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Attack and Conquer? Karen Ruth Adams International Anarchy and the Offense-Defense-Deterrence Balance

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Attack and Conquer? Karen Ruth Adams International Anarchy and the Offense-Defense-Deterrence Balance Attack and Conquer? Attack and Conquer? Karen Ruth Adams International Anarchy and the Offense-Defense-Deterrence Balance Scholars and strate- gists have long argued that offense is easier than defense in some periods but harder than defense in others.1 In the late 1970s, George Quester and Robert Jervis took the ªrst steps toward systematizing this claim.2 Since then, the de- bate about the causes and consequences of the offense-defense balance has been one of the most active in security studies.3 If the relative efªcacy of offense and defense changes over time, states should be more vulnerable to conquest and more likely to attack one another at some times than at others. Speciªcally, when offense is easier than defense, defenders’ military forces should be more likely to collapse or surrender when attacked, and defenders’ political leaders should be more likely to surrender sovereignty in response to military threats. Thus states in offense-dominant eras should be conquered—involuntarily lose the monopoly of force over all of their territory to external rivals—more often than states in defense-dominant eras.4 Given their heightened vulnerability to conquest, states in offense- Karen Ruth Adams is Assistant Professor of Political Science at Louisiana State University. For detailed comments, I thank Richard Betts, Stephen Biddle, Avery Goldstein, Miles Kahler, Susan Martin, Christopher Muste, Mark Peceny, Kenneth Waltz, James Wirtz, and Eugene Wittkopf. For research assistance, I thank Nicole Detraz, Katia Ivanova, and Aneta Leska. 1. For an annotated bibliography, see Michael E. Brown, Owen R. Coté Jr., Sean M. Lynn-Jones, and Steven E. Miller, eds., Offense, Defense, and War (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, forthcoming). 2. George H. Quester, Offense and Defense in the International System (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1977); and Robert Jervis, “Cooperation under the Security Dilemma,” World Politics, Vol. 30, No. 2 (January 1978), pp. 167–214. 3. For summaries of the debate, see Jack S. Levy, “The Offensive/Defensive Balance of Military Technology: A Theoretical and Historical Analysis,” International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 28, No. 2 (June 1984), pp. 219–238; and Sean M. Lynn-Jones, “Offense-Defense Theory and Its Critics,” Security Studies, Vol. 4, No. 4 (Summer 1995), pp. 660–691. 4. My deªnition of conquest derives from Max Weber’s deªnition of a state as “a human commu- nity that (successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given terri- tory.” Weber, “Politics as a Vocation,” in H.H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills, eds. and trans. From Max Weber: Essays on Sociology (New York: Oxford University Press, 1958), p. 78 (emphasis in original). A state exists when a particular community, deªned by its political structure, monopolizes force over some territory. It dies when it is no longer able to do so, either because its political structure collapses or because external or internal rivals render it powerless through conquest, union, revo- lution, or disintegration. Conquest may occur directly, through the collapse or surrender of a state’s military forces in response to attacks by an external rival, or indirectly, through the surren- der of leaders in response to an external rival’s military threats or operations. When a state loses the monopoly of force over part of its territory, it is dismembered, not conquered. Karen Ruth International Security, Vol. 28, No. 3 (Winter 2003/04), pp. 45–83 © 2004 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. 45 Downloaded from http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/016228803773100075 by guest on 28 September 2021 International Security 28:3 46 dominant eras should also be more likely to act on the doctrine that the best defense is a good offense. That is, they should attack one another—conduct of- fensive military operations against states that have not previously attacked them—more often than states in defense-dominant eras. Although these points have been widely discussed, neither proponents of of- fense-defense arguments5 nor their critics have tested the effects of the offense- defense balance on the historical incidence of attack and conquest.6 Instead, they have examined its effects on the offensive or defensive character of mili- tary doctrine;7 the extent of arms racing, prevalence of cooperation, and nature of alliances;8 and especially the incidence, severity, and duration of war.9 Adams, “State Survival and State Death: International and Technological Contexts,” Ph.D. disser- tation, University of California, Berkeley, 2000. 5. Although offense-defense arguments are generally described as theories, they are actually col- lections of hypotheses (if-then statements about lawlike regularities—e.g., “if offense is dominant, offensive operations are likely”), not theories (statements that explain laws). The theory behind of- fense-defense arguments is structural realist theory, which explains that offensive operations are likely when offense is dominant because there is no international sovereign to rule them out. Er- nest Nagel, The Structure of Science (New York: Harcourt, Brace, and World, 1961), pp. 80–81; Alan C. Isaak, Scope and Methods of Political Science (Homewood, Ill.: Dorsey, 1969), pp. 138–139; Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (New York: McGraw Hill, 1979), pp. 5–6; Kenneth N. Waltz, Man, the State, and War: A Theoretical Analysis (New York: Columbia University Press, 1959), pp. 230–238; Lynn-Jones, “Offense-Defense Theory and Its Critics,” pp. 664–665; and Richard K. Betts, “Must War Find a Way? A Review Essay,” International Security, Vol. 24, No. 2 (Fall 1999), p. 168. 6. Peter Liberman, whose dependent variable is expansionism, is the exception. Liberman, “The Offense-Defense Balance, Interdependence, and War,” Security Studies, Vol. 9, Nos. 1–2 (Summer and Fall 1999), pp. 59–91. Some scholars have suggested that the number (and, by implication, the size) of states in the international system is a function of the offense-defense balance. But because the number of states could fall through conquest, union, or collapse, studies that simply note the different numbers or sizes of states in different periods are not directly testing this hypothesis. Stanislav Andreski, Military Organization and Society, 2d ed. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1968), chap. 3; Richard Bean, “War and the Birth of the Nation State,” Journal of Economic His- tory, Vol. 33, No. 1 (March 1973), pp. 203–221; Quester, Offense and Defense in the International Sys- tem, pp. 8, 17; and Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), pp. 61–62, 66. 7. Stephen Van Evera, “The Cult of the Offensive and the Origins of the First World War,” and Jack Snyder, “Civil-Military Relations and the Cult of the Offensive, 1914 and 1984,” International Secu- rity, Vol. 9, No. 1 (Summer 1984), pp. 58–107 and pp. 108–146; Scott D. Sagan, “1914 Revisited: Allies, Offense, and Instability,” International Security, Vol. 11, No. 2 (Fall 1986), pp. 151–175; Jack Snyder and Scott D. Sagan, “Correspondence: The Origins of Offense and the Consequences of Counterforce,” International Security, Vol. 11, No. 3 (Winter 1986/87), pp. 187–198; and Jonathan Shimshoni, “Technology, Military Advantage, and World War I: A Case for Military Entrepreneur- ship,” International Security, Vol. 15, No. 3 (Winter 1990/91), pp. 187–215. 8. Jervis, “Cooperation under the Security Dilemma”; George W. Downs, David M. Rocke, and Randolph Siverson, “Cooperation and Arms Races,” World Politics, Vol. 38 (1985), pp. 118–146; Ste- phen M. Walt, The Origins of Alliances (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1987); Thomas J. Christensen and Jack Snyder, “Chain Gangs and Passed Bucks: Predicting Alliance Patterns in Multipolarity,” International Organization, Vol. 44, No. 2 (Spring 1990), pp. 137–168; Robert Powell, “Guns, Butter, and Anarchy,” American Political Science Review, Vol. 87, No. 1 (March 1993), pp. 115– 132; James Morrow, “Arms versus Allies: Trade-Offs in the Search for Security,” International Orga- Downloaded from http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/016228803773100075 by guest on 28 September 2021 Attack and Conquer? 47 Attention to war is easy to understand, for it is one of the most destructive human activities. But testing offense-defense arguments on the incidence of war is problematic because these arguments suggest that wars in offense- dominant eras should have many attacks while those in defense-dominant eras should have few. Moreover, they suggest that attacks in offense-dominant eras should frequently culminate in conquest while those in defense-dominant eras should rarely do so. In defense-dominant eras, states with state-of-the-art capabilities should be able to declare war then wait to counterattack without imperiling their survival. Thus, although there may be many declarations of war, there should be few attacks. Moreover, attacks should not result in conquest unless states have outdated capabilities or strategies. In offense- dominant eras, by contrast, security should come from attacking ªrst. Instead of declaring war, states should engage in surprise attacks, wars should involve a number of attacks by a variety of states, and attacks should frequently result in conquest. Because offense-defense arguments suggest there should be less variation in war than in attack and conquest, the most direct way to test the core claims of these arguments is to examine the effects of the balance on the incidence of at- tack and conquest. That is my purpose in this article. But constructing an effec- tive test requires more than applying existing arguments to new dependent variables. It also requires redeªning the concept of the balance to distinguish between defense and deterrence dominance, as well as operationalizing the historical balance deductively, at the operational level of analysis, and in purely technological terms. I begin by explaining the need for these reªnements to the logic and applica- tion of offense-defense arguments.
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