HOW TERRORIST GROUPS END Lessons for Countering Al Qa’Ida
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LIBICKI C O R P O R A T I O N This research in the public interest was supported by RAND, using discretionary funds made possible by the generosity of RAND's donors, the fees earned on client-funded research, and independent research and development (IR&D) funds provided by the Department of Defense. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Jones, Seth G., 1972– How terrorist groups end : lessons for countering Al Qa’ida / Seth G. Jones, Martin C. Libicki. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references. ISBN 978-0-8330-4465-5 (pbk. : alk. paper) 1. Terrorism. 2. Terrorism—Prevention—International cooperation. 3. Intelligence service. 4. Problem-oriented policing. 5. Qaida (Organization) I. Libicki, Martin C. II. Title. HV6431.J65 2008 363.325'16—dc22 2008025194 The RAND Corporation is a nonprofit research organization providing objective analysis and effective solutions that address the challenges facing the public and private sectors around the world. RAND’s publications do not necessarily reflect the opinions of its research clients and sponsors. R® is a registered trademark. Cover design by Carol Earnest © Copyright 2008 RAND Corporation All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced in any form by any electronic or mechanical means (including photocopying, recording, or information storage and retrieval) without permission in writing from RAND. Published 2008 by the RAND Corporation 1776 Main Street, P.O. Box 2138, Santa Monica, CA 90407-2138 1200 South Hayes Street, Arlington, VA 22202-5050 4570 Fifth Avenue, Suite 600, Pittsburgh, PA 15213-2665 RAND URL: http://www.rand.org To order RAND documents or to obtain additional information, contact Distribution Services: Telephone: (310) 451-7002; Fax: (310) 451-6915; Email: [email protected] About the Authors Seth G. Jones is a political scientist at RAND and an adjunct professor at Georgetown University’s Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Ser- vice and the U.S. Naval Postgraduate School. He specializes in stability operations and counterinsurgency. He is the author of In the Graveyard of Empires: America’s War in Afghanistan (W. W. Norton, forthcoming) and The Rise of European Security Cooperation (Cambridge University Press, 2007). He has published articles in such journals as International Security, National Interest, Security Studies, Chicago Journal of Interna- tional Law, International Affairs, and Survival, as well as such newspa- pers and magazines as the New York Times, Newsweek, Financial Times, and International Herald Tribune. His RAND publications include Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan: RAND Counterinsurgency Study, Volume 4 (2008); Establishing Law and Order after Conflict (2005); The UN’s Role in Nation-Building: From the Congo to Iraq (2005); and America’s Role in Nation-Building: From Germany to Iraq (2003). He received an M.A. and Ph.D. from the University of Chicago. Martin C. Libicki is a senior management scientist at RAND, focusing on the relationship between information technology and national security. This work is documented in commercially pub- lished books, Conquest in Cyberspace: National Security and Informa- tion Warfare (2007) and Information Technology Standards: Quest for the Common Byte (1995), as well as in numerous monographs, notably What Is Information Warfare (1995), The Mesh and the Net: Speculations on Armed Conflict in a Time of Free Silicon (1994), and Exploring Ter- rorist Targeting Preferences (2007). He was also an editor of the RAND iii iv How Terrorist Groups End: Lessons for Countering al Qa’ida textbook, New Challenges, New Tools for Defense Decisionmaking (2003). His most recent assignments were to create and analyze a database of post–World War II insurgencies, devise a strategy to maximize the use of information and information technology in countering insurgency, explore terrorists’ targeting preferences, develop a post–September 11 information technology strategy for U.S. Department of Justice and the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency’s Terrorist Informa- tion Awareness program, conduct an information-security analysis for the FBI, and assess CIA’s R&D venture, In-Q-Tel. Other work has examined information warfare and the revolution in military affairs. Prior employment includes 12 years at the National Defense Univer- sity, three years on the Navy staff as program sponsor for industrial pre- paredness, and three years as a policy analyst for the U.S. Government Accountability Office’s Energy and Minerals Division. He received a Ph.D. from the University of California, Berkeley. Preface By analyzing 648 groups that existed between 1968 and 2006, this monograph examines how terrorist groups end. Its purpose is to inform U.S. counterterrorist efforts by understanding how groups have ended in the past and to assess implications for countering al Qa’ida. This monograph results from the RAND Corporation’s continuing pro- gram of self-initiated independent research. Support for such research is provided, in part, by donors and by the independent research and development provisions of RAND’s contracts for the operation of its U.S. Department of Defense federally funded research and develop- ment centers. This research was conducted within the RAND National Secu- rity Research Division (NSRD) of the RAND Corporation. NSRD conducts research and analysis for the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, the Unified Commands, the defense agencies, the Department of the Navy, the U.S. Intelligence Community, allied foreign governments, and foundations. For more information on the RAND National Security Research Division, contact the Director of Operations, Nurith Berstein. She can be reached by email at [email protected]; by phone at 703-413-1100, extension 5469; or by mail at RAND, 1200 South Hayes Street, Arlington VA 22202-5050. More information about the RAND Corporation is available at www.rand.org. v Contents About the Authors ............................................................... iii Preface .............................................................................. v Figures ............................................................................. ix Tables .............................................................................. xi Summary .........................................................................xiii Acknowledgments .............................................................. xix Abbreviations .................................................................... xxi CHAPTER ONE Introduction ....................................................................... 1 CHAPTER TWO How Terrorist Groups End ...................................................... 9 CHAPTER THREE Policing and Japan’s Aum Shinrikyo .........................................45 CHAPTER FOUR Politics and the FMLN in El Salvador .......................................63 CHAPTER FIVE Military Force and al Qa’ida in Iraq .........................................83 CHAPTER SIX The Limits of America’s al Qa’ida Strategy ............................... 103 vii viii How Terrorist Groups End: Lessons for Countering al Qa’ida CHAPTER SEVEN Ending the “War” on Terrorism ............................................ 121 APPENDIXES A. End-of-Terror Data Set ................................................... 141 B. Al Qa’ida Attacks, 1994–2007 ......................................... 187 C. Regression Analysis ...................................................... 197 References ....................................................................... 201 Index ............................................................................. 223 Figures 2.1. How Terrorist Groups End (N = 268) ............................19 2.2. Politics and Group Goals .........................................