Art by Jody Harmon

Development of the American - Team During World War II in Africa and Europe

by Captain J. L. Mudd

The American tank-infantry team was to destroy antitank , bunkers, and tions, and its weight ranged from 33 to the key maneuver element that led to the unarmored or lightly-armored vehicles.5 almost 36 tons. Typically, the tank car- overwhelming number of tactical suc- When the entered ried a 75-mm gun, but many were later cesses enjoyed by the United States in the World War II, the two main in its fitted with a 76-mm higher velocity can- Second World War.1 However, this win- arsenal were the M3 and the non. It bristled with bow and coaxial .30- ning combination of men and machines M3 .6 The Light Tank, M3 caliber machine guns and a flexible tur- had developed throughout the course of Series weighed approximately 14-16 ret-mounted Browning .50 caliber ma- the war, and included a number of varia- tons, depending on the model, and was chine gun for antiaircraft use. Armor on tions based on the and areas armed with a 37-mm and up to the turret was 3.75 inches in effec- within each theater. Original develop- five .30-caliber machine guns. Its thickest tive thickness, while the hull front was ment came from training and lessons effective armor was 1.75 inches on the effectively up to four inches thick.10 learned in the decades between the two turret front and 3 inches on the hull front. Both medium tanks employed five-man world wars by and However, most units armed with M3s crews. The tank ’s job was to combat car units.2 When General Mar- replaced them with the M5 light tank select targets, defensive positions and shall was made Army Chief of Staff on 1 prior to combat overseas. The M5 was routes of advance, and supervise and lead September 1939 (the day of ’s very similar to the M3, but had some attack on Poland), he began a major reor- and other design improvements. the tank crew at all times. In the five-tank , the platoon leader (usually a first ganization of the service in order to put it (Later models of the M3 incorporated or second lieutenant) and the platoon on a wartime footing more like that of its some of these improvements.)7 sergeant, a staff sergeant, each com- European counterparts.3 One of the The Army’s first wartime medium tank manded a tank. Sergeants commanded changes was the creation of the Armored was the M3 series, nicknamed variably the remaining three. The gunner, a corpo- Force, a combination of the armored ele- 8 ments of the infantry and cavalry “Lee” or “Grant” by the British. The ral or technician 5th grade, was to iden- Medium Tank, M3 mounted a 75-mm tify and engage targets with either the branches, as well as sufficiently mobile cannon in a starboard hull sponson, a 37- main gun or the coaxial . components of , communications, mm gun in the turret, and three .30- The remaining three crewmen were jun- and other services.4 caliber machine guns — one each in the ior enlisted — technicians, pri- Tanks bow, coaxial in the turret and in the vates first class or “buck” privates. The commander’s cupola. Its heaviest effec- driver controlled the speed and direction Tank combat doctrine developed in the tive armor was 6.5 inches on the turret of the vehicle in accordance with the 1920s and ’30s called for two types of front and 4.3 inches on the front slope of commander’s orders. The assistant driver/ tanks: a light tank armed with machine the hull.9 During the fighting in North radio operator ensured that vehicular guns and a small-caliber cannon to en- Africa, the M3 began to be replaced by communications (both internal and exter- gage “soft” targets and a medium tank the Medium Tank, M4 — the Sherman. nal) were functional, and engaged targets with machine guns and a heavier cannon The M4 appeared in a number of varia- with the bow-mounted machine gun. The ARMOR — September-October 1999 15

loader was typically the most junior tank awesome against almost fire tactics as used in the final phase of crewmember. His job was to load the any target. However, the tank was highly ,19 referred to as “fire and main gun during engagements and to vulnerable to both antitank guns and in- maneuver.”20 Two riflemen, often ac- assist the commander in looking for tar- fantry antitank teams, as well as antitank companied by the leader scouted gets when not in actual combat. Only mines and obstacles. Against these foes, ahead of the squad.21 When they encoun- four crewmen manned light tanks; the the tank had a partner in a man and his tered an enemy force, the leader called tank commander assumed the duties of rifle — the infantryman. for his four-man fire team (Baker) to loader as well.11 All members partici- place suppressive BAR and rifle fire on Infantry pated in crew-level maintenance of their the enemy position. With the enemy tank, and usually assisted mechanics as- The American infantry squad in World pinned, the leader ordered his remaining signed to the .12 War II consisted of 12 men armed mainly five-man maneuver and assault team Normally, all tankers underwent initial with M1 semiautomatic .30-caliber ri- (Able) into a position where they could fles.17 The linchpin of the squad was the assault by fire, then overrun the enemy. If training at Fort Knox, Kentucky’s Ar- Browning Automatic Rifle (BAR), a light enemy fire was such that assaulting ri- mored Replacement Training Center automatic with a cyclic rate of flemen were unable to maneuver, tank (ARTC).13 In theory, men inducted under fire of either 300-350 or 500-600 rounds support was necessary. Infantry units the Selective Service Act were to be per minute. The rifle squad of the ar- from squad to used a variation of trained in accordance with their civilian occupations, prior training, even hobbies, mored ’s armored infantry battal- this tactic under most circumstances in all ions was similar, but one squad member theaters of the war, typically sending whenever possible. Under this theory, if a was assigned as the M3 half-track per- specialized reconnaissance units to scout man were a professional wilderness guide, he went to the infantry; if a ham sonnel carrier driver who normally re- the front and flanks; providing supporting mained with the vehicle, and had no fires with artillery, machine-gun and anti- radio buff, to the Signal Corps; a heavy BAR.18 The mechanized rifle platoon was tank fires; and finally assaulting with equipment operator, to the engineers or the Armored Force. Although this conse- mounted on five M3 halftracks and infantry and tanks. boasted a vast array of weapons. There quently benefited some of the more tech- were three rifle , as in a dis- Another style of assault tactic developed nical services of the Army, the combat during the war — the marching fire of- mounted infantry platoon, but the ar- arms received mainly “any arm or ser- fensive.22 General Patton’s 3rd Army 14 mored infantry platoon leader also had a vice” inductees. Training was length- 60-mm squad (an eight-man mor- used it to good advantage in northwestern ened from 12 to 13 weeks in 1941, and Europe, and though it was sometimes was later increased to 17. Conducted in tar crew) and a light machine gun squad effective in , the terrain generally did (12 soldiers manning one .50-caliber two phases, the first was devoted to basic machine gun and two .30-caliber machine not favor it. The method placed tanks and skills such as infantry drill, physi- halftracks at intervals within dense skir- cal fitness training, and small arms guns). The dismounted infantry company mish lines of dismounted infantry. The centralized these special squads in a sepa- marksmanship. The second phase intro- rate weapons platoon. There, the platoon entire line moved abreast, firing at possi- duced the trainees to tank skills: driving, ble strongpoints and other targets as they maintenance, tactical movement, and fielded a of three 60-mm mortars advanced. Although it maximized mutual and a section of two .30-caliber machine gunnery. Much of this was conducted guns. Additionally, the mechanized com- support, it reduced shock effect and under “combat conditions,” including tended to increase casualties. Its use was flares, explosions, gunfire sound effects, pany had a platoon of towed 57-mm anti- often the result of a lack of mental flexi- tank guns, each operated by a ten-man 23 and even a special aggressor unit dressed squad. bility on the part of . as German soldiers.15 Upon completion of training, the majority of new tankers Both mechanized and traditional infan- Officers reported to the armored divisions or sepa- try possessed three rifle com- The main roles of the Army officer in rate tank battalions. panies plus an additional complement of World War II were to plan operations and organic combat forces. The armored in- training, administer justice under The combat elements of a tank included the reconnaissance and assault fantry battalion had a reconnaissance the Articles of War, and lead soldiers in platoon of half-track mounted scouts, an combat. Officers held their commissions gun of the headquarters com- platoon with three 75-mm not only in the Army, but also in one of pany, three companies of medium tanks self-propelled assault guns, a mortar pla- the several arms or services, called a and one of light tanks.16 Each tank com- toon with three 81-mm tubes, and a ma- “branch.” When the Armored Force was pany had three platoons of five tanks and chine gun platoon with four .30-caliber established, it was not created as a sepa- two tanks in the headquarters section. Additionally, a medium company boasted machine guns. The infantry battalion had rate branch, but was made up of person- a single antitank platoon of three 57-mm nel of all arms and services. Tank officers an assault gun — an M4 armed with a guns, and a heavy weapons company and crewmen typically came from the 105-mm as its main armament. Each medium company was assigned with a platoon of six 81-mm mortars and infantry or cavalry branches, but wore the a platoon of four .30-caliber machine Armored Force insignia: the profile of a five officers and 117 enlisted men; a light guns. World War I British IV tank. company was somewhat smaller with only 92 enlisted personnel. The tank’s The age-old mission of infantry is to Tank and infantry officers came from advantage in close was its relative close with and destroy the enemy. The one of four commissioning sources: the imperviousness to small arms and indi- usual method employed by the American United States Military Academy at West rect fires. Its array of weapons gave the infantry squad was based on the covering Point, New York (USMA); the Reserve 16 ARMOR — September-October 1999

Officers’ Training Corps (ROTC); one of combat doctrine. Those veteran combat the officer candidate schools (OCS) run leaders selected by their commanders to by the Armor or Infantry Training Cen- become officers generally were young This photograph shows all of the ters; and for a deserving few, direct bat- noncommissioned officers who had men and machines that made up the tlefield commissions. USMA graduates proven their abilities under fire. They 66th Armored , part of the were appointed Regular Army officers, received no additional training; their ex- 2nd Armored Division, assembled on a hillside in Southern England and their pre-commissioning training perience was considered sufficient. about a month prior to entering the included instruction in all of the arms. Growing Pains war in Europe. Graduates of ROTC programs located at civilian universities trained in one of the The fighting elements of the Armored arms or services as cadets and were Force consisted originally of the 1st and commissioned into their respective 2nd Armored Divisions, which formed ington, from the summer of 1941 until branches.24 Until the mobilization of the I Armored Corps,29 and a number of spring 1942.33 The tankers took advan- 1940-42, the majority of these officers separate tank battalions. The divisions tage of all possible training time to im- did not enter active service, but were reflected the new “triangular” infantry prove their abilities to use their speed and placed in an inactive status in the Offi- division organization, with a firepower in support of dismounted infan- cers’ Reserve Corps (ORC).25 The ORC comprised of two light tank try. On two occasions in the immediate provided a trained pool for the great and a medium tank regiment. By March aftermath of the Japanese attack on Pearl number of officers needed when the of 1942, as the number of armored units Harbor, the tank-infantry teams reacted to Army expanded in the early 1940s. The grew, this was changed to two tank regi- alerts that brought them to the mouth of Armored Force School at Fort Knox, ments, each now with two medium and the Columbia River on the Washington Kentucky, and the Infantry School at Fort one light battalion, and an armored infan- coast, prepared to repel Japanese inva- Benning, Georgia, each established an try regiment — three infantry battalions sion. officer candidate school to train and equipped with halftracks.30 The assign- commission qualified enlisted soldiers ment of infantry to the armored division As part of Amphibious Corps Pacific and warrant officers.26 Candidates were eventually afforded commanders the op- Fleet, the soldiers of Fort Lewis were carefully screened and selected based portunity develop combined arms tactics expecting to be employed in the Pacific upon demonstrated performance and and train their soldiers to use and refine Theater. Company B of the 756th and the leadership aptitude. As combat losses them.31 15th Infantry moved to Monterey Bay to began to take their toll on the officer practice amphibious landings at , The separate tank battalions were to 34 corps, the practice of commissioning California. At this very early stage of combat-experienced sergeants with prov- keep an infantry flavor. Doctrine for these the war, the specialized equipment and “infantry tanks” specified a two-echelon en leadership talents was revived in the techniques that would later make am- attack.32 The lead echelon consisted of form of the commission.27 phibious tank assaults a realistic proposi- medium tanks and would destroy enemy tion were not yet available. The Navy’s For USMA and ROTC graduates, as antitank weapons. The second wave in- solution was to lower the new M3 light well as officers transferring into the Ar- cluded light tanks advancing with infan- tanks by crane from the ship’s deck into mored Force from other branches, the try to neutralize machine guns and targets violently bobbing several Armored Force School conducted an of opportunity. Infantry divisions and yards below. A number of tanks were lost orientation course to familiarize students separate tank battalions rarely enjoyed the this way before the naval crane operators with tank tactics, gunnery, maintenance, benefits of sufficient combined training became reasonably proficient. Armored Force organization, and to re- prior to actual combat. Habitual associa- fresh other military skills.28 The three- tions between tanks and infantry gener- The combined arms training undertaken month Infantry and Armored Force OCS ally did not develop until well into the by the 3rd Infantry Division and the courses taught candidates the skills war, but there are examples of early train- 756th Tank Battalion (L) reflected a ma- needed to be effective platoon leaders in ing relationships. One of these was the jor push by the Armored Force to in- their respective specialties, including partnership of the 3rd Infantry Division crease infantry-tank proficiency.35 In small-unit tactics, Army organization, with the 756th Tank Battalion (L) while early 1942, COL Edwin K. Wright, Ar- philosophy of leadership, and enemy they were stationed at Fort Lewis, Wash- mored Force Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3 ARMOR — September-October 1999 17

(Operations and Training), began stress- enemy. Unfortunately, the manual alone had as an initial objective the seizure of ing the need for combined arms training, was insufficient. The commanding gen- French antiaircraft, coastal and field artil- emphasizing tank support of infantry eral of the 84th Infantry Division wrote: lery batteries located on the Cape north of divisions in the attack. Army Ground “We have worked constantly with armor, Fedala. COL William H. Wilbur, a senior Forces, the Armored Force’s higher head- and with no training in the U.S., it was liaison officer from MG George S. Patton quarters, “replied with a supplement to its hard to receive our training on the battle- Jr.’s headquarters, took control of 2nd initial training directive, stating that field. I cannot stress too much the abso- Platoon, Company A, 756th Tank Battal- ‘combined infantry division-tank unit lute necessity for combined tank-infantry ion (L), which was just coming off land- training will be emphasized,’ and that training even in replacement training ing craft. COL Wilbur sped through town problems for the maneuver period should centers. We have worked with the 2nd, to assist the regiment’s first battalion in include infantry-tank unit operations.”36 3rd, 5th, and 7th Armored Divisions. silencing the coast , which However, this training often did not oc- They are all excellent units, but it is diffi- had been engaging landing craft enroute cur, or at least not to levels which made cult to teach infantry-tank tactics actually to the beach.41 After the tanks assumed an for real combined operations proficiency. on the battlefield. We now have our own assault position, Company A, 7th Infantry COL Wright, in analyzing reports from tank battalion, and I spend every avail- opened fire on the battery’s fire direction the North African battlefront in May able minute in training my infantry to center. The M5 tanks made an initial 1943, wrote the following:37 operate with tanks.”38 The tactics kept breach in the defensive wire, and infantry 42 In spite of constant attempts to provide evolving, however, and tankers and in- quickly seized the objective. fantrymen continued to send hard-fought infantry division-tank battalion coopera- lessons home from combat theaters Units not in contact in North Africa con- tive training in this country, practically 39 tinued to train while others eventually no success has been obtained. All infan- around the world. met the enemy in Tunisia. By the spring try division commanders, whether con- North Africa of 1943, Allied forces had made consid- tacted direct or through Army Ground erable progress in driving the Germans Forces, have indicated the desirability of The first major employment of tanks out of Africa. While the British 8th Army with infantry by the United States was on such training but fend it off on the excuse November 8, 1942 — the Operation under General Bernard Law Montgomery that “Time is not available,” “After we pressed from the east, American, British complete our unit training,” “After we Torch landings on the North African and Free French units advancing from the coast. Amphibious assault technology finish maneuvers,” etc. Army Ground still required the use of LCMs (Landing west beat back the into a Forces has been of no assistance to us in tight perimeter on the Tunisian peninsula. forcing this training. Craft Mechanized) to transport heavy At the end of April, the American II vehicles from ship to shore. The LCM The results of this failure to provide co- was capable of carrying only one tank or Corps was attacking German defenses 40 along an east-west row of hills near the operative infantry-tank training is being large artillery piece at a time. Neverthe- town of Mateur. The main defenses were reflected in the combat zone. For exam- less, tanks made it ashore and were able ple, Lieutenant Colonel Lou Hammack’s to assist the infantrymen right from the atop Djebel Tahent, identified on U.S. maps as Hill 609. Riflemen from the 34th very fine 751st Tank Battalion (M) was outset of combat. During the initial as- Infantry Division had fought their way to practically wiped out because in four sault from the beaches, the tank’s speed successive attacks, the infantry refused to and armor were exploited to seize key the base of the hill, but by April 29, had reached an impasse. Both sides had been follow him. Four times he took the objec- mission objectives and destroy enemy exchanging mortar and artillery fire in- tive and each time had to pull back, try- positions. ing to pull the infantry forward, the Ger- cessantly and the infantry could advance One example comes from the 3rd Infan- no further. Company I of the 1st Armored mans in the meantime re-obtaining the try Division’s landing at the town of Division’s 1st Tank Regiment, another II position. Fedala, about ten miles northeast of Corps unit, was assigned to assist in Finally, by September 1943, Army Casablanca. The 7th Infantry Regiment breaking the stalemate. In the early morn- Ground Forces had published FM 17-36, Employment of Tanks With Infantry. The publication of this field manual allowed units still training in the United States to learn some of the lessons learned the hard way by forces already in contact with the

Troops and equipment disembark from one of the tiny LCMs used to land in Algeria, North Africa in 1942. Compare this quiet beach landing scene with the complexity of the later Normandy . But at the time, this was the largest seaborne inva- sion in history. In photo at right, opposite page, are crammed in a landing craft. They wear American flag patches for identification, in the hope that Vichy French in Algeria would capitulate and not fire on Americans.

18 ARMOR — September-October 1999

ing of April 30, the tanks picked up the 1943, was to prove a long and bitter absence of dismounted support allowed infantry and proceeded up the hill, at struggle that would continue for most of the Germans to lay out antitank mines times literally pulling the riflemen along the next two years. Italy was not particu- quickly. One of these stopped a tank. The where the slope was too steep. The tanks larly suited to tank warfare, but the infan- remaining three began to move back destroyed a number of enemy positions, try went, and they needed tanks to see across the river, but the first got hung up and when antitank fire became too them through. One of the hardest-fought on the bridge and blocked passage of the deadly, the American infantry conducted engagements of the entire Italian cam- other two, one of which had been com- a bayonet against the gun crews, paign was the first phase of the Battle of mandeered by CPT Wilkie. As the crew allowing the tanks to continue. The abso- Cassino. Cassino was the anchor of the on the bridge dismounted and ran for lute summit of Hill 609 was inaccessible German “Gustav” defensive line to which friendly lines, the tank’s commander, LT to the tanks, but they supported the infan- they had steadily withdrawn by the end of Wayne Henry, was machine-gunned try with cannon and machine-gun fire November. Located near the western down. It was his first day in combat. The until the position was secure. The tank- coast of Italy, Monte Cassino overlooked crews of the remaining two tanks were infantry team repelled counterattacks the main highway to Rome. By the end of captured. both at 609 and at the neighboring Hill January 1944, when the Americans were The tanks managed a more successful 531. On May 2, the GIs saw heavy traffic ready to launch an attack against the town moving north. The Germans were leav- as a diversion to attract the German 10th crossing in the late afternoon of the 29th. 43 Again, the bulk of the infantry hesitated, ing. Army’s attention away from the immi- but the tank battalion commander, LTC nent amphibious invasion at nearby An- The of 1942- zio, the soldiers of the XIV Panzerkorps Harry W. Sweeting called for them to 43 demonstrates some of the earliest cross. A smaller, grass-covered hill nick- combat techniques of the tank-infantry had been digging in for two months. named “the Pimple” was an initial objec- team. There was yet no permanent affilia- On the night of January 20, two regi- tive for the 34th Division, which it seized tion of specific units with one another, so ments of the U.S. 36th Infantry Division soon after dark. The maneuver elements there was often no way to retain lessons conducted an opposed river crossing of of the division closed on the objective learned from one engagement to the next. the Rapido River just downstream from area and expanded up the hills over the The infantry typically fought without the where Cassino stood.45 The German de- next few days and into the village of aid of armored forces, and called on the fenders soon repulsed the Americans, so Cairo. The division next turned its atten- tanks to penetrate defenses or advance in the U.S. II Corps decided to try for an- tion south toward the town of Cassino the face of heavy small arms and artillery other foothold, this time with the 34th and the narrow path between the sheer fire. Tank units were used to break Infantry Division slightly upriver from rock face and the abrupt drop to the river through enemy formations, destroy tanks Cassino. The division began its attack on that led to it. On the morning of February and other pieces of equipment, and re- the 24th of January, but the Germans had 2nd, elements of the 133rd Infantry and duce hardened and wire demolished a small dam about two miles Company B of the 756th moved south to obstacles. However, the general lack of north of Cassino. North of town, the secure the road to Cassino. As the tank- prior training created some major defi- Rapido was fordable and normally only infantry team progressed, the file of tanks ciencies in effective prosecution of the about 50 feet wide; now, however, the poured armor piercing shells (high explo- campaign.44 dam’s destruction had allowed the river sive would have been too close to to flood the east bank and the land had friendly riflemen) and machine-gun fire Italy become a marsh hundreds of yards across onto any suspicious-looking points on the The push against the Germans in Italy, — impossible for tanks to negotiate. For hillside above. The infantrymen followed which had been launched by General more than two days, the riflemen of the through and captured about 150 prison- Mark Clark’s 5th Army in September of 34th tried to establish a bridgehead on the ers. west bank of the river. Opposing them The 34th Division never did secure Cas- were entanglements, antiper- sonnel mines and a series of machine gun sino. At one point in the first week of February, the division held about four nests stretching from the water’s edge square blocks on the northern edge of nearly to the top of the towering hills. These were supported by hidden mortar town, but they were relieved soon there- after by the 4th Indian Division.47 The pits and artillery dug into the back side of experience of the 34th Infantry Division the mountain. and the attached 756th Tank Battalion is Finally, on the morning of the 27th, an example of some of the problems of- combat engineers had emplaced enough ten faced by units without a standing “corduroy road” to allow CPT Charles support relationship. The tankers were “Wilkie” Wilkenson’s Company B, unfamiliar with the strengths and weak- 756th Tank Battalion to cross at a small nesses of the particular infantry leaders bridge.46 However, it still was not suffi- and the infantry were not used to using cient. The battalion had transitioned from the tanks’ advantages in combat. This M5 light tanks to M4 mediums in De- unfamiliarity took time to overcome, and cember. All but four of the company’s 18 in war, wasted time can mean wasted tanks became stuck in the mud. Those lives. Eventually, the men of the 756th four crossed and tore through the enemy were reunited with their old friends from defenses near the shore. The infantry Fort Lewis and Morocco — the 3rd In- failed to cross with the tanks, and the fantry Division. The battalion remained ARMOR — September-October 1999 19

attached to the 3rd from August of 1944 antitank guns were suspected, the infantry use of medium tanks over light.50 The (Operation ANVIL) until the end of the infiltrated into the positions at night, then armored divisions developed two ways of war in Europe. MG O’Daniel writes, destroyed the gun positions at dawn. In employing the tank-infantry team.51 The “The extent to which the various expedi- breaching the Siegfried Line, the 745th’s use of the armored division reflected its ents adopted to increase mutual confi- tanks moved into the woods, where en- origins in cavalry tactics. The essence of dence succeeded was well exemplified by gagement ranges were much shorter. armor is speed, firepower and shock ef- a statement made by an officer of the 3rd There, often as close as fifty yards, the fect. The armored division was used to Infantry Division toward the close of the tanks opened concrete pillboxes with gain ground rapidly and to exploit pene- campaign. He was asked his opinion of armor-piercing rounds, then dispersed the trations of enemy defenses and attack his the relative merits of the various tank occupants with white phosphorus shells. rear or flank. battalions then doing duty in the Sixth This allowed the infantry and engineers The division consisted of five basic Corps, to which the division belonged. to destroy the remnants in detail with elements: command, reconnaissance, He listed a number of the battalions in the and explosives. 52 order of his opinion of their efficiency. striking, support, and service. The chief In Aachen, small teams of two tanks and command structures of the armored divi- His questioner then remarked: an infantry platoon cleared blocks build- sion were its divisional headquarters and ‘Funny you didn’t include the 756th.’ ing by building. As the riflemen cleared, three subordinate “combat commands” the tanks provided security with longer — CC A, CC B and CC R(eserve).53 ‘Oh!’ He replied hastily. ‘That’s part of range fires. At intersections especially, These combat commands were in control the Division. They don’t come any better tanks fired at all four corners and down of one tank and one infantry battalion. than that.’ ”48 cross-streets to suppress possible ene- The division’s cavalry reconnaissance Northwest Europe mies. In turn, the dismounted soldiers fielded four recon troops, an Another tank-infantry team that enjoyed protected their protectors with constant assault gun , and a light tank com- reconnaissance against antitank pany. The squadron performed the recon- “permanent” attachment was the 745th () teams and antitank gun naissance function for the division, advis- Tank Battalion and the 1st Infantry Divi- positions. Additionally, four infantrymen ing the commander on terrain navigabil- sion.49 Attached in April 1944, the battal- were detailed to stay with the tank as last- ity, obstacles, and enemy presence. ion remained part of the division until the line defenders and runners. In small war’s end. However, until the Normandy The support echelon consisted of the invasion was completed, the companies towns, the tanks provided an initial attack division artillery’s three field artillery by fire, then accompanied the infantry in of the battalion had no support relation- clearing the town. In crossing rivers, the battalions, which provided indirect fire ship with any unit in the division, nor did support; the armored engineer battalion the tanks and infantry conduct serious tanks provided direct suppressive fires on conducted mobility (obstacle and mine the far side as the infantry made the initial training together. In , a company crossing. When all was secure, engineers clearing), countermobility (obstacle build- of medium tanks was attached to each of ing and mine laying), and survivability the infantry regiments, and the regimental laid bridges for the tanks to cross. Al- (defensive earthworks) operations; and though tank fire was not too accurate in commanders attached a tank platoon to night attacks, their presence was a morale the signal company established the divi- each battalion. Save for certain missions, sion’s communications networks. The this arrangement remained unchanged. booster to American infantry and a psy- armored division trains formed the ser- chological weapon against the Germans. Within the infantry battalions, the tank In the defense, 1st Infantry Division units vice echelon. This included an armored platoon could be further attached to a rifle medical battalion, which provided ambu- company for a particular task. This per- sometimes used tanks as part of the main lance service and medical clearing facili- defense, at others they were kept back as manency fostered mutual respect and a mobile counterattack force. The experi- ties for the wounded; the maintenance trust in the other’s capabilities and made battalion gave repair support beyond the it easy for standing operating procedures ence of this tank-infantry team shows the abilities of the mechanics on the front benefit of a close, long-term support rela- (SOPs) to develop. tionship. Early in the hedgerow fighting, lines; and the division’s military police platoon provided security to the rear areas Upon landing on June 7, the tanks were the veterans of the “Big Red One” recog- occupied by the trains. able to help speed the infantry into the nized the value of what the tanks brought hedgerow country by protecting the divi- to the fight, and in the spirit of mutually Three tank battalions and three armored sion’s exposed flanks and being alert to beneficial cooperation, did what they infantry battalions comprised the striking the enemy armored threat. The advancing could to help the tankers. echelon. There were two possible ways to infantry, meanwhile, was available to create the armored division’s combined repel potential tank-hunting infantry The Tank-Infantry Team arms team under control of the combat teams and clear away antitank mines. In the Armored Division command.54 The first was to create “tank- Once in the hedgerow country, tanks heavy” and “infantry-heavy” teams by aided the highly vulnerable infantry by The Armored Force expanded from two attaching an infantry company to the tank spraying the next and flanking hedgerows to sixteen armored divisions during the battalion and a tank company to the in- with machine-gun fire and clearing en- course of American involvement in fantry battalion, respectively. This way, emy machine gun nests with white phos- World War II. As mentioned above, the each team had strengths suited for certain phorus rounds. Advancing infantry made organization of the division was materi- types of missions. Crossing rivers, clear- sure to shoot or take fleeing Germans ally altered several times. The overall ing woods, and seizing towns were prime prisoner. When attacking wood lines, trend of the modifications was to reduce examples of tasks assigned the “infantry- tanks placed machine gun fire into the the number of tanks, eliminate middle heavy” team. The “tank-heavy” team trees from 400-500 yards while the infan- levels of command, increase the amount would assume the lead mission if, for try advanced below the covering fire. If of infantry in the division, and favor the example, enemy tanks or other armored 20 ARMOR — September-October 1999

Infantry find cover behind an as it brings fire on a German pillbox in Lammersdorf, Germany. They communicated with the tankers by hand signals, wire phone, infantry ra- dios, and sometimes by banging on the hull with their rifle butts.

could talk via radio to anyone on the ground. Several fixes were tried, and some units made them work, such as placing an additional infantry-compatible radio in the tank with the antenna through the hatch, or even through a bolt hole. An important means of communication vehicles were expected. Either way, the rail centers, bridges, sealing a pocket of was an external telephone handset team not in the principal role would re- resistance, etc. mounted in a steel box on the tank linked main in close support, prepared to react to The goal of the “Slugging Match” was with the tank crew’s intercom system — any change in the situation. to seize a series of dominant terrain fea- the interphone. This developed from a The second method of forging the ar- tures until the main objective was se- series of field expedient methods. At first, mored infantry-tank team was to meld the cured. Characterized by constant and the tank would trail a phone wire con- two battalions together fully, creating a heavy resistance, the armored team nected to a field telephone inside the sort of “super battalion.” The staffs of the counted its gains in thousands of yards tank. Accompanying infantry could con- two headquarters would combine to run per day. Here, the balanced or combined nect the end to another field telephone the combined arms battle. Each line com- team was used. The division assigned CC and talk to the crew. This was ineffective pany joined with its counterpart, giving A and CC B a series of objectives, which because the wire was constantly torn off tremendous fire- and manpower to the they then attacked in a leapfrogging se- the tank. company command team. This “dual quence; after one team secured its objec- Wire was an effective option if the tank captaincy” did not violate the principle of tive, it could support the other team in its was to remain in position for any consid- unity of command; rather, each com- advance with direct and indirect fires. erable length of time. In the defense, for mander assumed the lead on those mis- This left one whole team in reserve to example, field telephones could be in- sions in which his unit specialized. For reinforce one of the other teams as neces- stalled and quickly dismantled. However, example, if the mission was to destroy a sary or react to possible counterattack. in World War II, tanks were rarely used series of bunkers, the tank commander Again, the infantry and tanks worked as a defensive weapon. took charge and the infantryman assisted. nearly shoulder-to-track to seize their On the other hand, if the company was goal. The light tanks would normally Visual signals included standard hand ordered to secure a tree line, the infantry provide rear or flank security while the and arm signals, pyrotechnics (flares and commander planned and directed the medium tanks and riflemen conducted smoke) tracer , and lights. operation. the attack. Sound signals, such as tapping on the hull of a tank were also used. These signals MAJ Edward Bautz notes that the ar- Tank-Infantry Communications were, however, somewhat limited in their mored division conducts two types of A serious problem faced by the com- use and had to be supplemented by the operations: the “Rat Race” and bined arms team at the tank company, external interphone or radio. the “Slugging Match.”55 The former is platoon, and individual tank levels was essentially an exploitation or pursuit, that of communication with the supported Finally, the use of messengers or com- characterized by rapid terrain gains of up mand liaison was a necessity. At the tank to a hundred miles a day against light to infantry. The soldiers in World War II developed a number of methods to com- platoon level and below, it was necessary moderate resistance. In this type of opera- municate, some of which were for the infantry commander and the sup- tion, the infantry would ride in their half- porting tank commander to make face-to- tracks or on the tanks, while the battal- impractical, while others were quite effi- cient.57 The six that were developed are: face contact from time to time. Typically, ions’ “specialty platoons” and light tanks radio, external tank interphone, wire, at the tank company and above, a repre- secure an exposed flank or provide a sentative from the tank unit remained more robust reconnaissance force. Proper visual signals, sound signals, and mes- senger or liaison. with or near the supported commander’s spacing and placement of elements headquarters. within the moving force was critical in During the war, the radio sets used by ensuring the ability to “crash through the infantry platoon (SCR-536) and by Summary moderate resistance, to remove obstacles, the tank platoon (SCR-508, SCR-528, or to provide a base of fire for other ele- AN/VRC-3) weren’t compatible. Al- The World War II American tank- ments deeper in the column to maneu- though the tank platoon leader could talk infantry team was the product of numer- ver.”56 Typical objectives were essen- to the infantry company commander’s ous factors, foremost among which were tially strategic — key terrain, road and SCR-300 via his AN/VRC-3, no one else the men who fought the tanks and the ARMOR — September-October 1999 21

“By the late summer of 1944, as the Allies began the final long drive to Berlin, the tank-infantry team had come together and were finding ways to use their respective talents to the utmost.”

men who carried the rifles. These men Star, Purple Heart, Presidential Unit Citation and 43Zumbro, pp. 110-113. The account comes were willing to come together as a team, French Croix de Guerre. from a CPT Gwinn, the tank company com- 13 mander. frankly recognize each other’s strengths Historical Section, Army Ground Forces, and weaknesses, and use the best of what Study #27: The Armored Force Command and 44O’Daniel, p. 42. See also Historical Section, they had to drive the enemy from the Center (Headquarters, AGF: 1946) pp. 71-83. AGF, p. 54. 14 field of battle. For their commanders, this Lee Kennett, G.I. — The American Soldier in 45Fred Majdalany, The Battle of Cassino (River- coming together was a sort of laboratory World War II, 2nd ed. (University of Oklahoma side Press, Cambridge, Mass.: 1957) pp. 67-76. experiment, with sometimes frustrating, Press, Norman, Okla.: 1997) pp. 37-38. 46Roger Fazendin, ed., The 756th Tank Battal- even disastrous results. In North Africa, 15Historical Section, AGF, pp. 76-78. the United States Army began to realize ion in the Battle of Cassino (Stories Unlimited, 16Armored Div Org Charts, pp. 15-16 (T/O 17- Carefree, Ariz.: 1991) pp. 43-48. Majdalany that without closer cooperation between describes this action, but indicates that infantry tanks and infantry, the war could be lost. 27 & 17-17). 17 crossed with the tanks and were able to consoli- In Italy, the desire to build a team was George Forty, U.S. Army Handbook 1939- date a bridgehead, but Dave Redle in Fazendin’s there, but it often took some painful ex- 1945, 2nd ed. (Sutton Publishing Ltd., Glouster- book specifies that no infantry followed. shire, UK: 1995) p. 74. periences to make it work. By the late 47 18 Majdalany, p. 99. summer of 1944, as the Allies began the Armored Div Org Charts, pp. 19-20 (T/O 7-26 final long drive to Berlin, the tank- & 7-27). 48O’Daniel, p. 44. 19 infantry team had come together and Forty, p. 174. 49MAJ. William R. Campbell, “Tanks With In- were finding ways to use their respective 20Redle interview. fantry,” The Armored Cavalry Journal, v. LVI talents to the utmost. #5, September-October 1947, p. 49-51. 21FM 21-100, Soldier’s Handbook (War De- partment Basic Field Manual: July 23, 1941) p. 50Forty, p.78. Notes 181. 51MAJ Edward Bautz, “The Tank-Infantry 22 Forty, p. 175. Team in an Armored Division,” The Cavalry Journal, v. LV #3, May-June 1946, p. 21. 1CPT James J. Butler, “Individual Tank-Infantry 23LTC William D. Duncan, “Tanks With the Communications,” The Armored Cavalry Jour- Infantry Division” Military Review, v. XXIX #3 52The Officer’s Guide, p. 38. nal, v. LVI #4, July-August 1947, p. 43. p. 49. 53The 2nd and 3rd Armored Divisions did not 2 24 Geoffrey Perret, There’s a War to Be Won The Officer’s Guide, 9th ed. (Military Service adopt this new organization in September 1943, (Ballantine Books, New York: 1991) p. 40. Publishing Co., Harrisburg, Pa.: 1942) p. 107. but retained the previous structure of one regi- 3Ibid., p. 26. 25CPT Addison F. McGhee, Jr., He’s in the Ar- ment each of tanks and armored infantry. 4 mored Force Now (Robert M. McBride & Co., 54 Ibid., p. 41. Bautz, p. 21. New York: 1942) p. 226. 5David E. Johnson, Fast Tanks and Heavy 55Ibid., p. 22. 26The Officer’s Guide, pp. 78-79. Bombers: The United States Army and the Devel- 56 27 Ibid. opment of Armor and Aviation Doctrines and Redle interview. 57 Technologies, 1917 to 1945, Duke University 28McGhee, pp. 234-235. CPT James J. Butler, “Individual Tank- Ph.D. Dissertation, 1990 (UMI Dissertation Ser- Infantry Communications,” The Armored Cav- 29 vices, Ann Arbor, Mich.: 1993) p. 365. Edwin P. Hoyt, The GI’s War (Da Capo Press, alry Journal, v. LVI #4, July-August 1947 p. 43- 6 New York: 1988) p. 10. 45. Charles M. Baily, Faint Praise: American 30 Tanks and Tank Destroyers During World War II Forty, pp. 71-76. (Archon Books, Hamden, Conn.: 1983) p. 5. 31MG John W. O’Daniel, “The American Infan- 7Ian V. Hogg, ed., The American Arsenal try-Armor Team” The Cavalry Journal, v. LV #3, (Stackpole Books, Mechanicsburg, Pa.: 1996) pp. May-June 1946, p. 42. Captain J. L. Mudd is a 1990 13-17 . 32Johnson, p. 365. ROTC graduate of the College of 8 33 William and Mary. He served in the Baily, p. 148. Redle interview. 9 Regular Army for four years as a Hogg, p. 23. 34Ibid. 10 platoon leader in the 82d Airborne Ibid., p. 29. 35Historical Section, AGF, Study #27: p. 52-54. Division and in the XVIII Airborne 11 Armored Division Organizational Charts, T/O 36Ibid., p. 52. Corps G-3, operations staff. Addi- 17, 15 September 1943 (Reprint, Armor School 37 tionally, he spent two years as a Library, Ft. Knox, Ky.: 1985) p. 15 (T/O 17-27) Ibid., p. 54. & 16 (T/O 17-17). 38Ibid., p. 69. platoon leader in the Kentucky 12 39 ARNG and served in the 100th Divi- Interview with David W. Redle, 5-6 March Ibid., p. 59. 1999 at his home in Akron, Ohio. Captain Redle 40Donald D. Taggart, ed., History of the Third sion (IT) in a number of staff as- was commissioned in 1941 ROTC from Creigh- Infantry Division in World War II (Washington signments. An Armor officer, he is ton University, Omaha, Nebraska. He served as a D.C., 1947) pp. 13-14. currently a Tactical PSYOP De- tank platoon leader, company executive officer 41Ibid., p. 18; see also Ralph Zumbro, Tank Aces tachment Commander in the 10th and company commander in Co. B, 756th Tank — Stories of America’s Combat Tankers (New PSYOP Battalion in St. Louis and is Battalion. He served in North Africa, Italy, York, 1997) pp. 106-107. Southern France, and Central and Southern Ger- a graduate student at Southern Illi- 42 many. His awards include the Silver Star, Bronze Taggart, p. 18. nois University in Edwardsville. 22 ARMOR — September-October 1999