Explosive Ordnance Disposal Technician assigned to Commander, Task Group 56.1, explains underwater navigation system to Kuwait naval force technicians during training evolution as part of exercise Eager Response 18, Mohammed Al-Ahmad Naval Base, Kuwait, January 8, 2018 (U.S. Navy/Louis Rojas)
through U.S. authorities and partner agreements. By, with, and through has The By-With-Through proved agile, adaptive, and tailorable in pursuing American interests in the USCENTCOM area of responsibility Operational Approach (AOR). Moreover, this approach will become increasingly useful globally in a complex, resource-constrained environ- By Joseph L. Votel and Eero R. Keravuori ment with advantages from use before, during, and after conflict. The U.S. military must organize, resource, and Our approach is by, with, and through our Allies, so train the joint force to operate by, with, and through with greater efficiency that they own these spaces and the U.S. does not. and effectiveness with various types of partners and whole-of-government —Secretary James N. Mattis involvement. Executing this approach in current and future multipolar and resource-constrained environments he U.S. Central Command requires common understanding and (USCENTCOM) definition of the development of joint force doctrine. T the by-with-through (BWT) oper- ational approach is that operations are Overview General Joseph L. Votel, USA, is Commander of led by our partners, state or nonstate, Regional conflicts can arise when state U.S. Central Command. Colonel Eero R. Keravuori, USA, is Division Chief of the Combined Strategic with enabling support from the United or nonstate actors do not have the Analysis Group, CCJ5. States or U.S.-led coalitions, and capacity and resources to resolve their
40 Special Feature / The By-With-Through Operational Approach JFQ 89, 2nd Quarter 2018 conflicts locally, potentially putting U.S. Although for USCENTCOM it is mil- in Yemen. The BWT approach in this interests in the region at risk. Tradi- itarily focused, by, with, and through case is a hybrid or multilayered example tional U.S. military solutions can inhibit complements the whole-of-government involving a stable ally as the regional local responsibility for resolving those approach to regional conflicts that impli- partner, who in turn is enabling a local problems and may even provide oppor- cate U.S. national interests. partner in Yemen. This is also an example tunities for adversaries to challenge With this definition and broad of using the BWT operational approach and reverse the legitimacy of “foreign concept, the discussion is presented in support of aligned regional interests: power” solutions. Also, despite an invi- in two parts. In the first part, several countering al Qaeda in the Arabian tation of the host government, a large USCENTCOM examples are discussed Peninsula (AQAP). Specifically, the and protracted U.S. military presence to develop a better understanding of the United States contributes counterterror- is often perceived as an invasion or an BWT approach. These examples assist the ism advising, intelligence, and logistics occupation by significant numbers of explanation of essential components in capabilities to the UAE as part of an Arab the host-country’s citizens. Aware of decisions on where, when, with whom, coalition targeting AQAP in Yemen.5 In these challenges, Secretary of Defense and how the BWT approach is used. an additional layer, U.S. military support James Mattis stated, “U.S. forces Based on USCENTCOM experience, the enables UAE, with its greater cultural, have evolved to work by, with, and second part identifies strategic and oper- historical, and tribal knowledge, in its through our allies”1 and would defeat ational selection criteria, advantages, and own BWT approach to enhance the the so-called Islamic State (IS) “by, risks that must be considered at the onset capabilities of local Yemeni counterterror- with, and through other nations.”2 The and reassessed throughout execution. ism forces in the common fight against current USCENTCOM Theater Strat- Ultimately, how this approach impacts AQAP.6 Supporting allied missions by, egy states, “‘by, with and through’ is an the joint force and considerations for with, and through our regional partners important component of our strategic current and future doctrine and readiness is one way to secure common interests approach,”3 and “we choose to prevail are presented. and share responsibility and resource ‘by, with and through’ . . . nations that burdens. Furthermore, it exemplifies how share our interests.”4 The USCENTCOM AOR the joint force could use the approach to As this approach gains increasing Current examples in the USCENT- reassure and strengthen existing alliances usage, it is important to address what it COM AOR of BWT operational and deepen interoperability as envisioned entails and its implications for the joint approaches include: in the 2018 National Defense Strategy.7 force. The phrase has many potential Afghanistan. Contrastingly, the interpretations; therefore, along with the •• Multilayered approach to counterter- Afghanistan mission gradually evolved definition above, a conceptual framing rorism in Yemen into a BWT approach as recognition of of its meaning is necessary. The BWT •• U.S. Forces–Afghanistan’s Operation the need for domestic legitimacy and operational approach seeks to achieve Freedom’s Sentinel (OFS) ownership increased. In 2001, the United U.S. national interests by engaging and •• North Atlantic Treaty Organization States entered Afghanistan to destroy al enabling partners’ local and regional (NATO) Operation Resolute Support Qaeda and defeat the Taliban without capabilities and leadership. Through (ORS) in Afghanistan an accurate appreciation for the Afghans’ American authorities and partner agree- •• Operation Inherent Resolve (OIR) in capacity to retain these gains.8 General ments, joint force enablers can support, the campaign against IS. Stanley McChrystal, USA (Ret.), re- organize, train, equip, build/rebuild, and flected that in Afghanistan, as in Vietnam, advise partners’ security forces and their After several interviews and discus- the adversary was able to ratchet up and supporting institutions from the tactical sions with the leadership involved in these down both the size and composition to ministerial levels. operations, the recognized value of a of its forces to counter U.S. strengths. By, with, and through is not yet a BWT operational approach is consistent, The U.S. military was employing greater doctrine or a strategy or a formal military as are some of the concerns. The compo- numbers of conventional forces and gain- program. Instead, it is considered an op- sition and application of U.S. support to ing increasing ownership of the problem.9 erational approach to be used during the each of these conflicts are not identical. In Afghanistan, this cycle culminated with course of security cooperation activities In each, U.S. force structure and em- the conclusion of Operation Enduring or military campaigns. The approach ployment reflect the agile and tailorable Freedom and the start of OFS and ORS, pursues more culturally acceptable and nature of a BWT approach and illustrate both taking a BWT approach to the durable solutions by developing and the unique challenges that develop in the problem. supporting partner participation and various conflicts. ORS is established under a Status of operational ownership. By, with, and Yemen. Before exploring larger scale Forces Agreement (SOFA) between the through is a way of conducting military efforts in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria, Afghanistan government and NATO. activities and operations with less direct it is worth exploring the operational The SOFA authorizes NATO forces to combat employment of U.S. forces. approach supporting counterterrorism provide noncombat training, advising,
JFQ 89, 2nd Quarter 2018 Votel and Keravuori 41 and assistance to the Afghan National forward operating base advise-and-assist significant change from the previous mil- Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF).10 programs to expeditionary advising pro- itary involvement. As Brigadier General The United Nations Security Council grams that accompanied Iraqi Security John Richardson points out, in 2008 the adopted Resolution 2189, welcoming Forces into its operations to liberate Iraqi U.S. military was still telling the Iraqi mil- ORS as an expression of the international territory. Similarly, U.S. and coalition itary what to do and when to do it, even commitment to Afghanistan stability and special operations forces (SOF) in Syria when the Iraqis were the lead element. the financial sustainment of the ANDSF operated near the forward line of troops Although the United States and its coali- through 2020.11 The execution of the with the partner unit of action. In Iraq, tion partners were building ISF capacity, current BWT approach in support of the force-protection concerns initially limited their ownership of the conflict was inhib- ANDSF fosters domestic legitimacy and the influence that our enablers could ited by our lack of tactical patience to let ownership of Afghan security by its indig- provide.14 It is now recognized that them lead.15 Lieutenant General Stephen enous security institutions and bolsters partnering at the right level with the unit Townsend further notes that in 2007, the international legitimacy for the mission. of action creates better use and influence Iraqis did not ask for the surge of U.S. Even so, in 2016 and 2017, it was from the enabling assets. troops to fight the insurgency. In 2014, recognized that the mission and ANDSF In the USCENTCOM AOR, this is by comparison, the Iraqi government were still facing challenges in maintaining often, but not always, at the brigade level. asked the world for help. The differ- consistent progress against the Taliban. Advising with a broader set of expertise ence in operational success, Lieutenant Several of the commanders we inter- and down to the kandak (battalion) level General Townsend states, was not in ISF viewed, with multiple tours in Iraq and in Afghanistan will be the third evolution capability from 2007 to 2014. No Iraqi Afghanistan, noted that the limited mili- of this lesson, integrating the support unit was fully manned, equipped, or tary progress of a BWT approach was not into echelons closer to the unit of action trained in 2014, but in marked contrast based on the method but on the means. to create even more proficiency and with the Iraqi units of 2007, many units The preponderance of USCENTCOM efficiency from a BWT approach. The partnered with U.S.-coalition enablers enablers were committed to the priority impending military defeat of IS in Iraq were now fully willing to fight.16 The mission in Iraq and Syria, and the mission and Syria, and the subsequent availability alignment of interest, their confidence in in Afghanistan was conducted as an econ- of enabling capabilities, allows for prior- our support, and the investment of the omy of force.12 Senior leaders determined itizing resource increases in Afghanistan. host nation have been key to this change. that, in order to achieve more durable With increased enabling resources at Iraq also serves as an example that operational success, advisor teams were lower levels, the Afghanistan operational the BWT approach is not inexpensive needed at lower headquarters echelons realignment aims to further capitalize on and not necessarily less resource-inten- of the ANDSDF. While defeating the the BWT approach and help the ANDSF sive regarding enabling support than a IS remained the priority, there were not better secure the gains on the ground. comparable unilateral action undertaken more advising and enabling forces for OIR. While U.S. involvement in Iraq by the U.S. joint force. The capacity of the Afghanistan mission. Additionally, started in a similar way to Afghanistan, the partner and type and stage of conflict the SOFA initially limited advising to the the operation against IS represents a determine the enabling resource require- ANDSF corps or corps-equivalent level.13 distinct change from the preceding op- ments. Operations like Iraq, Syria, or In a unilateral approach, the change in erations. The BWT approach included Afghanistan, however, require a sufficient advising levels would simply be a sub- ground combat by Iraqi Security Forces level of resources for the problem to ject of resource availability. In a BWT (ISF) and Syrian Democratic Forces both provide the partner an operational approach that included a host-nation (SDF) supported by a 60-country U.S.- advantage and sustain it until conflict partner and broad coalition of NATO led coalition. The coalition role included termination. Thus, the appropriate mix Allies and partners, additional negoti- building partner capacity for ground and availability from a large spectrum ation to modify the NATO and U.S. combat and advise, assist, accompany, and of enablers including airpower, artillery, bilateral agreements with Afghanistan, enable missions. Additionally, coalition intelligence, cyber, and sustainment, and revision of coalition governments’ fires and precision airstrikes targeted all as well as possible civil, infrastructure, commitments to ORS, were necessary aspects of IS leadership, formations, infra- and humanitarian capacities, need to be preconditions to increase advising and structure, and resources. Backing all this considered before taking a BWT opera- enabling resources. was joint sustainment, communication, tional approach.17 In supporting the ISF The BWT operational approach is and intelligence, surveillance, and recon- joint force, the cost included persistent adaptive to evolving operational and naissance forces and assets. overwhelming support from all those tactical conditions as well as the partner’s Iraq. In Iraq, with the U.S. an- capabilities in higher levels to compensate capabilities and limitations. In Iraq, U.S. nouncement of OIR in 2014, the United for the developing ground force capabili- and coalition forces had reevaluated the States also announced that the coalition ties and longer operational timelines. The location and echelon of their support. there would be supporting, not direct- resourcing cost was high, but considered The result was the transition from static ing, operational objectives. This was a acceptable given the increased partner
42 Special Feature / The By-With-Through Operational Approach JFQ 89, 2nd Quarter 2018 Iraqi soldier assigned to 7th Iraqi army division participates in assault movement training at Al Asad Air Base, Iraq, January 13, 2017, as part of Combined Joint Task Force–Operation Inherent Resolve (U.S. Army/Lisa Soy)
confidence, ownership, and success military-to-military partnership for a relationship with moderate and vetted and the much-diminished risk of U.S. range of common interests.19 armed Syrian opposition groups that casualties. Syria. A significant difference in the pledged to fight against IS rather than Just as the partnerships may need BWT approach from Iraq to Syria is the the Syrian regime. This difference—part- initial robust support as in Iraq, or availability of a host-nation state partner. nering with a nonstate armed group right-sizing increases in U.S. and coa- The United States and its coalition part- rather that a partner-nation’s armed lition advisor teams as in Afghanistan, ners determined that the Syrian regime forces—required a different supporting there can also be a transition to decreased was either unwilling or unable to prevent force structure to enable the vetted Syrian numbers. As mentioned, with the military IS from launching attacks against Iraq, opposition light infantry capabilities successes in Iraq, the need for U.S. forces the United States, and its coalition part- rather than Iraq’s joint force capabilities. partnering below the division level is ners from within Syrian territory. Because The lack of host-government support diminishing.18 Compared to Operation cooperation with the Syrian regime was complicated logistical support and U.S. Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring politically untenable to the United States and coalition force protection, putting a Freedom missions that debated the and its partners, the coalition had to turn greater reliance on SOF trainers and ad- amount and length of U.S. force presence to other actors on the Syrian civil war visors, air support, and transfers of arms needed for long-term stability, in OIR battlefield. The considerations of suitable and equipment to the SDF. the domestic Iraqi forces are the hold, partners having aligned interests meant While a BWT approach generates build, and stabilize forces that can remain differentiating those forces seeking U.S. greater domestic legitimacy for the part- indefinitely. As this continues, the transi- assistance in the civil war from those ner, the lack of U.S. short- and long-term tion from the BWT operational approach willing to focus on defeating IS. Congress operational control over the partner and suggests evolving from a BWT partner- provided the executive branch the initial its agenda can have strategic concerns. ship for a specific interest to a traditional Syrian Train and Equip authorities,20 al- Partnering with the SDF, led largely by lowing the military to start a transactional Syrian Kurds, created strategic stress with
JFQ 89, 2nd Quarter 2018 Votel and Keravuori 43 Turkey, which is only magnified by the partnerships is the limited scope of mil- ment involvement, as well as the size notion of SDF ownership versus U.S. itary interest and the tenuous nature of and nature of the partner up to the host control. It also presents an ongoing po- the success. For instance, in Syria, the country government, are considered. litical challenge to the legitimacy for U.S. SDF faces uncertain domestic security Domestic Concerns. These concerns involvement from the Syrian regime and due to political, ethnic, and historical are paired with factors determined from its partners. tensions separate from IS. Military ac- the specific conflict situation, including In Syria, the partnership with the SDF tions to address these sources of domestic the type and stage of the conflict or is pragmatically focused on the defeat of SDF security exceed U.S. and coalition threat, availability of partners and their IS. The SDF’s legal status under inter- authorities, which are focused on the current contribution or capacity, and national law and in juxtaposition to the defeat of IS. This keeps the partnership regional and international involvement.24 Syrian regime limits the evolution of the transactional and risks a divergence of An evaluation of the stage of conflict and partnership as compared with Iraq and interests. In Iraq, internal domestic con- the capacity of the partner assist in deter- the government’s ISF. This is not meant cerns, including Iranian influence and mining the appropriate type of activity to imply that future partnerships are not Kurdish autonomy, are reminders that required. This may include any range of possible with nonstate groups like the the military BWT operational approach operations from building partner capacity SDF; rather it implies that these partner- cannot overcome all of the domestic and security force assistance to counter- ships support distinct U.S. interests with tensions or issues that may have led to or insurgency and foreign internal defense appropriate authorities and policies. In exacerbated the conditions that generated to offensive counterterrorism operations. Syria, the United States did not select IS. There is also a need for interagency This also provides clarity to the most a BWT approach simply to develop an and international involvement on the constraining factor, which is the required indigenous partner. It did so because it ground. In Afghanistan, the competing supporting forces and sustainment levels was a more effective operational approach pressures from Pakistan, Russia, and do- needed to ensure the host partner’s prog- to degrade, defeat, and destroy IS in a mestic power competitions are somewhat ress, parity, or overmatch—and ultimately country that the United States had no more balanced by a more robust interna- secure the shared U.S. interest. diplomatic relationship with. tional commitment. Governmental and The U.S. national interests at stake are Host Legitimacy. In all three cases, international efforts need to join early on determinants of where the joint force op- military gains made in support of U.S. and follow through beyond the limited erates along these spectra. These concerns interests are not secure if they rely solely military role to diminish the risk posed by center on the value of the endstate of the on military partnership. As pointed out rogue or revisionist actors. conflict to U.S. national interests and the in Building Armies, Building Nations, immediacy required. When the United the development and support of the Future Considerations States is facing an existential threat, the military, and the resulting legitimacy The BWT operational approach and the BWT operational approach is not suit- through ownership and success in the examples of its current employment in able due to its risks from partner, rather conflict, are not sufficient by themselves the USCENTCOM AOR reveal that than U.S., ownership of the outcome.25 for long-term nation-building or sta- it encompasses a spectrum of char- Similarly, if there is a vital national interest bility. The host-partner military needs acteristics. One end of the spectrum regarding how and when the conflict is development of its role as a bridge to a is the realm of low-visibility advisory concluded, then by, with, and through national identity.21 This resonates with assistance by small teams, with limited may again not be recommended.26 Secretary Mattis’s assertion that the enablers, partnering with small groups Another factor is the level and American example of military and civic of indigenous actors like the counter- leadership by the Armed Forces in con- leadership in shaping partners’ views terrorism support in Yemen. As the sideration of the political sensitivity of of social responsibility is as important conflict intensifies, U.S. involvement U.S. involvement and the type of conflict. as the technical proficiency.22 To foster becomes increasingly more overt. The This factor helps define the intended vis- this potential, the whole-of-government supporting leadership mix shifts from ibility of the American role (from limited participation in a BWT approach should unconventional warfare, irregular to overt), SOF and conventional force be sought from the onset. According to warfare, and counterterrorism experts mixture, number and type of enablers, Lieutenant General Terry Wolff, USA to more counterinsurgency, foreign and extent of other U.S. agency involve- (Ret.), the hard-won legitimacy of the internal defense, and conventional ment. In times of political constraint, ISF and government of Iraq will not last offensive warfare units and leaders in providing only U.S. military supporting in the liberated areas if they are not able increasing numbers, as seen in Iraq capabilities reduces the political tension to turn on the lights, get the water flow- and Afghanistan. Also increasing with of employing significant frontline combat ing, or open the schools in a popularly expanded U.S. involvement are the forces. With effective leadership and sup- acceptable timeframe.23 number of joint force resources like port, this may allow addressing interests U.S. and International Interests. fires, intelligence, and sustainment. that would be less accessible through Another factor existing in all of these Finally, the degree of whole-of-govern- other approaches.
44 Special Feature / The By-With-Through Operational Approach JFQ 89, 2nd Quarter 2018 Marines with 3rd Battalion, 7th Marine Regiment, Special Purpose Marine Air-Ground Task Force–Crisis Response–Central Command, conduct Tactical Recovery of Aircraft and Personnel exercise, October 8, 2016 (U.S. Marine Corps/Trever Statz)
Leadership. A significant advantage of The mitigating factors begin with first dispersed formations in the SFAB would a BWT operational approach is host-part- finding a willing and capable partner also require high performing noncom- ner ownership and durable outcome and ensuring aligned interests. Second is missioned officers.32 supporting U.S. national interests. To sustaining a committed, reliable, and du- Lieutenant General William Beydler, achieve this outcome, a BWT approach rable supporting and enabling presence.29 commander of Marine Corps Forces requires a leadership actively engaged in Through the provision of sound advice Central Command, commented that the sourcing and coordinating the enabling and reliable application of resources and 4-month Marine Expeditionary Unit resources and advising as a trusted agent, enablers, the American leaders involved rotation cycle approach does not match while allowing host partners to control provide tangible value to the partner up with the importance of relationships.33 employment, timelines, and direction.27 nation, thereby allowing the development A service force management process This type of supporting leadership from of trust and influence on the alignment of that allows a persistent unit alignment, the United States leverages the capabilities interests.30 as with SOF teams being sent back that host nations have and the primary Having the right quality of leaders to the same location, as suggested by leadership they can contribute. This was for this approach is essential. Lieutenant Special Operations Command Central the case in Iraq, where the Iraqis, with General Stephen Townsend, USA, Command Sergeant Major Marc Eckard, increasing confidence in committed sup- considers that leaders must first be USA, is another possible way to address port, selected other routes, objectives, and experts in their field, whether that is this challenge.34 Finally, the naval per- timelines of their own choosing rather direct action, fires, intelligence prepara- spective provided by U.S. Naval Forces than only those preferred by the United tion of the battlefield, or sustainment, Central Command commander Vice States. Accepting host state or nonstate and also be comfortable in a mission Admiral John Aquilino is that informa- leaders’ ownership of the fight reveals the command role without traditional tion-sharing in the maritime domain is commitment and risk tolerance of host mission control.31 Those commanders possible, but it is much harder to advise forces in meeting their own and U.S. in- interviewed contend that the experience and assist on someone else’s bridge.35 terests. This is essential for legitimacy with in a supporting and advising role relied Regarding leadership characteristics, the people, one of the shared advantages heavily on and complemented rather than Colonel Patrick Work’s Mosul experience of a BWT approach, especially in counter- degraded their primary wartime training. highlighted anticipation, agility, and insurgency scenarios.28 USCENTCOM Command Sergeant inquisitiveness as traits that improved the Empowering the partner leadership Major William Thetford, USA, noted support provided and the influence gained in this way, however, creates risk to U.S. that significant reliance on mission com- during this approach.36 Training for these objectives and operational timelines. mand and relationship-building in smaller and other necessary characteristics like
JFQ 89, 2nd Quarter 2018 Votel and Keravuori 45 historical context, language, and culture Lieutenant General Jeffrey Harrigian, operational circumstances and congres- are more common for SOF, but are no the U.S. Air Force’s Central Command sional concerns. As the specific situation less important when conventional forces commander, noted that an equivalent develops and support required changes, are employed. This also includes the po- structure does not exist in the Air Force however, new or revised authorities may tential of focusing military leaders’ careers and that training an indigenous air force be necessary. Congress does not operate on developing relationships with regional has significantly longer timelines.41 at the speed of war, creating a lag be- security partners and with regionally fo- Another component of risk is the tween need and the legislative solution. cused interagency counterparts. The force lethal threats to employed enablers. This presents a further requirement on will also need to develop ways to reward Enablers from the joint force may include commanders and planners to anticipate this type of leader development.37 sustainment and mobility; intelligence, evolutions of enabling requirements Sustainment and Enablers. Another surveillance, and reconnaissance; and and advocate early for the necessary area that impacts the success of the ap- kinetic and nonlethal fires. These enablers authorities. proach is sustainment of the host and the allow our partners to sustain themselves Further complicating this risk is the enablers. Lieutenant General Michael in the conflict. When provided with lack of joint doctrine supporting a BWT Garrett, U.S. Army Central commander, American leadership and commitment, operational approach. There is need for notes that, at equivalent levels, the sus- U.S. partners have demonstrated in- doctrine concerning large-scale conven- tainment force is not organized to support creased confidence and determination to tional forces conducting operations that the broadly dispersed footprint of a prevail. While this often lowers the risk include security force assistance; building Brigade Combat Team in this approach.38 from employment of a comparable num- partner capacity from the ministerial to USCENTCOM’s J4, Major General ber of U.S. frontline ground combatants, tactical levels; and various mixes of train, Edward Dorman, USA, commented that the lethal risk to the various types of advise, assist, accompany, and enable earlier involvement in sustainment partner- aircraft enablers, logistics operations, and missions.45 ships needs consideration for operationally advisers remains significant.42 With whom to partner our resources effective support, resource management, In interviews and discussions, import- carries significant implications for the and longer term outcomes.39 ant considerations were voiced suggesting U.S. authorities granted, military re- The BWT approach is often mistaken that adversaries will seek ways to adapt quirements, securing U.S. interest, and for an inexpensive approach to warfare. to and counter this approach. To begin, endstate or transition. Ultimately, the This is a misperception. This approach Lieutenant General Harrigian describes partnerships in a BWT approach change still requires significant financial expen- the enabling mission and associated de- when U.S. interests are secured or di- diture. Reducing the use of U.S. forces creased risk as relying on the assumption verge from the partner’s interest. The for direct combat operations creates less of air superiority, which is no longer a potential follow-on relationship depends control of the timelines and decreased certainty.43 It is in a contested air domain on the nature of the partner, success of efficiency of resource expenditure. where adversary airpower may disrupt the the partnership, and subsequent U.S. Therefore, the duration of the conflict supply lines or degrade other supporting interests. Transition following from and amount of resource consumption forces’ freedom of maneuver. Secretary BWT partnerships augmenting stable ally are potential strategic risks to joint force Mattis takes a position in his Summary states, such as the U.S. relationship with readiness in general and carry broader of the 2018 National Defense Strategy the UAE concerning Yemen, may be the U.S. economic implications that must that every domain is now contested.44 most straightforward. Highly transac- be mitigated. This requires continual The joint force must factor in this state tional relationships with nonstate actors vigilance of resource consumption, since, of domains with expected adaptations by remain the more challenging to transition as the USCENTCOM J5, Major General adversaries to degrade the BWT approach without authorities or policies that follow George Smith, USMC, cautioned, trad- and associated exposure to enablers. through. Finally, all the examples of con- ing tactical risks for strategic ones is not a Authorities and Doctrine. All flicts and partners require avoiding the viable long-term plan.40 of this requires the appropriate legal development of dependencies and rec- The joint force can react and adapt to framework and authorities for partner- ognizing mission limitations and mission meet the needs of a BWT approach when ing and resourcing. A major risk is that accomplishment. there are limited competing requirements permanent statutory authorities do not and the force is given enough time. exist to enable partner forces in this kind Concluding Imperative Creating a sustained capability requires of conflict. Colonel Matthew Grant, The U.S. military has a significant role developing the requisite capacities within USA, USCENTCOM Judge Advocate, in securing and maintaining American the components and a complementary expressed how specific legislation to national interests. The BWT operational joint doctrine. The Army SFAB and Field provision regular and irregular forces in approach identifies partners with spe- Manual 3-07.1, Security Force Assistance, Iraq, Syria, and Afghanistan was required cific shared interests, preferably held provide a conceptual starting point in each case—and the authorities in each by them at an equal or higher national for components for the advising role. instance were tailored to the particular value. The U.S. joint force leverages
46 Special Feature / The By-With-Through Operational Approach JFQ 89, 2nd Quarter 2018 7 24 the partner’s leadership and increases Summary of the 2018 National Defense Colonel Eric S. Strong, USA, com- Strategy of the United States of America: Sharp- mander, 1st Stryker Brigade Combat Team, its capacity and ownership for greater ening the American Military’s Competitive Edge 1st Armored Division, telephone interview by legitimacy and durability of the outcome. (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, authors, October 25, 2017. This approach, done with the purpose 2018), 9, available at
JFQ 89, 2nd Quarter 2018 Votel and Keravuori 47