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The By-With-Through Operational Approach JFQ 89, 2Nd Quarter 2018 Conflicts Locally, Potentially Putting U.S

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The By-With-Through Operational Approach JFQ 89, 2Nd Quarter 2018 Conflicts Locally, Potentially Putting U.S Explosive Ordnance Disposal Technician assigned to Commander, Task Group 56.1, explains underwater navigation system to Kuwait naval force technicians during training evolution as part of exercise Eager Response 18, Mohammed Al-Ahmad Naval Base, Kuwait, January 8, 2018 (U.S. Navy/Louis Rojas) through U.S. authorities and partner agreements. By, with, and through has The By-With-Through proved agile, adaptive, and tailorable in pursuing American interests in the USCENTCOM area of responsibility Operational Approach (AOR). Moreover, this approach will become increasingly useful globally in a complex, resource-constrained environ- By Joseph L. Votel and Eero R. Keravuori ment with advantages from use before, during, and after conflict. The U.S. military must organize, resource, and Our approach is by, with, and through our Allies, so train the joint force to operate by, with, and through with greater efficiency that they own these spaces and the U.S. does not. and effectiveness with various types of partners and whole-of-government —SECRETARY JAMES N. MAttIS involvement. Executing this approach in current and future multipolar and resource-constrained environments he U.S. Central Command requires common understanding and (USCENTCOM) definition of the development of joint force doctrine. T the by-with-through (BWT) oper- ational approach is that operations are Overview General Joseph L. Votel, USA, is Commander of led by our partners, state or nonstate, Regional conflicts can arise when state U.S. Central Command. Colonel Eero R. Keravuori, USA, is Division Chief of the Combined Strategic with enabling support from the United or nonstate actors do not have the Analysis Group, CCJ5. States or U.S.-led coalitions, and capacity and resources to resolve their 40 Special Feature / The By-With-Through Operational Approach JFQ 89, 2nd Quarter 2018 conflicts locally, potentially putting U.S. Although for USCENTCOM it is mil- in Yemen. The BWT approach in this interests in the region at risk. Tradi- itarily focused, by, with, and through case is a hybrid or multilayered example tional U.S. military solutions can inhibit complements the whole-of-government involving a stable ally as the regional local responsibility for resolving those approach to regional conflicts that impli- partner, who in turn is enabling a local problems and may even provide oppor- cate U.S. national interests. partner in Yemen. This is also an example tunities for adversaries to challenge With this definition and broad of using the BWT operational approach and reverse the legitimacy of “foreign concept, the discussion is presented in support of aligned regional interests: power” solutions. Also, despite an invi- in two parts. In the first part, several countering al Qaeda in the Arabian tation of the host government, a large USCENTCOM examples are discussed Peninsula (AQAP). Specifically, the and protracted U.S. military presence to develop a better understanding of the United States contributes counterterror- is often perceived as an invasion or an BWT approach. These examples assist the ism advising, intelligence, and logistics occupation by significant numbers of explanation of essential components in capabilities to the UAE as part of an Arab the host-country’s citizens. Aware of decisions on where, when, with whom, coalition targeting AQAP in Yemen.5 In these challenges, Secretary of Defense and how the BWT approach is used. an additional layer, U.S. military support James Mattis stated, “U.S. forces Based on USCENTCOM experience, the enables UAE, with its greater cultural, have evolved to work by, with, and second part identifies strategic and oper- historical, and tribal knowledge, in its through our allies”1 and would defeat ational selection criteria, advantages, and own BWT approach to enhance the the so-called Islamic State (IS) “by, risks that must be considered at the onset capabilities of local Yemeni counterterror- with, and through other nations.”2 The and reassessed throughout execution. ism forces in the common fight against current USCENTCOM Theater Strat- Ultimately, how this approach impacts AQAP.6 Supporting allied missions by, egy states, “‘by, with and through’ is an the joint force and considerations for with, and through our regional partners important component of our strategic current and future doctrine and readiness is one way to secure common interests approach,”3 and “we choose to prevail are presented. and share responsibility and resource ‘by, with and through’ . nations that burdens. Furthermore, it exemplifies how share our interests.”4 The USCENTCOM AOR the joint force could use the approach to As this approach gains increasing Current examples in the USCENT- reassure and strengthen existing alliances usage, it is important to address what it COM AOR of BWT operational and deepen interoperability as envisioned entails and its implications for the joint approaches include: in the 2018 National Defense Strategy.7 force. The phrase has many potential Afghanistan. Contrastingly, the interpretations; therefore, along with the • Multilayered approach to counterter- Afghanistan mission gradually evolved definition above, a conceptual framing rorism in Yemen into a BWT approach as recognition of of its meaning is necessary. The BWT • U.S. Forces–Afghanistan’s Operation the need for domestic legitimacy and operational approach seeks to achieve Freedom’s Sentinel (OFS) ownership increased. In 2001, the United U.S. national interests by engaging and • North Atlantic Treaty Organization States entered Afghanistan to destroy al enabling partners’ local and regional (NATO) Operation Resolute Support Qaeda and defeat the Taliban without capabilities and leadership. Through (ORS) in Afghanistan an accurate appreciation for the Afghans’ American authorities and partner agree- • Operation Inherent Resolve (OIR) in capacity to retain these gains.8 General ments, joint force enablers can support, the campaign against IS. Stanley McChrystal, USA (Ret.), re- organize, train, equip, build/rebuild, and flected that in Afghanistan, as in Vietnam, advise partners’ security forces and their After several interviews and discus- the adversary was able to ratchet up and supporting institutions from the tactical sions with the leadership involved in these down both the size and composition to ministerial levels. operations, the recognized value of a of its forces to counter U.S. strengths. By, with, and through is not yet a BWT operational approach is consistent, The U.S. military was employing greater doctrine or a strategy or a formal military as are some of the concerns. The compo- numbers of conventional forces and gain- program. Instead, it is considered an op- sition and application of U.S. support to ing increasing ownership of the problem.9 erational approach to be used during the each of these conflicts are not identical. In Afghanistan, this cycle culminated with course of security cooperation activities In each, U.S. force structure and em- the conclusion of Operation Enduring or military campaigns. The approach ployment reflect the agile and tailorable Freedom and the start of OFS and ORS, pursues more culturally acceptable and nature of a BWT approach and illustrate both taking a BWT approach to the durable solutions by developing and the unique challenges that develop in the problem. supporting partner participation and various conflicts. ORS is established under a Status of operational ownership. By, with, and Yemen. Before exploring larger scale Forces Agreement (SOFA) between the through is a way of conducting military efforts in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria, Afghanistan government and NATO. activities and operations with less direct it is worth exploring the operational The SOFA authorizes NATO forces to combat employment of U.S. forces. approach supporting counterterrorism provide noncombat training, advising, JFQ 89, 2nd Quarter 2018 Votel and Keravuori 41 and assistance to the Afghan National forward operating base advise-and-assist significant change from the previous mil- Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF).10 programs to expeditionary advising pro- itary involvement. As Brigadier General The United Nations Security Council grams that accompanied Iraqi Security John Richardson points out, in 2008 the adopted Resolution 2189, welcoming Forces into its operations to liberate Iraqi U.S. military was still telling the Iraqi mil- ORS as an expression of the international territory. Similarly, U.S. and coalition itary what to do and when to do it, even commitment to Afghanistan stability and special operations forces (SOF) in Syria when the Iraqis were the lead element. the financial sustainment of the ANDSF operated near the forward line of troops Although the United States and its coali- through 2020.11 The execution of the with the partner unit of action. In Iraq, tion partners were building ISF capacity, current BWT approach in support of the force-protection concerns initially limited their ownership of the conflict was inhib- ANDSF fosters domestic legitimacy and the influence that our enablers could ited by our lack of tactical patience to let ownership of Afghan security by its indig- provide.14 It is now recognized that them lead.15 Lieutenant General Stephen enous security institutions and bolsters partnering at the right level with the unit Townsend further notes that in 2007, the international legitimacy for the mission. of action creates better use and influence Iraqis did not ask for the surge of U.S. Even so, in 2016 and 2017, it was from the enabling assets. troops to fight the insurgency. In 2014, recognized that the mission and ANDSF In the USCENTCOM AOR, this is by comparison, the Iraqi government were still facing challenges in maintaining often, but not always, at the brigade level. asked the world for help. The differ- consistent progress against the Taliban. Advising with a broader set of expertise ence in operational success, Lieutenant Several of the commanders we inter- and down to the kandak (battalion) level General Townsend states, was not in ISF viewed, with multiple tours in Iraq and in Afghanistan will be the third evolution capability from 2007 to 2014.
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