The Future Combat System: Minimizing Risk While Maximizing Capability
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The Future Combat System: Minimizing Risk While Maximizing Capability USAWC Strategy Research Project by Colonel Brian R. Zahn, USA May 2000 Working Paper 00 – 2 The views expressed in this academic research paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the U.S. Government, the Department of Defense, or any of its agencies. ABSTRACT AUTHOR: Colonel Brian R. Zahn TITLE: The Future Combat System: Minimizing Risk While Maximizing Capability FORMAT: Strategy Research Project DATE: 24 April 2000 PAGES: 45 CLASSIFICATION: Unclassified This paper examines some of the technological candidates that are potential enablers of the Army Transformation to the future Objective Force. The paper highlights the technological risk associated with the Future Combat System program and offers an alternative acquisition strategy to minimize risk while maximizing potential capability. The paper examines lethality technologies such as the electromagnetic gun, electrothermal chemical gun, missile-in-a- box, and compact kinetic energy missile. Survivability candidates include passive armors, reactive armors, and active protection systems. The paper also examines the wheeled versus tracked debate. The paper concludes by recommending some of the technologies for further development under a parallel acquisition strategy. 2 TABLE OF CONTENTS ABSTRACT.......................................................................................................................................................................III PREFACE ........................................................................................................................................................................ VII LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS...........................................................................................................................................IX LIST OF TABLES ............................................................................................................................................................XI METHODOLOGY AND SCOPE.....................................................................................................................................2 THE RELEVANCE DEBATE..........................................................................................................................................4 THE THREAT.....................................................................................................................................................................6 USER REQUIREMENTS..................................................................................................................................................7 DESIGN TRADEOFFS………………………………………………………………………………………………8 LETHALITY .......................................................................................................................................................................9 CHEMICAL ENERGY WEAPONS .....................................................................................................................10 ENHANCED LETHALITY WITH KINETIC ENERGY.....................................................................................12 ELECTROMAGNETIC GUN ..............................................................................................................................13 ELECTROTHERMAL CHEMICAL GUN ..........................................................................................................16 SURVIVABILITY.............................................................................................................................................................17 PASSIVE ARMOR................................................................................................................................................22 REACTIVE ARMOR………..………………………………………………………………..…………………….....23 ELECTROMAGNETIC ARMOR…………………………………….……………………………………………….24 ACTIVE PROTECTION SYSTEMS…………………………………………………... ……………………………26 MOBILITY…………………………………………………………………………………………………………...2 7 RECOMMENDATIONS……………………………………………………………………………………………30 CONCLUSION……………………………………………………………………………………………………...32 ABREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS……………………………………………………………………………..35 ENDNOTES…………………………………………………..…………………………………………………………………37 BIBLIOGRAPHY.............................................................................................................................................................43 3 PREFACE I am sincerely grateful to the staffs of the Security Studies Program at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and the Army War College at Carlisle, Pennsylvania. The Senior Service College Fellowship Program and the support of these two organizations provided an outstanding opportunity for individual research on a topic of personal interest. In particular, I would like to thank Dr. Owen Cote, Associate Director of the MIT Security Studies Program, for his invaluable assistance, advice, and encouragement during this project. I would also like to thank Colonel Joe Cerami, Chairman, Department of National Security and Strategy at the Army War College for his advice on this paper and his mentorship throughout the academic year. 4 LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS FIGURE 1. US ARMY TANK EVOLUTION.......................................................................................................................... 4 FIGURE 2. FCS PROGRAM GOALS ..................................................................................................................................... 7 FIGURE 3. FCS FUNCTIONS ................................................................................................................................................ 8 FIGURE 4. SHAPED CHARGE TECHNOLOGY ..................................................................................................................11 FIGURE 5. MISSILE IN A BOX............................................................................................................................................12 FIGURE 6. CONCEPT SKETCH - ELECTROMAGNETIC GUN...........................................................................................13 FIGURE 7. COMPULSATOR POWER SUPPLY...................................................................................................................15 FIGURE 8. 20-TON VEHICLE WEIGHT DISTRUBUTION TRADEOFFS............................................................................19 FIGURE 9. SURVIVABILITY STRATEGY...........................................................................................................................21 FIGURE 10. REACTIVE ARMOR TECHNOLOGY ..............................................................................................................23 FIGURE 11. ELECTROMAGNETIC ARMOR CONCEPT.....................................................................................................25 FIGURE 12. TYPICAL ACTIVE PROTECTION SYSTEM....................................................................................................26 FIGURE 13. GROUND PRESSURE VS. NO-GO TERRAIN..................................................................................................28 5 LIST OF TABLES TABLE 1 COMPONENT WEIGHTS ...................................................................................................................................17 TABLE 2. SURVIVABILITY APPROACH FOR AN ADVANCED 20-TON VEHCILE CONCEPT......................................22 6 “SNAFU, that’s it!” said Senator John Warner (R-Va.), pointing to the Army’s new Chief of Staff, GEN Eric Shinseki, during the Joint Chief’s testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee in late 1999. The Committee Chairman used the acronym to describe the Army’s performance during the 78-day campaign in Kosovo - strong words given the vulgar character of the acronym and the fact that it was used by a long-time friend and supporter of the military. World War II soldiers used the acronym, meaning “Situation Normal, All Fouled Up” (a benign translation), to describe a disorganized environment that plagued an Army manned largely by conscripts and commanded by inexperienced young officers. Warner’s application of the term to a modern, professional Army boasting recent successes in Iraq, Haiti, and Bosnia represented a profound indictment of the Army’s ability to adapt to a new and dynamic post- Cold War environment. Despite these accomplishments, the Army had developed a reputation as the “can’t do force” among members of Congress1 and, while there were certainly extenuating circumstances, the Army clearly stood on the sidelines during the Kosovo conflict. Indeed, General Shinseki had his work cut out for him. Fortunately, the visionary Chief had already recognized the need for change. Only weeks earlier, the general announced a plan intended to transform the Army into a lighter, more agile force - suggesting its heavy forces are too heavy and its light forces are not lethal enough. He unveiled his plan before Army and industry leaders at the October 1999 Annual Meeting of the Association of the United States Army (AUSA) in Washington, D.C.. The plan posits a fundamental transformation; from an Army organized around heavy armored divisions to one that will increasingly rely on medium-weight units that are equally lethal but more readily deployable. The first step in the process is the ongoing Medium Weight Brigade concept that involves equipping two light brigades with light armored vehicles - creating a highly lethal and rapidly