Ground Combat Overmatch Through Control of the Atmospheric

Romanian soldier fires rocket propelled grenade at range near Bemowo Piskie Training Area, Poland, January 24, 2018, as part of multinational battle group comprised of U.S., UK, Croatian, and Romanian soldiers supporting NATO’s Enhanced Forward Presence (U.S. Army/Andrew McNeil) he U.S. military is seeking dis- Ground Combat ruptive innovations to sustain T its technological advantage despite rapid advances by potential adversaries. The need is particularly Overmatch Through acute in ground combat, where most U.S. casualties are sustained and where game-changing technical innovations Control of the have been less common than in other military mission areas. The Search for Tactical Atmospheric Littoral Overmatch In addition to increasing technologi- By George M. Dougherty cal pressure, recent coalition combat experiences and defense studies suggest that the future battlefield will be more complex than in the past. Combat in built-up areas including megacities will become commonplace. As concluded Colonel George M. Dougherty, USAF, is the Individual Mobilization Augmentee to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Science, Technology, and Engineering, Office of the Assistant Secretary of by a recent report, “Urban operations the Air Force for Acquisition and Logistics, in Washington, DC. in the 21st century are not just another 64 Features / Control of the Atmospheric Littoral JFQ 94, 3rd Quarter 2019 type of operation; they will become this tion of robotics and autonomy to forces can move, concentrate, and century’s signature form of warfare.”1 the land domain has focused largely disperse without hindrance, much The pivotal battles in Iraq and Syria on unmanned ground vehicles. This like aircraft but on a local scale. have been urban fights for cities like emphasis is seen, for instance, in the • Operations are conducted low Fallujah, Mosul, and Raqqa. Whether U.S. Army Robotic and Autonomous enough that the forces are in close conducted in urban areas or elsewhere, Systems Strategy, which envisions a and intimate contact with ground battles will involve proliferating low- ground vehicle–centric approach forces, able to attack enemy ground cost lethality used by adversaries, such extending through the far-term horizon forces or support friendly ones as improvised explosive devices of of the 2030s and beyond.8 However, in ways that other ground forces increasing sophistication, man-portable these vehicles will face the physical cannot. weapons like advanced rocket-propelled complexity of the future battlefield, in • Operations are conducted low grenades and explosively formed particular, the environment in which enough that the forces can use large penetrator warheads, and weaponized they need to navigate. The most features such as buildings, hills, or commercial drones.2 While roles exist advanced contemporary autonomous large trees as cover and concealment. for elegant technologies like hypersonic ground robots have had mishaps In shorthand, it can be thought of as weapons and other long-range stand- navigating relatively simple terrain. “the air between the buildings” and may off fires, winning future conflicts will At the Defense Advanced Research extend to an altitude of a few hundred ultimately require tactical overmatch in Projects Agency Robotics Challenge in feet. Contemporary helicopters often op- close battles in the land domain. 2015, autonomous robots in complex erate in the atmospheric littoral but tend The use of robotics and autonomy environments struggled at length to not to remain there for long in combat offers great but undefined potential. New accomplish the most basic tasks that because they are vulnerable to enemy fire innovations in this area could build on the humans find trivial, like moving over at that altitude, and their size—required U.S. military’s early technological and op- uneven ground and opening doors.9 for carrying human pilots and passen- erational lead in unmanned systems. They In another example during 2017, a gers—prevents them from maneuvering would also capitalize on U.S. advantages security surveillance robot toppled into safely or effectively between buildings in battlefield networking, logistics, and the fountain in an office park plaza.10 and trees or along streets. Once they are technical training, and could help frustrate The terrain of an urban battlescape, as high enough to be out of danger from enemy attempts to bleed away American seen in recent battles in Iraq and Syria, enemy small-arms fire, they are, tactically political will by inflicting U.S. casualties. can be vastly more complex—a jumble speaking, out of the atmospheric littoral. Most concepts to date involve straight- of obstacles including barricades, debris forward substitutions of unmanned or from damaged structures, craters, and Advantages of the manned platforms within current concepts wrecked vehicles. Even with navigation Atmospheric Littoral of operations—for instance, unmanned using artificial intelligence (AI) genera- Combat operations in the atmospheric strike fighters to serve as “wingmen” to tions beyond that of current self-driving littoral may provide disruptive new manned strike aircraft,3 explosive ordnance cars, or with continuous remote control military capability and overmatch for disposal robots,4 robotic “pack mules,”5 by a human operator, the physical ground forces. They effectively expand autonomous trucks6 for carrying supplies, obstacles are likely to impede any the ground combat battlespace at the and armed ground robots to provide ground robot. small-unit level from two dimensions to remote-controlled gun firing positions.7 Elevate the plane of movement three. This could open up a whole new These are all ways of better enabling perhaps 10 meters up, however, and dimension of tactical maneuver. For existing military capabilities. However, all is nearly as smooth as the floor of a instance, instead of flanking an enemy they may not provide decisive overmatch laboratory. Flying drones can operate at force on the next street by moving for U.S. forces. Could the inherent capa- this level but remain intimately engaged down side streets, the force could send bilities of robotics and autonomy bring in ground combat. They are effectively elements “up and over” an intervening entirely new operational concepts to the ground forces, but they operate in the air block to flank an opposing force from battlefield? Looking beyond immediate with the tactical advantages of airpower. above. technical limitations, what new capa- They operate in what can be called the The ability of atmospheric littoral bilities and combat doctrine could these atmospheric littoral, the portion of the at- forces to maneuver in the third dimen- technologies enable to provide disruptive mosphere adjacent to the Earth. In terms sion, and the freedom from ground tactical overmatch in the battles to come? of future military operations, it is where obstacles that this enables, could provide One example is proposed here. the following conditions apply: several pervasive advantages: Operations are conducted in the Atmospheric Littoral Operations • Speed. As with air forces, move- air, high enough that most ground • To date, official U.S. military think- ment through the air is fast and obstacles are of no consequence and ing regarding future direct applica- unobstructed, so forces could be JFQ 94, 3rd Quarter 2019 Dougherty 65 sent quickly to achieve time-sensitive • Three-axis maneuverability. Ability to small, the individual platforms may objectives, like cutting off a with- maneuver in the air up to an altitude be vulnerable to small-arms and other drawing enemy’s route of escape. of several hundred feet, move along direct fires such as laser and high-power • Concentration. As with air forces, multiple axes, or remain stationary. microwave drone defeat weapons, and the ability to move independently This effectively rules out fixed-wing will therefore rely on cover and maneu- of terrain and other ground forces aircraft. verability for their survivability.12 This enables the commander to concen- • Small size. Small enough to maneu- includes flying at very low altitudes (~ trate combat power at the decisive ver effectively between buildings, 10 meters). Being too small to carry time and place within the bat- trees, and other tall obstacles like a human pilot, they will be able to tlespace, even if physically separated cell towers and power lines. This carry light weapons loads comparable from other friendly forces. effectively rules out human-piloted to those of an individual soldier—for • Persistence. As with ground forces, vehicles. instance, an assault or squad automatic atmospheric littoral forces could • Usable payload. Large enough to rifle and/or compact tube-launched seize and control terrain. Operating carry light infantry, man-portable– direct-attack munitions. An individual in close contact with the ground, class weapons with significant platform therefore may be comparable they could land and remain in place lethality. to one or a few infantry soldiers in for long periods to physically occupy • Control. Equipped with sensors combat power. objectives and deny their use to the and communications to be able to Combining multiple platforms, how- enemy. sense their environment, report their ever, yields an aggregate that can provide • Mass. Unlike other forces, they could circumstances, and accept command significant survivability and lethality. The be arbitrarily arranged in space, and control. loss of a single drone would only margin- enabling a unique concentration • Autonomy. Autonomous enough to ally degrade the capability of the whole, of firepower. For instance, arraying manage their own stability, naviga- and the ability to mass the firepower of forces in the third dimension could tion, and other functions without a group could bring substantial combat enable a range of platforms at dif- continuous human control. Capable power to bear. ferent altitudes to all have sustained of collective control of many plat- In current usage, a group of un- direct-fire solutions on the enemy at forms by a single “operator,” includ- manned systems operating together the same moment. ing coordinated action as a group.

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