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Military Guide to Terrorism in the Twenty-First Century

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Military Guide to Terrorism in the Twenty-First Century US Army TRADOC TRADOC G2 Handbook No. 1 AA MilitaryMilitary GuideGuide toto TerrorismTerrorism in the Twenty-First Century US Army Training and Doctrine Command TRADOC G2 TRADOC Intelligence Support Activity - Threats Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 15 August 2007 DISTRIBUTION RESTRICTION: Approved for Public Release; Distribution Unlimited. 1 Summary of Change U.S. Army TRADOC G2 Handbook No. 1 (Version 5.0) A Military Guide to Terrorism in the Twenty-First Century Specifically, this handbook dated 15 August 2007 • Provides an information update since the DCSINT Handbook No. 1, A Military Guide to Terrorism in the Twenty-First Century, publication dated 10 August 2006 (Version 4.0). • References the U.S. Department of State, Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, Country Reports on Terrorism 2006 dated April 2007. • References the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC), Reports on Terrorist Incidents - 2006, dated 30 April 2007. • Deletes Appendix A, Terrorist Threat to Combatant Commands. By country assessments are available in U.S. Department of State, Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, Country Reports on Terrorism 2006 dated April 2007. • Deletes Appendix C, Terrorist Operations and Tactics. These topics are covered in chapter 4 of the 2007 handbook. Emerging patterns and trends are addressed in chapter 5 of the 2007 handbook. • Deletes Appendix F, Weapons of Mass Destruction. See TRADOC G2 Handbook No.1.04. • Refers to updated 2007 Supplemental TRADOC G2 Handbook No.1.01, Terror Operations: Case Studies in Terror, dated 25 July 2007. • Refers to Supplemental DCSINT Handbook No. 1.02, Critical Infrastructure Threats and Terrorism, dated 10 August 2006. • Refers to Supplemental DCSINT Handbook No. 1.03, Suicide Bombing in the COE, dated 10 August 2006. • Refers to new 2007 Supplemental TRADOC G2 Handbook No. 1.04, Terrorism and WMD in the Contemporary Operational Environment, dated 20 August 2007. • Refers to For Official Use Only (FOUO) Supplemental DCSINT Handbook No. 1.05, A Military Primer to Terrorism in the Contemporary Operational Environment, dated 10 August 2006. • This 2007 Version 5.0 supersedes DCSINT G2 Handbook No. 1, A Military Guide to Terrorism in the Twenty-First Century, publication dated 10 August 2006 (Version 4.0). AA MilitaryMilitary GuideGuide to TerrorismTerrorism inin thethe TwentyTwenty--FirstFirst CenturyCentury USU.S. Army Army Training Training and and DoctrineDoctrine CommandCommand Deputy ChiefTRADOC of Staff for G2 Intelligence TRADOCTRADOC Intelligence Intelligence Support Support Activity Activity (TRISA) - Threats – Threats 15 August 2007 COORD15 August DRAFT 2007 Version 5.0 3 Page Intentionally Blank 4 A Military Guide to Terrorism in the Twenty-First Century 15 August 2007 Contents Preface................................................................................................................................v Introduction....................................................................................................................... 1 The Problem.................................................................................................................... 2 Purpose............................................................................................................................ 4 Scope of the Issue ........................................................................................................... 6 WOT and the Contemporary Operational Environment................................................. 8 Targeting Vulnerabilities ................................................................................................ 8 Approach to Understanding Terrorism ......................................................................... 10 Conclusion .................................................................................................................... 12 Chapter 1 The Face of Terrroism Today ....................................................................1-1 Section I: What is Terrorism........................................................................................1-2 Defining Terrorism ..................................................................................................1-2 Vectors of Action.....................................................................................................1-3 Section II: Objectives..................................................................................................1-4 Section III: Terrorism and Insurgency.........................................................................1-5 Section IV: State Sponsored Terror .............................................................................1-9 Section V: Other Forms of Terrorism........................................................................1-11 Conclusion .................................................................................................................1-12 Chapter 2 Terrorist Motivations and Behaviors.........................................................2-1 Section I: Goals............................................................................................................2-2 Operational Intent of Terrorism...............................................................................2-4 Section II: Motivation.................................................................................................2-5 Ideology Influences..................................................................................................2-6 Ideological Categories .............................................................................................2-7 Location or Geographic Categories .........................................................................2-9 Section III: Behavior..................................................................................................2-11 Individual Behaviors..............................................................................................2-11 Organizational Behavior ........................................................................................2-14 Conclusion .................................................................................................................2-16 Chapter 3 Terrorist Organizational Models ...............................................................3-1 Section I: Organizational Commitment .......................................................................3-3 Levels of Commitment ............................................................................................3-3 i A Military Guide to Terrorism in the Twenty-First Century 15 August 2007 Section II: Organizational Structure ............................................................................3-5 Cellular Foundation .................................................................................................3-5 Hierarchical Structure ..............................................................................................3-6 Networked Structure ................................................................................................3-7 Types of Structure....................................................................................................3-8 Ideological Affiliation..............................................................................................3-9 Section III: Organizational Categories.........................................................................3-9 Terrorist Affiliation..................................................................................................3-9 Support...................................................................................................................3-11 Weapons and Equipment .......................................................................................3-13 Conclusion .................................................................................................................3-14 Chapter 4 Terrorist Targeting of U.S. Military Forces..............................................4-1 Section I: Operational Environments and U.S. Military Forces ..................................4-2 Deployed Forces ......................................................................................................4-3 In-Transit Forces......................................................................................................4-3 Institutional Forces...................................................................................................4-3 Section II: Circumstances and Influences....................................................................4-3 Reasons for Targeting..............................................................................................4-4 Section III: Terrorist Attack Threats to U.S. Forces..................................................4-13 General...................................................................................................................4-13 Contemporary Setting ............................................................................................4-13 Forms of Terrorism....................................................................................................4-14 Arson......................................................................................................................4-15 Sabotage.................................................................................................................4-15 Bombing.................................................................................................................4-16
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