Colonel Joseph D. Celeski, U.S. Army, Retired
Insurgencies arguably are the most agile, ation. Ironically, strategists continued to believe this sophisticated form of conflict. Opportunistic prac- even as all of the ingredients for a national security titioners with infinite persistence and unstructured debate and the elevation of this form of war to a approaches to problem-solving thrive on chaos that strategic art were forming around them. they deliberately engender. Skilled craftsmen gain True strategic thinking on the subject of COIN leverage from second-, third-, even fourth- and and irregular warfare should consider time and fifth-level effects that unfold unpredictably. Trends space and the long strategic view. What will toward ever greater complexity are evident. the critical areas for the global war on terrorism —John M. Collins1 (GWOT) be in the near future? One day we will find ourselves out of Iraq and Afghanistan with fter the fall of the Berlin Wall and end our force postured for the next crisis. What strate- A of the Cold War, new debates began at the U.S. gic direction will we take, and what should we be Army Command and General Staff College at Fort prepared to accomplish? Leavenworth, Kansas, about the changing nature of the threat environment. What would the 1990s COIN and the Three Levels bring in the form of strategic threats to America? of War The War on Drugs? Transnational crime? Asym- As we transform the Army to face 21st-century metric warfare and fights in the urban environment? irregular warfare enemies, we can still use the The next “big one?” Not much debate occurred on tactical, operational, and strategic levels of war as irregular warfare, however, because the military guidelines for professional military development. still existed in a bubble of denial about its Vietnam Our acumen is probably the strongest at the tactical War experience. Those who sought to learn about level, where our forces have by necessity adapted theoretical warfare areas other than Clausewitzian the time-honored principles of counterguerrilla trinitarian warfare found but one elective on the and foreign internal defense (FID) doctrine to subject of irregular warfare and could only learn local circumstances. Lessons-learned databases about indirect war by reading Sun Tzu. and emerging tactics, techniques, and procedures Conventional military strategists did not hold abound within doctrinal and professional literature. counterinsurgency (COIN) and irregular warfare The experience level of our forces in this environ- acolytes in high esteem. In fact, strategists marginal- ment steadily increases (as a result of multiple ized COIN and irregular warfare, never regarding deployments), and a new generation of Soldiers irregular warfare as worthy of strategic-level discus- and leaders now know the fundamentals of tactical sions. This attitude hindered the formulation of an actions in irregular warfare. But we will not win unconventional warfare (UW) theory and kept irreg- if the COIN campaign degenerates into a solely ular warfare out of strategic wargaming scenarios. tactical fight. In fact, strategists viewed counterinsurgency as a The last 3 years have changed our thinking at the discipline with tactical and operational components operational level of irregular warfare, primarily in that did not lend themselves to strategic consider- the COIN domain. At this level, combat commanders
Military Review March-April 2006 35 translate strategic concepts into viable plans within strategic concepts to address insurgencies. These theaters of war. Joint Special Operations University will, perhaps, be followed by a joint operational Report 05-2, Operationalizing COIN, captures cur- concept for irregular warfare that will leverage rent thinking on how we are to analyze insurgencies U.S. asymmetric and indirect warfare capabilities during the 21st century; guides joint force com- and not be based on maneuver warfare. Attrition in manders in overall campaign design, effects-based this context will mean adopting the perseverance operations, and logical lines of operations; and to outlast the transnational, global aspect of the updates COIN principles within the context of the irregular warfare challenge. current enemy.2 Strategic COIN concepts. Military scholar John We have begun other initiatives to increase our M. Collins defines strategic concepts as “judgments knowledge at the operational level of war as it concerning ways armed forces might best perform pertains to irregular warfare and counterinsurgency. respective functions and accomplish assigned mis- Numerous strategy sessions, seminars, think-tank sions, taking relevant theories, facts, assumptions, articles, and new courses and centers throughout and policies into account.”4 Counterinsurgency is the Department of Defense (DOD) enhance our one of those “respective functions.” knowledge of how to defeat these types of threats, Strategic concepts drive strategies and strategic and the Army will soon update COIN doctrine to objectives (deny, defeat, deter, enable, and so on). aid in these endeavors. This brings us to strategic A correct analysis of our adversary’s end state leads considerations. to correct strategic concepts. For the GWOT, our Strategic considerations. Winning the GWOT national strategy and the nature of our international and eliminating its spawn of insurgencies requires alliances guide our strategic concepts. Strategic policymakers to have a will and determination concepts are venues for coordinating interagency, unprecedented in recent history. A grand strategy— international, and intertheater efforts. A global employing the elements of national power to achieve campaign requires a global strategic concept. A national security objectives—requires a coalition strategic concept focuses the elements of national of global partners who agree that the GWOT is power into a cohesive whole. the first and foremost security issue affecting their What are strategic concepts for counterinsur- national interests. Their alliance with the United gency? Given our national security strategy of States depends on their appreciation of the threat preemption, we would rightly expect forms of and their ability to participate in the GWOT. maneuver such as strategic attacks or strikes (coun- As we transform our way of war, from state- tervalence operations), intervention operations, or versus-state warfare to transnational and global preventative FID. Preventative (or preemptive) irregular warfare characterized by competing ide- FID analyzes failing-state metrics to predict where ologies, we must develop an understanding of the ungoverned space might set the preconditions for deep ideological and cultural differences that arise terrorism and insurgency. In cooperation with from radically different religious practices. Our allies, preventative FID involves crisis resolution new strategic way of thinking should also consider to preclude deteriorating situations so the elements the use of international and local law-enforce- of national power can reverse negative metrics and ment capabilities, and this sea change should be deny adversaries freedom of maneuver. European anchored in the correct appreciation of the nature Command operationalizes a version of this strategic of our enemies. concept in the PanSahel initiative.5 We look to the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review Another strategic concept is using UW proxies (QDR) for strategic shaping of our security struc- to attack irregular challenges, just as our enemies tures to answer the irregular warfare challenge.3 use this strategy against us. With memories of the The QDR addresses irregular warfare, counter- Contras still fresh in our minds, this is probably not insurgency, and stability operations as the most a popular option, but it is a viable tool that several probable and salient scenarios in which we will be regimes have used as a strategic concept over the involved in this century. The QDR will drive the last 25 years, including Iran in its support of Hez- transformation of our military, force structure, and bollah. Proxy wars also serve as economy-of-force
36 March-April 2006 Military Review COUNTERINSURGENCY measures to tie down our enemies while we fight on This acutely important insight can serve as a basis other fronts. Proxy wars should have sabotage and to develop an appropriate counterstrategy within subversion as tactics. the direct-versus-indirect or indirect-versus-indirect The United Kingdom has employed two other UW paradigms (classic counterrevolutionary war, strategic concepts (management and containment) FID, war of attrition, focused guerrilla warfare, against the Irish Republican Army and during police action, and so on). Israel’s struggle against the Palestinians. Manage- Twenty-first century global insurgency is extremely ment is a form of persistent deterrence combined complex and problematic and poses challenges. with preventative FID. Containment combines an Transcending political and ethnic warfare, it has isolating function characterized by reluctance to mutated to global ideological warfare. The aim of escalate (limited war); reactive, not proactive ele- our current counterstrategy must be to defeat the pro- ments; and some form of deterrence (in essence, tracted global jihadist offensive, marginalizing radi- an aggregate of strategies to produce synergy in cal, political Islam and separating it from moderate the overall effort). These strategic concepts require Islam. Our end state might not be victory but, rather, taking the long view geopolitically, and they must have as its strategic objective such desired effects as be buttressed by a strong national will and by great preemption, marginalization, security enhancement, patience and perseverance. and isolation. We must also keep the second- and We have practiced management and containment third-order effects of these strategic objectives in in Operation Enduring Freedom. Arguably, after 4 mind and adjust the strategy as necessary. years, we have succeeded in holding the security line Although religion certainly serves to motivate of operation in Afghanistan by overthrowing the Tal- some insurgents, many have studied theories of tra- iban government and keeping follow-on actions in ditional insurgency and guerrilla warfare. As well as the low stages of insurgency, thus allowing political, seeing the influence of Sun Tzu, one can also deduce diplomatic, and economic elements of power to do some aspects of Marxist-Leninist ideology, such as their work. We are now conducting COIN as limited Osama bin-Laden’s calls for mass mobilization of war in Afghanistan in the hope that the enemy will the populace to jihad. One can also see the strategy give in to the ongoing political process. and tactics of Mao Tse-tung’s revolutionary warfare and Che Guevarra’s foco warfare.6 Insurgency Strategy Key leaders and prominent religious extremists Modern insurgencies are networked, amorphous, form the vanguard of the people. Religious extrem- headless, transnational, and criminal, and their doc- ism forms the core of the ideological movement trine is a complex gray stew. Today’s insurgent bor- to solve current societal problems by reverting rows from various terrorist, guerrilla, and insurgent to a previous form of society that was led by an theorists and, on any given day, can be operating off Islamic caliphate. Religion has become an element one or all of these strategies. Our COIN strategy of national power, and modern insurgents use it must overmatch the insurgent’s capabilities and quite effectively as a façade behind which to hide operating concepts, perhaps blending many COIN criminal enterprises and brutal power struggles. strategies into a new counterstrategy. The point is Even so, when analyzing the will of the insurgents, that we must correctly ascertain insurgent and terror- we must acknowledge that ideology might provide ist strategy to formulate appropriate counterstrate- them a built-in will that could outlast that of coun- gies, or the campaign plan might be an operational terinsurgent forces. mismatch that could place unrealistic requirements Before 9/11, most insurgencies were internal to on the military. one state, but Islamic insurgents are no longer bound We must study insurgent strategies to understand by this norm. The new space (or new sea to swim the theoretical and intellectual foundations of asym- in) for these insurgents is global and includes the metric war. No practitioner of counterinsurgency Internet, newly failing states, ethnic minority com- will be successful unless he analyzes the motivation munities of developed countries, and ethnic Diaspo- and strategy of the insurgents to discover how their ras that take “sanctuary” in religious institutions and various acts combine to achieve a desired end state. dogma. The new space also includes supranational
Military Review March-April 2006 37 aid organizations that, presumably unwittingly, 4. Provide a better truth message. This is ideological provide sustenance and support. The new form of warfare. We must target insurgent organizations, moti- dispersion for survival against conventional forces vations, and messages with information operations (IO) is to decentralize (but remain networked) by running that serve to undermine insurgents’ will. To counteract proxy wars using franchises. the effects of public beheadings, American “hope and Any global strategy to counteract such Islamofas- opportunity” actions must be seen as indispensable. cist insurgency will require patience and a strong national will. The answer to defeating this type of Transformation of COIN Forces insurgency is to adopt a series of long-term measures If 60 to 70 percent of our available resources are similar to nationbuilding, cultural diplomacy, and tied up in counterinsurgency, the time has come to police work (criminal business enterprise being the recognize that a contingency operation has grown closest analogy to such threats). Basically, there are into a major operation. We should translate COIN four actions to take: strategic concepts against global insurgency into 1. Implement democracy and liberalism, backed operations plans, not contingency plans. We must by legitimate government and participation of the modify the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP) people in the political process (elections) to de- to incorporate more interagency assets than previ- legitimize the Islamofascists. Success will not look ously considered. Our joint readiness reporting sys- like a clear-cut victory. We might only be able to tems must also measure our ability to conduct these manage or contain the insurgency over time. operations. We must elevate counterinsurgency to 2. With the help of law enforcement, the military the realm of a major campaign and develop the must assume a larger and broader role in separating expertise to plan global and theater campaigns. Our the insurgents from the populace. The new paradigm advanced military studies programs must prepare might include combined military and police opera- future strategists for this challenge. tions. We must have military and political forces To get things right at the strategic level, we must capable of innovation, indirection, speed, and adap- correctly shape our strategic forces’ posture. The tation to match those of the insurgents. national military strategy we grew up with empha- 3. Make every effort internally, externally, and dip- sized conventional forces for the high end of war- lomatically to shut down support for the insurgency. fare (conventional, state-on-state, nuclear), but to Even funds for charitable religious organizations respond to irregular warfare challenges, we might must be stopped. Governments that espouse Salafist need to reshape our forces. (See figure.) and Wahhabi radicalism must tone down the rhetoric In the past, low-end forces (such as Special and promote a more moderate religious dialog. Forces, civil affairs, and psychological operations
Additional missions to build capacity (FID) and regional engagement
Forces apportioned to Forces apportioned to IWC spectrum conventional spectrum
% of Force Unconventional/ Structure Conventional/ Irregular Nuclear
Redistribution of force posture along the range of military operations.
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[PSYOP]) could participate in conventional war as and agility the ground force commander requires to well as in irregular warfare, but conventional forces augment his operation. The commander gets either a did not view this as a two-way street: They played high-speed jet or an expensive helicopter, neither of no part in irregular warfare. Under the QDR and which covers the 90 percent of air he actually needs subsequent JSCPs, and to provide the versatility in a COIN environment (the in-between dilemma). required in our national military strategy, we need The U.N. and several nongovernmental organizations more forces trained specifically for irregular warfare (NGOs) are far ahead of us in this area. A fleet of while heavier (conventional) forces assist. short-take-off-and-landing (STOL) and small-cargo The irregular warfare peacetime charter includes fixed-wing aircraft service them around the world. building a capacity in allied nations to preclude the Indeed, in Somalia, Special Forces rode on U.N. or threat’s further expansion. We hone this force by NGO contingency aircraft to their assigned mission means of regional engagement to build relationships area because we lacked the right air assets. and the trust we need in a war of a global nature. The French Air Force transitioned to irregular Forces challenged by irregular warfare inherently warfare during the 1954 to 1962 Algerian War. They optimize their roles by building regional and cultural adopted a force posture and an operating style that knowledge. They are multitasked units that main- suited the threat environment, and they used technol- tain their ability to assist with larger, conventional ogy to enhance COIN operations. We should look to security requirements, but their primary mission is their example (as well as to lessons we learned with to be ready and able to fight irregular wars. the Air Commando squadrons during the Vietnam The larger percentage of the force remains the War) to redesign our aviation force structure to better Nation’s sledgehammer for attacking the most seri- support our irregular warfare strategic concepts. ous threats, but it too must multitask and perform some irregular warfare challenge missions. We Cultural Ethics and Strategic already see this as our combat formations transform Leadership to perform COIN tasks in Iraq and Afghanistan. We must incorporate unconventional and irregular Thus, these conventional forces reinforce the irregu- warfare more strongly into our professional ethos and lar warfare challenge and participate in regional develop strategic leaders in this arena. After 9/11, few engagement and FID activities more than before. within DOD understood the nature of the unconven- We must drive strategic flexibility lower into expe- tional warfare and irregular warfare challenge. We ditionary and brigade-centric formations, which had to climb a steep learning curve to get where we might come to look like the Vietnam-era Security are today. But what will happen 5 or 10 years from Assistance Task Force, with conventional, uncon- now, after we have accomplished the task at hand? ventional, humanitarian, civil affairs, irregular, and We cannot afford another episodic dip in our ability interagency forces under one command working to conduct this form of warfare. We must establish with police and law-enforcement agencies. a national strategic center for the study of irregular Will the joint transformation be a technical one, or warfare in order to sustain our ability to conduct it, to will it be a cultural transformation augmented with professionalize the art of indirect war, and to incul- technology? Probably the latter: Strategically agile cate a generation of warriors with its tradecraft. formations expert at indirect war will have a new The national and strategic center must work with agility and quickness enabled by technology. The civilian universities and incorporate members of greatest need for a technology enabler is in the arena our professional associations into a think-tank, or of tactical air. We need COIN and FID air task forces as a strategic reserve. Today, there is no one place to fight in gray areas and provide the appropriate where this occurs. We must take the time to look over assets to handle the emerging reality. the horizon and develop future combat leaders by Today, most of our rotary- and fixed-wing assets, improving on existing leader-development modali- including unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and tac- ties. We accomplish nothing by developing a grand tical UAVs, are designed for high-end, conventional strategy without concurrently developing strategic war. Our existing Cold War systems of centralized leaders to formulate strategic visions of “what ought air and airspace coordination lack the flexibility to be” in this global security environment.
Military Review March-April 2006 39 irregular warfare experts and tap them for their observations, insights, and reflections to help us bridge the gap until a more formal developmental process matures. We should also develop theorists and strategists. Only a small percentage of our military professionals will become strategic leaders, but they must have subordinates and staff members who can help them push strategic concepts down the chain of command. We can build a bench of qualified individuals, continue to develop their skills over their professional careers, and “bank” them for use when needed. We can
Photo courtesy of CJSO T F- A fghanistan identify qualified planners and com- Fighting asymmetry with asymmetry: In 2003, U.S. advisers employ and manders to educate and have these work with irregular forces alongside conventional forces during Operation Enduring Freedom. experts on hand when needed. Reflect- ing on his mission to recruit Arabs for irregular warfare against the Turks during World War I, T.E. Lawrence said: “For my strategy of insurgency, I could find no teachers in the field: behind me there were some years of military reading and writing.”7 A leader must have the following attributes in order to practice coun- terinsurgency and irregular warfare at the strategic level: ● A vested interest in improving the military profession in the art of irregular warfare. Photo courtesy of Bill R obinson ● Diplo-warrior interpersonal skills During the 1993 Operation Continue Hope in Somalia, Special Forces assets used nonstandard STOL and rotary-wing aircraft when aviation and the ability to handle complexity. assets were insufficient. ● A world view (expanding one’s hori- zons beyond just American interests). Developing COIN experts who possess the politi- ● A comprehensive cultural understanding of the cal and diplomatic skills to operate at the operational operational environment. and strategic levels of war will take some time. They ● An understanding of diplomacy and political must be strategic theorists and strategic practitioners. theories. If it takes years to build a competent battalion com- ● Negotiating skills (because irregular warfare is mander, it will surely take years to build a COIN a political form of warfare). diplo-warrior. We must first build the bench. We ● Experience in foreign countries or with foreign must identify leaders in the current generation who military forces (because foreign-language skills expand are learning the tactical and physical aspects of one’s mind and are clearly helpful in the GWOT). fighting irregulars and continue to develop them Other desired attributes might include— professionally in irregular warfare art and theory. We ● An understanding of media forms (such as IO must identify leaders who are becoming 21st-century and PSYOP).
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● Knowledge of history and culture, as warranted fully appreciating the strategic skills required to (such as social anthropology). execute operations against irregular warfare adver- ● Experience in joint, interagency, combined, and saries. Irregular warfare challenges to implement- coalition operations, as well as in unconventional ing counterinsurgency do not require us to throw operations. away the useful methodology of understanding ● Knowledge of the art and science of irregular and viewing war from its tactical, operational, and warfare. strategic levels. We are becoming experts at the ● A disposition toward Coalition teambuilding and tactical level and are getting better at the operational the enhancement of collaborative relationships.8 level for irregular warfare, but we need to work on Self-development is a learning domain. Leaders the strategic level. The time has come to critically can prepare themselves for the art of counterinsur- consider unconventional ways of thinking about gency and irregular warfare by— irregular warfare and to refine our understanding ● Traveling to a foreign country and immersing of the GWOT and what constitutes the strategic art themselves in its daily life (as foreign area officers, of war in this spectrum. exchange program officers, or security assistance As a place to begin the process, I recommend staffers at American embassies). that we— ● Learning and studying the language and culture ● Adopt COIN strategic concepts as a precursor of the country chosen or completing an advanced to the development of COIN strategies. degree at a basic or advanced military school in ● Structure and posture a force to handle the chal- another country. lenges of irregular warfare adversaries. ● Pursuing a tailored professional reading pro- ● Develop strategic leaders trained in the art of gram, which is an important component of devel- this form of warfare. MR oping strategic leaders for the irregular warfare challenge. Would-be strategic leaders should study examples of leadership in irregular warfare environ- NOTES ments, research case studies on counterinsurgency, 1. John M. Collins, Military Strategy: Principles, Practices, and Historical Perspec- read books and other sources on irregular warfare tives (Dulles, VA: Potomac Books, 2002), 167. theories, and expand knowledge horizons to include 2. COL Joseph D. Celeski, Joint Special Operations University Report 05-2, Operationalizing COIN (Hurlburt Field, FL: U.S. Southern Command, no date). non-American press and literature. 3. U.S. Department of Defense, 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review Report (Washington, DC: U.S Government Printing Office, 6 February 2006), on-line at
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