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Romanian soldier fires rocket propelled grenade at range near Bemowo Piskie Training Area, Poland, January 24, 2018, as part of multinational group comprised of U.S., UK, Croatian, and Romanian soldiers supporting NATO’s Enhanced Forward Presence (U.S. Army/Andrew McNeil)

he U.S. is seeking dis- Ground Combat ruptive innovations to sustain T its technological advantage despite rapid advances by potential adversaries. The need is particularly Overmatch Through acute in ground combat, where most U.S. casualties are sustained and where game-changing technical innovations Control of the have been less common than in other military mission areas.

The Search for Tactical Atmospheric Littoral Overmatch In addition to increasing technologi- By George M. Dougherty cal pressure, recent coalition combat experiences and defense studies suggest that the future battlefield will be more complex than in the past. Combat in built-up areas including megacities will become commonplace. As concluded Colonel George M. Dougherty, USAF, is the Individual Mobilization Augmentee to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Science, Technology, and Engineering, Office of the Assistant Secretary of by a recent report, “Urban operations the Air Force for Acquisition and Logistics, in Washington, DC. in the 21st century are not just another

64 Features / Control of the Atmospheric Littoral JFQ 94, 3rd Quarter 2019 type of operation; they will become this tion of robotics and autonomy to forces can move, concentrate, and century’s signature form of warfare.”1 the land domain has focused largely disperse without hindrance, much The pivotal in Iraq and Syria on unmanned ground vehicles. This like aircraft but on a local scale. have been urban fights for cities like emphasis is seen, for instance, in the •• Operations are conducted low Fallujah, Mosul, and Raqqa. Whether U.S. Army Robotic and Autonomous enough that the forces are in close conducted in urban areas or elsewhere, Systems Strategy, which envisions a and intimate contact with ground battles will involve proliferating low- ground vehicle–centric approach forces, able to attack enemy ground cost lethality used by adversaries, such extending through the far-term horizon forces or support friendly ones as improvised explosive devices of of the 2030s and beyond.8 However, in ways that other ground forces increasing sophistication, man-portable these vehicles will face the physical cannot. like advanced rocket-propelled complexity of the future battlefield, in •• Operations are conducted low grenades and explosively formed particular, the environment in which enough that the forces can use large penetrator warheads, and weaponized they need to navigate. The most features such as buildings, hills, or commercial drones.2 While roles exist advanced contemporary autonomous large trees as cover and concealment. for elegant technologies like hypersonic ground robots have had mishaps In shorthand, it can be thought of as weapons and other long-range stand- navigating relatively simple terrain. “the air between the buildings” and may off fires, winning future conflicts will At the Defense Advanced Research extend to an altitude of a few hundred ultimately require tactical overmatch in Projects Agency Robotics Challenge in feet. Contemporary helicopters often op- close battles in the land domain. 2015, autonomous robots in complex erate in the atmospheric littoral but tend The use of robotics and autonomy environments struggled at length to not to remain there for long in combat offers great but undefined potential. New accomplish the most basic tasks that because they are vulnerable to enemy fire innovations in this area could build on the humans find trivial, like moving over at that altitude, and their size—required U.S. military’s early technological and op- uneven ground and opening doors.9 for carrying human pilots and passen- erational lead in unmanned systems. They In another example during 2017, a gers—prevents them from maneuvering would also capitalize on U.S. advantages security surveillance robot toppled into safely or effectively between buildings in battlefield networking, logistics, and the fountain in an office park plaza.10 and trees or along streets. Once they are technical training, and could help frustrate The terrain of an urban battlescape, as high enough to be out of danger from enemy attempts to bleed away American seen in recent battles in Iraq and Syria, enemy small-arms fire, they are, tactically political will by inflicting U.S. casualties. can be vastly more complex—a jumble speaking, out of the atmospheric littoral. Most concepts to date involve straight- of obstacles including barricades, debris forward substitutions of unmanned or from damaged structures, craters, and Advantages of the manned platforms within current concepts wrecked vehicles. Even with navigation Atmospheric Littoral of operations—for instance, unmanned using artificial intelligence (AI) genera- Combat operations in the atmospheric strike fighters to serve as “wingmen” to tions beyond that of current self-driving littoral may provide disruptive new manned strike aircraft,3 explosive ordnance cars, or with continuous remote control military capability and overmatch for disposal robots,4 robotic “pack mules,”5 by a human operator, the physical ground forces. They effectively expand autonomous trucks6 for carrying supplies, obstacles are likely to impede any the ground combat at the and armed ground robots to provide ground robot. small-unit level from two dimensions to remote-controlled gun firing positions.7 Elevate the plane of movement three. This could open up a whole new These are all ways of better enabling perhaps 10 meters up, however, and dimension of tactical maneuver. For existing military capabilities. However, all is nearly as smooth as the floor of a instance, instead of flanking an enemy they may not provide decisive overmatch laboratory. Flying drones can operate at force on the next street by moving for U.S. forces. Could the inherent capa- this level but remain intimately engaged down side streets, the force could send bilities of robotics and autonomy bring in ground combat. They are effectively elements “up and over” an intervening entirely new operational concepts to the ground forces, but they operate in the air block to flank an opposing force from battlefield? Looking beyond immediate with the tactical advantages of airpower. above. technical limitations, what new capa- They operate in what can be called the The ability of atmospheric littoral bilities and combat doctrine could these atmospheric littoral, the portion of the at- forces to maneuver in the third dimen- technologies enable to provide disruptive mosphere adjacent to the Earth. In terms sion, and the freedom from ground tactical overmatch in the battles to come? of future military operations, it is where obstacles that this enables, could provide One example is proposed here. the following conditions apply: several pervasive advantages: Operations are conducted in the Atmospheric Littoral Operations •• Speed. As with air forces, move- air, high enough that most ground •• To date, official U.S. military think- ment through the air is fast and obstacles are of no consequence and ing regarding future direct applica- unobstructed, so forces could be

JFQ 94, 3rd Quarter 2019 Dougherty 65 sent quickly to achieve time-sensitive •• Three-axis maneuverability. Ability to small, the individual platforms may objectives, like cutting off a with- maneuver in the air up to an altitude be vulnerable to small-arms and other drawing enemy’s route of escape. of several hundred feet, move along direct fires such as laser and high-power •• Concentration. As with air forces, multiple axes, or remain stationary. microwave drone defeat weapons, and the ability to move independently This effectively rules out fixed-wing will therefore rely on cover and maneu- of terrain and other ground forces aircraft. verability for their survivability.12 This enables the commander to concen- •• Small size. Small enough to maneu- includes flying at very low altitudes (~ trate combat power at the decisive ver effectively between buildings, 10 meters). Being too small to carry time and place within the bat- trees, and other tall obstacles like a human pilot, they will be able to tlespace, even if physically separated cell towers and power lines. This carry light weapons loads comparable from other friendly forces. effectively rules out human-piloted to those of an individual soldier—for •• Persistence. As with ground forces, vehicles. instance, an assault or squad automatic atmospheric littoral forces could •• Usable payload. Large enough to rifle and/or compact tube-launched seize and control terrain. Operating carry light , man-portable– direct-attack munitions. An individual in close contact with the ground, class weapons with significant platform therefore may be comparable they could land and remain in place lethality. to one or a few infantry soldiers in for long periods to physically occupy •• Control. Equipped with sensors combat power. objectives and deny their use to the and communications to be able to Combining multiple platforms, how- enemy. sense their environment, report their ever, yields an aggregate that can provide •• Mass. Unlike other forces, they could circumstances, and accept command significant survivability and lethality. The be arbitrarily arranged in space, and control. loss of a single drone would only margin- enabling a unique concentration •• Autonomy. Autonomous enough to ally degrade the capability of the whole, of firepower. For instance, arraying manage their own stability, naviga- and the ability to mass the firepower of forces in the third dimension could tion, and other functions without a group could bring substantial combat enable a range of platforms at dif- continuous human control. Capable power to bear. ferent altitudes to all have sustained of collective control of many plat- In current usage, a group of un- direct-fire solutions on the enemy at forms by a single “operator,” includ- manned systems operating together the same moment. ing coordinated action as a group. is called a swarm. This implies a loose Endurance. Sufficient endurance to aggregation with a lot of random posi- A further advantage of atmospheric •• conduct meaningful combat opera- tioning, like an insect swarm, and may be littoral operations is that they are ex- tions on the timescale of small-unit consistent with public experience of small pected to be complementary to, and engagements and return to a logistics drones for pre-programmed light shows integrate with, other ground unit opera- point before running out of energy. and similar entertainment.13 However, in tions. Littoral combat forces could be About 30 minutes may be a practical military tactics it is unusual to speak of a attached to other ground units under minimum, with an ability to return swarm of soldiers, vehicles, or aircraft. To the same commander to serve as an or- immediately to operations after visit- provide a sufficient level of discipline and ganic force multiplier in combined-arms ing the logistics point. control for combat in close coordination operations. with friendly forces, a degree of order at Doctrinal concepts for atmospheric A large contemporary quad-rotor least comparable to that of other ground littoral operations are influenced by or hex-rotor drone is the first platform forces is needed. In this context, a term several sources, considering their multi- with the basic characteristics suitable for such as array may be more accurate, domain nature. These include airpower atmospheric littoral combat. Drones of indicating an ordered type of swarm theory, small-unit tactics from the land the required size are being demonstrated where each element occupies a controlled domain, and air-mobile/ today, for instance as part of the Army position. Like other forces, a drone array doctrine. Research Laboratory’s Joint Tactical can assume different tactical formations Aerial Resupply Vehicle technology pro- depending on the task it is performing. Characteristics of gram, which targets a cargo capacity of This degree of multiplatform coordina- Weapons Systems 200 pounds or more.11 Future platforms tion has been demonstrated using small Operations in the atmospheric littoral with different modes of propulsion and commercial drones in controlled environ- have not been possible in the past other qualities could offer greater capa- ments, including complex behaviors, such because no suitable platforms have been bilities in the future. as quickly forming and reforming highly technically possible. Characteristics of ordered formations and cooperating to a capable atmospheric littoral combat The Basic Unit of Operations move formations through constrictions platform include the following: An individual drone of this type has such as doorways and reform them on limited survivability and lethality. Being the other side.14

66 Features / Control of the Atmospheric Littoral JFQ 94, 3rd Quarter 2019 RoboSimian from Jet Propulsion Laboratory exits vehicle during DARPA Robotics Challenge, June 5, 2015, in Pomona, California (U.S. Navy/John F. Williams)

The drone array, not the individual a powerful and flexible range of new effects of terrain, drone arrays may platform, would be the basic unit of at- options that provide decisive tactical be a highly effective covering force mospheric littoral operations. Command advantage in both high- and low- during movement to contact. They and control would be feasible with one intensity conflicts, suited to the complex provide real-time intelligence, sur- human operating an array, with the many environments expected in (near) future veillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) details of individual drone navigation, campaigns. The basic concept of opera- information to the command unit. object avoidance, and so on handled tion envisions attachment to company- If a meeting engagement occurs, autonomously. The array would move, or battalion-level units operating in an array’s mobility could enable attack, or change formation as a unit built-up areas, similar, for instance, to it to react more quickly than the under human direction. When sustaining today’s Stryker Brigade Combat Team enemy to seize the initiative and fix battle damage, the array would remain infantry rifle companies or Marine the enemy forces to help shape the mission-capable despite the loss of some infantry battalions. Roles can also be larger engagement. Friendly forces of its elements. It would simply reas- envisioned for arrays operating with retain the option to disengage, since semble its formation and conduct its a range of combat forces from special the array’s mobility and attritabil- operations using the remaining elements. operations forces to heavier maneuver ity prevent it from being decisively It could undergo attrition gracefully. Due forces. The roles are applicable in both engaged. It could withdraw at will. to its distributed nature, it would be hard conventional and . •• Shaping engagements. During an to defeat with a single attack, no matter Some examples of tactical employment assault, a drone array could enter a how forceful. for drone arrays include the following built-up area before the arrival of small-unit maneuvers: follow-on forces in order to find Tactical Employment and engage prepared enemy posi- Movement to contact. Due to their Drone arrays operating in the atmo- •• tions, provide suppressive fire, and high mobility and immunity to the spheric littoral may offer ground forces drive enemy forces away from open

JFQ 94, 3rd Quarter 2019 Dougherty 67 TALON robot, operated by Marines with Explosive Ordnance Disposal Platoon, Combat Logistics Battalion 2, scouts area for improvised explosive devices during field exercise at Camp Lejeune, North Carolina, March 2, 2016 (U.S. Marine Corps/Paul S. Martinez)

areas. It could also identify potential position, fix the enemy, and subject dimensions to provide maximum ambush locations and lay smoke him to continuous fire. lethality. When called for, a drone screens. Because an array contains •• Infiltration and interdiction. An array could assume three-dimen- no human soldiers and is attritable, array is a dissociable unit and has the sional tactical formations to bring a this could greatly reduce hazards to ability to concentrate or disperse at unique number of converging direct the assaulting forces and speed the will. Because it can move without fires into play. This could be done engagement. regard to terrain, its elements could through vertical echeloning, for •• Vertical envelopment. Operations move through or into locations that instance—by forming the elements in the atmospheric littoral provide would ordinarily be inaccessible to into vertical ranks in a “wall” forma- tactical dominance because they friendly forces. Drones can filter tion, or even taking a hemispherical allow friendly forces to maneuver in individually through terrain and formation to concentrate fire on three dimensions while the enemy concentrate over enemy rear areas a discrete target such as a fortified is confined to two. In addition to to conduct rear attacks, interdict building. flanking envelopments, a drone array enemy supplies or reinforcements, •• Area defense. Atmospheric littoral could move over the top of interven- or attack command elements. They forces, like other ground forces, ing buildings, hills, or other obstacles can disperse and reinfiltrate back to could help take and hold ground and conduct a vertical envelopment. friendly locations or, if desired, be objectives. A drone array could This is particularly valuable when left engaged until all the elements are land, thereby conserving power, an enemy is in defilade—sheltering expended without incurring friendly and remain on station indefinitely behind an obstacle or in a trench— casualties. to observe and defend a location but is without strong overhead cover. •• Decisive engagement. Atmospheric and deny its use to enemy forces. Unlike traditional air support, the littoral operations provide the ability If attacked, it could take to the air array could maintain an enveloping to concentrate firepower in three to engage in combat. Future drone

68 Features / Control of the Atmospheric Littoral JFQ 94, 3rd Quarter 2019 elements may even be able to change advances in autonomy, but all will require or uphold U.S. military values and laws geometry when landed to opti- some military-specific investment. of armed conflict on their own. Human mize them for observation, energy Command, Control, and control at a high level will remain es- harvesting, ground movement, or Communications. Challenges in com- sential, both to carry out their military weapons employment while landed. mand and control include guiding missions effectively and to avoid mishaps, •• Mobile defense and retrograde. The multiple drones within an array and especially when weapons are being used. same capabilities provided for offen- enabling effective human control of ar- A human controller must be able to sive maneuvers could provide over- rays. The technology has reached the maintain positive situational awareness match in defensive situations. For point where many of these functions are and control over the array as a whole. instance, the ability of atmospheric feasible in the near term. Therefore, interfaces must be developed littoral forces to rapidly move and Autonomous swarm control has that allow an operator to see what the concentrate makes them a potent advanced to the point that external aids array sees, to “look over its shoulder” and reserve force. They enable defend- such as global positioning systems are give it direction. A human controller may ing friendly forces to quickly bring no longer required for complex array need to quickly switch his or her view- combat power to bear in response to behavior.15 Drones can navigate through point from one array element to another an enemy attack at any point, even complicated environments using visual as needed. Early technologies of this kind one separated by difficult terrain. and range data collected by miniature are being tested for operator control of Drone arrays may also provide effec- cameras, radar, and light distance and multiple military ISR drones.21 tive defensive covering forces during ranging sensors being commercialized All the func- retrograde movements, allowing the for self-driving cars.16 This includes tions will require information-sharing and human forces to disengage, and then navigation through indoor environments data fusion. Information will need to be exfiltrating themselves at will. including autonomous avoidance of shared between elements of the array in obstacles17 and through outdoor environ- order for it to act as a single unit and for 18 Technical Challenges ments as complex as forests. Recent all the elements to see what any one sees. advances, driven by applications like Similarly, it will be necessary for the array Current platforms may be sufficient to drone-based package delivery, include the controller to work with a current version start conducting limited experiments in ability to travel city streets and take navi- of the battle map and for the real-time atmospheric littoral operations. Making gational data from other vehicles.19 information on the drones and their drone platforms more durable and An array must be able to accept and observations to update the battle map mounting weapons are fairly straight- interpret high-level commands similar in seen by the commander and other parts forward challenges. But in order to be detail to those that might be given to a of the unit. This combat cloud is required combat effective, the drones will need soldier or squad leader, such as “move to with or without drone arrays. Secure a number of new technical capabili- this intersection” or “attack this target encrypted data links and data fusion ties related to command and control, until it is destroyed.” For the time being, would be critical enablers of collective AI, and logistics. Military-specific it is likely to be easiest to give these com- atmospheric littoral operations and could research and development will need mands electronically—for instance, by evolve along with other combat cloud to be directed toward maturing these clicking on locations and objects on a applications. capabilities. live map of the battlespace. This level of As with all unmanned concepts, the A common denominator to these control is already familiar and intuitive to security of communications is a con- challenges is the need to reduce a generation of real-time strategy gamers. sideration. Atmospheric littoral drone the burden on human warfighters. Human operator situational arrays could be subject to the same kinds Current unmanned systems can serve awareness, however, will require new of attack as other as high-value assets—for instance, as development. Contemporary ground unmanned platforms. If communications ISR platforms—but require too much warfare, instead of becoming more au- are cut, they could return autonomously human intervention for widespread use tomated and push-button, has seen the to their home location. However, due to in ground combat. A soldier, or a com- rise of the three-block where decisions their coordination with ground forces, bat vehicle including its crew, has to be with delicate ethical, political, and even the arrays could have an additional op- able to carry out orders, feed or refuel, strategic consequences are required at tion. In the event of loss of a secure care for itself when it stumbles or suffers the lowest ranks.20 It will not be practi- radio data channel, local communica- minor injury, and otherwise carry out cal in the foreseeable future for arrays to tions with their controlling unit could basic functions without constant outside understand the full complexity of their be maintained using high-bandwidth, oversight. The same applies to drone environment, and they may encounter low-probability-of-intercept line-of-sight arrays. The following challenges may unexpected obstacles or situations. They means, such as laser optical datalinks.22 be overcome with relatively near-term certainly cannot understand the nature Drone arrays will likely operate within a of the conflict, exercise good judgment, few kilometers or less of the base station,

JFQ 94, 3rd Quarter 2019 Dougherty 69 within line-of-sight range. Commands neutralized target or stopped before rocket/missile tubes. The individual such as “move here” or “destroy this the target has been neutralized. drones in the array could navigate to the target” could even be given by nearby •• Incoming fire awareness. Drone appropriate pod, perhaps following a forces using readily available laser target arrays will come under attack by radio frequency or infrared beacon. Self- designators with the addition of optical enemy forces. To survive, they will refueling could be achieved by deploying encoding. In urban areas, optical data- need to be able to detect when a a fuel probe from the bottom of a drone, links could be directed around corners drone is under attack or has been which could then hover atop a fuel pod, by relay drones hovering in intersections. destroyed and take appropriate docked with the port, until its onboard Such drones would be relatively simple defensive action, such as evasive tank is full. Self-rearming could involve compared to the combat drones they movement, while alerting the discarding depleted magazines and rocket support. operator. tubes and snapping new ones into place Combat Artificial Intelligence. by landing on the ammunition pod. When adversaries are able to field Combat by semi-autonomous drone At a modest speed of 30 miles per their own drone formations, combat arrays will involve some specific AI chal- hour, in one minute a drone could be the AI will need to incorporate drone vs. lenges, even with the tougher issues of distance of seven large city blocks to the drone combat. This may be simpler than human judgment and decisionmaking rear, refueling and rearming at a logistics ground combat in some ways, as the need handled by an operator. In order to ac- node, and in another minute be back in for human judgment will be reduced cept and execute operator commands in the fight. With this capability, the endur- and target recognition and assessment a way that is predictable and understand- ance of atmospheric littoral drones could may be more straightforward. Academic able, at the speed of combat, several be practically unlimited, as is the case researchers have already demonstrated capabilities will be needed: today for combat aircraft provided with autonomous swarm vs. swarm “dog- air-to-air refueling. Target acceptance. Automatic target fights” using simulated weapons.24 •• Self-repair is likely impractical, so recognition is the ability of a sensor to ease the burden, drones would need system to recognize and flag poten- Logistics to be built for damage tolerance. They tial targets based on predefined char- Drones in an array will eventually run will need to absorb damage gracefully, acteristics. Drone arrays will need a short of fuel, whether liquid or elec- through redundancy and by automatically related but distinct ability to accept tric, and be depleted of ammunition. compensating for damage where possible. the designation of a target by the Autonomous combat logistics will be The inherent redundancy of drones with operator and understand the target’s essential to keep the burden off the rest four or more rotors could help with this. boundaries and what it consists of: of the combat unit. Otherwise, efforts The ability of a fail-safe control system to a static object, part of a static object to support a drone array in sustained partially compensate for a lost rotor has (for example, a window of a build- combat could absorb the attention of already been demonstrated.25 ing), a moving vehicle, an area, and much of the rest of the unit that the None of the technical challenges so on. array is supporting. described here are trivial. Much as with Target keeping. Drone arrays require Like soldiers and manned vehicles, •• airpower and mechanized maneuver the ability to keep the designation drone arrays need to be provided with re- warfare, it may take many years of de- of a target despite movement or plenishment locations, but otherwise they velopment before the technologies are aspect changes, changes in lighting should be expected to refuel and rearm fully able to realize operational hopes en- or weather, brief obscuration of the themselves, as common floor-sweeping visioned in the doctrine. But as in those target behind an object or smoke robots recharge themselves today. One cases, important military advantages screen, or the effects of weapons way this could be done is by providing could likely be gained with each step for- use. Without this ability, drones may pods, reservoirs of fuel and ammunition ward in capability. constantly “lose lock” on the target that could be dropped in locations close or fall for simple tricks intended to to the battle area but with some degree of Questions and Concerns confuse them. This is similar to the sanctuary. In an urban combat scenario, There are important concerns regard- appreciation of object permanence, they could be located a few blocks to the ing the introduction of robotic combat which is a key step in cognitive devel- rear or in a physically inaccessible location systems. The doctrinal framework of opment for human infants.23 like the roof of a building. They could be exploiting the atmospheric littoral using Target assessment. After attack, placed by large supply drones, similar to •• drone arrays addresses several of these: drones need the ability to deter- the current Joint Tactical Aerial Resupply mine whether their target has been Vehicle prototypes. The pods could be •• Will they accidentally shoot the destroyed so that attacks are not simple, such as a pressurized fuel bladder wrong things or run amok? Drone continued needlessly on an already with a docking port on top or a frame arrays have only limited autonomy, covered with full magazines and in keeping with a realistic view of

70 Features / Control of the Atmospheric Littoral JFQ 94, 3rd Quarter 2019 The DARPA Subterranean Challenge explores innovative approaches and new technologies to rapidly map, navigate, and search complex underground environments, Edgar Experimental Mine, April 2019 (DARPA/Colorado School of Mines)

the limitations of fully autonomous •• Will their communications be and secure a lasting source of tactical systems in complex environments. jammed? Relative proximity to overmatch may be greater still. Authority to use weapons is provided friendly forces and to each other Atmospheric littoral operations are and circumscribed by the human provides excellent fallback options one example of how the inherent capabil- operators overseeing them and oper- if digital radio communications are ities of unmanned systems and autonomy ating in coordination with them. unreliable. For instance, line-of-sight could enable overmatch, particularly for •• Will they be a burden to operate in communications using laser datalinks close combat in the land domain, where a combat situation? Autonomous could be both practical and intuitive many conflicts of the coming decades logistics and the intuitive control and enable continued operations are likely to be decided. A doctrine of of large numbers of platforms by a under the most severe jamming. exploiting control of the atmospheric single operator are key aspects of littoral offers tactical advantages that pro- the littoral operations concept. The Next Steps vide a driving force for the adoption of burden can be even lower than with robotic systems into ground combat. To Realizing the military potential of conventional weapons systems. adequately explore the potential, the next autonomous robotics will involve more Can other systems do the same steps would be to focus technical research •• than just plugging unmanned systems things? Littoral drone arrays provide and development efforts on the areas into existing operational doctrine. It capabilities that are fundamentally described above and conduct military ex- will likely involve a comprehensive set unobtainable through existing means periments to advance tactical experience of changes similar to those that allowed such as ground vehicles, manned air- and methods. the Army and Marine Corps to incorpo- craft, or large fixed-wing drones. The The necessary hardware technology rate aviation starting in the late 1940s atmospheric littoral is a new tactical is essentially available, and the software or to “own the night” starting in the dimension open for exploitation. is advancing quickly. Fully mature tech- 1970s. But the opportunities to force nology is not needed up front; small disruptive change on U.S. adversaries

JFQ 94, 3rd Quarter 2019 Dougherty 71 Lattice Modular Heli-Drone flies during test run of Lattice Platform Security System, at Red Beach training area, Marine Corps Base Camp Pendleton, California, November 8, 2018 (U.S. Marine Corps/Dylan Chagnon) numbers of prototype militarized drones the military possibilities of rotary-wing Notes should be procured for experimentation aviation.26 and the results of the experiments used to Since many combat advantages may 1 David Barno and Nora Bensahel, The refine requirements for the next genera- be gained from the addition of a drone Future of the Army: Today, Tomorrow, and the tion of drones. array to otherwise standard forces, ad- Day after Tomorrow (Washington, DC: Atlantic Key military questions, such as how vances could be seen with incremental Council, September 2016), available at . unit actions and how much autonomy forces could start small and increase 2 Thomas Gibbons-Neff, “ISIS Drones to allow, should be worked out on the their commitment as the possibilities are Are Attacking U.S. Troops and Disrupting training ground. The possibilities can be matured. Airstrikes in Raqqa, Officials Say,”Washing - explored gradually and at low cost. The Soldiers and Marines are already en- ton Post, June 14, 2017, available at . software, new doctrinal concepts, and this type, they may have to face enemies 3 Kelsey D. Atherton, “The Future of the forward-thinking warfighters and allow in the future who can fight in three Air Force Is Fighter Pilots Leading Drone Swarms into Battle,” Popular Science, June 23, the best approaches to be developed iter- dimensions. By pursuing a low-cost 2017, available at . approach was used successfully in the tation, the U.S. military can lead the 4 Stefan Nitschke, “Explosive Ordnance past—for instance, within the Marines’ emerging combat capabilities offered by Disposal and Decommissioning: Thinking Out- experimental helicopter unit, HMX-1, unmanned systems, avoid technological side the Box,” , September 2013, 88–90. that started work in 1947 to explore surprise, and enable a new era of sus- 5 Stew Magnuson, “Robotic Mule Vendors tained tactical overmatch. JFQ Seek Opportunities Outside Military,” National

72 Features / Control of the Atmospheric Littoral JFQ 94, 3rd Quarter 2019 Defense, July 2013, 37. Help Drones Fly Autonomously, Even Indoors 6 Dan Parsons, “Army Wants Trucks to or Off the Grid,” TechCrunch, February Drive without Troops,” National Defense, July 21, 2017, available at . for the Center for Strategic Research 18 Army Technology 2, no. 6 (November/Decem- “Battlefield Game Changer: Autonomous Strategic Forum 301 ber 2014), 12–13, available at . 19 Antonio Loquercioet et al., “Drones: Japan Strategic Alliance 8 The U.S. Army Robotic and Autonomous Learning to Fly by Driving,” IEEE Robotics By James J. Przystup Systems Strategy (Fort Eustis, VA: U.S. Army and Automation Letters 3, no. 2 (April 2018), The U.S.- Training and Doctrine Command, March 1088–1095. Japan rela- 2017), available at . Corporal: Leadership in the Three Block War,” 9 Erik Sofge, “The DARPA Robotics Leatherneck 83, no. 2 (January 1999), available at its core, Challenge Was a Bust,” Popular Science, July at . anchored robotics-challenge-was-bust-why-darpa-needs- 21 Gloria L. Calhoun and Mark H. Draper, in the U.S.- try-again>. “Display and Control Concepts for Multi-UAV Japan Security 10 Todd C. Frankel, “A Security Robot Fell Applications,” in Handbook of Unmanned into a Fountain at a D.C. Office Building. And Aerial Vehicles, ed. Kimon P. Valavanis and Alliance. The the Internet Went Wild,” Washington Post, July George J. Vachtsevanos (Dordrecht, Nether- significant bilateral trade frictions 17, 2017, available at . . alliance has continued to evolve Developing UAV for Faster, Safer Resupply 23 Gillian Fournier, “Object Permanance,” to meet the challenges of the 21st Missions,” Army Times, February 15, 2017, PsychCentral online Encyclopedia of Psychol- century. Today, the alliance enjoys available at . oping-uav-for-faster-safer-resupply-missions/>. 24 Javier Chagoya, “NPS, Academic Part- countries, and both governments 12 Christian Davenport, “How the Pen- ners Take to the Skies in First-Ever UAV Swarm have been updating and upgrading tagon Is Preparing for the Coming Drone Dogfight,” Naval Postgraduate School press re- key elements of this important stra- : As Dangers Increase, the U.S. Military Is lease, February 22, 2017, available at . at . . Show,” Wired, February 9, 2018, available at 26 Chuck Lloyd and Rick Llinares, “HMX- more effectively with the serious . 79, no. 4 (May/June 1997), 12. Korea and China, as well as to allow 14 Alex Kushleyev, Daniel Mellinger, and Japan to address the broadening Vijay Kumar, “Towards a Swarm of Agile challenges to the existing rules- Micro Quadrotors,” Autonomous Robots 35, no. 4 (November 2013), 287–300, available based international economic and at . 15 Evan Ackerman, “This Autonomous Quadrotor Swarm Doesn’t Need GPS,” IEEE Spectrum, December 27, 2017, available at . 16 Shaojie Shen et al., “Vision-Based State Estimation for Autonomous Rotorcraft MAVs in Complex Environments,” 2013 IEEE Inter- national Conference on Robotics and Automa- Visit the NDU Press Web site for tion, Karlsruhe, Germany, May 6–10, 2013. more information on publications 17 Lora Kolodny, “Exyn Unveils AI to at ndupress.ndu.edu

JFQ 94, 3rd Quarter 2019 Dougherty 73