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KPA Journal V2N12.Pages KPAJOURNAL VOLUME 2, NUMBER 12 An August 24, 2013 photograph of Kim Jong-un standing in front of a newly constructed fast patrol craft armed with a new variant of the 30mm AK230, a 14.5mm CIWS and a 3-barrel chaff/fare launcher. (KCNA) " made mention of the “30mm 6-barrel boat automatic anti- Contents aircraf gun system.”1 Details and quality imagery of this " later system, however, were not available. In August 2013 KPN 30mm CIWS .............................................................1 KPA Lessons Learned From Foreign Conflicts (III) .....2 reader Xu Tianran identified an image showing Kim Jong- Spaced Armor Screening for KPA Tanks .......................3 un conducting “on-the-spot” guidance of what appears to KPA Antennas (II) ............................................................5 be a newly constructed high-speed patrol boat. Tis image KPN Training Aids ...........................................................6 may have been taken during a trip to the KPN base at Organization of the KPA Tank Battalion .......................7 Munch’ŏn (i.e., Wŏnsan). Seen behind Kim, on the bow of Editor’s Notes .....................................................................8 an unidentified vessel, are a 14.5mm 6-barrel CIWS, a 3- Endnotes .............................................................................9 barrel chaff/flare launcher and the 30mm gatling-gun CIWS. Tere is possibly a second a 14.5mm 6-barrel CIWS, Korean People’s Navy 30mm CIWS on the port side of the vessel. Tis weapons system By Joseph S. Bermudez Jr. arrangement is unusual and not seen on any other KPN As noted in in KPA Journal Vol. 2, Number 8, since the ear- vessels, suggesting a new class or a vessel of experimental ly 2000s the Korean People’s Navy (KPN) has undertaken design. Although the former is more likely. both a small-scale shipbuilding program and a series of Te origins of the 30mm CIWS are unclear, however, it upgrades to a number of its existing vessels and weapon is believed to have been developed from the Soviet/Russian systems. While the earlier article discussed the KPN 30mm AK230 which was first acquired by the KPN during 14.5mm 6-barrel close in weapon system (CIWS), it also the 1970s. Te AK230 likely also served as the basis for the 1 December 2013 www.kpajournal.com Korean People’s Army (KPA) M-1990 30mm 4-barrel DPRK nuclear development and its flagrant attempts to gatling-gun. Te characteristics for the M-1990 are, deceive the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) " and international community. Included within this was Type: 30mm gatling gun dramatic evidence of several DPRK falsifications. Te avail- Range: 3,000m able evidence indicates that the DPRK leadership was si- Rate of Fire: 2,400-3,400 res./min. multaneously embarrassed by these revelations and their Elevation: -5 to 85 degrees technical inferiority, and astonished by satellite reconnais- Ammo: HEI-T (30mm x 210mm) sance capabilities. Other: 4-wheel carriage Te net result of these three events was a reexamina- tion and reemphasizing of CCD operations within the KPA KPA Lessons Learned from Foreign Con- —particularly within the ballistic missile and WMD pro- grams. ficts 1960-Present, Part III Subsequent operations by the U.S. and its allies during By Joseph S. Bermudez Jr. Operations DESERT STORM, IRAQI FREEDOM and ENDURING In KPA Journal Volume 1, Numbers 9 and 10, and Volume FREEDOM were evaluated by the DPRK leadership as rein- 2, Number 4 some of the lessons that the KPA has derived forcing the technical inferiority of the KPA and the correct- from the study of foreign conflicts were discussed. Addi- ness of their decision to reemphasize CCD operations. tional information concerning this subject has been identi- In 1997 Ko Young-hwan, a defector who worked for fied and is presented here. While some of this new informa- the DPRK Ministry of Foreign Affairs, testified that his tion fits within specific conflicts the subject of camouflage, brother who was involved in the design of antiship cruise concealment and deception (CCD) within the ballistic mis- missiles and aware of CCD, sile and WMD programs crosses several time periods and is According to him [Ko’s brother] the North conducted test discussed here separately. firings of the missiles on the coastal areas of the Yellow Camoufage, Concealment and Deception Sea during the night time in order to avoid detection by the U.S. reconnaissance satellites.2 With regards to the DPRK’s ballistic missile and weapons of Tree years later, in March 2000, Commander of U.S. mass destruction (WMD) programs the level of intensity Forces Korea, General Tomas A. Schwartz, mentioned the ascribed to CCD operations were galvanized during the DPRK’s increased emphasis in CCD operations in his tes- mid 1980s and early 1990s as a result three events—the timony before Congress, Iran-Iraq War, the launch of the French commercial SPOT 1 (Satellite Pour l’Observation de la Terre) earth imaging Applying lessons from our operations in Europe and Southwest Asia, the North Koreans have modified key satellite, and the first phase of the international crisis over facility defenses, dispersed forces, and improved an al- the DPRK’s nuclear capabilities. ready impressive camouflage, concealment, and decep- During the eight-year-long Iran-Iraq war the DPRK tion effort.3 was a major supplier of arms to Iran. In particular, begin- Two years later General Schwartz’s successor General ning in 1985 it supplied Iran with Scud ballistic missiles. Leon J. LaPorte reemphasized the DPRK commitment to During the war both nations became aware of the U.S. pro- CCD operations, vision of satellite imagery and other strategic intelligence to Iraq. Tey ascribe this assistance as being among the root They concentrate their efforts against the combined sur- causes for subsequent successful Iraqi ground offensives veillance, precision attack, and force generation capabili- ty of the Republic of Korea and the United States.4 and ultimately of Iran being compelled to sign a cease-fire in 1988. Significantly the DPRK declared 2004 as the "Year of 5 In 1986 France launched the commercial SPOT 1 earth Camouflage.” As a result a major effort was initiated to observation satellite with a spatial resolution of 10-20 me- reemphasize CCD at all levels of the KPA, KPN and KPAF. ters. Tis provided commercial access to reconnaissance Tese efforts reportedly included the construction of fake imagery at a capability that was previously only available to installations and bases. the superpowers. Tis rapidly led to the use of high-resolu- Currently, camouflage, concealment and deception tion satellite imagery by news organizations, researchers operations are practiced—with varying degrees of intensity and governments. Tese commercial capabilities were " quickly focused upon the DPRK nuclear crisis. Except where noted KPA Journal is Copyright © 2010-2014 by During the later portion of the first round of the DPRK Joseph S. Bermudez Jr. All rights are reserved. Permission for nuclear crisis (1984-1994) the U.S. presented extensive evi- reprints can be obtained by contacting KPA Journal. dence including satellite imagery of both the extent of 2 December 2013 www.kpajournal.com and success—throughout the KPA and within its ballistic physical deterrent.8 missile and WMD programs. As noted in KPA Journal Vol. 1, Number 10 during the Operation ALLIED FORCE, 1999 Iran-Iraq War the Korean People’s Navy (KPN) took an active interest in naval mine operations and supplied Iran During 2010 a excerpts from KPA manual concerning with large quantities of naval mines and naval mine produc- CCD found its way into the media. Among the interesting tion technology. Subsequently, during Operation DESERT sections of the manual was this quote concerning opera- STORM, the KPN closely observed both Iraqi naval mine tions in Kosovo that the KPA should emulate, operations in the waters off Kuwait and on the shores, and Yugoslavian forces in an exposed camp deployed fake the US Navy’s response to these threats. antiaircraft guns, ground-to-air missiles, aircraft and While conducting an amphibious demonstration and tanks made of logs, plywood and cloth, and hid their heading to an amphibious raid, the USS Princeton (CG-59), actual weapons. As a result, NATO forces in fact de- stroyed only 13 of the 300 tanks though it claimed to a Ticonderoga-class guided missile cruiser, and the USS have destroyed 40 percent of the armored targets.6 Tripoli (LPH-10), an Iwo Jima-class amphibious assault ship, were both severely damaged by Iraqi naval mines.9 Other lessons were learned from the fighting in Koso- While the precise lessons learned by the KPN from vo. During May 2006 Kim Ch'o'l-su (pseudonym), a defec- these operations are unknown, they likely reinforced tor and former professor at the North Korean University of lessons learned during the Iran-Iraq War, existing KPN Computer Technology, gave an interview discussing the naval mine warfare doctrine and the understanding that DPRK’s cyber warfare capabilities. In that interview profes- naval mine operations have the potential to shape the na- sor Kim is quoted as saving, ture of a future conflict in the waters around the Korean It [cyber warfare] was adopted as a national strategy Peninsula and denying the US Navy access to large sections starting in 1999. Kim Jong-il re-evaluated things after of its exposed coastlines. the war in Kosovo. He drew the conclusion that if wars during the 20th century were 'oil wars' and 'bullet wars,' in the 21st century they will be 'information wars.' Prior Spaced Armor Screening for KPA Tanks to that, the younger elite members of the military had By Joseph S. Bermudez Jr. proposed that a number of times, but it had not been adopted. Kim Jong-il has said that future warfare will While it is know that the KPA has been interested in spaced depend not on 'who is showered with a lot of bullets,' but and reactive armor for it tanks (see KPA Journal Volume 1, 'who grasps diverse information faster.' Number 4 for examples of the armor on the P’okpoong War is not just crushing someone.
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