Issue 83, 4th Quarter 2016
Threat Assessment and Its Perils An Interview with Cecil D. Haney Commentary on
JOINT FORCE QUARTERL Chinese Military Reforms Y ISSUE EIGHTY -THREE, 4 TH QUARTER 2016 Joint Force Quarterly Founded in 1993 • Vol. 83, 4th Quarter 2016 http://ndupress.ndu.edu
Gen Joseph F. Dunford, Jr., USMC, Publisher MajGen Frederick M. Padilla, USMC, President, NDU
Editor in Chief Col William T. Eliason, USAF (Ret.), Ph.D.
Executive Editor Jeffrey D. Smotherman, Ph.D.
Production Editor John J. Church, D.M.A.
Internet Publications Editor Joanna E. Seich
Book Review Editor Dr. Frank G. Hoffman
Art Director Marco Marchegiani, U.S. Government Printing Office
Advisory Committee COL Michael S. Bell, USA (Ret.), Ph.D./College of International Security Affairs; Brig Gen Christopher A. Coffelt, USAF/ Air War College; Col David J. Eskelund, USMC/Marine Corps War College; COL (P) Paul H. Fredenburgh III, USA/Dwight D. Eisenhower School for National Security and Resource Strategy; Brig Gen Darren E. Hartford, USAF/National War College; Brig Gen (Sel) Brian E. Hastings, USAF/Air Command and Staff College; RADM P. Gardner Howe III/U.S. Naval War College; LTG Michael D. Lundy, USA/U.S. Army Command and General Staff College; LTG William C. Mayville, Jr., USA/The Joint Staff; Col William McCollough, USMC/Marine Corps Command and Staff College; MG William E. Rapp, USA/U.S. Army War College; RDML Jeffrey Ruth/Joint Forces Staff College; VADM Kevin D. Scott/The Joint Staff
Editorial Board Richard K. Betts/Columbia University; Stephen D. Chiabotti/ School of Advanced Air and Space Studies; Eliot A. Cohen/The Johns Hopkins University; COL Joseph J. Collins, USA (Ret.)/ National War College; Mark J. Conversino/Air War College; Thomas P. Ehrhard/Office of the Secretary of Defense; Aaron L. Friedberg/Princeton University; Bryon Greenwald/Joint Forces Staff College; Col Thomas C. Greenwood, USMC (Ret.)/Office of the Secretary of Defense; Douglas N. Hime/Naval War College; Mark H. Jacobsen/Marine Corps Command and Staff College; Col Jerome M. Lynes, USMC (Ret.)/The Joint Staff; Kathleen Mahoney-Norris/Air Command and Staff College; Thomas L. McNaugher/Georgetown University; Col Mark Pizzo, USMC (Ret.)/ National War College; James A. Schear/Office of the Secretary of Defense; LtGen Bernard E. Trainor, USMC (Ret.)
Printed in St. Louis, Missouri, by
Cover 2 images (top to bottom): Captain Brittny Barney, 1st Helicopter Squadron, performs preflight checks of equipment inside UH-1N Huey at Joint Base Andrews, Maryland, August 3, 2016 (U.S. Air Force/Philip Bryant); Sailors secure waist catapults after launching aircraft on flight deck aboard USS Carl Vinson, under way in the Arabian Gulf, March 5, 2012 (U.S. Navy/George M. Bell); Marine with 11th Marine Expeditionary Unit surveys San Clemente Island in search of landing zone during Amphibious Squadron–Marine Expeditionary Unit Integration, prior to deployment to U.S. Pacific and U.S. Central Commands’ areas of operations, July 16, 2016 (U.S. Marine Corps/Robert B. Brown) About the Cover In this Issue U.S. Army 1st Lieutenant Kelly Elmlinger, Warrior Transition Battalion, Fort Sam Houston, Texas, Dialogue swims preliminary race during 2014 2 From the Chairman Warrior Games at U.S. Olympic Training Center in Colorado Springs, Colorado, September 30, 2014. More Forum than 200 wounded, ill, and injured 4 Executive Summary Servicemembers and veterans participated in the 2014 Warrior 6 Global Power Distribution and Games, an annual event featuring Warfighting in the 21st Century Paralympic-style competitions (U.S. By John R. Benedict, Jr. Army/Ronda Robb) Fast Followers, Learning Machines, and the Third Joint Force Quarterly is published by the National Offset Strategy Features Defense University Press for the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. JFQ is the Chairman’s flagship By Brent D. Sadler 66 An Interview with Cecil D. Haney joint military and security studies journal designed to 75 Global Mental Health: inform members of the U.S. Armed Forces, allies, and 19 Predicting the Proliferation other partners on joint and integrated operations; of Cyber Weapons Optimizing Uniformed national security policy and strategy; efforts to combat Services Roles terrorism; homeland security; and developments in into Small States training and joint professional military education to By Brian W. Flynn, Joshua C. transform America’s military and security apparatus By Daniel Hughes and Morganstein, Robert J. Ursano, to meet tomorrow’s challenges better while protecting Andrew M. Colarik Darrel A. Regier, James C. freedom today. All published articles have been vetted through a peer-review process and cleared by the 27 The Danger of False Peril: West, Gary H. Wynn, David M. Defense Office of Prepublication and Security Review. Benedek, and Carol S. Fullerton Avoiding Threat Inflation NDU Press is the National Defense University’s cross-component, professional military and academic By Andrew Stigler 83 Applying Smart Power via publishing house. Global Health Engagement The opinions, conclusions, and recommendations By Sebastian Kevany expressed or implied within are those of the JPME Today contributors and do not necessarily reflect the views and Michael Baker of the Department of Defense or any other agency of 34 Wargaming the Third the Federal Government. Offset Strategy 91 NATO Nouvelle: Everything Submissions and Communications By Paul Norwood and Old Is New Again JFQ welcomes submission of scholarly, independent research from members of the Armed Forces, Benjamin Jensen By G. Alexander Crowther security policymakers and shapers, defense analysts, academic specialists, and civilians from the United 40 I Liked Ike . . . Whence Comes States and abroad. Submit articles for consideration to ScholarOne, available at https://mc04. Another? Why PME Needs a Recall manuscriptcentral.com/ndupress. Or write to: Congressional Advocate 99 Fighting with Friends: Editor, Joint Force Quarterly By John T. Kuehn Coalition Warfare in Korean NDU Press 260 Fifth Avenue (Building 64, Room 2504) Waters, 1950–1953 Fort Lesley J. McNair By Corbin Williamson Washington, DC 20319 Commentary Telephone: (202) 685-4220/DSN 325 44 Is the Chinese Army the Real Email: [email protected] Winner in PLA Reforms? Book Reviews JFQ online: www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jfq/jfq.htm th By Phillip C. Saunders and John Chen 4 Quarter, October 2016 105 A Passion for Leadership ISSN 1070-0692 Reviewed by Christopher J. Lamb 49 China’s Military Reforms: An Optimistic Take 107 Carnage and Connectivity By Michael S. Chase and Reviewed by Jeffrey Meiser Jeffrey Engstrom 108 Assessing War 53 Chinese Military Reforms: Reviewed by Jonathan Schroden A Pessimistic Take By Roger Cliff Joint Doctrine 57 PLA Reforms and China’s 109 Let’s Fix or Kill the Nuclear Forces Center of Gravity By David C. Logan By Dale C. Eikmeier 63 What Do China’s Military 116 Joint Doctrine Update Reforms Mean for Taiwan? By Joel Wuthnow Basic Underwater Demolition/SEAL students participate in Surf Passage as part of first phase of SEAL training (U.S. Navy/Michael Russell)
From the Chairman Strategic Challenges and Implications
have previously written in this Joint Readiness responsiveness, flexibility, and resiliency column to share with you the areas One of my priorities is joint readi- is ensuring that our men and women I where I am devoting my time and ness, which, from my perspective, never enter a fair fight. focus: joint readiness, joint warfighting is an ongoing engagement with the capability, and the development of President and Secretary of Defense Strategic Challenges leaders for the future. I have also shared to provide timely and viable military Many of you have heard me talk about with you my thoughts regarding the options that, in the event of a crisis five strategic challenges: the four imperative for the Joint Force to remain or contingency, are responsive to the potential state competitors of Russia, focused on and responsive to the desired policy endstate objectives of the China, Iran, and North Korea, and the current National Command Authority. National Command Authority. I also nonstate challenge of violent extremist That responsiveness underpins healthy consider flexibility (transitioning from organizations. We colloquially refer to civil-military relations and is the hall- one crisis or contingency to another these five challenges as the 4+1. But mark of the Profession of Arms. I now across the range of military options) these challenges cannot be the only ones write to share with you how we are and resiliency (sustaining what the we plan against. I am humble about our channeling these priorities and profes- Joint Force is doing) as part of joint ability to predict the future, so I use the sional focus into execution. readiness. Underlining the principles of 4+1 as a planning construct. Bench-
2 Dialogue / From the Chairman JFQ 83, 4th Quarter 2016 marking the Joint Force against one of continue to advance their interests at the information on a routine basis so they these challenges or two of these state qualitative and quantitative expense of can have real-time ability to see the challenges simultaneously, along with our own. fight; to visualize in time and space the violent extremism, helps inform our The third implication, and to me one opportunities to seize the initiative; and assessment of the current inventory of of the most significant, is that we have a to better identify potential opportunity current joint capabilities and capacities. mandate to keep pace with the character costs. Over time, as we successfully help Looking at the trajectory of capability of war in the 21st century. While the the Secretary of Defense to see the Joint development in the context of the 4+1 nature of war—the violent clash of po- Force better, it will inform the assess- also informs priorities for joint capability litical will—has not changed, we should ment process to make recommendations development. I assume that if we build expect that any future conflict is going for the prioritization and allocation a force that can deal with the challenges to be transregional, rapidly crossing the of resources across all the combatant associated with the 4+1 today and in the boundaries of geographic combatant commands. In short, we are working future, we will have a Joint Force that commands; multidomain, simultaneously to develop the conditions to exercise can respond to the unexpected and that involving combinations of land, sea, mission command at the strategic level. has a competitive advantage against any air, space, and cyberspace operational What drives me, and what motivates potential adversary. domains; and multifunctional, including our Joint Staff team, is the changing conventional operations, special oper- character of war. How do we get more Implications ations, ballistic missiles, strike, cyber, agile? How do we frame decisions for The five strategic challenges have a and space capabilities. Not only will our senior leadership in a more effective number of implications for the Joint the pace and scope of future conflict be way? Just like every other endeavor in Force. The first one is foundational. accelerated, but we are also going to see our profession, it begins with a common We need a balanced inventory of joint these functional capabilities fielded by understanding of the threat, and a com- capabilities that allow us to deter and both state and nonstate actors who will mon appreciation for the capabilities and defeat potential adversaries across the continually look for ways to harness those limitations of the Joint Force, and then a full range of military operations. As a capabilities to exploit our vulnerabilities. framework within which we could make nation, we do not have the luxury of Therefore, the fourth implication is real-time decisions that will most effec- choosing between a force that can fight the need for greater strategic integra- tively employ that force. the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant tion in the future, both in our strategy It remains an honor to serve as your and one that can deter and defeat a development and in our decisionmaking Chairman, and I look forward to hearing peer competitor. Nor do we have the processes. The intent is to build a frame- from you. JFQ luxury of choosing between meeting work within which we can address these our current operational requirements 4+1 challenges across the five operational General Joseph F. Dunford, Jr. and developing the capabilities we need domains with which we are dealing Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to meet tomorrow’s requirements. and the many associated functions. By Getting that balance right—between expanding the way we develop our ap- current requirements and future proach to Russia, China, Iran, and North requirements—will probably be one of Korea, we are working to expand the the most important non-operational intellectual capital that we are expending challenges we have as a team over the on these challenge sets, with the intended next few years. result of opening the aperture of viable The second implication is the need for and timely options to our National us to more effectively employ the military Command Authority. The next version instrument of national power to address of the National Military Strategy is being the challenges Russia, China, Iran, and written to support this endstate. North Korea present. Each of these nations, in different ways, fully leverages Strategic Integration economic coercion, political influence, To increase strategic integration in our unconventional warfare, information decisionmaking process, the Joint Staff operations, cyber operations, and military and I are working on how to better posture to advance their interests. This organize ourselves and organize infor- is competition with a military dimension mation from across the Joint Force to that falls below the threshold that would better facilitate National Command trigger a traditional and decisive military Authority decisionmaking in a timely response. And since these countries com- manner. We need to give the President pete in ways that mute our response, they and Secretary of Defense the right
JFQ 83, 4th Quarter 2016 Dunford 3 Painted by Auguste Couder in 1836, Bataille de Yorktown shows Rochambeau and Washington giving final orders before battle (Palais de Versailles, France)
Executive Summary
iving near or visiting the Nation’s engagements with the British, is now our capital, where he met with capital, you cannot escape the Washington believed the way forward was his family briefly, before riding off south L weight of history that surrounds to attack the British stronghold in what to his fate on the York River. Indeed, you. From the monuments to the is now New York City. Washington’s General Washington was an exceptional historic buildings, the trails and battle- French allies, led by Jean-Baptiste individual, but he could not have known fields, the names on the roads—even the Donatien de Vimeur (better known as the what lay ahead any more than we do geography itself—force you to consider Count de Rochambeau), had different today. Yet he trusted his troops and his al- what happened in the past and what ideas and gave Washington’s forces, par- lies, who were key to his eventual victory. might happen in the future. Even with ticularly the French Fleet, orders that did Particularly crucial to the land battle’s a political process that at times seems to not support his plan. After a conference success was the lesser-known Battle of the be stagnant and combative, our nation in Connecticut, Washington reluctantly Virginia Capes, where an outnumbered, continues to do what must be done. accepted the French proposal and or- outgunned, and out-maneuvered British This is something George Washington dered the combined land force to march Fleet had left Charles Cornwallis to fend knew some 235 years ago when he to Yorktown. He really only had the for himself days before Washington ar- stopped by Mount Vernon, the home he counsel of his allies to guide him, which rived. The French and American armies had not visited for 6 long years of war, as he took primarily because his French (with the larger and more experienced he moved his headquarters toward what counterparts had more extensive military number being the former) would go on would be the most important battle of experience. He must have been quite to defeat the British in a town not far the Revolutionary War, Yorktown. worried about the likelihood of success as from our largest naval base at Norfolk By the spring of 1781, based on he passed his home on the banks of the and just a few hours’ drive from Mount a long series of less-than-successful Potomac some 20 miles south of what Vernon. From such a gamble, relying on
4 Forum / Executive Summary JFQ 83, 4th Quarter 2016 friends without any real confidence in the larger than anything we have seen before. destructive power in the world. His outcome, perhaps our greatest military Helping us to keep things in perspective, personal story is equally remarkable as few commander achieved victory. Andrew Stigler suggests we need to avoid would have thought it likely a young man Our history is full of similar examples “supersizing” these threats and offers a growing up in the 1960s in a Washington, where the time was not bright in terms simple threat assessment methodology DC, neighborhood such as his could of prospect, but we endured in part due that could help. have achieved such success or been given to the help of our friends such as the In JPME Today, we have two articles such awesome responsibilities. We then French. In more recent times this reliance that offer thought-provoking points of continue our discussion of global health on allies repeated itself as the North view. First, continuing the theme of how issues, and catch up on what NATO has Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to realize the Third Offset Strategy, Paul been doing in recent years. Spoiler alert— decided to support its most powerful Norwood and Benjamin Jensen describe more than you think. Brian Flynn and member in the moments after attacks how to wargame emerging concepts from his co-authors believe the U.S. military on New York City and the Pentagon this important evolving area of interest has a significant role to play in improving occurred 15 years ago last month. and how the war colleges might assist mental health around the world. Sebastian Moreover, NATO came to the aid of the Department of Defense in finding a Kevany and Michael Baker make a broader one of its members in an unprecedented way forward. Next, John Kuehn helps us case for global health through a strategy of out-of-area operation that probably few see a simple truth about the power of an engagement, which the United States can outside of the military probably know advocate for joint professional military do so well. NATO has come in for some about. NATO actually took the burden education on Capitol Hill. criticism for a number of perceived as well of shoring up U.S. domestic air defense in China continues to be a source of as actual faults, but G. Alex Crowther pro- the days and months after 9/11 with its fascination to scholars and pundits alike. vides the facts to show how engaged the NATO Airborne Early Warning aircraft In Commentary, experts from National Alliance is and why this is important. and crews of international airmen while Defense University (NDU) and beyond Often called the forgotten war, the our forces were engaged overseas. While help to update you on the People’s Korean War was more than just two op- we are the world’s most essential power, Liberation Army (PLA). For some time posing armies fighting up and down the we are never really alone or independent now, NDU’s Center for the Study of peninsula. In Recall, Corbin Williamson from the rest of the world. One of our Chinese Military Affairs, which is a part takes us to the decks of the fighting authors in this issue helps to reinforce of the Institute for National Strategic ships involved in joint operations around that point while others help us better Studies, has focused on the ongoing re- the peninsula. In Joint Doctrine, Dale understand the realities of this very differ- forms being made within the PLA. Phillip Eikmeier returns to JFQ with his views on ent world we inheritors of Washington’s Saunders, the center’s director, and John the center of gravity and gives us an ex- gamble must live in. We are up against Chen discuss these reforms and whether cellent commentary on a key element of many challenges, but we are not alone in they favor the Chinese ground forces over any military planner’s or strategist’s lex- how we might deal with them. other PLA capabilities. Michael Chase and icon. We also have three excellent book In Forum, John Benedict helps us Jeffrey Engstrom offer the view that these reviews and, as always, our Joint Doctrine work out what the future of national and reforms are aimed at curbing corruption Update for your consideration. international security will bring, and dis- and making the PLA a more joint and Whether we will find ourselves deal- cusses the trends that will impact where integrated force. Roger Cliff sees these ing with budget reductions, confronting power will be found in the international reforms as insufficiently dealing with epidemics, sweeping up the 1s and 0s system of states, what threats will arise, an organizational culture that inhibits after a “cyber Pearl Harbor,” challenging and how military operations could be PLA effectiveness. One of the opaque nuclear threats, space attacks, or invasions applied to deal with them. As we look to parts of China’s military strength is its by little “green men,” or just dealing with the future and build on the Third Offset nuclear force, which David Logan dis- our own fears of what the future holds, Strategy–related articles in the last issue cusses through the lens of these ongoing sometimes taking a look back helps give of JFQ, Brent Sadler offers an interesting reforms. And what about Taiwan? Joel perspective that our nation still stands and compact look at how humans and Wuthnow offers some valuable insights on because when times are tough, we rely machines will interact in the battlespace how long the PLA might take to become on ourselves, our leaders, and our friends ahead. Daniel Hughes and Andrew joint and what that means for those who to help us make it through. This is the Colarik explore the nature of cyber capa- are concerned about Taiwan’s defenses. fundamental insight of Washington as he bilities, their impact on warfare, and the Features leads off with my interview rode south. We hope these pages provide utility of cyber weapons for a growing of Admiral Cecil B. Haney, USN, com- you with similar insights about how to number of players internationally. Given mander of U.S. Strategic Command. He deal with our world. JFQ the growing number and diversity of the provides his perspective from a position threats to global security, it would be easy with responsibilities that include lead- William T. Eliason to see these weapons in the aggregate as ing the forces with arguably the most Editor in Chief
JFQ 83, 4th Quarter 2016 Eliason 5 Space and Naval Warfare Systems Center Pacific diver assists University of Florida team member with in-water checks to university’s “Subjugator” Autonomous Underwater Vehicle during 14th Annual International RoboSub Competition, July 13, 2011 (U.S. Navy/Rick Naystatt)
Global Power Distribution and Warfighting in the 21st Century
By John R. Benedict, Jr.
he U.S. national security commu- and potential shocks that could dra- Department of Defense (DOD) in the nity needs to focus more on the matically change U.S. national security decades to come, it is crucial that U.S. T driving forces and likely associ- perspectives. By largely ignoring these military forces and their capabilities ated consequences that will influence longer term factors, the U.S. military is be properly aligned to counter a wide warfighting in the 21st century. A dis- unlikely to develop the needed national spectrum of threats and challenges that proportionate amount of effort is spent defense capabilities to deal effectively could undermine U.S. national security by national security experts on narrow with critical threats in this emerging interests in the first half of this century problem and solution spaces without an environment. With even greater fiscal and beyond. adequate appreciation of broader trends constraints predicted for the U.S. Drivers and Trends for U.S. Security The first driving force that deserves John R. Benedict, Jr., is a Fellow in the National Security Studies Office and former Head of the Joint Warfare Analysis Branch within the National Security Analysis Department at The Johns Hopkins more recognition is the nature and University Applied Physics Laboratory. diffusion of power globally. U.S.
6 Forum / Global Power Distribution and Warfighting JFQ 83, 4th Quarter 2016 power is less influential and dominant highly disruptive to the absolutely cata- These four overarching drivers and than it was from World War II to the strophic—in the hands of individuals or other factors will contribute significantly immediate post–Cold War era. In many groups with few of the same policy, legal, toward diminished global governance instances “coalitions of the willing” are or ethical impediments for employing trends that could alter U.S. national secu- now much harder to form and sustain. them that the U.S. military would have.3 rity perspectives and the future use of the Consensus-building in international The first and second aforementioned U.S. military in essential ways. First, U.S. forums is difficult to achieve. It is drivers are largely empowered by a third influence is being gradually reduced due much easier for opposing actors to be one: global communications, such as to its tarnished “brand” from various fac- disruptive and to stop initiatives than the Internet and social media, which can tors or events including the 2008 global it is to move these initiatives forward. have both positive and negative effects. financial crisis, the less than conclusive Disruptions that impede progress at The global communications network outcomes in Afghanistan and Iraq, and dealing with international issues can accelerates and amplifies ideas and events the perceived U.S. domestic political occur from nonstate entities as easily as in unprecedented ways compared to dysfunction. Many U.S. alliances have from nation-states. Nation-state legiti- the recent past. This trend is unlikely to weakened without a common threat, macy and authority continue to erode in subside, and it will continue to slowly causing respective priorities and interests many regions with the populace identi- undermine state authority, have dispro- to diverge.6 fying more with their religion, ethnicity, portionate influence on state actions and Second, the potential for U.S. re- race, tribe, class, or other affiliations. policies, empower and facilitate groups trenchment and disengagement from These nonstate entities and their impact and movements, and allow technolo- many of its traditional roles in world af- on national security problems are gies and associated design concepts to fairs is increasing. Much of the American more evident in the morning headlines proliferate worldwide. More individuals public is frustrated by U.S. global obli- every day. As Moisés Naím has argued, and groups will be able to perceive their gations and foreign entanglements that obsessing primarily or exclusively about disadvantaged positions compared to have had questionable effects and return great power rivalries is a red herring others in the world. Access to other par- on investment. They see the “American that prevents a realistic view of nonstate ties with similar grievances will facilitate Dream” eroding and want their govern- entities that are dramatically reshaping movements, enable recruiting and radi- ment to focus more on improving their U.S. national as well as international calization, and support the coordination standards of living rather than engaging security interests.1 and execution of terrorist, insurgent, in dubious international endeavors.7 The second driving force is the ac- criminal, and other disruptive activities Third, various global institutions are celerating pace of, and easier access to, domestically and abroad.4 gradually eroding in influence.8 These in- technology mostly being driven by the One additional driver that will con- clude, but are not limited to, the United commercial sector. Fewer technology tinue to have a large impact on U.S. Nations, International Monetary Fund, developments are the exclusive domain national security and global security ob- World Trade Organization, and World of powerful nations and their militaries as jectives is the economic power shift from Bank. A more fragmented or regional occurred during the Cold War.2 Some of West to East. This “rise of the rest” has di- world order with reduced U.S. leadership the scientific areas being dominated by minished the previous dominance of both will make it particularly difficult to ade- nonmilitary research and development the United States and the West in terms of quately address critical global challenges. are additive manufacturing, including: economic, political, and security matters. Examples of these possible challenges Leading this economic shift from West to are nuclear proliferation, international 3D printing •• East is China, whose emboldened leaders terrorism, large-scale issues related to robotics, autonomy, and artificial •• are seeking what they believe to be their climate and environmental effects, global intelligence rightful place in the world order. No one financial instability, global economic stag- energy generation and storage •• can be certain if Chinese aspirations to be- nation, potential worldwide pandemics, synthetic biology •• come the new hegemon in East Asia, with global energy availability and associated biotechnology •• a resulting power structure unfavorable price volatility, emerging problems in the nanotechnology •• to the United States, will actually occur. global commons such as within each of information technology. •• But few can argue that the relationship the cyber and space domains, and large- It is not farfetched to imagine open- between China and the United States is scale regional instabilities or conflicts. source design developments and adaptive fundamentally important to the inter- crowdsourcing by individuals and groups ests of both countries and could largely Four Crucial Threat Concerns that could allow nonstate entities to determine future security and stability The driving forces and trends delineated “out-innovate” states encumbered by in the Asia-Pacific region, the vitality of in the previous section could have sig- large bureaucracies. It does not take the economies for both nations, and the nificant impact on four crucial threat much imagination to conceive of cheap, credibility and influence of American and concerns for the U.S. military in the effective weapons—ranging from the Chinese power around the world.5 21st century. First, increasing global
JFQ 83, 4th Quarter 2016 Benedict 7 Airman loads AGM-86B air-cruise launch trainer missile onto B-52H Stratofortress, February 26, 2014, at Minot Air Force Base, North Dakota (U.S. Air Force/Aaron D. Allmon II) disorder, instabilities, and insecurities by nonstate actors. It represents the dark was no longer viewed as credible, for could occur with much of the world side of globalization and can take many example, by perceived U.S. disengage- becoming more dangerous and chaotic.9 forms. Imagine individuals or groups ment from their regions. Increasing the This trend toward a more disorderly operating in garages or small shops number of nuclear nations in East Asia, world, should it happen, would be employing readily available gene-splicing the Middle East, or elsewhere would largely driven by the rise of malevolent equipment and genome sequences to correspondingly increase the potential nonstate actors, reduced authority and synthesize lethal biological agents based for nuclear accidents, crises, and conflicts legitimacy of nation-states in many on information found in the public in these areas. In addition, proliferation regions, and decreased ability to provide domain.12 Also, consider the possibility to nonstate actors could be caused by effective global governance. of nonstate actors relying on open- the nexus of nuclear proliferation among A second threat concern would be source designs and 3D printing to build nations and the increased access to the further rise of regional hegemons of insect-size drones capable of delivering advanced technology including nuclear revisionist powers such as China, Russia, deadly poisons to assassinate world weapon designs, nuclear or radiological and Iran, whose objectives often clash leaders.13 Finding these individuals or materials, and related expertise. with U.S. national interests. Should these groups around the globe easily exceeds regional developments occur, particularly the law enforcement capabilities in most Need for a Bifurcated as a result of reduced U.S. influence and locales. Thus there is a significant role Military Approach engagement in those same regions, then to be played by multinational intelli- Given these four threat concerns, the likelihood of adverse regional compe- gence assets, military forces, and other each of them serious in its own right, tition, arms races, and state conflict could organizations. how does the U.S. military need to be be increased.10 The final threat concern would largely aligned in order to protect or further A third threat concern involves the complicate the other three. It is a greatly U.S. interests in this dangerous future? rise of “super-empowered” individuals increased level of nuclear proliferation It needs to adopt a bifurcated approach and groups capable of levels of violence beyond the gradual erosion of the to deal with both nation-state and non- formerly only within the purview of Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear state threats. Neither type of threat can nations.11 This ominous threat devel- Weapons that we see today.14 This prolif- be considered a “lesser included case” opment is primarily enabled by the eration among nations could be enabled of the other. They demand significantly increased access to advanced technology if the U.S. nuclear umbrella for key allies different approaches.
8 Forum / Global Power Distribution and Warfighting JFQ 83, 4th Quarter 2016 To counter nation-state threats posed weaponry, or ready access to SATCOM •• manned “tourist submarines” or by countries ranging from near-peer rivals and GPS. As a result, defense of maritime mini-submarines entering a major to rogue states, the U.S. military must be forces and power projection by those U.S. harbor and detonating 5 to prepared to conduct high-tech warfare same forces could be much more difficult 10 tons of high explosives under an in harsh antiaccess/area-denial (A2/ than in the recent past. In future conflicts oil tanker or liquefied natural gas AD) environments.15 This would require U.S. air and space forces cannot count on carrier19 U.S. forces to have advanced air-missile air and space superiority due to advanced •• a ship-launched torpedo detonating defenses capable of handling large-capac- integrated air defenses and effective a radiological dispersal device and ity adversary attacks to leverage certain kinetic and nonkinetic antisatellite tech- wreaking havoc on a major port or U.S. undersea capabilities for asymmetric niques of their opponents. This means base20 advantage and to project advanced strike that conducting strikes, close air support, •• mobile mines or improvised under- capabilities effectively against a variety and other missions could be much water explosive devices deployed of adversary targets. To prevail in high- more challenging than in recent history. from surface vessels and detonating tech warfare, the military must be able Despite these challenges, the United against various targets transiting to to achieve information dominance by States should not overprepare and overin- and from U.S. ports21 protecting its own assets and by coun- vest against nation-state opponents at the •• heavyweight torpedoes deployed tering those of the adversary including cost of being ill-prepared for conflicts or from a camouflaged gravity launcher in the crucial space domain. Advanced contingencies involving nonstate actors. on a merchant ship, homing on the information operations such as electronic To counter nonstate threats, in- wake signature of a nearby transiting warfare, military deception, cyber attacks, cluding potential super-empowered cruise ship, and detonating lethally and psychological warfare will need to be individuals and groups of terrorists, in- under thousands of passengers22 integrated with kinetic attacks to achieve surgents, criminals, and other bad actors, •• a nuclear-tipped cruise missile fired maximum effects. The military will need significant U.S. military resources and from a merchant ship or from across to maintain an adequate and coherent capabilities will need to be developed. the U.S. border and targeting a nuclear deterrence posture, a topic that This means continuing counterterrorism, major urban area23 has been largely neglected by portions of including efforts to penetrate adversary •• a ballistic missile with an electro- the national security community since the information and other networks. It could magnetic pulse (EMP) warhead fired end of the Cold War.16 It will also need to evolve to increased homeland defense from a merchant ship off the conti- be capable of countering ballistic missile roles and capabilities plus key support to nental United States and disabling a nuclear threats from rogue nations such various homeland security endeavors such major portion of the electric grid for as North Korea, and be prepared to fight as combating WMD. Furthermore, U.S. weeks to months24 in limited nuclear wars if an adversary forces will have to improve their ability to •• an unmanned aerial system dispens- should make a potentially ill-advised deci- operate and fight in urban, mountainous, ing deadly biological agents over a sion to initiate such a conflict. or other demanding environments. The dense U.S. city.25 Increasing access by nations to com- U.S. military must also increase its ability If these types of threats develop, mercial technologies will likely translate to deal with so-called hybrid warfare it may become necessary to divert key to effective military applications that will situations (for example, those involving DOD assets to provide the needed home- significantly close the gap with the U.S. surrogate or proxy forces operating land protection. military.17 In the future, U.S. ground below the threshold of war or adversaries forces cannot count on air superiority employing an innovative mix of low-tech Additional Perspectives due to advanced missiles and other air- and high-tech weaponry). Finally, the In recent history there has been a dimin- borne threats, or the ready availability U.S. military needs to upgrade its mes- ished willingness of states with tradi- of satellite communications (SATCOM) saging capabilities to gain crucial support tional militaries to make full use of their and GPS, or being able to conduct for its irregular operations. destructive power due to policy, legal, operations in strictly non–weapons of As indicated earlier, the role of the regulatory, ethical, moral, and other mass destruction (WMD) environments. U.S. military in homeland defense is reasons. These constraints will only be This means that gaining access to areas likely to be elevated in the future due compounded in the future for the U.S. of operation, conducting expeditionary to the increased threat from advanced military, particularly when dealing with maneuvers, and defending ground units technologies and systems falling into the less discriminating nonstate actors and could prove much more challenging hands of nonstate adversaries. Examples rogue or desperate nations who have than it has been in recent conflicts. of these emerging threats include: access to advanced technologies. For Similarly, U.S. maritime forces cannot autonomous undersea vehicles or example, certain transnational terrorists count on air superiority, control of the •• deep submersible vehicles cutting would attempt to employ nuclear or undersea environment due to advanced undersea cables18 radiological weapons against U.S. or adversary submarines and other undersea
JFQ 83, 4th Quarter 2016 Benedict 9 Although military power is unlikely to prove decisive by itself, it could provide a crucial underpinning for nonmilitary components of power such as diplomatic, intelligence, economic, financial, infor- mational, and legal measures.
Guiding Principles So what are some of the guiding prin- ciples for DOD that are consistent with achieving a more cohesive and balanced military approach? The first principle is to emphasize fundamentals. An example would be for DOD and other elements of the national security community to place as much focus on the information and cyberspace domain as they have traditionally done for the ground, maritime, air, and space domains. Infor- mation operations have always been important in warfare.28 But dominating Sailor assigned to USS Mustin stands watch in ship’s combat information center during Exercise the information domain could prove to st Valiant Shield 2014, which integrates about 18,000 U.S. Navy, Air Force, Army, and Marine Corps be the coin of the realm in 21 -century personnel, more than 200 aircraft, and 19 surface ships for real-world joint operational experience, warfare. Another example is for DOD September 16, 2014 (U.S. Navy/Declan Barnes) to maintain its technological edge by greater leveraging of commercial devel- other civilian populations if they had an electronic warfare jamming against •• opments in many fields,29 thus avoiding opportunity. Some adversary nation- civilian assets such as GPS an overreliance on technology develop- state militaries, if losing to the United fully autonomous armed robots •• ments within the Defense Department States in a conventional conflict and nanotechnology weapons •• unless absolutely necessary. their leadership feared regime change biotechnology-enhanced •• The second principle is to emphasize and its very survival, could choose to “super-soldiers” prevention. An illustration would be for employ tactical nuclear weapons against kinetic weapons in space with the •• DOD to give comparable emphasis to U.S. forces. Conversely, current U.S. potential to create debris fields that peacetime activities designed to deter policy deemphasizes employment of render portions of that domain and prevent conflicts as it has historically tactical nuclear weapons on the battle- unusable. given to planning for war if deterrence field.26 Thus the U.S. military could be As a possible disadvantaged user in and prevention measures fail. This viewed as a “disadvantaged user” when these and other areas, the U.S. military would include a revitalization of nuclear it comes to tactical nuclear weapons. will need to adapt and compensate for deterrence, not so much by increasing Similar examples could be provided for utterly ruthless opponents who are capability or capacity, but by clearly chemical and biological weapons. relatively unconstrained by rules of articulating its purpose and continued Another related illustration is in the engagement, disproportionate effects, importance.30 Revitalization would have realm of EMP weapons. Future adver- and the need to minimize destruction of a three-fold effect: It would boost morale saries may not hesitate to employ EMP infrastructure and civilian populations. for those in the military assigned to this against space and terrestrial targets. U.S. As a final note, many national secu- mission; it would clarify to U.S. allies and policy is to avoid use of these weapons if rity problems are such that “war is not partners any limitations on the nuclear they would heavily damage civilian infra- the ultimate arbiter,” as Joseph Nye has umbrella that is being provided to them; structure. Some U.S. adversaries in the so aptly stated.27 This would include and it would also increase the credibility future would be equally indiscriminate in challenges such as those posed by inter- of the U.S. nuclear deterrent to any po- employing the following capabilities: national terrorism, insurgents, organized tential adversaries. •• offensive cyber weapons or physical crime, maritime piracy, natural disasters, The third principle is to reduce attacks against critical civilian infra- large-scale poverty, mass migration, money pits. An example would be for structure, such as power grids, finan- genocide and other widespread human DOD to seriously address its increasing cial networks, communication net- rights abuses, cyber threats, infrastruc- human capital expenditures, which works, and water and food supplies ture attacks, and nuclear proliferation. are unsustainable on their current
10 Forum / Global Power Distribution and Warfighting JFQ 83, 4th Quarter 2016 trajectory.31 This adverse trend needs expect to encounter guerrilla forces, Conclusion to be reversed in a manner that is not including in challenging urban environ- The primary objective for the U.S. detrimental to the viability of the all-vol- ments. This could occur while either military in a highly constrained budget unteer force. On the material side, DOD coming to the aid of an ally or partner environment should not be to achieve needs to reduce its focus on maintaining nation or while attempting to maintain at all costs a decisive win in a major force structures for large, expensive adequate security and order in the after- war against a near-peer rival by domi- traditional platforms or systems if they math of a conflict that the U.S. military nating that adversary in all warfighting require significantly increased levels of and its allies have just won. domains. That objective would be protection or have decreased overall util- The final principle is to be prepared extremely resource intensive and techni- ity against key portions of the emerging for out-of-the-box situations. As an cally challenging; it would also consume threat spectrum.32 illustration, the U.S. Government, with large portions of future military budgets The fourth principle is to be selective key contributions from DOD, will need at the expense of countering other and prioritize. An illustration would to counter challenging asymmetric threats that also deserve significant be to make only large military resource approaches by potential nation-state ad- resources and attention.40 Additionally, commitments and expenditures (people, versaries. These include: a truly decisive win against the conven- equipment, funding) in areas that clearly tional forces of a major power could financial attacks involve either vital or very important U.S. •• inadvertently escalate that conflict to a economic and trade destabilization national interests.33 A corollary for the •• nuclear war.41 measures U.S. Government and DOD is to stop On the contrary, the primary objec- sabotage or bombings attempting to do more with less. This •• tives for the U.S. military should be to assassinations does not work. It is necessary, in fact, •• support efforts to deter adversaries and extortion, intimidation, or political to make hard choices by setting priori- •• prevent a major power war as well as other coercion ties that ultimately will help to prevent types of conflicts from occurring; if a cyber warfare stretching U.S. military forces too thin. •• conflict does occur and is in U.S. national psychological warfare and Finally, the U.S. Government and its mil- •• interests, then to help win it in terms propaganda itary must develop effective strategies for of reaching a successful and sustainable various gray zone or hybrid warfare each of the long-term national security •• political outcome, which may or may not approaches conducted through sur- challenges to which they are committed. involve a decisive win by the military; and rogates or other means.37 Correspondingly, as Mike Vickers stated to effectively contribute to mitigating a in recent Senate testimony, the military A second illustration is the need for variety of global security challenges, in- needs “to identify a decisive element that the U.S. military to develop adequate cluding those posed by nefarious nonstate confers enduring advantage, and then to mitigation measures against adversaries actors, by achieving successful outcomes focus actions and resources on it.”34 employing advanced technologies in as part of an overall team composed of The fifth principle is to avoid tunnel which the United States could find itself other U.S. agencies, partner nations, and vision. DOD is focusing strongly on as a disadvantaged user. This includes re- organizations. Hopefully this set of objec- countering A2/AD threats posed by solving policy issues regarding the U.S. tives for the U.S. military would be more certain militaries in key regions such military employing systems or weaponry affordable, more technically achievable, as Europe, the Middle East, and the that rely on advances in robotics and less likely to result in nuclear escalation, Western Pacific. As important as this is, it artificial intelligence, cyber warfare, and better able to address a broad set of should not be done to such a degree that directed energy, nanotechnology, syn- security challenges. it is at the expense of dealing with other thetic biology, genetic engineering, A properly designed, bifurcated more likely threats and challenges.35 For biotechnology, and other potentially military approach that is employed example, irregular warfare and counter- controversial areas.38 Finally, the U.S. effectively in coordination with other terrorism efforts by the military Services Government, including DOD, will need components of national and inter- against nonstate actors will need to to dramatically increase its participation national power would support these increase to ensure sufficient preparedness in public-private partnerships in order objectives. Focusing on major power against the proliferation of super-em- to provide protection against out-of- wars and treating other national security powered individuals and groups, which the-box threats to the homeland.39 challenges as lesser included cases, how- some believe are just over the horizon. Without these partnerships it is difficult ever, would not. U.S. decisionmakers in Also, despite contrary strategic guidance to imagine how sufficient levels of cyber charge of developing an effective mili- released by DOD in January 2012, it is security, bio security, nuclear or radio- tary approach to counter the emergent imperative that the U.S. military maintain logical security, EMP security, financial threats outlined herein need to choose the capability to conduct counterinsur- security, and energy and power grid wisely—U.S. national security and global gency and stability operations of various security would be achievable. international security in the 21st century scales.36 In the future the joint force can could depend on it. JFQ
JFQ 83, 4th Quarter 2016 Benedict 11 November 2015), 52–56, 78–88, 93–96, erations: Warfare and the Hard Reality of Soft Notes 120–121. Power (Washington, DC: Brassey’s, Inc., 2004), 15 Joint Operational Access Concept (JOAC), 9, 13–14, 231–233. 1 Moisés Naím, The End of Power: From Version 1.0 (Washington, DC: Department of 29 FitzGerald and Sayler, 6, 9–10, 16–17, Boardrooms to Battlefields and Churches to Defense, January 17, 2012), 9–16, available at 19, 34–35. States, Why Being in Charge Isn’t What It Used
12 Forum / Global Power Distribution and Warfighting JFQ 83, 4th Quarter 2016 Unmanned Combat Air System X-47B demonstrator flies near USS George H.W. Bush, first aircraft carrier to successfully catapult launch unmanned aircraft from its flight deck, May 14, 2013 (U.S. Navy/ Erik Hildebrandt)
oday, the Department of Defense (DOD) is coming to terms with Fast Followers, T trends forcing a rethinking of how it fights wars. One trend is pro- liferation of and parity by competitors Learning Machines, in precision munitions. Most notable are China’s antiship ballistic missiles and the proliferation of cruise missiles, and the Third Offset such as those the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant claimed to use to attack an Egyptian ship off the Sinai in 2014. Strategy Another trend is the rapid technolog- ical advances in artificial intelligence (AI) and robotics that are enabling the By Brent D. Sadler creation of learning machines. Failure to adapt and lead in this new reality risks U.S. ability to effectively respond and control the future battle- It is change, continuing change, inevitable change, that is the dominant field. However, budget realities make it factor in society today. No sensible decision can be made any longer unlikely that today’s DOD could spend its way ahead of these challenges or field without taking into account not only the world as it is, but the world as new systems fast enough. Consider that it will be. . . . This, in turn, means that our statesmen, our businessmen, F-35 fighter development is 7 years behind schedule and, at $1.3 trillion, is our everyman must take on a science fictional way of thinking. $163 billion over budget.1 On the other —Isaac Asimov hand, China produced and test-flew its first fifth-generation fighter (J-20) within 2 years. These pressures create urgency to find a cost-effective response through emergent and disruptive technologies that could ensure U.S. conventional Captain Brent D. Sadler, USN, is a Special deterrent advantage—in other words, the Assistant to the Navy Asia-Pacific Advisory Group. so-called Third Offset Strategy.
JFQ 83, 4th Quarter 2016 Sadler 13 Narrowing Conventional examples include Russian interventions and combat effectiveness of each manned Deterrence (Georgia, Ukraine, Syria) and increasingly platform. Four, such a strategy could nul- In 1993, Andrew Marshall, Director coercive Chinese activities in the East lify the advantages afforded by geographic of Net Assessment, stated, “I project and South China seas, especially massive proximity and being the first to attack. a day when our adversaries will have island-building in the South China Sea guided munitions parity with us and it since 2014. Robot Renaissance will change the game.”2 On December Persistent Global Risks from Violent In 1997, IBM’s Deep Blue beat chess 14, 2015, Deputy Secretary of Defense Extremists. While not an existential champion Garry Kasparov, marking Robert Work announced that day’s threat, left unchecked, violent extremism an inflection point in the development arrival when arguing for a Third Offset is inimical to U.S. interests as it corrodes of learning machines. Since then, during comments at the Center for a inclusive, open economies and societies. development of learning machines has New American Security.3 As a long-term ideological competition, accelerated, as illustrated by Giraffe, An offset seeks to leverage emerging a global presence able to monitor, attack, which taught itself how to play chess at and disruptive technologies in innova- and attrite violent extremist networks is a master’s level in 72 hours.8 Driving tive ways in order to prevail in Great required. this rapid development have been accel- Power competition. A Great Power is In response to these challenges, two erating computer-processing speeds and understood to be a rational state seeking 2015 studies are informing DOD lead- miniaturization. In 2011, at the size of survival through regional hegemony ership on the need for a new offset: the 10 refrigerators, the super-computer with global offensive capabilities.4 The Defense Science Board summer study on Watson beat two champions of the game First Offset Strategy in the 1950s relied autonomy and the Long-Range Research show Jeopardy. Within 3 years, Watson on tactical nuclear superiority to counter and Development Planning Program. was shrunk to the size of three stacked Soviet numerical conventional superiority. From these studies, Deputy Secretary pizza boxes—a 90-percent reduction in As the Soviets gained nuclear parity in Work has articulated five building blocks size along with a 2,700-percent improve- the 1960s, a Second Offset in the 1970s of a new offset: ment in processing speed.9 Within a centered on precision-guided munitions decade, computers likely will match the autonomous deep-learning systems and stealth technologies to sustain tech- •• massive parallel processing capacity of the human-machine collaboration nical overmatch, conventional deterrence, •• human brain, and these machines will assisted human operations and containment for another quarter •• increasingly augment and expand human advanced human-machine combat century. The Third Offset, like previous •• memory and thinking much like cloud teaming ones, seeks to deliberately change an un- computing for computers today, leading network-enabled semi-autonomous attractive Great Power competition, this •• to accelerating returns in anything that weapons. time with China and Russia, to one more can be digitized.10 This teaming of man advantageous. This requires addressing Central to all are learning machines and machine will set the stage for a new the following challenges. that, when teamed with a person, provide renaissance of human consciousness as Fast Followers. Russia and China a potential prompt jump in capability. augmented by learning machines—a have been able to rapidly gain and sus- Technological advantages alone, however, Robot Renaissance.11 But man is not tain near-parity by stealing and copying could prove chimerical as Russia and destined for extinction and will remain others’ technologies for their own China are also investing in autonomous part of the equation; as “freestyle chess” long-range precision capabilities, while weapons, making any U.S. advantage demonstrates, man paired with com- largely pocketing developmental costs. gained a temporary one. In fact, Russia’s puters utilizing superior processes can Lateral thinking5 is required to confound Chief of the General Staff, General Valery prevail over any competitor.12 these Fast Followers, as Apple used with Gerasimov, predicts a future battlefield Augmenting human consciousness Microsoft when it regained tech-sector populated with learning machines.7 with learning machines will usher in an leadership in the early 2000s.6 A Third Offset Strategy could achieve explosion in creativity, engineering inno- Hybrid Warfare. Russia’s actions in a qualitative edge and ensure conventional vation, and societal change. This will in Crimea and ongoing activities in Eastern deterrence relative to Fast Followers in turn greatly impact the way we concep- Ukraine indicate both that Russia is four ways: One, it could provide U.S. tualize and conduct warfare, just as the undeterred and that it was successful in leaders more options along the escalation Renaissance spurred mathematical solu- coordinating asymmetric and unconven- ladder. Two, a Third Offset could flip the tions to ballistic trajectories, metallurgy, tional tactics across multiple domains. cost advantage to defenders in a ballistic and engineering for mobile cannons. Such Narrowing Conventional and cruise missile exchange; in East Asia a future is already being embraced. For Advantage. The loss of the preci- this would make continuation of China’s example, Bank of America and Merrill sion-munitions advantage increases cost decades-long investment in these weapons Lynch recently concluded that robotics for U.S. intervention, thus reducing de- cost prohibitive. Three, it could have a and AI—learning machines—will define terrence and inviting adventurism. Recent multiplicative effect on presence, sensing, the next industrial revolution and that the
14 Forum / Fast Followers and Learning Machines JFQ 83, 4th Quarter 2016 Garry Kasparov, chess grandmaster and former world champion, speaking at Turing centennial conference at Manchester, June 25, 2012 (Courtesy David Monniaux) adoption of this technology is a foregone (observe, orient, decide, act) loop •• High-Precision, Emotionless Warfare. conclusion. Their report concludes that by necessitates learning machines that Learning machines provide an 2025 learning machines will be perform- are able to engage targets at increas- opportunity for battlefield civility by ing 45 percent of all manufacturing versus ing speed, which diminishes direct lessening death and destruction with 10 percent today.13 It would be a future human control.15 improved precision and accuracy. of profound change and peril and was the •• Greater Combat Effect per Person. Moreover, being non-ethical and focus of the 2016 Davos Summit whose As extensions of manned platforms, unemotional, they are not susceptible founder, Klaus Schwab, calls the period teaming increases the combat effect to revenge killings and atrocities. the Fourth Industrial Revolution.14 As per person through swarm tactics as •• Hard to Target. Learning machines the Industrial Revolution demonstrated, well as big data management. More- enable disaggregated combat net- the advantage will be to the early adopter, over, augmenting the manned force works to be both more difficult to leaving the United States little choice but with autonomous systems could mit- target and more fluid in attack. Some to pursue an offset strategy that leverages igate deployment costs, which have capabilities (for example, cyber) learning machines. increased 31 percent since 2000 and could reside during all phases of a are likely unsustainable under current conflict well within a competitor’s Advantages of Man- constructs.16 physical borders, collecting intelli- Machine Teaming •• Less Human Risk. Reduced risk to gence while also ready to act like a Learning machines teamed with manned platforms provides more “zero-day bomb.”17 manned platforms enabled by concepts options along the escalation ladder •• Faster Acquisition and Improvement. of operations will be a key element of to commanders and allows a more Incorporation of learning machines the Third Offset Strategy. Advantages of forward and pervasive presence. in design, production, and instan- this approach include: Moreover, autonomous systems taneous sharing of learning across deployed in large numbers will have machines would have a multiplicative Speed Faster than Adversaries. •• the long-term effect of mitigating effect. However, achieving such ben- Staying inside an adversary’s OODA relative troop strengths. efits requires overcoming proprietary
JFQ 83, 4th Quarter 2016 Sadler 15 Mitigating such threats and staying inside an adversary’s accelerating OODA loop would drive increasing autonomy and de- creasing reliance on communications.20 Proliferation and Intellectual Insecurity. The risk of proliferation and Fast Followers to close technological advantage makes protecting the most sensitive elements of learning machines an imperative. Doing so requires ad- dressing industrial espionage and cyber vulnerabilities in the commercial defense industry, which will require concerted congressional and DOD action. Unlawful Use. As competitors de- velop learning machines, they may be less constrained and ethical in their employ- ment. Nonetheless, the international Law of Armed Conflict applies, and does not preclude employing learning machines on the battlefield in accordance with jus in bello—the legal conduct of war. Legally, learning machines would have to pass the same tests as any other weapons; their use must be necessary, discriminate, and pro- portional against a military objective.21 A key test for learning machines is dis- crimination; that is, the ability to discern noncombatants from targeted combat- ants while limiting collateral damage.22 Unethical War. When fielded in significant numbers, learning machines could challenge traditions of jus ad bellum—criteria regarding decisions to engage in war. That is, by significantly Seven teams from DARPA’s Virtual Robotics Challenge continue to develop and refine ATLAS robot, reducing the cost in human life to wage developed by Boston Dynamics (DARPA) war, the decision to wage it becomes less restrictive. Such a future is debatable, but constraints such as those encoun- Cyber Intrusion and Programming as General Paul J. Selva (Vice Chairman tered with the Scan Eagle unmanned Brittleness. DOD relies on commercial of the Joint Chiefs of Staff) suggested vehicle if better intra-DOD innova- industry to develop and provide it with at the Brookings Institution on January tion and interoperability are to be critical capabilities. This situation provides 21, 2016, there should be an interna- achieved. some cost savings, while presenting an tional debate on the role of autonomous Achilles’ heel for cyber exploitation during weapons systems and jus ad bellum Realizing these potential benefits fabrication and in the field. One avenue implications. requires institutional change in acqui- for attack is through the complexity of A New Fog of War. Lastly, the sition and a dedicated cadre of roboti- programming, which leads to program- advent of learning machines will give cists. However, pursuing a Third Offset ming brittleness, or seams and back rooms rise to a new fog of war emerging from Strategy is not without risks. causing system vulnerabilities.18 Another is uncertainty in a learning machine’s AI Third Offset Risks through communications vital to proper programming. It is a little unsettling that human control. Additionally, swarm tactics a branch of AI popular in the late 1980s Fielding learning machines presents involving teams of machines networking and early 1990s was called “fuzzy logic,” several risks, and several technical and independently of human control on a due to an ability to alter its programming institutional barriers. The risks include near-continuous basis could further ex- that represents a potential loss of control the following challenges. pose them to attack and manipulation.19 and weakening of liability.
16 Forum / Fast Followers and Learning Machines JFQ 83, 4th Quarter 2016 Third Offset Barriers way is to more rapidly move prototypes expanding collaboration with SCO. Overcoming the barriers to a Third into the field. Such changes would be An early effort could be maturing Offset Strategy requires advancing key essential to stay ahead of Fast Followers. Unmanned Carrier-Launched Air- foundational technologies, adjustments While acquisition reforms are being borne Surveillance and Strike, which in acquisition, and training for man– debated in Congress, fielding emerging is currently being developed for learning machine interaction. and disruptive technologies would need aerial refueling, into the full spec- Man-Machine Interaction. Ensuring to progress regardless.24 However, doing trum of operations.26 proper human interface with and the both provides a game-changing tech- •• Standardize training and concepts proper setting of parameters for a given nological leap at a pace that can break of operations for learning machines mission employing learning machines re- today’s closely run technological race—a and their teaming with manned plat- quires a professional cadre of roboticists. prompt jump in capability. forms. Early efforts should include As with human communication, failure formally establishing a new subspe- to appropriately command and control Chasing a Capability cialty of roboticist and joint exercises learning machines could be disastrous. Prompt Jump dedicated to developing operational This potential was illustrated in the movie Actualizing a nascent Third Offset concepts of man-machine teaming. 2001: A Space Odyssesy when the HAL Strategy in a large organization such Promising work is being done at the 9000 computer resolved a dilemma of as DOD requires unity of effort. One Naval Postgraduate School, which conflicting orders by killing its human approach would be to establish a central in the summer of 2015 demon- crew. Ensuring an adequately trained office empowered to ensure coherency strated the ability to swarm up to 50 cadre is in place as new systems come in guidance and oversight of resource unmanned systems at its Advanced online requires building the institutional decisions so that investments remain Robotic Systems Engineering Labora- bedrock on which these specialists are complementary. Such an office would tory and should inform future efforts. trained. Because it will take several years build on the legacy of the Air Sea Battle •• Direct expanded investment in the to build such a cadre, it is perhaps the Office, Joint Staff’s Joint Concept for trinity of capabilities—high-den- most pressing Third Offset investment. Access and Maneuver in the Global sity energy sources, sensors, and Trinity of Robotic Capability. Gaining Commons, and Strategic Capabilities next-generation processors. The a sustainable and significant conventional Office (SCO). Therefore, a central DOD Defense Innovation Initiative advantage through learning machines office would need to be resourced and is building mechanisms to identify requires advances in three key areas. given authority to direct acquisition those in industry advancing key This trinity includes high-density energy related to the Third Offset, develop technologies, and will need to be sources, sensors, and massive parallel pro- doctrine, standardize training, and sustained as private industry is more cessing capacity. Several promising systems conduct exercises to refine concepts of deeply engaged. have failed because of weakness in one or operation. First steps could include: DOD is already moving ahead on all of these core capabilities. Fire Scout, a Limit or curtail proprietary use in a Third Offset Strategy, and it is not Navy autonomous helicopter, failed largely •• Third Offset systems while stan- breaking the bank. The budget proposal due to limited endurance. The Army and dardizing protocols and systems for fiscal year 2017 seeks a significant Marine Corps Big Dog was terminated for maximum cross-Service but manageable $18 billion toward the because its noisy gasoline engine gave interoperability. Third Offset, with $3 billion devoted troop positions away. Sensor limitations Leverage legacy systems initially by to man-machine teaming, over the next undid Boomerang, a counter-sniper robot •• filling existing capacity gaps. SCO 5 years; the $3.6 billion committed in with limited ability to discern hostiles in work has been notable in pursuing 2017 equates to less than 1 percent of the complex urban settings.23 rapid development and integration annual $582.7 billion defense budget.27 Agile Acquisition Enterprise. As of advanced low-cost capabilities into As a first step, this funds initial analytical technological challenges are overcome, legacy systems. This approach results efforts in wargaming and modeling and any advantage earned would be transitory in extension of legacy systems lethal- begins modest investments in promising unless acquisition processes adapt in sev- ity while complicating competitors’ new technologies. eral key ways. One way is to implement countermeasures. Examples include continuous testing and evaluation to shooting hypersonic rounds from Conclusion monitor the evolving programming of legacy Army artillery and the use of Because continued U.S. advantage in learning machines and ensure the rapid digital cameras to improve accuracy conventional deterrence is at stake, dissemination of learning across the ma- of small-diameter bombs.25 The Navy resources and senior leader involve- chine fleet. A second way is to broaden could do this by leveraging existing ment must grow to ensure the success the number of promising new capabilities fleet test and evaluation efforts, of a Third Offset Strategy. It will be tested while more quickly determining such as those by Seventh Fleet, and critical to develop operational learning which ones move to prototype. A third
JFQ 83, 4th Quarter 2016 Sadler 17 machines, associated concepts of oper- speech delivered to a Center for a New Amer- com/content/dam/boamlimages/documents/ ican Security Defense Forum, Washington, articles/D3_006/11511357.pdf>. ations for their teaming with people, DC, December 14, 2015, available at 18 Forum / Fast Followers and Learning Machines JFQ 83, 4th Quarter 2016 Located at Naval Computer and Telecommunications Area Master Station Pacific, Wahiawa, Hawaii, Mobile User Objective System is next-generation narrowband tactical satellite communications system intended to significantly improve ground communications for U.S. forces on the move, November 3, 2008 (U.S. Navy/John W. Ciccarelli, Jr.) Predicting the Proliferation of Cyber Weapons into Small States By Daniel Hughes and Andrew M. Colarik ecent analysis of cyber warfare one strategic issue facing the United are facing progressively difficult secu- has been dominated by works States.1 Conversely, questions regarding rity investment choices as the balance R focused on the challenges and cyber weapons acquisition by small among global security, regional dom- opportunities it presents to the con- states have received little attention. inance, and national interests is con- ventional military dominance of the While individually weak, small states stantly being assessed. An increasingly United States. This was aptly demon- are numerous. They comprise over half relevant factor in these choices is the strated by the 2015 assessment from the the membership of the United Nations escalating costs of military platforms Director of National Intelligence, who and remain important to geopolitical and perceptions that cyber warfare may named cyber threats as the number considerations.2 Moreover, these states provide a cheap and effective offensive capability to exert strategic influence over geopolitical rivals. This article takes the position that Daniel Hughes is a Master's Candidate with a professional background in Defense and Immigration. Andrew M. Colarik is a Senior Lecturer in the Centre for Defence and Security Studies, Massey in cyber warfare the balance of power University, New Zealand. between offense and defense has yet to JFQ 83, 4th Quarter 2016 Hughes and Colarik 19 MQ-1 Predator and MQ-9 Reaper assigned to 432nd Aircraft Maintenance Squadron provided intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance, especially during Operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom (U.S. Air Force/Vernon Young, Jr.) be determined. Moreover, the indirect The Nature of Cyber Warfare capabilities held by those with the and immaterial nature of cyber weapons expertise and resources required to Cyber warfare is increasingly being rec- ensures that they do not alter the funda- deliver and deploy them. Thus, it is the ognized as the fifth domain of warfare. mental principles of warfare and cannot intent to possess the skills required to Its growing importance is suggested win military conflicts unaided. Rather, develop and deploy cyber weapons that by its prominence in national strat- cyber weapons are likely to be most effec- must be the focus of any national secu- egy, military doctrine, and significant tive when used as a force multiplier and rity strategy involving cyber warfare. investments in relevant capabilities. not just as an infrastructure disruption Notable theorists have judged that Despite this, a conclusive definition of capability. The consideration of cyber in cyber warfare, offense is dominant.5 cyber warfare has yet to emerge.3 For dependence—that is, the extent to which Attacks can be launched instantaneously, our purposes, such a definition is not a state’s economy, military, and govern- and there is rapid growth in the number required as the critical features of cyber ment rely on cyberspace—is also highly of networks and assets requiring protec- warfare can be summarized in three relevant to this discussion. Depending tion. After all, cyberspace is a target-rich points. First, cyber warfare involves on infrastructure resiliency, a strategic environment based on network structures actions that achieve political or military technological advantage may become a that privilege accessibility over security. effect. Second, it involves the use of significant disadvantage in times of con- Considerable technical and legal difficul- cyberspace to deliver direct or cascading flict. The capacity to amplify conventional ties make accurate attribution of cyber kinetic effects that have comparable military capabilities, exploit vulnera- attacks, as well as precise and propor- results to traditional military capabili- bilities in national infrastructure, and tionate retaliation, a fraught process.6 ties. Third, it creates results that either control the cyber conflict space is thus There is also the low cost of creating cause or are a crucial component of a an important aspect for any war-making cyber weapons—code is cheap—and any serious threat to a nation’s security or doctrine. Integrating these capabilities weapon released onto the Internet can that are conducted in response to such a into defense strategies is the driving force be modified to create the basis of new of- threat.4 More specifically, cyber weapons in the research and development of cyber fensive capabilities.7 All of this means that are defined as weaponized cyber warfare weapons. the battlespace is open, accessible, nearly 20 Forum / Proliferation of Cyber Weapons into Small States JFQ 83, 4th Quarter 2016 anonymous, and with an entry cost that be the extent to which major disruptions encompass cyber exercises conducted appears affordable to any nation-state. to infrastructure erode political willpower by military cyber specialists. Defense Strategies that rely too heavily on and are exploitable by conventional diplomacy can act as a deterrent, but offensive dominance in cyber warfare military capabilities. For the moment, it is effective only if relevant military may, however, be premature. Cyber however, it is safe to presume that con- capabilities are both credible and dependence—the extent to which an flicts will not be won in cyberspace alone demonstrable.14 The latter is problem- attacker depends on cyberspace for and that this applies as much to small atic. Advanced cyber weapons are highly critical infrastructure—is crucial to the states as it does to major powers. classified; caution must therefore be strategic advantages that cyber weapons exercised when demonstrating capabili- can provide. Uncertainty rules as the Uses of Cyber Weapons ties so that “live” network penetrations dual-use nature of cyber weapons allows by Small States are not divulged. them to be captured, manipulated, and To be worthy of investment, a cyber These four capabilities have crucial turned against their creators.8 Equally weapons arsenal must provide states dependencies, all of which can limit their important is the practice of “escalation with political or military advantage suitability for deployment in a conflict. dominance.”9 As shown by as yet un- over—or at the very least, parity with— First, the conflicting parties must have tested U.S. policy, retaliation for a cyber their adversaries. To judge whether a comparable military power. Disrupting attack may be delivered by more destruc- small state benefits sufficiently to justify an opponent’s C4ISR will be of little tive military capabilities.10 And while the their acquisition, we must understand consequence if they still enjoy consid- speed of a cyber attack may be near in- how these capabilities can be used. A erable conventional military superiority stantaneous, preparation for sophisticated nonexhaustive list of potential cyber despite the successful deployment of cyber attacks is considerable. The Stuxnet weapon uses includes warfighting, coer- cyber weapons. Second, as demonstrated attack required the resources of a techno- cion, deterrence, and defense diplomacy. by the principle of cyber dependence, logically sophisticated state to provide the As cyber weapons are limited to second- one state’s disruption of another’s cyber expansive espionage, industrial testing, ary effects, they currently have restricted infrastructure is effective only if they can and clandestine delivery that were so vital uses in warfighting. Their most prom- defend their own cyber assets or possess to its success. The above demonstrates inent effect likely will be the disrup- the capability to act without these assets that the true cost of advanced cyber tion and/or manipulation of military with minimal degradation in operational weapons lies not in their creation but in command, control, communications, effectiveness. Third, states must have their targeting and deployment, both computers, intelligence, surveillance, the resources and expertise required to of which reduce their ability to be rede- and reconnaissance (C4ISR) capabilities deploy cyber weapons, which increase ployed to face future, unforeseen threats. and the degradation of civilian support commensurate with their efficacy. Fourth, Cyber weapons are further limited networks. Attacks on civilian infrastruc- cyber weapons rely on aggressive for- by their lack of physicality. As pieces of ture remain most feasible, and attacks ward reconnaissance into networks of computer code, they generate military on automated military platforms are potential adversaries; weapons should effect only by exploiting vulnerabilities possible.12 The effective use of cyber be positioned before conflict begins. created by reliance on cyberspace.11 They weapons as a coercive tool is con- This creates political and military risk can attack vulnerable platforms and in- strained by the relative size and cyber if an opponent discovers and traces a frastructures by manipulating computer dependence of an opponent and carries dormant cyber weapon. Finally, all use systems or act as a force multiplier to the risk of weapons acting in unforeseen of cyber weapons is complicated by their traditional military assets. This may lead ways. Both of these dependencies are inherent unpredictability, which casts to the disruption and control of the shared when cyber weapons are used as doubts over weapon precision and effect. battlespace, as well as to the provision a deterrent. This is due to the peculiar Once unleashed, the course of cyber of additional intelligence when payloads nature of the cyber domain, where both weapons may be difficult to predict and/ are deployed. These effects, however, are coercion and deterrence rely on the or contain.15 Unforeseen results may un- always secondary—cyber weapons cannot same aggressive forward reconnaissance dermine relationships or spread to neutral directly affect the battlefield without a de- of an adversary’s network. This results states that then take retaliatory action.16 vice to act through, nor can they occupy in the difference between coercion and Accordingly, weapon deployment must and control territory. deterrence being reduced to intent— follow sound strategy against clearly iden- Ultimately, the debate regarding the something difficult to prove. The final tified adversaries to minimize unforeseen balance of power in cyber warfare and the potential use of cyber weapons is as a consequences. relative power of cyber weapons will likely component of defense diplomacy strat- be decided by empirical evidence relating egy, which focuses on joint interstate A Predictive Framework to two factors. The first is the amount of military exercises as a means to dispel What is offered in this section is an damage caused by the compromise of cy- hostility, build trust, and develop armed analytical framework that may provide ber-dependent platforms. The second will forces.13 This could be expanded to a customized evaluation of whether a JFQ 83, 4th Quarter 2016 Hughes and Colarik 21 Figure. Cyber Weapon Acquisition Framework cyber weapons would align with current security and defense policies; whether the small state has the military capabilities 1. Foundational 2. Availability and alignment 3. Cyberdependence characteristics of the state of cyber-weapon systems to exploit vulnerabilities caused by cyber weapon deployment; and whether the small state has the intelligence and tech- 6. Recommend or predict 5. Benefits, feasibility, 4. State behavioral nical resources needed to target, develop, acquisition strategy and risk alignment and deploy cyber weapons. In key New Zealand defense doc- uments, references to cyber primarily particular small state should—or will— of a small state. Instead, definition and mention defense against cyber attacks, acquire cyber weapons. In essence, categorization are achieved through with only two references to the appli- what is being provided is a baseline for possession of a sufficient number of cation of military force to cyberspace. a comparative, comprehensive study on overlapping characteristics—some quanti- There is no mention of cyber weapon a state-by-state basis. The framework tative, some behavioral, and some identity acquisition. New Zealand’s defense policy itself yields its maximum value when based.19 Quantitatively, New Zealand has has focused on military contributions numerous states have been analyzed. a small population (approximately 4.5 to a secure New Zealand, a rules-based This enables potential proliferation pat- million), a small GDP (approximately international order, and a sound global terns to emerge and a clearer picture of $197 billion), and a small land area.20 It economy. Because the likelihood of direct the threat landscape to present itself. is geographically isolated, bordering no threats against the country and its closest The outline of the basic process for other countries. In the realm of behavior, allies is low, there has been a focus on analysis is provided in the figure. New Zealand practices an institutionally peacekeeping, disaster relief, affordability, Each step is explained by a purpose focused multilateral foreign policy. It is a and maritime patrol. New Zealand’s mili- statement and demonstrated through a founding member of the United Nations tary is small (11,500 personnel, including case study. The subject of the case study is and was elected to the Security Council reservists) with limited offensive capabil- New Zealand, chosen due to its member- for the 2015–2016 term after running on ities and low funding (just 1.1 percent ship in the Five Eyes intelligence network a platform of advocating for other small of GDP). Accordingly, the New Zealand and because it both self-identifies as and states. It participates in multiple alliances military lacks the ability to exploit vulner- is widely perceived to be a small state.17 and takes a special interest in the security abilities caused by the successful use of Ideally, each step of the framework would of the South Pacific.21 Regarding identity, cyber weapons. be completed by a group representing New Zealand’s self-identity emphasizes New Zealand is a member of the Five a variety of perspectives from military the values of fairness, independence, Eyes intelligence network and thus can forces, government entities, and academic nonaggression, cooperation, and ac- access more sophisticated intelligence specialties. There is the potential for a knowledgment of its status as a small than most small states. This can be used much more detailed evaluation than that state.22 Its security identity is driven by a to increase its ability to target and deploy presented, which has been condensed for lack of perceived threat that allows New cyber weapons. It has a modern signals brevity. Zealand to make security decisions based intelligence capability, housed by the Step One: Identify Foundational on principle rather than practicality.23 civilian Government Communications Small-State Characteristics. The pur- This was demonstrated by the banning Security Bureau, which also has respon- pose is to identify key characteristics of of nuclear-armed and nuclear-powered sibility for national cybersecurity. It most the small state within three categories: ships within New Zealand waters, and its likely has the technical capability to adapt quantitative, behavioral, and identity.18 subsequent informal exclusion from as- existing cyber weapons or develop new Quantitative refers to measures such as pects of the Australia, New Zealand, and ones, particularly if aided by its allies. land area, population, and gross domes- United States Security Treaty. Despite Due to fiscal constraints, however, any tic product (GDP). Behavioral refers reduced security, however, domestic additional funding for cyber weapons to qualitative metrics concerning the opinion strongly supported the anti-nu- will likely have to come from the existing behavior of a state, both domestically clear policy that, along with support for defense budget and thus result in com- and within the international system. nonproliferation and disarmament, has promises to other capabilities.25 Identity refers to qualitative metrics that strengthened the pacifistic elements of Step Three: Examine Small-State focus on how a state perceives its own New Zealand’s national identity.24 Cyber Dependence. The purpose is to identity. This article proposes that metrics Step Two: Identify Resource examine the small state’s reliance on from each category can be freely used Availability and Policy Alignment cyberspace for its military capabilities and by suitably informed analysts to assign for Cyber Weapon Development, critical infrastructure, as well as its relative a size category to any particular state. Deployment, and Exploitation. The cyber dependence when compared to This avoids the need for a final definition purpose is to identify how the use of potential geopolitical adversaries. 22 Forum / Proliferation of Cyber Weapons into Small States JFQ 83, 4th Quarter 2016 When submerged, Los Angeles–class fast attack submarine USS Santa Fe is among world’s stealthiest platforms, capable of supporting missions including anti-submarine warfare, anti–surface ship warfare, strike, naval special warfare involving special operations forces, and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance, August 8, 2013 (U.S. Navy/Sebastian McCormack) New Zealand has moderate to high objectives. These objectives depend on of vulnerabilities caused by cyber weap- cyber dependence, with increasing reli- a state’s behavior and identity, both of ons. In the event that a cyber weapon ance on online services and platforms by which are difficult to quantify. A degree unwittingly targets a powerful third party, the government, business sector, and civil of quantification is possible, however, a small state may be less likely to be sub- society. This dependence will increase. through the use of conceptual security jected to blowback if it is shielded by a For example, the acquisition of new models. A synthesis of recent small- strong alliance. Furthermore, cyber weap- C4ISR capabilities to increase military state security scholarship generates four ons may be a reasonably cost-effective adoption of network-centric warfare models: the first focused on alliances, contribution to an alliance; a great power principles would create new vulnerabili- the second on international cooperation, could even provide preferential procure- ties.26 New Zealand’s cyber dependence is and the third and fourth on identity, ment opportunities for a favored ally. further increased by limited cybersecurity differentiated by competing focuses (col- New Zealand maintains a close expertise.27 It does not have obvious laboration and influence, and defensive military alliance with Australia and is military opponents, so its relative level of autonomy).28 The alliance-focused model a member of the Five Power Defence cyber dependence is difficult to calculate. presents small states with persuasive Arrangements. It also has recently signed Step Four: Analyze State Behavior reasons to acquire cyber weapons. This cybersecurity agreements with the North Against Competing Security Models. The applies both to balancing behavior (that Atlantic Treaty Organization and United purpose is to analyze how state behavior is, joining an alliance against a threaten- Kingdom.30 The alliances above have aligns with each competing security ing state) and bandwagoning (that is, focused on security and mutual defense model and how cyber weapon acquisition entering into an alliance with a threat- rather than offensive capabilities. New and use may support or detract from ening state).29 The additional military Zealand does, however, have a policy of this behavior. Cyber weapon arsenals are resources provided by an alliance present complementing Australian defense capa- used to advance political and military greater opportunities for the exploitation bilities.31 This could be achieved through JFQ 83, 4th Quarter 2016 Hughes and Colarik 23 Table 1. Cyber Weapon Cost-Benefit Risk Matrix for New Zealand elite and population of the state.”33 This Warfighting Coercion Deterrence Defense Diplomacy identity can be based around a number of disparate factors such as ongoing Benefits Ability to Limited coercive Limited deterrence Deterrence from complement ability from cyber from cyber demonstrating security threats, perceptions of national military capabilities weapons weapons effective cyber character, and historical consciousness. A of allies weapons via state’s security identity can lead it toward defense diplomacy Cost effective a preference for either of the identity fo- offensive capability cused security models mentioned above. Feasibility Allies may Appropriate Appropriate Appropriate Regarding collaboration and influence, provide favorable technical and technical and technical and procurement intelligence intelligence intelligence New Zealand’s identity strikes a balance opportunities resources exist resources exist resources exist between practicality and principle. It Appropriate strives to be a moral, fair-minded state technical and that advances what it regards as import- intelligence resources exist ant values, such as human rights and 34 Risks Procurement may Domestic Procurement may Procurement may the rule of law. It still wishes, however, result in reduced opposition to result in reduced result in reduced to work in a constructive manner that funding for other acquisition of new funding for other funding for other allows it to contribute practical solutions military capabilities offensive weapons military capabilities military capabilities to difficult problems. The acquisition of Domestic Security identity Cyber weapon Cyber weapon cyber weapons is unlikely to advance this opposition to not reconcilable acquisition acquisition model. Thus this model assesses state be- acquisition of new with coercive may reduce may reduce havioral alignment as medium and cyber offensive weapons military actions international international weapon support as low. Cyber weapon Procurement may reputation reputation acquisition result in reduced High level of High level of Despite its multilateral behavior, New may reduce funding for other cyber dependence cyber dependence Zealand retains some defensive autonomy international military capabilities increases reduces deterrent and takes pride in maintaining indepen- reputation Cyber weapon vulnerability to effect dent views on major issues.35 Its isolation Cyber weapons acquisition retaliation and lack of major threats have allowed exploitation relies may reduce Lack of identified it to retain a measure of autonomy in its on allied forces international threats reduces defense policy and to maintain a small reputation ability to target High level of military. Its independent and pacifistic cyber dependence High level of and develop increases cyber dependence deterrent cyber nature suggests that cyber weapon acqui- vulnerability to increases weapons sition could be controversial. Thus this retaliation vulnerability to model assesses state behavioral alignment retaliation as medium and cyber weapon support as low/medium. the acquisition of cyber weapons, so long incorporate them into the international Step Five: Analyze Benefits, as it was closely coordinated and inte- laws of warfare. Feasibility, and Risk for Each Category grated with the Australian military. Thus New Zealand usually pursues a of Cyber Weapon Use. The purpose is to this model assesses state behavioral align- multilateral foreign policy approach and first identify the benefits, feasibility, and ment as medium/high and cyber weapon is a member of multiple international risk of acquiring cyber weapons based support as medium/high. organizations. It has a long history of on each category of potential use, as The international cooperation model championing disarmament and arms con- shown in table 1. Next this information assumes that small states can exert in- trol, which conflicts with the acquisition is analyzed against the degree to which fluence by strengthening international of new categories of offensive weapons. cyber weapon use may support different organizations, encouraging cooperative This model assesses state behavioral align- security models, as shown in table 2. approaches to security, and creating laws ment as high and cyber weapon support This results in a ranking of the benefits, and norms to constrain powerful states.32 as low. feasibility, and risk of each combination of Small states acting under this model will Both of the identity focused models cyber weapon use and small-state security favor diplomatic and ideological methods (collaboration and influence versus model. This is followed by an overall of influence. As such, they are less likely defensive autonomy) are centered on recommendation or prediction for cyber to acquire cyber weapons. Instead, it is analysis of a small state’s “security iden- weapon acquisition under each security more likely that they will try to regulate tity.” This develops from perceptions of model and category of cyber weapon use. cyber weapons in a manner similar to the “past behavior and images and myths Step Six: Recommend or Predict restrictions on biological and chemical linked to it which have been internalized Cyber Weapon Acquisition Strategy. The weapons or by leading efforts to explicitly over long periods of time by the political purpose is to summarize key findings, to 24 Forum / Proliferation of Cyber Weapons into Small States JFQ 83, 4th Quarter 2016 Table 2. Cyber Weapon Acquisition Matrix for New Zealand Security Model BFR Warfighting Coercion Deterrence Defense Diplomacy Overall Benefits Medium Low Low Medium Medium Feasibility Medium Medium Medium Medium Medium Alliances Risk High Very High High Low High Recommendation/ Further No No Further Further Prediction Investigation Investigation Investigation Benefits Low Low Low Medium Low Feasibility Medium Medium Medium Medium Medium International cooperation Risk High High High Low High Recommendation/ No No No Further No Prediction Investigation Benefits Low Low Low Medium Low Identity and norms: Feasibility Medium Medium Medium Medium Medium collaboration and Risk High High High Low High influence Recommendation/ No No No Further No Prediction Investigation Benefits Low Low Low Low Low Feasibility Medium Medium Medium Medium Medium Identity and norms: defensive autonomy Risk High High High Low Low Recommendation/ No No No No No Prediction recommend whether a small state should also provides a basis for potential cyber organizations, policymakers, and the acquire cyber weapons, and to predict weapon capabilities to be analyzed under general public. These outcomes provide the likelihood of such an acquisition. a standard return-on-investment pro- significant benefits to the broad spectrum The key findings are that New Zealand is curement model. This would involve a of actors seeking stability and influence unlikely to gain significant benefits from more detailed analysis of benefits, costs, within the international order. the acquisition of cyber weapons. This and risks that would allow fit-for-purpose is due to its limited military capabilities, procurement decisions to be made in a Conclusion multilateral foreign approach, extensive fiscally and operationally prudent manner. The evolution of the various domains of participation in international organi- Alternatively, the framework, which warfare did not occur overnight. Learn- zations, and pacifistic security identity. is low cost and allows a variety of actors ing from and leveraging the changing Factors that could change this evaluation to determine the likelihood of cyber landscapes of war required continuous and increase the benefits of cyber weapon weapon acquisition by small states, could investigation, reflection, and formative acquisition would include an increased be used as a tool to develop predictive activities to achieve parity, much less focus on military alliances, the emergence intelligence. Furthermore, when the dominance, with rivals. Treating cyber- of more obvious threats to New Zealand framework is used on a sufficient number space as the fifth domain of warfare or its close allies, or a changing security of small states, it could be used as a basis requires a greater understanding of the identity. for making broader predictions regarding battlespace than currently exists. This Therefore, the recommendation/pre- the proliferation of cyber weapons. This goes well beyond the technological diction is that New Zealand should not would be particularly effective over geo- aspects and requires the integration acquire cyber weapons at this time and is graphical areas with a large concentration of cyber capabilities and strategies unlikely to do so.The framework’s output of small states. For more powerful states, into existing defense doctrines. The has considerable utility as a decision sup- this might indicate opportunities for framework we have developed has the port tool. When used by a small state as increased cyber warfare cooperation with potential to help guide this process, an input into a strategic decisionmaking geopolitical allies, perhaps even extend- from strategic decision to procurement process, its output can be incorporated ing to arms sales or defense diplomacy. and doctrinal and operational integra- into relevant defense capability and policy Conversely, the framework could provide tion. Similarly, its predictive potential is documents. If cyber weapon acquisition nongovernmental organizations and aca- significant—any ability to forecast cyber is recommended, its output could be demics with opportunities to trace cyber weapon acquisition on a state-by-state further used to inform specific strategic, weapon proliferation and raise visibility basis and thus monitor cyber weapon doctrinal, and planning documents. It of the phenomenon among international proliferation would be of substantial JFQ 83, 4th Quarter 2016 Hughes and Colarik 25 9 24 geopolitical benefit. We further propose Thomas G. Mahnken, “Cyberwar and Andreas Reitzig, “In Defiance of Nuclear Cyber Warfare,” in America’s Cyber Future, ed. Deterrence: Anti-Nuclear New Zealand After that decisionmakers of large, powerful Kristin M. Lord and Travis Sharp (Washing- Two Decades,” Medicine, Conflict, and Surviv- states must not ignore the strategic ton, DC: Center for a New American Security, al 22, no. 2 (2006), 132–144. impact that small states could have in 2011), available at 26 Forum / Proliferation of Cyber Weapons into Small States JFQ 83, 4th Quarter 2016 President Obama talks with President Lee Myung-bak of South Korea in Treaty Room Office in Residence of White House, November 23, 2010, after North Korea conducted artillery attack against South Korean island of Yeonpyeong (White House/Pete Souza) The Danger of False Peril Avoiding Threat Inflation By Andrew Stigler s his advisors deliberated during superpowers could have exceeded 200 history of the superpower confrontation the Cuban Missile Crisis, Pres- million people.1 strongly suggests that the United States A ident John F. Kennedy believed But how serious was the threat that could have tolerated Soviet offensive that the chance of war with the Soviet Kennedy was responding to? The Soviet missiles in Cuba. Over the course of the Union was “between one in three and Union sought to impose some small Cold War, the Soviet nuclear arsenal even.” Even if the President’s estima- measure of vulnerability on the United grew over tenfold. In 1986, the Soviet tion was overly pessimistic, the fact that States, just a fraction of the nuclear strik- Union possessed approximately 45,000 a leader would choose to initiate a crisis ing capability that the North Atlantic warheads, up from 3,322 at the time while believing there was such a high Treaty Organization possessed. Though of the Cuba crisis.2 During these later risk of a nuclear exchange is a most most Americans feared Soviet advances Cold War years, the Soviets had an sobering thought. Some estimated in nuclear strike capability—even ability to engage in a nuclear attack on that the number of dead resulting Kennedy wondered if inaction would the United States that vastly exceeded from a nuclear exchange between the lead to his own impeachment—the later the capability they planned to place in Cuba in 1962. Yet we made it through, strongly suggesting Kennedy’s alarmism Dr. Andrew Stigler is an Associate Professor of National Security Affairs at the U.S. Naval War College. was misplaced. JFQ 83, 4th Quarter 2016 Stigler 27 Secretary of State John Kerry speaks with Hossein Fereydoun, brother of Iranian President Hassan Rouhani, and Iranian Foreign Minister Javad Zarif before announcing historic nuclear agreement to reporters in Vienna, Austria (State Department) The Cuban Missile Crisis is often that America needed to commit itself to to a certain number of joint billets. Yet heralded as a successful combination the Vietnam conflict in order to avoid the officers being prepared for advancement of brinkmanship and negotiation. But spread of communism in the region.3 Yet receive little of the methodological the later history of the Cold War calls when South Vietnam fell in 1975, in spite training that would best equip them to into serious question whether President of years of American effort and sacrifice address this complicated task. Kennedy (and other leading politicians) to avoid such an outcome, the regional This article attempts to offer a struc- exaggerated the threat posed by Soviet dominoes did fall as Johnson had feared. tured approach to this underappreciated weapons in Cuba. If Kennedy unneces- The task of avoiding unnecessary aspect of national security threat assess- sarily courted a nuclear exchange with confrontations is a critical aspect of sound ment. Given that a majority of what is the Soviets, then the crisis potentially policymaking that receives too little at- written on national security seeks to advo- represents the single greatest unnecessary tention. When a nation avoids the trap of cate confrontational approaches to nascent risk in American history. threat exaggeration, this leads to a “quiet threats, this article deliberately addresses This example highlights, in the success.” Such successes, however, do not the issue with a countervailing bias. It starkest terms, how the task of designing lead to banner headlines or celebrations explores potential reasons to be dubious national security policy is heavily weighted in Times Square. Conflict is avoided, and of threats and examines approaches and toward the end of detecting threats as historians and pundits move on, writing perspectives that could potentially reveal early as possible. Nations aim to either their essays on the disasters that did occur inadvertent threat exaggeration. neutralize threats, or at least to prepare rather than a potential catastrophe that What follows are a series of questions as best as possible for a future confronta- was avoided. that could be employed to engage in tion. When wars occur, we ask ourselves As military officers advance in their something similar to a systematic effort if earlier action would have avoided the careers, it becomes increasingly likely to turn a skeptical eye on alarmist assess- conflict, or at least reduced its cost. But that they will be assigned tours of duty ments. The term opposing state is used phrasing policy choices in such terms that will involve broader responsibilities, to refer to the state of concern—a nation can lead to avoidable violence. President including threat assessment. This is one whose actions, history, character, or Lyndon Johnson referenced the specter of the reasons why promotable O-4s and leadership have led some in the United of Adolf Hitler to convince the Nation O-5s are required to have been assigned States to conclude that it poses a future 28 Forum / Avoiding Threat Inflation JFQ 83, 4th Quarter 2016 national security threat. While imperfect Does the Opposing State defensive system, was feared by Mikhail to be sure, this approach could help bring Have Other Concerns? Gorbachev out of a concern that it would to the fore underappreciated or ignored Even if a plausible case could be made allow the United States to engage in an reasons to downplay a threat and offer an that the threatening state has malign offensive strike on the Soviet Union. opportunity for calmer heads to prevail. intent, there may be mitigating factors Since most arms buildups enhance both that could reduce the level of concern. offensive and defensive capabilities, states Will the Opposing An opposing state that is dealing with that seek only to protect themselves can State Actually Take dangers and concerns of its own might be caught in a cycle of unnecessary mili- Aggressive Action? be less of a threat. Economic difficul- tary preparations. Gauging the possibility that an opposing ties, social unrest, or political instability The fact that an opposing state sees state will avoid offensive action is half the are factors that could keep the state in the United States as the aggressive party threat equation. Threat assessments tend question from taking the initiative on should not, in and of itself, be cause for to focus on national leaders’ provocative a revisionist foreign policy agenda. At revising our assessment of the right course statements that suggest a belligerent the same time, this consideration could of action. A state motivated to attack attitude—and, to an extent, rightly so. cut both ways; any of the factors listed America for misguided reasons could still But reflecting on such statements in and could lead the opposing state to be pose a threat, and preemptive action could of themselves is not the same as threat more conflict prone in hopes of alleviat- still be warranted. The main reason to be assessment. North Korea has been pillo- ing domestic concerns or the like. alert to the possibility that the opposing ried for decades as among the most dan- Consider China, a country that state perceives the United States as the gerous and untrustworthy nations in the is engaging in a military moderniza- aggressive party is to potentially identify world. But despite the dire predictions tion of considerable scope. Deputy opportunities to reduce the environment of American security experts over many Undersecretary of Defense for of mutual fear. If a state’s fears could be re- decades, the peninsula has been free of Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics duced via diplomatic signals or some other large-scale conflict since 1953. Frank Kendall argued in 2014 that credible communication of neutral intent, Even substate groups can show state- America’s military edge is being “chal- this is usually preferable to a conflict. like restraint. At the conclusion of its lenged in ways that I have not seen for 2006 conflict with Israel, for instance, decades.”4 For China, however, as for Are There Political Pressures Hizballah demonstrated that its missile most countries, fostering economic on the Opposing State to Make stocks had survived the month-long war. growth is a priority. A conflict of any Threatening Statements? The day before the ceasefire took effect, scope between China and the United Even powerful states that sense no Hizballah launched 246 rockets into States would be certain to cause tremen- imminent threat and harbor no inten- Israel—the largest number that it had dous turmoil in international markets. tion of taking action sometimes make fired during the course of combat. Yet As of this writing, China’s currency threatening statements for political Hizballah ceased offensive operations devaluations signal significant concerns or strategic reasons. America is no on the same day the Israelis did, and has among party elites that unusual measures exception. Despite the fact that the largely refrained from aggressive actions are necessary to sustain the trajectory of United States enjoys a geostrategic since August 2006. Hizballah’s restraint China’s economy. position that is the envy of the world, does not make it a neighborly organi- American leaders are often influenced zation, but it does suggest an example Does the Opposing State by political incentives to play the tough of how even groups labeled as terrorist Have Reason to Fear guy. Phrases such as “all options are organizations are not all reflexively the United States? on the table” have become rhetorical hyper-aggressive. In 1978, Robert Jervis argued that states boilerplate in the United States to the As a mental exercise, we might put in the international system face what point where it is easy to forget such ourselves in the position of “making the could be called a “security dilemma.”5 statements could be perceived as threats case” that the opposing state does not Increases in military spending that are to strike militarily. In the early 1980s, harbor genuine aggressive intentions. intended for defensive purposes may President Reagan’s anti-Soviet rhetoric What evidence would we cite? Using Iran be perceived by others as a dangerous about the “evil empire” and exercises as an example, we could point to the fact and threatening offensive arms buildup. such as Able Archer led Soviet leaders that Tehran has not initiated any wars The second state then enhances its own to genuinely fear American aggression, since the 1979 revolution. In addition, defenses, which is seen by the first state even a possible nuclear surprise attack.6 Iran has been restrained in the face of as a threat and evidence of the malign Other countries, given reason to be provocation in the recent past, and it is intent of the second state. Few weapons nervous of the United States or other important to assess the actions that have systems are purely defensive in nature. regional powers, could compel their not been taken as well. Even President Ronald Reagan’s “Star leaders to engage in “tough guy” pos- Wars” missile defense system, a purely turing. When Soviet General Secretary JFQ 83, 4th Quarter 2016 Stigler 29 President Obama delivers first major speech stating commitment to seek peace and security of world without nuclear weapons in front of thousands in Prague, Czech Republic, April 5, 2009 (White House/Pete Souza) Nikita Khrushchev warned Western swelling of the ranks of nuclear weapons world’s most dangerous weapons? We diplomats in 1956 when he said, “We states. President Kennedy predicted can all but rule out the possibility that will bury you,” his audience may have there could be “ten, fifteen, twenty” even a state-supported terrorist organiza- been the Soviet Politburo, and not nuclear states by 1964.8 Such predic- tion could independently develop even a American policymakers.7 At the same tions have not come to pass, even half a crude nuclear weapon. John Mueller ex- time, posturing could lead to a sense of century after Kennedy’s prediction. amines the 20 steps required to produce commitment that could promote actual Even the mere repetition of a threat a nuclear weapon de novo, and failure or aggression. But threats should not be could increase the public’s assumptions detection at even 1 of these 20 stages reflexively taken as indications of true about the capabilities of an adversary. defeats the entire enterprise.10 malign intent, since other, less threaten- Prior to the invasion of Iraq in 2003, Recent research suggests that states ing explanations are possible as well. the George W. Bush administration with nuclear weapons are extremely suggested the possibility that Saddam unlikely to hand those weapons over to ter- Even if Conflict Occurs, Hussein was generating a program to rorist groups. Why would states undertake How Likely Are Worst- develop weapons of mass destruction very expensive nuclear weapons programs, Case Outcomes? (WMD). Yet by the time of the invasion, endure the political and economic costs While dire scenarios must be consid- a majority of Americans believed that of defying the international community, ered in national security deliberations, Iraq actually possessed WMD.9 Images of and then hand one of their limited stock of it is also essential to coldly assess the mushroom clouds are easily summoned weapons to a stateless organization? From probability of such scenarios before yet hard to dispel. this perspective, it is an odd notion. Kier determining a course of action. A likely While nation-states can be deterred, Lieber and Daryl Press argue that states current example of casual worst-case terrorist groups are understandably will not undertake the “mind-bogglingly scenario thinking is America’s concern viewed as far less susceptible to deterrent dangerous” approach of handing it to an over nuclear proliferation. Since 1945, threats. But how likely is it that such a unaffiliated group.11 They also point out pessimists have predicted the inexorable group would acquire even one of the that the vast majority of state-sponsored 30 Forum / Avoiding Threat Inflation JFQ 83, 4th Quarter 2016 terrorism has been eventually attributed to consideration was prominently voiced 3. Observer’s bias overemphasiz- the sponsor, raising the near certainty that during the 2015 debate over the Joint ing malign signals? the originating state would be subjected to Comprehensive Plan of Action nuclear 4. Fractured government author- cataclysmic retaliation. agreement with Iran. President Barack ity in opposing state dilutes Obama has stated that a military importance of statements? How Imminent Is the Need strike against Iran would only delay a. divided leadership to Respond to the Threat? its program, while driving it “deeper b. military veto/civilian veto A wait-and-see approach could be a underground” and “destroy[ing] the over any action rational course of action. Does the international unity [behind efforts to 5. Translation issues? Signal situation offer latitude to respond when forestall Iran’s nuclear program] that context? the threat becomes more concrete, or we’ve spent so many years building.”15 B. Cause of Aggressive Intent even after the threat has been realized? The Islamic State of Iraq and the 1. Fear of the United States? For example, in the early stages of Levant (ISIL) offers a similar confirming 2. Domestic political pressure? the Cold War there was some talk of example of how preemptive action can 3. Political competition leading to engaging in preemptive action before lead to the rise of greater threats. The increased nationalism? the Soviet Union and China developed United States invaded Iraq in 2003 to 4. Recent political setback? nuclear weapons. Major General Orvil eliminate the danger posed by Saddam’s 5. Alliance dynamics? Anderson, USAF, stated, “Give me regime. Yet it was this preemptive action 6. Economic difficulties? the order to do it, and I can break up that was the primary cause in the rise C. Depth of Aggressive Intent Russia’s five A-bomb nests in a week.”12 of a number of terrorist groups in the 1. Opposing state has marginal President Kennedy considered preemp- region, including ISIL.16 The tyranny of or limited willingness to bear tive strikes on China, perhaps using unintended consequences has been the costs? “anonymous planes.”13 But history’s undoing of countless national security 2. Future political events (such as verdict is clearly in favor of those who initiatives. Efforts to address short- elections) on the horizon? resisted calls for dramatic action against term concerns can lead to long-term 3. Opposing state recognizes its these emerging nuclear powers. We repercussions. vulnerability to retaliation? might prefer a world with fewer nuclear What follows is an attempt to address 4. Opposing state recognizes/ weapons today, but most people sleep the spectrum of factors that could be fears potential for attack to fail? soundly today in spite of the Russian applicable when skeptically assessing II. Gauging Opposing State’s Ability and Chinese nuclear arsenals. the threat posed by an opposing state. to Act Adopting a wait-and-see approach is a They are presented in sequence: gauging A. Means to Act politically awkward topic. No commander intent, assessing the opposing state’s 1. Limited military means? in chief relishes the idea of explaining ability to act aggressively, evaluating Uncertain means? after an attack why advance indication was the spectrum of possible responses after 2. Untested strategy/tactics? available but action was not taken. At the any attack by the opposing state, and 3. Lack of opportunity for same time, from a strategic standpoint, it exploring the possible repercussions surprise? is a perspective that must be considered, of unnecessary action. No answer to 4. Limited opportunity to act/ particularly for a country with the vast any of these question should reflexively close window of opportunity? security resources that the United States trigger a downgrade of the threat. They B. Obstacles to Action possesses. And flashpoints could endure are, instead, considerations that should 1. Dependent on allies? for long periods of time without leading influence a threat assessment but that a. U.S. leverage on allies ex ante? to violence. As David Kang points out, are, at times, overlooked. To reiterate, b. U.S. ability to punish allies ex many security analysts have claimed to the opposing state refers to the state that post? identify powder kegs in Asia—the Korean may or may not pose a threat, while the 2. Fractured system of Peninsula in particular—while those kegs target is the state that might have cause government? have failed to ignite a conflict over the to fear an attack of some kind from the 3. Long mobilization time/ course of years, sometimes decades.14 opposing state. unavoidable warning of prepa- Could Preemptive Action Threat Assessment rations for attack? C. Likely Impact of Action Against the Opposing State I. Gauging Opposing State’s Intent 1. Are anticipated attacks likely to Make a Bad Situation Worse? A. Indications of Aggressive Intent be limited? We should also consider if a confron- 1. Result of confused signals? 2. Could target easily absorb likely tation, instead of delaying or obviating 2. Opposing state posturing attacks? a perceived threat, might create a a. for domestic audience more dangerous environment. This b. for international audience JFQ 83, 4th Quarter 2016 Stigler 31 This image, taken by Major Richard “Steve” Heyser in U.S. Air Force U-2, shows Soviet truck convoy deploying missiles near San Cristobal, Cuba, proving Russian missiles were being emplaced in Cuba, October 14, 1962 (U.S. Air Force) 3. Consequences of attack com- 4. Would preemptive action dam- Conclusion: Primum Non Nocere pared to costs of preemption? age the target’s reputation? “First, do no harm.” This is the mantra 5. Are there domestic political III. Target’s Ability to Preempt or Deter instilled in aspiring doctors during costs of preemptive action? A. What are the costs associated with medical school, the concept that we 6. Would other states see oppor- preempting the threat? must not make an unfortunate situation tunities following preemptive B. Repercussions of preemption for worse by resorting to avoidable actions. action by the target? target state: National security policy should take the C. Are there opportunities to deter 1. What are repercussions of same caveat to heart. Just as a patient the opposing state, via political/ preemptive action over short/ complaining of excruciating pain could military/economic actions or medium/long term? still be best served by a wait-and-see threatened actions? 2. Would preemptive action in- approach, the best option in any given crease likelihood of worst-case IV. Target’s Ability to Respond national security scenario might be to scenarios? A. Ability to Limit Damage take no action at all. A calm and even- 3. Is there a risk that preemptive B. Ability to Retaliate handed assessment of the true scope of action would distract the target a perceived threat could be essential to from other threats? avoiding an unwanted conflict. 32 Forum / Avoiding Threat Inflation JFQ 83, 4th Quarter 2016 Unsurprisingly, military officers prise Attack by U.S.,” Washington Post, October 24, 2015, available at JFQ 83, 4th Quarter 2016 Stigler 33 Soldiers assigned to Bravo Company, 1st Battalion, 77th Armor Regiment, 4th Armored Brigade Combat Team, 1st Armored Division, provide security with a M109A6 Paladin prior to reconnaissance patrol during Decisive Action Rotation 14-10 at National Training Center at Fort Irwin, California, September 24, 2014 (U.S. Army/Richard W. Jones, Jr.) collaboration, human-assisted opera- tions, combat teaming (robotics), and Wargaming the autonomous weapons will give U.S. forces a competitive advantage.3 To date, much of the Third Offset Third Offset Strategy discussion has focused on technology. To support the initiative, Undersecretary of By Paul Norwood and Benjamin Jensen Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics Frank Kendall convened a new long-range research and development planning program. Of note, Kendall t a November 2014 keynote gence of precision strike) gave the U.S. helped implement the second offset address at the Reagan National military significant advantages, a new through his work on follow-on forces at- Defense Forum, then–Secretary series of technological building blocks A tack capabilities in the late 1980s. Similar of Defense Chuck Hagel announced will sustain American military domi- to the institutional processes that drove the Defense Innovation Initiative nance.2 In a December 2015 speech, the Second Offset Strategy, the Third (DII) to develop “a game-changing Deputy Secretary of Defense Robert Offset appears to prioritize developing Third Offset Strategy.”1 Just as the Work envisioned a future in which and integrating revolutionary technolo- First Offset (introduction of nuclear autonomous deep learning systems gies that have the potential to change weapons) and the Second Offset (emer- (artificial intelligence), human-machine how actors fight wars. New capabilities require new operat- ing concepts. Just as carrier aviation in Colonel Paul Norwood, USA, is a Senior Military Fellow in the Office of the Chief of Staff of the Army the 1920s benefited from the tactical- Strategic Studies Group. Major Benjamin Jensen, USAR, is a Military Fellow in the Strategic Studies and operational-level wargames held at Group and the Donald L. Bren Chair at the Marine Corps University in Quantico, Virginia. 34 JPME Today / Wargaming the Third Offset Strategy JFQ 83, 4th Quarter 2016 the Naval War College, the Third Offset a maritime environment, or using smart around the proposed offset technolo- Strategy would benefit from experi- projectiles that can be fired from many of gies. Wargames serve as a time-tested mentation through a series of wargames our existing land- and ship-based artillery mechanism for generating new ideas connected to joint professional military guns to defeat incoming missiles at much about warfare.14 These ideas can then be education (JPME) and field/fleet exer- lower cost per round.”7 tested through further analysis and field cises. Unlike earlier top-down efforts, this Yet the question becomes how to in- and fleet experiments. new experimentation and conceptual de- tegrate these potential offset technologies Wargaming is “a representation of velopment campaign should harness the into joint and Service operating concepts military activities, using rules, data, and power of crowdsourcing and incorporate such as the new U.S. Army Operating procedures, not involving actual military ideas from across the Services, academia, Concept Win in a Complex World.8 For forces, and in which the flow of events is and the private sector to develop what example, the concept uses focus areas and affected by, and in turn affects, decisions Secretary Work refers to as “AirLand first principles to guide the acceleration of made during the course of those events Battle 2.0.”4 new technologies into the force. Instead by players acting for the actors, factions, This article lays out an approach for of searching for technological silver bul- factors and frictions pertinent to those developing new joint concepts for the lets, the U.S. Army uses focus areas, such military activities.”15 Within this broad Third Offset Strategy. First, the article as mobile protected precision firepower continuum, analytical wargaming is the defines offsets and their importance in and situational understanding, to develop use of competitive scenarios designed military theory. Next, the analysis shifts concepts for achieving overmatch on a to further understand the changing to assessing the role of wargames in 21st-century battlefield. character of warfare and enable future developing military concepts. Finally, the There are several ways offsets could planning.16 These games provide their article proposes a wargaming campaign be applied to deter adversaries and as- players, usually military officers and to develop new joint concepts for the sure allies in the contemporary operating civilian defense officials, with “decision- strategy. environment. The Third Offset could be making experience and decision-making part of a cost-imposing concept designed information.”17 What Are Offsets? to achieve limited objectives in peace- There is a long history of using Offsets are investments in new capabili- time great-power competition.9 Such wargaming to develop new tactics and ties that maintain relative force superior- a move would parallel important Cold operating concepts in the profession of ity. The idea emerges from applying the War cases, including the U.S. Air Force’s arms. Prior to World War I, German Field classical economic concept of compara- development of new bomber concepts Marshal Alfred Graf von Schlieffen used tive advantage to long-term competi- to penetrate Soviet defenses as a means a combination of wargames and field tive defense strategies. Offsets match of increasing the amount of Warsaw exercises to test operating concepts.18 strengths to weaknesses. Put simply, you Pact resources spent on air defense.10 During the interwar period, the U.S. want to find an investment that maxi- Alternatively, the Third Offset technolo- Navy used the Naval War College to mizes your strengths and efficiencies gies could be integrated into a denial generate new ideas about fleet tactics while offsetting those of an opponent. concept that seeks to convince the enemy and employing emerging capabilities For example, according to former Sec- it is costly to accomplish their objec- like aircraft carriers.19 These experiments retary of Defense Harold Brown, one tive.11 For example, Chinese and Russian connected the schoolhouse and the fleet. of the architects of the second offset, investments in antiaccess/area-denial In 1925, Admiral Joseph Reeves moved “if the United States looks for com- capabilities can be thought of as a larger from heading the tactics department at parative advantages against a potential effort to deny U.S. power projection.12 the Naval War College, where he used Soviet adversary with superior numbers It is not only technology but also wargaming to develop new concepts for of forces, one of the most obvious is how new capabilities are employed that carrier aviation, to commanding the USS the relatively lower cost of incorporat- produces military power.13 A new capabil- Langley, an experimental carrier.20 U.S. ing high technology into U.S. military ity is more than just a new technology. It Army General Donn Starry used a series equipment.”5 requires new concepts for employing the of corps-level wargames and simulations Through the DII, the Third Offset systems and training on how to operate on the “central battle” in the Fulda Gap seeks “specific investments in promising them as part of a larger joint fight. The to stress test the Active Defense doctrine new technologies and capabilities such strategy is unlikely to reach its full poten- and develop the conceptual foundation as high-speed strike weapons, advanced tial until the joint community develops of AirLand Battle.21 The Office of Net aeronautics, rail guns and high-energy new operating concepts. Assessment used a series of seminar-based lasers.”6 In addition to these new tech- wargames to develop creative ideas for nologies, the strategy involves using Wargaming as Experimentation harnessing the power of precision strike “current capabilities in new and creative The Department of Defense should throughout the 1980s and 1990s. ways—like adapting our Tomahawk mis- pursue a joint wargaming initiative There is a new interest in the use of siles to be used against moving targets in designed to generate new concepts wargaming to generate new operating JFQ 83, 4th Quarter 2016 Norwood and Jensen 35 concepts. Secretary Work and General units alter campaign objectives or simply enabling a wide range of officers, as Paul Selva, USAF, have called for a new increase the joint force’s effectiveness practitioners, to investigate new ways of era of wargaming to prepare for future in reaching existing objectives? Do new solving an emerging military challenge in wars.22 The RAND Corporation has capabilities open up entirely new objec- relation to stated national interests and opened a Center for Gaming to explore tives and lines of effort in the campaign joint objectives. Game design should cap- new approaches to national security planning process? ture “the identification and refinement challenges.23 Through the Brute Krulak Fifth, the game designers need to of a joint military problem, a proposed Center, the Marine Corps University is choose the format that best facilitates operational solution, and the capabilities reintroducing competitive wargames into concept development. There are four required to implement the proposed JPME to develop creative problem-solv- types of analytical wargames: seminar, solution.”33 Participants assume a com- ing techniques and explore the changing matrix, free kriegsspiel (German for petitive role in this environment and test character of war.24 Paralleling these ef- “wargame”), and rigid kriegsspiel.27 new ideas from operational solutions to forts, American University’s School of Seminar games and matrix games are new capabilities. International Service is exploring how to loosely structured and focus on allow- use games as a means of helping students ing the participants to interpret events. Wargaming Offsets consider new solutions to global chal- Kriegsspiel descends from a Prussian The Third Offset is a central idea in lenges ranging from climate change to game used to train operational and tacti- U.S. military thought that should be complex humanitarian emergencies and cal decisionmaking. Applied to modern tested through broad-based wargaming mass migration. wargaming, free and rigid kriegsspiels efforts that create a vibrant marketplace There are best practices associated imply analytical games with a more of ideas. First, the wargames should with analytical wargames used to develop structured rule set. These rules could be structured in a manner that recre- new concepts.25 First, games need mul- be based on everything from force-ratio ates the interwar loop at the Naval War tiple parties engaged in a competitive calculations to the limits of certain weap- College.34 There should be a dialogue struggle, which facilitates creativity and ons systems or allied preferences. Unlike between the Joint Staff, Services, and new approaches. Second, the games seminar and matrix games, these rules researchers in JPME-granting institu- should be set in realistic scenarios that are established in advance as opposed to tions about the future of war. This have uncertainty, risk/reward dynamics, interpreted and debated. dialogue should be rooted in an active and different objectives for the actors. To develop a modern joint concept, research program, thereby implying a According to Williamson Murray and wargames must specify a military prob- requirement for more rigorous publica- Macgregor Knox, “Every major cluster lem in the context of a clear political tion standards for JPME-granting insti- of innovations during the interwar period objective and provide a forum in which tutions, and should integrate students. that resulted in a revolution in military practitioners can imagine a wide range Major research universities incorporate affairs . . . depended on the existence of possible solutions. A concept is a graduate students into their investiga- of concrete adversaries against which to “description of a method or scheme for tions, and the same should be true for frame innovation.” employing specified military capabilities JPME-granting institutions that also Third, the games have to be recorded in the achievement of a stated objec- offer accredited graduate degrees. The and the decision calculus tracked in order tive or aim.”28 Joint concepts “examine officers in attendance, typically field to facilitate discussion about options. military problems by describing how grade officers, have the types of tactical- These observations enable a robust dia- the Joint Force, using military art and level insights and recent battlefield expe- logue after the game, encouraging critical science, may conduct joint operations, riences that make games more realistic. reflection on the nature and character of functions, and activities in response to a The schoolhouses could become war. Games should start conversations, range of future challenges.”29 For former hothouses of ideas, sites where officers not end them. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff engage in research and take ownership Fourth, the games should clearly General Martin Dempsey, USA, concepts of the ideas that will become future distinguish between tactical engage- “inform our ideas and sharpen our think- doctrine. Such a move would require a ments and operational-level campaigns.26 ing as we determine how to meet the significant shift to current curriculum Tactical games help participants learn requirements laid out in . . . defense stra- development approaches in JPME how to use a new capability in a battle. tegic guidance.”30 They are the central institutions. Curriculum is often over- Operational-level games help partici- ideas that evolve through deliberation prescribed based on the requirements pants situate campaign-level objectives into doctrine.31 of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs and determine which options are Rigid bureaucracies like military of Staff, Officer Professional Military available, given a new capability. For organizations require arenas outside the Education Policy, and host institution example, would the introduction of rail normal chain of command in which to instructions.35 JPME institutions often guns on multiple classes of surface com- develop new ideas about fighting war.32 do not teach the graduate-level histori- batants and forward-deployed artillery Wargames provide one such forum, cal or social science research methods 36 JPME Today / Wargaming the Third Offset Strategy JFQ 83, 4th Quarter 2016 Electromagnetic Railgun launches projectiles using electricity instead of chemical propellants for use aboard ships, June 21, 2012 (U.S. Navy/John F. Williams) required to help their students develop environments to conduct virtual maneu- Community.38 Crowdsourcing implies and test new ideas, as concepts, about vers in order to assess prototypes.37 harnessing the diversity of perspec- future warfare.36 As a result, many The Marine Corps University, tives in large populations to enhance schools have difficulty producing space through the Brute Krulak Center and the decisionmaking. Each individual has a in the curriculum to develop and test Advanced Studies Program, is connecting different piece of information that could new operating concepts. students writing their master’s theses with aid in making a decision. Collecting and Two institutions are taking steps defense partners such as U.S. European comparing these different viewpoints to remedy the current state of affairs, Command and the Marine Corps increases the chances of being correct however. The U.S. Army War College is Warfighting Lab in focused research lines about the future. The process also helps seeking to link research faculty and stu- linked to ongoing concept development. leaders identify “zombies,” capability in- dents to current strategic priorities of the For example, in 2015 students researched vestments that are no longer relevant on Chief of Staff of the Army and the larger the future of warfighting in a megacity the modern battlefield.39 joint community. In September 2015, the and tested their concepts through semi- Applied to wargaming the Third college designed and played a wargame nar-style wargames. Though promising, Offset, the joint concept development for the U.S. Army G3/5/7. Played by these initiatives should be funded and community should take the concepts a mix of students and technical experts, connected to joint concept development developed at schoolhouses and in op- the game explored future modernization in a more deliberate manner that incen- erational units and test and refine them options for mission command networks. tivizes civilian faculty and JPME students through crowdsourcing. Using a variety The game designers used the principles of to collaborate on developing new con- of unit-level exercises would provide a the Army Operating Concept to evaluate cepts to test ideas like the Third Offset higher level of fidelity to experimenta- each player’s moves. Through a partner- through forums such as wargames. tion and help the military spot innovative ship between the Army War College and Second, the joint community should leaders. For example, a low-cost means the Army Capabilities Integration Center take ideas developed in wargaming the to tap into the wisdom of crowds would (ARCIC), senior Service college students Third Offset in schoolhouses and crowd- be to task every Army brigade to submit help design the future force as part of the source them. There is a new interest in a Third Offset–related new concept, annual Unified Quest wargame. ARCIC crowdsourcing and predictive market- organizational change, or technological is also exploring the use of online gaming places in businesses and the Intelligence improvement that would fundamentally JFQ 83, 4th Quarter 2016 Norwood and Jensen 37 change the way they operate. As the ideas Through the Force 2025 Maneuvers, the critique alternative operating concepts are vetted, the Army could identify bright U.S. Army conducts “wargaming, exer- that emerge from the wargames. tactical-level officers and noncommis- cises, experiments, evaluations, and other Pursued along these lines, the net sioned officers who are comfortable with efforts focused on determining how the benefit of wargaming the Third Offset innovating. In the words of key AirLand Army organizes and designs the force.”45 could well be to empower a new genera- battle architect General Starry, the Army These initiatives include maintaining tion of military leaders to take ownership should find the “professional visionaries Wiki-type Web sites where Soldiers and of intellectual development in the profes- and malcontents”40 with an aptitude for civilians can comment on ongoing Army sion of arms. The operational tempo over experimentation and tactics who could be warfighting challenges.46 the last 14 years and the reliance on gov- groomed for future leadership positions. In practice, this approach to ernment civilians and contractors has led This group of innovators could then be wargaming the Third Offset implies to a situation in which fewer and fewer put to work in a variety of settings, such the following. First, the joint concept officers publish their ideas on warfare. as U.S. Army Training and Doctrine community would collaborate with Wargames integrated with JPME cur- Command (for example, ARCIC JPME institutions to design games that riculum and field exercises could provide wargames), the Joint Staff (for example, introduce Third Offset capabilities in a forum for generating new ideas and a studies and war plans), and the Office of campaigns linked to current war plans. spirit of reasoned debate about future the Secretary of Defense (for example, Students playing these games would then war. The joint doctrine community has the Office of Net Assessment and the work with faculty to develop research ini- yet to coalesce around an AirLand Battle Defense Innovation Unit Experimental in tiatives on new concepts. These concepts, 2.0 or AirSea Battle 2.0. Aggregating Silicon Valley). These efforts could build as solution sets to the military problem Third Offset–focused wargames and tacti- a tactical cascade of innovative behavior in the game, would then be crowd- cal experiments can start this process and that can serve as a guide to new overarch- sourced and stress-tested across a larger provide a means of finding candidates for ing doctrine that applies Third Offset community. Parallel experimentation future joint doctrine while avoiding costly technological advances. would occur in tactical units, creating a dead ends. JFQ The crowd could expand beyond the competitive marketplace of ideas. Such an military to include social scientists and approach has the potential to reinvigorate historians in civilian academic institutions JPME institutions and develop leaders of Notes and the private sector. The general public future military thought. 1 could even participate in unclassified Chuck Hagel, keynote address at Reagan National Defense Forum, Simi Valley, CA, forums via platforms such as Amazon’s Conclusion November 15, 2014, available at 38 JPME Today / Wargaming the Third Offset Strategy JFQ 83, 4th Quarter 2016 Carter%20Testimony%20-%20SAC-D.pdf>. 26 Dale C. Eikmeier, “Waffles or Pancakes? thony, David Duncan, and Pontus M.A. Siren, 7 Ibid. Operational- versus Tactical-Level Wargaming,” “Zombie Projects: How to Find Them and Kill 8 U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Com- Joint Force Quarterly 78 (3rd Quarter 2015), Them,” Harvard Business Review, March 4, mand (TRADOC) Pamphlet 525-3.1, The U.S. available at JFQ 83, 4th Quarter 2016 Norwood and Jensen 39 Audience members listen to General Dunford deliver graduation address at National Defense University’s 2016 graduation ceremony, on Fort Lesley J. McNair, Washington, DC, June 9, 2016 (DOD/Sean K. Harp) I Liked Ike . . . Whence Comes Another? Why PME Needs a Congressional Advocate By John T. Kuehn ith all the discussion of colleague. Ever since former Representa- for reform but forget his profound role troubles in the world of pro- tive Ike Skelton (D-MO) left Congress in enabling PME reform in the first W fessional military education in 2010 (dying only 3 years later), PME place. To better understand that role, (PME), the obvious finally dawned on has needed an advocate in Congress. we must take a trip, as we historians are me in a discussion of the issue with a Historians and pundits, however, wont to do, down memory lane. including the author of this article, have perhaps missed this essential need Historical Insights and in their prescriptions for enhancing, or Skelton’s Legacy Dr. John T. Kuehn is Professor of Military History reforming, higher level military educa- The first stop is to that oft-studied at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College and an Adjunct Professor at the Naval tion as it exists in the United States period between World War I and War College. today.1 We cite Ike’s name as the basis World War II—commonly referred to 40 JPME Today / Why PME Needs a Congressional Advocate JFQ 83, 4th Quarter 2016 as the interwar period—during which at joint PME (JPME).5 The work and However, the challenge, especially significant insights regarding military findings of the panel eventually made following Skelton’s ouster from his posi- education were formulated. Much has their way into the “Bible” of JPME, the tion as chairman of the HASC by the been written about the relative advan- Officer Professional Military Education Missouri Tea Party in 2010, has been tage conferred by honest PME during Policy (OPMEP) instruction (also re- who might replace him in his essential this period, particularly in institutions ferred to as the Chairman of the Joint role as guardian of PME. That is right— as disparate as the Kriegsakademie in Chiefs of Staff 1800 series). The rather I liked Ike. And so should all those who Germany (and the Versailles-limited stifling military nomenclature is included are committed to honest PME and Reichswehr in general) and those in the here not only to emphasize how a truly JPME. Skelton is no longer here, how- United States (the Naval War College, transformative and influential document ever, so who can take his place? In truth, the Command and General Staff can hide itself behind acronyms, but also no one. I believe that this challenge College [CGSC], and the Air Corps to serve as a sort of talisman to ward off has never been properly articulated as a Tactical School at Maxwell Field in the evil spirits who would undermine question by anyone in power inside the Alabama). Some was, in fact, written Skelton’s legacy. It seems that every Pentagon and by few outside. No one by Congressman Ike Skelton himself.2 day brings news of developments that has stepped up to fill his shoes, perhaps More often than not, however, the undermine the essential goodness of because few elected representatives see role of Congress in all this is slighted, Congressman Skelton’s great work and any political value in assuming the role. at least regarding PME. Nonetheless, the intent of the OPMEP. It is almost as if the assumption was that, the Services, and particularly the Navy, Skelton found the PME system with Skelton gone, the system would had an advocate on the naval subcom- in much disarray when he toured the somehow police itself. Anyone making mittee of what is today the House Nation’s facilities in the late 1980s and this assumption has been proved wrong; Armed Services Committee (HASC): early 1990s. For example, he wrote about large bureaucratic institutions are rarely Representative Carl Vinson (D-GA), the military history curriculum during his successful policing themselves. There who was the longest-serving member of visit to CGSC: currently is no authoritative figure in Congress in the last century. Vinson’s Congress to whom individuals can appeal impact on events, however, was indirect. Another area that our panel report stressed when the PME train goes off the rails, He is most famous for three pieces of was the study of military history, especially and the strengths of Skelton’s vision as legislation that prepared the Navy for in helping to develop strategists. In our visit enacted by Goldwater-Nichols and the World War II—most significantly, the to Fort Leavenworth in 1988, the study of subsequent Skelton Panel have been un- first Vinson-Trammel Bill in 1934 that military history was confined to 51 hours dermined by compromise and rollback. finally put the Nation on a trajectory and limited to the American experience of It is all well and good to have pro- toward aligning its means with its strate- war in the 20th century.6 fessors working at intermediate- and gic ends.3 But there was a second-order senior-level Service colleges bemoan the effect from building all those new war- It was just this sort of oversight in problems with PME, but the real prob- ships: Those students at the Naval War curriculum, class mix (of various Service lem is a lack of effective congressional College who wargamed and studied this officers), and joint faculty assignments oversight or, more specifically, ineffective problem could put their findings into that Skelton jealously monitored and and disjointed leadership of congressio- practice during the Navy’s “Fleet Prob- worked with the Services to correct. nal oversight. Congress has 535 voting lems,” large-scale exercises conducted On the issue of joint faculty, part of his members.8 It is critical that someone (and each year between 1923 and 1940. In reforms were undermined in 2007 when preferably more than one individual) these exercises, U.S. naval forces would most of the joint faculty billets at the steps up to assume Skelton’s mantle as engage in mock battles that served as intermediate- and senior-level Service PME guardian. As cited in a 2010 HASC the culmination of the Service’s annual colleges were “de-coded” in a misguided report, “the society that separates its training maneuvers. At the conclusion “reprogramming” of these billets to new scholars from its warriors will have its of each exercise, the Navy cycled the joint billets overseas and on joint staffs. thinking done by cowards and its fighting lessons learned back into the school- These billets have never migrated back done by fools.”9 Naming a library after house, a difficult task in the absence of to the military education faculty jobs Ike Skelton has not been nearly enough. any force structure.4 from which they were removed, despite In fact, the only congressional representa- Our second example, however, set the drawdown of forces in Iraq and tive who has come to the library named in 1987, involves almost the reverse Afghanistan.7 As a result, the officers who in his honor at Fort Leavenworth was situation. After helping to craft and explain one Service to the future leaders the nonvoting member from the U.S. pass the landmark Goldwater-Nichols of other branches receive no credit for territory of Guam.10 That seems to be Department of Defense Reorganization “joint time,” making joint instructor duty a strong indicator of the true state of Act of 1986, Skelton formed a panel— even less respected and sought after than Skelton’s PME legacy. known as the Skelton Panel—to look it had been previously. JFQ 83, 4th Quarter 2016 Kuehn 41 defense concerns.11 These include Con- gressman J. Randy Forbes (R-VA), a member of the all-important HASC and thus a natural successor in that body to Skelton’s PME watchdog legacy. Who better to pick up Skelton’s PME baton and continue to carry it until relieved than perhaps even a Member of Congress from his home state of Missouri? Whoever steps up to the plate will have to use a bipartisan team ap- proach to perform the necessary function of policing PME and to combine forces in the best joint manner. This also has the key advantage of avoiding the sort of single-point failure that happened following Skelton’s congressional defeat and would build some redundancy into the watchdog role. Another key task for his replacement(s) will be the ability to mentor others, since shifting political winds never guarantee anyone longevity in Congress. The short-term political payoffs may be small, but such a role would provide long-term benefits to the Nation and meet the real need to protect how we develop our strategic thinkers in the U.S. military. Conclusions and Recommendations No one is minding the JPME store. The Department of Defense (DOD) has too large a span of control to do the job. Furthermore, it is somewhat ludicrous to ask the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to do this job, which has been delegated, for all intents and purposes, to the Joint Staff J7, the component that was assigned responsibility for JPME. The military has thus been tasked to police itself and its constituent institutions, none Instructor inspects Marine’s uniform during 16-day Corporals Course, U.S. Marine Corps Enlisted of which are answerable directly to the Professional Military Education course, which was taught for first time at Dyess Air Force Base, Texas, August 5, 2010 (U.S. Air Force/Domonique Washington) J7. Although the J7 has the Process for Accreditation of Joint Education America’s Got Talent and the Senate Armed Services Com- (PAJE) portfolio, this portfolio is in All is not lost, however. A number of mittee (SASC) due to election cycles, actuality on loan from the Chairman, names come immediately to mind— it is inappropriate to name specific who in turn has received the responsi- Members of the House and Senate who Members of the House or Senate here. bility from the Office of the Secretary possess the requisite passion, interest, There are, however, outspoken advo- of Defense, which by law is responsible and talent to take on this exciting but cates for military preparedness across a for this function. challenging legacy—and they come range of issues involving national secu- The ability of these trustworthy from both sides of the aisle. Given the rity and defense who write prolifically organizations to effectively police PME flux in leadership inside both the HASC as a means to educate the public about institutions has been eroded due to 42 JPME Today / Why PME Needs a Congressional Advocate JFQ 83, 4th Quarter 2016 changes in the accreditation process since 9/11, which have minimized the number of PAJE visits institutions receive by com- parison to the previous model of annual or biannual visits. This was primarily due to the implementation of further self- policing by “institutional self-studies.”12 One might reasonably respond that many of these negative things occurred while Skelton was still on watch. This is partially the case. However, they were all implemented for the same reasons: the Nation was at war in both Iraq and Afghanistan and needed some temporary relief from peacetime OPMEP and PAJE requirements. Unfortunately, what were once vices are now established habits. In 2010, just as the war in Iraq was wind- Professional military education instructor, 62nd Airlift Wing, speaks with students about results of ing down, Skelton left Congress. In the their graded assignment, August 26, 2015, at Julius A. Kolb Airman Leadership School at Joint Base 6 years since, nothing substantive has Lewis-McChord, Washington (U.S. Air Force/Sean Tobin) been done to rescind these measures. 9 The most recent House legislation of Cited in Johnson-Freese, 135. Notes 10 The Combined Arms Research Library April 2016 does not include any of the that services the Command and General Staff modest education reforms discussed in 1 See, for example, Nicholas Murray, College (CGSC) was renamed the Ike Skelton both SASC and HASC hearings held this “Finally, Official Recognition That CGSC Is Combined Arms Research Library in 2013. spring. In fact, the only two references to Broken, Bust and in the Ditch,” Foreign Policy, 11 See, for example, “Committee Assign- PME are for medical trauma and “Small September 25, 2015, available at JFQ 83, 4th Quarter 2016 Kuehn 43 Soldiers with People’s Liberation Army at Shenyang training base in China (DOD/D. Myles Cullen) Is the Chinese Army the Real Winner in PLA Reforms? By Phillip C. Saunders and John Chen round force officers run China’s Central Military Commission (CMC) tions show only a smattering of navy military, the People’s Liberation and in China’s new theater commands. white and air force blue uniforms in a G Army (PLA). About 70 percent The PLA’s history, traditions, and orga- sea of army green. of PLA soldiers serve in the PLA Army nizational culture are all built upon Despite this traditional dominance, (PLAA), and ground officers occupy the PLAA role in bringing the Chinese the PLAA has lost status, budget share, almost all senior positions on the Communist Party (CCP) to power. and end strength relative to the other ser- Until the establishment of a separate vices in recent years. Since 2004, Chinese army headquarters in January 2016, defense white papers have emphasized the Dr. Phillip C. Saunders is Director of the Center the PLA’s major organizations (the need for increased funding for the navy, for the Study of Chinese Military Affairs general departments) existed primarily air force, and Second Artillery (which (CSCMA), Institute for National Strategic 1 Studies, at the National Defense University. to serve the needs of the army. Pictures was elevated in status and renamed John Chen is a Research Intern in CSCMA and of the CMC staff or of visiting Chinese the Rocket Force in January 2016). a Graduate Student in the Security Studies National Defense University delega- “Optimizing the composition of the Program at Georgetown University. 44 Commentary / The Chinese Army and PLA Reforms JFQ 83, 4th Quarter 2016 services and arms of the PLA” has meant the ability to command assets controlled contributing to global public goods such reductions in “technologically backward” by the other services. We flesh out the as counterpiracy, counterterrorism, peace- PLAA units and personnel increases for argument that core army capabilities have keeping, and humanitarian assistance and the other services.2 Most of the 300,000 become less relevant to China’s most disaster relief operations have all figured troops that will be cut from the PLA will pressing external threats and national more prominently as PLA missions.11 come from army ranks. Moreover, the security priorities, examine why the army Consistent with this shift, China declared army is widely perceived as the likely loser failed to adapt, and highlight how new itself a “maritime power” in the 2012 in current PLA organizational reforms.3 PLA joint C2 structures may serve PLAA party congress work report and has given Elimination of the general departments institutional interests at a potential cost in maritime and overseas operations pride of and establishment of a new army com- overall operational effectiveness. place in recent defense white papers. mander and headquarters reduced the The PLAA is relevant to some of army to bureaucratic equality with the Shifting Priorities and Hu’s “New Historic Missions,” but these other services. The PLAA also lost direct Decreasing Army Relevance do not justify much manpower or the control of space and cyber units, which The collapse of the Soviet Union in acquisition of new capabilities. The army were transferred to the new Strategic 1991 and improved relations with many retains formal responsibility for the high- Support Force. neighboring countries removed China’s priority missions of maintaining domestic Current senior PLAA officers all most serious traditional military threats. stability and ensuring CCP rule, but in retained their rank and were given new With the exception of a continuing practice primary responsibility for these positions after the reforms, but there is land border dispute with India, China functions has shifted to the public secu- no guarantee that this transitional ar- currently faces no major threats on its rity forces and the People’s Armed Police rangement will continue when the next borders, reducing the salience of the (PAP).12 military command shuffle occurs in 2017. PLAA’s traditional mission of defending The 2015 defense white paper calls Some positions may be downgraded once against land invasion.6 Although the for the armed forces to protect Chinese the current incumbents leave, and the service could be called upon to respond air, land, and sea sovereignty; protect other services will press for more leader- to border contingencies in North Chinese unification; safeguard Chinese ship positions on the CMC staff. Korea, Burma, or Pakistan, China’s security in new domains; maintain re- The apparent PLAA sense of decline remaining land threats mainly involve gional and world peace; protect overseas may be intensifying. Despite President cross-border terrorism or instability in interests; maintain strategic nuclear and CMC Chairman Xi Jinping’s neighboring countries.7 deterrence; counter separatists and terror- insistence that the army plays an “ir- As land threats dissipated, China’s ists; and perform emergency rescue and replaceable” role in protecting national rapid integration into the global economy disaster relief missions.13 The 2015 white interests,4 the new PLAA commander created increasingly important national paper, along with other authoritative used his first media interview to refute interests well beyond its immediate land PLA writings such as the 2013 edition the notion that “land warfare was out- borders. The shift in China’s strategic of Science of Military Strategy, also place dated and the army is useless.” Editorials orientation toward the sea and away great emphasis on major power competi- in the PLA Daily and other outlets fol- from land threats began as early as the tion in the maritime, nuclear, space, and lowed suit shortly thereafter.5 1980s.8 Changes in China’s “Military cyber domains.14 The current reform’s emphasis on Strategic Guidelines” in 1993 reflected However, the PLAA has either lost improving the PLA’s ability to conduct an increased emphasis on Taiwan contin- or never owned the capabilities most multi-service joint operations [军种联合 gencies and protecting maritime interests relevant to a party leadership that is 作战, junzhong lianhe zuozhan] implies in the South and East China seas, all of increasingly focused on missions outside a higher status and increased funding for which required power projection capa- China’s land borders. The army does the navy, air force, Rocket Force, and the bilities as well as the capacity to forestall not have rapid reaction airborne forces new Strategic Support Force. The steady U.S. intervention in order to achieve the or the strategic lift capabilities needed decline in PLAA size, status, and rel- desired results.9 to move forces beyond China’s land evance poses an interesting puzzle: why Hu Jintao’s 2004 “New Historic borders—paratroopers and strategic would a PLA dominated by army officers Missions” [新的历史使命] marked a airlift assets both belong to the air force. acquiesce to reforms that apparently fur- clear shift in Chinese national security The PLAA does not operate long-range ther weaken the status of the service? priorities, calling for the armed forces surface-to-air missiles that can defend In this article, we argue that the to secure party rule, safeguard national Chinese airspace, does not command reforms can also be read as an effort by development, protect national interests, conventional or nuclear missile forces PLAA commanders to use new joint and promote world peace and common that can enable power projection or deter command and control (C2) arrange- development.10 Securing sea lines of com- nuclear attack, and has now ceded space ments to reassert the service’s strategic munication, protecting Chinese nationals and command, control, communications, relevance and political muscle by gaining and economic interests overseas, and computers, intelligence, surveillance, and JFQ 83, 4th Quarter 2016 Saunders and Chen 45 reconnaissance missions to the Strategic capability, and army leaders have been priorities. (The new army headquarters Support Force. willing to accept large reductions in troop will give the PLAA commander both a Even in areas where army capabili- strength to fund this modernization.16 A platform and the responsibility to advo- ties are relevant to China’s new strategic focus on improving the PLAA’s ability to cate for army priorities; the army is also focus, the PLAA faces stiff competition perform its traditional mission may have using reforms to educate soldiers about from other services. Army amphibious blinded army leaders to the increasing its future role and identity.19) units would have primary responsibility priority of other missions where army for the ground aspects of an invasion of capabilities were less relevant. Military Reforms: Expanding Taiwan, but the PLA Navy Marine Corps A PLA debate in the early 2000s Army Control at the Expense has the lead for South China Sea am- about the relative priority and sequencing of Effectiveness? phibious operations. Each service in the of “mechanization” and “informationiza- Given the PLAA’s decreasing relevance PLA operates unmanned aerial vehicles of tion” was a proxy for debates about the to new tasks and missions, the military various types for its own purposes.15 The relative priority of service missions. The reforms could be interpreted as a way PLAA has ceded many counterterrorism PLAA would have benefited most from for the PLAA to reassert its strategic missions to Ministry of Public Security a sequential approach that prioritized relevance and expand its control over forces and the PAP. Though the PLAA mechanization as a stepping stone toward other parts of the PLA. The new CMC has developed an air assault capability, informationization; the decision to pur- Joint Staff Department, which has is increasingly mechanized, and has im- sue both goals simultaneously reduced overall responsibility for joint opera- proved its ability to move forces within the PLAA’s claim on funding and allowed tions, is commanded by former Chief China, it would require considerable other services and specialized elements of the General Staff Fang Fenghui of support from other services to get to and of the PLA to stake their own claims for the PLAA. Army officers currently stay in the fight, especially if the fight is modernization resources.17 command all five theater commands outside China’s borders or across water. Beyond mechanization, the PLAA’s (and hold four of the five political com- chief modernization priority has been missar positions at the theaters).20 The Why Didn’t the Army Adapt? in developing “new type forces” better new joint C2 structure gives these army Given the slow-moving nature of suited for offensive operations. These officers full operational command over China’s strategic shift, why did the include special operations, helicopter, forces from all services during both war PLAA fail to foresee the declining rel- electronic warfare, light mechanized, and and peacetime. Under the old system, evance of its capabilities and missions long-range artillery units that may have military region commanders did not and adjust its priorities accordingly? more applicability to maritime and over- exercise peacetime operational control Three possible explanations exist for the seas missions. However, many of these over navy, air force, and Second Artil- PLAA’s current predicament. capabilities remain comparatively un- lery assets within their areas of respon- One is the historical legacy of the derdeveloped despite high prioritization sibility. Under the new system, the navy Soviet military. The PLAA was patterned and two decades of modernization, and and air force headquarters no longer on the Soviet Red Army, which placed recent army transregional exercises have have an operational command role. The ballistic missiles, surface-to-air missiles, not emphasized an expeditionary role for CMC Joint Staff Department has set and paratroopers in different organi- the PLAA.18 up a new Overseas Operations Office zations outside army control. These A third possibility is that the PLAA’s that should eventually exercise control organizational choices may not have ability to advocate for army missions over PLA forces deployed far outside struck army commanders as important and priorities may have been hindered China’s borders. concessions during the early days of the by a lack of bureaucratic coherence. An If the theater commands become People’s Republic of China, but once the “army-by-default” mentality undercut the critical proving ground for future missions and forces were ceded to other the need to create a PLAA-specific iden- PLA leaders, then the PLAA will want services, the PLAA was unable to wrest tity and mission set, and the abundant to continue to reserve these positions for these capabilities back. but diffuse army presence in the highest army officers. Going forward, the PLAA A second explanation focuses on levels of military command meant no will likely seek to define the qualifica- China’s traditional status as a continental single voice was responsible for advocat- tions for joint command assignments and power. PLAA leaders may have believed ing for army priorities. In contrast, other control the pipeline for new operational that the mission of protecting Chinese services were forced to carve out separate commanders in ways that benefit army territory from invasion was important identities, missions, and service cultures officers. Reforms in China’s military enough to justify preservation and mod- to assert their independence and to education system will create a new “op- ernization of core army capabilities. The capture resources and personnel. Once erational command track” in the PLA PLAA has focused heavily on mechaniza- established, the services would naturally National Defense University courses that tion of the army and combined arms resist any PLAA efforts to take over capa- train PLA officers for promotion to se- operations to improve ground combat bilities most relevant to new missions and nior positions.21 Attendance in command 46 Commentary / The Chinese Army and PLA Reforms JFQ 83, 4th Quarter 2016 Soldier makes fish trap during survival phase of Exercise Kowari 2016, Australian army–hosted survival skills exercise designed to increase defense cooperation between forces from the United States, Australia, and China, September 4, 2016 (Australian Defence Force/Jake Sims) track courses will likely become a re- based on the most likely missions within rogatives of the army relative to other quirement for future joint command a theater or putting together joint task services? A bureaucratic politics lens assignments. Whether that track is exclu- forces led by a commander from the produces an unexpected answer: orga- sive to or dominated by army offices will most relevant Service for the mission. nizational reforms nominally intended be a key leading indicator of whether the In contrast, the current PLA approach to improve the Chinese military’s ability PLAA will continue to hold on to the- of placing joint C2 mechanisms at the to conduct joint operations have been ater command slots and key CMC joint theater command level injects an army heavily shaped by army organizational command positions. Conversely, if the commander into the operational chain of interests and will actually expand the navy, air force, and rocket force are over- command even if the mission does not ability of PLAA commanders to control represented in those courses, this would require it. An army general heading the forces currently owned by other ser- indicate an intent to rebalance joint Southern Theater Command may not vices. The resulting C2 arrangements command positions in ways that benefit be best qualified to command forces in may be suboptimal for some kinds of officers from other services and create a South China Sea maritime disputes; his joint operations (especially those with a more joint force. presence in the chain of command adds heavy air or maritime focus). From this perspective, the PLA’s new an extra layer that subordinates must A key question going forward is joint C2 structure centered on theater navigate to include other services in plan- whether army officers will continue to commands may reflect the dominance ning and conducting operations. hold on to key joint command positions of army thinking and army institutional in the CMC Joint Staff Department and interests. In some cases, this may produce Conclusion in the theater commands, or whether of- suboptimal warfighting outcomes. The We began with a puzzle: why would ficers from other services will eventually U.S. military emphasizes flexibility in a PLA dominated by ground officers be able to stake a claim to those positions. conducting joint operations, selecting embrace joint reforms likely to reduce Will the PLAA be able to influence selec- commanders from different Services the size, status, and bureaucratic pre- tion, evaluation, and promotion criteria JFQ 83, 4th Quarter 2016 Saunders and Chen 47 11 Oriana Mastro, “China’s Military Is About to Go Global,” The National Interest, December 18, 2014. 12 See Phillip C. Saunders and Isaac Kardon, “Reconsidering the PLA as an Interest Group,” in PLA Influence on China’s National Security Policymaking, ed. Phillip C. Saunders and Andrew Scobell (Stanford, CA: Stanford Uni- versity Press, 2015), 46. 13 State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China, “China’s Military Strategy,” May 2015. 14 Ibid.; Science of Military Strategy [战略 学] (Beijing: Academy of Military Sciences, 2013). 15 Elsa Kania and Kenneth Allen, The Hu- man and Organizational Dimensions of the PLA’s Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Systems, China Brief 16, no. 8 (Washington, DC: The James- town Foundation, May 11, 2016). 16 Dennis J. Blasko, The Chinese Army Australian army–hosted Exercise Kowari 2016, at Larrakeyah Barracks, Northern Territory, Australia, Today (New York: Routledge, 2012); James focused on increasing friendship and trust between forces from the United States, Australia, and C. Mulvenon, “The PLA Army’s Struggle for China through trilateral cooperation in Asia-Pacific and Indian Ocean Rim regions, August 26, 2016 Identity,” in The People’s Liberation Army and (U.S. Marine Corps/Osvaldo L. Ortega III) China in Transition, ed. Stephen J. Flanagan and Michael E. Marti (Washington, DC: NDU for theater command and joint command the Army Is Useless,’” People’s Daily, February 16, 2016, available at 48 Commentary / The Chinese Army and PLA Reforms JFQ 83, 4th Quarter 2016 President Obama and President Xi Jinping walk on grounds of Annenberg Retreat at Sunnylands, in Rancho Mirage, California, before their bilateral meeting, June 8, 2013 (White House/Pete Souza) China’s Military Reforms An Optimistic Take By Michael S. Chase and Jeffrey Engstrom hina is implementing a sweeping fully modernized and “informatized” more even footing in the traditionally reorganization of its military that fighting force capable of carrying out army-dominated PLA and to enable C has the potential to be the most joint combat operations, conducting the military to more effectively harness important in the post-1949 history of military operations other than war space, cyberspace, and electronic the People’s Liberation Army (PLA).1 (MOOTW), and providing a powerful warfare capabilities. Simultaneously, Xi Xi Jinping, who serves as China’s presi- strategic deterrent to prevent challenges is looking to rein in PLA corruption dent, general secretary of the Chinese to China’s interests and constrain and assert his control over the military. Communist Party, and chairman of the the decisions of potential adversaries. Central Military Commission (CMC), Scheduled for completion by 2020, the Brief Overview of the Reforms seeks to transform the PLA into a reforms aim to place the services on a China unveiled the long-anticipated organizational reforms in a series of major announcements beginning on Dr. Michael S. Chase is a Senior Political Scientist at RAND, Adjunct Professor in the School of December 31, 2015, when it subor- Advanced and International Studies at The Johns Hopkins University, and Adjunct Professor at dinated the ground force to an army Georgetown University. Jeffrey Engstrom is a Senior Project Associate at RAND. JFQ 83, 4th Quarter 2016 Chase and Engstrom 49 service headquarters, raised the stature in the direction of positioning the PLA to set up a theater that might span mul- and role of the strategic missile force, away from the dominance of army-centric tiple MRs.4 Under the new system, the and established a Strategic Support thinking and leadership. It also empha- theater command for wartime is already Force (SSF) to integrate space, cyber, sizes the contributions of other services, stood up. The theater command is the and electronic warfare capabilities. On and, along with the reduction of 300,000 “top joint operational commanding January 11, 2016, Xi announced “a dra- troops Xi announced in September 2015, institution,” and therefore the theater matic breakthrough . . . in the reform it likely cuts fat and frees resources to commander is also the joint forces com- of the military leadership and command build air force, rocket force, and navy ca- mander.5 The theater commander and system” that discarded the PLA’s pabilities.3 Another benefit of the ground his staff presumably are already keenly four traditional general departments force focusing more heavily on its own attuned to the particular threats in their in favor of 15 new CMC functional requirements rather than those of the command and, other than potential relo- departments.2 Next, the reorganiza- entire PLA could be accelerating efforts cation to a wartime command post, are tion eliminated China’s seven military to transform it into a leaner force more immediately ready to prosecute a conflict regions (MRs) and converted them into capable of carrying out joint combat op- with forces currently existing within five theater commands. This part of the erations and MOOTW. the theater command and those that restructuring is intended to enhance Optimizing Organizational may have been sent from other theater the PLA’s readiness and strengthen its Structures for Combat. The second major commands. deterrence and warfighting capabili- benefit of the reforms derives from the In addition, the theater command ties. In addition, the CMC released a elimination of MRs and their replacement structure allows the PLA to truly imple- “guideline on deepening national with theater commands. The purpose of ment the active defense strategy as a defense and military reform,” which reorganizing the military regions into a preemptive posture. The former system states that under the new system, the smaller number of theater commands is to of enacting wartime theaters placed a pre- CMC is in charge of overall administra- improve the PLA’s ability to prepare for mium on China either starting a conflict tion of the PLA, People’s Armed Police, and execute modern, high-intensity joint itself or anticipating conflict well before it militia, and reserves; the new joint war military operations. For many years, PLA occurred. Conflict or aggression that was zone commands focus on combat pre- officers have perceived the old MR-based either unforeseen or occurred with little paredness, and the services are in charge command structure as outdated and not lead time immediately placed China into of development (presumably of person- well suited to winning the kinds of con- a reactive and defensive posture. Early nel and capabilities). flicts they think the PLA may need to be iterations of the People’s War strategy prepared for in the future. recognized China’s own limitations in its Likely Benefits of the Reforms Theater commands now directly ability to fight technologically superior The reforms are likely to offer benefits focus on the specific strategic directions adversaries under these circumstances, in several areas, including achieving determined by potential external threats. tacitly accepting that potential invaders enhanced jointness, optimizing orga- Instead of two MRs dealing with a hypo- would necessarily encroach upon China’s nizational structures for combat, and thetical India conflict, there is now one. territorial sovereignty. Though substantial ensuring information dominance. Instead of three MRs bordering Russia, military modernization efforts by the PLA Achieving Enhanced Jointness. One there are now only two, and one shares over the last few decades had already ren- important aspect of the reforms is that only an approximately 30-mile border. In dered Maoist doctrine on this topic moot, the ground force is becoming a real this way, the external threat environment the theater command structure provides service. Historically, the PLA’s ground arguably has shaped the development the required organizational framework to service component lacked a headquarters of the theaters in a profound way that enact an active defense posture. and instead dominated the entire mili- never appeared to be a rationale for any Ensuring Information Dominance. tary by controlling all four of the PLA’s of the previous and varied configura- A third major benefit could be realized general departments, which doubled as tions of MRs since the founding of the if the creation of the Strategic Support its de facto headquarters. Under the new PRC. Seams, however, still exist. The Force—which is responsible for cyber, system, however, the army will now pos- Sino-Vietnamese border region appears space, electronic warfare, and intelligence, sess its own headquarters—referred to as unchanged by this restructuring, with surveillance, and reconnaissance—offers the PLA Army Leading Organ—and will two theater commands replacing two improved flexibility and responsiveness be on par with the PLA’s naval, air, and military regions. that enhance the PLA’s ability to fight newly formed strategic missile service. Transition from peacetime to war- multi-domain conflicts. This recognizes The main goals in this respect appear time command will be easier. Under the the need for such forces, places them to be to reduce army domination and former system, the MR commander was within a clear command structure, and improve the PLA’s jointness. To this end, not necessarily the wartime theater com- likely provides additional resources and giving the ground force its own head- mander. This individual would likely be intra-service stature (from a general staff quarters appears to be an important step appointed by the CMC and sanctioned department to a force). 50 Commentary / China’s Military Reforms: An Optimistic Take JFQ 83, 4th Quarter 2016 Anti-corruption campaign began after conclusion of 18th National Congress of the Communist Party of China held in Beijing, November 2012 (Dong Fang) Indeed, this may be the least surprising Success Likely Despite served as CMC vice chairmen, and change, as the emphasis on information Expected Opposition their arrests marked the first time the warfare has captured the attention of the Xi’s anti-corruption campaign is part of PLA’s highest-level retired officers faced PLA since at least the mid-1990s. The an effort aimed at strengthening party corruption charges. As of early March current conception of “winning infor- (and his own) control over the PLA. 2016, Xi’s anti-corruption campaign mationized local wars” recognizes the When Xi assumed power in November had reportedly resulted in the arrest of centrality of information and the informa- 2012, he vowed to fight both “tigers” at least 60 military officers, although tion domain as a battlefield in modern and “flies”—a reference to taking on the actual numbers could be higher. warfare. The creation of such forces is corrupt leaders at the highest levels as Another reflection of Xi’s determina- driven by the reality that national-level well as lower level bureaucrats engaged tion to strengthen his control came when assets must perform many information in corrupt practices throughout the he drew a direct line between the era of functions in warfare. Furthermore, it Chinese system, and the PLA would be Mao Zedong and the present at a major would be unrealistic and unnecessary no exception. The first shot over the meeting in November 2014. In com- to recreate many of these functions and bow came against the tigers. In 2014, memoration of the 85th anniversary of the capabilities under each theater command. Xi arrested a former CMC vice chair- “Gutian Congress,” at which Mao first Lastly, many of the SSF’s capabilities in the man, Xu Caihou, for participating in a affirmed the “party’s absolute control cyber and space domains, if used, could “cash for ranks” scheme. After expel- over the military” in 1929, Xi convened be extremely escalatory. For all of these ling Xu from the party, Xi followed up 420 of his most senior officers to meet in factors, the SSF appears to be directly (and in 2015 with the arrest and purge of the small town of Gutian in southeastern appropriately) subordinate to the CMC another former CMC vice chairman, Fujian Province.7 This was believed to be rather than a theater command or service. Guo Boxiong, on similar charges. The the first time a PRC leader reconvened However, it appears likely that units within arrests were unprecedented in that Xu military leadership at Gutian since Mao’s the theaters will be under operational con- and Guo were the two highest-ranking famous meeting there—symbolism that trol of the theater commander.6 officers in China’s military when they was certainly not lost on the top brass. JFQ 83, 4th Quarter 2016 Chase and Engstrom 51 Prior reading material reportedly reaf- aimed at transforming it into a leaner Military Committee (CMC) include the Gen- eral Office, Joint Staff Department, Political firmed the unassailable and preeminent and more modern military that is more Work Department, Logistic Support Depart- position the party has over the military. capable of carrying out joint operations. ment, Equipment Development Department, This set the stage for Xi to implicitly There are clear indications that Beijing Training and Administration Department, convey to all in attendance that they too expects some internal opposition to the National Defense Mobilization Department, could become victims of his anti-corrup- reorganization, but Xi Jinping’s unprec- Discipline Inspection Commission, Politics and Law Commission, Science and Technology tion campaign, just as General Xu had edented anti-corruption campaign Commission, Office for Strategic Planning, Of- a few months earlier, if they refused to probably gives him the leverage he fice for Reform and Organizational Structure, toe the line. Indeed, the anti-corruption needs to overcome entrenched opposi- Office for International Military Cooperation, campaign is probably the most important tion. The reorganization will have a Audit Office, and Agency for Offices Adminis- source of Xi’s power over the PLA. major impact on the PLA’s ability to tration. 3 Evidence of this is having an immediate prepare for and execute its main func- trickledown effect on the enrollment at the Unanswered Questions tions of strategic deterrence, combat PLA’s military schools; one newspaper article While the reorganization appears to operations, and MOOTW. reports that schools focusing on ground force offer a number of important benefits to Importantly, despite some speculation competencies such as infantry and artillery the PLA, several important questions to the contrary, Xi’s assertion of control will see a reduction in admission of 24 percent whereas aviation, missile, and naval schools remain unanswered. These include: over the military in the form of the anti- will increase admissions by 14 percent. See corruption campaign and organizational •• What impact will the anti-corruption “PLA Restructuring Changes Focus at Military reforms is more likely to enhance than Schools,” China Daily, April 28, 2016. campaign have on military effective- it is to impede the PLA’s ongoing mod- 4 This individual could be a commander of ness? Specifically, is it weeding out ernization efforts. Part of Xi’s “China one of the military regions adjacent to conflict the bad apples, or does it have a as it was with Xu Shiyou and Li Desheng for Dream” is to produce a strong military chilling effect on potentially dynamic the Southern and Northern Theaters, respec- capable of deterring or, if necessary, tak- senior officers that the PLA will need tively, during the 1979 Sino-Vietnamese War, ing on powerful potential adversaries, or the CMC could appoint a senior general if it is to be successful in fighting and including even the United States. officer from another command entirely, as it did winning wars? Xi not only wants a PLA that dem- with Peng Dehuai during the Korean War. Will ground force personnel con- 5 “Spokesperson: PLA’s Theater Command •• onstrates utmost loyalty to the party, but tinue to dominate most of the top Adjustment and Establishment Accomplished,” he also wants a far more competent and positions in the PLA even under the China Military Online, February 2, 2016. operationally capable PLA by 2020, one 6 Saunders and Wuthnow, 3. reforms, or will this change over the that is commensurate with China’s status 7 James C. Mulvenon, “Hotel Gutian: We next several years as a result of future as a major world power and capable of Haven’t Had That Spirit Here Since 1929,” retirements and promotions under China Leadership Monitor, no. 46 (Winter protecting China’s regional and global in- the reforms? For example, will a PLA 2015). terests. If his aspirations are realized, Xi’s Navy, PLA Air Force, or PLA Rocket reformed PLA will soon be capable of Force officer serve in a position such posing an even more potent challenge to as commander of one of the new China’s neighbors and to U.S. objectives theater commands or director of the and strategy in the region. JFQ new Joint Staff Department under the CMC? •• Does the focus on the reorganiza- Notes tion and changes such as reshuffling of former MR commanders to new 1 See, for example, Phillip C. Saunders and theaters cast doubt on the PLA’s Joel Wuthnow, China’s Goldwater-Nichols? As- ability to prosecute conflict at its sessing PLA Organizational Reforms, Strategic borders, at least in the short run? Forum 294 (Washington, DC: NDU Press, April 2016), available at 52 Commentary / China’s Military Reforms: An Optimistic Take JFQ 83, 4th Quarter 2016 Littoral combat ship USS Fort Worth conducts routine patrols in international waters of South China Sea near Spratly Islands as People’s Liberation Army Navy guided-missile frigate Yancheng sails close behind, May 11, 2015 (U.S. Navy/Conor Minto) Chinese Military Reforms A Pessimistic Take By Roger Cliff n the evening of May 21, 1941, proved to be virtually unsinkable by recent changes to the organizational the German battleship Bismarck, naval gunfire; it ultimately absorbed structure of China’s military have made O escorted by the heavy cruiser more than 400 direct hits from naval clear improvements, but do nothing to Prinz Eugen, departed the Norwegian guns, roughly a quarter of which address its most important weaknesses. port of Bergen, intending to conduct were main battery rounds from other commerce raiding against Allied mer- battleships, without sinking. And yet Recent Changes chant shipping in the Atlantic Ocean. less than 6 days into its first combat Over the past few months the leadership The Bismarck was the world’s largest mission, the Bismarck had nonetheless of China’s military has announced several warship in operation at the time and been sunk. Better armor or a more major changes to the organizational powerful armament might have made structure of the People’s Liberation the Bismarck even more dangerous and Army (PLA). One change has been the Dr. Roger Cliff is a Senior Research Scientist at difficult to sink, but would not have dismantling of the four “general depart- the Center for Naval Analyses. prevented it from being sunk. Similarly, ments” that formerly served as both the JFQ 83, 4th Quarter 2016 Cliff 53 headquarters of the PLA Army (PLAA) staff functions previously performed by fundamental flaws remain that, in a and as a joint staff for the entire military. the general departments to the CMC conflict, would likely prevent the PLA Most joint staff–type functions have been eliminate the inherent institutional bias from effectively employing its weaponry, moved to the Central Military Commis- caused by having a single organization personnel, and training. Most crucially, sion (CMC) while a separate PLAA head- responsible for both PLA army specific the operational doctrine of the PLA is quarters has been created, comparable to and joint functions. Elevating the PLA inconsistent with both its organizational the headquarters of the PLA Navy, Air Rocket Force to the level of a full- culture and its organizational structure. Force, and Rocket Force (formerly known fledged service increases its stature and as the Second Artillery Force), to oversee influence relative to the other services Organizational Structure the PLAA. In addition, the Rocket Force in general and helps counterbalance Organizational theorists use several has been elevated in stature from an inde- the PLAA dominance in particular. The general characteristics to describe an pendent branch (兵种) to a full-fledged creation of the Strategic Support Force organization’s structure. One is orga- service (军种). A new organization, the may further dilute the influence of the nizational height (that is, the number Strategic Support Force (战略保障部队), army. And creating theater commands, of organizational layers between the has been created and is apparently inde- in the place of collections of single- lowest ranking person and the highest pendent of the four services, although service organizations that just happen to ranking person in an organization). precisely how it will be organized and be located in the same place, means that To operate at maximum efficiency, an function are unclear as of this writing. the PLA can now conduct truly joint organization should have the small- The other major area of organiza- operations at the theater level. est number of layers needed to ensure tional change has been the replacement These changes have rightly been that supervisors at each level have no of the former seven military region recognized as insufficient to achieve true more direct subordinates than they can commands (军区) by five theater com- jointness. The key remaining obstacle adequately manage. The optimal height mands (战区). Aside from the enlarged is continued army dominance of PLA of a specific organization depends on its geographic areas of responsibility, a key command organizations, even if those or- size and the nature of its activities, but difference between the new theater com- ganizations are now officially joint. Once in general adding organizational layers mands and old military region commands reason for this is that even if all 300,000 tends to reduce efficiency. In this regard is that the former are explicitly designed troops to be eliminated from the PLA, the PLA’s recent structural changes do to be joint headquarters similar to the as announced in September 2015, are not appear to have made a significant geographic combatant command head- members of the army, more than half of difference. One organizational level, the quarters of the U.S. military. Under the the remaining PLA personnel will still general departments, was eliminated, old system, although the commanders of be army personnel. Thus everything else but their functions were simply moved the military region air forces (MRAFs) being equal, on average more than half up to the CMC—in effect adding a layer and, if applicable, PLA Navy fleets who the qualified personnel available to fill po- to the CMC’s chain of command—and were based in a military region were sitions in joint organizations will be from horizontally, in the creation of the deputy commanders of the military re- the army. Continued army dominance PLAA headquarters. Comparison with gion, the MRAFs and fleets themselves appears to be the result of more than the U.S. military, however, suggests that were not subordinate to the commander just the numbers of available personnel, the PLA’s structure is not overly “tall.” of the military region but rather to the however, as all the commanders and four The PLA has roughly the same number headquarters of the PLA Air Force and of the five political commissars of the of organizational layers between top Navy. Now each theater command has ostensibly joint theater commands are commanders and frontline troops, even established a joint command post and, PLAA officers.1 though the PLA will have roughly 50 presumably, at least in a small-scale con- Even if the dominance of the PLAA percent more personnel than the U.S. tingency, the PLA Air Force, Navy, and is gradually reduced over time, however, military even after the current round Rocket Force forces in a region would the PLA faces more serious challenges of troop reductions. Thus, there does be under the command of the theater than a lack of jointness, and the recent not appear to be a need for the PLA to commander. organizational changes do nothing to re- eliminate organizational layers. solve these challenges and, in some cases, Other characteristics used to de- Assessment make them worse. scribe an organization’s structure are its These changes have rightly been recog- The PLA has made significant im- degrees of centralization, standardiza- nized as significant steps toward resolv- provements in many areas over the past tion, and horizontal integration. The ing some longstanding problems caused two decades in an effort to transform type of organization that is optimal for by the PLA’s previous organizational itself into an effective, modern fighting a military in these dimensions depends structure, particularly in the area of force. These improvements have been on the nature of its operational doctrine. “jointness.” Creating a separate PLAA greatest in the areas of personnel quality, If the military’s doctrine emphasizes headquarters and moving the joint weaponry, and training. Nonetheless, maneuver and indirection, such as the 54 Commentary / Chinese Military Reforms: A Pessimistic Take JFQ 83, 4th Quarter 2016 Marines, assigned to 31st Marine Expeditionary Unit, fire M4 service rifles during exercise on flight deck of USS Bonhomme Richard, currently under way conducting operations in U.S. 7th Fleet area of responsibility, February 10, 2015 (U.S. Navy/Matthew Dickinson) Israeli military and German army during maneuver. Authoritative PLA publica- the PLA has low levels of horizontal in- the early part of World War II, then it tions advocate avoiding directly engaging tegration, with most personnel spending needs an organization that is decentral- an adversary’s main forces and instead their entire careers within a single chain ized, has a low degree of standardization conducting “focal point” strikes on of command and most units having only (that is, allows its personnel to deviate targets such as command and control infrequent contact with units outside from standard practices as the situa- centers, information systems, transporta- their chain of command. Thus there is tion warrants), and has a high degree tion hubs, and logistics systems, with the a fundamental incompatibility between of horizontal integration so that field goal of rendering the adversary “blind” the nature of the PLA’s doctrine and its commanders can coordinate directly and “paralyzed.” The transient and organizational structure. with their local counterparts in other unpredictable nature of opportunities to The recent structural changes to the units and services without having to get attack such targets means that effectively PLA have done little to alter this incom- approval all the way up and down their implementing this doctrine requires an patibility. The joint command posts set respective chains of command. But if the agile organization that is decentralized, up in each theater employ tens of person- military has a doctrine that emphasizes has a low degree of standardization, nel drawn from each of the services. For direct engagement (that is, defeating and has a high degree of horizontal in- many of these personnel, working in the an enemy through direct assaults on his tegration. By all accounts, however, the command post will be the first time they main forces, such as most of the U.S. PLA has precisely the opposite type of have had to work with personnel from and Soviet armies during World War organization. The PLA is highly central- another service. If the average term of II), then it needs an organization that is ized, with low-level officers and enlisted assignment to a joint command post lasts, highly centralized, has a high degree of personnel having limited authority to for instance, 3 years, then in 15 years’ standardization, and has a low degree of make their own decisions. The PLA is time there may be several thousand PLA horizontal integration. highly standardized, with minimal lati- members, mostly officers, who are experi- Since 1999 the PLA has had a doc- tude for individuals or sub-organizations enced working with personnel from other trine that emphasizes indirection and to deviate from prescribed practices. And services and branches. This will expand JFQ 83, 4th Quarter 2016 Cliff 55 their personal networks beyond their with a doctrine that emphasizes maneu- training over the past two decades. This own chains of command and strengthen ver and indirection needs an organiza- is not to say that the PLA would not their ability to communicate and coor- tional structure that is decentralized, be a dangerous and formidable foe for dinate their actions with members of has low levels of standardization, and the armed forces of the United States other branches and services. These will has high levels of horizontal integra- or other nation. After all, the Bismarck represent a tiny percentage of the several tion, it needs an organizational culture sank a British battlecruiser and damaged hundred thousand officers and two that values initiative, innovation and a battleship before itself being sunk, but million members of the PLA, however, creativity, adaptability and flexibility, it would be a flawed giant, vulnerable to and will not address the fact that, unless and risk-taking. But these are among an adversary that can exploit its weak- current PLA personnel practices change, the qualities that are least valued by nesses. JFQ the vast majority of PLA members will PLA organizational culture. The recent not have experience working in, or with, structural changes, moreover, the effects another division, much less a unit in a dif- of which are to increase central control Notes ferent military region or service than the over the PLA, are likely to result in a 1 ones in which they have spent their entire further discouragement of initiative, The fifth political commissar spent most of his career in the People’s Liberation Army career. innovation and creativity, adaptability (PLA) before transferring to the PLA Air Force. Other aspects of the recent structural and flexibility, and risk-taking. Thus, 2 See Phillip C. Saunders and Joel Wuth- changes, moreover, are designed to the recent structural changes have likely now, China’s Goldwater-Nichols? Assessing PLA increase the centralization of the PLA, made this weakness of the PLA worse Organizational Reforms, Strategic Forum 294 not decrease it. Abolishing the general as well. (Washington, DC: NDU Press, April 2016), 6, available at 56 Commentary / Chinese Military Reforms: A Pessimistic Take JFQ 83, 4th Quarter 2016 Chinese Su-27 Flanker fighter makes fly-by at Anshan Airfield, China, March 24, 2007 (DOD/D. Myles Cullen) Strategic Support Force. Establishment of a separate headquarters will move the PLA Reforms and PLAA to a bureaucratic structure and sta- tus equivalent with the other services and ostensibly reduce army dominance within China’s Nuclear Forces the PLA. Most senior positions within the new theater commands and the re- By David C. Logan structured Central Military Commission (CMC), however, are staffed by PLAA officers, so the effectiveness of this change remains to be seen.2 The exact hina is in the midst of sweeping Rocket Force appears to be the service role and mission of the Strategic Support military reforms that will affect least affected by the reforms. Force are still unclear but have been the force structure, adminis- C described as “the core of China’s in- tration, and command and control PLA-Wide Reforms formation warfare force” and appear to mechanisms of the People’s Liberation The Rocket Force’s creation did not have control over a range of space, cyber, Army (PLA). The reforms have the dual occur in isolation, but in the context electronic warfare, and communications goals of tightening political control of reforms that affected the missions capabilities.3 The Strategic Support Force and improving the military’s ability to and command arrangements for nearly has reportedly also been tasked with col- conduct joint operations. Among the all the Chinese military. The scope and laborating with industry to develop more major steps is the creation of the new significance of PLA reforms have been high-tech capabilities.4 PLA Rocket Force, which replaced the likened to those of the Goldwater-Nich- The PLA also replaced its old system former Second Artillery in controlling ols Department of Defense Reorganiza- of seven military regions (MRs) with five China’s nuclear forces and land-based tion Act of 1986.1 new theater commands. Under the old ballistic and cruise missiles. Despite The Rocket Force was created along- system, the air force, navy, and Second much attention paid to its new name side other new organizations, including a Artillery maintained peacetime control of and higher organizational status, the PLA Army (PLAA) headquarters and the their units, with command and control of air force and navy assets transferring to the war zone commander in the event of David C. Logan is a Graduate Student in the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International 5 Affairs at Princeton University and a Research Intern in the Center for the Study of Chinese Military actual conflict. By contrast, theater com- Affairs, Institute for National Strategic Studies, at the National Defense University. manders will command ground, naval, JFQ 83, 4th Quarter 2016 Logan 57 and air forces assigned to their theaters China’s nuclear program, moving from nuclear capability at the minimum level during peace and war. The relationship first-generation, silo-based, liquid-fueled, required for safeguarding its national se- between the services and the theater single-warhead missiles to an arsenal curity.”13 In describing the Rocket Force, commands appears similar to the U.S. ar- increasingly featuring road-mobile, solid- China’s leader, Xi Jinping, used language rangement, with the services responsible fueled missiles, some capable of carrying identical to that applied to the Second for organizing, training, and equipping multiple warheads. China has also begun Artillery in the past, describing the new units as a “force provider” and the theater to develop and deploy a ballistic missile Rocket Force as “a fundamental force for commands responsible for operational submarine (SSBN) force, though it is un- our country’s strategic deterrent, a stra- planning and execution.6 clear what, if any, relationship it has with tegic pillar for our country’s great power Experts have suggested a number China’s land-based nuclear forces. status, and an important cornerstone in of drivers for the recent reforms.7 Compared with the other services, the protecting our national security.”14 The Reshuffling the PLA’s bureaucratic and Second Artillery had distinctive command same rhetorical formulation was repeated administrative functions could be an at- and control arrangements. Prior to the by Xi in his 2012 address to the Second tempt to eliminate corruption within the reforms, MR commanders did not exercise Artillery, suggesting the fundamental role force and to enhance political control of peacetime command over naval and air of the new Rocket Force will mirror that the military. Operationally, the reforms forces in their region; these units would be of its predecessor.15 appear aimed at creating a force better reassigned only to a war zone headquar- Operational Command and Control. able to conduct the joint operations ters (usually led by an MR commander) The military reforms have resulted in a needed to “fight and win informationized during an actual conflict. In contrast, significant change in theater command local wars.” The upgrading of the Second Second Artillery officers were not dual- and control, moving the PLA toward Artillery to the Rocket Force is one piece hatted as MR deputy commanders. Both a model resembling the relationship of these broader reforms. wartime and peacetime command and between the U.S. Services and the com- control were highly centralized from the batant commands, in which the services The Former Second Artillery CMC. Some have even described a “skip train and equip the military forces, which The Second Artillery was created in echelon” system in which superior levels of are then commanded by the theater com- 1966, just 2 years after China’s first command can bypass intermediate com- mands (zhanqu) in actual operations.16 successful nuclear test at Lop Nor.8 mand units and communicate directly with This relationship is captured by the new Though work had begun on China’s lowest-level units.12 Under such a system, 12-character phrase used to describe the missile systems a decade earlier, the the CMC might communicate directly new organizational relationships after Second Artillery was given responsibility with launch brigades in the field. the reforms: the CMC is responsible for for wielding these weapons. It was not overall force management, the theater an official military service (junzhong), The Rocket Force: More commands are responsible for operations, but rather an “independent branch Continuity than Change and the services are responsible for force- [bingzhong] that is considered equal While the reforms include dramatic building (军委管总, 战区主战, 军种主).17 to the services.”9 Though the Second changes in the command and control The command and control structures of Artillery gradually attained most of the arrangements of the other services, the Rocket Force, again, appear largely trappings of a full-fledged service, its the Rocket Force appears largely unchanged. official organizational status remained untouched. Reports have emphasized First, mainland commentary on the “one-half notch lower in bureaucratic continuity both in China’s nuclear poli- Rocket Force has consistently emphasized rank.”10 In official documents, refer- cies and in Rocket Force command and the need for strong central control. In ences to the Second Artillery were less control arrangements. announcing the creation of the Rocket common than to the services, and its Nuclear Strategy and Policy. Media Force, media reports have reiterated the personnel wore army uniforms. reports and official statements consis- importance of centralized high-level com- The Second Artillery underwent a tently emphasize that the creation of the mand for strategic missile forces.18 An significant change in its mission and force Rocket Force will not entail a change in article in Rocket Force News stated that the structure over the last 25 years. Though China’s fundamental nuclear strategy, and Rocket Force is “a strategic military service it originally focused on nuclear missions, especially not a change in its no-first-use directly controlled and used by the Central the 1990s saw the introduction of the policy. Reporting on the creation of the Party Committee, the Central Military first conventionally armed units. Today, Rocket Force, a China Daily article stated Commission, and Chairman Xi.”19 These it is estimated that China possesses more that China’s nuclear policy would remain comments suggest that centralized com- than 1,200 conventional missiles, com- unchanged: “Reiterating the no-first-use mand continues to extend not only to pared to under 300 nuclear ones.11 Along nuclear weapons policy and the country’s nuclear units but also conventional ones. with the rapid growth of its convention- defensive nuclear strategy, [Ministry Second, reports about the relation- ally armed forces, the Second Artillery of National Defense Spokesman] Yang ship between the services and the theater conducted an extensive modernization of [Yujun] said China always keeps its commands are notable for the absence 58 Commentary / PLA Reforms and China’s Nuclear Forces JFQ 83, 4th Quarter 2016 People’s Liberation Army Navy marines stand at attention following demonstration of brigade’s capabilities (U.S. Marine Corps/J.J. Harper) of references to the Rocket Force. For between the Rocket Force and theater had six missile bases commanding launch example, according to media reports, commands emphasize coordination brigades and a seventh responsible for the new theater commands will have between the Rocket Force and theater nuclear warhead storage and handling. dedicated forces from the army, navy, commands, eschewing any language Of the six operational bases, four were and air force. However, those reports did suggesting direct command authority believed to command launch brigades not mention forces of the newly formed from the theater command to Rocket garrisoned in different military regions. Rocket Force, suggesting that its units Force units.23 A mock order in a training For example, Base 51, headquartered in will remain with their home bases.20 The drill used the word coordinate (peihe) to Shenyang, oversaw not only two nuclear- theater commands are reported to have describe the unit’s activities in relation armed launch brigades garrisoned in the two deputy commanders from “each of to the theater command’s units (zhanqu former Shenyang MR but also one nu- the three service branches,” presumably budui). A photo essay reporting on clear-armed launch brigade garrisoned in not including the Rocket Force.21 In Rocket Force joint training hosted on the the former Beijing MR and one conven- addition, a report on the recent reforms Web site of the newly created Southern tionally armed launch brigade garrisoned and the role of the theater commands Theater Command stated that Rocket in the former Jinan MR.25 A similar com- stated that “each Theater Command’s Force units conducted operations “ac- mand geography involving Rocket Force Army organ, Navy organ, and Air Force cording to newly revised joint operations bases commanding brigades in multiple organ cadres must talk about how to war plans with the relevant units of each theater commands appears to be in place deeply grasp the strategic intentions of of the other services,” again suggesting a after the recent military reforms.26 Chairman Xi and the CMC.”22 Though role of independent support rather than A review of open-source references this makes reference to institutions that command subordination.24 to Rocket Force Military Unit Cover came into existence only after the reforms One indicator of the Second Designators (MUCD) suggests there also (the theater commands and theater com- Artillery’s relative independence vis-à-vis has not been a change in which launch mands’ army organs), the Rocket Force is the military regions was the fact that brigades are assigned to which missile notably absent. the command geography of the Second bases. A change in MUCDs would imply Third, reports on training intended Artillery did not map directly onto the a change in the number or organization to improve the operational relationship former MR borders. The Second Artillery of launch brigades. However, a review of JFQ 83, 4th Quarter 2016 Logan 59 2016 Internet references to the MUCDs Rocket Force members have stressed erbate this problem. It may be difficult of Second Artillery units showed that the the independence and prestige that come to coordinate the actions of Rocket internal organizational structure of the with its new status. The Rocket Force has Force missile brigades and those forces Rocket Force’s launch brigades mirrors reportedly already begun implementing assigned directly to a theater command that of the Second Artillery. the internal bureaucratic adjustments in a fast-moving crisis without clear necessary to elevate it to the status of a command authorities and an integrated Elevation to Independent full military service,29 including a roll-out communications network. The need Service of new Rocket Force uniforms.30 Internal to coordinate with other services will Much of the reporting on the new Rocket Force reports highlight the fact likely grow as the conflict progresses. Rocket Force has focused on its new that Chairman Xi personally chose the This could be especially relevant in any status as a service. Whereas the Second name of the Rocket Force and bestowed future Taiwan contingency or opera- Artillery was an independent branch, a new flag to the force.31 An article pub- tions seeking to employ China’s anti- the newly formed Rocket Force is a full- lished in Rocket Force News reflecting on access/area-denial assets, which would fledged military service on par with the the significance of the force’s elevation require significant coordination among others. This may lead to an expansion of to the level of a military service noted China’s air, sea, and missile forces. both personnel and mission set. that “the status of the Rocket Force as The PLA could have mirrored the In some respects, the formal eleva- a military service is getting more im- changes to navy and air force command tion of the Rocket Force to the level of a portant than ever before.”32 The article and control arrangements by transfer- service merely codifies its de facto status. predicted the Rocket Force would see ring operational control of Rocket The Second Artillery’s organizational changes in force structure, status, and Force conventional units to the theater clout had steadily grown in the last 15 missions. Specifically, “the value and the commands while keeping nuclear units years. Prior to the creation of the Rocket capability of the Rocket Force should lie under the strict centralized control of the Force, the Second Artillery commander in the strengthening of the credible and force. PLA leadership, however, clearly and other Second Artillery senior leaders reliable nuclear deterrence and nuclear eschewed such a choice (or Second enjoyed ranks and grades equivalent to counterstrike capabilities referenced by Artillery leaders were able to resist such those of their counterparts in the services. Chairman Xi, along with strengthening efforts). Past attempts to place missile In 2004, Jing Zhiyuan, then-commander the establishment of intermediate-range units within other services appear to of the Second Artillery, and his navy and and long-range precision strike forces and have ended in failure. For example, in air force counterparts became ex officio enhancing counterbalancing abilities.”33 the late 1990s, an army artillery brigade members of the CMC. Rocket Force A Rocket Force political instructor, was transformed into a short-range bal- representation on the CMC continues writing about the reforms, stated that the listic missile brigade armed with DF-11 today under Commander Wei Fenghe. elevation to the level of a military service missiles otherwise operated only by the The Second Artillery had the same con- would bring commensurate transforma- Second Artillery.35 A second similar bri- stellation of bureaucratic structures as the tion of the force’s structure and elevation gade was formed sometime later. But in services, including a Political Department, of its mission, writing that the new status 2010, both of these brigades were trans- Logistics Department, Armaments as a full-fledged service means that “the ferred to the Second Artillery.36 Department, and Command Academy. Rocket Force is no longer a paper tiger, PLA leadership might have decided Despite this trend, many reports on placing missiles on launch platforms to that maintaining the current force struc- the new Rocket Force have emphasized scare the adversary, but rather is a stra- ture exploits economies of scale and the significance of the force’s higher sta- tegic iron fist ready anytime to launch operational synergies. Some of the missile tus as a service. Previous writings about missiles to intimidate the enemy,” per- systems operated by the Rocket Force the Second Artillery’s role in joint cam- haps suggesting a greater warfighting role include both conventional and nuclear paigns noted that while strikes conducted for the force.34 variants. Even missiles of different systems by Second Artillery units would be may share logistics, maintenance, and central to the importance of any opera- Implications training requirements. Transferring con- tion, the Second Artillery as an institution Despite the reform’s emphasis on joint trol of conventional units to the theater would largely play an auxiliary or sup- command and control arrangements, commands would likely have required porting role to the services.27 However, a Rocket Force command and control the creation of parallel and redundant professor at the Rocket Force Command appears to remain highly centralized structures. As one expert notes, “person- Academy predicted that the new force and not delegated to theater command- nel, logistics, and training requirements would be able to “fight independently” ers, which may hamper effectiveness for only two SRBM [short-range ballistic rather than merely “support[ing] other in future joint campaigns. The greater missile] brigades proved unwieldy for forces, a definition that is incompatible institutional independence of the the army when most SRBM units are as- with the Rocket Force’s capacity and Rocket Force vis-à-vis both the theater signed to the Second Artillery.”37 actual role.”28 commands and other services may exac- 60 Commentary / PLA Reforms and China’s Nuclear Forces JFQ 83, 4th Quarter 2016 There may also be operational reasons Conversely, the Rocket Force main- Force, and their importance as strategic for maintaining current command and tains a comparative advantage over the assets argues for strict centralized control. control arrangements for conventional other services in the nuclear realm. China’s sweeping military reforms missile units. Theater commands lead- Chinese leadership views about the have ushered in substantial changes ers, who are all army officers, probably limited utility of nuclear weapons and in the relative status and relationships lack familiarity with missile operations guidance to build a “lean and effective” between different parts of the People’s and Rocket Force units. CMC leaders, nuclear deterrent imply a cap on the size Liberation Army. The Rocket Force has including Xi Jinping, may also want of nuclear forces and the missions as- emerged as arguably the biggest winner to maintain tight central control over signed to them.41 However, the Rocket in the reforms. The navy and air force lost China’s conventional and nuclear mis- Force could seek to capitalize on its operational control of their forces to the sile systems given their unique ability unique nuclear role in a number of ways. theater commands, and the army suffered to strike targets abroad and potentially First, it could push China’s leadership a reduction in both formal status and initiate a conflict due to carelessness or to expand the role of nuclear forces and administrative power after the dissolution poor judgment. The accidental launch in argue for an expanded force structure and of the General Staff Department. The July of a Taiwanese anti-ship missile that mission set in ways that could potentially Rocket Force, on the other hand, appears killed a fisherman provided a sobering re- lead to more aggressive changes in overall to have maintained direct control of both minder that such concerns are not merely strategy and policy.42 its conventional and nuclear units, while academic.38 The Rocket Force might also make also boosting its formal organizational Elevation to a full-fledged service may a play for operational control of China’s status and strengthening its ability to give the Rocket Force the institutional emergent fleet of Jin-class SSBNs. A compete against the other services for prestige and resources necessary to com- number of Chinese and American experts resources and missions. JFQ pete effectively with the other services have predicted that China’s future SSBN for resources and missions. As the PLA force could fall under the command rebalances away from traditional army of the Rocket Force, though few have Notes dominance and slower economic growth offered specifics about how such a com- 1 leads to slower growth in military spend- mand arrangement might work.43 Phillip C. Saunders and Joel Wuthnow, “China’s Goldwater-Nichols? Assessing PLA ing, inter-service rivalry, and competition The PLA Navy has little to no experi- Organizational Reforms,” Joint Force Quarterly to control emerging missions will likely ence controlling nuclear weapons as 82 (3rd Quarter 2016), 68–75. become more intense. China built only one hull of the previous- 2 Kenneth Allen, Dennis J. Blasko, and Conventional missions and forces generation Xia-class SSBN, which never John F. Corbett, Jr., The PLA’s New Organi- may present such a “growth area” to conducted a single operational patrol.44 zational Structure: What is Known, Unknown and Speculation (Part 1), China Brief 16, the Rocket Force. With growing PLA To the extent that greater operational ex- no. 3 (Washington, DC: Jamestown Founda- emphasis on conducting joint conven- perience with nuclear weapons increases tion, February 4, 2016), available at JFQ 83, 4th Quarter 2016 Logan 61 kelstein, Initial Thoughts on the Reorganization 20 Allen, Blasko, and Corbett. Hard to Construct a Powerful and Modern and Reform of the PLA, CNA China Studies 21 Choi Chi-yuk, “The Rising Star in Rocket Force on a New Starting Point,” Rocket (Washington, DC: Center for Naval Analyses, China’s Military Tipped as Future Air Force Force News, March 2, 2016. January 2016), available at 62 Commentary / PLA Reforms and China’s Nuclear Forces JFQ 83, 4th Quarter 2016 Chief of Naval Operations Admiral John Richardson visits Chinese People’s Liberation Army Navy Submarine Academy, North Sea Fleet Headquarters, and a PLAN frigate and submarine in Qingdao, China, to improve mutual understanding and encourage professional interaction between U.S. and Chinese navies, July 20, 2016 (U.S. Navy/Nathan Laird) What Do China’s Military Reforms Mean for Taiwan? By Joel Wuthnow n late 2015 and early 2016, China armaments) were replaced by 15 and nuclear missiles, was upgraded announced a sweeping set of reforms departments directly under the to a full-fledged service and renamed to the organizational structure of the Central Military Commission the PLA Rocket Force. I 1 People’s Liberation Army (PLA). Key (CMC). •• The seven military regions, respon- changes included the following: •• At the service level, a new Strategic sible for administering forces at the Support Force was set up to provide regional level, were replaced with five The 4 semiautonomous general •• support in the electromagnetic, “theater commands” aligned against departments (responsible for opera- space, and cyber domains; a separate specific land and maritime threats on tions, political work, logistics, and headquarters was established for the China’s periphery. ground forces (which were previ- The reforms not only significantly ously collectively led by the general altered the PLA’s organizational structure Dr. Joel Wuthnow is a Research Fellow in the departments); and the Second Artil- Center for the Study of Chinese Military Affairs, but also redefined authority relationships lery Force, an independent branch Institute for National Strategic Studies, at the among major components. The PLA National Defense University. responsible for China’s conventional JFQ 83, 4th Quarter 2016 Wuthnow 63 Guided missile destroyer Jinan, top, frigate Yiyang and guided missile destroyer USS Mason, center, guided missile cruiser USS Monterey and guided missile destroyer USS Stout, bottom, steam in formation during passing exercise in Atlantic Ocean, November 7, 2015 (U.S. Navy/Edward Guttierrez III) Air Force and Navy headquarters, which as a CMC, political commissars, and party strengthens auditing and discipline previously commanded operations during committees down to the regimental level. inspection functions, which allow the peacetime, were reassigned to admin- Why did Chinese president Xi Jinping CMC to send investigators to units across istrative roles focused on training and and his supporters in the PLA pursue this the PLA to root out offenders. In addi- equipping troops. Operational authority course of reform? There are both political tion, the new Political and Legal Affairs moved to a two-tiered system in which and operational motivations. Politically, Commission was set up under the CMC decisions will be made by the CMC and the reforms were designed to enhance the to bolster the role of regulations and law carried out by theater commanders. ability of the CCP to supervise the armed enforcement in the PLA. In some ways, the new system is forces, which were seen as increasingly Operationally, the reforms are in- reminiscent of the U.S. military structure corrupt and undisciplined. The reforms tended to increase the PLA’s ability to that developed following the passage of thus go hand in hand with parallel efforts successfully conduct joint operations on the Goldwater-Nichols Department of to weed out malfeasance through an anti- a high-tech battlefield. Over the past Defense Reorganization Act of 1986. corruption campaign in the PLA that has two decades, Chinese military strategists That act similarly assigned the Services already resulted in the dismissal of dozens have identified joint operations as a key an “organize, train, and equip” function, of senior officers (including two former to modern warfare. This recognition was while placing operations in the hands of CMC vice chairmen, Xu Caihou and Guo due in part to the observations of U.S. regional combatant commands, such as Boxiong) and with efforts to strengthen battlefield success during the first Gulf the U.S. Pacific Command. Nevertheless, Xi’s authority over the military in his role War and other operations in the 1990s. a key difference is that the PLA remains as CCP general secretary. Consequently, the PLA developed joint a “party army”—with a primary focus on The reforms strengthen political con- doctrine and carried out an increasing defending the interests of the Chinese trol over the PLA in several ways. One number of cross-service exercises. Communist Party (CCP)—not a national reform, for instance, disbands the general The reforms help facilitate “joint- army, like the U.S. military, that serves the departments, which were seen as too ness” in the PLA in several ways. The first country’s interests regardless of which po- autonomous and riddled with corruption, way is by creating a joint command and litical party is in power. Thus, the PLA will and places their successor organizations control system that places operational continue to possess Leninist features that directly under the CMC, where they can authority in the hands of commanders at have no cognate in the U.S. system, such be more closely scrutinized. Another both the central level (in the new joint 64 Commentary / What Do China’s Military Reforms Mean for Taiwan? JFQ 83, 4th Quarter 2016 staff department under the CMC) and Third, the PLA is working to create war since 1979) means that it will not the regional level (in theater commands). new and better trained leaders responsible enjoy the advantage of testing its organi- Second, the reforms established a sepa- for developing doctrine and conduct- zation, doctrine, and equipment under rate ground force headquarters, freeing ing training and operations relevant to a real combat conditions. the CMC and theater commands to Taiwan contingency. The PLA is already In sum, the PLA’s organizational re- become fully joint organizations. Third, instituting professional military education forms are clearly intended to allow China the reforms create a training management reforms to complement its organizational to field a stronger joint force capable of department at the CMC level that focuses restructuring, including a new curricu- effectively conducting operations across on joint training. The fourth way is by lum focused on joint command at the the range of possible contingencies, giving theater commanders authority PLA National Defense University.2 New including those related to Taiwan. If over almost all units in their respective commanders will also rotate into key all goes according to plan, Taipei could areas of responsibility. This includes air, positions at both the CMC and theater face an adversary that is not only better naval, and conventional missile forces, levels. Some of these could be senior of- organized, trained, and equipped but also but probably not nuclear forces. ficers from the navy and air force, which more confident in its ability to fight and What does all this mean for Taiwan’s would bring valuable new perspectives win wars under informationized condi- security? There are several possible as the PLA seeks to build a more joint tions. Nevertheless, as the U.S. military implications. First, in the near term force. Moreover, the PLA will probably has found in the 30 years following the PLA is likely to face a degree of continue a tradition of sending its best Goldwater-Nichols, developing a capable organizational disruption as new lines and brightest officers to the theater re- joint force takes years of trial and error. of authority are clarified, new leaders sponsible for Taiwan. Whether and how successfully the PLA take their positions, and rank-and-file Fourth, the Chinese military will will overcome its own obstacles remain to personnel seek to understand where they continue to allocate its most advanced be seen. JFQ stand in the new organizational chart equipment to the Eastern Theater and what their roles will be. An added Command, just as it sent its most source of organizational stress will be a capable hardware to the preceding Notes concurrent downsizing of the PLA, in Nanjing Military Region. The reforms 1 which the Chinese military is slated to could facilitate development of more Phillip C. Saunders and Joel Wuthnow, China’s Goldwater-Nichols? Assessing PLA decrease from 2.3 million to 2 million advanced equipment, such as long-range Organizational Reforms, Strategic Forum 294 servicemembers by late 2017. As a result, precision-strike systems, by encouraging (Washington, DC: NDU Press, April 2016), the PLA will be focused inward for the stronger civil-military cooperation in available at JFQ 83, 4th Quarter 2016 Wuthnow 65 provocative and destabilizing behavior by current and potential adversaries are making threats today transregional, multidomain, and multifunctional. Some nations are investing in long-term mili- tary modernization programs, including capabilities that could pose an existential threat to the United States. A number of others are developing, sustaining, or modernizing their nuclear forces, in- cluding weapons and platforms that are mobile, hardened, and underground. Russia is engaged in destabilizing actions in Syria and Ukraine, developing counterspace and cyber capabilities, and aggressively pursuing other approaches such as hyper-glide vehicle technology. At the same time, it continues to mod- ernize its nuclear forces, even though Russia faces some challenging economic conditions. Qualitative and quantitative advancements in capabilities that are not accountable under the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty [New START] and in nonstrategic nuclear weapon systems, some of which have ranges or payloads comparable to New START–ac- countable systems, are causes for concern. These destabilizing actions are taking place at the same time Russia is declaring and recklessly expressing its willingness to escalate if required. By virtue of the size Admiral Cecil D. Haney, Commander, of its nuclear arsenal, Russia poses an exis- U.S. Strategic Command (DOD) tential threat to the United States. Russia must understand that it would be a seri- ous miscalculation to consider nuclear escalation as a viable option, and it will not achieve the benefits it seeks. In the Indo-Asia-Pacific, China is An Interview with making significant investments in devel- oping its overarching military capabilities, both nuclear and conventional, as well as Cecil D. Haney realignment of its command and control structure to better support its antiaccess/ area-denial [A2/AD] campaign. It is also pursuing conventional prompt global strike capabilities and offensive JFQ: As you have led U.S. Strategic Admiral Cecil D. Haney: During my counterspace technologies while exploit- Command [USSTRATCOM] for the past time at the command, the global security ing computer networks. Perhaps equally few years, how do you view the threats and environment has become more complex, disconcerting has been China’s efforts challenges your command faces? dynamic, and volatile—perhaps more to challenge territorial jurisdiction in so than any time in our history. The the East and South China seas and its continued propagation of asymmetric disregard for international norms and Admiral Cecil D. Haney, USN, is Commander of methods, unprecedented proliferation of the recent ruling by the United Nations U.S. Strategic Command. advancing technologies, and increasingly [UN] Convention on the Law of the 66 Features / Interview JFQ 83, 4th Quarter 2016 Sea. Collectively, these actions only threat of sequestration looming in 2018, international accords and norms, it is contribute to instability at a time of rapid we cannot compromise the momentum developing counterspace and cyber capa- globalization and increasing regional in- we are establishing. bilities, and it is continuing to invest in terconnectivity. These activities, coupled Our strategic capabilities must pro- the modernization of its nuclear forces. with China’s lack of transparency, raise vide not only our adversaries a complex Russia has demonstrated its willing- questions about its aspirations. deterrence problem but also options to ness to use military force and hybrid North Korea’s coercive, irresponsible the President if deterrence were to fail. I tactics to achieve its political goals of rhetoric and actions undermine regional must point out that sustaining and mod- reestablishing a sphere of influence, un- stability. Kim Jong-un continues to defy ernizing our strategic forces supports the dermining NATO [North Atlantic Treaty international norms and violate multiple President’s nonproliferation goals, and Organization], and challenging the bed- UN Security Council resolutions. North modernization is in line with the 2010 rock principles of the international order: Korea’s persistent attempts to launch Nuclear Posture Review, 2013 Nuclear sovereignty, territorial integrity, and the submarine-launched ballistic missiles Weapons Employment Strategy, 2014 inviolability of borders. As a combatant and intermediate-range ballistic missiles Quadrennial Defense Review, and 2015 commander I must view these actions underline this irresponsible behavior. It National Military Strategy. If we are to and behaviors as threatening not only to continues its quest to obtain a nuclear- meet future challenges, we must have a the United States but also to our allies tipped missile capable of striking the synchronized campaign of investments and partners. To be clear, we have no United States and its allies and partners, supporting the full range of military op- interest in threatening Russian security. launch satellites into space using ballistic erations that secure U.S. national security Its actions, which include probing and missile technology, and conduct additional objectives. We need appropriations and activities below the threshold of armed nuclear tests. As with Russia, North Korea operations for 2017, and we need relief conflict, are destabilizing and pose in- must understand it cannot escalate its way from sequestration. creased threats to international security. to victory, and the United States will take Due to the global nature of U.S. We are responding with strong and pru- actions to assure its allies in the region. Strategic Command’s Unified Command dent measures to defend U.S. interests: Iran’s continued involvement in Plan–assigned missions, we have a signifi- Russia’s nuclear doctrine and rheto- Middle East conflicts and development of cant role working with the other eight •• ric, which appear to lower the thresh- ballistic missile programs and cyberspace combatant commands and the inter- old for the use of nuclear weapons, capabilities require our attention. While agency community to address each of the show the difference between Russian today it appears that Iran is following the five evolving challenges facing the United and U.S. concepts of the use of mandates of the Joint Comprehensive States: Russia, China, North Korea, force. They also bring to light con- Plan of Action, we must remain Iran, and VEOs. It has been my privilege cerns about Russia’s commitment to vigilant for any shifts regarding nuclear to lead the Soldiers, Marines, Sailors, strategic stability. ambitions. Airmen, and civilians who support these Russia’s nuclear force and infra- Violent extremist organizations missions 24 hours a day, 7 days a week, •• structure modernization raise the [VEOs] and terror groups are recruiting, 365 days a year. possibility of both qualitative and financing, and operating across politi- quantitative advancements in its cal, social, and cyberspace boundaries. force structure. Ungoverned or ineffectively governed JFQ: Can you describe the relationship be- From a conventional standpoint, regions remain incubators for those who tween the United States and Russia today, •• Russia’s investments pose a threat to seek to attack the world’s peaceful societ- specifically your views of their nuclear and regional and strategic stability. ies. We must continue to address their conventional force buildups, the role of Verifiable treaties and policies are threat to our way of life through all of missile defense, and the prospects for arms •• key to strategic stability. While to our levers of power while working with control agreements in the future? date Russia is adhering to its New the international community. START obligations, it has chosen to Lastly, I continue to be concerned Admiral Haney: The relationship be- circumvent its Conventional Forces about the U.S. defense budget. As I tween the United States and Russia is in Europe and Intermediate-Range have testified, I am pleased with the complex and multifaceted. It’s informed Nuclear Forces [INF] Treaty com- President’s budget request for fiscal year by both recent and distant historic events mitments. Particularly in the case of 2017, particularly in the areas of nuclear and differing worldviews between the INF, the manner with which it has enterprise sustainment and moderniza- two nations. Russia continues to chal- violated its responsibilities calls into tion, space, cyberspace, and missile lenge the international order, engaging question Russia’s adherence to inter- defense. It reflects the Nation’s com- in destabilizing actions in Syria and national law and norms of behavior. mitment to modernization, a key part Ukraine. It is developing systems that We encourage Russia to return to of our deterrence strategy. But there is breach the bounds of the Intermediate- adherence to its treaties. no margin to absorb new risk. With the Range Nuclear Forces Treaty and other JFQ 83, 4th Quarter 2016 Haney 67 •• Historically, arms control trea- deployed and nondeployed launchers, we capabilities alone are not enough. Often ties have significantly reduced the must ensure that we have a credible stra- overlooked are the critical tankers that numbers of nuclear weapons in tegic nuclear deterrent that has diversity refuel our strategic bombers; effective stockpiles. While I am hopeful that and flexibility such that no adversaries indications and warning of incoming this trend can continue, it is up to can think that they will benefit from threats through our strategic space and Russia to return responsibly back to escalating to include the employment of terrestrial systems; and assured and sur- the negotiations. Arms control trea- a nuclear weapon, that it will be costly vivable national and nuclear command, ties contribute to strategic stability to them, and that restraint is a better op- control, and communications. Our stra- through transparency, confidence- tion. Other nuclear-capable nations are tegic deterrent also includes the necessary building, and verification. placing a high priority on developing, infrastructure to sustain reliable war- •• Effective missile defense is an essential sustaining, modernizing—and in some heads; a credible missile defense system element of the U.S. commitment cases expanding—their nuclear forces. A that defends against attacks from rogue to strengthen strategic and regional safe, secure, effective, and ready nuclear nations; a resilient space and counterspace deterrence against states of concern. deterrent is fundamental to our national architecture; a robust conventional force; The Ground-Based Midcourse security strategy and to deterring strategic and of course a comprehensive whole- Defense system protects the U.S. attack on the United States and assuring of-government approach. All of these homeland against a limited interconti- our allies. This is why recapitalization of capabilities—along with continued invest- nental ballistic missile [ICBM] attack our nuclear-deterrent enterprise is my top ments in space and cyberspace—provide from North Korea and potential priority. Our choice is not between keep- the tools the Nation needs for security future threats from Iran. Our missile ing the current forces or replacing them; in a dangerous and unpredictable world. defense capability is not about Russia rather the choice is between replacing At the end of the day, we must ensure nor does it pose a threat to Russia’s those forces or not having them at all. that no nuclear-armed adversaries think nuclear arsenal. Russia should under- Current plans to replace they can escalate their way out of a failed stand this given our transparency of Minuteman III ICBMs are just in time. conflict. They must perceive that restraint U.S. missile defense capabilities. Recapitalization is necessary to ensure a is the best course of action. •• We would all like to see Russia work viable, responsive ICBM force so future to emerge as a responsible player on adversaries cannot launch a compre- the international stage. hensive counterforce attack by striking JFQ: What is your assessment of only a few targets. Our ballistic missile USSTRATCOM’s ability to gain and submarines [SSBNs] represent our most maintain situational awareness while effec- JFQ: Given the rise of a more diverse set survivable leg. Recapitalization of the tively executing all your operations in space? of threats from a number of states and sea-based strategic deterrent is my top potentially nonstate groups, how does the modernization priority as we cannot fur- Admiral Haney: Increasingly contested, current triad of U.S. nuclear forces first ther extend the current Ohio-class SSBN. degraded, and operationally limited, fielded in the Cold War and your plans to Air-delivered nuclear weapons offer space is vital to our way of life, and given modernize these capabilities address this unique value in that they are readily the number of objects, including debris, different world? capable of providing both strategic and that are in orbit today, it is important extended deterrence. The B-21 bomber, that we are able to have and share space Admiral Haney: The range of potential long-range standoff cruise missile, and situational awareness [SSA]. In concert actors with nuclear weapons and the B61-12 gravity bomb will provide flex- with the Joint Space Operations Center means to deliver them has increased ibility and provide the President tailorable [JSpOC] at Vandenberg Air Force Base, since the end of the Cold War, but we options should deterrence fail. These ca- California, the newly formed 18th Space must also address the rapid evolution of pabilities will allow us to address a range Control Squadron performs the routine destructive counterspace and cyberspace of contingencies in highly contested and SSA mission, tracking more than 23,000 capabilities. While not every attack in A2/AD environments. man-made objects in orbit every single space or cyberspace is of a strategic na- Our stockpile is safe, secure, and day. Last year more than 1.2 million ture, we must be able to deter strategic effective, but we must proceed with collision warnings were sent to satellite attack in multiple domains from multiple planned life-extension programs as the operators supporting 148 confirmed actors. We must be able to deter strategic average age of the stockpile is the oldest collision-avoidance maneuvers, including attack from major powers while we also it has ever been. Like the platforms, our four by the International Space Station. address threats from nonstate actors and warheads require life extension as we are Those numbers will continue to grow regional states such as North Korea. using a capability that in most cases is as more governmental, commercial, and Even as we adhere to our New well beyond the intended design life. academic entities pursue space capabilities. START obligations and reduce the While all three legs of the triad are The JSpOC remains focused on delivering number of deployed warheads as well as vital to our deterrence efforts, those tailored space effects to joint and coalition 68 Features / Interview JFQ 83, 4th Quarter 2016 Ballistic missile submarine USS Rhode Island (SSBN 740) returns to Naval Submarine Base Kings Bay in Kings Bay, Georgia, March 20, 2013 (DOD/James Kimber) warfighters. Under the leadership of the Department of Defense [DOD] and to continue to the support joint and/or my Component Commander for Space, Intelligence Community. As an example, coalition campaigns through advanced Lieutenant General David Buck, USAF, we’ve worked to better integrate our battle management command and con- last year the JSpOC supported theater op- exercise programs and wargames, share trol methodologies. erations 724 times and also resolved 245 lessons learned from both experiments USSTRATCOM has SSA sharing instances of electromagnetic interference, and exercises, explore doctrine changes, agreements and arrangements with more ensuring persistent access to critical capa- and enhance information and data flow. than 50 commercial entities, 2 intergov- bilities optimized to meet the demands of We also stood up the Joint ernmental organizations (EUMETSAT multidomain force projection. Interagency Combined Space Operations [European Organisation for the We have various initiatives mov- Center at Schriever Air Force Base, Exploitation of Meteorological Satellites] ing forward today to help improve our Colorado, in 2015. Also under the and European Space Agency), and 11 performance and understanding of SSA. leadership of Lieutenant General nations (Australia, Canada, France, Israel, These initiatives include organizational Buck, this center combines the ef- Italy, Japan, South Korea, Spain, United improvements, partnering, better tech- forts of USSTRATCOM, Air Force Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, and nology, and data collaboration. Space Command, and the Intelligence Germany). In fact, we currently have a We established the Joint Space Community to create unity of effort number of allies and partners serving in Doctrine and Tactics Forum in 2015. and facilitate information-sharing across critical crew and leadership positions in I co-chair this forum with Betty Sapp, the national security space enterprise in the JSpOC. Sharing SSA information director of the National Reconnaissance order to develop and maintain a common and collaborating with other nations Office. Having Ms. Sapp’s leadership operating picture across communities of and commercial firms promote safe and emphasizes the foundational role that interest. This center is being developed responsible space operations, reduce intelligence plays in detecting and to identify and address adversarial ap- the potential for debris-producing col- characterizing threats to increase space proaches challenging our on-orbit space lisions and other harmful interference, collaboration and coordination between operations to ensure this capability is able build international confidence in U.S. JFQ 83, 4th Quarter 2016 Haney 69 B-52H Stratofortress flies over Minot Air Force Base, North Dakota, during training exercise, November 3, 2013 (U.S. Air Force/Brittany Y. Auld) space systems, foster U.S. space leader- August 19 launch. GSSAP provides cut- context. This vision is being used as we ship, and improve our own SSA through ting-edge SSA capabilities that facilitate architect, develop, acquire, and operate knowledge of owner/operator satellite space-monitoring activities, contributing our space systems. positional data. to global safety of spaceflight as well as To better address the challenges We must also continue to seek in- the peaceful access to space. in space requires the integration of all novative solutions with allies and our Other advancements in technol- source intelligence and sensing in such a commercial partners to ensure that ogy include the Space Fence program, way to improve indication and warning access to space operations remains which will greatly expand the capacity and time to execute response options if available. These include active and pas- of the U.S. Space Surveillance Network; we sense our space capabilities are being sive protection measures for individual investments in modeling and simulation threatened. The dynamic space common systems and constellations and a critical that will increase our understanding of operational picture is being designed to examination of the architectural path the space environment and adversary allow effective command and control of we must follow to ensure resilience and capabilities; and funding for satellite space capabilities not only to attribute affordability in our space capabilities. communications that are resistant to irresponsible behavior in space but also Continued partnering with international interference. to allow adequate decision space for im- and commercial entities is fundamental A Space Enterprise Vision has been proved operational resilience. to effective space operations. adopted by DOD and the Intelligence These efforts, combined with ex- One tool we use to gain and main- Community that recognizes that the perimentation and better training for tain SSA is the Geosynchronous Space U.S. space enterprise is not resilient our operators, will allow the maturity Situational Awareness Program [GSSAP]. enough to be successful in a conflict of our SSA and space control efforts to The program achieved initial opera- that extends to space. It recognizes that ensure space can continue to effectively tional capability in October 2015, and acquisition and programmatic decisions contribute to joint and coalition force USSTRATCOM is now operating two can no longer occur in mission area operations. GSSAP satellites with two more currently stovepipes, but must instead be driven by maneuvering into position following an an overarching space mission enterprise 70 Features / Interview JFQ 83, 4th Quarter 2016 JFQ: How would you characterize your command’s ability to operate in cyberspace Figure. Spectrum of Conflict with Nuclear Adversary and the role of U.S. Cyber Command Intergrated Tools Decision Calculus [USCYBERCOM] as the lead team in Diplomacy (specific to a decision) Large Scale that fight? Information Nuclear Military Costs of Benefits of Conventional Action Action Admiral Haney: Cyberspace underpins Cyber/Space Nuclear Benefits of Costs of Limited Restraint Restraint all of my mission areas and has become Economic Nuclear a critical facet of national power. Our Offramp Adversary action primary focus for cyberspace operations Nuclear U.S./allied action within DOD is building the capability and Capability Decision/Escalation Control Point Demo capacity to protect networks, systems, and Escalation Milestone Intensity information; defend against cyber attacks; Conventional Offramp Conventional Conflict and support operational and contingency Conflict Begins planning. Admiral Mike Rogers, the com- mander of U.S. Cyber Command, is my Rhetoric, R D, Other Dimensions Misinformation of Crisis/Conflict operational commander to execute those Offramp Hybrid Warfare cyberspace missions tasked to me in the Offramp Asymmetric Warfare Unified Command Plan. Since its stand up 6 years ago, Timeline USCYBERCOM has made great strides in developing, integrating, and synchronizing cyberspace operations into our day-to-day the commands must be made on a regu- Chairman’s Joint Concept for activities and in support of the combatant lar basis. This is becoming even more Electromagnetic Spectrum Operations commander’s objectives. We are building important as we face transregional threats to enable operational planning and battle up robust Cyber Mission Force [CMF] that challenge our current geographic management of the EMS. and Cyber Protection Teams with the command and control constructs and authorities, skills, and resources to protect management processes. We are also our networks against a maturing set of working to create the right balance of JFQ: In congressional testimony and in cyberspace threats. We’re also working ISR capabilities and determining what press conferences recent you spoke about the to ensure we can better sense threats our future ISR capabilities should look concepts of deterrence and assurance in the and malicious activities, taking a layered like. We’ve spent the past decade or more 21st century. What are your views on how approach to resilience and emphasizing building an impressive fleet of ISR forces deterrence and assurance have changed individual cyber hygiene, all critical to the geared toward counterinsurgency and over time and whether they are well under- defense of our networks. In other words, counterterrorism operations in a per- stood in today’s context by the joint force the Nation and every combatant com- missive environment. We are balancing and national civilian leadership? mander can now draw upon CMF teams maintenance of these forces while devel- to achieve cyberspace effects and support oping future capabilities to operate in an Admiral Haney: Strategic deterrence their myriad operations. One example is A2/AD environment. remains a complex subject that is foun- where our CMF teams are conducting One of the critical abilities neces- dational to global security. It depends on cyberspace operations to support U.S. sary for joint force success is operating the situation, and one size never fits all. Central Command’s mission to degrade, in a heavily contested electromagnetic Yet it is bounded by the understanding dismantle, and ultimately defeat ISIL [the spectrum [EMS] environment. The joint that no adversaries can escalate their way Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant]. force commander requires the EMS to out of a failed conflict, that no adversaries enable success in all warfighting domains. will gain the benefits they seek, that re- We are working hard to integrate modern straint is always a better option, and that, JFQ: Which challenges has USSTRATCOM electronic warfare with new ISR, cyber, if necessary, we will respond in a time, a had in two areas that are critical to the joint and space capabilities to support our place, and a domain of our choosing. force: intelligence, surveillance, and recon- joint and coalition forces. Our current Today’s world is not the bipolar world naissance [ISR] and electronic warfare? efforts in this area support counter-ISIL of the Cold War. Deterring in today’s operations in theater, which stimulated multipolar world requires us to view Admiral Haney: Combatant command a new focus on the integration of nonki- threats across the spectrum of conflict ISR requirements continuously outstrip netic planning, targeting, and execution where escalation can occur with more Service supply, creating a situation where processes. Additionally, USSTRATCOM than one adversary and can be transre- difficult operational tradeoffs between is leading implementation of the gional and can span land, sea, air, space, JFQ 83, 4th Quarter 2016 Haney 71 B-2 Spirit bomber provides vital support to U.S. Strategic Command’s global strike and bomber assurance and deterrence missions (U.S. Air Force/Joel Pfiester) and cyberspace domains. Given all these or competitor that has nuclear weapons me to continue to learn while ensuring complexities and the interconnectedness capabilities and/or other weapons of that the lessons of history are incorpo- of globalization, these strategic problems mass destruction as well as significant rated in our planning and operations to have global consequences that require counterspace or cyberspace capabilities. include how we have to deal with uncer- comprehensive solutions. We must understand that the intertwined tainty as we digest reams of information Deterrence remains a fundamentally nature of these threats and our method- and a variety of intelligence sources. I also human endeavor—it is about having a ology to counter them is not limited to learned the importance of interagency, safe, secure, effective, and ready strategic a specific domain. We must understand allied, and partner contributions. capability and the will to use it. For U.S. the difference between conventional and Decades of joint military operations Strategic Command to deliver strategic nuclear deterrence and what it takes to and warfighting have become part of our stability, we must enable a comprehensive maintain strategic stability, even during culture. We must have a joint force to ad- approach to strategic deterrence, assur- periods of friction and/or conflict. dress the five challenge areas facing DOD ance, and escalation control. today—Russia, China, North Korea, To address the spectrum of conflict Iran, and VEOs—as well as the ability to (see figure), we must have a compre- JFQ: As a graduate of the National War operate across the spectrum of conflict hensive understanding of the strategic College, how has your experience with against adversaries or potential adversaries environment as perceived from an adver- JPME affected your views on the value of that have weapons of mass destruction, sary’s point of view. We must understand jointness and the need for the Services to ef- cyberspace, or counterspace capabilities. capability and intent so that we can deny fectively work together as a joint force? Our national security challenges enemy action, threaten the important areas require us to integrate all elements of the adversary values, and prevent misper- Admiral Haney: When I completed national power, which is helped by the ceptions and actions from escalating. We JPME, the last thing I thought was that I work we’re doing to integrate not only must have a deep understanding of the would become a flag officer, let alone the our joint force, but also across the entire adversary. And we can’t do this alone. commander of U.S. Strategic Command. U.S. Government and with our allies and Building deterrence and assurance ca- I can’t tell you how important it is to partners. We must improve our abilities pacity in today’s challenging geopolitical develop critical thinking skills and a to use information and intelligence at the landscape requires a collaborative effort; questioning attitude. The National War speed of conflict and integrate all levers of we must have a whole-of-government College helped me hone those skills and national power into a comprehensive na- approach that includes our allies and taught me the value of motivating my tional campaign, rather than a collection partners. leadership team to challenge my thinking. of disjointed efforts. Given all this, I believe joint profes- Whenever I conduct a meeting today, I’m very proud of how far our military sional military education [JPME] must whatever the subject, I look for individu- has come in taking the Goldwater-Nichols include course material on strategic deter- als who challenge traditional thinking, [Department of Defense Reorganization rence, assurance, and escalation control. regardless of rank. My JPME experience, Act of 1986] standard and develop- It must challenge our thinking regarding including the various case studies covered ing this kind of education, but there’s the spectrum of conflict for an adversary as part of my education, further inspired still work to do. Recently, 18 members 72 Features / Interview JFQ 83, 4th Quarter 2016 of my command completed a satellite of national security and deterrence and I’m very proud of the progress we’ve JPME Phase II course at the University assurance to leverage expertise and made, including the progress of our allies of Nebraska at Omaha to enhance their research and encourage development and partners, in a number of our tabletop understanding of the joint environment of deterrence professionals to meet the and annual exercises to gain invaluable and to use their knowledge to tackle Nation’s need for future generations of insight from their knowledge and per- today’s threats. This was the first satellite leaders to address these challenges. More spectives. For example, in the past year, course offered at a nonmilitary academic importantly, this alliance provides a forum one of our ballistic missile submarines— institution, and partnerships like these are for communication and collaboration. the USS Wyoming—ported in Faslane, exactly what we need to further develop The full list of Deterrence and Assurance Scotland, validated operational objectives the joint force. Academic Alliance members can be found while demonstrating the close U.S.– I tell those coming out of JPME to at JFQ 83, 4th Quarter 2016 Haney 73 Unarmed Minuteman III intercontinental ballistic missile launches during operational test on February 20, 2016, Vandenberg Air Force Base (U.S. Air Force/Michael Peterson) After graduating from Eastern High commercial sector. A few years ago, I was Working at U.S. Strategic Command School in DC, I was privileged to attend privileged to tour Nagasaki’s Peace Park, twice, getting to lead a joint task force the U.S. Naval Academy. This environ- a vivid reminder of the events of August in the Pacific, and working for the OSD ment gave me the opportunity to apply 1945. I also visited numerous locations of Comptroller broadened my understand- to the nuclear submarine field. My edu- the various island campaigns of World War ing of joint operations. This built on the cation at both the Naval Postgraduate II, such as Tinian’s North Field, Midway JPME I experienced. School and the National War College Atoll, Corregidor, and the Marshall Each opportunity has presented me provided me not only a well-rounded Islands. From a visit to the demilitarized with an opportunity to learn and grow. education but also a chance to attend zone separating North and South Korea, I would encourage all of our joint force advanced education with international the Panama Canal, to various countries in members to make the most out of the op- students as well as individuals from the Europe, the Middle East, and the conti- portunities and adventures their military interagency community. nent of Africa, each opportunity to visit careers provide. I couldn’t be prouder of The combination of Service and joint and get a live view of the complexity of so our joint force and the contributions they education, training, and operations al- many different nation-states has helped make to our collective security. They are lowed me to have a broad perspective. shape my perspective of the challenges fac- the most prepared and professional force I also benefited as much, or more, from ing different parts of the globe. in the world. JFQ the people I have had the pleasure to Just the opportunity to work first-hand serve with, work with, and for—mentors, with key allies and partners in so many seniors, peers, and subordinates. jobs has given me a vast perspective of is- I have also been fortunate to visit sues as seen by other nations as well as the many places from other countries and understanding of how coalitions are ex- operational units to our national labora- tremely valuable in addressing the complex tories to places such as Gallup from the regional and global challenges of today. 74 Features / Interview JFQ 83, 4th Quarter 2016 Flight nurse Airman with 433rd Aeromedical Evacuation Squadron works as safety spotter at Fort McCoy, Wisconsin, July 27, 2013, during Exercise Global Medic 2013 (U.S. Air Force/Efren Lopez) Global Mental Health Optimizing Uniformed Services Roles By Brian W. Flynn, Joshua C. Morganstein, Robert J. Ursano, Darrel A. Regier, James C. West, Gary H. Wynn, David M. Benedek, and Carol S. Fullerton ental health considerations in the context of global health M include an extensive variety of elements and constitute complex and Brian W. Flynn, Ed.D., is Associate Director of Health Systems in the Center for the Study of Traumatic wide-ranging topics. Three perspec- Stress (CSTS) and Adjunct Professor of Psychiatry in the Department of Psychiatry at the Uniformed Services University (USU). Dr. Joshua C. Morganstein is Assistant Professor and Assistant Chair in tives are important to consider. First, the Department of Psychiatry and Scientist at CSTS. Dr. Robert J. Ursano is Professor of Psychiatry in the field of global mental health, and Neuroscience and Chairman of the Department of Psychiatry at USU. Dr. Darrel A. Regier is Senior direct patient care is not the only role Scientist at CSTS in the Henry M. Jackson Foundation for the Advancement of Military Medicine and Department of Psychiatry at USU. Commander James C. West, USN (Ret.), MD, Medical Corps, is that should be considered important. Assistant Professor of Psychiatry and Scientist at CSTS. Lieutenant Colonel Gary H. Wynn, USA (Ret.), Second, this article is inclusive of not MD, Medical Corps, is Assistant Professor and Assistant Chair in the Department of Psychiatry and only military Services, but uniformed Scientist at CSTS. Colonel David M. Benedek, USA (Ret.), MD, Medical Corps, is Professor of Psychiatry and Neuroscience and Associate Director/Senior Scientist at CSTS. Dr. Carol S. Fullerton is Research services as well. A true uniformed Professor in the Department of Psychiatry and Scientific Director of CSTS. services approach, one that includes JFQ 83, 4th Quarter 2016 Flynn et al. 75 the Commissioned Corps of the U.S. and obsessive-compulsive disorder—with biased towards mortality because of the Public Health Service (USPHS), is unipolar major depression constituting relative ease of acquiring figures on death essential to tackle global health chal- the leading cause of disability worldwide. compared to those on morbidity. lenges. Third, global health activities The levels of disability associated with in the mental health field have been mental disorders in the United States For mental disorders, this was clearly taking place for decades. Therefore, have shown that one-third of all the dis- the case before the development of the examples that represent important ability days “out-of-role” associated with third edition of the American Psychiatric historic landmarks as well as current chronic-recurrent health problems are Association (APA) Diagnostic and activities are included. These examples due to mental disorders.3 The societal Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders demonstrate important lessons as well costs of anxiety disorders alone in the (DSM-III) in 1980. With the availability as the diversity of mental health contri- United States throughout the 1990s ex- of specific diagnostic criteria that could be butions to global health. ceeded $42 billion.4 incorporated into diagnostic instruments After the GBD report, the WHO for use in community and clinical popula- Mental Health Around recognized the importance of mental tions, it was possible to launch a new the World disorders for public health and economic generation of psychiatric epidemiology “There is no health without mental development by devoting an entire an- studies that began with the Epidemiologic health.” In making this bold statement nual report to mental health, The World Catchment Area (ECA) study.6 This as the foundation for its groundbreak- Health Report 2001—Mental Health: study and its international replicates pro- ing Mental Health Action Plan 2013– New Understanding, New Hope.5 The vided essential data for the GBD report 2020, the World Health Organization conclusions of this historic report were prevalence and disability estimates and (WHO) reminds us that mental health that there can be no health without men- subsequent WHO and GBD surveys. is a fundamental global health issue.1 tal health, and recommendations were Commissioned officers in the USPHS Consider the following excerpts from provided for initiating more treatment at the National Institute of Mental that report: in primary care and community set- Health (NIMH) initiated and led the tings, involving families and consumers, ECA study, and collaborated with “Depending on local context, certain •• and linking with other sectors includ- the WHO in developing the “Mental individuals and groups in society ing education, labor, welfare, and the Disorders” chapter in the 10th edition of may be placed at higher risk of expe- criminal-justice system. With support the International Classification of Diseases riencing mental health problems.” from the National Institutes of Health (ICD-10).7 This chapter included the di- The report mentions such factors as (NIH) and many international organiza- agnosis of Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder poverty, chronic health conditions, tions, the WHO has followed up with (PTSD) for the first time in the ICD—a child and elderly maltreatment and a program of international surveys of diagnosis now recognized worldwide in neglect, and human rights violations. mental disorders in over 30 countries to both civilian and military populations “Mental disorders often affect, and •• document in greater detail the types of associated with trauma, disasters, and mil- are affected by, other diseases such disorders and levels of severity and dis- itary conflict. Mental health experts for as cancer, cardiovascular disease, ability associated with these conditions. the Department of Defense (DOD) and and HIV infection/AIDS. Taken In 2014, the WHO updated its findings USPHS Commissioned Corps have been together, mental, neurological, and and recommendations, adding to and closely involved with versions of the DSM substance abuse disorders exact a emphasizing the multitude of evidence including the most recent DSM-5. These high toll, accounting for 13 percent for increased attention to mental health efforts have moved us toward establishing of the total global burden of disease issues worldwide. common nosology on a global level. in the year 2004.” In his foreword to the GBD report, How have we come to such dramatic William Foege, former director of Mental Health’s Place and global conclusions? In 1996, the the Centers for Disease Control and in Global Health WHO and World Bank published the Prevention (CDC), noted: Mental health issues pervade lives, landmark study The Global Burden of communities, and nations, and there Disease (GBD).2 It quantified for the first If knowledge is power, the field of public is a worldwide trend toward a globally time the mortality and disability from health has remained incredibly weak. accepted way of identifying disorders diseases, injuries, and risk factors in 1990 Compared with the extensive informa- and understanding their epidemiology. with projections to 2020. Among the tion to a clinician for a specific patient, We continue to make progress toward most striking findings were that mental collective knowledge about the health condi- common understandings of mental and addictive disorders occupied five of tions of a group, city, country, region or health and mental disorders, provid- the leading causes of disability in the world, continent is often fragmentary. Our sur- ing potential opportunities for mental including unipolar major depression, alco- veillance systems, with few exceptions, have health as a core component of global hol use, bipolar disorder, schizophrenia, been incomplete, inaccurate and heavily health efforts. 76 Features / Uniformed Services Roles in Global Mental Health JFQ 83, 4th Quarter 2016 It is gratifying to see mental health Example 1. Global Violence increasingly recognized as a critical part In 1996 the WHO declared violence a major and growing public health problem across the globe of global health. International collabora- and in 2002 published its World Report on Violence and Health. Estimating approximately 475,000 tion is an absolute necessity if there is deaths due to homicide, the WHO issued its Global Status Report on Violence Prevention 2014. In the to be improvement in understanding, face of an estimated 840,000 suicides worldwide, the WHO published in 2014 Suicide Prevention: A Global Imperative. Self- and other-directed violence are worldwide problems and all types of violence diagnosing, and treating mental disor- have mental health implications for prevention, cause, intervention, and recovery. ders. The need and opportunities for The WHO lists many mental and behavioral health consequences of violence, for example, collective and collaborative international alcohol and drug abuse, depression, anxiety, PTSD, eating and sleep disorders, attention deficits, action in research, training and human hyperactivity, suicidal thoughts and behaviors, and unsafe sex. Indirect psychosocial consequences resources, policy development, and ser- include loss of hope and empowerment, diminished self-efficacy, and erosion of trust and social vices are without question. At the same connectedness. Types of violence are diverse yet all have significant mental health impacts. time, challenges regarding availability and These include armed violence, gangs, child molestation, intimate partner violence, child abuse, sexual violence, and elder abuse. The demographics of violence affect regions, countries, and distribution of provider resources, stigma, communities differentially. Due to gaps in our knowledge, intervention planning is not often based access and barriers to care, and system on empirical research; additionally, there are divergent cultural views on violence. Nevertheless, and governmental stability are daunting. there is an increased appreciation that violence is a public health problem and growing evidence There are contributions, however, that violence can be prevented. Medical, public health, and mental and behavioral health experts that mental and behavioral health profes- are developing promising approaches and models to reduce violence. sionals can make beyond direct diagnosis and treatment of illness. Global mental health concerns must also be addressed at Example 2. Disaster Risk Reduction the community level. In addition, there Disaster risk reduction, response, and recovery have increasingly become global health topics. are mental health elements intertwined This is partly a result of the increasing understanding of the dynamics of psychosocial impacts for disasters. These impacts reach from the individual, to the family, to the community, and to the among numerous other worldwide chal- nation and culture. The WHO’s global leadership both in mental health and in psychosocial support lenges and many opportunities (even in disasters reconciles well with its Mental Health Action Plan 2013–2020. obligations) for mental health experts to The truly worldwide nature of this issue is demonstrated by activities geared toward the contribute to multinational efforts and development of the Hyogo Framework for Action 2 (HFA2). The United Nations supported the deliberations. Consider two such cases initial HFA in 2005. Surprisingly, it did not address certain health considerations such as key on the topics of violence prevention elements in disaster risk reduction (DRR). This has changed significantly in the worldwide process (example 1) and disaster risk reduction, leading toward the development of HFA2, which is intended to build on global efforts in the decade since the initiation of the HFA and help guide DRR efforts for the next decade. In processes around response, and recovery (example 2). the world, health has been a significant topic for consideration and mental health has been fully Behavioral health experts both within represented in those considerations. For example, as part of the HFA2 health planning effort, and without the uniformed services can a special working group of international experts (including current and former U.S. uniformed contribute to global health efforts in services members) was convened to address psychosocial/mental health concerns and build ways beyond individual diagnosis and community resilience within the context of DRR. Emerging themes included the importance of attending to physical as well as mental health factors across all phases of DRR: prevention, treatment, for example, research, needs preparedness, response, and recovery. assessment, training and education, risk and crisis communication, systems design and support, program and systems evalua- Example 3. Collaboration with Russia under the Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission tion, and stigma assessment and reduction. An international example of Global Mental Health contributions of commissioned officers in the Additionally, consultation to leadership is Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) and the Department of Defense (DOD) occurred often underappreciated both as a skill and from 1994–2000 under the U.S.-Russian Joint Commission on Economic and Technological a role. Leaders can benefit from consulta- Cooperation (the Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission). A disaster-related mental health collaboration tion by mental health experts in areas such involved the exchange of information on disaster response programs and training rescuers. Russian representatives visited disaster sites in the United States, led by USPHS commissioned officers in as risk and crisis communication as well as the Substance Abuse and Mental Health Administration (SAMHSA), with additional consultations grief leadership. Example 3 illustrates how on disaster responses by the NIMH and the USUHS Department of Psychiatry (involving both high-level government-to-government Active-duty and retired military members). SAMHSA commissioned officers visited an airplane leadership consultation in global health crash site in Irkutsk and the healthcare programs for victims of the accident at Chernobyl. The capitalizes on larger government initiatives Russians visited the site of the Oklahoma City bombing and a tornado recovery program in Arkansas. Additional extensive programs were initiated under this health committee to advance and involves nations with already well- the treatment of depressive disorders in primary care settings and to address alcoholism prevention developed mental health systems. and encourage the treatment of substance abuse in primary care settings. The interest in health and mental health programs at the highest levels of government is directly Roles for the Uniformed related to their relevance for humanitarian, economic, and national security implications. The need Services for shared international collaboration, rapid mobilization of expert medical resources, and logistical The uniformed services have historically support to address these issues has consistently required the services of commissioned officers in conducted a wide range of noncombat both the USPHS and DOD. JFQ 83, 4th Quarter 2016 Flynn et al. 77 Former Montana National Guard Soldier who struggles with PTSD receives pointers from U.S. Navy Reserve officer and volunteer ski instructor during Eagle Mount Bozeman Lasting Experiences for Military therapeutic ski program at Big Sky, Montana, January 31, 2014 (DOD/Michael J. MacLeod) Example 4. Mental Health Elements in East Africa U.S. Embassy Bombings operations. The increasing globaliza- On August 7, 1998, the U.S. Embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam were bombed. In Nairobi, a tion of the U.S. economy, expansion significant number of Kenyans were killed and injured and 12 Americans lost their lives. In the of international partnerships, advance- days that followed, the Kenyan Medical Association, through the U.S. Agency for International ments in technological communica- Development (USAID), requested a senior USPHS officer with extensive experience in disaster tion, and an increase in the frequency behavioral health to come to Nairobi to advise and assist in organizing programs for Kenyans who of natural disasters have resulted in were experiencing psychological trauma. Several trips to Nairobi followed, resulting in the funding of a behavioral health intervention program funded by USAID. a greater emphasis on global health operations. Increasingly, the focus is When the Embassy was rendered unusable, Department of State activities and staff were temporarily moved to USAID offices, resulting in the crowding of two organizations with on efforts to optimize the delivery of different levels of exposure to the trauma and different organizational cultures. The USPHS global health support by the U.S. uni- Commissioned Corps officer located in that building was also confronted with many of these formed mental health providers who psychosocial consequences. The mission quickly expanded to include consultation to State play a key role in the preparation, exe- Department and USAID leadership. This consultation involved needs assessment, recommending cution, and recovery from global health appropriate interventions, and advising on organizational policies and practices (for example, staff reassignments, availability of treatment resources, and the extent of documentation of diagnostic operations. Example 4 illustrates uni- and treatment information). The officer worked closely with Embassy medical leadership who were formed services contributions in disaster simultaneously victims and responders, State Department leadership in Washington, senior USAID relief and health care after the bombing officials in Kenya, as well as the Ambassador and her senior staff. of U.S. Embassies in East Africa. In the months following the bombings, there was a U.S.-led assessment of how the emergency medical systems of Kenya and Tanzania could be improved. In addition, a significant research Training and Preparation agenda was undertaken to better understand the psychosocial impact of such events. The early Prior to conducting global health and continuing involvement of behavioral health expertise later contributed to capacity-building efforts not only in Kenya and Tanzania but in U.S. Government entities as well. The intervention operations, uniformed personnel receive required content expertise in disaster behavioral health and rapid response to changing and an array of trainings including education emerging needs, acquisition of ethnic/racial and organizational cultural factors, political factors, and simulated experiences. Prepara- and complex organizational factors. tion increases their ability to effectively 78 Features / Uniformed Services Roles in Global Mental Health JFQ 83, 4th Quarter 2016 Chaplain assistant, 175th Wing, Maryland Air National Guard, rappels down mountainside during Adaptive Sports Camp in Crested Butte, Colorado, designed to provide encouragement to military veterans with post-traumatic stress disorder, amputations, and other injuries (U.S. Air Force/Vernon Young, Jr.) conduct operations using enhanced Example 5. Consultation to Eurasian Allies in Disaster Preparedness and Response situational awareness unique to the In 1993, the George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies was established to create environment and anticipated exposures. a more stable security environment by advancing democratic institutions and relationships, Personnel are trained in cultural aware- promoting active, peaceful security cooperation, and enhancing enduring partnerships among the ness to aid in the provision of effective nations of North America, Europe, and Eurasia. In addition to graduate-level resident programs and health care that respects the unique conferences, the Marshall Center identifies Defense Department and civilian experts in technical and professional fields to meet specific assistance or training requests of partner nations and needs of the indigenous population. coordinates visits with content experts. As preparedness for and response to disasters often Joint training operations with host- fall to the national defense forces of U.S. allies, assistance in developing public health response nation personnel facilitate information to psychological aspects of disaster (including war and terrorism) has been both sought out exchange and collaboration throughout and encouraged by Marshall Center leadership. Comprehensive disaster response planning and the mission. An important aspect of implementation enhances health security in our allies and is thus in our mutual best interest. preparation is learning how to work In response to such a request for assistance, a military psychiatrist from the USUHS traveled to with socioeconomically disadvantaged the Kazakhstan National Defense University in 2013 to train members of the National Military Medical Institute in curriculum development for assessment and management of post-traumatic populations including the impact of stress. Over 2 days of presentations, interactive seminars, and discussions (assisted by translators health disparities on how foreign inter- hired and vetted through the Marshall Center), military medical educators from the Kazakhstan vention may be received. Military per- Defense Forces were introduced to specific elements of disaster-response curriculum developed sonnel receive guidance on anticipating at USUHS including principles of psychological first aid, psychological triage during disaster, and psychological stressors unique to diverse the assessment and management of PTSD. The focus of the consultation was integrating disaster psychiatry concepts into existing medical education programs supporting traditional didactics overseas operational environments such with cooperative learning group exercises and simulation. Discussions involved translation of as exposure to human suffering, han- Kazakhstani culture-specific elements into U.S. case material, and expansion of military response dling bodily remains in the aftermath of concepts to potential civilian disasters. The dialogue initiated during the visit was extended via a disaster, and managing concerns about further correspondence, resulting in requests for future collaboration. potential chemical, biological, radiologi- cal, and nuclear exposures. Ongoing JFQ 83, 4th Quarter 2016 Flynn et al. 79 Table. Roles of Uniformed Mental Health Providers in Global Health Operations Uniformed services mental health re- Preparation Execution Recovery sources can play roles for U.S. uniformed personnel as well as global partners. Identify and prepare for Monitor individuals and Provide reintegration operational exposures, systems and provide education, screening, and The recovery phase of global health psychological stressors interventions such as referral operations is enhanced by mental health Psychological First Aid interventions that reintegrate caregivers Training/educated regarding Monitor methods intended to Evaluate cultural into daily life. This includes education cultural awareness assure cultural appropriateness. appropriateness of about expected reactions to stressful Make rapid adjustments approaches/interventions events, common mental health symp- Assess pre-event/early event Advise on reestablishing Normalizing reactions, monitor healthcare status, capacity, healthcare capacity healthcare system recovery toms, education about and linking with disparities available resources, mental health screen- Train in consultation Provide consultation to and Assist in after action review ing of personnel, and treatment referrals to leadership. Develop provide support for leaders and analysis. Assist in when indicated. Success of global health relationships and educate sustaining positive changes operations can be enhanced during the leaders recovery phase when mental health advi- Assist in preparedness and Assist/monitor plan Evaluate/assist in plan sors work with local leaders to provide plan development implementation modification consultation on mechanisms to sustain Train providers/responders Monitor performance Redesign based on experience beneficial healthcare changes. Mental Conduct and disseminate Apply research Repeat/conduct further health personnel can assist the host na- research research tion to articulate long-term public health goals, clarify gaps in mental healthcare needs, and identify potential barriers to Example 6. Responding to an Ebola Outbreak implementation. The accompanying table The outbreak of Ebola in West Africa provides a dramatic example of both how complex and far demonstrates how uniformed mental reaching disease outbreaks can be and how comprehensive an effective response must be. In this case, understanding and addressing both public health and medical needs are essential. The health workers can assist throughout dif- psychosocial consequences are massive. The response has been an integrated uniformed services ferent phases of various operations. response that fully incorporated mental health issues. The recent U.S. response to the Ebola epidemic is a prime example of the need for such expertise and logistical support. Regardless Contributions of the nature of the medical or disaster emergency, the need to address the mental health Uniformed mental health providers consequences in affected populations requires the same level of attention and expertise. offer a unique set of capabilities to The Department of Defense (DOD) has deployed significant resources to establish medical organizations involved in global health treatment resources and improvement of disease diagnostics. The USPHS has deployed officers (including mental health personnel) to staff a DOD hospital in Liberia to care for healthcare workers operations. Every uniformed provider exposed to Ebola. develops skill in direct support of As part of the Uniformed Services University response, the Department of Psychiatry and the operating forces. Success stems from Center for the Study of Traumatic Stress (CSTS) have provided (through an integrated effort shared experiences, knowledge of orga- involving USPHS and military officers) consultation on Ebola risk communication to leadership nizational culture, and recognition that at the CDC to assist in their domestic and international messaging efforts. CSTS has also interventions affect individuals as well as developed educational fact sheets on Ebola for patients and healthcare providers. These have groups (see example 6). been disseminated to a wide range of stakeholders including Federal agencies, national and state mental health leaders and policymakers, healthcare advocacy groups, and U.S. medical schools. Direct patient care in the uniformed services is fundamentally identical to that provided by any qualified mental health challenges include training enough safety, calming, connectedness, self and provider, but the interaction is different of the right people—early in their community empowerment, and hope. in several ways. Uniformed providers careers—who possess skill sets matched A unique role for military mental health succeed by applying an understanding both to the mission and to the culture. services is providing support to high- of organization and operational context Mental health support to the execu- risk personnel often overlooked during in which Servicemembers function. This tion of a global health operation involves high-tempo operations, for example, first understanding allows treatment to be the provision of direct patient care includ- responders and leaders. Uniformed mental tailored to the needs of the individual ing screening for and treatment of a range health personnel can collaborate with local and organization without creating or of behavioral health symptoms and dis- healthcare leaders on policy and planning exacerbating conflicts. Periodic reassign- orders. Uniformed healthcare personnel to support the development or reestablish- ment and augmentation require mental understand fundamental evidence-based ment of disrupted healthcare capacity. health providers to rapidly assimilate into mental health interventions for use in the Example 5 presents a military-to-military new organizations on a regular basis. This initial response to traumatic events such as global health initiative facilitated by an ability translates readily into supporting psychological first aid, which emphasizes international organization. Servicemembers as they enter global 80 Features / Uniformed Services Roles in Global Mental Health JFQ 83, 4th Quarter 2016 Airman assigned to 379th Expeditionary Aeromedical Evacuation Squadron logs patient’s information into Electronic Health Record system in Southwest Asia to support Operation Inherent Resolve, January 6, 2016 (U.S. Air Force/Nathan Lipscomb) health engagement, where leaders and is fundamental as rates of psychological average of 0.05 psychiatrists per 100,000 caregivers must rapidly and effectively trauma can be significant while treatment people in low-income countries.8 In understand and assimilate new cultures to and follow-up resources are often few or some countries, there may be only one provide effective care often while operat- even nonexistent. psychiatrist in the entire nation. In such ing in difficult environments. Mental health in the military Services instances, the role of the uniformed Military mental health providers is inherently task-oriented. Every clinical provider is to support and develop the develop and apply knowledge of human encounter concludes with a fitness for capacity for mental health intervention in response to acute and chronic stress duty determination, a constant reminder primary care. as part of their routine clinical work. to providers of the role they play in main- Whether stress of adaptation to the taining readiness. Providers are capable of Challenges and Opportunities military, garrison training demands, or deploying a range of scalable and diverse The integration of mental health issues combat exposure, military mental health capacities to meet the needs of opera- into global health engagement presents professionals routinely care for individu- tions. Military mental health providers a number of exciting opportunities als exposed to significant psychological routinely support humanitarian assistance as well as challenges. Opportunities stress. Mental health providers routinely missions with the primary mission of care include: advise line leaders on best practices for for military personnel. This role can easily Identifying and appropriately treat- preventing and mitigating combat and expand to include direct care or advising •• ing mental disorders is a worldwide operational stress. They also provide local health officials or other uniformed challenge (for example, see The incident response capability within mili- medical personnel on population psycho- Global Burden of Disease report and tary units following traumatic events. logical health. Mental health systems in the WHO’s Mental Health Action In working with developing nations, an low- and middle-income countries are Plan 2013–2020). Preparing for and understanding of human stress response minimally funded and staffed, with an JFQ 83, 4th Quarter 2016 Flynn et al. 81 Conditions on Role Disability in the U.S. Adult Example 7. Providing Timely, Practical, and Customizable Mental Health Guidance Household Population,” Archives of General Psy- CSTS conducts research and consults with communities and Federal and international agencies chiatry 64, no. 10 (October 2007), 1180–1188. on matters surrounding individual and community responses to trauma, disaster, and war. The 4 Paul E. Greenberg et al., “The Economic center also provides educational resources in the form of customized, highly readable just-in-time Burden of Anxiety Disorders in the 1990s,” fact sheets that offer individuals and organizations relevant information to support the behavioral Journal of Clinical Psychiatry 60, no. 7 (July health response to disasters. In 2013, Typhoon Haiyan devastated Southeast Asia, causing over 1999), 427–435. $2 billion in damages, killing approximately 6,300 people, and injuring nearly 29,000 others. 5 WHO, The World Health Report Prior to the deployment of DOD mental health forces in response to this disaster, CSTS provided 2001—Mental Health: New Understand- educational fact sheets to U.S. senior military mental health leadership with information about ing, New Hope (Geneva: WHO, 2001), supporting first responders, providing for the needs of children and families, aiding leaders in available at responding to global events provide uniformed Services and other mental a unique opportunity to share health experts can achieve. knowledge among nations, enhance •• Training needs are broad and reach the mental health capacity of under- beyond direct patient care, especially developed nations, and help combat regarding cultural competence, crisis worldwide stigma concerning mental communication, and consultation. illness. (Example 7 illustrates how •• There is a need for expanded support pre-event and just-in-time guidance for the value of multi-professional and educational materials are avail- and multi-organizational integration able for preparedness and response.) and collaboration. •• Providing opportunities to expand •• There is a need for expanded the range of uniformed services roles methods of collecting, organizing, and interventions beyond combat retrieving, and adapting what is will benefit the uniformed services in known. JFQ contexts that extend beyond global health. Increased awareness of the impact of global health capabilities of Notes the uniformed services can enhance U.S. foreign policy and diplomatic 1 World Health Organization objectives. (WHO), Mental Health Action Plan 2013–2020 (Geneva: WHO, 2013), avail- Ongoing challenges include: able at 82 Features / Uniformed Services Roles in Global Mental Health JFQ 83, 4th Quarter 2016 U.S. Navy Hospital Corpsman talks with students from Andalas Primary School during subject matter expert exchange held at Andalas Social Health Clinic, during Pacific Partnership 2016, August 26, 2016 (Royal Australian Air Force/David Cotton) Applying Smart Power via Global Health Engagement By Sebastian Kevany and Michael Baker he U.S. military is entering a opportunities to shift toward innovative fundamentalism highlight an increasing period of dramatic redirection forms of international intervention and need for the United States and other T and restructuring at a time of conflict resolution by the U.S. military world powers to harmonize and align broader international upheaval, from through coordination with national development, altruistic, and security Ukraine to Syria.1 The past decade security strategies such as global initiatives.3 of global conflict has emphasized health diplomacy (GHD).2 Recently Military forces could be deployed the predominant hard power focus articulated doubts over the wisdom of and used to contribute to foreign policy, of the Armed Forces, often with supplying health, development, and global health, and the strengthening of limited success. The emergence of a other forms of economic support to key local actors in related sectors.4 Doing new mission—smart power—offers those countries that support Islamic so could maintain strategic regional and international goals and advance interna- tional stability and development through Sebastian Kevany is an International Policy Specialist at the University of California, San Francisco. strategies such as global health engage- Rear Admiral Michael Baker, MC, USN (Ret.), is Chairman of Surgery at John Muir Medical Center. ment (GHE). GHE is defined as “health JFQ 83, 4th Quarter 2016 Kevany and Baker 83 activities which the DOD [Department One significant driver of this change is diverse roles, as well as proving purpose- of Defense] conducts in support of the the failed state, an environment that pro- ful activity for the residual manpower national security policy and military strat- vides little hope for a better future among surplus associated with technological war- egy of the United States.”5 While a range young populations and is “susceptible fare, the Armed Forces require increased of tensions exists around expanded mili- to exploitation by terrorists, tyrants, and training in, and awareness of, their role tary engagement in humanitarianism, we international criminals.”11 Concurrently, as international representatives, global can attempt to guide this process toward the nature of the physical battlefield has health workers, and diplomats, as well as a mutually acceptable engagement on changed via an increasing number of their traditional battlefield roles. both altruistic and strategic levels via the tribal and ethnic clashes that involve non- Soldiers will continue to function ac- GHD paradigm. state, guerrilla, or other irregular players cording to the rules of engagement and Considerable damage to the interna- rather than uniformed forces.12 This take orders and procedures from their tional prestige of the armed forces of the evolution of the conflict environment officers, while demonstrating an explicit United States and United Kingdom has has had a corresponding impact on ap- awareness and recognition of their im- resulted from the Iraq and Afghanistan proaches used by security instruments to plicit role as benign liberators and agents wars and associated events.6 Combined implement and influence foreign policy of international relations and develop- with questions of strategic gains, cost- objectives. ment that stands to significantly enhance effectiveness (consideration of the The U.S. Marine Corps first identified their prestige, value, functionality, and “opportunity costs” of the combat and related models in the latter half of the self-esteem. Such aspirations mirror the postcombat periods, including care of 1990s, describing its vision of future war- North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s returning veterans), long-term regional fare in this context as the “Three Block longstanding Peace Support Operations stability, and lack of global social, po- War” under which hypothesis individual doctrine, which includes the provision of litical, and cultural acceptability, there is soldiers are required to simultaneously humanitarian assistance to civilian popula- increasing speculation regarding the use conduct military, peacekeeping, and aid tions as one of its six guiding principles.16 of combined military, health, and devel- operations in combination with, and in Since the end of the Cold War, inter- opment initiatives as some of the possible close geographical proximity to, each national economic crises and domestic effective substitutes for, or complements other.13 The essence of this innovative budgetary pressures have generated to, hard power interventions. For exam- concept is that modern militaries, to be tremendous pressure on Western military ple, strengthening host-nation healthcare effective, must be trained to operate in establishments to adapt and streamline systems is one path to achieving strategic all three operating environments simul- operations via a diversification of roles goals, through accessing and stabilizing taneously—and that to do so, leadership and responsibilities. Military and politi- regimes opposed to extremism.7 training in related noncombat skills, in- cal leaders’ recognition of international Opponents of smart power strate- cluding health care and diplomacy, must health emergencies and climate change gies point to the fact that there is no be conducted at all levels of command. as threats to national security is notable.17 proven correlation between international Military technology has advanced The Policy Guidance for DOD Global development programs and the capacity significantly in recent years, including Health Engagement, released in May of donors to positively influence geostra- remote imaging that can be leveraged to 2013, made important first steps in tegic or geopolitical events, yet medical gain immediate information regarding related diversification processes.18 All of initiatives are increasingly recognized needs on the ground through overflight these vectors have come to be important as an effective and efficient method of by satellites and unmanned aerial vehicles elements in the strategies and tactics used supporting the global community’s (UAVs). This ascendancy of technological by the military in current and recent dual-health and non-health priorities in warfare has led to a reevaluation of the conflicts—as well as in the context of tandem.8 These include threat reduction role of traditional or conventional armed the debate about the appropriate role, from epidemics, enhanced security (in- forces as ground troops.14 Apart from structure, and composition of the U.S. cluding health security), and political and growing public intolerance of military military. These broader global develop- diplomatic alliances—pursued in concert and civilian “body counts” associated ments have contributed in a critical way with each other, rather than in isolation, with the pre-UAV era, the increased to a rapidly evolving conflict environment via DOD initiatives such as medical sta- range of options offered by related in which traditional interventions have bility operations and partner engagement technological advances has meant that struggled to achieve success. and force health protection and readi- the threat neutralization roles formerly ness.9 Thus GHE is specifically designed the responsibility of the foot soldier are GHD as a Strategic Military Tool to support both national security and increasingly delegated to unmanned The discussion thus far suggests that the international engagement.10 interventions.15 As described in the Three increased use of tools such as GHE by The modern international security Block War paradigm, the role of indi- the Armed Forces should be examined environment has undergone significant vidual soldiers is evolving beyond mere more closely in the diplomatic context changes since the end of the Cold War. combatants. To adapt to these new and as well as in its primary health security 84 Features / Applying Smart Power via Global Health Engagement JFQ 83, 4th Quarter 2016 People’s Liberation Army Navy hospital ship Peace Ark Senior Captain Sun Tao shares medical experiences during group activity during Fundamentals of Global Health Engagement Course at Makalapa Clinic as part of Rim of the Pacific 2016, Joint Base Pearl Harbor–Hickam, July 11, 2016 (U.S. Navy/ Katarzyna Kobiljak) role (for example, the 2014 response to both human or natural disaster emer- related to GHE (for example, emergency to West Africa’s Ebola outbreak) of gencies and longer term nation-building medical care, provision of drugs or treat- protecting vital national health security and stabilization through infectious ments, rapid mobilization of people or interests.19 This is particularly relevant diseases control and support in order resources) and those generally associated in the context of DOD guidance that to achieve specific goals for the global with GHD (polio eradication, HIV/ promulgates the use of global health community.21 AIDS prevention or treatment, and programs to achieve strategic endstates Western military forces hold a distin- anti-malarial campaigns) are increasingly or to support other national and inter- guished tradition of providing emergency evident. national objectives. Global health, in this health and aid assistance to civilian Medical “hearts and minds” opera- context, is defined as the alleviation of populations overwhelmed by natural tions were also initially highly successful those health challenges that affect the disasters or civil strife.22 The military is as an alternative to military force during world’s poorest and most marginal- unique in providing immediate response the Vietnam War, and it remains a regret ized populations, with an emphasis on using transportation assets, surveillance, of the conflict’s high-level planners that communicable diseases such as HIV/ monitoring and evaluation, and other such approaches were not maintained and AIDS, tuberculosis, and malaria, as well intelligence tools—particularly important employed more extensively.25 Modern as specific reference to health concerns in both epidemiological and security GHE doctrine, encompassing longer that require global cooperation due to contexts.23 The Armed Forces also have term global health interventions, appears transcendence of territorial boundar- a built-in logistics supply system that to have assimilated related lessons on ies.20 GHD in this context is therefore can put relief anywhere in the world in a the need for different configurations, best described as a foreign policy tool short time. This represents a unique set supplies, and training for appropriate, that blurs the line between altruism and of capabilities that often make the mili- sustainable, and effective responses, in enlightened self-interest. It leverages tary the best “first responder” for GHE.24 both medical and strategic contexts. military and political assets in response Opportunities for those fields of endeavor For example, after more than 13 years JFQ 83, 4th Quarter 2016 Kevany and Baker 85 Co-founder and CEO of Seed Global Health speaks on “Improving Developing Country Health Systems Through the Spirit of Volunteerism,” part of Secretary’s Office of Global Health Diplomacy Speaker Series, at State Department, April 22, 2014 (State Department) of operations according to traditional date of the maintenance of these activities of Ukraine.31 Interagency coordination military roles, U.S. involvements and after military withdrawal, while related and governance of combined GHE and interventions in Southeast Asia are now GHE initiatives have both demonstrated GHD activities as well as public and increasingly characterized as soft power the potential capacity of the military in media transparency are therefore key missions, while DOD policy guidance for this regard and produced significant yet concerns.32 GHE stipulates parameters to “ensure unmeasured strategic gains that were po- Enhanced alignment between DOD legality, appropriateness, and effective- tentially as effective in achieving strategic and the U.S. Agency for International ness” as well as building the trust and goals as combat and ballistic efforts.29 Development (USAID), for example, confidence of partner nations and com- While combined tactical and altruistic inevitably raises questions around align- munities.26 The United States is not successes have occurred throughout mili- ment between civilian and military alone in pursuing such innovative strate- tary history, no formal framework and set doctrines. Would DOD, in a joint GHD/ gies; other international actors such as of standards for their delivery, along with GHE operation scenario, subordinate Venezuela and Cuba, through sustainable a set of operational principles governing itself to the governing principles and initiatives such as community based clin- such engagements that optimize smart authority of USAID? Or, under a GHD ics and hospitals that provide long-term power effectiveness, have been developed paradigm, would USAID become and affordable health care to recipient and applied. increasingly aware of strategic consider- populations, have been “particularly ations, with specific regard to settings in adept at parlaying provision of medical Issues of Primacy, Alignment, which conflict is currently taking place or services to nationals of other countries and Harmonization recipient populations that pose a proven into support in international forums” In a recent editorial, The Lancet exam- threat to donor security? DOD is at pres- as well as advancing strategic donor ines the risks and benefits of the inevi- ent subordinated to USAID through self-interest.27 table augmentation of the military’s role its Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance The military has proved its nascent in global health in the 21st century.30 in every foreign disaster response that capacity in settings such as Iraq and We must ask to what extent GHE and DOD is asked to support. For nondisas- Afghanistan to provide longer term GHE other altruistic endeavors could be ter engagements, such as partner-nation support operations. This is evident in used by the United States and others capacity-building, while not subordinate programs that mitigate infectious diseases as a convenient rationale for expanding to USAID, DOD policy guidance such as HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis and ma- international military presence—argu- directs that “GHE activities should laria, as well as making healthcare systems ments that Russia has employed to be consistent with the relevant U.S. stronger.28 There has been no evidence to justify its occupation of eastern parts Embassy’s integrated country strategy 86 Features / Applying Smart Power via Global Health Engagement JFQ 83, 4th Quarter 2016 and complementary to USAID’s country Afghanistan, Somalia, and the former of the targets to be influenced?” and development cooperation strategy” to Yugoslavia, while also contributing via “What forms of power behavior are avoid redundancy—or even conflict—be- short- and long-term aid efforts in coun- most likely to succeed?”—are linked to tween individual agency efforts.33 The tries such as Cambodia and Honduras.37 the objective of enhanced geographical development of coherent, consistent, and Civil affairs units do not focus primar- influence and coverage by international broadly applicable GHE approaches may ily on health issues, but, via the GHE actors.42 Access to and development of be informed, enhanced, and made prac- paradigm, the U.S. military continues to an international presence in otherwise ticable by reference to relevant criteria, develop international health and global non-permissive areas provide opportuni- standards, and guidelines for smart global health capacity in this context. ties for communications and education health.34 The development of systems by to populations whose only other alter- which the military can operate in closer native is often exposure to extremist Developing a Frame cohesion with global health initiatives propaganda, doctrine, and inculcation. of Reference is central to the success of smart power Appropriately designed, selected, and If the U.S. military chooses to devote strategies. These include consideration of adapted global health initiatives, operat- greater levels of resources and effort the delivery of health assistance programs ing in concert with the military umbrellas to GHE in order to achieve joint stra- under military umbrellas, defined (in to provide protection and support, have tegic and altruistic ends under a GHD this context) as military support, advise- been demonstrated in such circumstances paradigm, adherence to appropriate ment, protection, and coordination for to enhance both international influence program and intervention design, health, development, and foreign as- and relations in remote geographical delivery, and selection criteria will be of sistance activities in unstable or insecure regions of countries such as Afghanistan critical importance. As a recent RAND environments. While successful strategic and Iraq.43 report notes, “A focus on the higher- outcomes may have been at least partially International development and health order objective of enhancing legitimacy achieved in recent conflicts through programs have traditionally assisted with of local leaders would cause planners global health roles in “armed social or been employed as tools of interna- to carry out global health programs in work,” the dangers posed to non-military tional lines of strategic intelligence and a different way.”35 This demonstrates international development and diplo- communication.44 The recent outcry the importance of adapting focus to matic representatives have never been over the use of vaccination programs as a optimize multilevel gains. Equally greater.38 These include the increased cover for intelligence-gathering activities important, interventions should not incidence of violent deaths, abductions, in Pakistan elicited a range of dissociat- threaten the structure or integrity of and hostage situations involving formally ing responses from medical leaders, the local healthcare systems by significantly and informally deployed personnel in White House, and other key actors at exceeding local standards of care.36 regions as diverse as Sudan, Somalia, and the State Department.45 Arguments that Smart intervention categories in this Syria. To counter this threat, military objectives such as international security regard, and as described in recent DOD intelligence, surveillance, and commu- transcend those of international develop- guidance, also include educational and nications can provide support to assist a ment suggest that such condemnations training exercises. These are endeavors humanitarian response, allowing, for ex- should be tempered by broader historical to which, for example, the plans, opera- ample, transportation and logistics to be and contextual considerations.46 The tions, and military intelligence division fine-tuned for maximum impact and staff use of GHE surveillance from both the of organizations such as the U.S. Navy security. Careful and detailed advance national and health security perspectives and Naval Reserve might meaningfully liaison with local stakeholders, including forms an explicit element of related DOD contribute. health, military, and political representa- policy guidance.47 The access granted to Civil affairs units of the United tives, can also help to ensure both health global health and development programs States and other militaries traditionally and strategic successes via a “hand off” in insecure environments cannot be sys- conduct civil-military operations, includ- to local personnel or organizations as the tematically leveraged or exploited in this ing initiatives such as Civil Information military departs.39 ad hoc manner, both risking safety and Management, Foreign Humanitarian DOD policy guidance suggests that security of program staff and jeopardiz- Assistance, and Nation Assistance. The GHE initiatives should target activities ing future target population approval of remit of such units also extends to the on locations or regions “where there any forms of international involvement. preservation and restoration of protected is humanitarian need balanced with Rather, a compelling case for structures targets such as healthcare facilities in operational and strategic significance.”40 governing the use of strategic commu- war zones, facilitating links between Accessing unstable or ungoverned areas nications and observations, in either an military commanders and civil society. is a critical aspect of 21st-century U.S. explicit or an implicit manner, is made Civil affairs personnel have become in- military and diplomatic policy.41 Two based on the tragic lessons learned from creasingly integral to U.S. (and United of the major smart power questions— such experiences.48 Nations) peacekeeping operations in Iraq, “What are the positions and preferences JFQ 83, 4th Quarter 2016 Kevany and Baker 87 Training specialists, building on the development response to the Ebola epidemic in West GHD in the context of military person- of GHE coordinators at DOD, will help Africa, has elicited an abundance of com- nel training will include the develop- to ensure the greatest possible strategic mentary both supportive and questioning ment of enhanced diplomatic and impact and alignment. Complementary of the military’s role. The latter has humanitarian skill sets, with a specific inputs include advising on host-nation been driven by events such as attacks on focus on improving strategic capacity capacity for GHE project appropriateness healthcare workers in Pakistan as a result within GHE staff and improving diplo- and country ownership.52 of associations with security activities in matic and humanitarian capacity within pursuit of Osama bin Laden and more combat staff. The Three Block War Conclusions general concerns around the implications paradigm illustrates the complex spec- What do these recommendations imply of military GHE “occupations.”54 Such trum of challenges and responsibilities for the future acceptability, prestige, agendas, though potentially justifiable on likely to be faced during deployment and success of international interven- the international and health security levels, or on the modern battlefield, includ- tions by the U.S. military and its allies? cast doubt upon the viability of expanded ing stability operations. The essence of As the 21st century progresses, DOD collaborations between global health and such approaches is that both military is presented with a unique opportunity geopolitical or geostrategic concerns.55 and foreign assistance personnel must to establish itself not only as eminently Until these ambiguities are resolved, be trained to operate coherently in capable of power projection but also as DOD GHE efforts will continue to be diplomatic, humanitarian, and combat an altruistic and humanitarian organi- critiqued for “an ad hoc, short-term focus, capacities simultaneously rather than in zation. To achieve these noble goals, poor appreciation of local cultural norms, a stovepiped fashion. Adaptations to the which echo the national and interna- inadequate high-level involvement, and a related “strategic corporal” approach tional respect and admiration for the failure to properly assess effectiveness.”56 build on the increasingly global consen- Armed Forces in the immediate after- Issues of political and social legiti- sus that leadership in complex, rapidly math of World War II as exemplified macy surrounding armed interventions evolving, and potentially hostile health by the Marshall Plan, decisionmakers are at least partially addressed through and security environments requires may choose to support strategic plans the integration of hard and soft power a much broader range of skills and using GHE as a key role for the Armed operations, helping to rebuild American training than previously considered Forces, addressing contemporary military preeminence as an agent of necessary. “asymmetries of perception” surround- good.57 As a counterpoint, the pursuit of To achieve joint strategic and altru- ing the military’s role in international armed interventions that either ignore istic goals, the U.S. military may wish to affairs.53 It may be unrealistic to propose the health and well-being of civilian invest further in the application of smart that significantly expanding the scope and other populations is increasingly power and GHD contributions to GHE. of GHE informed by GHD operat- unacceptable on social, political, and This would include enhancing specialist ing principles would single-handedly legislative bases—as well as being fraught diplomatic input on the choice of GHE counter the doubts that have been gen- with negative strategic consequences.58 interventions, the manner in which they erated by more recent armed conflicts in Global public opinion appears united in are delivered, as well as their duration, which the United States has engaged. believing that the reported 100,000 civil- sustainability, and alignment between It is nonetheless hoped that such an ian deaths during the Iraq conflict should medical and strategic considerations. enhanced role in both diplomatic and never be allowed to happen again.59 To These are of critical importance to “the medical endeavors would augment the limit the extent of such casualties and evaluation of DOD GHE projects as a successful and simultaneous pursuit of to improve military legitimacy, smart means to determine whether strategic development and strategic goals. Related power efforts require critical funding theater objectives are satisfied,” with initiatives such as Operation United decisions related to the military-industrial particular reference to unexpected health Assistance have cast the U.S. military in a complex, including, where feasible and or non-health outcomes and conse- new light—as a highly responsive, effec- appropriate, advocacy for GHE in lieu of quences.49 To date, in the United States tive, rapid response organization that has or complementary to ballistic alternatives. and elsewhere, diplomatic, development, the capacity to contribute to national and The past 3 to 5 years have already seen and military forces, when acting inde- also global health and non-health security. a dramatic evolution of the way GHE is pendently of each other, “may lack either A range of concerns and critiques designed, planned, and executed in many the appropriate authority or resources related to U.S. military involvement in combatant commands. We advocate for to employ smart power,” risking “tense global health and broader international the continuation, diplomatization, and and confusing dualities” between agency development programs deserves recogni- acceleration of this process. agendas.50 Such increased levels of inter- tion. For example, the visible role that Former Chairman of the Joint departmental cooperation are desirable the military has played in recent disaster Chiefs of Staff Admiral Mike Mullen yet have been exceedingly difficult to ac- relief efforts from Haiti to Monrovia has stated that “we have been leading complish in practice.51 The use of GHD to Fukushima, and, most recently, the with the military for far too long. We 88 Features / Applying Smart Power via Global Health Engagement JFQ 83, 4th Quarter 2016 need to get diplomacy, development, (August 2010), 65–76, available at JFQ 83, 4th Quarter 2016 Kevany and Baker 89 McNamara Fallacy,” British Medical Journal, Regulating Covert Action: Practices, Contexts, vol. 339, b3141 (August 4, 2009), available at and Policies of Covert Coercion Abroad in NEW from 90 Features / Applying Smart Power via Global Health Engagement JFQ 83, 4th Quarter 2016 A-10 Thunderbolt II pilot, 74th Expeditionary Fighter Squadron, during deployment in support of Operation Atlantic Resolve at Graf Ignatievo, Bulgaria, March 18, 2016 (U.S. Air Force/Joe W. McFadden) NATO Nouvelle Everything Old Is New Again By G. Alexander Crowther he North Atlantic Treaty Organi- means. This goal is executed through Western Europe. Since that time, NATO zation (NATO) is heralded as the three mission sets: collective defense, expanded its mission set to include crisis world’s most successful military crisis management, and cooperative management, and its area of operations T 1 alliance. However, it finds itself under security. Other people outside NATO to include Eastern Europe, the Middle pressure from within and without. countries understand those missions East, the Horn of Africa, and Central Some people in NATO countries do well—and seek to destroy the Alliance. Asia. NATO has become the center of not understand the importance of its Recent comments that NATO Allies the global coalition of the willing. The goal: to safeguard its members’ freedom are free-riders and calls for the United Alliance now has 28 members and an- and security by political and military States to leave the Alliance are rooted in other 41 partner nations through four ignorance and do not take into account different partnership programs. It has the reforms that NATO has sought, nor also reorganized several times, chang- Dr. G. Alexander Crowther is a Senior Fellow the importance of the Alliance in the ing structure to account for changing in the Center for Strategic Research, Institute 21st century. The end of the Cold War mission sets. NATO today is an alliance for National Strategic Studies, at the National found 15 Allies in a defensive crouch in that operates globally but is returning to Defense University. JFQ 83, 4th Quarter 2016 Crowther 91 NATO Parliamentary Assembly pre-summit conference in London, September 2, 2014 (NATO) its original mission of collective defense. cooperation.”2 NATO also contemplated the breakup of the Soviet Union; and This article describes how the Alliance has expansion in the 1990s, producing a providing increased AWACS coverage of changed since the end of the Cold War study on the subject in 1995.3 As its final the Central Mediterranean to monitor air and where it is today. NATO has passed pre-9/11 mission set, NATO conducted approach routes from the North African through the crisis management era and three different operations to Macedonia littoral in May 1992 after the United has returned to another era of collective during 2001–2003 to help mitigate rising Nations (UN) imposed sanctions on defense. ethnic tensions. Libya after the Lockerbie bombing. NATO also began to do out-of- When Yugoslavia broke up in 1992, After the Cold War area operations during the 1990s. The NATO became involved, usually in sup- The 1990s. At the end of the Cold Alliance was designed to defend mem- port of UN declarations. Because they War, some thought that NATO should bers against a Soviet offensive, not for saw it as a Slavic area, Russia opposed be relegated to the dustbin of history expeditionary operations, but national outside intervention in Yugoslavia. In along with the conflict that had birthed forces did have expeditionary capabilities summer of 1993, NATO started to it. The Alliance survived, however, that NATO was able to tap into. Early enforce the UN arms embargo in the and managed to adapt to the new era, operations included the deployment Adriatic Sea and enforced a no-fly zone establishing the Partnership for Peace of both NATO Airborne Warning and declared by the UN Security Council, (PfP) program in 1994 to engage its Control System (AWACS) aircraft and where NATO conducted its first com- former opponents of the Warsaw Pact. the ACE Mobile Force (Air) and air de- bat operations when it shot down four Additionally, NATO morphed the North fense packages to Turkey during the first Bosnian Serb aircraft on February 28, Atlantic Cooperation Council to the Gulf War; assisting an international relief 1994. NATO began airstrikes in 1995, Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council in effort by flying teams of humanitarian which were credited as a key factor in 1997. It was designed to “strengthen and assistance experts and medical advisors ending the war in Bosnia. The Alliance extend peace and stability in the Euro- to Russia and other Commonwealth of immediately deployed a 60,000-strong Atlantic area, on the basis of the shared Independent States nations in 1992 using UN-mandated Implementation Force values and principles which underlie their AWACS trainer cargo aircraft following to the Balkans and then deployed a 92 Features / NATO Nouvelle JFQ 83, 4th Quarter 2016 32,000-strong Stabilization Force of the 2004 Olympic and Paralympic performed over 26,500 sorties, including in December 1996 in support of the games held in Athens with Operation over 9,700 strike sorties.7 Dayton Peace Accords. NATO ended Distinguished Games and the Riga this operation in December 2004 and Summit in Latvia in 2006. Current Operations maintains a military headquarters in the NATO practiced international disaster Afghanistan Since 2015. NATO cur- country. NATO also entered Kosovo in relief in the 2000s. In 2005, for instance, rently leads Operation Resolute Support, June 1999 to end widespread violence nine member nations moved 189 tons a noncombat mission that provides train- and halt a humanitarian disaster, remain- of supplies to the United States in the ing, advice, and assistance to the Afghan ing there until 2008. aftermath of Hurricane Katrina while National Security Forces and institutions. September 11, 2001. The 9/11 at- also delivering 3,500 tons of supplies, The operation launched on January tacks gave NATO a new lease on life. In engineers, medical units, and specialized 1, 2015, and includes approximately response to the attacks, NATO invoked equipment. In response to a request from 13,000 personnel from NATO and Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, which Pakistan, NATO assisted in the urgent partner countries and operates with one states that “an armed attack against one earthquake relief effort, which was one of hub in Kabul/Bagram and four spokes . . . shall be considered an attack against the Alliance’s largest humanitarian relief in Mazar-e Sharif, Herat, Kandahar, and them all” and went to the assistance of initiatives to date. NATO has also helped Laghman. the United States.4 This is the only time coordinate assistance to other coun- As NATO has given up the combat that Article 5 has been declared and was tries hit by natural disasters, including mission in Afghanistan, this operation recognized as a watershed event, dem- Turkey, Ukraine, and Portugal. It does works with the Afghan government, onstrating the utility of the Alliance. In this through its Euro-Atlantic Disaster ministry of defense, and military, provid- an immediate response, NATO executed Response Coordination Centre. In addi- ing functions including support planning, Operation Eagle Assist from late 2001 to tion to missions in Central Asia and the programming, and budgeting; assur- early 2002, conducting over 360 sorties Middle East, NATO moved into Africa in ing transparency, accountability, and of seven AWACS aircraft on patrol over the 2000s, assisting the African Union in oversight; supporting the adherence to the United States.5 Darfur, Sudan, from 2005 to 2007, and the principles of rule of law and good beginning counterpiracy maritime patrols governance; and supporting the estab- The 2000s in the Gulf of Aden in 2008 and off the lishment and sustainment of processes The early 2000s were a busy time for Horn of Africa in 2009. such as force generation, recruiting, the Alliance. The largest and best- Libya 2011. In the wake of UN training, managing, and development of known mission was NATO leading the Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) personnel.8 International Security Assistance Force 1973 of March 17, 2011, several nations Since NATO is an international or- (ISAF) in Afghanistan from August began operations in support of UNSCR ganization that uses force, international 2003 to December 2014. ISAF was goals. Initially, NATO enforced a mari- law is an important basis for all opera- one of the largest international crisis- time arms embargo, then a no-fly zone tions. The legal basis of Resolute Support management operations ever, bringing and, on March 31, ultimately took over rests on a formal invitation from the together contributions from over 50 sole command and control of all military Afghan government and the Status of countries. By the end of 2014, the operations for Libya. The NATO-led Forces Agreement between NATO and process of transitioning full security Operation Unified Protector had three Afghanistan. UNSCR 2189 of December responsibility from ISAF troops to the distinct components: 12, 2014, welcomes Resolute Support Afghan army and police forces was and underscores the importance of Starting on March 23, enforcing an completed and the ISAF mission came •• continued international support for the arms embargo on the high seas of to a close. On January 1, 2015, a new stability of Afghanistan, and it reflects the Mediterranean to prevent the NATO-led noncombat mission called NATO commitment to an enduring transfer of arms, related material, and Resolute Support (to train, advise, and partnership with Afghanistan, reflecting mercenaries to Libya assist the Afghan National Security the strengthening political consultations Starting on March 25, enforcing a Forces and institutions) was launched. •• and practical cooperation within the no-fly zone to prevent any aircraft During the second Gulf War in 2003, framework of the NATO-Afghanistan from bombing civilian targets NATO deployed AWACS radar aircraft Enduring Partnership signed in 2010.9 Starting on March 31, commencing and air defense batteries to enhance the •• Kosovo Since 2008. Although the air and naval strikes against military defense of Turkey. NATO later provided major NATO operation in Kosovo forces involved in attacks (or threats the training mission in Iraq from 2004 to wrapped up in 2008, NATO maintains to attack) on Libyan civilians and 2011, training, mentoring, and assisting approximately 4,800 Allied troops there as civilian-populated areas. the Iraqi Security Forces.6 part of NATO’s Kosovo Force, preserving NATO participated in protecting The operation officially ended on the peace that was imposed in the wake public events, deploying forces in support October 31, 2011, after participants of its deployment in 1999. Following JFQ 83, 4th Quarter 2016 Crowther 93 Kosovo’s declaration of independence Russia’s illegal military intervention in Alliance could actually defend some of in February 2008, NATO agreed that it Ukraine in 2014, Russian operations the easternmost countries, particularly the would continue to maintain its presence tempo has risen while NATO has been Baltics—Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. on the basis of UNSCR 1244, and has taking extra reassurance measures for Russia has reacted negatively to NATO helped to create a professional and multi- its Allies, including the deployment of expansion into Eastern Europe. The ethnic Kosovo Security Force.10 additional aircraft to reinforce missions Alliance is now less than 500 miles from Monitoring the Mediterranean over Albania and Slovenia, as well as the Moscow. Russian issues with NATO ex- Sea Since 2001. After the 9/11 at- Baltic region where NATO F-16s have pansion have become some of the major tacks, NATO sought ways to counter intercepted Russian aircraft repeatedly disinformation operations deployed by the threat of international terrorism. In violating allied airspace.16 the government. October 2001, it launched the maritime While air policing has been a viable The discussion on defending coun- surveillance operation Active Endeavour, mission for NATO, Russian revanchism tries such as those in the Baltics has detecting and deterring terrorist activity has caused some NATO members to two main thrusts: that they cannot be in the Mediterranean. NATO has been rethink this approach. Recently a senior defended from Russian aggression and systematically boarding suspect ships NATO commander visiting the Atlantic that Eastern European NATO members since April 2003. At the Warsaw Summit Council remarked that it is time for the could drag NATO into an Article 5 situ- in July 2016, NATO leaders decided to air policing mission to change to an air ation by provoking Russia into an attack. transition Operation Active Endeavour to defense mission because of additional One of the major discussion points at the a maritime security operation now called threats and the fact that NATO has July 2016 Warsaw Summit was prepara- Sea Guardian.11 stopped routinely practicing air defense tion for the defense of the Baltics,20 while Counterpiracy off the Horn of and badly needs practice in this basic Baltic and Polish visits to the United Africa Since 2009. The UN Secretary- defense function. This lack of experience States always contain a discussion about General requested maritime protection at air defense missions is an example of how to ensure that the Alliance provides for food convoys in the Gulf of Aden in NATO’s lack of paying attention to high- Article 5 mutual defense. 2008. NATO responded with Operation end combat fundamentals, which became The idea of “cooperative security” Allied Provider between October and a second-tier priority when the Alliance as a mission set for NATO came from December 2008.12 The next iteration paid more attention to crisis management the Lisbon Summit in 2010.21 The main of NATO maritime protection was rather than collective defense. programs are the Partnership for Peace Operation Allied Protector, between program, Mediterranean Dialogue, and March and August of 2009. The cur- Issues Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI). rent mission is Operation Ocean Shield, While NATO has expanded its mission NATO also partners with the EU through approved on August 17, 2009, by the set and conducted operations from the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council North Atlantic Council.13 During this Iceland to Afghanistan, there have been (EAPC) as well as with other like-minded time NATO forces have worked closely issues, mainly at the political level. nations around the world, often referred with the European Union’s Operation NATO Expansion. One major issue to as “partners across the globe.” Atalanta,14 the U.S.-led Combined Task for the Alliance has been the expansion The PfP was founded in 1994 and Force 151,15 and individual country of membership from 12 to currently 28 consists of 22 members: Armenia, contributors. countries. Founded with 12 members, Austria, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bosnia Supporting the African Union Since NATO integrated Greece, Turkey, West and Herzegovina, Finland, Georgia, 2007. NATO also works ashore in Africa, Germany, and Spain during the Cold Ireland, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, supporting the African Union (AU) in War. After a study of the subject of Malta, Moldova, Montenegro, Russia, its peacekeeping missions on the African expansion in 1995,17 NATO further in- Serbia, Sweden, Switzerland, Tajikistan, continent since June 2007, providing tegrated the Czech Republic, Hungary, Macedonia, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, and airlift support for AU peacekeepers of the and Poland in 1999; Bulgaria, Estonia, Uzbekistan.22 Twelve former PfP coun- AU Mission in Somalia. Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, tries have become NATO Allies.23 Air Policing Missions Since 2004. and Slovenia in 2004; and Albania The Mediterranean Dialogue was Air policing missions are collective peace- and Croatia, who joined in 2009.18 also founded in 1994 and consists of time operations that enable NATO to Currently, Montenegro is an “invitee,” Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Mauritania, detect, track, and identify all violations while three other countries “aspire” Morocco, and Tunisia.24 In the wake and infringements of its airspace and to to membership: Bosnia-Herzegovina, of the success of the Mediterranean take appropriate action. Allied fighter Georgia, and Macedonia.19 Dialogue, the ICI was founded in 2004 jets patrol the airspace of Allies who do The expansion into the former and includes the following four coun- not have air superiority aircraft of their Warsaw Pact was contentious for two tries of the Gulf Cooperation Council: own such as Albania, Estonia, Latvia, main reasons. First is the Russian reac- Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, and the United Lithuania, Iceland, and Slovenia. Since tion, while the second is whether the Arab Emirates.25 94 Features / NATO Nouvelle JFQ 83, 4th Quarter 2016 Norwegian soldiers stand at attention during Baltic Air Policing change of command ceremony, April 30, 2015 (NATO) The EAPC consists of all NATO training, education, transformation, and member nations to develop their own at member countries and the follow- so forth. Under ACO are two joint force the July 2016 Warsaw Summit.33 ing partner countries: Armenia, commands as well as Allied Maritime Paying Their Way. Much has been Austria, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bosnia Command, Allied Air Command, and made over the subject of NATO Allies and Herzegovina, Finland, Georgia, Allied Land Command. There are nine providing funding to the organization. Ireland, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, rapidly deployable corps headquarters Nations agreed to spend 2 percent of Macedonia, Malta, Montenegro, as well as Immediate Reaction Forces gross domestic product (GDP) per year Republic of Moldova, Russia, Serbia, (Maritime).28 in 2010. Although the combined GDP Sweden, Switzerland, Tajikistan, Countering Terror. NATO an- of the other members is larger than that Turkmenistan, Ukraine, and nounced its “Policy Guidelines on of the United States, the U.S. defense Uzbekistan.26 Counter-Terrorism: Aware, Capable expenditure represents 73 percent of “Partners across the globe” are a va- and Engaged for a Safer Future,” at the NATO spending, much of which is riety of countries who have similar goals, Chicago Summit in 2012. NATO policy dedicated to high-demand, low-density including Afghanistan, Australia, Iraq, has been informed by 9/11 and subse- capabilities such as intelligence, surveil- Japan, Mongolia, New Zealand, Pakistan, quent terror attacks.29 lance, and reconnaissance, air-to-air and Republic of Korea.27 Cyber. Like many member nations, refueling, ballistic missile defense, and Reforms. During the Cold War, NATO has been challenged by the airborne electronic warfare.34 NATO had a variety of subordinate com- emergence of cyber operations. Russian National Caveats. There are ongoing mands designed to fight a war against political warfare has a large cyber compo- complaints by some Allies that others im- the Soviet Union. In general, these nent, which has been overtly used against pose politically driven limitations on their organizations reflected the need to fight Estonia, Georgia, and Ukraine and po- operations through the use of national on land, sea, and air in the north, center, tentially used against national targets such caveats.35 During Operation Unified and south of Europe. With the end of as the Pentagon30 and U.S. Democratic Protector, some nations positioned gen- the Cold War, NATO undertook a series National Committee.31 NATO made eral and flag officers at the Combined Air of transformations to adapt to the new forward progress on developing cyber ca- Operations Center in Poggio Renatico, world. Now NATO has Allied Command pabilities at the Wales Summit in 201432 Italy. Their mission appeared to be to en- Operations (ACO), which is the warfight- and declared cyber to be a “domain” and sure that national caveats were respected. ing headquarters, and Allied Command announced further efforts to develop At times the development of the daily Transformation, which is responsible for NATO capabilities while also assisting Air Tasking Order resembled a bidding JFQ 83, 4th Quarter 2016 Crowther 95 Members of visit, board, search, and seizure team of guided missile frigate USS Taylor, assigned to Commander, NATO Task Force 508, supporting Operation Ocean Shield, respond to disabled Yemeni fishing dhow Nahda in Gulf of Aden, May 20, 2012 (U.S. Navy/Peter Santini) session, where the NATO planners and has refuted each of them.39 NATO as democracy, free trade, and rule of law. sought to generate sufficient strike capa- engaged Russia following the Cold These states work together at the United bilities to complete the mission.36 In spite War and the two cooperated regularly, Nations in regional fora and on a bilat- of the use of national caveats, members reflected in both the Founding Act on eral basis in support of global norms that always complete the mission. Although it Mutual Relations, Cooperation and have provided unparalleled peace and sometimes requires the Deputy Supreme Security between NATO and the Russian prosperity to the world. The Alliance Allied Commander Europe to convene Federation (May 17, 1997),40 and the sets standards of behavior, concepts of a force generation conference37 or the announcement of the formation of the operations, and equipment that are fol- Supreme Allied Commander Europe NATO-Russia Council (NRC) at the lowed around the world. These member to call an occasional minister of defense Rome Summit on May 28, 2002.41 The nations also provide excellent examples with a request to waive a national caveat, NRC was formed to serve as the prin- to other states around the world that NATO still managed to provide 40,000 cipal structure and venue for advancing seek to emulate their progress. personnel to the Afghanistan mission and the relationship between NATO and One of the most important responsi- generate enough strikes to complete the Russia;42 however, NRC operations were bilities that NATO members can fulfill is mission in Libya. suspended in the wake of Russian actions the need to tell their populations why the Russia. Russia regularly accuses in Ukraine in April 2014.43 Alliance is important and how NATO NATO of aggression. The Russian helps each of them maintain the indepen- Federation identified NATO as its first NATO Today and Tomorrow dence and freedom that they currently main external military risk in its military While it is easy to quantify what military enjoy. Many misunderstandings about doctrine.38 NATO has identified 32 assets NATO brings to the table, the NATO could be resolved with modest different Russian claims about Alliance Alliance provides ineffable qualities. but effective public affairs and public enlargement, NATO’s attitude toward Allies and partners form the interna- diplomacy programs. This would make it Russia, NATO as a threat, promises tional coalition of the willing, that is, easier to prevent attacks on NATO from and pledges, and NATO operations, nations who support similar goals such within and would allow political leaders 96 Features / NATO Nouvelle JFQ 83, 4th Quarter 2016 to make the case for spending 2 percent was prepositioned to support crossing available at JFQ 83, 4th Quarter 2016 Crowther 97 example of the perceived fecklessness of some actually, again, that’s the way these play out. members. Greece refuses to accept the name, I would point out though that virtually every New from insisting on calling it the “Former Yugoslav Re- one of the troop-contributing countries here public of Macedonia” (FYROM). Greek officers has sustained tough losses and tough casualties, NDU Press assigned to NATO go so far as to word search and indeed some of the smaller countries, if for the Center for the Study of every document that they receive and provide you look at their losses per capita, Denmark, for Chinese Military Affairs feedback reminding authors of the require- example. You’ll see again that there is a great ment to call Macedonia “FYROM,” wasting a sharing of the hardship and sacrifice in this Strategic Forum 289 large amount of person-hours in bureaucratic effort, without question.” Available at 98 Features / NATO Nouvelle JFQ 83, 4th Quarter 2016 B-26 Invader prepares for night intruder mission over North Korea (DOD/Air and Space Museum) Fighting with Friends Coalition Warfare in Korean Waters, 1950–1953 By Corbin Williamson n late June 1950, President Harry first units to respond was a combined strained and frayed when U.S. Navy Truman ordered U.S. forces into U.S. Navy–Royal Navy task force with commanders operated as though the I combat against the North Korean one aircraft carrier from each navy. Royal Navy was a mirror image of their invasion of South Korea. One of the Throughout the Korean War, British own fleet. This case study in manag- and American naval forces operated ing multinational operations serves as together to support the decisive actions a timely reminder for commanders and on land. Although Anglo-American operators of the importance of under- Dr. Corbin Williamson is a Historian at the Historical Office of the Office of the Secretary of naval relations were close throughout standing the history and organizational Defense. the Korean War, these ties could be structure of their coalition partners and JFQ 83, 4th Quarter 2016 Williamson 99 Corsairs returning from combat mission over North Korea circle USS Boxer as they wait for planes in next strike to launch, September 4, 1951 (U.S. Navy/NARA) of being prepared to adjust practices Forces Far East, and General Douglas against the enemy than had previously and procedures based on this knowl- MacArthur, the overall UN commander. been the case “in an effort to keep up edge. The experience of Rear Admiral The Task Force was responsible for the pressure on the Communists at George Dyer illustrates the dangers of three task missions: providing air and a high level,” a reference by Dyer to mirror-imaging coalition allies, even naval gunfire support along the Korean the ongoing armistice talks between those as close as the Royal Navy. Peninsula’s west coast, blockading North Chinese and UN negotiators. From his Dyer took command of Task Force Korea on both coasts, and escorting perspective, the UN was giving away 95, the United Nations (UN) Blockading convoys to and from Japan. The first mis- too much at the talks and increasing and Escort Force, in June 1951, after sion, west coast air and gunfire support, the military pressure on the Com- ending a tour as the deputy comman- fell to Task Group 95.2, commanded munists might force them into greater dant of the National War College in by a British officer, Rear Admiral Alan concessions.3 Dyer’s personal letters Washington, DC. Dyer brought a great Scott-Moncrieff.2 to friends and fellow officers back deal of experience to his new command, home frequently enumerated the total having held several staff and surface Dyer’s Approach to numbers of bombs and shells expended warfare positions in both the Pacific Naval Bombardment by Task Force 95. For example, in an and Atlantic during World War II.1 Task Dyer entered his position with a firm August 1951 letter, he approvingly Force 95 was under the command of conviction about the role of naval wrote that daily his ships were firing Seventh Fleet, which reported to Vice power in Korea. He believed that 500–1,000 shells and his planes were Admiral Turner Joy, Commander Naval his force should use more firepower dropping 10–25 tons of bombs.4 Under 100 Recall / Coalition Warfare in Korean Waters, 1950–1953 JFQ 83, 4th Quarter 2016 his leadership, commanding officers pattern of criticizing the U.S. Navy were Dyer between bombardment and promo- who received fire from the shore and from British officers “who have served tion. In July 1952, Vice Admiral Robert returned fire received top priority for in the United States,” a reminder that Briscoe, the senior American naval officer awards and decorations. He told a duty with another coalition partner often in Korea, and Vice Admiral Joseph Clark, friend in early 1952, “I believe that created advocates for closer cooperation Commander Seventh Fleet, emphasized those who fight the war, in counter- or at least greater understanding. Plomer to their subordinates that evaluation re- distinction with those who are merely obliquely referred to Dyer as “the princi- ports “would not depend on the amount present while the fighting goes on pal trouble-maker,” while also pointing of ammunition” fired.14 about them, are deserving of some out that Scott-Moncrieff’s chief of staff, special recognition.”5 Captain R.A. Villiers, was “strongly anti- Diverging Styles of Command Dyer’s approach to naval bombard- American in outlook.”9 In addition to diverging views about ment aggravated the British, especially naval bombardment, Dyer’s style of Scott-Moncrieff. He complained about U.S. Navy Historical Practice command damaged relations with the Dyer’s practice of judging “a ship’s The lavish use of ammunition by the Royal Navy in Korea. The U.S. Navy efficiency and aggressiveness . . . in pro- U.S. Navy in Korea did not begin with divided command functions into three portion to the ammunition expended.” Dyer’s time with Task Force 95. As the separate lines of authority: operational, The British admiral also deplored the British naval advisor in Tokyo wrote in type, and logistics. An operational com- “injunctions to ‘get into the shooting August 1950, in the U.S. Navy “more mander assigned missions and ordered war’” that came down from Dyer’s weight is put on the number of rounds ships and aircraft to perform specific flagship.6 Britain’s economy remained you fire than where they fall.”10 In missions. The type commander handled weakened from the strains of World War 1951, Admiral Guy Russell, the senior administrative tasks such as assigning II and rationing was still in force in 1950. British naval officer in the western personnel to a warship, ensuring train- Accordingly, the Royal Navy sought Pacific, ruefully commented to the ing requirements were met, and sched- to conserve ammunition by firing only First Sea Lord about American material uling repairs. Logistics ships were set at verified targets and by avoiding the abundance, “their ammunition expen- aside in a logistics force that reported to American practice of “harassing fire.” diture would buy us another Cruiser a logistics commander separate from the British and Commonwealth naval of- Squadron or Carrier Task Force.” type and operational commanders. The ficers frequently complained about the Russell also reported that the captain purpose of this command structure was extravagant American expenditure of of the battleship USS New Jersey “is to free the operational commander from ammunition. One Canadian officer de- bitterly disappointed if he doesn’t fire administrative and logistical responsi- scribed the U.S. Navy as an organization his whole ammunition outfit each time bilities so that he could focus entirely “seemingly run without regard for cost.”7 up the coast.”11 The captain of HMAS on combat operations. The system also Rear Admiral Scott-Moncrieff did Warramunga, Commander James gave the commander maximum mobil- not keep his negative feelings about Ramsay, described a visit to an American ity and flexibility in operations, two Dyer and Dyer’s views on bombard- landing craft loaded with 5,000 rockets characteristics that dominated opera- ment to himself. He sent a message to fired from 20 launchers. The American tions in the Pacific theater in World one of the other senior officers in Task captain told Ramsay that “he had to War II.15 In contrast, the British system Force 95 describing an upcoming trip restrain himself from firing for too long of command combined operational, Dyer was taking to the west coast, com- because the rockets cost the taxpayers administrative, and logistical functions menting, “I hope he [Dyer] will cause 50 bucks each.” Ramsay concluded, within a single command position no trouble,” knowing full well that the “it is rare to find the USN [U.S. Navy] located at a shore base. message would be seen by junior officers practicing such self-restraint in bom- Due in part to his World War II expe- throughout the Task Force.8 Captain bardment.”12 As a result of this profli- rience in the Pacific, Rear Admiral Dyer James Plomer, Commander Canadian gate expenditure of ammunition, in the believed that the best way to command Destroyers Far East, reported that he first 2 years of the Korean War, U.S. Task Force 95 was to be at sea with the saw examples of other messages that Navy and U.S. Marine Corps aircraft fleet as much as possible. Several months brought Scott-Moncrieff and his staff’s dropped almost as many bombs as were after taking command, Dyer wrote to dislike of Dyer into the open. Plomer dropped by these two Services in all of a fellow admiral in Pearl Harbor, “the believed the situation was not helped by World War II.13 only way I can do my job adequately is to the “undercurrent of irritation with the However, Dyer’s efforts to link visit the areas where the fighting is going Americans” and “frequent discourag- ammunition expenditure with rewards on.”16 He frequently took his staff to sea ing remarks and petty criticisms of the and promotions went beyond standard with him in the heavy cruiser USS Toledo Americans and the American Navy” com- American practice. After Dyer’s depar- to visit his forces off Korea.17 mon on Scott-Moncrieff’s staff. He also ture, succeeding American admirals Although Task Force 95 commanders noted that the “rare exceptions” to this worked to remove the links created by before and after Dyer also went to sea, JFQ 83, 4th Quarter 2016 Williamson 101 Pilot from USS Bon Homme Richard bombs Korean bridge, November 1952 (U.S. Navy/NARA) Dyer did so more frequently. This style Second, and more troubling for the “any advice or question [upon receipt of of command caused two problems as British, Dyer’s method upset the standing Dyer’s orders] appeared to be regarded far as Scott-Moncrieff and his staff were command arrangement in Task Force 95. as criticism or unwillingness.” Dyer’s concerned. First, Dyer was frequently Dyer’s predecessor, Rear Admiral Allan leadership led many British captains to not present at his headquarters at Sasebo Smith, as well as other previous Task conclude that “they were not trusted” by in Japan, which limited his day-to-day Force 95 commanders, concentrated the American admiral. Furthermore, the contact with liaison officers from the their attention on east coast operations, British desire to conserve ammunition Air Force, Army, intelligence, and other giving Scott-Moncrieff considerable combined with American pressure to organizations. This reduction in daily autonomy over west coast operations. expend it led the British to feel that Dyer contact led to lower levels of cooperation In contrast, Dyer’s frequent trips to the “thought we were dragging our feet.”18 between Task Force 95 and the various west coast led to “a great deal of backseat Dyer’s largely negative impact on rela- other organizations involved in fighting driving,” according to Scott-Moncrieff. tions within the command structure of the Korean War. In the Central Pacific in Dyer’s technique overturned the arrange- Task Force 95 demonstrates the impor- World War II, the U.S. Navy largely ran ment reached between Scott-Moncrieff tance of understanding the traditions and the war as it saw fit with minimal contact and Dyer’s predecessors under which the culture of coalition partners. If Dyer had with organizations not under the con- British operated with considerable auton- been more accommodating to the British trol of Admiral Chester Nimitz at Pearl omy on the west coast. But Dyer’s visits or pursued closer personal relations with Harbor. But Korea was different. Air to the west coast undermined this mis- Scott-Moncrieff, perhaps much of the support required constant coordination sion command agreement. In addition to acrimony could have been avoided. and communication with the Army and diverging approaches to command, Dyer Other British naval officers found that Air Force, while raids and island defense also did not explain the “why” when close personal ties could bring consider- missions needed to be coordinated with issuing orders, as was customary in the able benefits in Korea. For example, multiple intelligence organizations. Royal Navy. Finally, the British found that relations at American naval headquarters 102 Recall / Coalition Warfare in Korean Waters, 1950–1953 JFQ 83, 4th Quarter 2016 in Tokyo between the U.S. Navy staff and ing command of Task Force 95, Gin- adjust his methods and procedures to ac- the British naval liaison officer stationed grich told an audience at the Industrial commodate U.S. allies such as the British there remained close and harmonious College of the Armed Forces: and Commonwealth navies. A greater throughout the war. Vice Admiral Turner appreciation for Britain’s economic con- Joy, the overall American naval com- In the Korean action I was commander straints might have led Dyer to at least mander in 1951, gave the British officer a of Task Force 95 and I was worried about exempt the Royal Navy from pressure to desk inside the headquarters building and our heavy expenditure of ammunition. expend more ammunition. Ultimately, made him a part of the Admiral’s staff. When I took over Task Force 95, I found the U.S. Navy concluded that Dyer’s The liaison officer, Commander John that we were firing 37,000 rounds of 5-inch approach to bombardment was not the Gray, helped provide the Admiralty with ammunition on the east coast of Korea preferred model. Furthermore, Dyer insight on American naval thinking while and 14,700 on the west coast of Korea [per could have granted the British greater providing information to the Americans month]. Much of this was unobserved fire. autonomy in their area of operations off about British capabilities and intentions. I gave instructions that I wanted air spots, the Korean east coast, as his predecessors Gray found that the personal connections shore fire-control spots, and director spots at and successors did. While overall relations he developed paid dividends. For ex- the targets which were worth shooting at. I between the Americans and the British ample, the U.S. Navy briefed him on the wanted to know specifically what damage and Commonwealth fleets were strong classified plans for the landing at Inchon, was done, not that “great damage” was during the Korean War, Rear Admiral information not provided to the British done. The result of this was that we cut down George Dyer’s approach was a prominent Army or Royal Air Force officers on the to 8,500 rounds on the east coast . . . on the exception. JFQ British embassy in Tokyo staff.19 west coast we cut down to 6,500 rounds.24 Change of Command Scott-Moncrieff could not have said it Notes On May 31, 1952, Rear Admiral John better himself. 1 Gingrich replaced Dyer as Commander, Ironically, Dyer’s correspondence Library of Congress Manuscript Divi- sion, “Biographical Note,” George C. Dyer Task Force 95, much to the Royal reveals that he personally was quite Papers, 1898–1988, available at JFQ 83, 4th Quarter 2016 Williamson 103 116/6227, NAUK; Commander J.M.D. Gray, RN, Naval Advisor Tokyo to Commander in Chief, Far East Station, “NA 41/1189/50, Fifth Report of Proceedings,” December 1, 1950, 3, 5, ADM 116/6227, NAUK; Com- mander J.M.D. Gray, RN, Naval Advisor Tokyo to Commander in Chief, Far East Station, “NA 41/912/50, Third Report of Proceedings,” September 28, 1950, 3, 4, ADM 116/6227, National Archives of the UK; Commander J.M.D. Gray, RN, Naval Advisor Tokyo to Commander in Chief, Far East Station, “NA 41/792/50.” 20 Rear Admiral George C. Dyer, USN, to Lieutenant Commander Joseph Raymond Tenanty, USN, February 12, 1952, Folder 2, Box 2, George C. Dyer Papers, Naval Historical Foundation Collection, Manuscript Division, LOC. 21 Rear Admiral Alan K. Scott-Moncrieff, RN, Flag Officer, Second-in-Command, Far East Station, “Report of Experience in Korean Operations, July 1951–June 1952,” Part II. 22 Vice Admiral Guy Russell, RN, Com- mander in Chief, Far East Station to Admiral Rhoderick R. McGrigor, RN, First Sea Lord, “D/010,” 3. 23 Commander John C. Reed, RCN, to Supply warehouses and dock facilities at this important east coast port feel destructive weight of para- Commander, Canadian Destroyers, Far East, demolition bombs dropped from Fifth Air Force’s B-26 Invader light bombers, Wonsan, North Korea, 1951 “Report of Proceedings, February 1953,” (U.S. Air Force/NARA) March 17, 1953, 1, File 1926-355/31 Part 2, “HMCS Athabaskan—Report of Experience Destroyers, Far East, “Korea War Report, Staff (Washington) to Naval Secretary, “CANA- in Korean Operations, 1950–1953,” Volume Part One” 1952, 26, Folder Korean War VUS Report of Proceedings for November 11374, RG24-D-22, Library and Archives Report–Part One, HMCS Cayuga, July 1951– 1952,” December 3, 1952, 2, Folder HMCS Canada. June 1952, File 2, Box 109, 81/520/1650- Niagara (Base) 1952, File 5, HMCS Niagara 24 Vice Admiral John E. Gingrich, USN, 238/187, Directorate of History and Heritage (Base) Reports of Proceedings, 1952, Box 145, Chief of Naval Material, “Publication No. 154- (DHH). 81-520-8000, DHH. 54, Military Procurement” (Industrial College 8 Commander James Plomer, RCN, Com- 14 Vice Admiral Guy Russell, RN, Com- of the Armed Forces, November 18, 1953), 3, mander Canadian Destroyers, Far East, “Korea mander in Chief, Far East Station to Admiral available at 104 Recall / Coalition Warfare in Korean Waters, 1950–1953 JFQ 83, 4th Quarter 2016 rity advisers, ten directors of the CIA,” argues that the ground has to be prepared and innumerable senior military officers and that involvement by as many people and diplomats. He has observed and as possible, especially career professionals, exercised a lot of leadership and believes is necessary. But leaders must then take he has something important to say bold action that runs counter to insti- about the topic. He is right. tutional preferences because, he argues, Gates wrote the book to convince bureaucracies inevitably believe things are rising leaders that the quest for reform fine just as they are. is worthwhile and to suggest some A “leader focused on bringing signifi- tools and personal attributes helpful for cant change must find a way to break up leading change. The book is structured the bureaucratic concrete and create the accordingly. It begins with the frank opportunity to develop new thinking and acknowledgment that U.S. institutions approaches,” Gates states. His preferred “are failing us.” Gates surveys a litany mechanism for doing this was cross- of “disasters and embarrassments” and cutting task forces: concludes that reform is “not a luxury but a necessity.” Rejecting the indif- Task forces and similar ad hoc groups are ference of the political left about the silo busters. Most bureaucracies—both pri- need for reform and the cynicism of the vate and public—are rigid, pyramid-like political right about feasibility, Gates sets structures in which information is shared out to convince readers that “bureaucra- with those in ever-higher boxes in the struc- cies can be fixed; changed, made more ture but rarely laterally. Properly designed A Passion for Leadership: cost-effective, user-friendly, efficient and task forces make diverse elements within an Lessons on Change and responsive, and shaped to meet new institution communicate and coordinate Reform from Fifty Years problems and challenges even in an age with one another at a level not achievable of Public Service of austerity.” The rest of the book backs within the daily routine. up this assertion with numerous examples By Robert M. Gates from his experiences leading three very Gates warns that task forces cannot be Knopf Doubleday Publishing Group, different institutions. allowed to make consensus decisionmak- 2016 In a chapter on how to determine the ing their priority, in which case they will 256 pp. $18.99 kind of change an organization needs, end up producing mere “pap.” To avoid ISBN: 978-0307959492 Gates underscores the value of listening this trap, leaders must carefully structure Reviewed by Christopher J. Lamb to the organization’s rank and file—one the task forces. They must choose the of the major reasons he was a popular right leaders, prepare strong and detailed leader. He makes a strong case for pursu- charters, and monitor the task force’s obert Gates’s previous memoirs ing change with a deliberate strategy, work carefully and repeatedly, both to on his time at the Central Intel- which sounds like common sense but protect and empower them. They need R ligence Agency (CIA) and on the often is overlooked, as Gates points out. protection “to keep the bureaucracy from National Security Council staff as well The next chapter, on “techniques for smothering their efforts.” They need as his tenure as Secretary of Defense implementing change,” is perhaps the empowerment to “carry out the task” were well received as “ultimate insider” most intriguing and useful. Gates offers and “space to show what they can do.” accounts. Gates’s latest book, A Passion many “how to” insights well illustrated He believes in empowering subordinates for Leadership, is different but should by his long career. For example, he and “staying out of their hair.” The prove just as popular for different elaborates on his distinction between leader must point to the change needed reasons. Gates distills his government micro-knowledge and micromanage- but must recognize the task force may experience, along with his service as ment, an important subject he raised in “come up with a different way of imple- president of Texas A&M (the Nation’s Duty: Memoirs of a Secretary at War, his menting it.” Gates considers task forces fifth largest university), into a treatise Pentagon memoir. “immensely useful, indeed crucial for on leadership. It is a fitting capstone to Gates’s prescriptions are too nu- developing specific proposals, for imple- an illustrious career, during which he merous to list, but several of the more mentation of reforms and for tracking “worked for eight U.S. presidents . . . important ones deserve emphasis. With progress,” and observes that “with only a and observed or worked with fourteen characteristic candor, Gates notes that couple of exceptions, virtually every task secretaries of state, thirteen secretaries “any fool can (and all too often does) force I appointed improved on and en- of defense, nine chairman of the Joint dictate change from the top,” but such riched my ideas and often expanded the Chiefs of Staff, fourteen national secu- reform by diktat is seldom successful. He scope of the change.” JFQ 83, 4th Quarter 2016 Book Reviews 105 Toward the end of the book, Gates Barzun’s observation that governing well it is not clear he accepts the ephemeral turns to the importance of building requires both the political skills to discern nature of his own leadership interven- relationships and acting with integrity. what can and needs to be done and how tions and the depth of change required His conviction that we need leaders who to mobilize support for the undertaking, to transform “pyramidal, hierarchical will engage all stakeholders civilly and and the administrative skills with which structures.” Consequently, the book act honorably in all matters large and one imposes order when everything Gates intended to be uplifting may small may seem like boilerplate to some continually tends toward disorder. Truly instead leave aspiring leaders with some readers, but he communicates these tradi- gifted leaders with these skills are the ex- worrisome thoughts—namely, that the tional values with verve. For example, he ception. In fact, as Gates acknowledges, Robert M. Gateses of this world are few asks bluntly: Why we should trust a leader “real leadership” in general “is a rare and far between and that the organiza- if his or her spouse cannot? Gates also of- commodity.” So relying on the great tions failing us are more recalcitrant than fers many positive examples of leadership leader to lift institutional performance to Gates appreciates. For these rising lead- probity. Indeed, all the leadership virtues new levels when so much of the govern- ers, who Gates states he knows are “often and vices Gates catalogues are illustrated ment is headed in the opposite direction frustrated by the shortcomings of their with telling examples from his personal seems like a long shot. institutions” and who want “to be proud experience. Second, transforming organizations of the organizations they work for,” the As well-written and full of practical requires more than good leadership. wait for truly transformational prescrip- wisdom as this book is, it left this reader Washington, DC, is full of self-confident tions continues. JFQ disquieted. Gates’s solution for rampant people, so the emphasis on great lead- poor organizational performance is stellar ers and boiling organizational reform leaders. Yet he also believes “Americans down to “just good leadership” is not Dr. Christopher J. Lamb is a Distinguished Research Fellow in the Center for Strategic have, at every level, the most dedicated, surprising. But leading transformational Research, Institute for National Strategic Studies, capable, and honest public servants change requires engaging elements of at the National Defense University. anywhere.” He notes that it has been his organizational performance other than privilege to work with leaders of impec- leadership, including organizational cable character—and he names many. structure, culture, processes, and so forth. He also argues that contrary to public This may explain why the only thing rarer perceptions, and especially in the national than good leadership in Washington is security bureaucracy, civil servants work success at transformational organizational extremely hard, putting in 70-hour weeks reform. As Gates confesses, “The truth and foregoing vacations. is that dramatic reform efforts in public With so many hard-working civil institutions, certainly at the federal level, servants led by men and women of are so rare that examples are hard to impeccable character, why are our insti- come by.” tutions failing? Could better leadership According to Greg Jaffe in his alone carry off the kind of transforma- Washington Post book review of Duty, tion change Gates claims is imperative? Gates is “widely considered the best de- At the outset of the book, Gates lists a fense secretary of the post–World War II number of reasons why reform is hard, era.” Anyone reading his book on leader- but he never really offers a compelling ship will profit. But are his prescriptions explanation for the poor organizational sufficient for transformational change? performances he lambasts. The closest More pointedly, did he transform the he comes is singling out “the same pyra- Department of Defense rather than just midal, hierarchical structures, and lack of lead it exceptionally well? His two main lateral communication, that pervade the goals were getting the department to take public sector” and “also negatively affect irregular security challenges seriously and the private sector.” Gates does not say so, delivering more capability on a tighter but many other observers have concluded budget. Most observers would argue the these kinds of structures are ill suited to department’s performance has not been the 21st-century environment. Relying transformed for lasting effect in either on great leaders alone to correct the poor respect. performance of these antiquated struc- Gates acknowledges there is more tures is problematic for two reasons. to be done. In fact, that is how he con- First, stellar leaders do not come cludes: by arguing that organizational along often. Gates quotes Jacques reform is a never-ending challenge. But 106 Book Reviews JFQ 83, 4th Quarter 2016 of “passion, chance, and political pur- The alleged technocentrism of the pose.” The first chapter covers Clausewitz “new American way of war” ignores a 101 in a clean and clear manner, so much fundamental component of war, what so that a beginner in strategic stud- Clausewitz called the “moral factor.” ies could easily read this book without Betz explains that standoff precision prerequisites. The next chapter describes weaponry is no substitute for the will the historical, social, and cultural context to victory. The renewed importance of of contemporary war. David Betz makes “war amongst the people” increases the the nuanced point that every era has its significance of the moral factor because own particular context but that analysts these wars are protracted, indecisive, and, of every era exaggerate the uniqueness most importantly, dependent on generat- of their predicament. He argues that ing psychological effects among a foreign “the passions which drive us to compel population. According to Betz, the others to do our will have themselves United States and its allies are particularly not disappeared” (p. 32), but warfare disadvantaged in this area because we are has decentralized and shown a tendency a postmodern people resistant to nation- to mutate rather than come to a neat alist appeals and Manichean worldviews; conclusion. War is not obsolescent (as the we are “post-heroic,” jaded, and de- heirs of Norman Angell argue), it has not tached. In one sentence Betz does more fundamentally changed (as “new war” to explain our current reality than a shelf theorists argue), and we cannot master it full of strategy books: “A materially weak Carnage and Connectivity: through technology alone (as some ad- actor who nonetheless does not believe in Landmarks in the Decline of vocates of RMA contend). This last point his powerlessness possesses a paradoxical Conventional Military Power is the subject of chapters three and four, strength which can outmeasure that of a particularly devastating critique of pro- a materially greater opponent who does By David Betz ponents of concepts such as “dominant not believe in his own power.” Oxford University Press, 2015 battlespace knowledge,” “rapid domi- In his concluding chapters, Betz shifts 264 pp. $50 nance,” and “network-centric warfare.” to a somewhat belabored discussion of ISBN: 978-0190264857 Betz bemoans the transformation of cyber power that makes use of an interest- Reviewed by Jeffrey Meiser American strategic thinking in the 1990s ing comparison with the emergence of with this memorable reproach: “The airpower in the early 1900s. This discus- blind faith in military technology that it sion does not add much to the already ne approaches the first few pages [RMA] evinced would prove to be the extensive debate on the cyber dimension of Carnage and Connectivity most self-defeating habit of mind since for a professional military audience. O with a sense of trepidation. Do the cult of the offensive wrong-footed the Despite this disappointing conclusion, the we need another book invoking Carl generals of the First World War” (p. 57). core chapters of Carnage and Connectivity von Clausewitz’s “remarkable trinity” The “tactical hubris and strategic present a compelling explanation of the to explain the changing character vacuity” of the 1990s set the stage for strategic failures of the United States and (but not nature!) of war? Do we need conflicts of the early 2000s. During the its allies over the past decade and a half of another book critiquing revolutions in short-lived optimism of 2003, RMA war. Betz does not provide any neat solu- military affairs (RMAs) as unrealistic optimists invoked a “new American way tions to our problems, but his text does technophilia? Do we need another of war” to explain the emerging era of provide a clear diagnosis of the root cause: book parsing the meaning of cyber U.S. military dominance based on speed our leaders have neither given us a com- power? With a deep sense of foreboding and information. Betz is unimpressed: “It pelling reason for the sacrifices we have I plowed on, expecting my pessimism is hard to imagine any of history’s great made in Iraq, Afghanistan, and beyond, to be confirmed. But then I encoun- commanders—Zhukov, Patton, Sharon— nor have they found allies fundamentally tered pithy writing, unique insights, bothering to list the defeat of Iraq in committed to victory. No amount of and even detected a sense of humor. 2003 on their resumes” (p. 77). Not only technological sophistication or tactical While Carnage and Connectivity covers was the fighting largely one-sided, but proficiency can make up for this intellec- well-trodden ground, it does so with the United States also failed to establish tual and strategic failure. JFQ exceptional clarity, biting critiques, and anything approaching perfect situational the self-confident voice of a seasoned (if awareness and, most importantly, failed not cynical) scholar. to understand that rapidly destroying Dr. Jeffrey Meiser is an Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Portland The book proceeds more or less ac- armored vehicles does not mean that you in Oregon. He previously taught at the National cording to the Clausewitzian framework have broken the will of the enemy. Defense University. JFQ 83, 4th Quarter 2016 Book Reviews 107 Assessing War ultimately delivers a mixed That is not to say there is nothing of value performance in accomplishing them. here for practitioners. Numerous impor- The book is strongest in its presen- tant points are discussed—for example, tation of history. The dozen chapters that assessments can and do significantly looking at cases spanning from the Seven influence the behaviors of the units and Years’ War to contemporary conflicts in individuals being assessed. This aspect of Iraq and Afghanistan represent a major assessment is one of the most overlooked contribution to the discourse on this in my experience and the one that can topic, even though the chapters them- have the most disastrous consequences, selves vary widely in quality. The best both in terms of missed opportunities to include the chapters by Edward G. Lengel shape outcomes and in creating incentives (the Revolutionary War), Brooks D. for counterproductive actions. Simpson (U.S. actions to subdue rebellion The book’s greatest weakness is its in 1861), Michael Richardson (U.S. cav- inability to synthesize its theoretical con- alry operations against the Plains Indians), cepts and empirical examples to generate Bruce McAllister Linn (the Philippine new insights for the field of strategic as- War), and William C. Hix and Kalev I. sessment. More work should have been Sepp (the Iraq War). The last of these es- done to pull consistent threads across the pecially fills a major gap, as little has been concepts and cases presented in order written about assessment in the Iraq War to explicitly offer the reader something to date. Some chapters, most notably one of enduring value at the book’s conclu- Assessing War: The about how al Qaeda assesses its progress sion. To be sure, there are many issues Challenge of Measuring and one on “alternative dimensions of pertaining to strategic assessment that Success and Failure assessment,” are fascinating but relatively could have been broached—for example, out of place, while others—most notably whether assessment approaches used Edited by Leo J. Blanken, Hy Roth- those by John Grenier (Seven Years’ in the Revolutionary or Civil wars are stein, and Jason J. Lepore War) and Alejandro S. Hernandez, Julian still viable today, given increases in the Georgetown University Press, 2015 Ouellet, and Christopher J. Nannini complexity of the battlefield and in our 376 pp. $64.95 (Afghanistan)—completely miss the mark. national command structures, or whether ISBN: 978-1626162457 But such unevenness is often the norm technological advances in areas such as Reviewed by Jonathan Schroden in an edited volume, and it should not communications have improved our abil- detract from the utility of these works as ity to assess progress (by “flattening” the a whole—there is much of value to be battlefield) or made things worse (by gen- r. Philip Meilinger of the Air found here. erating volumes of data beyond what we University once wrote that “one The book attempts to provide a new, can process and interpret). That the book D of the most vital yet difficult tasks useable model of strategic assessment for eschews any real attempt to learn from its a wartime commander must perform is practitioners, but it struggles from the component chapters and address critical strategic assessment.” And yet, as the beginning. One major reason for this is issues facing the future of strategic assess- editors of Assessing War rightfully point the book’s confusion of terms; authors ments is its most disappointing aspect. out, strategic assessment is a topic that continually conflate wartime assessment, So what is the overall assessment of has been underserved by academic and strategic assessment, and operations as- Assessing War? To use the pithy yet unfor- military writers to date. It is into this sessment, and in some cases other forms tunate assessment lexicon of the day, the void that Assessing War commendably (for example, intelligence assessment) book is “green” when it comes to its first charges, with three primary goals: to also creep in. This lack of singular under- goal, “yellow” for its second, and decid- compile a set of in-depth historical standing of the topic dilutes the section edly “red” for its third. Does this mean it accounts of a crucial, yet neglected, on theory, which is mostly aimed at is a success or a failure? The ambiguity of aspect of military history; to refresh strategic assessment (are we winning the that question and the data available to an- our understanding of the assessment war?) but also touches inconsistently on swer it lies at the heart of every strategic problem by refining our models in light operations assessment (are we successfully assessment—a final point the book would of the evolving wartime environments prosecuting military campaigns?). The have done well to address better. JFQ we observe today and may find in the concepts presented, such as the “metrics future; and to generate recommenda- triangle,” principal-agent models, the tions to assist in establishing future “Clausewitzian Gap,” and the dominant Dr. Jonathan Schroden is Director of the Center for Stability and Development at the Center for policy, strategy, and doctrine. This is indicator theory, are rendered more as in- Naval Analyses. He has deployed numerous times a heady set of goals for one book, and teresting abstractions than useable models. to Afghanistan as an assessment analyst. 108 Book Reviews JFQ 83, 4th Quarter 2016 Danish soldier rushes objective during live-fire exercise at Joint Multinational Training Command’s Grafenwoehr Training Area in Germany, July 4, 2014 (DOD/Markus Rauchenberger) Let’s Fix or Kill the Center of Gravity Concept By Dale C. Eikmeier he current revision of Joint Pub- foundation toward a modern 21st- lication (JP) 5-0, Joint Operation century concept that can end years of T Planning, provides an opportu- debate and let the concept become the nity to fix the flawed description of the useful tool doctrine intended. center of gravity (COG) concept. The The main flaws fueling the doctrinal description is constructed so poorly concept’s debate are its Clausewitzian that it has fueled endless debate and foundation and its use of imprecise created volumes of articles and papers— metaphors. When we use metaphors all for something that is supposed to be to define something, we do not really clearly understood and accepted as the understand it. This imprecision, first Colonel Dale C. Eikmeier, USA (Ret.), is an “linchpin in the planning effort.”1 This introduced in Army doctrine in 1986 and Assistant Professor in the Department of Joint and Multinational Operations at the U.S. Army article proposes a new COG definition joint doctrine in 1994, created a cottage Command and General Staff College. that moves away from a Clausewitzian industry of theoretical debate that rages JFQ 83, 4th Quarter 2016 Eikmeier 109 Soldiers, 5th Special Forces Group jump masters, check drop zone prior to jumping from C-130J Super Hercules over Fort Campbell, Kentucky, May 21, 2014 (U.S. Air Force/Jonathan Snyder) on to this day.2 This debate has three debate. Echevarria’s Naval War College Naval Institute Proceedings, September camps: the Clausewitzian traditionalists, Review article, “Clausewitz’s Center of 1998, “Centers of Gravity Are a Myth,” the rejectionists, and between them, the Gravity: It’s Not What We Thought,” pretty well summed up the rejectionist accommodators, who are perhaps a bit discusses this mistranslation argument. argument. The rejectionists do not care quixotic in their quest to fix the concept. The solution, according to the author, what Clausewitz said or meant almost The Clausewitzian traditionalists, best is “to align the definitions of center of 200 years ago; they are practitioners represented by Antulio Echevarria II of gravity with the Clausewitzian concept looking for concepts and tools that will the U.S. Army War College, have sought and bring it back under control.”4 The help address the challenges they face in a to correct the doctrine’s flaws by going cornerstone of the traditionalist argument complex 21st-century environment. They back to Carl von Clausewitz himself and is that what Clausewitz said trumps real perhaps have the strongest argument in his seminal On War, often in the original world utility. searching for a solid analytical tool that German, and trying to divine what he The rejectionists, represented by has real utility, but they only see unsettled really meant. Echevarria confirmed this, Alex Ryan of the Army’s School of theory, so they reject it. stating, “Yet after more than two decades Advanced Military Studies and Colonel Then there are the accommodators of controversy, the meaning of center of Mark Cancian, USMC, also studied represented by Joe Strange, formerly gravity remains unsettled. Fortunately the concept of the doctrine’s discussion of the U.S. Marine Corps War College, some of the confusion can be eliminated and the real world. What they learned Milan Vego of the U.S. Naval War by returning to its original [Clausewitz] and saw caused them to throw up their College, and me of the U.S. Army sense.”3 The traditionalist argument hands in frustration. This led Ryan to Command and General Staff College. is that flawed English translations cor- conclude the COG concept is “so ab- Accommodators take a practitioner’s rupted the original concept and doctrine stract to be meaningless.”5 The title of view, much like the rejectionists, but are accepted this corruption, fueling the Cancian’s award-winning article in U.S. less concerned than traditionalists with 110 Joint Doctrine / Let’s Fix or Kill the Center of Gravity JFQ 83, 4th Quarter 2016 what Clausewitz meant and are more narrowly confined to one type of war, Redefining the Center of Gravity concerned with how planners use the that it is ill-suited for the current range Joint doctrine is clear on the concept’s concept. The accommodators, however, of military operations. Again, the rejec- purpose and utility. What doctrine reject the rejectionist viewpoint and see tionists would have a field day with this needs is new definitions of the COG value in the concept, thus their quixotic definition, arguing it is “meaningless.” and its critical factors that end decades quest to fix the concept. So JP 5-0’s Using his definition, Echevarria of debate that fuels the rejectionist revision is the “giant,” or, if one prefers, lays out a three-step process for COG argument. The criteria of clarity, logic, the “windmill” that the accommodators’ identification: precision, and testability guide the lances are aimed at. On the tip of the proposed definitions. Additionally, the Step 1: Determine whether identify- lance is a new definition. •• definitions should not only stand up ing and attacking a COG is appropri- to modern military theory but also be ate for the type of war (total defeat Definitions based on them. New definitions allow or limited) that one is going to wage. The definition is key. Echevarria and I for improved COG identification and He suggests reduced utility in limited have both proposed new definitions, validation methods based on logic and wars. Echevarria’s in Joint Force Quarterly objectivity, not metaphors or lists of Step 2: Determine whether the 35 (4th Quarter 2004) and my defini- •• characteristics. The modernized defini- adversary’s whole structure or system tion in JFQ 59 (4th Quarter 2010). tion is as follows: The center of gravity is is sufficiently connected to be treated Echeverria still relies on Clausewitz, the primary entity that inherently pos- as a single body (concentrated or dis- but not the source or hub of power sesses the critical capabilities to achieve persed). If dispersed or networked, definition. My definition is divorced the objective.9 the concept has less utility. from Clausewitz and uses the doctrinal Clarity. This definition is a simple Step 3: Determine what element has intent of the COG tool as the primary •• declarative statement of what a COG is. It the necessary centripetal force to source. I suspect the rejectionists will is the primary entity that achieves the ob- hold the system together. refuse Echevarria’s for the same reason jective. Unlike the joint definition, it is not they reject the current definition—“so The concept is no longer a source of a list of characteristics or descriptions sepa- abstract to be meaningless.” My intent power, as we currently understand it, but rated by commas. The words used in the is to win over the rejectionists by pro- rather something that draws power from proposed definition have limited meaning, viding a definition that is not abstract the system.8 This is a 180-degree flip in the unlike the phrase “a source of power,” and has real-world utility. concept’s definition. A concept that is so which can have several meanings. Clarity is Echevarria’s definition places the flexible lends credence to the rejection- achieved, which then allows for logic. emphasis not on strength but on cohe- ist argument that it is so abstract to be Logic. This definition has two criteria sion, and replaces the COG metaphor meaningless. It would even send a devout that lead to a valid inference. First, COG with “centripetal force” that holds the accommodator such as myself running to is the primary entity, the key word being force together. He defines COG as focal the rejectionist camp. primary. Second, it has the capability to points that serve to hold a system or I will concede to Echevarria that this achieve the specified objective or pur- structure together and that draw power proposed definition may be closer to pose. The logic is A (primary entity) + B from a variety of sources, providing the what Clausewitz really meant. However, (capability to achieve the objective) = COG. system with purpose and direction.6 Note that does not matter. On War is not di- Using these simple criteria, one can infer that this definition has three elements: vine revelation. What matters is passing what is and what is not a COG. it holds a system together, draws power, the “Cancian Test”: does it work and Note that the capability must be and provides purpose and direction. One have utility in the real world? What we directly linked to attaining the objective. must assume that a COG candidate must need in JP 5-0 is a definition that meets This linkage provides purpose to action possess all three elements. the Cancian Test. In the remainder of and supports doctrine that correctly Echevarria also states that “planners this article, I propose and explain just states, “An objective is always linked to a should refrain from applying the concept such a definition. My proposal modern- COG.”10 The COG is the primary pos- to every kind of war or operation.”7 He izes the COG concept, thus making it sessor of the capability that achieves the freely admits that his concept is best relevant for 21st-century conflict while objective. It is not a source of power; it is suited for war seeking the complete meeting the doctrinal intent of provid- the possessor and wielder of that power. defeat of an enemy and has less utility in ing a powerful analytical planning tool. Three questions illustrate this logic: limited wars. Organizational structure in The proposal is a new set of definitions what is the objective, how can it be the sense of connectedness and cohesion that draws on systems theory rather achieved (the required capability), and is another factor. The greater the degree than Clausewitz. This modernization, if what has the capability to do it? The of decentralization or networking, the adopted, would finally make COG the answer to the last question is the COG. less utility the concept has. Echevarria’s useful analytical tool that doctrine envi- This logic then excludes other contenders definition has so many caveats, and is so sioned it to be. allowing for greater precision. JFQ 83, 4th Quarter 2016 Eikmeier 111 Army Rangers assigned to 2nd Battalion, 75th Ranger Regiment, prepare to provide suppressive fire for assault element advancing on its objective during task force training, January 23, 2014, at Fort Hunter Liggett, California (U.S. Army/Steven Hitchcock) Precision. Clarity and logic provide used or consumed to execute the primary however, it resides in tangibles such as a precision. Use of the word primary action, it is a requirement. If it contrib- mind, a book, or other type of physical excludes secondary, supporting, or utes to, but does not actually perform, media that is targetable. Morale resides extraneous elements. If something is the action, it serves a supporting function in individuals and organizations; it does secondary or supporting, even if essential, and is a requirement. It is not a COG. not exist in a targetable sense on its own. it is a requirement, not a COG. This In this definition, there are no However, an individual or organization distinction allows planners to focus on “moral” COGs, only physical ones. could be a target of attacks designed to the COG and its relationships with other Removing moral COGs contributes affect morale. Here is another way of elements in the system. The COG is the to clarity by reducing abstractness. looking at this issue. Police do not target primary doer; it has the inherent capabil- Intangibles, such as moral strength, pub- speeding, although they say they do, be- ity required to achieve the objective. If lic opinion, or a righteous cause, are not cause speeding is intangible. They target an entity does not have that capability, COGs because they have no inherent ca- speeders—people exceeding the speed it is not a COG and the system needs to pability for action. However, they are not limit. We may think we are promoting or find or create a COG with the requisite without value and they can be require- attacking moral power, but in reality we capability. ments. A tangible physical agent must are targeting individuals or organizations Testable. The logic in the defini- perform the action. This is an important motivated by that moral power. tion provides for the supported and distinction and highlights a key difference supporting validation test. The real between my proposal, Echevarria’s, and Critical Factors COG is supported; it is the doer. Other current definitions. This brings us to critical factors, which candidates are supporting. The COG The intent of the proposed definition can be targets for indirect attacks. They is inherently capable of achieving the is to limit COGs to tangible agents that are critical capabilities, requirements, purpose or objective and executes the have a physical existence. The reason is and vulnerabilities of a COG.11 An primary action(s) that achieves it. It uses simple: we can more easily target things intangible such as popular support is or consumes supporting resources to ac- for defense or attack that physically at best a critical requirement for some complish the objective. If something is exist. For example, an idea is intangible; physical entity such as a government 112 Joint Doctrine / Let’s Fix or Kill the Center of Gravity JFQ 83, 4th Quarter 2016 or an army to perform some action Figure 1 Center of Gravity nalysis E am le that achieves a goal. However, like the COG definition, joint doctrine needs to hreat Friendly revise the definitions of critical capabili- ties, critical requirements, and critical Adversary armored corps Center of Gravity Adversary armored corps vulnerabilities associated with the COG concept. JP 5-0 states that planners should ana- Strategic mobility from Integrated Air Defense Critical Ca ability continental U.S. or supporting lyze COGs within a framework of three System critical factors: critical capabilities, critical theaters requirements, and critical vulnerabilities.12 In 1996, Joe Strange created and defined Mobile launchers Air and sea lines of the idea of critical factors: Command and control communication Critical capability: primary abilities capabilities Air and sea mobility •• Critical Re uirement platforms that merit a COG to be identified as Network of radars Air and sea ports of such in the context of a given sce- debarkation nario, situation, or mission •• Critical requirements: essential con- ditions, resources, and means for a critical capability to be fully operative Long air and sea lines Network of radars Critical ulnerability •• Critical vulnerabilities: critical of communications requirements or components thereof that are deficient or vulnerable to neutralization, interdiction, or a COG to function as such, and are confusion. The proposed definition of attack in a manner achieving decisive essential to the accomplishment of critical capabilities is primary abilities results.13 the adversary’s assumed objective.14 essential to the accomplishment of the These factors and their definitions objective that merits a COG to be identi- In his definition Strange refers to were a tremendous step forward in COG fied as such. This revised definition of abilities, which are verbs. The first joint analysis because they created a logical critical capabilities reinforces the idea definition refers to means and enablers, hierarchy that helped separate the true that the COG is the primary agent or which can be verbs or nouns. The second COG, the doer, from other contenders, doer that possesses the ability to achieve definition replaces means with those, which may only be requirements. Critical the objective. It also links the critical which refers back to capabilities that are factors also linked systems theory to the capabilities to a purpose—achieving the generally expressed as verbs. This ambi- COG concept. The COG was no longer objective. This contributes to logic and guity between abilities or things confuses a single mass or point; it was part of a precision. rather that clarifies. If one believes that system with connections to capabilities Both the Strange and joint definitions means and enablers are things (nouns), and requirements. Additionally, these of critical requirements—“essential condi- then the first joint definition could be factors provided planners insights on how tions, resources and means for a critical synonymous with Strange’s definition to attack or defend a COG by showing capability to be fully operative”—are ac- of critical requirements. One solution is what it does, what is needed, and what is ceptable.15 However, we could improve to accept Strange’s wording for critical vulnerable. However, for unknown rea- them by shifting the focus to the COG capability, emphasizing primary abilities, sons, joint doctrine significantly changed rather than the capability. Both definitions which cannot be confused with nouns Strange’s definition of critical capability. link critical requirements to capabilities, and returns the focus to actions that Two versions of the joint definition of which are verbs. Since the COG possesses accomplish the objective. However, an critical capabilities, from JP 5-0 of August the critical capability, it is clearer to link advantage of the joint definition is the 2011, are as follow: the requirement to the COG. For ex- phrase “essential to the accomplishment ample, the capability of running does not Critical capability: a means that is of the adversary’s assumed objective.” •• require shoes, but a runner does require considered a crucial enabler for a This clearly links the COG’s purpose and shoes. The question should be what does COG to function as such, and is capability to achieving the objective and the COG (the runner) require (shoes) to essential to the accomplishment of supports the proposed definition. perform the critical capability (running), the specified or assumed objective(s). If we combine elements from the not what does the capability (running) Critical capabilities are those that Strange and joint definitions, clarity •• require. This may seem like a small point, are considered crucial enablers for and logic can replace ambiguity and but it keeps the focus on the tangible JFQ 83, 4th Quarter 2016 Eikmeier 113 Soldiers load AH-64 Apache with 2.75-inch rockets during Forward Arming and Refueling Point exercise near Camp Buehring, Kuwait, January 15, 2014 (NY Army National Guard/Harley Jelis) agent, the COG, which is targetable and defense is a capability critical to achieving •• COGs simply do not exist in the the focus of planning efforts. The pro- the objective. The critical requirements modern environment. posed definition of critical requirements listed are requirements of an air defense The proposal is not only compatible is essential conditions, resources, and the system, not the COG. The radars may with systems theory, but it also relies on means that the COG requires to perform be vulnerable, but the relationship to systems theory to provide understanding the critical capability. the COG is not clear, so their relevancy of the system itself. Since the proposed Flawed definitions of the COG and to the COG is unknown. The example definition links the COG to objectives, critical factors result in flawed COG contains no logic because the definitions capabilities, and available means, it allows identification and analysis. Figure 1 lack logic. The result is an illustration in for changing COGs in dynamic environ- (from JP 5-0, figure III-12) illustrates a doctrinal publication that contributes ments where ends, ways, and means poor reasoning and flawed analysis that nothing positive and reinforces poor constantly change. It does not rely on results from the current doctrinal defini- reasoning. Figure 2 illustrates an im- confusing and inaccurate metaphors that tions of COG and critical capabilities. No proved COG analysis based on revised produce endless discussions on what is a adversary objective or endstate is given in definitions. source of power or a hub. Lastly, in the the figure, so we have to assume that the The proposed definitions resolve revised definition, the COG is a tangible identification of the “adversary armored many of the valid criticisms from the and targetable agent that performs an corps” as the COG is correct. The critical rejectionists currently associated with the action and can be shown to exist. These capability, “integrated air defense sys- doctrinal definitions. Criticisms include: characteristics are the new foundation for tem,” is not a capability at all; it is a thing incompatibility with modern systems a modernized center of gravity concept. that is perhaps a requirement. Providing •• theory Fixing the definitions of the center of air defense is a capability. Since we do failure to account for dynamic gravity, critical capabilities, and critical not know the mission of the armored •• environments requirements is the first step toward corps, there is no way of knowing if air •• imprecise metaphors achieving the intent of JP 5-0. 114 Joint Doctrine / Let’s Fix or Kill the Center of Gravity JFQ 83, 4th Quarter 2016 Figure 2 Revised Center of Gravity nalysis Release of New Joint Document Country liberated and sovereignty Objective or endstate n his remarks to a recent graduating restored Iclass at the National Defense University, General Dunford declared that “not adapting to the change of Attack, Destroy, Critical Capability the character of war, and not thinking Seize, Occupy, Re ired o o ain out to the future in an innovative Secure, Defend he o ec i e way . . . is the difference between us having a competitive advantage in the future, and not having a competitive advantage.” In response to General Armored Corps Center of Gravity Dunford’s call to action, the Joint Staff J7 recently published the Joint Operating Environment 2035: The C2, Logistics, Secure Joint Force in a Contested and Disordered World. Critical Requirements lines/flanks, Joint fires, re ired o er orm Intel, Protection, Mvt he cri ica ca a i i JOE 2035 was specifically designed to investigate Maneuver, Legitimacy the changing character of war and identify the implications of war’s evolving character for the joint force. It strikes a delicate balance between a Critical ulnerabilities Legitimacy, ec o ad er ar credible description of key trends that will redefine Supply lines ac ion the future security environment and the innovative reimagining of how combinations of these trends might influence and shape the future of conflict and war. It concludes by describing a range of The current revision of JP 5-0 is an evolving missions that the future joint force might opportunity to end decades of debate be required to conduct in response to the changing and finally achieve the original intent character of war. of the COG’s inclusion of doctrine. We have a choice: accept the proposal and JOE 2035 does not attempt to predict the future or forecast specific settle the debate, or pass on this op- scenarios. However, consistent with General Dunford’s mandate to study portunity and continue the debate for the future demands of war, it emphasizes that “thinking through the most several more years. JFQ important conditions in a changing world can mean the difference between victory and defeat, success and failure.” Ultimately, JOE 2035 should encourage the purposeful preparation of the joint force so that it can Notes effectively protect the United States and its interests, allies, and partners around the world. 1 Joint Publication (JP) 5-0, Joint Operation Planning (Washington, DC: The Joint Staff, August 11, 2011), III-23. 2 Field Manual (FM) 100-5, Operations 8 Echevarria. (Washington, DC: Headquarters Department 9 The use of the word primary is attributed of the Army, 1986), 179; JP 1-02, Department to Joe Strange. See Joe Strange, Centers of of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associ- Gravity & Critical Vulnerabilities, Perspectives ated Terms (Washington, DC: The Joint Staff, on Warfighting Number Four, 2nd ed. (Quan- March 23, 1994), 63. tico, VA: Marine Corps University, 1996), ix. 3 Antulio Echevarria II, “Center of Gravity 10 JP 5-0, III-22. Recommendations for Joint Doctrine,” Joint 11 Ibid., III-24. th Force Quarterly 35 (4 Quarter 2004), 10. 12 Ibid. 4 Ibid., 12. 13 Strange, ix. 5 Alex Ryan, email to Celestino Perez, Fort 14 JP 5-0, GL-8, IV-12. Leavenworth, KS, passed to author, October 15 Strange, ix; JP 5-0, GL-8, III-24. 13, 2011. 6 Echevarria. 7 Ibid. JFQ 83, 4th Quarter 2016 Eikmeier 115 New from Joint Publications (JPs) Under Revision NDU Press (to be signed within 6 months) for the Center for Strategic Research JP 2-01, Joint and National Intelligence Support to Military Operations Strategic Forum 292 JP 2-03, Geospatial Intelligence in Joint Operations Supporting Democracy in Erdogan’s Turkey: The Role of Think Tanks JP 3-01, Countering Air and Missile Threats by Richard H.M. Outzen and Ryan JP 3-13.4, Military Deception Schwing JP 3-15.1, Counter-Improvised Explosive Device Operations Fifteen years into the era JP 3-18, Joint Forcible Entry Operations of President JP 3-33, Joint Task Force Headquarters Recep Tayyip JP 3-59, Meteorological and Oceanographic Operations Erdogan, U.S. influence JP 4-01, Defense Transportation System on his inner JP 4-06, Mortuary Affairs circle and JP 4-08, Logistic Support of Multinational Operations support base, the new gen- JP 5-0, Joint Planning eration of Turkish strategic thinkers, and the Turkish public at large has JPs Revised (signed within last 6 months) diminished rather than improved. JP 1-0, Joint Personnel Support U.S. interests would be better served by avoiding confrontation JP 1-04, Legal Support to Military Operations and maintaining close military- JP 2-01.2, Counterintelligence/Human Intelligence to-military cooperation while also JP 3-0, Joint Operations pressing for democratization in a patient, low-profile manner. The JP 3-03, Joint Interdiction emerging Turkish think tank sector JP 3-04, Joint Shipboard Helicopter and Tiltrotor Operations offers opportunities for doing just JP 3-07, Stability that. The sector has grown dra- matically over the past 20 years and JP 3-08, Interorganizational Cooperation offers a window for better under- JP 3-14, Space Operations standing the revolution in Turkish JP 3-15, Barriers, Obstacles, and Mine Warfare strategic thinking that now perplexes many American observers. Engaging JP 3-20, Security Cooperation Turkey’s think tanks would support JP 3-25, Countering Threat Networks democratization. JP 3-41, CBRN Consequence Management JP 3-42, Joint Explosive Ordnance Disposal JP 4-01.6, Joint Logistics Over-the-Shore Visit the NDU Press Web site for more information on publications at ndupress.ndu.edu 116 Joint Doctrine / Joint Doctrine Update JFQ 83, 4th Quarter 2016 From NDU Press Lessons Encountered: Learning from the Long War NDU Press, 2015 • 488 pp. This volume began as two questions from General Martin E. Dempsey, 18th Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff: What were the costs and benefits of the campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan, and what were the strategic lessons of these campaigns? The Institute for National Strategic Studies at the National Defense University was tasked to answer these questions. The editors composed a volume that assesses the war and analyzes the costs, using the Institute’s considerable in-house talent and the dedication of the NDU Press team. The audience for this volume is senior officers, their staffs, and the students in joint professional military education courses—the future leaders of the Armed Forces. Other national security professionals should find it of great value as well. The volume begins with an introduction that addresses the difficulty of learning strategic lessons and a preview of the major lessons identified in the study. It then moves on to an analysis of the campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq from their initiation to the onset of the U.S. Surges. The study then turns to the Surges themselves as tests of assessment and adaptation. The next part focuses on decision- making, implementation, and unity of effort. The volume then turns to the all-important issue of raising and mentoring indigenous security forces, the basis for the U.S. exit strategy in both campaigns. Capping the study is a chapter on legal issues that range from detention to the use of unmanned aerial vehicles. The final chapter analyzes costs and benefits, dissects decisionmaking in both campaigns, and summarizes the lessons encountered. Supporting the volume are three annexes: one on the human and financial costs of the Long War and two detailed timelines for histories of Afghanistan and Iraq and the U.S. campaigns in those countries. The lessons encountered in Afghanistan and Iraq at the strategic level inform our understanding of national security decisionmaking, intelligence, the character of contemporary conflict, and unity of effort and command. They stand alongside the lessons of other wars and remind future senior offi- cers that those who fail to learn from past mistakes are bound to repeat them. Available at ndupress.ndu.edu/Books/LessonsEncountered.aspx JOINT FORCE QUARTERLY ISSUE EIGHTY-THREE, 4TH QUARTER 2016 Flickr Pinterest Facebook Twitter www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jfq/jfq.htm You can also find us on: can also find You Visit us online at: http://ndupress.ndu.edu Visit JFQ is available online at the Joint Electronic Library: articles, occasional papers, books, and other publications. site is a great place to find information on new and upcomingsite is a great place to find information With 20,000 unique visitors each month, the NDU Press WebWith 20,000 unique visitors each month, JOINT FORCE QUARTERLY Our understanding of the importance and keeping peace is of women in building Around and activists are the globe, policymakers empower women as working to National Defense University, Washington, DC National Defense University, Washington, informed by a wide range of experts, from diplomats to military officials and from human rights activists to development professionals.together The goal of this book is to bring these diverse voices. As leaders in every region of the world recognize, no country can reach its full potential without the participation of all its citizens. This book seeks to add to the chorus of voices working to ensure that women and girls take their rightful place in more prosperous world. safer, building a stronger, Available at ndupress.ndu.edu/Books/WomenontheFrontlinesofPeaceandSecurity.aspx agents of peace and to help addressagents of peace and as survivors the challenges they face of conflict. When women are important in peace negotiations, they raise involved issues that might be otherwise When women are overlooked. educated and enabled to participate in every societies—from aspect of their growing the economy to strengthening the security sector—communities are more stable and less prone to conflict. Women on the Frontlines of Peace and Security of Peace on the Frontlines Women Foreword by Hillary Rodham Clinton and Leon Panetta NDU Press, 2015 • 218 pp. This book reflects President women’s Obama’s commitment to advancing Barack participation in preventing conflict and keeping peace. It is inspired by the countless the frontlineswomen and girls on a difference who make every day in their communities and societies by creating opportunities and building peace. Published for the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff University Press by National Defense Have you checked out NDU Press online lately? Have you checked