The M1A2 Abrams: the Last Main Battle Tank?
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The Centurion Tank Pdf, Epub, Ebook
THE CENTURION TANK PDF, EPUB, EBOOK Pat Ware,Brian Delf | 128 pages | 19 Apr 2013 | Pen & Sword Books Ltd | 9781781590119 | English | South Yorkshire, United Kingdom The Centurion Tank PDF Book The Comet was a relatively new design entering service only in and seeing additional combat in the upcoming Korean War. Vietnam Studies. July Learn how and when to remove this template message. Ivan Siiak. Retrieved 2 September Centurion Universal Tank — The next Centurion model, Mk. Maximum Range: miles km. Despite these changes, the department concluded that the weight restriction would not allow the tank design to withstand the 88 mm rounds. During the Indo-Pakistani War, Allied tanks were deployed on both sides. Israelis entering Hebron captured 25 Jordanian Centurion tanks. Cape Town: Struik Publishers. Archived from the original on 17 June While the air war was of particular historical note - it featured the first aerial combat between jet fighters - the war would still be hard fought on the ground across unforgiving terrain and environments. Centurion Main Battle Tank Specifications. The Mk 11 was an Mk 6 model with the ranging gun and infrared equipment. Great Bookham, Surrey: Profile Publications. Osprey Publishing. It was equipped with a pounder Cape Town: Tafelberg. The designations follows the pattern of main gun calibre in centimetres followed by the service order number. Height: 9. Related Content " ". Three were lost in training incidents with no deaths among the crew. The Centurion Mk II promised better battlefield protection through use of more armor and serial production from a strong government order was underway by the end of November of It became one of the most widely used tank designs, equipping armies around the world, with some still in service until the s. -
Errors in American Tank Development in World War II Jacob Fox James Madison University
James Madison University JMU Scholarly Commons Masters Theses The Graduate School Spring 2013 The rW ong track: Errors in American tank development in World War II Jacob Fox James Madison University Follow this and additional works at: https://commons.lib.jmu.edu/master201019 Part of the History Commons Recommended Citation Fox, Jacob, "The rW ong track: Errors in American tank development in World War II" (2013). Masters Theses. 215. https://commons.lib.jmu.edu/master201019/215 This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the The Graduate School at JMU Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Masters Theses by an authorized administrator of JMU Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact [email protected]. The Wrong Track: Errors in American Tank Development in World War II Jacob Fox A thesis submitted to the Graduate Faculty of JAMES MADISON UNIVERSITY In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the degree of Master of Arts Department of History May 2013 ii Table of Contents Abstract ........................................................................................................... iii Introduction and Historiography ....................................................................... 1 Chapter One: America’s Pre-War tank Policy and Early War Development ....... 19 McNair’s Tank Destroyers Chapter Two: The Sherman on the Battlefield ................................................. 30 Reaction in the Press Chapter Three: Ordnance Department and the T26 ........................................ -
LIBERTY UNIVERSITY Master's Thesis the M26 Pershing
LIBERTY UNIVERSITY Master’s Thesis The M26 Pershing: America’s Forgotten Tank - Developmental and Combat History Author : Reader : Supervisor : Robert P. Hanger Dr. Christopher J. Smith Dr. David L. Snead A thesis submitted in fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master’s of Arts In the Liberty University Department of History May 11, 2018 Abstract The M26 tank, nicknamed the “General Pershing,” was the final result of the Ordnance Department’s revolutionary T20 series. It was the only American heavy tank to be fielded during the Second World War. Less is known about this tank, mainly because it entered the war too late and in too few numbers to impact events. However, it proved a sufficient design – capable of going toe-to-toe with vaunted German armor. After the war, American tank development slowed and was reduced mostly to modernization of the M26 and component development. The Korean War created a sudden need for armor and provided the impetus for further development. M26s were rushed to the conflict and demonstrated to be decisive against North Korean armor. Nonetheless, the principle role the tank fulfilled was infantry support. In 1951, the M26 was replaced by its improved derivative, the M46. Its final legacy was that of being the foundation of America’s Cold War tank fleet. Contents Introduction………………………………………………………………………………………..1 Chapter 1. Development of the T26 …………………………………………………..………..10 Chapter 2. The M26 in Action in World War II …………...…………………………………40 Chapter 3. The Interwar Period ……………………………………………………………….63 Chapter 4. The M26 in Korea ………………………………………………………………….76 The Invasion………………………………………………………...………77 Intervention…………………………………………………………………81 The M26 Enters the War……………………………………………………85 The M26 in the Anti-Tank Role…………………………………………….87 Chapter 5. -
Procurement Politics, Technology Transfer and the Challenges of Collaborative MBT Projects in the NATO Alliance Since 1945
A Standard European Tank? Procurement Politics, Technology Transfer and the Challenges of Collaborative MBT Projects in the NATO Alliance since 1945 Mike Cubbin School of Arts and Media Salford University Submitted to the University of Salford in Partial Fulfilment of the Requirements of the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy 2019 Abstract International cooperation in weapons technology projects has long been a feature of alliance politics; and, there are many advantages to both international technology transfer and standardisation within military alliances. International collaboration between national defence industries has produced successful weapon systems from technologically advanced fighter aircraft to anti-tank missiles. Given the success of many joint defence projects, one unresolved question is why there have been no successful collaborative international main battle tank (MBT) projects since 1945. This thesis seeks to answer this question by considering four case studies of failed attempts to produce an MBT through an international collaborative tank project: first and second, the Franco-German efforts to produce a standard European tank, or Euro-Panzer (represented by two separate projects in 1957-63 and 1977- 83); third, the US-German MBT-70 project (1963-70); and, fourth, the Anglo-German Future Main Battle Tank, or KPz3 (1971-77). In order to provide an explanation of the causes of failure on four separate occasions, the analysis includes reference to other high-technology civilian and military joint projects which either succeeded, -
France Historical AFV Register
France Historical AFV Register Armored Fighting Vehicles Preserved in France Updated 24 July 2016 Pierre-Olivier Buan Neil Baumgardner For the AFV Association 1 TABLE OF CONTENTS INTRODUCTION....................................................................................................4 ALSACE.................................................................................................................5 Bas-Rhin / Lower Rhine (67)........................................................5 Haut-Rhin / Upper Rhine (68)......................................................10 AQUITAINE...........................................................................................................12 Dordogne (24) .............................................................................12 Gironde (33) ................................................................................13 Lot-et-Garonne (47).....................................................................14 AUVERGNE............................................................................................................15 Puy-de-Dôme (63)........................................................................15 BASSE-NORMANDIE / LOWER NORMANDY............................................................16 Calvados (14)...............................................................................16 Manche (50).................................................................................19 Orne (61).....................................................................................21 -
The Uncertain Role of the Tank in Modern War: Lessons from the Israeli Experience in Hybrid Warfare
No. 109 JUNE 2016 The Uncertain Role of the Tank in Modern War: Lessons from the Israeli Experience in Hybrid Warfare Michael B. Kim The Uncertain Role of the Tank in Modern War: Lessons from the Israeli Experience in Hybrid Warfare by Michael B. Kim The Institute of Land Warfare ASSOCIATION OF THE UNITED STATES ARMY AN INSTITUTE OF LAND WARFARE PAPER The purpose of the Institute of Land Warfare is to extend the educational work of AUSA by sponsoring scholarly publications, to include books, monographs and essays on key defense issues, as well as workshops and symposia. A work selected for publication as a Land Warfare Paper represents research by the author which, in the opinion of ILW’s editorial board, will contribute to a better understanding of a particular defense or national security issue. Publication as an Institute of Land Warfare Paper does not indicate that the Association of the United States Army agrees with everything in the paper but does suggest that the Association believes the paper will stimulate the thinking of AUSA members and others concerned about important defense issues. LAND WARFARE PAPER No. 109, June 2016 The Uncertain Role of the Tank in Modern War: Lessons from the Israeli Experience in Hybrid Warfare by Michael B. Kim Major Michael B. Kim currently serves as the Squadron Executive Officer for the 8th Squadron, 1st Cavalry Regiment, 2d Stryker Brigade Combat Team, 2d Infantry Division. Prior to his current position, he graduated from the Command and General Staff College (CGSC), Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, and completed the Art of War Scholars Program. -
The T-34-85 in Detail
ASSEMBLY GUIDE STEP 1 THE T-34-85 IN DETAIL The three-man turret on the T-34-85 was one of several significant innovations that greatly enhanced its combat effectiveness in comparison with its earlier versions. Here is a view of the turret seen from above, and this is the part with which you start when you come to assemble the model. he turret roofs on the T-34-85 varied depending on scope. The most important diference between the turret the factory at which they were manufactured. Its designs was the location of the commander’s cupola. T turret armor thickness was 20 mm, as compared to In 1944, cupola production was increased, and the early 16 mm, on, for example, the German “Panther” tank. versions were given a small ledge on the left side of the All T-34-85 roofs had two covers above the ventilators. At turret intended for this cupola. The turret roof took the the end of 1945, one of the ventilators was placed in front form of an armored plate that rotated on a ball bushing. of the loader’s hatch. There were two diferent periscope It comprised two parts, one of which was hinged and able designs: some T-34-85s had a high PTK-5 periscope from to open. On the early version of the T-34, both parts of this 1943, but the majority were equipped with a low MK-4 peri- hatch could be opened. In 1944 this Т-34-85 was equipped with a commander’s cupola, for which a ledge was provided on the side of the turret. -
Development of the American Tank-Infantry Team During World War II in Africa and Europe
Art by Jody Harmon Development of the American Tank-Infantry Team During World War II in Africa and Europe by Captain J. L. Mudd The American tank-infantry team was to destroy antitank weapons, bunkers, and tions, and its weight ranged from 33 to the key maneuver element that led to the unarmored or lightly-armored vehicles.5 almost 36 tons. Typically, the tank car- overwhelming number of tactical suc- When the United States Army entered ried a 75-mm gun, but many were later cesses enjoyed by the United States in the World War II, the two main tanks in its fitted with a 76-mm higher velocity can- Second World War.1 However, this win- arsenal were the M3 light tank and the non. It bristled with bow and coaxial .30- ning combination of men and machines M3 medium tank.6 The Light Tank, M3 caliber machine guns and a flexible tur- had developed throughout the course of Series weighed approximately 14-16 ret-mounted Browning .50 caliber ma- the war, and included a number of varia- tons, depending on the model, and was chine gun for antiaircraft use. Armor on tions based on the theater and areas armed with a 37-mm cannon and up to the turret front was 3.75 inches in effec- within each theater. Original develop- five .30-caliber machine guns. Its thickest tive thickness, while the hull front was ment came from training and lessons effective armor was 1.75 inches on the effectively up to four inches thick.10 learned in the decades between the two turret front and 3 inches on the hull front. -
Preserving Shock Action: a New Approach to Armored Maneuver Warfare
Preserving Shock Action: A New Approach to Armored Maneuver Warfare by Lester W. Grau In theory, mechanized infantry, self-propelled artillery, and ar- RPGs. They first destroyed the Russian lead and rear vehicles mored forces are mutually supporting. Artillery rains destruction on the side streets, trapping the unit. The tanks could not lower to the front and flanks as infantry personnel carriers and dis- their gun tubes far enough to shoot into basements or high enough mounted infantry protect tanks from enemy antitank systems and to reach the tops of buildings. Infantry fighting vehicles and per- enemy infantry. Simultaneously, tanks protect the personnel car- sonnel carriers were unable to support their tanks. Chechens sys- riers and dismounted infantry from enemy tanks and strong tematically destroyed the column from above and below with points. In practice, personnel carriers have problems keeping up RPGs and grenades. Other Chechens surrounded the force in with fast-moving tanks, their armor protection is too thin to sur- the train station. The commander of the Russian unit waited un- vive at the point of the attack and battle drills between tanks and til 2 January for reinforcements, but they never arrived. Part of mechanized infantry frequently break down due to the lack of his decimated unit broke out. By 3 January 1995, the brigade had sufficient team training prior to combat. Artillery fire may be on lost nearly 800 men, 20 of its 26 tanks, and 102 of its 120 ar- or off target, or too early or too late. The bottom line is that mored vehicles.2 there is often too great a gap between the tanks and the mecha- nized infantry at the crucial point and artillery may not bridge Several nations have recognized the problem of the tactical gap that gap. -
The Historical Combat Effectiveness of Lighter-Weight Armored Forces
The Dupuy Institute 1497 Chain Bridge Road Suite 100 McLean, VA 22101 Phone: (703) 356-1151 Fax: (703) 356-1152 Website: http://dupuyinstitute.org/ THE HISTORICAL COMBAT EFFECTIVENESS OF LIGHTER-WEIGHT ARMORED FORCES FINAL REPORT Contract Number DASW01-98-D-0058, Task Order 005 6 August 2001 Prepared for: U.S. Department of the Army Center for Army Analysis 6001 Goethals Road Fort Belvoir, Virginia 22060-5230 I. INTRODUCTION..................................................................................................................................................... 1 Definitions .................................................................................................................................................... 1 Study Plan..................................................................................................................................................... 2 Technology ................................................................................................................................................... 3 Wheeled Tanks ............................................................................................................................................. 3 The Interim Brigade/Division ....................................................................................................................... 4 II. USE OF ARMOR IN CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS........................................................................................ 5 Presence of Armor in SSCOs....................................................................................................................... -
Exmoor Tanks Pack
North Hill in World War II Minehead, Somerset SCHOOLS RESOURCE PACK for Key Stages 2 & 3 This pack has been created by Sarah Butterworth and Caroline Barnes of Emerald Ant C.I.C. Emerald Ant is dedicated to engaging communities in their local history and heritage through exciting arts projects and interactive education. Community Interest Company 9608594. www.emeraldant.com Contents >> ACTIVITY >> >> CURRICULUM AREA >> 1. Tank Missions and Top Trumps Science / Engineering, Geography, History 2. Designing a Tank Training Ground Art & Design, Maths, Geography, History 3. Camouflage Design Art & Design, Geography 4. Radar Station: A Very Hush Hush Building Language & Literacy, Creative Writing, History 5. Radar Detection: Creating an Invisible Plane Art & Design, History, Science Credits Cover Painting by Year 5 pupils at Minehead Middle School. Photograph credit Caroline Barnes. Top Trump cards >> Crusader Miller, David – An Illustrated Guide to World War II Tanks and Fighting Vehicles, 1981 CRUSADER MARK III - http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File%3ACrusader_tank_III.jpg http://www.tanks-encyclopedia.com/ww2/gb/Cruiser-MkVI_Crusader.php >> Stuart M3 Image - http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File%3AM3-Stuart-Fort-Knox-1.jpg >> Sherman Image - “M4 Sherman tank - Flickr - Joost J. Bakker IJmuiden” by Joost J. Bakker - M4 Sherman tank. Licensed under CC BY 2.0 via Wikimedia Commons - http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/ File:M4_Sherman_tank_-_Flickr_-_Joost_J._Bakker_IJmuiden.jpg#/media/File:M4_Sherman_ tank_-_Flickr_-_Joost_J._Bakker_IJmuiden.jpg Miller, David – An Illustrated Guide to World War II Tanks and Fighting Vehicles, 1981 >> Churchill Infantry Tank Image: http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/4/42/Tanks_and_Afvs_of_the_British_ Army_1939-45_KID1265.jpg Activity 2 Legend reproduced by permission of Ordnance Survey on behalf of HMSO. -
Long-Range Fires: Commanders' Options
LANDPOWER ESSAY SERIES No. 94-8 October 1994 LONG-RANGE FIRES: COMMANDERS' OPTIONS by General Glenn K. Otis, USA (Ret.) Combat operations that involve firing weapons at enemy targets encompass two broad categories of fires: (1) direct, line-of-sight; and (2) indirect or non-line-of-sight. Tanks, rifles, machine guns and anti-tank weapons, to name a few, are examples of direct fires. In general, they are aimed by human sighting. Sensors aim indirect or non-line-of-sight fires, and the human operators may never see the target. Artillery, rockets, some air defense weapons and stand-off aircraft, to name a few, are examples of indirect fires. To be successful in combat, achieve decisive results quickly and minimize friendly casualties, commanders at every level will employ both direct and indirect fire to achieve the desired payoff. The concept of long-range fires applies to both direct and indirect weapons. For example, a tank's direct fire main gun may be used at very close range such as 100 meters. It may also be used at ranges out to 5,000 meters where a ten-power scope is needed to aid the eye in acquiring the target and aiming the gun. For a tank, shooting at targets beyond about 2,000 meters is considered "long range." Similarly, the Army's Tactical Missile System (ATACMS) can engage targets beyond 100,000 meters, so its reference to short-and long-range takes on an even different meaning. Moreover, aircraft, both helicopters and fixed-wing, can perform air-to-ground firing roles at ranges that run the gamut from directly in front of friendly ground combat troops to literally hundreds of kilometers distant from them.