to theoverall U.S.-Soviet relationship.But the existenceof regimes is a matterof degree. There are variationsin scope,adher- ence, duration,and degreeof institutionalization.Even in the economic area, regimesare far fromperfect. The existenceof tariffs,quotas, and protectionistsentiments does notmean that the GATT (GeneralAgreement

10. JanetGross Stein, "Detection and Defection: Security Regimes and the Management of InternationalConflict," International Journal 11 (Autumn1985); Charles Lipson, "Interna- tionalCooperation in Economicand SecurityAffairs," World Politics 37 (October1984); RobertJervis, "Security Regimes," in Krasner,International Regimes; and "FromBalance to Concept," in WorldPolitics 38 (October 1985). 11. Dan Caldwell, American-Soviet Relations: From 1947 to the Nixon-Kissinger Grand Design(Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1981); Michael Mandelbaum, The Nuclear Revo- lution(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), chap. 3; JoanneGowa and Nils Wessell, Ground Rules: Soviet and American Involvementin Regional Conflicts(Philadelphia: Foreign PolicyResearch Institute, 1982); David Gompert,Michael Mandelbaum, Richard Garwin, and JohnBarton, Nuclear Weapons and WorldPolitics (New York: McGraw Hill, 1977). 12. Jervis,"Security Regimes," p. 359. 376 InternationalOrganization

on Tariffsand Trade) regime has nothad a significantimpact on international tradingbehavior. Rather than focusing on whetherthe overall U.S.-Soviet relationshipcan be categorizedas a securityregime, we shouldmore fruit- fullyconsider it as a patchworkquilt or a mosaicof subissues in the security area, some characterizedby rulesand institutionswe wouldcall a regime and othersnot. Differentiating by subissue facilitates comparative observa- tionsabout how regimesaffect state behavior. It also allows us to raise interestingquestions about the dynamicsof bothlearning and redefining interests;questions which skeptics tend to neglectin theircategorical judg- mentsabout the nonexistence of a regimein theoverall U.S.-Soviet securityrelationship. Skepticsmight still object that it makes no senseto use theregime concept whendealing with the relations between a statusquo powerand a revolu- tionarypower. Skepticssay thatthe notionof a regimeis a statusquo conceptwhich attracts U.S. theoristsbecause theyare attractedto stability.'3From a Marxistpoint of view, if regimesdelay dynamicforces of history,there can be no agreementupon internationalregimes. It is inter- estingthat the Soviets have increasinglyused theterm in thelast decade. 14 However,the critical question is whetherSoviet behavior can be consistent withthe rules and institutionsof a regime. In thisregard, one has to addressthe debate about the nature of Soviet goalsand therole of ideology in theSoviet system. The bestjudgment must be mixed.To describethe Soviet Union as a rigidlyideological and totalitar- ian societydoes not fitcurrent reality. Seweryn Bialer sees it as not yet traditionalauthoritarian, but no longertotalitarian. As RichardPipes de- scribes,its leadershiphas become bureaucratizedand its ideologyhas eroded.15 The roleof the party and statein mobilizing the society has greatly diminishedsince the Stalinist days, when the concept of totalitarianism was originallyformulated. At the same time,ideology still plays a role in legitimizingthe Soviet politicalelite and in providing many categories through which they approach the world.One of the mostinteresting developments in the last decade, however,has been theadaptation of Westernconcepts into Soviet thinking aboutinternational relations. This does notmean that the Marxist categories have been discarded,but theyhave been supplementedby moreflexible conceptsand categories.Joanne Gowa and Nils Wessellargue that "as the

13. See SusanStrange, "Cave! Hic Dragones:A Critiqueof Regime Analysis," in Krasner, InternationalRegimes. 14. Based on conversationswith Soviet academicians, Moscow, June 1986. Note also M. Gorbachev'srecent suggestion of "an internationalregime for the safe development of nuclear energy."New YorkTimes, 4 June 1986, or his 1985 tributeto the "internationalnon- profilerationregime ... as an effectiveinstrument ofpeace." SovietNews, no. 6289,28 August 1985. 15. SewerynBialer, The SovietParadox (New York: Knopf,1986), p. 40; RichardPipes, Survivalis Not Enough(New York:Simon & Schuster,1984). Nuclearlearning 377

U.S.S.R. acquireda stakein thestable operation of theinternational political systemand particularlyas it reliedon treatiesas an instrumentof its foreignpolicy, its leadership came to valuethe role international agreements playin thedefense of establishedinterests." 16 The Sovietview of internationalpolitics is farmore differentiated and complextoday than it was in Stalin'sday. For example,it is hardto imaginea Sovietleader today abolish- ingan entireinstitute of world economy as Stalindid simply because he was displeasedby itsaccurate but optimistic description of the prospects of the capitalisteconomies.'7 Nor is it helpfulto see the Soviet Union as a purelyrevolutionary or purelystatus quo actorin internationalpolitics. Because ofthe role of ideol- ogyin legitimizing,ifnot always motivating, the political elite, there is oftena revolutionaryand expansivetone to Sovietforeign policy pronouncements and sometimesto its behavior.But it is also worthnoticing that Soviet behavioris farmore cautious and risk-aversethan its pronouncements make it sound.Support for proletarian revolutions has alwayscome second to the safetyof the Soviet state. In Europe,which the Soviets still see as theheart ofthe global balance of power, the Soviets tend to be a statusquo morethan a revolutionaryactor in the shortterm of decades. In a sense, boththe UnitedStates and the Soviet Union were the great winners of World War II. Neitheris eagerto reversethe partition which took the German problem off thefront burner of internationalpolitics. Neither wants a nuclearizedGer- many.Neither has madestrenuous efforts to reversethe de factodivision of Europeinto spheres of relativeinterest. IfHitler's Germany is theexample par excellence of a revolutionaryworld powerfor which the concept of securityregime is totallymeaningless, then clearlythe Soviet Union is quitesome distance from the revolutionary end in thecontinuum between revolutionary and statusquo powers.Caspar Wein- bergerdoes notsee "any realchange or anyreal possibility of modification of theirbasic policies,'"18but this need notprevent limited cooperation on securityregimes. Such cooperationcan be based on riskaversion without requiringagreement on the long-termcourse of history.In the wordsof BrentScowcroft, "the Soviets,whatever their view of history and the 'inev- itableoutcome' which 'history' promises-are very cautious and verycon- servative."19 On thisbasis, cooperation on securityis possible,though it will remainlimited by ideology and competition.One shouldexpect the concept of regimesto be moreuseful when potential risks are highand the Soviet

16. Gowa and Wessell,Ground Rules; see also theforthcoming work by RobertLegvold, ColumbiaUniversity. 17. WilliamZimmerman, Soviet Perspectiveson InternationalRelations, 1956-1967 (Prince- ton,N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1973), p. 32. 18. Weinbergerinterview in Michael Charlton, The Star Wars History (London: BBC, 1986), p. 97. 19. Scowcroftinterview in Charlton,Star WarsHistory, p. 106. 378 InternationalOrganization

Unionis nearerthe status quo pole and is willingto approachissues in less ideologicalterms. In fact,as we shallsee, theseconditions do affecttheir behavior. Thissituation does notmean that the application of the concept of regime to the U.S.-Soviet relationshipis a perfectfit. Ideological differences set limitson behaviorconsistent with regimes. The structureof nuclear bipolar- ityheightens the nature of the security dilemma as perceivedby the leaders of thetwo countries. Lastly, the secretive nature of theSoviet society and governmentalsystem makes tracing the effectiveness of regimes on domestic politicallearning highly problematic. But notwithstandingthese dif- ficulties,students can use the regimeconcept in conjunctionwith both Realistand Liberaltheories to gleanfresh insights about the nature of the U.S.-Soviet relationshipand its prospectsover time.

3. Learning

Perceptionof national interests may change in severalways. The mostobvi- ous occursafter domestic shifts in power. An election,coup, or even genera- tionalchange can cause leaderswith quite different perceptions of national interestto replaceold ones. In otherwords, some changesin "national interest"depend not upon new affective or cognitiveviews in the society at large,but merelyon changesof politicalelites. Such politicalchange may occurbecause of domesticissues largelyunrelated to foreignpolicy. Na- tionalinterest may also be redefinedthrough normative change. The prac- ticesor interestsof one periodbecome downgraded or evenillegitimate in a laterperiod because of normativeevolution. Changed views of slaveryor colonialismare examples. A thirdway in whichnational interests may change is throughcognitive changeor learning.In thissense, to learnis to developknowledge by study or experience.New informationalters prior beliefs about the world. Learn- ingoften involves a shiftfrom overly simple generalizations to "complex, integratedunderstandings grounded in realistic attention to detail."20Learn- ing occurs internationallywhen "new knowledgeis used to redefinethe contentof thenational interest. Awareness of newlyunderstood causes of unwantedeffects often results in theadoption of different,and moreeffec- tive,means to attainone's ends.''21 In such instances,a simplepower or pressuremodel of policychange may be highlymisleading. To takea case frommy personal experience, in the mid-1970s,the UnitedStates wanted

20. LloydEtheredge, Can GovernmentsLearn? (New York:Pergamon Press, 1985), p. 143; also "GovernmentLearning: An Overview,"in SamuelL. Long,ed., Handbookof Political Behavior,vol. 2 (New York:Plenum Press, 1981), pp. 73-161. 21. ErnstHaas, "WhyCollaborate? Issue-Linkage and International Regimes," World Poli- tics32 (April1980), p. 390. Nuclearlearning 379

France to cancel its sale of a plutoniumreprocessing plant to Pakistan. Francerefused for some timeon the groundsthat the plantwas forcivil purposes.But Francedecided to cancel the sale in 1977when the United States providednew informationthat the plantwould be misused.Most pressaccounts attributed the changeto U.S. arm-twisting,but theywere wrong. The alterationof beliefsby new informationdoes not alwaysincrease effectiveness.Sometimes new informationcan be misleadingor wrongly applied.Misread "lessons of history"and inappropriateanalogies have often preventedleaders from attaining their goals.22 Large macrohistorical analogiessuch as "Munich" or "Vietnam,"laden with emotional and do- mesticpolitical content, can be particularlymisleading. Neither individuals norsocieties are clean slates.New informationaffects prior beliefs, but its receptionand interpretationare also affectedby thoseprior beliefs. The extentand accuracyof learningdepends upon the strengthof the'prior beliefsand thequantity and qualityof thenew information.23 Some beliefs maybe so strongthat new informationis ignored and no learning,or only highlydistorted learning, occurs. Psychologicalstudies of perceptionand misperceptionhelp us to understandsuch barriersto learning,but so do politicaland institutional factors. Cognitive change is important,but it rarely standsalone. Learningis oftenblocked or distortedby affectiveand power variables.Russell Leng has shown,for example, that in crisisbargaining, experientiallearning from the outcomeof thelast crisisis nota powerful predictorof behavior in thenext crisis until it is combinedwith prior beliefs aboutthe importance of demonstratingpower and resolve.24 Learningcan be a slipperyconcept for two reasons. One problemis the tendencyto buildeffectiveness into the definition. For simplesituations, this connotationis intuitivelyobvious. It seems odd to say that one has "learned"that two plus twoequals five.But thesituation is differentwith complexsocial phenomena.The Keynesianrevolution in economicsmeant thatsome "laws" learnedin the 1920swere wrongin the 1930s. Some economiststoday believe that early Keynesian formulations about inflation werefar too simple.The effectivenessof alteredcognitive beliefs is some- timesonly known with great delay, and sometimesnot at all. A second problemis thatlearning sometimes has a positiveevaluative connotation: whenthe observerapproves of the new conceptionof self-interest,it is called "learning";disliked changes are not.But by mydefinition, negative,

22. RichardNeustadt and Ernest May, Thinking in Time(New York:Free Press, 1986). See also JohnD. Steinbruner,The Cybernetic Theory of Decision (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton Uni- versityPress, 1974); Robert Jervis,Perception and Misperceptionin InternationalPolitics (Princeton:Princeton University Press, 1976), chap. 6. 23. Fora discussionof theories of the affects of prior beliefs and some interesting examples, see DeborahLarson, Origins of Containment(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985). 24. RussellLeng, "When Will They Ever Learn?"Journal of ConflictResolution 27 (Sep- tember1983). 380 InternationalOrganization as well as positive,learning can occur. The questionis whetherthe new informationor skillshave enabledthe actors to achievetheir purposes bet- ter,regardless of whetherthe observerlikes those purposesor not. Of course,choices of definition are to someextent arbitrary, but the danger of buildingeffectiveness and positive value into the definition of learning is that itinhibits one's abilityto observevariation. The sparedefinition chosen here is designedto avoidthese pitfalls, and providesa moreuseful research tool in an importantbut murky area. Thereare also differentdegrees of learningalong a continuumof ends- meansrelationships, from very simple to highlycomplex. Simple learning uses new informationmerely to adapt the means,without altering any deepergoals in the ends-meanschain. The actorsimply uses a different instrumentto attainthe same goal. Complexlearning, by contrast,involves recognitionof conflictsamong means and goals in causallycomplicated situations,and leads to new prioritiesand trade-offs.25Simple learning is relativelyeasy for an observerto assess,but complex learning is oftenmore elusivewhen changes in deepergoals mayhave occurred.This distinction helpsus avoid needlesssemantic disputes over whetheror notchanges in behaviorare examplesof learning.For instance,most changes in nuclear behaviorare adaptationsto changedcircumstances. Only a fewinvolve the readjustmentof goals and the developmentof new norms.Both typesof learningare important,but complex learning may be moreso. At thesame time,complex learning is sometimesdifficult to ascertainobjectively, because perceptionsand ideologyplay a largerrole in assessingconsequences whenhuman affairs have longand complexcausal chains.Thus, complex learningoften involves evaluative ambiguity, and we mustbe explicitabout thevalues involved. The Bay of Pigs episode in 1961 helps illustratethe distinctions. Khrushchevseems to have learned(incorrectly) that Kennedy would re- spondweakly, and thisinterpretation may have led himto therisky actions thatbrought on theBerlin and Cubanmissile crises. Kennedy seems to have learnedvery important but simple lessons about managing bureaucracy and crises.Whether he "failed" to learnmore complex lessons, which would haveeffectively altered his goals in Cuba, is morecontroversial.26 Even ifhe had, we mustadmit there would be a higherideological evaluative compo- nentin assessingwhether complex learning led to greateror lessereffec- tivenessin theachievement of his higherpriority goals. Some eventsseem to have a largereffect on statesmen'slearning than others.Robert Jervis argues that leaders' firsthand experiences early in life whichhave consequencesare particularlyimportant. He also notes the

25. Chris Argyrisand Donald Schon, OrganizationalLearning: A Theoryof Action Perspec- tive(Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley,1978). Their terminology is single-loop and double-loop learning. 26. See Etheredge,Can GovernmentsLearn? for this interpretation. Nuclearlearning 381 powerof analogiesand overgeneralizationwhen leaders do not have the experienceof alternative explanations. They usually have sharperreactions to failurethan they have learningabout the limits of success.27Sometimes nothingfails like success. Finally,individual learning is a necessary,but insufficient,basis foror- ganizationallearning. Societies and governmentsare complexentities. Not everyonelearns the same lessonsor at thesame rate. Shifts in social struc- tureand political power determine whose learning matters. In organizations, theremust be an institutionalmemory and procedureswhich affect old and newmembers throughout the organization. In JamesRosenau's terms, they are pools ofhabits.28 As JohnSteinbruner points out, organizations tend to dividecomplex problems and reduceuncertainty so thattheir cybernetic learningis slowerand moreconstrained than analytic causal learning.29Fi- nally,in societies,one needsto understandnot only the social and genera- tionaldivisions over the interpretation ofcommon experiences, but also the transmissionbelts between mass public opinion, societal groups, and political elites. Skepticsmay argue that we knowtoo little about internal Soviet processes to be able to applysuch theories of learning. Certainly the secretive nature of Sovietsociety makes this task difficult, but it is notimpossible. In terms ofthe simple learning criterion, one can observeSoviet responses to experience and new information.With regard to complexlearning, one can also see glimpsesof more sophisticated thought which go deeperinto the chain of ends-meansrelationships, even if it does notchallenge ultimate ideological goals. As ThaneGustafson argues, "there is evidencefrom many different fieldsthat the scope and qualityof specialists'advice to policymakers . . . haveincreased."30 Alexander Dallin sees "a learningprocess that has led to growingsophistication and 'emancipation'from doctrinal stereotypes on the partof a relativelysmall number of members of the intellectual and political elite... ",31 Rose Gottemoellernotes an increasedcomplexity of Soviet decision-makingfor arms control.32 Sovietwritings about nuclear weapons in worldpolitics have also become moredetailed and sophisticated.33An interestinganecdote is ArkadyShev-

27. Jervis,Perception and Misperception,chap. 6. 28. JamesN. Rosenau, "Learningin East-WestRelations: The Superpowersas Habit- DrivenActors" (Los Angeles:Institute for Transnational Studies, mimeo, 1986). 29. Steinbruner,Cybernetic Theory, pp. 78-79. 30. ThaneGustafson, Reform in SovietPolitics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981),chap. 6. 31. AlexanderDallin, "The DemocraticSources of Soviet ForeignPolicy," in Seweryn Bialer, ed., The Domestic Contextof Soviet ForeignPolicy (Boulder: WestviewPress, 1981),p. 359. 32. Rose E. Gottemoeller,"Decisionmaking for Arms Limitation in theSoviet Union," in Hans GuentherBrauch and Duncan Clark, eds., Decisionmakingfor Arms Limitation(Cam- bridge,Mass.: Ballinger,1983), pp. 53ff. 33. RobertLegvold, cited in note16. Compareto Zimmerman,Soviet Perspectives. 382 InternationalOrganization chenko'sdescription of the strategemby whichForeign Minister Andrei Gromykoinvolved the reluctant Soviet military in arms control negotiations. He lobbiedto have risingyoung officers placed on the Sovietdelegation and insistedon a unique procedureby whichall seven delegateshad to signcables to Moscow. " 'It's hardto discussthe subjectwith the military,'Gromyko told me, 'but themore contact they have withthe Ameri- cans,the easier it willbe to turnour soldiersinto something more than just martinets.'"34 The Sovietshave oftenunderstated the degreeto whichtheir positions changeand tendto stresscontinuity almost as muchas Americansempha- size evolutionand change.Organizational learning is likelyto be slowerin centralizedsystems with limited access to outsideinformation and a concern fordoctrinal continuity. But if one expectsthe Soviets to be slowerto learn, one shouldalso expectthe Americans to be quickerto forget. Because of the frequentturnover of political officials, the American government has a weak institutionalmemory, and new leadersoften have to relearnold lessons.

4. Nuclearlearning

One difficultywe encounterwhen we evaluatenuclear learning relates to the uncertaintiesof deterrence. No one knowsfor certain exactly what weapons are necessaryfor deterrence. Moreover, deterrence of conventionalwar or politicalaggrandizement demands capability and credibilitygreater than whatis needed to detera strikeagainst one's homeland.Thus, muchof whatpasses for nuclear knowledge rests upon elaborate counterfactual argu- ment,abstractions based on assumptionsabout rational actors, assumptions about the othernation's unknown intentions, and simpleintuitions. The ambiguousstructure of nuclearknowledge makes it difficultfor new infor- mationto alterprior beliefs. Obviously, this combination leaves lots of room forspurious knowledge, false learning, and occasionalforgetting as coali- tionsshift in domesticpolitics. The uncertaintiesof deterrencealso block transitionsfrom simple to morecomplex learning. The differencein political and militarycultures means that divergent prior beliefs tend to lead each countryto learndifferent lessons from new information.It is particularly interestingwhen common lessons are learneddespite varying prior beliefs. Overthe past four decades, new information about nuclear weapons and experienceswith their handling have altered prior beliefs. In severalareas, it has even createda core of consensualknowledge that both countries share to a largeextent. Both sides share a greaterknowledge about the destructive powerof nuclearweapons. The discoveryof the powerof the hydrogen bombin the 1950smeant that whole societies were henceforth vulnerable.

34. ArkadyShevchenko, Breaking with Moscow (New York:Ballantine, 1985) p. 270. Nuclearlearning 383

Despitetechnical and doctrinalefforts at damagelimitation and precision targeting,collateral damage is likelyto be high.More recently, public atten- tionhas focusedon theunintended environmental consequence of nuclear war. Whilethe early alarms about nuclear winter destroying the earth may have been spuriouslearning, the existence of largeand unpredictableenvi- ronmentaleffects now seems to be widelyaccepted. One resultof this learning is thatwe recognizeassured destruction as a presentcondition, even thoughwe stillhave doctrinaldifferences about its desirability or theeffec- tivenessof long-termefforts to escape it by buildingperfect defenses. A second area of commonknowledge is the commandand controlof nuclearweapons and theincumbent dangers of escalation. In theearly days of fewweapons, each side put nuclearcontrol in the handsof a separate civilianagency (the Atomic Energy Commission in the United States and the KGB in theSoviet Union). As nuclearweapons systems became more nu- merousand complex,such simple solutions no longerworked. More elabo- ratetechnical and politicalprocedures have been developedto cope with problemsof controland to reducerisks of inadvertentnuclear war. A thirdarea in which common knowledge has developedis inthe spread of nuclearweapons to morecountries. Both the United States and theSoviet Unionacted somewhatnaively during the 1950sand 1960s,when they be- lievedthat sharing nuclear technology with allies could be controlled,and thatpeaceful nuclear exports could be keptfrom military use. Bettersci- entificknowledge and diplomatic experience has changedthese attitudes and policies. A fourtharea involvesforces and thevolatility of the armsrace. Some earlyillusions have been dispelled, such as thefallacy of the last move-that is, thebelief that a technologicalinnovation will not soon be acquiredby the otherside. The Sovietsseem to have learnedthat they can toleratesome degreeof "open skysurveillance," which they rejected in the 1950s.Both seem to have acceptedthe languageof parityand recognizedthe link be- tweenoffense and defense,though each appearsat timesto hankerafter the superiorityithas officiallyforsworn. Both seem to havelearned the practice offormal arms control negotiations. Nonetheless, they have disagreed about the value of armscontrol, and bothhave been reluctantto make major changesin forcestructures. In thisfifth area, whichincludes the forces neededfor deterrence, the ambiguitiesand uncertaintiesof nucleardeter- rencedoctrine seem to have blockedfurther learning. Both sides recognize the value of havinginvulnerable forces for crisis stability, but neitheris willingto foregothe desire to putthe other sides' forces at riskas a meansof deterringpolitical aggrandizement. Table 1 summarizesthe four areas in whichconsiderable nuclear learning has occurred,as well as the fiftharea, in whichlearning has been more limited.In the firstthree areas, learningrests upon fairlyconcrete new informationsuch as scientific,technical, and diplomaticexperience. The s~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~0X dc

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0 s~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~tkjoo Nuclearlearning 385 fourtharea restslargely upon diplomatic experience. The fifthrests mostly upontheoretical studies and perceptionsof strategicinteractions. This type ofnew information provides a less clear-cutbasis for judging complex causal chains,and itis less likelyto alterprior beliefs than to be distortedby them. Nonetheless,changes in forcestructures have occurred, some of them con- vergent.The UnitedStates moved to flexibleresponse in the 1960s,and the Sovietsreplied with a similardevelopment of conventional capabilities in the 1970s.The Sovietsdeveloped significant counterforce options in the 1960s, and theUnited States replied with the countervailing strategy of the 1970s. Whetherthese changes in doctrineand structureenhanced and stabilized deterrenceis moredifficult to ascertain.In thisarea, though learning led to someconcurrence in beliefs,it did notlead to explicitcooperation. Moreover,much learning in the fifth area of force structure and deterrence seemsto havebeen simple rather than complex. For example,the invulnera- bilityof one's ownforces was stressedmore than the development of a norm of mutualinvulnerability. Robert McNamara's welcoming of thenews that theSoviets were hardening their silos in the 1960sand theBrooke Resolu- tion,which tried to limitimprovements inmissile accuracy in 1969and 1970, bore no fruit.35Because of the complexnotions of nuclearstability, both sides continuetheir attempts to threatenthe other's forces. That situation setslimits on thedevelopment of norms and explicitcooperation. Yet in the otherfour areas, learningand convergentknowledge did lead to explicit, albeitlimited, cooperation. In thefirst three areas, regimes were established, as we shallsee whenwe lookat each ofthem in greater detail. In turn,these regimeshelped to "lock in " and developthe learning that had occurredin thefirst three cases. In thefourth area-arms control,where the nature of theinformation is less firmand strategicbargaining has a powerfulimpact -the regimehas erodedand cooperationhas becomemore problematic. Comparingthe five areas, it seemsthat the extent to whichcooperation is learneddoes indeeddepend upon the strength of the prior beliefs (and who holdsthem) and thequantity and qualityof theinformation. I shalllook at thesefive areas in greaterdetail. First, regarding destruc- tivenessand non-useof nuclearweapons, both the Americanand Soviet governmentshave learned somethingduring the nuclear era. Nuclear weaponswere invented to be used. Yet today,both sides frequently discuss themas thoughthey are not usable or thatthey are usefulfor deterrence only.In thewords of theGeneva communique of November1985: "[T]he sides have agreedthat a nuclearwar cannotbe won and mustnever be fought.Recognizing that any conflictbetween the Soviet Union and the UnitedStates could have catastrophicconsequences, they emphasize the

35. See CongressionalInformation Service, "ABM, MIRV, SALT, and theNuclear Arms Race," 72-608111(Washington, D.C.: U.S. GovernmentPrinting Office, 1970); "Senate Unit AsksMIRV Test Cutoff,"New YorkTimes, 17 March1970, p. 7; JohnW. Finney,"Senate UnitUrges Nuclear Arms Freeze," New YorkTimes, 21 March1970, p. 6. 386 InternationalOrganization importanceof preventing any war between them whether nuclear or conventional.They will not seek to achievemilitary superiority." Non-usewas notalways the received nuclear wisdom. The UnitedStates activelyconsidered using nuclear weapons at a highlevel severaltimes in the 1950s(Korea, DienbienPhu, Taiwan). During one of thefirst National SecurityCouncil meetings in 1953,President Eisenhower and Secretaryof State JohnFoster Dulles worriedthat public campaignsagainst nuclear weaponsmight hinder their usability as weaponsof war. Since the early 1960s,however, hardly any evidence shows high-level consideration of the deliberateuse of nuclearweapons to achievea politicalpurpose (although theUnited States worried that nuclear weapons might be used in a crisis).36 Overtincidents of coercivenuclear diplomacy also declined.37Public opinion became moreskeptical about the use of nuclearweapons during the 1950s.38While the United States has refusedto makean opendeclaration of "no firstuse" of nuclearweapons (because ofthe requirements of the doctrineof flexible response for extended deterrence in Europe),many observ- ersbelieve that the de factoposition is no firstuse. When,in the early years of the Reagan administration,officials began to discussthe possibilityof protractednuclear war, public opinion forced them to revisethe declaratory policyeventually stated in theGeneva communique. A similarevolution occurred in Sovietdeclaratory policy. Under Stalin, nuclearweapons were seen as militaryinstruments of bombardmentwithin an ideologicalcontext which declared the inevitability of war betweenthe two greatcamps.3 WhenGeorgii Malenkov tried to alterthis doctrine in 1954,Khrushchev used it to helpdefeat him in his bid forthe succession. Nonetheless,by the twentiethparty conference in 1956,Khrushchev had adoptedMalenkov's position that war between the two camps was no longer inevitablein the nuclearage. Khrushchevbluffed openly with nuclear weaponsafter the major action had concludedduring the Suez crisisof 1956 and theTaiwan Straitcrisis of 1958,but the dangers of nuclearwar in the lattercase clearlyenhanced Soviet caution.40 This caution contributed to the Sino-Sovietsplit. In theearly 1960s polemics between the Soviet and Chi- nese CommunistParties, the Soviets declared that nuclear weapons do not

36. JohnLewis Gaddis, "The LongPeace: Elementsof Stability in the Postwar International System,"International Security 10 (Spring 1986). "The patternof caution in the use ofnuclear weaponsdid not develop solely, as one mighthave expected, from the prospect of retaliation." It "mayowe moreto themoral and public relations-sensibilities ofWashington officials than to anyactual fear of escalation," p. 137. 37. BarryBlechman and Stephen Kaplan, Force WithoutWar (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution,1978). 38. ThomasW. Graham,"Future Fission," HarvardUniversity Center for Science and InternationalAffairs, 1987. 39. See David Holloway,The Soviet Union and theArms Race (New Haven,Conn.: Yale UniversityPress, 1983). 40. BenjaminS. Lambeth,"Nuclear Proliferation and SovietArms Control Policy," Orbis 13 (Summer1970). Nuclearlearning 387 observethe class principle.These positions developed further in the various SALT-relatedagreements of the 1970s,in Brezhnev'sTula speechof Janu- ary 1977,which cautioned against the beliefin the usabilityof nuclear weapons,and again in a seriesof statements by Andropov and Chernenko in theearly 1980s. In short,the two countries have changed their declared position about the usabilityof nuclearweapons. How significantlythis change affects opera- tionaldoctrine is an open question.For example,declaratory policy affects Americanstrategic targeting plans (with certain lags), but they have always involveda moremixed set of targetsthan pure declaratory policy would suggest.On theSoviet side, most analysts distinguish between the political and the operationallevels of strategicdoctrine, the former enunciated by partyleaders and the latterby militaryofficers.41 In general,the political doctrinehas become more defensive;nuclear weapons will not be used unlessthe Soviet Unionis attacked.In 1982,Soviet leaders formally de- clareda doctrineof no firstuse. On theother hand, the military doctrine is preemptive.If an attackappears imminent, it is betterto strikefirst than second.42These two positionsare not necessarilycontradictory, but it is importantto notethe limits of declaratory policy. Nonetheless, knowledge- able expertsreport that the Soviets cannot maintain two completely separate audiences,and changesin declaratorypolicy have an influence.Soviet policy changessometimes start because of tacticalor propagandaadvantage, and latertake on a lifeof theirown. To theextent that declaratory policy does have an influence,the changing definitions of interest,as reflectedin declaratorypolicy in both societiesover the past threedecades, are of considerableinterest. In contrastto the apparentlearning and developmentof some common normsat thelevel of rhetoric, much less learninghas occurredin thefourth andfifth areas (armscontrol and deterrentforce structures). Both countries continueto develop new nuclearsystems, including those designedfor promptattack against the other'shardened nuclear forces. Yet whilethe sides maynot hold commonnorms, similar simple learning seems to have occurredand someconvergent views exist. Both sides have gone to consid- erableexpense to developforces which are relativelyinvulnerable to a first strike.This developmentmay be explainedsimply as prudentadaptation; it mayalso have been affectedby Americanefforts to persuadethe Soviets of thevalue of a seabornedeterrent during arms talks in the 1970s.While the Sovietshave placed farfewer of theirwarheads at sea, theyhave invested heavilyin developinga submarine-basedforce which can be held in pro-

41. See Derek Leebaert,ed., SovietMilitary Thinking (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1981),and RobbinLaird and Dale Herspring,The Soviet Union and StrategicArms (Boulder: WestviewPress, 1984). 42. StephenMeyer, "Soviet Perspectives on thePaths to Nuclear War," in G. T. Allison,A. Carnesaleand J. Nye,eds., Hawks,Doves and Owls(New York:Norton, 1985). 388 InternationalOrganization tectedsanctuaries. Similarly, while some Americans speak nervously about our nuclearvulnerability because of concernfor the survivabilityof fixed land-basedmissiles, it is worthremembering that the ICBMs constituteonly a quarterof Americanstrategic warheads. In contrastto theirleaders' rhetoric,both sides have made heavyinvestments in redundantand invul- nerablesecond-strike capabilities, which contribute to stabilityin a timeof crisis. Why,then, do bothsides resist agreement on a commonnorm of second- strikeforces only? Why do theycontinue to investin forces which present a capabilityfor first strike against missile silos? Some observersexplain that bothsides have totally different concepts of what constitutes nuclear stability.Certainly differences in forcestructures reflect conceptual and historical differences.43However, both countries face some verybasic similaritiesin thesituation. The classicusability dilemma has blockedthe development of a normabout non-use and buildingit into force structures on bothsides.44 If no one believes nuclearweapons can be used, theylose theirdeterrent value.Yet ifused, they may destroy the values they are supposedto protect. Thisdilemma creates ambivalence in bothcountries and limitsthe developmentof the doctrine of non-use. Instead, both sides have developed a complex nuclearstability which trades off different values. Crisisstability refers to theabsence of incentivesto preemptin timeof crisis.Arms race stabilityrefers to theabsence of incentivesto accelerate the developmentof new arms.Political stability refers to the absence of incentivesto takepolitical actions that might lead to crisesor nuclearwar. Whenthe Soviets are pressedto explainwhy they have invested so muchin the developmentof large,vulnerable, land-based missiles which threaten AmericanICBMs, theyoften reply that such missiles frighten the Americans and deterWashington from taking risky actions which might lead to war. One hearssimilar arguments from Americans. For example,Defense De- partmentofficials justify the placement of MX missilesin silos by arguing thatthey threaten the Soviets and keepthem from risky political actions. As one U.S. AirForce officerput it: "Deterrenceis moreimportant than sur- vivability."45Both countries have groupsstressing one dimensionof stabil- itymore than another. Both countries' force structures and doctrineshave becomemore similar over time. In fact,the Soviet force structure strongly 43. WilliamE. Odom,"The SovietApproach to NuclearWeapons: A HistoricalReview," TheAnnals 469 (Sept 1983);see ColinGray, Nuclear Strategy and NationalStyle (Boston: HamiltonPress, 1986) on thispoint and for general skepticism about Soviet learning. 44. See thediscussion in JosephS. Nye,Nuclear Ethics (New York:Free Press, 1986), pp. 53ff. 45. Conversationsat OffutAir Force Base, February1986. A Sovietexample occurred in 1965,when General Talenskii concluded that "in ourdays there is no moredangerous illusion thanthe idea that thermonuclear war can stillserve as an instrumentofpolitics," while Lt. Col. Rybkinwarned that "any a priorirejection of thepossibility of victoryis harmfulbecause it leadsto moraldisarmament, to a disbeliefin victoryand to fatalismand passivity." Quoted in Holloway,Arms Race, p. 164. Nuclearlearning 389 affectedthe development of the American countervailing strategy of the late 1970s.46While important differences remain (most notably in air defense), bothcountries practice a policyof investing heavily in crisis stability-albeit as a unilateralgoal fortheir own forces rather than for their adversary. The Sovietsare developingmobile land-based missiles and increasingthe capa- bilitiesof their submarine forces, while the Americans debate the prospect of mobilityand enhancetheir submarine forces.47 The result,of course, is notalways helpful for arms race stability.But to arguethat no learninghas occurredin arms race stability and deterrent force structuresis an overstatement.Both sides seemedto have learnedthe importanceof maintaininginvulnerable second-strike retaliatory capabilities, butthey differ somewhat internally and witheach otherover the allocation ofinvestment between these three dimensions of strategic stability. In arms race stability,there has also beensome learning. Both sides have eschewed superiority,at least at thedeclaratory level. This is a changefrom earlier postures.Neither has developedas manynuclear weapons as itis physically capableof doing. As ErnestMay has shownin theAmerican case, thishas beencaused partly by thebroadening number of groups involved in nuclear decision-making.48Similarly, on the Soviet side, one can arguethat the participationin armslimitation talks during the detente also helpedbroaden the numberof actorsinvolved in the weaponsacquisition process. More recently,a greatercivilian involvement in militaryaffairs has occurred.It is interestingto notethat a clause in the 1986Party Program "breaks ground byreserving for party leaders the right to formulateSoviet military doctrine, whichincludes forecasting the probability of war." WhenMarshall Ogarkov wrotein 1985of analogiesto the 1930s,Gorbachev contradicted him at a Moscowrally, telling the crowd that "the present world is absolutelyunlike thatof the 1930s."49 Fourth,we can discernnuclear learning in thepostwar period in thearea ofavoiding inadvertent and accidentalnuclear war. If one dividesthe forty- yearperiod, the first half involved far more serious crises (such as thoseover Berlinand Cuba) thanthe latterhalf. Alexander George has arguedthat duringsuch crises, as wellas thosein Korea, Hungary, Suez, andthe Middle East, the two sides learnedde facto rules of prudence.50In Zbigniew

46. See WalterSlocombe, "The CountervailingStrategy," International Security 5 (Spring 1981). 47. In thearea of mobility,the Americans learned by observingthe Soviets. The U.S. Air Forcefinally decided that garrison basing for rail-mobile missiles might be safeenough after theyobserved the Soviets using that system for their new SS-24 missile. Interview, Pentagon official,1987. 48. ErnestMay, "Why Doesn't the United States Have MoreNuclear Weapons?" Harvard University,1986. 49. Gottemoeller,"Decisionmaking for Arms Limitation"; Sidney Ploss, "A New Soviet Era," ForeignPolicy 62 (Spring1986), pp. 54-56. 50. AlexanderGeorge, Managing the U.S.-Soviet Rivalry (Boulder: Westview Press, 1983). 390 InternationalOrganization

Brzezinski'swords, they are "a code of reciprocalbehavior guiding the competition,lessening the danger that it could become lethal.",51 These rules includeavoiding direct fighting with each other(which hasn't occurred since Sovietpilots manned MIGs overKorea in 1950);no use ofnuclear weapons even in limitedwars; the importanceof communicationduring crisis (as Eisenhowersignalled to Khrushchevin 1956); not pressingeach others' clientsto thewall in suchregions as theMiddle East; and roughrespect for areasof primary interest to theother side. During informal discussions with theSoviets, both sides have acknowledgedcommon rules of prudence,al- thoughexact formulations and thelength of thelist are stillambiguous. Therehas also beenlearning in thearea ofavoiding accidental sources of nuclearwar. This is not necessarilyobvious and easy. The prospectof accidentaluse can helpdeterrence. As one Sovietput it, "such measures are likehaving perfect seat beltsin cars. Theymay encourage reckless driving. Sincewe believeyour president has a tendencyfor reckless driving, the last thingwe wantto do is providehim with the belief that he has a perfectseat belt." At thesame time, another Soviet explained the other side of the same dilemma:"Nuclear accidents are so frighteningthat nobody will believe in perfectsafety belts. Safety measures are critical."52 In general,given Ameri- can proclivitiesfor technical solutions and Sovietpreferences for political solutions,Americans have oftenpressed such measuresmore than the Soviets.In addition,the Sovietsfind some advantagein stimulatingcon- cernsabout accidentsas a way of drainingconfidence in the West while controllingthe Soviet domestic audience.53 Despitethese differences, both sides agreeupon a numberof measures. Themost frequently cited is thehotline, or direct communication link, which has becomeso widelyaccepted that it is hardto remember that many Ameri- cansonce opposed, thinking itmight sap deterrence.54In the early 1970s, the two sides signedthe Accident Measures Agreement, which led to working outcodes andprocedures for communication during crises; more recently, it has led to an understandingon consultationsto occurin the event of nuclear terrorism.A particularlyinteresting agreement is the one governinginci- dentsat sea; it has had a strong(though not perfect) effect on reducingthe numberof dangerous incidents between the navies of the two countries, and ithas attaineda considerabledegree of support in the U.S. Navy.In thearea of surveillanceand inspection,which can helplimit misperceptions, change has also beengradual. Although Soviet secrecy is stillpervasive, they accept

51. ZbigniewBrzezinski, Game Plan (Boston:Atheneum, 1986), p. 244. 52. Conversationswith academicians in Moscow,January 1984. 53. See BarryBlechman, "Efforts by theU.S. and SovietUnion to ReduceRisks of Acci- dentalor InadvertentWar," Preparedfor the StanfordProject on U.S.-Soviet Effortsto Cooperatein SecurityMatters, May 1986. 54. See WebsterStone, "The Hot Line," undergraduatehistory thesis, Harvard University, 1984.See also WilliamUry, Beyond the Hotline (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1985). Nuclearlearning 391 satellitesurveillance and are flirtingwith on-site inspection, which differs greatlyfrom their earlier positions. Not all cooperationin thisarea has been formal.For example,after the Americansdeveloped the electronic safety devices called permissive actions links(PALs), theydeliberately leaked information to the Soviet Union, hop- ingthat they would begin to developsimilar devices. By thetime the ques- tionof suchdevices was raisedin formalnegotiations in 1970and 1971,the Sovietstold the Americans that they did not need their assistance.55 It seems reasonableto believethat, in this case, informalcooperation was successful. Despitedifficulties in priorbeliefs and initialpositions, nuclear learning has occurredas newinformation altered prior beliefs and definitionsof interest overtime. Finally,learning has been particularlyimpressive in effortsto slow the spreadof nuclearweapons to new countries.Although this seems to be an obviouscommon interest, both sides took nearly a decade to appreciateit. Even afterthey learned its significancein theearly 1950s, both sides tried unilateralefforts at restriction.Then, in the mid-1950s, both sides turned to a policyof sharingnuclear technology with allies. WhenKhrushchev found thatthis policy involved higher risks with Chinese nuclear weapons than he originallyintended, he triedto controlhis Chineseally by confrontingthe Americanopponent and proclaiminghis leadershipof the Sino-Sovietal- liance.At thesame time,the United States was tryingto balancetwo concerns:1) sharingoperational control of nuclear deterrence with its allies, and 2) the desireto developbroader norms for slowing the spreadof nuclear weapons.Only after these unilateral efforts of the mid-1950s and early 1960s faileddid the two sides turnto cooperativesolutions, developing internationalinstitutions to slow the spreadof nuclearweapons.56 Once again, learningoccurred: initial beliefs and definitions of interest altered as a result of newinformation and experience.

5. The incompletemosaic of securityregimes

As RobertJervis has argued,it is difficultto describethe overall nature of the U.S.-Soviet securityrelationship as a securityregime. But Jervis stoppedshort. The two countrieslargely agree upon broad and specific injunctionsin a numberof subissueswithin the securityrelationship, and one can arguethat ajointly recognized regime exists in suchareas.57 Table 2

55. See reporton theConference on PermissiveAction Links, held at HarvardUniversity Centerfor Science and InternationalAffairs, February 1986 (forthcoming). 56. See JosephS. Nye, "Non-Proliferation,"Paper prepared for Stanford Project on U.S.- SovietEfforts to Cooperatein SecurityMatters, May 1986. 57. I agreewith Keohane that principles, norms, rules, and procedures shade into each other and are bestdistinguished as broadand specificinjunctions. After Hegemony, p. 59. 392 InternationalOrganization

TABLE 2. U.S.-Soviet securityregimes

Does a regimeexist? Whateffects? Specific Area of injunctions Constrain Reshape common Broadinjunctions (rulesand short-run long-run knowledgea (principlesand norms) institutions) self-interestself-interest

1. Destructive Limitcompetition to Yes in Europe, power avoidwar no in LDCs A. Europe DivideGermany and Berlinagree- yes yes respectspheres of in- ments,CSCE fluence B. LDCs No consensuson status Onlyvague or no no quo, butprudence in tacit crises 2. Control Reducesrisk of acci- Hot Line; Acci- yes yes problems dent;crisis manage- dentsMeasures mentand prevention Agreement; INCSEA meetings 3. Prolifer- Slow thespread; NPT; IAEA; yes yes ation priorityto non- Suppliers'Group proliferation 4. Arms Acceptparity; limit of- ABM Treaty yes uncertain race sta- fenseand defense SALT II bility 5. Deterrent Ambivalenceprevents No ...... forces significantlimits on counterforceand con- ventionalthreats a. See Table 1 portraysthis incomplete mosaic in termsof thefive areas of nuclearlearning,whether a regimeexists, and what evidence we haveof its effect on state behavior.The columnsrepresent the operational definitions for a regimes' existence(the ability to identifyagreed-upon broad and specificinjunctions) anda regime'seffects (whether it constrains short-run and reshapes long-run definitionsof self-interest). Structuralfactors and ideologicaldifferences lead the two countriesto competepolitically, but the awarenessof nucleardestructiveness makes themavoid war with each other.One can evenidentify, as describedearlier, certainbasic rulesof prudence (no directfighting, no nuclearuse, communicationduring crisis, and so forth).But aside fromthe multilateralUnited Nations,which has limitedeffects on the relationship,one does not find Nuclearlearning 393 stablebilateral institutions, such as regularsummitry or fullyworked-out agreementsfor codifying the ambiguous rules and formanaging the overall competition.There is no agreementon thelegitimacy of theoverall status quo. It is doubtfulwhether the rules constrain the short-run self-interest of the participants.Prudence sufficiently explains the effect.Whether these rulesaffect states' reshaping of their long-run self-interest or provide a point aroundwhich expectations can convergeis uncertain,although some learningmay occur from the formal and informaldiscussions of suchprinciples. In general,Jervis's judgment holds at theoverall level, that is, we can most easilyunderstand the observed cooperation in terms of prudential pursuit of short-rangeself-interest. It is difficultto ascertainan independentcausal effectof therules of prudence. In the mostimportant area of thepolitical competition, however, some broad and specificinjunctions constrain behavior. One can arguethat at leasta weakregime exists in Europeand that its broad principles and norms are thedivision of Germany, the legitimate role of the United States and the Soviet Union in Europeansecurity, and mutuallyrecognized spheres of concern.The implications and implementation ofthese principles are spelled outin various ways, including the Berlin agreements and the Final Act of the Conferenceon Securityand Cooperationin Europe. The earlyefforts at establishinga postwar peace treatyor settlementfor Europefailed. The earlynegotiations did notaim to divideGermany or to leavean anomalousBerlin in the midst of East Germany,58but it was impos- sibleto agreeupon a setof rules and institutions for a unitedGermany and a Europeanpeace treaty.However, both the UnitedStates and the Soviet Uniongradually redefined their interests away from their early positions in thepostwar negotiations and their expectations gradually converged around theexisting principles. The 1958-61Berlin crisis raised nuclear fears which reinforcedthe importance of adhering to theseprinciples. Subsequently, the specificagreements laid out the rulesand the institutionalframework for meetingto discussthe issues in a mannerwhich fits the descriptionof a partialsecurity regime. The rulesand institutionshelp constrainthe short-rangeself-interest of theUnited States and theSoviet Union in Europe.Despite the vagaries and vicissitudesof the overallpolitical relationship, both sides have closely adheredto cooperationon access to Berlin,the neutrality of Austria, and the de factodivision of Germany.The 1985slaying of an Americanmajor was noteworthybecause it occurredin thegray area of whatis permissiblein intelligencegathering, and because it did not severelydisrupt or change eitherstate's behavior in thisissue. Similarly,the brief efforts of East Ger-

58. See David Schoenbaum,"The WorldWar II AlliedAgreement on Occupationand Ad- ministrationofPostwar Germany," Paper for Stanford Project on U.S.-SovietEfforts to Coop- eratein SecurityMatters, May 1986. 394 InternationalOrganization man authoritiesto restrictdiplomats' freedom of access in Berlinin 1986 werenot sustained. It is moredifficult to ascertainwhether this partial regime has provideda pointaround which expectations converge, and thusreshaped both sides' definitionsof theirlong-range self-interest. While high American officials have occasionallygiven speeches about reversing the Yalta agreementand Sovietshave occasionallycomplained about revanchism in WestGermany, themain lines of expectationshave apparentlyconverged around the rough statusquo, at least since the agreementsof the early1970s. At the same time,the European regime has limitations.Formal cooperation on disarma- menthas beenelusive, although tacit cooperation may have occurred. When it lookedas ifthe American Congress might compel a unilateralwithdrawal of U.S. troops,Brezhnev made a speechin Tblisisuggesting talks on con- ventionalforces; his speechhelped the Nixonadministration successfully oppose Congress.59Eastern Europe remains an area of potentialinstability whichcould disrupt a neutralizationregime. The HelsinkiAgreement of 1975 is at besta de factorather than de jure peace treatyfor the region. In contrast,no regimelimits the politicalcompetition in therest of the world.As forbroad injunctions, the Basic Principlesof Agreement signed in 1972are ambiguousand vague.They did notagree about the legitimacy of thestatus quo, thelegitimacy of each other'sactions in supportof particular groups,or forwars of national liberation. They had littleeffect on Sovietor Americanbehavior in the Third World. As forspecific rules and institutions, prudentpractices have aided themanagement of crises,particularly in the Middle East. But as AlexanderGeorge has noted,simple rules of crisis managementare easierto learnthan the complex changes involved in crisis prevention.Agreements to meetto discussregional issues have had little effect.In general,there is littleevidence of rulesor institutionsthat con- strainboth sides' short-rangeself-interest or thathelp to reshapetheir definitionof theirlong-range self-interest. The area of managingthe arms race has also seen mixedresults. For at leasta decade,the SALT agreementsformed a partialsecurity regime based on theacceptance of parity, recognition of mutualvulnerability, and agree- mentto limitboth offense and defense.60These principlesand normswere supplementedby specificrules in treatyform and in an institutionalframe- workcalled the StandingConsultative Commission (SCC) fordiscussing issuesof compliance. Both sides redefined their short-run interest by adhering to rules(such as not interferingwith the nationaltechnical means of verification)and by dismantlingnuclear systems that exceeded treaty re- straints.Given Soviet proclivities for keeping redundant systems and given

59. See JohnG. Keliher, The Negotiationson Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions (New York:Pergamon Press, 1981), pp. 25-27. 60. CondoleezaRice, "SALT as a LimitedSecurity Regime," Paper for Stanford Project on U.S.-Soviet Effortsto Cooperatein SecurityMatters, May 1986. Nuclearlearning 395 the Americandebate over dismantlementof Poseidonsubmarines, these actionsconstitute observable evidence that the rules and institutions indeed affectthe definitionof short-rangeself-interest. Moreover, bureaucratic definitionsof self-interesthave evolved. As a formerchairman described the JointChiefs of Staff:"As we gotdeeper into arms control came recognition ofits increasing importance-that neither side couldgain through a nuclear war." Duringdebates about whether or notto abideby SALT II earlyin the Reaganadministration, "the argumentsnot to undermineSALT II wereby thesemilitary officers.' '61 On theSoviet side, WilliamJackson argues that theSALT regimetipped the balance between contending long-run expecta- tionsabout the UnitedStates in SovietPolitburo politics in themoderate direction.Shevchenko confirms that the arms control process broadened the thinkingof theSoviet military.62 On the otherhand, the SALT regime'sdefinition of long-rangeself- interestand the convergenceof expectationsgradually eroded-at least amongpart of the American political elite. This erosion had severalcauses. One was theirinability to insulatethe SALT regimefrom political competi- tionin theThird World, which helps explain why SALT II was notratified. Sovietadvances in theThird World, as wellas intrinsicissues, weakened it. Brzezinski'scomment that SALT II died in the sandsof the Ogadenmay have been premature,but Afghanistan doomed its ratification. A secondcause of erosionwas theworsening U.S.-Soviet relationsand theconfrontational manner used to discussissues of verificationand compliance.Soviet compliancefrequently rested on narrowinterpretations of theletter of the agreements and seemed to violatetheir spirit. Their behavior came closerto thespecific than to thediffuse end ofthe spectrum of reciprocalbehavior, which suggests a weak regime.63Nonetheless, in the 1970s theSoviets changed their behavior after contentious issues wereraised in the SCC. The maincharges of Soviet non-compliancein the 1980s-the Krasnoyarskradar, the second new land-based missile, and theencryption oftelemetry-might have been dealt with by the SCC ina quieterperiod, but thedeterioration in theoverall political relationship allowed groups opposed to the armscontrol regime to turnthese peripheral questions into central issues,which were used as a litmustest of Soviet reputation and intentions. This developmentsuggests that a thirdcause of erosionwas thepolitical powershift in theUnited States. The 1980election brought to powerelites who had learneddifferent lessons about armscontrol. In contrastto the JointChiefs of Staff,the new politicalelite assimilated information about 61. GeneralDavid Jonesquoted in Charlton,Star WarsHistory, pp. 82-83. 62. WilliamD. Jackson,"Soviet Imagesof theU.S. as a NuclearAdversary, 1969-1979," WorldPolitics 33 (July1981), p. 637. See also RaymondGarthoff, "The SovietMilitary and SALT," in Viri Valenta and WilliamPotter, eds., Soviet Decisionmakingand National Security (London,Allen & Unwin,1984), pp. 136ff. 63. See Robert0. Keohane,"Reciprocity in International Relations," International Organi- zation40 (Winter1986). 396 InternationalOrganization

Soviet armscontrol behavior in a way thatled to negativeassessments. Thendirector of the Arms Control and DisarmamentAgency, Eugene Ros- tow, for example,argued that the Soviets used arms controlto seek superiorityin the 1970s.Assistant Secretary of DefenseRichard Perle argued that"far from learning from the experienceof 1972,we will simply repeatit."64 Finally,the regimeeroded because changesin technologyand politics beganquestioning the basic principlesof parity,mutual vulnerability, and theoffense/defense relationship which reflected the conditions of theearly 1970s.The prospectsof space-baseddefense pose specialchallenges to the ABM Treaty.If thecurrent erosion continues, and no newagreements are reached,the strategicarms controlregime may turnout to be not only limited,but also short-lived.While it lasted,however, the SALT II regime constrainedshort-range self-interest. The problemof controlhas been moresuccessful: there is a regimefor avoidingaccidental nuclear war. The broadinjunction of the regimeis to reducerisk of accidental nuclear war; thespecific rules and institutionsare the AccidentsMeasures Agreement, the Hot Line, and the obligationto consultand communicate.These rules and institutionshave constrained the short-rangeself-interest of statesin a limitedway. As arguedearlier, short- rangeself-interest could have led to Sovietsto playthe danger of accidents forshort-run political advantage in theWest. Cooperation to avoidacciden- tal nuclearwar is notas clearor easy as itmight at firstappear. These rules and institutionsprobably also helpedto reshapethe long-run self-interest of thetwo states. The continueddiscussions and gradual development of addi- tionalagreements in this area suggestthat both countries take the issue seriously. A particularsubset of theregime to preventaccidental nuclear war is the regimeto regulateand prevent incidents at sea. In additionto reducingrisks, it is a way to reducecosts to thetwo navies.The twobureaucracies have elaboratedquite specific rules and a seriesof regular meetings to implement the agreement.When one looks at the changein naval behavioron both sidesbefore and afterthe 1972 agreement, one can arguethat interests were redefinedand that the rules and institutions have constrained the short-range self-interestof thetwo states.65 Anothersuccessful area is the regimefor non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.The keyinjunctions are to slowthe spread of nuclear weapons and weapons-usabletechnologies to thirdparties and to place non-proliferation concernsbefore political advantage with allies or thirdparties. A numberof specificrules and institutionshave been developedto implementthese

64. EugeneRostow and RichardPerle quoted in Charlton,Star WarsHistory, p. 60, 114. 65. Sean Lynn-Jones,"A QuietSuccess forArms Control: Preventing Incidents at Sea," InternationalSecurity 9 (Spring 1985). Nuclearlearning 397 norms-for example, the Non-ProliferationTreaty, the International AtomicEnergy Agency, and theNuclear Suppliers' Group. While these are multilateralinstitutional devices, they are supplementedby regular bilateral non-proliferationtalks between the UnitedStates and the Soviet Union. Moreover,these rules and institutionshave constrainedshort-range self- interests.In a numberof instances,the Soviet Unioncould have gained impressiveshort-range political advantages with third countries, but decided to foregothem (for example, over SouthAfrica in the UnitedNations in 1978,or overthe issue of a testban at the 1985NPT ReviewConference). Even whenoverall political relations between the Soviet Union and the UnitedStates worsened in theearly 1980s and Sovietscut off other forms of armsnegotiations after the deployment of thenew NATO missilesin 1983, thenon-proliferation talks continued. In thewords of a high-levelpartici- pant:"Our earlydiscussions were somewhat rigid regarding the hard cases, butafter seven or eightmeetings, they have become more frank. They now giveus detailedinformation, and when they bring up ourhard cases, itis not in theold rhetoricalway. The talksdefinitely improved with time."66 The rulesand institutionsnot only constrained short-range self-interest, butthey helped to reshapelong-range self-interest so thatnon-proliferation has become a majorinterest for both states.This is quite a contrastto PresidentReagan's initial statements (as a candidatein 1980),when he de- claredthat non-proliferation was noneof our business. It also indicatesthat regularmeetings in an institutionalframework help disconnect an issuefrom thevicissitudes of the overall political relationship. The hostilityof the 1980s generallyoverwhelmed the cooperationthat had been establishedearlier, butin some cases, such as non-proliferation,the superstructureof regime madethe area of cooperationless vulnerableto therising tide of hostility. Finally,limited regimes, such as agreementson neutralization,are not relatedto nuclearlearning, but they have someeffect on thesecurity relationship.The basic principlesand normsof theseregimes isolate certain areas fromthe overall U.S.-Soviet competition.The specificrules and in- stitutionsvary. For example,an effectivemultilateral agreement in Antarc- ticaprohibits the implanting of nuclear devices on theseabed. Other specific regimesneutralize particular countries, such as Austria.One can also find evidencethat such rulesand institutionshave constrainedthe short-range self-interestsof states. For example,Deborah Shapley shows how the Ant- arcticaregime helped reshape the long-rangeself-interest of statesfrom relativelyincoherent positions to longer-termcooperation.67 In short,one can arguethat, while no overallU.S.-Soviet securityregime constrainsor reshapesthe two countries'definition of self-interest,some evidencesuggests that partial security regimes exist in Europe,in strategic 66. Interview,U.S. StateDepartment, October 1986. 67. DeborahShapley, "Antarctica: A Case Historyof Success," Paperprepared for Stan- fordProject on U.S.-Soviet Effortsto Cooperatein SecurityMatters, May 1986. 398 InternationalOrganization

armscontrol, accidental nuclear war, non-proliferation, and forneutralizing certainissues. Moreover,some evidence (independent of that used to iden- tifythe regimes)suggests that the regimeshave shaped both countries' securitybehavior. Further, their behavior in areaswhere regimes have been identifieddiffers from their behavior in the overallsecurity relationship. Whileadditional evidence of internalprocesses within the Soviet Union wouldhelp determine how significanta role regimes play in Sovietlearning andredefinition ofinterest, this information will be hardto get.On theother hand,arguing from observable behavior and counterfactualhistory, agreed rulesand institutionshave helpedto makethe security relationship in some issuesdifferent from areas withoutregimes.

6. Regimesand learning

I have shownhow learningmay lead to the creationof regimes.In turn, regimesmay promotefurther learning. Such learningis oftendifficult to tracein detail. It occursthrough complex psychological processes. Not only do individualsmisunderstand or misapplynew information,but when deal- ingwith large bureaucracies, one mustconsider complexities of political as wellas psychologicalprocesses. Learning is frequentlyblocked by the affective or poweraspects of priorbeliefs. Nonetheless, new informationcan lead notonly to convergentknowledge, but also to thelearning of coopera- tionand thecreation of regimes.What difference do suchregimes make to furtherlearning? Some learningis discontinuousor "lumpy."Large groups or generations maylearn by crises or majorevents which serve as metaphorsfor organizing diversesets of experiences.Learning may also occur incrementally,as bureaucraciesor groupslearn that certain approaches or proceduresdo not work.In turn,they may adapt their behavior. But suchadaptation may be hinderedby therigidities of personality,bureaucratic politics, or ideology. Internationalregimes probably play a largerrole in incrementallearning thanin discontinuouslearning. Nonetheless, even with discontinuous learning,the institutionsmay crystallizethe learningof a particularperiod or group,and contactwithin regimes may help to spreada commoninterpreta- tionof large events. In short,regimes may foster organizational learning by creatingor reinforcinginstitutional memory. The reasonthat regimes play a largerrole in incrementallearning is becausethey establish standard operat- ingprocedures, constrain certain ideologies and rewardothers, and provide opportunitiesfor contacts and bargainingamong leaders. One shouldnot startby assumingthat regimes make a difference,however. The mostparsimonious explanation of governmentallearning is that leadersnotice changes in the structureof the situationwhich affects their effectiveness,and theyadapt theirbehavior as a resultof anticipationor Nuclearlearning 399 experience.Starting with the simplifying assumption that states are unitary actors,we can ask whetherexperience in playinga gameleads to learning. The experienceof playing iterated games of prisoner's dilemma in situations witha long shadowof the futuremay lead playersto learnthe value of cooperationto maximizetheir pay-offs over time.68 Or learningmay occur simplythrough perceptions of changein the structureof thesituation. For example,the weakening of alliances and theperceived erosion of bipolarity in themid-1960s may have helpedthe United States and theSoviet Union learnthat they had a commoninterest in cooperationas a meansof slowing proliferationof nuclearweapons. One need not thinkof regimesor even overtnegotiation to imagineconditions in which cooperation between coun- triescan be learned.Changes in thestructure of power can producelearning withoutthe interveningvariable of regimes.Cooperation can evolve as a choice of unitaryrational actors who are redefiningtheir self-interest in responseto changesin the structureof the game-and thatis itselfan optimisticconclusion.69 In someinstances, however, the existence of a regimemay affect learning. Its principles,rules, and institutionsmay have two typesof effects.First, theymay restrain state behavior. In thissense, one can seek evidenceof restrainedbehavior either in external changes or arguments used in domestic processes.Do thespecific injunctions cause statesto act differentlythan if theymerely followed their short-run self-interest? Second, the injunctions of a regimemay create a focalpoint around which expectations converge. One can lookat thebehavior of states to see to whatextent interests and expecta- tionsare redefinedaround such principles, norms, and rules. Has theexpec- tationof rule-governed behavior become so firmthat self-interest is defined in a way thattakes the existence of theregime as given? These two differenteffects of regimeson behaviorcan be illustratedby theexample of the SALT regime'spartial failure. One can lookat observable Sovietbehavior, for instance, and see thatweapons were dismantled accord- ingto theSALT rules.But it is muchharder to knowwhether their long-term interestswere redefined to convergearound the SALT regime.Access to internalpolitical arguments in theSoviet Union is particularlydifficult, and thustheir development is hardto trace.But the problem is notmerely on the Soviet side. For example,for six years the UnitedStates observedthe unratifiedSALT II rulesregarding dismantlement. However, the U.S. decla- rationof intentto explorespace-based defenses in 1983and its eventual breachof the SALT II limitationsin 1986suggests that the UnitedStates was, fora time,constrained by the SALT regime,but that expectations had

68. RobertAxelrod, The Evolution of Cooperation (New York:Basic Books,1984). See also HaywardR. Alkerand RogerHurwitz, Resolving Prisoner's Dilemmas (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Schoolfor International Studies, 1980). 69. DuncanSnidal, "Coordination versus Prisoner's Dilemma: Implications for International Cooperation and Regimes," American Political Science Review 79 (December 1985). 400 InternationalOrganization notconverged on it.More specifically, in light of the political furor stirred by PresidentReagan's 1986 announcementof intentto cease observingthe SALT II limits,some American expectations had converged around continu- ationof theregime, but those of theparty in powerhad not. Even thoughimperfect and short-lived,however, the SALT regimedid have some impacton learning.For example,it led to a broadersharing of informationon the Sovietside. Earlyin SALT, Sovietleaders complained aboutthe American habit of discussing sensitive military information before civilianmembers of the Soviet delegation.The Sovietdelegation showed littleunderstanding ofAmerican institutions or therole of Congress. Today theyare moresophisticated. Arkady Shevchenko cites Marshall Ogarkov as ''an exampleof this changing outlook and temperament" of younger officers on theSoviet delegation, and formerChairman of theJoint Chiefs of Staff David Jonesfound that in his SALT II discussionwith Marshall Ogarkov, "we couldget to thespecifics without all thedialectical rhetoric.' 70 In some instancesin SALT I, "transnational"or "transdelegational"partnerships of interestdeveloped.71 Of course,even if contactswithin a regimeprovide newinformation which changes policy, false learning is stilla danger.Both Shevchenkoand Paul Nitze argue thatsome Americansgeneralized too muchabout changes in Sovietintentions from the arms control experience.72 The importantpoint is thateven imperfect regimes such as SALT can affect learning. Regimescan affectlearning and statebehavior in severalways. The principlesand norms of the regime may be internalizedby states or byimportant groupswithin states. This processraises the costs of defectingfrom cooperativesolutions and makes it more important to establisha reputationfor reciprocity.Secondly, regimes may provideinformation which alters the waykey participants in thestate understand their interests, or theymay see cause andeffect relationships that were not previously understood. Included in thisinformation may be proceduresfor transparency and timelywarning throughinspection or verification,which then tend to discourageworst-case assumptions.73More specifically,the institutionalization of regimes can: 1) changestandard operating procedures for national bureaucracies; 2) present newcoalition opportunities for subnational actors and improvedaccess for thirdparties; 3) changeparticipants' attitudes through contacts within the frameworkof institutions;and 4) providemeans to dissociatea particular issue fromchanges in the overallpolitical relationship by regular,formal

70. Shevchenko,Breaking withMoscow, p. 271; Jones, quoted in Charlton,Star Wars His- tory,p. 83. 71. RaymondGarthoff, "Negotiating SALT," The WilsonQuarterly (Autumn 1977), p. 79. 72. Shevchenko,Breaking with Moscow, p. 287; Paul Nitzequoted in Charlton,Star Wars History,p. 51. 73. See thearticles in thespecial issue of WorldPolitics 38 (October1985), particularly by Oye,Jervis, Axelrod, and Keohane. Nuclearlearning 401 meetings.If regimesmake a difference,we shouldsee differentbehavior betweenthose areas of securitycooperation where regimes exist and those wherethey do not.To a largeextent, we have foundthis to be thecase.

7. Prospectsand problems

Prospectsare mixedfor the partial regimes in thecomplex mosaic of U.S.- Sovietsecurity relations. For some,such as the SALT regime,the future does notlook promising. Further erosion is likely,but it is uncertainwhether a completecollapse of the ABM Treatywill occur, or whether the treaty will be surpassedby a new strategicaccord. Whilethe regimeestablished in Europe in the early 1970s seems relativelystable, it has not yet led to significantreduction in nuclearor conventionalarmaments. Moreover, it may weaken if changesthreaten Eastern Europe and temptthe United Statesto crossthe historical dividing line by, forexample, assisting those nations'human rights. The agreementsless centralto U.S.-Soviet competi- tionmay be moredurable and betterinsulated from the vagariesof the overallrelationship. These includethe regimesfor non-proliferation, for avoidingaccidental nuclear war, and for neutralizingcertain areas and countries. Lookingat theU.S.-Soviet securityrelationship in termsof learning and regimesdoes notsolve problems. It raisesquestions. Some learning may be falseor maladaptive.Some regimesmay reinforce false learning. To focus on the rulesand institutionsthat affect parts of the relationshipdoes not insurethat they will be stableor thatthey will benefitother areas. But lookingat regimesin subissuesof therelationship does suggestfruitful av- enuesfor exploration and importantquestions to ask; theseare notalways capturedby the usual approachesto the U.S.-Soviet relationship.How havethe two countries learned in thenuclear area? Whatcauses definitions ofinterest to change?Why has learningbeen faster in someareas and slower in others?When has learningbeen maladaptive?When has learningled to the developmentof institutionsand regimesand whenhas it not? What differencedoes itmake when such institutions and regimes have been developed? Whatare theimpediments to learning?To whatextent are domestic impedimentschanged when regimes are developed-forexample, how are naviestransformed from opponents to majordefenders of a particularre- gime?When regimes are created,what accounts for their stability? What accountsfor their erosion? When a regimeis establishedin one area, how does its strengthaffect other areas? What are thedynamics of spilloverand spillbackfrom progress and failurein differentareas? Whatare thecrucial gaps? To whatextent can theybe filled?How can incorrector distorted learningbe identifiedin complexsituations with long causal chains?How can learningbe accelerated?Can societiesplan to takeadvantage of crises 402 InternationalOrganization anddiscontinuous learning to createnew regimes and lock in the learning?74 At thisstage, we have morequestions than answers, but one taskof a good researchprogram is to raiseimportant questions. These questionsare differentfrom those usually asked whentheorists thinksolely in terms of a Realistparadigm which either posits the stability of thebipolar world or looksat changesin relative power as thesole significant sourceof probableconflict and war. I am not arguingthat those Realist questionsare irrelevant or unimportant. For example, Seweryn Bialer warns againstthe 1970sview that agreements not backed by power would restrain Sovietpolicies.75 Realist insight remains crucial, but it is notenough. The conceptsof learningand regimecan be used withboth Realist and Liberal theory.Applying both concepts and boththeories to theU.S.-Soviet securityrelationship opens new questions and provides possible insights on how we can thinkmore broadly about change in thatpolitical relationship.

74. See RobertKeohane and JosephS. Nye, "Two Cheersfor Multilateralism," Foreign Policy60 (Fall 1985). 75. Bialer, The Soviet Paradox.