PAK-US STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP AMIDST CONFLICTING APPROACHES TOWARDS MILITANCY (2005-2015)

ASIF SALIM Ph.D (Scholar)

DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE UNIVERSITY OF PESHAWAR SESSION: 2014-15

PAK-US STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP AMIDST CONFLICTING APPROACHES TOWARDS MILITANCY (2005-2015)

Thesis submitted to the Department of Political Science, University of Peshawar, in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the award of the degree of DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY IN POLITICAL SCIENCE

MARCH, 2018

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ABSTRACT

International system based on anarchic theories and approaches in which power politics and statism are the basic components which play vital role when states conduct the relations with one another. The power of the state can be appraised through its ability to protect its national interests at any cost. States in relation with equal strength can easily protect their national interests but when the small and big state interests are clashed with each other, double standers and distrust take birth. and the US relation is the best example of the realistic ideas in which it can be safely quoted „There is no permanent friendship and enmity. There are interests that decide the faith of friendship and enmity‟.

After the partition of subcontinent civil and military leadership deviated from the golden principles of the founder (Quaid-e-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah) and joined the . America warmly welcomed Pakistan as the US needed partner in South and Southwest Asia and Asia Pacific to counter the spread of communistic ideologies in the region. From the day one the leader ship of Pakistan was not concerned with the but interested to acquire economic and military assistance from the US so as to keep balance with . This is the reason that soon after the 1965 war parting of ways was started, resultantly tilted toward Moscow in Bhutto regime.

However, entrance of the Soviet forces in once again impelled both the old partners to stand together against the common enemy. Jihadi forces were gathered in Pakistan and billion dollars were pumped for their training and facilitation. Further, latest war technology was also handed over to Pakistan. After ten years of long war Geneva Accord was inked and Red Forces () were retreated. Ever bad decision, which was accepted by Hilary Clinton, to leave Pakistan at lurch and propagated against the nuclear technology of Pakistan and imposed severe economic sanctions immediately after the end of war; this froze Pak-US relations. After the six years of civil war in Afghanistan the forces of with the title of „‟ emerged as triumphant and established their government.

Once again the tragic incident of 9/11 in New York by the so-called Jihadi organization „Al-Qaida‟ provided an opportunity to the US for rekindling the relations with old partner Pakistan to ensure stability in South Asia and peace in the world by

ii countering the emerging threat of terrorism. But from the very first day element of trust deficit was existed. Washington has been rebuffed in its efforts to compel Islamabad to eliminate Pakistan-based sanctuaries of militants who attack the US troops in Afghanistan while Islamabad has struggled to protect those groups with the justification of „strategic assets‟ and only to obtain a variety of coveted prizes from Washington. There is no denial to the fact that started number of operations in tribal areas with the financial support of the US because after 2001 Pakistan was among the world‟s leading recipients of the US aid and obtained billions of dollars under the US assistance including civil and security-related aid and also received reimbursement for its support of the US-led counterterrorism operations. Later on, the incidents such as drone strikes, Ramond Davis case, Osama raid and Salala incident further diluted the partnership of the states.

Major factor of trust deficit between the partners is not to care of each other‟s national interests and to work only for their own interests. It is a general perception among the security experts of South Asia that Pakistan‟s proxy strategies will continue in Afghanistan and India unless the US takes concrete steps to resolve the core issues of Pakistan with its neighboring countries. Furthermore, the US approaches towards Pakistan always revolves around military objectives rather than broad based strategic partnership which is enshrined in Pak-US strategic partnership goals. In this partnership the US will cooperate in the different sectors such as to remove energy crisis, work for the uplifting of economic indicators, counterterrorism, defense, strategic stability, and education. Moreover, the US policy-makers should recognize the fact that only a stable, democratic, and economically thriving Pakistan can secure the vital interests of the US in the region without disturbing the balance of power in South Asia.

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PREFACE

This thesis is submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for a Ph. D degree in Political Science. Prof. Dr. A. Z. Hilali, Ex-Chairman Department of

Political Science University of Peshawar is my supervisor for this thesis. The thesis has been made solely by the author; some of the text, however, is based on the research of others, and I have done my best to provide references to these sources.

Writing this thesis has been hard but in the process of writing I feel I have learned a lot, and our initial conceptions have certainly changed. I have dealt with a lot of subjects in an attempt to give this thesis a broad perspective on “Pak-US

Strategic Partnership Amidst Conflicting Approaches towards Militancy (2005-

2015)”.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

S.No. Topic Page No. Abstract i Preface iii Acknowledgement viii List of Abbreviations x 1. Chapter-1 1 1.1 INTRODUCTION 1 1.2 Statement of the Problem 5 1.3 Aims and Objectives of the Study 6 1.4 Research Questions 6 1.5 Literature Review 6 1.6 Theoretical & Conceptual Outlines 12 1.7 Methodology 16 1.8 Organization of the Study 17 Chapter – 2 20 2. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF PAKISTAN-US RELATIONS FROM 1947-2001 20 2.1 Introduction 20 2.2 Beginning of the US Role in Asia 20 2.3 Convergence of Pakistan – US Interest 24 2.4 US Neutrality on Kashmir 26 2.5 US tilt in Favor of Pakistan 27 2.6 Signing of Pakistan US Defense Agreement 29 2.7 Beginning of Tension in US-Pakistan Relations 33 2.8 Issue of Pakistan Nuclear Program 37 2.9 Issue of Political Instability 38 2.10 Thaw in US-Pakistan‟s Relations due to Soviet Invasion 39 2.11 Continuing Pakistan‟s Nuclear Program Issue 40 2.12 Pakistan‟s Uncompromising Nuclear Program 41 2.13 Improved US Pakistan Relation 42 2.14 US Tilt towards India 43 2.15 Conclusion 45 Chapter – 3 46 3. PAKISTAN-US SECURITY PARADOX (SEATO-CENTO AN APPRAISAL) 46 3.1 Introduction 46 3.2 Background and Development SEATO 46 3.3 Pakistan Response to SEATO 53

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3.4 Background of the (CENTO) 54 3.5 Benefits of the Alliance 58 3.6 Military/Political Benefits 59 3.7 Economic Benefits 63 3.8 Costs 67 3.9 Political 67 3.10 Indian Reaction Against Western Pacts 77 3.11 Strategic 81 3.12 Economic 82 3.13 Conclusion 83 Chapter – 4 84 4. PAK-US STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP AFTER THE INCIDENT OF 9/11 & SECURITY COMPULSION OF PAKISTAN 84 4.1 Introduction 84 4.2 A Security Measurement within Pakistan 85 4.3 Fragile Economy 85 4.4 Religious Extremism and Sectarian Violence 88 4.5 General Zia-Ul-Haq Politics of Islamization 88 4.6 89 4.7 Afghan Jihad 91 4.8 Taliban Reign (1996-2001) 91 4.9 Kashmir Jihad 93 4.10 Regional and International Security Calculations 94 4.11 Falling Into Afghan Policy 94 4.12 Duality in Kashmir Policy 97 4.13 Isolation From US in 1990 98 4.14 Pakistan‟s Nuclear Capability 98 4.15 Safety and Security of Pakistan‟s Nuclear and Missile Assets 100 4.16 Events of 11 September 2001 & Musharraf‟s Response 101 4.17 Conclusion 105 Chapter – 5 107 5. PAKISTAN-US CONFLICTING APPROACHES TO CONTAIN RISING MILITANCY AND FOMENTING INSURGENCIES 107 5.1 Introduction 107 5.2 Pak-US Strategic Partnership and Issues of Financial Aid 108 5.3 Provision of Assistance for Non-Security Purposes 119 5.4 Non-US Economic and Development Assistance to Pakistan 120 5.5 US Publish Diplomacy and Democracy Promotion Efforts 123 5.6 The Downsides of Conditionality (Conditionality Downsides) 123

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5.7 The Downsides of the US Support for Individual Pakistani Leaders 125 5.8 Pak-US Marriage of Convenience to Contain Rising Militancy and Fomenting Insurgencies Through Military Operations 126 5.9 Support to Operation Enduring Freedom Operation Enduring Freedom Support 131 5.10 Operation Al-Mizan 135 5.11 Operation Zalzala 143 5.12 Operation Sher Dil, Rah-E-Haq, & Rah-E-Rast 148 5.13 Operation Sher-Dil (Lion‟s Heart) 148 5.14 Operation Rah-e-Rast (Path of Truth) 150 5.15 Operation Har-e-Ras (Path of Righteousness) 151 5.16 Other Operations 152 5.17 Efficacy of the Operations 152 5.18 Operation Rah-e-Nijaat 153 5.19 Operation Zarb-e-Azab (2015) 157 5.20 Military Operations‟ Impact on the Security Forces 157 5.21 Conclusion 159 Chapter – 6 161 6. CONVERGENCE AND DIVERGENCE IN PAK-US STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP 161 6.1 Introduction 161 6.2 Convergence in the Interests 163 6.3 Intensions Behind US Intensive Involvement in South Asia 171 6.4 Divergence in Pak-US Interests 175 6.5 Nuclear Developments in Pakistan 176 6.6 Issues of Terrorism 187 6.7 Conclusion 200 Chapter – 7 202 7. DOMESTIC AND REGIONAL IMPLICATIONS OF PAK-US STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP 202 7.1 Introduction 202 7.2 Political Implication of Militant Culture 202 7.3 Domestic Political Dynamics of Pakistan 203 7.4 External Political Dynamics 212 7.5 Strategic Implications of Pakistan-US Partnership 218 7.6 Internal Security Threats to Pakistan 218 7.7 Emergence of Islamists Militant Organizations 219 7.8 Birth of Pakistani Taliban in FATA 220

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7.9 Secrete Compromise Among Al-Qaida, Punjab Based Militant Organizations and Pakistani Taliban 223 7.10 Cooperation of Al-Qaida, TTP and Punjabi Taliban Strategy and Impacts on The Security of Pakistan 225 7.11 Multiplication of Sectarian & Sub-Sectarian Violence in Pakistan 227 7.12 Militants‟ (Al-Qaida and Affiliate Group) Strategy Against the West that Has Roots in FATA 230 7.13 Linkages between Terrorism, Organized Crime and NARCO Trade 332 7.14 Secrete Operations of CIA and Raw on the Soil of Pakistan 334 7.15 Economic Implications of Pakistan‟s Strategic Partnership with the USA 240 7.16 Indirect Economic Cost 244 7.17 Negative Impact on Tourism 246 7.18 Internally Displaced People & Its Cost 247 7.19 Increased in Poverty and & Employment Loss 247 7.20 Risk to Food Security 248 7.21 Loss in Tax Collection, Inflows of Privatization and Swelling Budget Deficit 248 7.22 Conclusion 249 Chapter – 8 251 8. CONCLUSION AND POLICY RECOMMENDATION 251 8.1 Introduction 251 8.2 Research Findings 265 8.3 Policy Recommendations 266 8.4 Political Measures 271 8.5 Politico-Strategic 272 8.6 Measures for Internal Security 273 8.7 Economic Measures 274 BIBLIOGRAPHY 276

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

Thanks to Allah Almighty who enabled me to research on such a hot issue of these days. I revere the patronage and moral support extended with love by my parents, brother, sister in Law, and nephew whose passionate encouragement made it possible for me to complete this project.

I submit my heartiest gratitude to my respected supervisor Prof. Dr. A. Z. Hilali, Ex-Chairman Department of Political Science, University of Peshawar for his sincere guidance, academic assistance and help for completing this task.

I am highly indebted to Prof. Dr. Holli A. Semetko, Department of Political science, Emory University, Atlanta, Georgia, USA who not only imparted new techniques of research and guided me on all aspects of modern research methodologies. I am also grateful to the encouragement of Miss Kyla King who was incharge of administration in Emory University, Atlanta. In my short stay of six months in this university She always facilitated me in all my research work and made my stay comfortable in the University.

My thanks also go to Mr. Prof. Creekmore, Ex-Deputy High Commissioner to India and presently staying in Carter Research Centre, Atlanta. He graciously agreed to give me interview of his experiences in his professional life. His interviews enriched my insight and cleared my vision on various complicated issues relating to my subject. At the same time special thanks go to Prof. Yuwai President of Carter Center, Atlanta for his intellectual help and encouragement in concluding my research at Atlanta. Moreover, the sterling contribution of Prof. Anup Kumar, Georgia State University is worth mentioning particularly relating to my subject in regional politics and world view of various issues.

I am deeply indebted to my respected teachers: Dr. Muhammad Zubair, Assistant Professor, Dr. Sami Raza, Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science, University of Peshawar, Mr. Roshan Din, Assistant Professor, Dr. Muhammad Bilal and my colleagues: Zikria Nazar, Adnan Khan, Shahid , Waqar Ahmad, Zermina Baloch, Farhan Ali, Fatih Demirchi and Halil for their invaluable help in preparing this thesis.

I humbly extend my thanks to all concerned persons who cooperated with me in this research.

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Dedication

This Wok is Dedicated to All the Innocents Who Became the Victims of Terrorism across the World Also Would Like to Dedicate My Parents (Father & Mother)

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ADB Asian Development Bank

BCCS Border Crossing Card Security

CENTO: Central Treaty Organization

CIA: Central Intelligence Agency

COAS: Chief of Army Staff

COGS: Chief of General Staff

CSFs: Coalition Support Funds

CTLE: Counter-terrorism and law enforcement

DCG: Defense Consultative Group

DoD: Department of Defense

DSCA: Defense Security Cooperation Agency

FATA: Federally Administered Tribal Area

FCR: Frontier Crime Regulatory Authority

FR: Frontier Regions

FY: Financial Year

GAO: Government Accountability Office

GDP: Gross Domestic Products

GNP: Gross National Products

HJI: Harkatul Jihad-e-Islami

HM: Harkat-ul- Mujahideen

IDPs: Internally Displaced People

IMET: International Military Education and Training

IMF: International Monitoring Fund

ISAF: International Security Assistance Force

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ISI: Inter-Services Intelligence

JD: Jumat-u-Dawa

JI: Jummat-e-Islami

JM: Jaish-e-Muhammad

JUI: Jamiat-e-Uluma-e-Islam

JWG Joint Working Group

LeT: Lashkar-e-Taiba

LJ: Lashkar-e-Jahangvi

LNOs: Liaison Officers

MEDO Middle East Defense Organization

NATO: North Atlantic Treaty Organization

OEF: Operation Enduring Freedom

RAW: Research and Analysis Wing

SEATO: South East Asian Treaty Organization

SOFA: Status of Forces Agreement

SSP: Sipha-e-Sahaba Pakistan

TJ: Tahreek-e-Jafriya

TNSM: Tahrik-e-Nifaz-e-Shariat-e-Muhammadi

TTP: Tahreek-e-Taliban Pakistan

US:

USSR: Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

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Chapter-1

1.1 INTRODUCTION

The tragic incidents of 9/11 (2001) transformed Pakistan-US partnership virtually overnight because in the t was one of the terrible event in its . It powerfully shaped perceptions and emotions of Pakistan‟s geostrategic environment and became an iconic event which made the country vulnerable for sweeping domestic and external changes. This episode turned the country into a dangerous situation. The timely decision of the government not only bailed out the country from serious crisis but also protected it from diplomatic isolation. So, the war against radicalization and religious extremism deeply shattered the state and society of Pakistan.

On the other hand, the US drastically changed its foreign policy and diplomacy and aggressively responded to countries “either you are with us or against us”.1In fact, the US adopted a radical policy in the post 9/11 attacks and interacted with the international community in an effort to enhance reputational and symbolic power of the US beyond challenge.2In this circumstance, the US policy makers eagerly inclined towards Pakistan so as it could assist the US in curbing the menace of terrorism and could save the world from its negative fallouts. It is also considered to be the policy of George W. to ensure its supremacy and unilateralism in the world stage in 21st century,3 and the US has shown its strategic strength in reshaping the future of world politics. Moreover, the catastrophic events further highlighted the fact that state survival remains the most significant factor in the world politics, and the enhancement of military power only can ensure state security.4 The deadliest events of 9/11 also reshaped Pakistan‟s security dimensions and security vanguard took some important decisions which proved to be more lasting transformation in the country‟s political life.

1Robert G. Kaufman, “US Foreign Policy after 9/11,” New York Times, July 18, 2010. 2Robert S. Litwak, Regime Change: US Strategy through the Prism of 9/11 (Washington DC: Woodrow WilsonCenter Press, John Hopkins University, 2007), pp. 12-43. 3EfraimInbar and Gabriel Sheffer, The National Security of Small States in a Changing World (London: Frank Cass, 1997), pp. 13-24. 4 John J. Mearsheimer, “The False Promise of International Institutions,” International Security, Winter 2006 (Vo. 20, No. 5), pp. 5-32.

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Resultantly, the most immediate and obvious changes appeared in the country‟s domestic and foreign policies. Furthermore, in order to curb the religious extremism in Pak-Afghan borderland both the states decided to adopt the strategy of pre-emptive strikes.

Therefore, the partnership between the US and Pakistan is come in the category of „opportunistic alliance‟ between small and great power. Economic and political weaknesses of Pakistan and its unsaved eastern and western borders also impelled Pakistan to enter into an agreement as a strategic partnership.5 Geo-strategic location of Pakistan was suitable for the US policy makers to use its air and land facilities to invade Afghanistan and to extricate Al-Qaeda.6Pakistan was not in position to easily overlook the bounties offered by the US and the threatening tone by the officials of Bush administration. The government also wanted to save itself from international isolation due to military rule in the country and also benefit from the US economic and military assistance.

Washington established strategic partnership with Islamabad with the aim to get assistance from Pakistan in elimination the radical regime of Afghan Taliban and Al-Qaeda conglomerates from Afghanistan and also to eliminate hidden safe havens in the borderland area. Contrary to this, the fundamental objective of the Pakistan to strength its economy through aid assistance of the US and by military support strength its security against India. So as Kashmir could be liberated and Pro-Islamabad government could be installed in Kabul. Despite Islamabad‟s commitment to eliminate terrorism, Washington doubted Pakistan‟s fight against the militants and its overall policy towards anti-terrorism efforts. It is an existential fact that the two countries established partnership in the contemporary time with conflicting perceptions. Currently Pakistan is trying to get war equipment so as to make its position strong to combat Indian threat. But the United States, as a global leader does not expand legitimate boundaries of the partnership with Pakistan and refuses to assist against Indian threat. Kashmir which is a bone of contention between Pakistan and

5Barry Buzan and GowherRizvi,South Asian Insecurity and the Great Powers (London: Macmillan, 1986), p. 36. 6 A. Z. Hilali, US-Pakistan Relationship: Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan (England: Ashgate, 2005), pp. 33-48.

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India, no doubt, the US can play a leading role in resolving the this issue but it‟s reluctance in this regard is obvious and not willing to pressurize India to resolve this crucial issue of South Asia.

Furthermore, the US policymakers widely believe that Pakistan is a haven for numerous militant and terrorist groups; and its security establishment still sympathizes with and even supports some of the militant groups due to Islamabad‟s historical conflicts with neighbors. Pakistan‟s security vanguard are seen by many independent analysts to be too willing to make distinctions between what they consider to be “good” and “bad” militant groups, maintaining supportive relations with Afghan insurgent and anti-India militant groups which operate from Pakistani territory.7However, the critical analysis of is marked by a series of crises in the relationship between the two countries. This leads to serious rancor on both sides and opens talk of a “divorce” because some of the Congress members publically mentioned that the performance of Islamabad to curb militants‟ activities seems inadequate. Some urge an outright cutoff in aid while others seek a new and more punitive approach, giving a perception that Islamabad has “failed to combat terrorists”.8

In the situation, it is not difficult to understand the nature and scope of partnership between the two unequal powers which often conflicts in terms of demands and policies. In this regard, the relationship which was built under strategic partnership many times came into the verge of disengagement and disruption because of clash in their policies as well as conflicting approaches. Thus, the fourteen years long war on terror has created doubts between the two contenders and it is perceived that continuity of relations seems complicated once again in the diplomatic history of the two countries. Although, presently Pakistan is one of the largest recipients of the US security and economic aid, however, security experts in Pakistan argue in an historical perspective that the US as an unreliable ally and may any time leave Pakistan at lurch and stop the aid.

7Shashank Bengali, AounSahi and Zulfiqar Ali, “Pakistan's ties to militant groups complicate its terrorism fight,” Los Angeles Times, December 18, 2014. 8Denial S. Markey, No Exit from Pakistan: America’s Tortured Relations with Islamabad (New York: Cambridge, 2014), pp. 76-77.

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Nonetheless, the War on Terror had colossal effects across the globe, particularly in the South and Southwest Asian region where the situation appears more serious and alarming. However, it is possible for the US to bear the fall outs the incidents of war on terror because of great powers and its strong political and economic base. But contrary to this, Pakistan is not in position to maintain its social- economics and political stability because of internal and external challenges.9 The consequences of the war on terror were so deep as these entirely shattered internal and regional dynamics of Pakistan especially its border land areas. Arguably, Pakistan has suffered a lot as compare to gains which it planked in the strategic partnership from the US. The impact of the war is quite clear on state and society of Pakistan.10 There is non-dispute the fact that in the wave of terrorism Pakistan, being a frontline ally of the US state suffered a lot and bored human and material losses. Moreover, the regional situation has become sandwich between global and peripheral actors, and the position is aggrandized further due to Indian presence in Afghanistan. Although India has emerged as an important factor in the region, its presence in Kabul annoys Islamabad which perceives it as a serious threat to her interests in the region.11Pakistan‟s security guardians consider Afghanistan as its strategic resource especially a place where the military can deploy non-governmental formations and militant groups that will operate for the interest of Pakistan.12 In addition, Pakistan will never allow forming a regime in Afghanistan which is loyal to New Delhi because this obviously means it will be in a hostile encirclement. Furthermore, the security establishment of Pakistan might use militants as an instrument or counterweight to Kabul and New Delhi and the US as an antidote to extremism and terrorism.

Nevertheless, history is witness to the fact that for weak state military power is not a solution for its problems because it has strategic imperatives and only economic

9Rafeh A. Malik, “Threats to Pakistan‟s internal Security,” Defense Journal, Vol. 7, No. 1, 2003, pp. 13-28. 10Alexander Evans, “Pakistan and the Shadow of 9/11,” The RUSI Journal, Vol. 156 (August/September 2012), pp. 64-70. 11Larry Hanaur and Peter Chalk, India’s and Pakistan’s Strategies in Afghanistan Implications for the United States (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, Center for Asia Pacific Policy, 2012), pp. 25-32. 12Moeed Yusuf, Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in South Asia: Through a Peace-buildingLens (Washington, D. C: Foundation Books, 2015), pp. 134-135.

5 strength can stabilize the countries. However, this research focuses the limitations and internal fragility of the state of Pakistan being a strategic partnership in the Us war on terrorism. It is established fact that that partnership between the small and great powers doesn‟t go parallel because of clash in ther regional and global conflicting interests. Thus, the research in hand provides in-depth analyses of the partnership between Pakistan being small state with its regional objectives and the US being a great power with its global interests are in clash because partnership cannot restrain borders of national interest The study also focuses and justify that in an alliance between the small state and great power the policies and approaches of the latter one prevail on the cost of damaging the interests of the small states.

1.2 STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

After the tragic incident of 9/11 Pakistan and the US entered into a partnership to topple the radical regime of Taliban in Afghanistan and to exterminate the Al- Qaeda and other affiliated conglomerates which according to the US were source of threat to global peace. In this war against terrorism Pakistan became a frontline line ally. However, from the very beginning of the partnership, there was clash of interests in their foreign policies which consequently became a source of disenchantment and disruption of strategic partnership. Both the states adopted divergent approaches to tackle the menace of militancy in Afghanistan as well as in borderland area which became later on save havens for many militant groups. The adoption of conflicting approaches widened the gap of distrust and strengthened non-state-actors in the regions which adversely affected their joint struggle. Time and again the US thwart the security and economic assistance to Pakistan because responsible officials‟ blame the role of Pakistan by saying that Islamabad has adopted double standards and covertly supporting the Afghan militant groups against the US and NATO forces in Afghanistan. Consequently, Pakistan also stops cooperation with the US. Both the partners should not forget that they are inevitable to each other. The fact is, without the active support of Pakistan the US cannot achieve ground success in Afghanistan and on the other hand without the operational and economic support of the US Pakistan is not in position defeat the radical militant groups in the borderland.

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1.3 AIMS AND OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY

The study shows the comparative analyzes of Pakistan-US security policies after the incident of 9/11 with special reference to strategic partnership. The main focused objectives are;

1. To analyse Pakistan and the United States relationship in the anarchical international system; 2. To analyse the strategic partnership under the specific Pakistan-US perspective; 3. To examine the conflicting interests of Pakistan and the US after the incident of 9/11; 4. To analyse the areas of divergence in Pakistan and US approaches towards militancy; and 5. To examine the domestic and regional scenario with reference to political, economic and strategic compulsions between the two countries.

1.4 RESEARCH QUESTIONS

1. What is the rationale behind Pak-US strategic partnership? 2. What are the areas of divergence in Pak-US strategic partnership? 3. What is the relationship of militant groups with the state of Pakistan? 4. How Pakistan and the US have been able to sustain strategic partnership despite conflicting approaches towards militancy? 5. How far Pakistan‟s strategic policy towards militancy has affected Pak-US strategic partnership?

1.5 LITERATURE REVIEW

Many scholars, academicians and experts of South Asia have written about the various aspects of Pakistan-US relationship. According to Stephen M. Walt the recent survey shows that round about 280 books have addressed Pak-US alliance from 1947 to date. However, the important books are listed below;

Leo E. Rose and Noor A. Hussain, United States-Pakistan Forum: Relations with the Major Powers. (1985), the author discusses the different aspects of Pak-US alliance. However, the focused point is Pak-US security and economic alliance

7 developed in 70s. The work also examines the ties between the two countries which was the product of domestic politics, regional and global developments. According to author that it was an era of informal alliance between the two states. The states (the US-Pakistan) entered into a partnership to contain the communism in South Asia and South East Asia. Pakistan played a frontline state in containing the physical and ideological boundaries of USSR. In its historical perspective, author describes that nation‟s father (Quaid-e-Azam) after Pakistan‟s independence wanted to forge security relations with the US but as the later was engaged in developing the Europe through , therefore, neglected Pakistan‟s offer. However, the changing regional and global dynamics, expansion of communism and Indian nefarious designs in South Asia increased the importance of Pakistan in the eyes of the US officials. The work also covers the economic perspectives between the US and Pakistan. Detailed information has been provided about the economic assistance and investment by the US in Pakistan. The data in book is useful to understand the future course of Pak-US security and economic relationship.

M. Raziullah Azmi, Pak America Relations: The Recent Past. (1994), the book provides detailed information about the role of Pakistan during the occupation of Afghanistan by the forces of USSR. The economic assistance provided by the US to Pakistan further strengthened the relationship but Pakistan‟s clear stand on the issue of nuclear remained a bone of contention between the two States. The book also conveys in depth comparative analysis comprising the eras 1950 and 1980s in which the US took firm steps for the of communism and also the compared the eras of 1960s and 1990 when the US and USSR moved towards rapprochement. Author further evaluate that during the time of President Johnson Pakistan faced tough attitude from the Americans because of Pakistan‟s inclination towards China. However, President Nixon appreciated the role of Pakistan as a bridge between the US and China. Sizeable portion of the book analyses Pakistan‟s nuclear program and the US discontinuation of aid in the backdrop of its nuclear program. The work also defines the Pak-US relationship after the disintegration of USSR and changed of policies by the partnering states towards regional and global challenges. The US tilts towards India after the Soviet disintegration limited foreign policy options for

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Pakistan. The work provides detail analyses of the various aspects of the relationship which can be used as reference for future course of strategic partnership between the US and Pakistan.

Dennis Kux, The United States and Pakistan: Disenchanted Allies, 1947-2000. (2001), the author examines the threats which Pakistan was receiving immediately after its inception from its border neighbor (India). Therefore, policy-makers of Pakistan formulated the foreign policy with the intention to counter or balance the Indian intimidation. That time the defense of the state of Pakistan was a priority. This was the reason whereby founding father of the country right from Quaid-e-Azam (1947) to General Zia-ul-Haq (1977) were inclined to get military and economic assistance from the US. Later on, General Zia-ul-Haq became the favorite figure for the US for implementing the later‟s policies to contain the physical and expansion of the Red forces (USSR) in Afghanistan. Joining the western block (led by the US) the Pakistan government in 50s‟ made it one of the largest recipients of military and economic aid. This aid, on one hand, enhanced the capacity of the armed forces of Pakistan, on the other hand, adversely affected the internal politics of Pakistan and restricted the liberties of the people thereby converting as a security state. The author has further discussed the role of Pakistani leadership and their interactions with the US which made the country more dependable on the Americans. The author also narrates the circumstantial facts in the world politics which impelled the US leadership to increase interactions with Pakistan. The focused analysis of the author is regarding Pak-US military alliance and its impact on the domestic politics of Pakistan. The author work is useful to know the historical background and communications made at different stages between the leaderships of the two countries and sheds light on the future prospects of this relationship.

Zahid Hussain, Frontline Pakistan: The Struggle with Militant Islam. (2007), the author highlights the rise of religious extremism since 1979 when the US and Pakistan jointly established the Jihadi factories to counter physical expansionism of USSR. Islamic warriors brought to Pakistan from all over the world and they were trained in Pakistan with the active support of the US. The US pumped billion of dollars and military equipment to Pakistan. Author further compare the role of the US in 1979 and 2001. In the former period the militants were called by the Americans as

9 holy warriors who were fighting against the infidels in Afghanistan. Osama Bin Ladan declared as the great hero of Islam. That was the time, when Al-Qaeda relentlessly rose to surface. But, after 2001 the great heroes of Islam turned into violent terrorists who remained dangerous threat to the humanity at large. Although the US and Pakistan worked together in 70s, yet it was not possible for Pakistan to take complete U-turn against the Taliban government once recognized by Islamabad. The book is informatory in term of understanding alliance and building Jihadi culture in Pakistan. But it does not provide the future perspectives of Pak-US strategic partnership.

Hafeez Malik, The US Relations with Afghanistan & Pakistan: The Imperial Dimension (2008), the study of this book confers multifaceted information regarding the US role in the world politics as an imperialist. Author presents the idea about the establishment of the US as an independent state and its journey through different phases to dominate the world politics. To establish its hegemony in the world politics the US entered into alliances with various states and secured its national interests. Author also examines the foreign policies of regional countries of South Asia. A portion in a book is allocated for the military operation conducted by the with the active intelligence sharing by the US agencies against Taliban in Pak-Afghan borderland area. Book also high light that despite long bilateral relationship the element of trust deficit exists between both the states. It was expected after 2001 that both the states will foster long-term bilateral relationship but soon parting of ways emerged and the US adopted to establish close ties with India. The book is very important to be consulted to understand the areas of clash between the partners. Yet, many areas need to be explored e.g. Pakistan‟s military operations were specific to the groups which distorted the image of Pakistan among the comity of the Nations. The US tilt towards India and its impact on Pak-US relationship and future Pak-US strategic partnership also needs to be explored.

Teresita C. Schaffer & Howard B. Schaffer, How Pakistan Negotiates with the United States: Riding the Roller Coaster. (2011), the book present detailed information about Pakistan‟s foreign policy options adopted in the mid of 50s. Further, it also describes the response of the Indians towards military alliance (SEATO & CENTO) which Pakistan joined. In the alliance economic factor was

10 dominant and the US approach towards Pakistan‟s nuclear program remained an irritant. Apart from this, author highlights the factors such as Pakistan‟s geopolitical location, ideological and cultural , and dominant military structures play important role in negotiating process with the US. Focused material can be used by the researchers to deeply comprehend the economic assistance and negotiating process between the US and Pakistan in cold and post- era.

Daniel S. Markey, No Exit from Pakistan: America’s Tortured Relationship with Islamabad. (2013), the author deeply analyses the events occurred after the event of 9/11. Author discusses that the US was very hopeful about the role of Pakistan in countering the extremists‟ threat in Pakistan‟s borderland area which became safe havens for the militant groups fighting against American and NATO forces in Afghanistan. Moreover the author highlights that why the people of Pakistan hate the US. In depth analysis of different strands of anti-Americanism in Pakistani society further complicate the bilateral relations between the two countries. After 2008, Author argues that the great expectations of the US about the role of Pakistan in the war against terrorism changed into great frustration. However, the core theme of the work depicts that despite divergence of interests the US cannot keep Pakistan out from Afghan imbroglio because Islamabad is an active stakeholder and can play leading role in resolving the Afghan crisis. The material in book can be used as a reference to comprehend the nature of bilateral ties developed and dived after 2001.

Carlotta Gall, Wrong Enemy: America in Afghanistan 2001-2014. (2014), the work confers the in depth analysis of the tragic incident of 9/11. How Pakistan took a partial U-turn from the Taliban in Afghanistan and started playing frontline ally of the US in the global war on terrorism. The US after an attack took no time to blame Osama Bin Ladan and Al-Qaeda for attacks on World Trade Centre and Pentagon. The then secretary of state of the US Richard Armitage direct threat to the then “either you are with us or against us”. This intimidation left no option for Pakistan to diplomatically handle the situation. Author further describes that radicalization in Pakistani society had increased due to partnering of Pakistan with the US. The book also highlights the adverse effects on domestic politics and economy of Pakistan since its‟ joining the war against miscreants. Author argues that the US forces are targeting the Taliban forces in Afghanistan but the hub of Taliban

11 groups is Pakistan‟s side borderland area. The real enemy is not the Afghan government but Islamabad which is patronizing the Taliban forces fighting inside Afghanistan. Moreover, No doubt, the work is important in term of extracting the useful information regarding the incident of 9/11 and the dubious role of Pakistan, yet the work does not provide any future prospects of the partnership.

C. Christine Fair, Fighting to the End: The Pakistan Army's Way of War. (2014), the author provides in depth information about Pakistan‟s security dilemma since its inception. Security vulnerabilities had been increased with the passage of time. The more the security vanguards of Pakistan felt threatened from its eastern border, the more they tilted towards the US for military and economic assistance. Furthermore, the writer describes that Pakistan‟s expectations from the US were always high. But contrary to this, Islamabad‟s performance in different phases of relationship was weak. Author highlights the strategic partnership of Pak-US emerged as a weak alliance because security managers of Pakistan cannot easily step back from the support of selected militant groups. The groups have paramount importance for GHQ because they are at the front to fulfill their revisionist agenda. According to author the policy of “strategic depth” adopted by the military establishment in 70s is still surviving. It is because of this reason, trust deficit between the partnering states have been widening with each passing day. However, author has left many gaps in the work. She ignored the historical facts that how illegally and by force India captured the princely and settled areas which wanted annexation with Pakistan. Furthermore, the secrete role of India in the dismemberment of . In addition to this, the author throughout his writings had hostile attitude towards Pakistan and ignoring Indo-US nexus and their policy of encirclement from Pakistan‟s eastern and western borders. The work can be used as a reference to comprehend Pak-US strategic partnership from the American‟s point of view.

Hussain Haqqani, Reimaging Pakistan: Transforming a Dysfunctional Nuclear State, (2018), the author discusses the past historical policies as adopted by the early policy makers of Pakistan to make it an ideological state. Author says that 70% young generation wanted to live under functional nationalism rather than ideological nationalism. He further describes that the US is also responsible for preparing the

12 grounds for Pakistan as an ideological extremist State by promoting its own national interests. However the author provides useful arguments by saying that being a sovereign state it should not take dictation from the US while principal actors should be people of Pakistan. Further, it is not possible for Pakistan in current situation to make covert arrangements with the US or China. Foreign policy of Pakistan must be open and straight forward so that it could strongly secure its national interests. Yet, Pakistan will have to change its approach towards Islamist militancy to change its image before the comity of the Nations. A sizable portion of work highlights Pak-US strategic partnership which can be used as a source reference. However, the question is that how the security managers of Pakistan can revisit the policy towards militant groups who are considered by them as third and fourth line of defense.

1.6 THEORETICAL & CONCEPTUAL OUTLINES

This study evaluate why using the theory of alliance (Realism) as an analytical conceptual frame work, despite the differences in Pak-US strategic and diplomatic relationship through partnership and to understand the development of this partnership. In the literature of international relations both the discipline of diplomacy and foreign policy are very complex in the contemporary world. Joseph S. Nye describes foreign policy as a means rather than an end in an anarchic international system.13 More recently, John J. Mearsheimer describes that “for great power foreign policy is a profitable game and for small states it is a ruthless and dangerous business” because ultimately great power will become the system‟s hegemon relative to its rivals.14 Thus, great power can secure its national interests in better way as compared to small states which have less ability to protect its interests, and this unbalanced behavior in policies is a common problem in international system. In this situation, the difference of „interests‟ between two unequal powers normally becomes the cause of conflict and put at stake the interest of small states. In this regard, power structure basically confined the small states, and relatively it can happen in many circumstances because of the limited options to small states.

13Joseph Nye, The Future of Power (New York: Public Affairs, 2011), p. 15. 14John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power politics (New York: Norton, 2001), pp. 9-19

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Partnership

In the text of international relations the term „partnership‟ does not provide the legal basis to the relationship because of its non-binding nature in agreements and arrangements. Gravi point out that multilateral framework of interactions between the countries goes parallel to understand the nature of their relationships. However, after 1990s‟ the concept of strategic partnership emerged in the scene of world politics for building the closer and structural relationship which gave birth to new dimensions to the interactions for achieving common goals. The concept not only defines the place for the leading global powers in the arena of world politics but also changed the behavior of bilateral relationship between the small and great powers15.

The concept of „partnership‟ and „strategic‟ is not new in the literature of international politics. Partnership is formed between two or more than two countries to achieve the settled objectives. The objectives can be for the short-term or for the long-term, yet, long-term relations are proffered so that with the passage of time mutual understanding regarding the specific goals could be developed. „Strategic‟ on the other hand is the name of organization and planning between the partnering states to counter the opponents‟ physical and ideological expansion. Similarly, Kay argues that „partnership‟ between the states is an old phenomena but it‟s embeddedness with the term „strategic‟ provides new look to the contextual meaning of the relationship between the states. For instance, the US and USSR entered into a formal kind of arrangements to resolve the post-cold war environment in Eastern Europe and Pacific Ocean.

It is pivotal to understand the concept of „strategic partnership‟. Arguably, the boundaries of „strategic partnership‟ are not defined and restricted but it is based on some judgmental attributes which prepare grounds for its understanding. First, there must not be complexity in the partnership. Comprehensiveness provides strong roots and persistent linkages to strategic partnership. Second, it must be built on mutual responsibilities and understandings about each other interests and limitations; otherwise it will be short in term. Third, terms of interactions must be clearly defined so as to space could be maintained for mutual values and objectives. Fourth,

15Givonni Grevi, Strategic partnerships: smart grid or talking shops? (Madrid: FRIDE book, 2011), pp. 5-8.

14 partnering states must settle long-term goals and these must not be prey victim to ordinary disputes. Finally, the fundamental raison d‟être of the partnership is to tackle the regional and global challenges vis-à-vis bilateral objectives. In this context, bilateral relationship under the umbrella of strategic partnership is more strong and invincible in its broader spectrum rather than narrow settlement of objectives16.

Theory of alliance in international relations provides proper place to strategic partnership. Walt argues that the sovereign states enter into formal and informal arrangements and agreements for security cooperation. Similarly, Liska describes the formal association between the sovereign states to use or not to use the military force against the declared common opponents. These formal arrangements are made either for security purposes or to enhance the capabilities of the member states against determined specific states17. Walt further discuss that the different factors play an important role in making the final shape of an alliance. However, its core objective is to maintain balance against existential external threat. The argument nearly comes in the parameters of rationality covered by the „offensive realism‟. Political landscape of the world is anarchic because of the absence of higher authority to manage the affairs of the states in their dealings. Therefore, those states which face threats at global theater join hands with the other states to secure their interests and to counter balance or defeat the attack18.

Realists‟ school of thought in international relations provides space to the concept of „strategic partnership‟ especially determines the interactions between offensive and defensive strategies of the state. Offensive realism ensures the supremacy of the great power as utilized by the US. By adopting strategic partnership great powers tries to maintain or maximize its political, economic and military influence in world politics which is favorable and in tune with the national interest of the great power.

16Sean Kay, “Rebalancing and the Role of Allies and Partners: Europe, NATO, and the Future of American Land Power,” Journal of SSI, Vol. 17, No. 6. 2004, pp. 69-78. 17George Liska. Nations in Alliance: The Limits of Interdependence (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1962), pp. 147-158. 18Stephan M. Walt. The Origin of Alliances (New York: Cornell University Press, 1987), pp. 147-181

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Mao Weizhon defines the concept of „strategic partnership‟ through the lens of cultural significance. He explains that for viable partnership it is essential in international relations the state must have common values. Partnership solely based on interests will lead to utilitarian interactions. Change of interests adversely affects the partnership between the states. There is no denial to the fact that common interests are at the center in any strategic partnership but too much inclination towards them (interests) overlaps the other factors. This ultimately damages the common values which are the pillars of strategic partnership19. Mao Weizhon further describes the major five standards of strategic partnership i.e. common interests, shared values, leverage, strength and influence, for building the intensive network of strategic partnership.

Arguably, the term „strategic partnership‟ has been used in the theories and concepts of international relations for defining the specific nature of relationship between the states, however in diplomatic lexicon it is relatively new. The terminology strategic partnership, with the passage of time, is gaining comprehensive explanation, absorbing new definitions and interpretations. It is the reason that it provides different meanings to different people or the same people/states are using the term in different context with the objective to define and redefine their relationship in the arena of world politics20.

In this context, the strategic partnership between Pakistan and the US is a perfect example which provides a deep analysis that how small state and great power interact with each other despite numerous clash of interests and approaches to counter the common enemy (Radical Islamist Militancy). The geopolitical landscape on the eve of 9/11 changed Pakistan-US dimension of relationship and both faced various challenges to handle the threat of Islamist militancy. Pakistan supported the war on terror in order to achieve political, economic and strategic objectives while the US employed coercive diplomacy to contain the waves of terrorism and to protect the global interests in the world. In this regard, the available literature is limited to cover Pakistan‟s position in the war on terror and its approach towards Islamist militancy

19FarhaArbab, “China-Africa Interaction: Prospects for a Strategic Partnership,” Cornell International Affairs Review, Vol. 1, No. 1. 2007, pp. 3-7. 20ibid.

16 because much has been written on the US perspective. There is a greater need to conduct research on Pakistan‟s perspective and investigate the causes of mistrust between Pakistan and the US that arises from the day of partnership. The research in hand is no doubt challenging but interesting to understand and apprise the clash of intersts in their foreign policies and conflicting approaches both the states have adopted to curb militant bloodbath. Nevertheless, the core objective of the studies lies to deeply investigate changing trends and challenges of Pakistan-US security partnership in order to contain militancy in the region and explore the prospects of better relationship without hurting the national interests of the countries.

1.7 METHODOLOGY

This research, in depth, is qualitative in nature in which both primary and secondary data has been used. The study also employs the descriptive and analytical and empirical methods to draw the conclusion. Primary data has been collected by providing wide space to the personal interviews with the security experts in the field of international relations in Pakistan and the US under the category of structural interviews. An open ended type of questionnaire has been provided so that to clearly grasp the idea of the interviewee. Moreover, official documents and first handed agreements were deeply consulted. Apart from this, semi-structured personal interviews were also conducted from the academicians, politicians, scholars, journalists, retired and serving military and civil bureaucrats in Pakistan and the US. In the US common people perception regarding the role of Pakistan in war on terrorism is also gathered through unstructured interviews. For collecting the secondary data Department of International Relations university of Peshawar, Archives Library Peshawar, Library of Area Study Centre Peshawar, Central Library Peshawar, Quaid-e-Azam University Central Library Islamabad, Carter Centre Atlanta, Central Library Emory University Atlanta, Congress Library Washington D, Library of Georgia State and South Asian Studies Atlanta Georgia USA have thoroughly visited. Analytical methods have also been used for comparison, authentication, interpretation and reinterpretation of facts related to the fluctuating trends in the strategic partnership between Pakistan and the US to contain militant culture and fomenting insurgencies.

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The major part of the study consists of Pak-US strategic partnership which started after the tragic incident of 9/11 (2001). Historical evidences and estimations provide base to the judgmental interpretations to the study. The time frame in the study (2005-2015) significantly shape and reshape the strategic partnership between Pakistan and the US. Both the allies were at the same page in countering the rising militancy in Pak-Afghan borderland area, however, clash of regional and global interests impelled the partners to adopt different approaches for countering the common enemy. Disenchantment in the partnership is against the interests of both the countries because this is providing space to non-state-actors in Afghanistan as well in the borderland land area. Addition to this, the study applies realist approach by adopting the conceptual grounds of alliance between small state and great power. Proponents of realists‟ school thought Joseph S. Nye and John J. Mearsheimer and Walt provide the theoretical basis to the study by explaining the concept of strategic partnership in the literature of foreign policy and diplomacy in the contemporary world politics.

1.8 ORGANIZATION OF THE STUDY

The study consists of eight different chapters along with separate sections on conclusion and recommendations.

In chapter number one detailed introduction along with the statement of the problem and literature review has been provided. The chapter also includes conceptual and theoretical framework which prepared grounds for the aims and objectives of the study. Moreover, research questions with the research findings are at the center of this chapter. How data has been collected for this research? Detailed methodology has also been provided by the Scholar.

The second chapter briefly discusses Pakistan-US relationship since the inception of the state Pakistan in 1947. Analytical study of different eras of their relations provides deep understanding of disenchantment and clash of interests between the US and Pakistan. Moreover, it discusses as to why both the states were at the same page in 1979 to counter the physical expansionism of USSR? And then why immediately after Geneva Accord 1989 the US left Pakistan in the lurch?

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The third chapter highlights the merits and demerits of the US sponsored pact (SEATO& CENTO) joined by Pakistan in the mid 50s. It also discusses that despite the refusal of Quaid-e-Azam not to join any bloc in the world politics then why policy-makers of Pakistan decided to join Western bloc to contain the Communism in South Asia? Additionally, the chapter also provides detail about the Indian reaction against the US led security pacts in the region of South Asia.

The fourth chapter discusses the security compulsions of Pakistan due to which the security vanguards decided to join the US led global war on terrorism. It argues that how the incident of 9/11 (2001) entirely changed the nature of world politics and compelled the small states to alter their foreign policy objectives. Further, it has also discussed that what options were left with then Army Chief-cum-President to secure the larger interests of the state of Pakistan?

The fifth chapter is divided into two parts but is interconnected. The first part describes the Pak-US strategic partnership started after the incident of 9/11 and controversial issue of economic aid emerged subsequently between the two States. Security and economic assistance provided by the US under different agreements were thoroughly discussed between Islamabad and Washington. While the second portion of the chapter discusses those military operations which were initiated by Pakistan Army with the active financial and intelligence support by the US. How much these military operations were successful and beneficial for the state of Pakistan? is a core theme of this chapter.

The sixth chapter confers in-depth analysis about the areas of convergence and divergence between Pak-US strategic partnership. Brief historical perspectives between the US and Pakistan are also discussed to comprehend the stand of Pakistan‟s view point over some of the important issues where Islamabad is not willing to step backward at the cost of declaring Pakistan as a non-NATO ally by the US. The chapter also encompasses the nuclear program of Pakistan and the US policy-makers reservations about its security measurements.

The seventh chapter deals with the political, economic and strategic implications of Pak-US strategic partnership. The chapter also sheds light on the linkages between the militant groups and the sectarian outfits who are operating in the

19 urban areas of Pakistan. Furthermore, the chapter also highlights the linkages between terrorism, organized crime and narcotics trade which are severely complicating the war on terrorism. Secret agencies of the US have entered into Pakistan and covertly conducted the operations in the settled areas of Pakistan to hunt down the members of Al-Qaeda and other related conglomerates is also argued in this chapter.

Chapter eight is divided into two sections. First section provides detailed analysis as well as conclusion of the study. In the second section political, strategic and economic recommendations have been made which are important for the academicians, experts and researchers working on Pak-US strategic partnership.

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CHAPTER – 2

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF PAKISTAN-UNITED STATES RELATIONS (Brief History)

2.1 INTRODUCTION

The United States of America (USA) and The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) rose up as world powers after the end of World War II, the US as the champion of while Soviet Union as the champion of . Cold war rivalry between the Soviet Union and the US started when both of them tried to spread their own ideologies. The Soviet Union was forcing to implement socialism while the US was advocating . The US fearing that the Soviet way of life might not gain popularity started opposing socialistic way of life in various parts of the world including Europe and Asia.21

For this purposes immediately after the WWII both started to search the states in Europe and Asia not only to adopt their political and economic systems and values but also to work for the containment of other ideologies and declared systems. This kind of international scenario was much attractive especially for the new born states because they wanted politically and economically shelters from the economically and technologically strong states. Pakistan came into being in 1947 with weak economy and unsafe borders. Therefore, Pakistan moved to Western bloc to come under the umbrella of powerful country which can fulfill her needs and requirements.

2.2 BEGINNING OF THE US ROLE IN SOUTH AND SOUTHWEST ASIA & ASIA PACIFIC

The involvement of US began in Asia even before the World War II when Maoist communists were struggling against Chiang Kai-shek government. The US favored the existing government to protect its status quo in China and try to bring peace between the fighting Maoists and the then government fearing communism a threat to the world order. General George said;

21 Jusuf Vanadi, “Global Coalition against International Terrorism”, International Security 26, no. 4, (2002): p. 184.

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“Events in this country, (China) however, would indicate that a breach of peace anywhere in the world threatens the peace of the entire world. It is thus in the most vital interest of the US and all people of the United Nations..... to adjust their (Chinese) internal differences.”22

The US involvement in Asia was ignited by the anti-communist and pro-status quo polices. Thus it got engaged in Asia generally and in South Asia particularly, the purpose was to ward off the threat of communism in the Persian Gulf and the West Asia. It was high time of the cold war. The nearness of the Middle East to the Soviet Union posed threat of spreading communism in this region which was to be stopped. George F. Kenon (ex-Ambassador to the Soviet Union) said:

“In these circumstances it is clear that the main element of any United States policy towards the Soviet Union must be that of a long term, patient but firm and vigilant containment of Russian expansive tendencies.”23

In this situation where Pakistan had geo-strategic location as a tri-junction of Middle East, Central Asia, and South Asia could be suitable companion in the upcoming security partnership with US. In the beginning it did not seem to American policy makers that Pakistan could be an important country to serve its interests in the region. Its interest was focused on Europe and to some extent on Japan. No doubt, the Middle East did have much importance for its rich resources of oil.

They had their worries in the main land of Asia for Chinese communists in the civil war forging a bad fortune for their favored Chiang Kai-Shek. Then the US policy makers‟ attention directed towards the new entity which was even not familiar to the people of America in comparison to larger and better known India. It seems that it was not in the interest of the US in terms of security that there might be diversified India. If there had been instability in that part, it would easily accommodate communism and other nonconformist elements through Soviet Union in this area. Another worry for US was political weakness of Kashmir and its strategic location which could invite communism and fuel the fire of instability. But the things did not

22 Address delivered by the US President George W. Bush to the Nation (Washington D.C.: September 11, 2001). 23 Dennis Kux, The United States and Pakistan 1947-2000: Disenchanted Allies (Washington D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Centre Press, 2001), pp. 145-152.

22 take the expected direction. The events that took place after it made America go for security alliance with Pakistan and Indian subcontinent as strategic partners.24

The idea behind recognition of Pakistan by the US necessitated for worldwide geo-political situation. It became the amalgamation of worldview of the British Tory and the Truman‟s collective security concepts in rising of cold war after the partition. The architect of the idea of the military aid to Pakistan was Olaf Carole, a foreign secretary in New Delhi under two viceroys who was also considered an authority on Soviet Central Asia.25

Pakistan came into being on 14 August, 1947 to give the Muslim minority a separate homeland because they did not feel well-adjusted in the Hindu dominated India with the larger part in the northwest of India and a smaller part in the northeast of India. In the beginning the US did not react fervently in the creation of Pakistan but it showed its apprehension about rights given to autocratic states to join any one of them.26

It was because of the right given to the princely states to join any one of the two countries. The Kashmir problem rose up and is still unsolved. In the beginning US showed little interest in this matter. Its focus was to keep peace in the region instead of favoring one against the other. Thus US policy did not remain constant; moreover, it also avoided the legal question of Kashmir. It just steered its purpose to keep peace because only peace could ward off communism stepping in the area.27

The crisis of cold war with Soviet Union in Greece, Turkey, , West Asia and East Europe forced US to view the importance of South Asia. India appeared neutral but found tilted towards Soviet Union during the Cold War. Thus Pakistan became the best option for US as strategic partner because of its location in the South West Asia touching boundaries with Soviet Central Asia, China and India. The situation remains the same till 1949, and then the possession of the atomic bomb by US makes it more powerful to flex its muscles and force the Soviet Union to go back

24 M. Ehsan Ahrari, “Transnational Terrorism and Old Friends: Pakistan and US, Strategic Review 18, No. 7, (2001), p.16. 25 Ibid. 26 Robert Ross and Jiang Changbin, Re-examining the Cold War: US-China Diplomacy, 1954-1973 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2001), p. 133-137. 27 Kux, The United States and Pakistan 1947-2000, p.71.

23 on disputes relating to Iran and Turkey. Unites States was un-thoughtful of its strength in air and atomic power which mitigated the fear of extending Soviet influence in India. The US attention was focused on the security of the Western Europe to a larger extent and west Asia to a lesser extent. After the Second World War the agenda of the American was to establish deep down relations with the Chinese leadership to protect interests in East and South Asia.28

Soviet Union dismantled American supremacy of atomic arsenal in 1949. There America hit upon a grand plan and entered the military alliance of North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to restrict Soviet expansionism. America declared that its policy would be to support the people fighting against the forced subjugation by the military minority or by the pressure developed from outside. This came to be known as . This doctrine appeared to be in practice only in Greece and Turkey, but it implicated warning for the countries which were outside the Soviet Union circle.29

The US did not show any interest in the insurgent activities, with regard to South and South East Asia, carried out by the communist parties. It seemed sufficient to draw the attention of the nationalists in these countries to the threat posed by the local communists and international communism. The national leaders‟ attention was drawn towards the fact that nationalism which they wanted and desired was considered a heinous crime that smoothed grounds for heartless intervention in their house dealings led by communistic approaches. It took some time for America to frame a policy for the region for participating in the military alliance, aid and economic help.30

The whole scenario changed with the down fall of Chiang Kai-shek regime of China. The pendulum swung towards the other side and Peoples Republic of China was established in October 1949. It was a hard blow for American diplomatic and military polices towards East Asia. This almost stunned the policy makers and made them bring drastic changes in their policies towards the countries of subcontinent.

28 Stephen P. Cohen, “US Weapons and South Asia: A Policy Analysis”, Pacific Affairs 49, no. 1, (1976): p. 50. 29 See Congressional Research Service, Pakistan-US Relations; June 21, 2001, p.2. 30 Ashlis J. Telli‟s, India Emerging Nuclear Posture between Recessed Deterrent and Ready Arsenal (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2001), pp. 147-152.

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India and Pakistan whose population and resources were almost similar to China became important for America. The formation of totalitarian regime in China did not attract the attention of Pakistan and India before they had their own disputes like Kashmir and various other domestic problems.31

2.3 CONVERGENCE OF PAKISTAN- US INTEREST

Pakistan came into being on the basis of two nation theory. Congress opposed the idea of division. But India was divided and Kashmir became a disputed area. Pakistan feared that partition might not be undone. This made Pakistan to frame its foreign policies exerting all efforts to gain Kashmir. Indian leadership‟s did not accept Pakistan wholeheartedly; therefore, it needed a strong ally. Pakistan‟s first Governor General Mohammad Ali Jinnah‟s fervent support for democracy was invitation to the Americans for alliance. This invitation was responded positively because on the other hand US was looking for an ally to ward off the spreading of communism. The convergence of interests straightened the way for Pakistan to find an ally strong enough to guarantee security.32

Though, the US seemed interested in India for making relationship instead of Pakistan. Moreover, it appeared that America had no interest in the people of Pakistan and its politics. This is evident from the attitude of the US ambassador which they sent to Karachi in 1948. After four months he went back because of bad health and the new Ambassador took charge in the beginning of 1950. The sluggish attitude evidently explains the level of interest of the US towards Pakistan. On the other hand there had been no such response observed regarding America‟s interest towards India.33

This kind of attitude by the US towards Pakistan was very much disappointing. Pakistan considered it the only possible security partner and that possibility was drifting away. Pakistan felt very much unhappy with the situation for it felt insecure from the giant neighboring country that was India. It wasn‟t only the procrastinated appointment of the ambassador of the US government but the US also

31 Ibid. 32 Sumita Kumar, “Politics in Pakistan Post-September 11, 2001‟‟, Strategic Analysis 22, no. 9, (2002): p. 37-40. 33 Vijay K. Nair, “The Nuclear Dimensions of the War on Terrorism”, Aakrosh 5, no. 14, (2002): p.27.

25 sent an official invitation to India causing aversion in the foreign office of Pakistan. But unhappy situation turned into a happy note when the Prime Minister Jawahar Lal Nehru refused to join any camp rather preferred to keep the non-alignment policy. The neutrality in the policy of the prime minister was a great satisfaction for Pakistan. Now the task for the foreign office was to play the right card to convince America that its relation with Pakistan would be of much importance.34

Therefore, Pakistan became the first to pay visit to US before India did. The views of Quaid-e-Azam in the cabinet meeting in September 7, 1947 were very much clear about the state affiliation with the democratic countries such as UK and America rather than the countries of communistic systems and ideas.

In 1947 similar statement was given by the Pakistani minister for commerce Fazlur Rahman that the ideologies of the US and Pakistan were common and communism was quite opposite which had no acceptance in the folds of Islam. Ghulam Mohammad minister for Finance in his statement talked about the sanctity of the private enterprise and invited American technicians to develop industries in Pakistan.35

Major General Iskander Mirza, Secretary to the Defense Ministry of Pakistan reportedly visited America in 1949 to develop cooperative environment and open paths of military cooperation. The General in his statement said that the military power of the US could only ensure and give guarantee of peace in the whole world. All these clear indications of Pakistan to attract America went to the dogs when Nehru was invited by the US. Finding themselves in dismay the foreign office of Pakistan started looking for ways to come closer to Russia. It was not exactly a relationship with Soviet Union rather it was a political tactic.

Pakistan continued the policy of finding ways to steer the direction to find a guarantor for its security. The prime minister of Pakistan announced that he had accepted the invitation from Soviet Union to visit Moscow. But this visit could not be made because this time America sent invitation which was readily accepted. The meeting of Liaqat Ali Khan was arranged with the Secretary of States in Paris in

34 Kux, The United States and Pakistan 1947-2000, pp. 147-150. 35 Zbigniew Brzezinski, Game Plan: A Geostrategic Framework for the Conduct of the US-Soviet Contest (New York: The Atlantic Monthly Press, 1986), p. 28.

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October 1948. This was first meeting of high level since the inception of Pakistan. Liaqat Ali Khan in this meeting assured the Secretary of States that there was no room for communism in Islam; therefore, there is no chance of falling prey to it. Then he asked the US for economic assistance for Pakistan in the same way as the nations of Middle East and Europe received.36

Pakistani leadership openly declared, unlike the Indian prime minister, that Pakistan was not in favor of communism. It seemed that this stance would gain economic benefits from the US and it did. The second thing for which Pakistan made all these efforts was military help because of the fear of India. The diplomatic relationships developed, Pakistani Prime Minister was invited and was given warm reception. The prime minister of Pakistan called his visit “an impressive success”. On the other hand America appreciated the determination of Pakistan against communism and its will to encourage the private enterprise. The confirmation that Islamic way of life is quite against communism had appeal for America as compared to Nehru‟s non- alignment policy. 37

2.4 US NEUTRALITY ON KASHMIR On October 22, 1947 around 2000 Pakistani tribals entered Kashmir for its liberation. The news were spread that the surrounding town of Muzzaffarabad was captured by the raiders. The Maharaja of Kashmir wasting no time acceded to India within three days, there Indian troops quickly responded and were deployed in Srinagar. Thus the seed of conflict was sown between the two countries over Kashmir. The desire of the Indian government to incorporate Hyderabad with India was the cause of Pakistani tribals infiltration into Kashmir. India and Pakistan both were aware of the security issues because of Kashmir‟s geographical location. Jawaharlal Nehru announced plebiscite in Kashmir to determine the future of its denizens, but he laid some conditions for it. He said that the invading forces may be withdrawn and peace may be restored first in the region. Pakistan agreed that there should be plebiscite, but it did not agree on other conditions. Pakistan asked for the withdrawal of Indian Forces which was unacceptable to India. When these negotiations between the two countries reached a dead lock and military deployment took place, Nehru accessed the Security Council to intervene into the matter. Thus

36 Kumar, “Politics in Pakistan”, p. 147. 37 Brzezinski, Game Plan, p. 29.

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Kashmir issue became international issue instead of a local one. The Security Council formed a commission to visit the area and formulate recommendations for its solution. The commission recommended the withdrawal of the military forces to smooth the way for its plebiscite. Pakistan wanted the active role of America in the Kashmir dispute and US was chosen as a member along with Czechoslovakia, Belgium, Colombia, and Argentina.38

Pakistan kept on nourishing the idea that US would take active part on Kashmir issue. But it turned out to be only a wish. Thus Pakistan disappointed to get its gains through diplomatic means, changed its stance and turned towards force and started amassing arms and ammunitions. It had fear of war with India; therefore kept on equipping their army with modern weapons. Therefore, Liaqat Ali Khan‟s visit to America carried the focal point to procure arms and ammunition for the country. He submitted a memorandum to the state department requesting to equip and build its defense service upto 510 million dollars. Two billion dollars were asked as loan to be used in the period of five years. Pakistan asked for defense $510, and $ 205 were asked for the deficits in the Pakistan army budget. But that memorandum was rejected by the President Truman on the ground that both India and Pakistan were engaged fighting in Kashmir, though some sales of arms were approved.39 The embargo was lifted after the cease fire in 1949; even then America‟s response to arms request was slow. Inspite of the fact that there was no objection from any side, the problem remained the same that is, the shortage of equipment and Pakistan‟s low strategic priority. US rejected Pakistan‟s request of arms assistance without saying it openly and kept on embarking on the point that India and Pakistan were at loggers head in Kashmir.

2.5 US TILT IN FAVOUR OF PAKISTAN The US policy was to appear neutral instead of being seen as anti-Indian because this stance could move India towards Soviet Union. When Dwight D. Eisenhower was elected as president of US, the relations of Pakistan and America became a primary goal for the American president like the goal of establishing „Northern Tier of defense‟. Moreover in July 1950 broke out, and

38 Allan R. Millett, “The Parameters of Peacekeeping: US Interventions Abroad, 1798-1999”, Strategic Review 32, no. 8, (2000): p.34. 39 D. A. Graber, Crisis Diplomacy: A History of US Interventions Policies and Practices (Washington, D.C.: Public Affairs Press, 1959), p.271.

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American leadership was keenly interested in getting Pakistan‟s response. This was an important occasion for Pakistan to prove itself as a trustworthy friend when in America there was strong conflict in the public opinion about it. Pakistan‟s strong support in favor of US against Korean aggression smoothed the way for Pakistan. On the other hand India wanted admission of and PRC‟s in UN. Thus America‟s cherishing hope of getting India‟s favor diminished, and the importance of Pakistan became prominent for America. Pakistan‟s support for American foreign policy objectives on Korean War and Japan‟s peace treaty in comparison with India‟s attitude made Pakistan more favorable and cooperative ally of the US. The image of India before the US tarnished and declared as China‟s supporter while Pakistan became a staunch supporter of the US.40

The US re-evaluated its foreign policy with the changing scenario. The entrance of Chinese volunteers in Korea and the further developments in South Asia and the Middle East impelled the Americans to reappraise their foreign policy. In this regard Pakistan came closer to US for its strong support in Korean War. It was also important for Pakistan to equip itself militarily to face the aftermath of 1948 war with India over Kashmir.41

The relations between US and Pakistan were on the basis of need. Whatever the reasons there may be, every country needed the support of the other. US needed Pakistan to serve American interest and Pakistan needed American support to equip itself for the lurking danger from India. Though America was not happy with Nehru‟s practice of non-alignment policy but expressed resentment towards India because of its tilt towards China. And if it happened, it would bear dangerous consequences for the peace of the world. This made America get ready to extent any help asked by India. In 1951 India underwent food shortage and asked for help from US which was readily accepted and help was extended more than requested. Pakistan‟s complaint to US was that the India food shortage was because of the trade war against Pakistan and if it was stopped, there would be no food shortage. But America was not getting influenced by either of them in making its foreign policy.42

40 George F. Kennon, American Diplomacy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1951), p. 117. 41 Baldev Raj Nayar, American Geopolitics and India (New Delhi: Manohar Publications, 1976), p. 38. 42 M. S. Venkataramani, The American Role in Pakistan, 1947-1958 (New Delhi: Radiant Publishers, 1982), p. 4.

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In 1952 when US signed the pact with the name of ANZUS and established equally relations with Japan and through the formal treaties, India showed doubt on the American stance. Moreover, India took it as provocation for China. This brought America to the realization that India was creating hindrance to the US policy of the deterrence on the expansion of communism.43

2.6 SIGNING OF PAKISTAN-US DEFENCE AGREEMENT Pakistan‟s efforts continued to obtain military aid from America. Army Chief Mohammad paid a visit to US for paving way to collaborate in military affairs of the both countries. On May 19, 1954 an agreement on Mutual Defense Assistance was signed.44 A high level team including Ayub Khan went to America to meet Eisenhower administration. The agreement took place and US announced $ 50 million to uplift military level in the coming fiscal year. The memorandum included 6 modern air crafts for air force squadrons and 12 vessels for the navy. Further the agreement committed to equip 4 army infantry and 1.5 armored divisions. The cost of the program was estimated $171 million. Moreover, the US secretary of state Dulles who had initiated the South East Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) invited South Asian countries to sign the pact; no nation but Pakistan attended.45 Yet the US bore doubt that Soviet Union had allocated military aid for Pakistan. Pakistan‟s Foreign Minister Zafarullah Khan returning from Manila conference stressed that instead of saying aggression from communist states, it should be narrated as aggression from all quarters. Dulles curtly replied that the treaty had explicit reservations to deal only with communist aggression.46 Again on 25 September 1955America asked Pakistan to join the Baghdad pact. After eight and half years of its birth on 23rd March 1956 Pakistan became the Islamic Republic with Iskandar Mirza as the president though it was its turbulent time. Jawaharlal Nehru the Indian prime minister never stopped looking at Pakistan-America relations doubtfully. He criticized Pak-America formal security alliance. He showed worry about the supply of weapons to the Pakistan Army and raised the point that this would cause aggression on the part of Pakistan against India.

43 Selig S. Harrison, “The United States and South Asia: Trapped by the Past?”, Current History 6, no. 614, (1997): p. 402. 44 Robert J. Me Mohan, The Cold War on the Periphery: The United States, India and Pakistan (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), p. 2. 45 Robert S. Me Namara, Out of the Cold: New Thinking for American Foreign and Defence Policy in the 21st Century (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1989), pp. 53-56. 46 M. S. Venkataramani and Harish Chandra Arya, “American‟s Military Alliance with Pakistan: The Evolution and Course of Uneasy Partnership”, International Studies 8, no. 2, (1966), p.79.

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At this the US president stepped in to mitigate India‟s fear and assured that if such thing happened, America would be at the victim‟s side supporting India under the charter of the United Nations.47Pakistan though signed American sponsored anti-communist military alliance started easing the tension with China so that the path of relations may be built. The then Prime Minister Suhrawardy kept on working on this track. In 1956 he exchanged a well-publicized visit to China‟s Prime Minister Chou En-Lai.

Pakistan‟s Prime Minister, tired of no progress towards Kashmir issue, decided to go to the United Nations‟ Security Council with the then foreign minister Feroz Khan Noon. They asked the US to favor Pakistan at least for the plebiscite in Kashmir.48 Further Pakistan made it clear that anything less than this support would lead to Pak-US relations to disaster. The prime minister justified his allegiance to the US by allowing U-2 reconnaissance aircraft to fly from Pakistan and then asked US for a clear cut favor to Pakistan. He added that Pakistan cannot remain neutral, and it would definitely need to look at others for defense. However, the US extending its promises to India on one hand and on the other hand signing agreements of Military Cooperation with Pakistan on 5th March 1959. It is also included in the preamble of the agreement that the US would regards the Integrity and preservation of Pakistan as regards its national interest. It was also brought into the agreement about the aggression on Pakistan which would be perceived as onslaught on the US and stern actions would be taken as it was in the agreement between the two countries.49 The relations further strengthened and in 1959 the two counties signed an agreement to establish a communication unit in Peshawar - a long desired action by the US. The treaty of Friendship and commerce signed in November 1959 smoothed the way for the entry of American private capital and investment. This political and economic alliance made America won the favor of Pakistan on the international issues.

Pakistan was consistently demanding from the US military equipment while domestically Pakistan was in political crisis. Ayub khan imposed martial law on 27

47 Robert J. Mc Mohan, The Cold War on the Periphery: The United States, India and Pakistan (New York: Colombia University Press, 1994), p. 72. 48 Alaistar Lamb, Kashmir: A Disputed Legacy, 1846-1990 (Hertingfordbury: Oxford Books, 1991), p. 110. 49 Parama Sihna Palit, “The Kashmir Policy of the United States: A Study of the Perceptions, Conflicts and Dilemmas”, Strategic Analysis 25, no. 6, (2001): p. 2.

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November, 1958.50Pakistan demanded the fighter aircrafts F-104 from the US. The US not only refused to agree upon the military aid, but also paid no heed to the military takeover in Pakistan. The president of US enthusiastically paid a visit on 7 December, 1959 to Pakistan. The president Eisenhower discussed issues of interest with Ayub Khan. Pakistan raised the issue of Russian prospective invasion in Afghanistan and China‟s constructing air base near the region, concluded it as security threat to Pakistan. As a matter of fact all these were preambles for asking from US modern weapons including F-104s to the . Assistant Secretary of States for the Near East, South Asia, and Africa Langley supported Pakistan in term of giving it military help, he wrote:

“I wonder if we have not collectively developed certain generalizations about Pakistan and then proceeded to accept themes gospel truth without sufficient periodical scrutiny.... the situation of strength which we have accepted as synonymous with Pakistan has too large component of wishful thinking..... it is not too difficult to make a rather convincing case that the preset [Pakistan] military program is based upon hoax, the hoax being that it is related to the Soviet threat.”51

The US president did not accept Pakistan‟s demand until 1960 and then the same year agreed to supply F-104s. Pakistan gained two benefits from this acceptance of US. First, Pakistan‟s diplomatic isolation ended. Second, the backing of a super power enhanced confidence with reference to India. Moreover, US gave support to Pakistan on Kashmir issue against India and the issue of Pakhtunistan against Afghanistan. Further, the defense capabilities of Pakistan rose quickly and exonerated it from the fear of political and military threats from India. The defense relationship included material aid which includes military hardware, training and security supporting assistance.52

Though there was alliance between the two countries but their goals and interests were polls apart from each other. For Pakistan it was important because it provided security from the long obsessed threat from India. Moreover, economic

50 Mohammad Ayub, “India, Pakistan and Super-Power Rivalry”, The World Today 38, no. 5, (1982): p. l98. 51 W. Norman Brown, The United States and India, Pakistan, (Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1972). 52 Smriti S. Patnaik, “Pakistan‟s Kashmir Policy: Objectives and Approaches”, Strategic Analysis 26, no. 2, (2002): p. 201.

32 considerations were expected to increase its defense capabilities. Another interest of Pakistan was to put pressure on America to resolve the issue of Kashmir according to Pakistan‟s will.53 On the other hand US had its own global considerations. US wanted to contain spreading of communism of Russia and China, and for that purpose Pakistan was situated at a strategic location. Both China and Russia were at the doorstep of Pakistan. This is the reason that in the agreements the commitments and obligations are confined to the aggression of communism.54

The divergent interests of US and Pakistan ultimately ended in disillusionment. The need of Pakistan was connected to its utility. When the need increased, its importance also increased and when the need decreased, Pakistan consideration was lost in oblivion. In that situation both the countries decided not to dance together.55

Pakistan came into alliance with America, provided territory for communication facilities and signed treaties even then the US did not alienate India. America signed an agreement with Pakistan in 1950s but not at any stage had eliminated the possibilities of making alignment with it. The stable economy of India was considered to be a helpful factor in keeping it economically oriented towards the west. This resulted in distinguishing mark of $85 million out of $307.4 million for India by Dulles in 1954. He also laid stress on the congress to support this request in spite of the fact that the foreign policies of the both countries (US and India) had differences.56

The relationship of India with America went up when Democratic President John Kennedy rose to power. It was like adding fuel to the fire for Pakistan. President Kennedy increased aid to India; he admired Nehru for his idealism in his address to congress on 30 January 1961. This situation was seen with concern by Pakistan and perceived as biased approach towards India. The cleavage appeared and started widening between US and Pakistan. The estrangement in relation between US and Pakistan became evident. Though the depth of alignment of US and Pakistan can be

53 Sisir Gupta, Kashmir: A Study of India-Pakistan Relations (Bombay: Asia Publishing House, 1966), p. 111. 54 Sumit Ganguly, The Origins of War in South Asia: Indo-Pakistani Conflict since 1947 (Colorado: West view Press, 1986), p. 17. 55 Shirin Tahir-Kheli, The United States and Pakistan: The Evolution of an Influence Relationship (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1982), p. 2. 56 David W. Clinton‟s book, The Two Faces of National Interest (London: Lousiana State University Press, 1994), pp. 197-199.

33 guessed from U-2 incident [American military flight originated from Pakistan] in May1960. Russia‟s strong reaction made people of Pakistan aware that the national independence had been sold out. Thus in Pakistan anti-America feelings generated.57 There in America presidential elections were won by the democrats. President Kennedy favored India and his ideas about the subcontinent were quite different from Republicans.58 His foreign policy emphasized that understanding might be developed with non-aligned countries like India, and they might also be supported. During this time Indian military had taken over Goa. American reaction was far below than Pakistan expected. The situations of Goa and Kashmir were quite similar; this created suspicious feelings in Pakistan that such cold reaction might occur in its close ally if India does the same in Kashmir.59

2.7 BEGINNING OF TENSION IN US-PAKISTAN RELATIONS

The tension in the relationship of US and Pakistan started rising up when Pakistan without intimating America broke the diplomatic relations with Afghanistan in 1961. Border between Pakistan and Afghanistan was sealed due which all kind of American aid to Afghanistan through khyber Pass was stopped. Two more steps of Pakistan increased the worries of America; Firstly, In 1961 Pakistan signed an agreement with Russia for oil exploration. Secondly, it entered into negotiations over its border with China.60

In 1961 Ayub Khan went to America to ease the tension and find ways to overcome the differences. He tried his level best to show Pakistan as the most dependable friend. In his speech in the joint session of American Congress on July 12, 1961, he said; “The only people who will stand by you are the people of Pakistan, provided you are also prepared to stand by them... I would like you please remember that whatever may be the dictates of your worldwide commitments, you will, I hope, take care that you will not take any fashion to jeopardize our security”.61

57 Zullikar Ali Bhutto, The Myth of Independence (London: Oxford University Press, 1967), p. 46. 58 Rashmi Jain, US-Pakistan Relations 1947-1983 (New Delhi: Radiant publishers, 1983), p. 14. 59 Mohammad Ayub Khan, Friends Not Masters (London: Oxford University Press, 1967), pp. 164- 168. 60 Norman D. Palmer, South Asia and United States Policy (Boston: Houghton Miffilin Press, 1966), p. 39. 61 W. M. Dobell; “Ramifications of China-Pakistan Border Treaty”, Pacific Affairs, (Autumn 1964): pp. 283-95.

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The differences between the countries seemed subsided, but it rose to its pinnacles due to Sino-India conflict in 1962. Thus the question of dependability as an ally of America came to the lime tight.

Sino-India conflict in 1962 provided an opportunity to the US to make the flow of heavy arms to India from the US and . It was definitely a concern for Pakistan being an ally. Pakistan was not taken into confidence, and there was no consultation as well. It was not only this even the quantity of the military assistance did not match the nature of the conflict. Pakistan‟s view was that the military balance would be one sided which will create disturbance in the region of the subcontinent. In addition to this US laid stress on Pakistan to freeze the Kashmir issue with India so that it can move its forces to Chinese border. This created great dismay and bitterness in the hearts of the people of Pakistan.62

Pakistan US relations from 1962 to 1965 had a lot of uneven situations. Pakistani policy makers were disappointed at American attitude towards India; they needed to broaden their policy options for their security. Therefore, an air and some trade agreements were signed with China in 1963. To strengthen the relationship state visits were made. Chau En-lai came to Pakistan in 1964 while Ayub khan went to China in 1965 where he was given a grand welcome. After these visits we see the change in Pakistan‟s policies towards Burma, Nepal and Sri Lanka. Border was demarcated with Burma and more trade links were established with Nepal. This was for the first time since Pakistan became the member of security pacts and did not attend the SEATO meeting in April 1964.63

Pakistan‟s developing relations with China seemed to be received with displeasure by the US. First this displeasure was displayed with the cancellation of Ayub Khan‟s visit to the US which was due in April 1965. America was so critical of the Sino- Pak relationship that at the insistence of the President Johnson‟s Government held off the aid to Pakistan consortium meeting by two months in July 1965. This meeting was important because in the meeting it was supposed that the aid for the first year of the third five year plan would be discussed and the delay could cause hardships. The American

62 Ibid., p. 43. 63 Tahir Sberin-Kheli, TheUnited States and Pakistan: The Evolution of an Influence Relationship (New York: Praeger Press, 1982), p. 2l.

35 stance in the whole situation was taken as unfavorable attitude and the alliance with it was suspected. America was not considered dependable friend and relation with China was considered a step to the right direction.64

The US and Pakistan relations turned from bad to worse in 1965 when Pakistan engaged in the war of Rann of Kutch with India and expected American support. Instead of giving support, it put ban on economic and military assistance on 8th September 1965. Moreover, American stressed both the countries to cease fire and retreat the troops to their previous positions. It was a great blow on Pakistan‟s dependence on the US for help in the supply of artillery, tanks, aircrafts and support in logistical system. America also warned China to keep away from the situation occurred in the subcontinent.65

The acridness in US-Pak relations increased at the instance of giving full support to India on the occasion of Sino-Indian conflict but during Indo-Pak war of 1965 America posed itself as neutral. The US suspended its support till Tashkent declaration. Ayub Kahn‟s visit to America was cancelled. To normalize the relations Ayub Kahn‟s visit to the US was scheduled in December, 1965. Pakistan decided to keep cordial relationship with the US but at the same time was interested to extend the hand of friendship to China.66

The notable military support of US for Pakistan was comparatively high from 1954 to 1965 as compared to India who purchased military equipment for $50 million after the Sino-India conflict in 1962-65 and also received grant of $90 million for military assistance. The purpose of the grant was to be used for the arms production facilities, communication and transport equipment. But in 1965 all the grants and support stopped.67Pakistan‟s response to the halt of military and economic support was resulted in developing relationships with China. Moreover, Pakistan was disappointed at America‟s attitude and did not renew the Badaber agreement.

64 Kux, The United States and Pakistan,1947- 2000, p.70. 65 Stephen Cohen, “US Weapons and South Asia”, p. 50. 66 Raymond L. Garthoff, Detente and Confrontation: American-Soviet Relations from Nixon to Reagan (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution Press,1985), p.264. 67 Henry Kissinger, White House Years (Boston: Little &Brown Press, 1979), p.854.

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In Pakistan pro-American sentiments had been observed even in the chaotic government of Yahya Khan in which there was no clarity in the foreign Policy.68Though Nixon announced to sell jets and armored personnel carriers to Pakistan, but in 1971 when there were internal crisis in Pakistan, the aid was stopped by the House of Representatives of the US on the pretext that there was lack of political stability in the country. Even though Pakistan had organized a secret visit of Kissinger to China to prove its fidelity,69the rift of estrangement increased further between Pakistan and US when Bangladesh was established and Fords was the president in the US. Pakistan was extremely disappointed and left SEATO in 1972.70

The division of Pakistan resulted in the creation of Bangladesh in 1971. Then the importance of Pakistan decreased and India emerged to the politically dominant position. During that period Henry Kissinger Secretary of state visited Pakistan and India. He stayed for three days and declared India as the predominant power in the region. It was a happy note for India, but for Pakistan it was hard blow on the friendship. Henry Kissinger‟s attitude towards Pakistan can be guessed by the response he gave to Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto when he asked for the provision of arms to Pakistan, he answered, “It was not that Pakistan wanted toys.....Pakistan sought sufficient arms to permit it to defend itself.” Bhutto paid a visit to US in 4 February 1975 with a purpose to lift arm embargo.71

Gerald Ford the President of the US gave a positive reaction to the request of lifting arm embargo imposed by Lyndon Johnson ten years before in 1965 over the Kashmir issue of Pakistan with India. Kissinger announced removing of any restrictions over arm supply to Pakistan except some lethal weapons in February 24, 1975. It was an administration‟s friendly gesture. Washington also provided four hundred thousand tons of wheat worth about $65 million. Moreover US also gave $78 million loan for the development. 72

68 Dennis Kux, India and the United States: Estranged Democracies1941-91 (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1993), pp. 227-28. 69 Kux, The United States and Pakistan, 1947-2000, p.216. 70 Ibid., p. 44. 71 Thomas P. Thorton, “Between Two Stools: US Policy towards Pakistan in the Carter Administration”, Asian Survey, (October1982): pp. 959-77. 72 Mohamad Ayub, “India, Pakistan and Super Power Rivalry”, The World Today 38, no. 15, (1982): p. 201.

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2.8 ISSUE OF PAKISTAN’S NUCLEAR PROGRAMME When India conducted nuclear test, Pakistan was not to be left behind. It put all efforts to copy India in this regard. From that time Pakistan started negotiations with French government for the reprocessing plant. The inflow of the fuel more than the need and provision of heavy water plants from Germany created doubt in America that Pakistan was working on making nuclear plant. America showed its serious concern about this issue.73

The US was bent upon to stop Pakistan from acquiring nuclear reprocessing plant; therefore, President Ford and Secretary of State Kissinger wrote a letter to Bhutto asking to stop the nuclear project until the possible alternatives are found. President Ford‟s desire was to stop Pakistan‟s nuclear program and sign non- proliferation treaty. Therefore, President Ford agreed to give 110 A-7 attack bombers to take Pakistan away from the intended project. At the same time congress in America started working on amendments in the law of section 699 and 670 by the senators John Glenn and Stuart Symington to give provision that non-NPT signatories will not be given any support. The purpose of this act was to make the countries keep away from importing uranium-enrichment of nuclear fuel reprocessing technology. Then Pakistan was admonished that it might encounter the suspension economic aid. To accept the proposal US would give Pakistan substantial conventional arm package in which A-7‟s are included if Pakistan complied the non-proliferation treaty.74

In spite of the pressure from America Bhutto continued working on nuclear project. He deputed Abdul Qadir Khan the metallurgist to gain the complete knowledge of the uranium process. He worked in Netherlands and equipped himself with the knowledge of uranium-enrichment process to be able to build nuclear arsenal like India. Though US and Pakistan had good relations but American approach to stop Pakistan from developing nuclear capability would definitely bear consequences in the coming time.75

73 Kux, The United States and Pakistan, 1947-2000, p.216. 74 Ibid., p. 216. 75 Ibid., p. 17.

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2.9 ISSUE OF POLITICAL INSTABILITY

Political instability starts in Pakistan with the controversy over the general election held in 1977. Peoples‟ party led by Bhutto won the elections with the majority of 155 out of 200 seats. But Pakistan National Alliance (PNA) rejected the validity of the elections; it claimed that huge rigging had been done. The joint opposition came to the streets and created great unrest for the government. Bhutto called in the Army under the Army Chief General Zia-ul-Haq. General Zia took over, and the era of Martial law started again in Pakistan.76

Jimmy Carter took over the post of President of America after Gerald Ford, before the elections of 1977 announced by Bhutto in Pakistan. Jimmy Carter took a hard position dealing with the nuclear non-proliferation stance, and he put a greater stress on human rights. He withheld the supply of tear gas worth $68 thousand on 21 April 1977 to Pakistan.77 The supply of the tear gas was blocked because it was against human rights as Carter‟s administration deemed. Similarly Carter‟s administration went back on the promise of giving 110 A-7 attack aircrafts which were due at the time of Gerald Ford. The more pinching thing was that the aircrafts were not only given even Pakistan was not informed of it. Through press Pakistan came to know about the decision. The political turmoil in Pakistan was on its peak. The problem between PPP and PNA was not solved. Then general Zia-ul-Haq imposed martial law on July 5, 1977 named as Operation fair Play. This was the third time that military took over and for the first time elected government was ousted.

During this time Pakistan struggled hard for getting French fuel reprocessing plant and with the equal amount of strength America tried to let Pakistan not be nuclearized. But Pakistan‟s nuclear policy remained the same even after the military take over. The worry of the US about Pakistan‟s nuclear program increased which can be guessed by the state department nuclear specialist Joseph Nye‟s warning to Pakistan. He said if it did not stop French Fuel Processing project, the US government would terminate the economic support under the Glen amendment of the Foreign Assistance Act.78 The amendment was that those countries that did not sign the non- proliferation treaty and those countries that had imported nuclear reprocessing

76 Thorton, “Between Two Stools”, pp. 559-73. 77 Kux, The United States and Pakistan, 1947-2000, p. 226. 78 Ibid., pp. 233-235.

39 technology would not be given aid. But Pakistan even after such hindrances continued nuclear program secretly. America announced suspension of the aid to Pakistan on April 6, 1979. All this happened two days after the execution of Bhutto on the charges of murder and other high crimes under the constitution of 1973. American secret agencies busy in Pakistan had reported a month earlier that Pakistan was working on technology of enriching uranium and developing an atomic explosive device. Warren Christopher Deputy Secretary of state dropped in at Islamabad on his way to South Asia to apprize Zia-ul-Haq about the impending aid suspension. He told Zia-ul-Haq that action under Symington amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act would be taken if Pakistan did not comply with the request of not undertaking the pursuance of nuclear weapon. Zia-ul-Haq was determined to continue with the peaceful nuclear project and he was not ready to accept any international pressure. Carter‟s administration was not satisfied with Zia-ul-Haq‟s response and eventually stopped aid for the second time. This nuclear issue became the main rift in the relationship.79

2.10 THAW IN US-PAKISTAN’S RELATIONS DUE TO SOVIET INVASION

Incidents like invasion of Soviet Union on Afghanistan on 25 December, 1979 and Iranian revolution in 1978 changed the whole scenario. America had to lower stress on Pakistan‟s nuclear issue because Pakistan had to play the role of frontline state against the Soviet Uion expansionism, for Pakistan‟s cooperation was needed by Washington. This was an opportunity for Pakistan to squeeze US as much as possible for economic aid. Therefore, the Carter administration had to give the package of $400 million for economic and security assistance on 14 January, 1980. This made Zia-ul-Haq happy and in his interview called the assistance “peanuts”.80

Zia-ul-Haq had a bad experience with the President Carter‟s administration on Pakistan‟s nuclear issue and democratic rights. Therefore, as a result the aid given to Pakistan was far little than expected. But Zia-ul-Haq waited and looked forward to President Reagan‟s administration to take oath on 21 January, 1981 since he was given assurance of higher defense expenditure and a stronger policy regarding the

79 John Hoff, “How the United States Sold Its Soul To Win The Cold War”, International Journal 3, (2001): p. 376. See also Congressional Research Service, Pakistan-US Relations, June 21, 2001, p. 2. 80 Hamid H. Kizilbash and Khawar Mumtaz, Changes in US Foreign Policy and Pakistan’s Options (: Punjab University Press, 1976), p. 4.

40 advancement of Russia in Afghanistan. Pakistan once again had become the most favorable ally in the region to stop Soviet Union‟s advancement in the third world. Regan‟s administration considered that Pakistan deserved more aid as compared to President Carter‟s time. After negotiation and assurances of the peaceful nuclear program, Regan administration released $3.2 billion military and economic aid to Pakistan. Congress also added new sections and waived off the old ones for 6 years to smooth the way for the inflow of arms in Pakistan. Thus Pakistan became the center of arms supply to Afghan resistance.81

2.11 CONTINUING PAKISTAN’S NUCLEAR PROGRAM ISSUE Pakistan was on the front line against Russia in Afghanistan. Therefore, US renewed aid to Pakistan but still there was difference of opinion in Congress. Some of the members had serious concern about the nuclear arm capability program, and there were members in the support for Pakistan because it was playing important role for the control of the expansion of communism in the region. To bridge the two different opinions Pressler amendment was brought. Thus Pakistan received $ 4 billion for five years in 1986. The funding was further increased from $ 300 million to $ 600 million annually for anti-Soviet program.82

Soviet forces faced a defeating blow with the introduction of the stinger missiles in Afghanistan war. The casualty rate was so high that forced Russia to retreat slowly from Afghanistan in 1988. And in September 1991both countries USSR and US agreed not to give military support to Afghanistan. The agreement between the two countries signed by the secretary of state Baker and the foreign minister Shevardnadze brought the interest of America in Afghanistan to the lowest. Thus the interest of US in Pakistan also went down. It is evident from the act of Bush administration who almost confirmed the involvement of Inter-Services Intelligence in Kashmir, and Pakistan was close to be declared as terrorist state.83

The seesaw of US Pak relations again went down. In 1990 president Bush stopped military and economic aid to Pakistan according to the previous legislation of Pressler Amendment. The aid had also included the major military equipment. The

81 Inis L. Claude, American Approach to World Affairs (New York: University Press of America, 1986), pp. 158-159. 82 Stephen P. Cohen, The Pakistan Army (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984), pp. 52-55. 83 Ibid., pp. 57-58.

41 only aid that remained was $ 3-5 billion for Narcotics Matters administered by the State Department‟s Bureau. Moreover, the aid for food assistance PL 480 continued partially and assistance to non-governmental organization was also maintained. Yet, another amendment in the Foreign Operations Appropriations Act brought by Senator Hank Brown that allowed Pakistan $ 368 million one-time release of the aid suspended before 1990.84

The US kept on pressurizing Pakistan to give up nuclear program. For this purpose support was stopped and sanctions were laid above all the provision of 71 F- 16 aircrafts considered very important constituent of Pakistan‟s air force was suspended.85

The struggle against occupation of Afghanistan brought US-Pak relations to the lowest ebb. There President Bush left his office in 1993. Pakistan once again was no more an important country for US. This was disappointing for Pakistanis because American friendship proved very weak and fragile. America discarded Pakistan like something disposable. The things even went bad to worse when took the office.86

2.12 PAKISTAN’S UNCOMPROMISING NUCLEAR PROGRAM When Clinton became the president of America, he followed the footsteps of his predecessor Jimmy Carter who had focused on the nuclear non-proliferation, human rights, democratic governance, and terrorism. During the Bush administration the reports of ISI involvement with the groups creating insurgency in Kashmir had also proved troublesome for Pakistan. Adding gap to the rift became Prime Minister in 1993 and gave the following statement, “Rolling back the nuclear program is not feasible.... the nuclear program is linked with Jammu and Kashmir issue.”87

84 Jusuf Wanandi, “Global Coalition against International Terrorism”, International Security 26, no. 4, (Spring 2002): p.184. And also see, John Ikenberry‟s article, “America‟s Imperial Ambition”, Foreign Affairs, (September-October, 2002): p. 195. 85 See the address delivered by the US President George W. Bush to the US Congress and to the US People, Washington D.C.; 20 September 2001. This address is given as a document in Pakistan Horizon, 54, no. 4, (October 2001): pp.122-129. 86 Ibid., p. 132. 87 M. Ehsan Ahrari, “Transnational Terrorism and Old Friends: Pakistan and US”, Strategic Review, (Winter, 2001): p.l6.

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President Bill Clinton administration was determined on nuclear non- proliferation program. It took a step to get the approval of the Congress to give Pakistan the embargoed F-16 if Pakistan expresses its willingness to stop its nuclear pursuits.88 Clinton‟s administration was using high words with much strength about the nuclear non-proliferation program, even implying Pakistan‟s willingness but nothing was down to earth. The army chief General Waheed made his stance clear on his visit to US. He said that Pakistan would not compromise on its nuclear program even at the cost of F-16s. He further explained that if political leadership fell prey to the bargain, the army would certainly make its views known. Pakistan took the position that it was not only Pakistan who should be tied to the non-proliferation treaty India should also sign it otherwise there would be imbalance of power in the region. Benazir told Talbot, “If we are unilaterally pressed for the capping, it will be discriminatory and Pakistan will not agree to it”.89

2.13 IMPROVED US-PAKISTAN RELATION Pakistan made clear about the intentions of the nuclear program, and the Clinton administration started talking in favor of Pakistan. Robin Raphel stated that they never accepted the accession of Kashmir to India while the secretary of Defense Willium Perry pressing Pentagon that Pakistan should be considered a long-time friend. Pakistan was important because it would be helpful and source of force in keeping the peace mission of UN in the region. Jerry visited Pakistan in 1995 and he was the first ever American who suggested the measures to improve the security cooperation between the two countries. One of the suggestions was to rebuild a consultative group for military discussions same as it was built during the war of Afghanistan. The friendship was strengthened by the proposal of the Secretary of Defense to rebuild a consultative group on the same pattern which was made during the Afghan war for discussions among senior military officials. Moreover the capturing of Ramzi Yusuf who was the master mind of the terrorist bombing of World Trade Center on 26 February 1993, and his deportation was appreciated by Washington. Therefore, the changes were brought in the Brown‟s Act on 25 September 1995. Thus the discretionary powers were given to the president to give economic or military aid including F-16 to any country.

88 Vijai K. Nair, “The Nuclear Dimension of the War on Terrorism”, Aakrosh 5, No. 14, (2002): p. 27. 89 Ibid., pp. 29-30.

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In March 1996, Pakistan had internal ethnic disturbance in the country but the US considered the situation quite comfortable. Therefore, it was a proper time for implementing Brown amendments which as a result enabled US to release $ 368 million as military equipment frozen by Pressler amendment. Moreover, the amendment also paved the way to refund $ 120 million for the items not delivered before 1990 when the economic sanctions were imposed.

2.14 US TILT TOWARDS INDIA

As usual the US kept on changing its foreign policy even to the extent which proved it a disloyal friend. As we see, the first tenure of Bill Clinton had cordial relations with Pakistan, but the second tenure changed the policy to 180 degree. India became the focus of interest and US interest for Pakistan was only limited. Nevertheless, Brown amendment in which arm embargo was lifted even then with the change of the US foreign policy Pressler amendment was kept alive. Therefore, US had to pay Pakistan for the undelivered F-16 aircrafts. US started finding ways to blame Pakistan and raised objection that Pakistan is supporting Taliban in Afghanistan instead of helping Pakistan to develop its unsteady economy. It also became matter of concern for US about the involvement of Pakistan in the disturbance of Kashmir. In April 1998, Pakistan imported missile from Korea which caused trouble. US intelligence reached the conclusion that Pakistan had taken the technology from Korea to develop medium range missile.90

Pakistan fired the missiles successfully on April 6, 1998. The range of the missiles was nine hundred kilometers. This time America went to impose sanctions on North Korea and Khan Research Laboratories where missiles were made. These sanctions were only symbolic because earlier sanctions had already cut off dealing with the US. The relations further precipitated with the conduction of six nuclear detonations on 28-31 May 1998. Pakistan said that these tests were in response to Indian tests which were conducted on 12-13 May 1998.91

The support of Inter-Services Intelligence to the Taliban of Afghanistan had also made the relationship bitter. , a Saudi rich man, was allowed to

90 Rajeshwari Pillai Rajagopalan, “Emerging US Policy towards Pakistan”, Strategic Analysis 26, no. 3, (2002), p.370. 91 Ibid., pp. 373-376.

44 use the Pakistan territory for the military designs against America in the US embassy Nairobi, Kenya, Dar-es-Salam, and Tanzania. US Navy warship launched a cruise missile attack on Bin Laden‟s training camps in Afghanistan. Pakistan felt insulted because the long-time ally was not even informed about the attack, let alone the air space violation.

On May 13, 1998 economic and military sanctions were imposed by the Clinton administration and these sanctions were strengthened by the section 102 of Arms Export Control Act.92

A new turn could be seen in America‟s foreign policy concerning South Asia in 1999. Bill Clinton sent Talbot for negotiations on nuclear issue with India and Pakistan. The team put forward an outline of proposal following which would result in lifting up all sanctions including Pressler amendment. The followings were the three conditions: “Pakistan should stop missile cooperation with Korea; show agreement to sit for multilateral negotiation to ban the production of fissile material; and put in place a comprehensive nuclear export control regime.” But Pakistan responded that India should sign this agreement first.

The incident of Kargil in February 1999 in which Pakistan respond to India‟s move, the worry of the US government increased that any kind of aggression may lead to nuclear war. However, the conflict came to an end when ordered the withdrawal of Army backed intruders on the request of President Bill Clinton on July 1999. But this conflict changed into the conflict over the responsibility of Kargil. The tussle continued and on 12 October, 2000 General Pervez Musharaf over thrown the government of Nawaz Sharif.93

The ups and downs of Pak-US relationship remained a reality. After 1971 it seems that the ties between the two countries were weak and Pakistan was losing its relevance to the US. This gap was filled by the five hour stay of Bill Clinton in Pakistan.

92 http://www.historycommons.org/context.jsp?item=a0885pressleramendment accessed on 06 June, 2016. 93 Dawn (Islamabad), October 12, 1999. p. 1. Available at: http://www.dawn.com/news/1020514.

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2.15 CONCLUSION

Pakistan and US alliance started with common objectives to ward off communism in the South Asia. In return Pakistan asked for the security in terms of military equipment. Pakistan‟s stance of stopping communism was not core desire rather its target was the guarantee of security in terms of political, diplomatic, and military equipment. The incidents of wars in 1965 and in 1971 show the U-turns of the US which completed in 1998 indicated with the Arm embargo and nuclear non- proliferation.

Pakistan depended much on the US support for its security, but American relationship was not durable. America believed in the national interest which change its policy according to need of time. Despite, ups and downs in the Pak-US relationship it is rightly argue that the fate of Pakistan is determined by three things: God, Army and America.

American policy can be understood by Lord Palmerstone‟s famous words that there are no permanent friends and foes in international politics. Thus the ups and downs of Pak-US relations had been the testimony of the same idea. America‟s attitude can easily be portrayed by the statement of Henry Kissinger who says American friends suffered more than American enemies in its global politics. Therefore, common man in Pakistan rightly complains that the US use Pakistan like “Cleaner” after every major international trouble the US approach to Pakistan to clean the mess.

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CHAPTER – 3

PAKISTAN-US SECURITY PARADOX (SEATO-CENTO AN APPRAISAL)

3.1 INTRODUCTION The interests of the US in South East and South West Asia have been described as both denial and development. In other words, if the US supports the Asian countries its interests definitely be suffered, yet if it does not support the powerful country in the region will determine the future course of action.

There is no denial to the fact that the economic interests should not be against the interests of communism and adopt the rational approach toward it. It is important to comprehensively understand the statement of James Killen, “It would be important to provide Pakistan with economic assistance as well as with the military assistance so as to stop the spread of communism.

3.2 BACKGROUND AND DEVELOPMENT OF SEATO

“The US has a vital interest in insuring Pakistan’s independence and its Continuing alignment with the free world in collective security against communism. It is therefore necessary to help Pakistan to maintain a military force capable of meeting this threat, to maintain levels of economic activity and standards of living for supporting US interests in this part the world”.1

The denial and development interests of the US imply subsidiary goals for economic aid, military aid, and are based on relations of the nations. However, the US and Pakistan entered into alliance with divergent objectives. The US made Pakistan one of its lesser allies in Asia for the sole purpose of expanding the scope of its policy of containing communism. Pakistan aligned itself with the US primarily for three reasons. Pakistan‟s first objective can be described as the preservation of the territorial integrity and political independence of Pakistan. For the sake of brevity this objective will be referred to as “security”. This objective has come to attain a much greater importance in the case of Pakistan because of its peculiar geographical division, the events, and circumstances that led to its creation. For Pakistan, the search

1 A. Z. Hilali, “Cold War Politics of Superpowers in South Asia”, Available at: http://www.qurtuba.edu.pk/thedialogue/The%20Dialogue/1_2/4_Mr.%20Hilali.pdf, Accessed on May 26, 2016.

47 for security was to secure it against India. Pakistan‟s second objective was achievement of its goals regarding Kashmir. It included a plebiscite under international auspices in the entire territory of Jammu and Kashmir with the eventual aim of bringing about the accession of state of Jammu and Kashmir to Pakistan. The third fundamental objective of Pakistan‟s foreign policy was to attract foreign aid into Pakistan for economic development. Because of the divergent objectives of the two allies, the alliance from its very inception stood on a shaky foundation.

Pakistan has had different goals for its relations with the US. However, the differences were not readily apparent until the Sino-Indian Border war of 1962. The low saliency of the differences during the 1950‟s characterized the Pakistani- American alliance as one “serving complementary interests”. When stated in very general terms, Pakistan‟s goals did not obviously diverge from American goals. There seems to be wide agreement that Pakistan‟s objectives were national security, economic development, Kashmir question, and ideological cooperation among the Islamic nations.

Conflict was severe on the issue of national security.2 President Mohammad Ayub Khan was quite explicit on Pakistan‟s national security problem when he said, “Our first concern was the defense of Pakistan against any possible aggression by India”.3 Due to this reason Pakistani leaders were eagerly expected that the alignment with the US would bring enormous benefits for Pakistan such as balance in term of defense with India can be maintained with and more pressure and can be asserted to resolve the issue of Kashmir.4

The conflict inherent in Pakistan‟s Indo-centric foreign policy was not readily apparent because Ayub Khan did consider the Soviet Union to be a subsidiary security threat. Several times he emphasized the strategic importance of Pakistan and the danger of a push from the north.5 Further, Pakistan‟s interest in economic development was congruent with the American desire of aid. One of the reasons for which Ayub Khan adopted the alignment policy was to get aid from the US. He said,

2 Khalid Bin Saeed, The Political System of Pakistan (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1967), p. 261. 3 Muhammad Ayub khan, Friends Not Masters (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1967), p. 47. 4 Muhammad Ayub Khan, Pakistan Perspective: A collection of Important Articles and Experts from Major address (Washington, D.C: Embassy of Pakistan), p. 15. 5 Ibid., p. 16.

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“For us, our development and economic needs were paramount, and that was the reason we joined the pacts”.6 For Pakistan, the inter-relationship of economic and military objectives differed from the American view because aligning with the US made it possible to concentrate on economic development by decreasing the diversion of scarce domestic resources to the military sector.7 But for both the nations, the military and economic relationships were mutually reinforcing. In contrast, American national security policy in Asia for 1945 centered on the problem of stabilizing the regional balance of power and integrating non-communist Asia into a global strategic balance favorable to the US. The most immediate, difficult, and costly aspect of the problem was the military containment of the Chinese forces and the frustration of Russian influence. A second and related aspect of the problem of regional security was the weakness and disorganization of several of the new states of post-colonial Asia. American economic, military, and political support was given to reinforce national efforts to combat insurgency and its social and economic causes. A third and perhaps most complex aspect of the problem of stabilizing the regional balance of power along China‟s frontiers concerned the need for an Asian collective security community relatively independent of a heavy and direct American contribution. The growth of regional associations to promote trade, development, wider social, and cultural interchange was not fully accompanied by a commitment to mutual defense, but there was little that America could do other than to encourage the Asian states to meet their own security needs. In short, American policy successfully frustrated direct military aggression; it somewhat less successfully strengthened non-communist governments against subversion associated with social and economic disorder, and it only began to see the growth of both the opportunities and the capacities within the region for cooperative effort.8

It is commonly charged that the US policy towards Asia is always defined in military terms, ignoring the political and developmental requirements which are key to stability. These charges generally stem from an over- emphasis of the cases of Korea, China and Viet Nam.

6 Khan, Friends Not Masters, p. 154. 7 Aslam Saddiqi, Pakistan Seeks Security (Lahore: Longmans, Green and Co., 1960), pp. 150-151. 8 Wayne Ayres Wilcox, Asia and United States Policy: America’s Role in World Affairs Series (London: Prentice Hall International, 1967), p. 85.

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Each of these “security” problems began with the breakdown of post-war political and diplomatic arrangements; each became military problem only after political and diplomatic attempts for their resolution foundered in the heavy seas of Cold war competition. So long as China appeared to be the Asian partner of the Soviet Union, the US insisted that the frontier of Asia constituted fixed boundaries of the non-communist world.9

The idea for united action against the communistic bloc is not a new one specially the dire need was realized for alliance in southwest Asia. Sir Winston Churchill and British foreign secretary were on the same page after the formal talks in Paris and London that alliance was the utmost need in the region of southwest Asia.10 Nevertheless, the single defense unit in southwest Asia was formed even before the Second World War. It was the desire and strategic planning of the Britain that in any kind of military defense pact in south Asia the countries such as Indonesia, Burma, Ceylon and India should be included.11 The prime minister of Pibal Songgram and Penn of North Cambodia both eagerly were in favor of strong defense pact in South East Asia against the communistic bloc in the region.12

In Singapore tripartite military conference was held on the request of France in the countries, UK, France, and USA were agreed for sharing information. After a Singapore conference, meeting of the chief of staff was held in Washington in 1952. In this meeting the representatives of the countries such as Australia, Canada and New Zealand west also participated. Later on after a year it was formally announced that defense pact on the pattern of NATO was proposed by the Churchill to contain any kind of communistic aggression in South East Asia.13

Liaison Committee was formed in 1953 in which the members of Britain, France, Australia, New Zealand, and US were included. The purpose of this committee was to share military information and to equip each other about the strategic planning relating to South East Asian countries which are standing against the communism. Contrary to this, the US, France and Britain were overwhelmingly

9 Ibid., p. 85. 10 , April 14, 1954. 11 Ibid., May 4, 1954. 12 Richard Butwell, “Collective Security in South East Asia”, Eastern World 8, (September, 1954): pp. 10-13. 13 Ibid., pp. 11-12.

50 interested for some kind of defense arrangements in the region of South East Asia, while Americans were willing to support militarily and economically the alliance of South East Asians nations against the communism. Formal meeting took place between the foreign secretaries of Britain and US in April 1954 in which both the parties were agreed and later on announced that the joint mechanism would be adopted to form collective defense system for the countries of South East Asia. In the final step in July 1954, eight countries participated in conference which was held in September 8, 1954, and they were agreed for the collective and common defense for the South East Asian nations.

The working parties, which concluded their study at the end of July 1954, recommended economic as well as military safeguards for Southeast Asia.14 The proposed organization was to be:  An alliance of free nations in Southeast Asia and of Western powers which would respond in unison;  The strengthening of the internal security forces in certain countries to minimize subversion;  Economic development as a long range guard against communism and also to eliminate the conditions which were causing suspicion among some of the nations in South East Asia.15

The US policy-makers were fully aware about the fact that in the agreement the states had divergent objectives and no alliance could be equivalent to the strength of NATO. It appeared that the US had no intention of committing a large complement of troops to SEATO. However, plans went ahead steadily.

For the establishment of collective defense system SEATO was established. For this purposes on September 5, 1954 delegates from Pakistan, US, Britain, France, Australia, New Zealand, Thailand, and Philippines met in the capital of the Philippines capital, Manila. The fundamental aim of the pact was to assist each other militarily as well as economically and to take common actions in case of armed aggression by the enemy. It would be obligatory on each member of state to act according to his respective constitutional procedures to thwart the common danger. It

14 The New York Times, August 1, 1954. 15 Ibid.

51 was incorporated in the treaty that any kind of subversion and indirect aggressions would be responded collectively. Importance of social welfare and economic development is pivotal for the strengthening of such type of alliances as in South East Asia majority of the countries were not well off; therefore, treaty recognized the importance of economic development in the region. No doubt, the treaty covered the large territories of the Asian participants and covered round about the general area of the southwest pacific and the areas of north.

Furthermore, it was a basic flaw in the treaty that the directions of perceived alliance were not clear. Against whom this alliance would work no one was clear because only the words „aggression‟ was continually used. It is interesting to highlight that no any type of territorial interests were incorporated in the territory and failed to classify as an actor in the region. In fact, US was interested for such kind of alliance to pursue the policy of containment in South East Asia. Although, SEATO became as a multilateral defense alliance, yet all the participants lacked the potential. Like NATO, SEATO military alliance did not have common control and command structure without any military headquarters. Further, it was also failed to form joint military force for tackling the perceived aggression.16

Another important development was very interesting. The states which joined the SEATO pact were pursuing their own settled goals. USA which was an important member only joined the pact with the sole objective to contain the possible threat of communism in the region, while objectives of the other members‟ states were completely at contrast. For instance, a Philippines objective was closer to America as it wanted to control the domestic and external communist forces to enter the state affairs; therefore, alliance with regional and great powers was pivotal. Moreover, the sole objective of France was to secure its remaining colonial states and UK found an opportunity to secure Malay‟s northern flanks. The participation of Australia and New Zealand was to keep the US between communist states of Asia and the northern neighbors of Australia. Pakistan‟s decision to join the military pact of SEATO was

16 Zbigniew Brzezinski, Game Plan: A Geostrategic Framework for the Conduct of the US- Soviet Contest (New York: The Atlantic Monthly Press, 1986), p. 28.

52 based on its security needs in the region especially to strengthen itself against the Indian aggression rather than to please the American and to curb communism.17

The controversial aspect of the Pact and particularly one which separated Pakistan and the US was the type of “aggression” against which the treaty signatories would act. The primary goal of the US undertaking leadership in the formation of SEATO was to resist communist advances in the area.18 On the other hand, Pakistan was insistent that the treaty must cover any type of aggression, not necessarily of the communist variety.19 In an impassioned plea at the Manila conference, the Pakistan delegate, Foreign Minister Zafrullah Khan, insisted that “aggression is evil. There are no varieties of aggression, and it is necessary to resist it wherever it comes from”20

Ultimately, the delegates especially the Americans agreed to incorporate in the treaty about joint action against any type of aggression with the reservation to the effect that “The US will categorically enshrine in the agreement that the support and countering the threat would only be from communist aggression not against any other country.21 Nevertheless, in Pakistan much rejoicing ensued when the press on September 9 announced in banner headlines that the treaty “excluded any reference to communist aggression”.22

The Pakistani Foreign Minister, explaining the treaty to his country, stated, “The treaty is a safeguard against aggression from whichever quarter it may proceed”.23 On September 9, the eight nations present at the Manila conference signed the Treaty. Cambodia, Laos and South Viet Nam were covered in the treaty by special protocol. In his message to the nation, after the formation of SEATO, the US secretary of state, Dulles called the new alliance, “A substantial contribution to the preservation of free governments in Asia”. He also emphasized that no special forces of the US would be allowed there.24

17 Allan R. Millett, “The Parameters of Peacekeeping: US Interventions Abroad, 1798-1999”, Strategic Review 32, no. 8, (2000): p. 34. 18 Pakistan Times, September 7, 1954. 19 Ibid. 20 George F. Kennon, American Diplomacy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1951), p. 117. 21 Dawn (Karachi), September 9, 1954. 22 Ibid. 23 The New York Times, April 27, 1955. 24 Dawn, October 3, 1954.

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3.3 PAKISTAN’S RESPONSE TO SEATO

In Pakistan, the SEATO Treaty was greeted with enthusiasm in the press and in government circles. However, no debate was held on this subject in the Constituent Assembly. In London, Prime Minister Muhammad Ali stated, “Neutralism is no longer possible” and “Pakistan had to choose between Seeing Eye to eye with communism or the Western powers”.25

With Pakistan‟s accession to SEATO, she became the only country linked both indirectly to NATO and directly to SEATO. But no one knew for certain Pakistan‟s intentions in joining SEATO. However, the fact that she insisted on the inclusion of aggression from any source in the treaty and opposed the specific mention of communist aggression revealed some possible motives. SEATO became, as the US had originally designed, an anti-communist security arrangement, aimed particularly at possible Chinese aggression in Southeast Asia, and Pakistan‟s attempts to focus it against India and not China. The ‟s political- committee, in the presence of Prime Minister Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the Prime minister of Pakistan, cleared the doubts about its alignment with the US that it was not against China and if the US had any kind of nefarious designs against China or global peace, Pakistan would not be the party.26

It is no surprise that China maintained its close and friendly relations with Pakistan. On October 1956, when Prime Minister Suhrawardy visited China, he assured Chou-En-Lai that “SEATO was exclusively a defense pact” and that “Pakistan would like to strengthen relations with China”.27 Chou-En-Lai reciprocated by announcing that Pakistan‟s membership of SEATO would not bar friendly relations between China and Pakistan.28

The statements by the heads of the two countries cleared the situation and Pakistan‟s prime objective in joining the anti-communist security arrangements was to strengthen Pakistan‟s defense against India rather than against Soviet Union or Communist China.

25 The New York Times, April 27, 1955. 26 Muhammad Ahsan Chudhury, “Pakistan and East Asia”, Pakistan Horizon, (1962): pp. 44-45. 27 Ibid., p. 45. 28 S. M. Burke, Pakistan Foreign Policy: An Historical Analysis (London: University Press, Ely House), p. 169.

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3.4 BACKGROUND OF THE BAGHDAD PACT (CENTO)

Baghdad pact actually is the outcome of the expansionist policies of the USSR in South East Asia. Small Muslim countries and Intra-States conflicts brought the Soviet Union to the borders of Afghanistan. Accords were concluded with Turkey, Pakistan and Iran in which there were clear repudiation of the policies of Czarist. USSR‟s ambitions to control the territories were being intensified with the passage of time and it had a desire to get access Warm Water of Arabian Sea.29 When treaty among the Soviet- Germen-Italian and Japanese was going to be inked, condition from the USSR was incorporated that USSR was a member if South of Batura and Baku would be declared as the Centre of the aspirations of South Soviet Union. This assertion was stated by the foreign minister of Soviet Molotov. The significance of the area was forth highlight by the American when with the containment policy of oil resources became vital consideration after the war.30 Both the great powers were fully aware of the strategic significance of the areas and wanted to build their monopoly over the oil resources and to keep the adversary at bay even the then president of US Eisenhower declared that the area of gulf was more vital for the US from any other strategic area.

At the end of Second World War it was very difficult for the British to continue their monopoly over the areas. One the other hand, to reduce the military and political pressure on Turkey and Iran USA pumped huge amount of military and economic aid to strengthen them against any possible aggression by USSR. In the late 50s USA was endeavoring to assist the Middle-Eastern countries with the help of Britain so as to develop defense arrangement. In the beginning, in 1951-52 the countries such as US, Britain, France and Turkey made efforts to build Middle East command sponsored by the above mentioned countries. And then later on Middle East Defense Organization (MEDO) proposal was made by the respective countries. Yet, the proposed design was entirely failed due to conflicts among the local states. In 1953, Dulles visited the area and commented on his return that the idea of Middle East defense would be viable in future and the idea of MEDO was futile because it could not attract the states to become its members. The major reason for this was that the pact was originated outside rather than inside the region. Dulles pointed out that collective security arrangement among

29 Ibid. 30 Hossein Amirsadeghi, The Security of the Persian Gulf (London: Croom Helm, 1981), pp. 1-2.

55 the Middle Eastern countries are difficult to achieve and it would be beneficial for the US to work and assist the countries for interrelated defenses among them which indirectly would protect the US interests as well.

USA inked mutual defense agreement with on April 21, 1954 and with Pakistan in May 1954 respectively. The events of February 1954, when Turkey and Pakistan announced plans to study methods for a closer collaboration, rekindled dreams of a Middle Eastern defense system, despite initial opposition from Britain.31

Traditionally, Britain‟s interests were centered in Egypt. She realized there were compelling reasons for settlement of the Suez dispute. Finally, under considerable internal and America pressur, Egypt and India signed a seven year defense agreement with Egypt. By this step, the defense of Middle East passed from Egypt to Turkey, but there was greater urgency than ever for some method of unity of the Middle East to protect itself from the ever present danger of the USSR.32

In early 1954, Britain had advised Iraq against joining the Pakistan-Turkey Pact until negotiations over the canal were completed. However, by the end of 1954, she welcomed the invitation of Nun-el-Said, Prime Minister of Iraq, to the creation of a Middle Eastern defensive organization with which Britain and possibly the US could be associated. On January 9, 1955, it was announced by the Britain authorities to convert its 1930 treaty with Iraq into a Regional Security Organization. Britain stated that the idea behind the plan was for her to relinquish exclusive rights to Iraqi bases provided they remained open to the west.33

In a press statement the Prime Minister of Iraq categorically gave a statement on October 19, 1954 at Istanbul that the defense of Iraq is mostly dependent on Turkey and Iran. Similarly on January 12, 1954 both the countries jointly issued a statement that they were gonging to sign regional defense pack for their security, yet the other Middle Eastern countries can join the defense agreement. Therefore, in spite of heavy resistance and pressure from the other Arab countries both Iraq and Turkey entered into mutual cooperation pact on February 24, 1955; at Baghdad in the face of it three other countries (Britain, Pakistan, and Iraq) joined the pact in the coming

31 The New York Times, January 29, 1954. 32 Ibid. 33 Ibid.

56 years.34 It was stated in the pact that the states would cooperate with each other for their own security and defense purposes. Yet, it was further classified that further special agreements would be singed to give effect to this corporation. It was further pointed out that the agreement was open for all states which were in Arab League and also for those states on which the member states built consensus. The member states would recognize and sign for the new state. But all these agreements would not affect the exiting obligations which the member states had rectified.35 When the pact was finally going to be signed, the prime minister of Iraq and Turkey (Menderes & Nun- el) were hoping that Pakistan Iran, Britain, and USA would join the pact soon.

Britain formally linked the Baghdad pact on April 4, 1954 and cancelled its 1930‟s treaty with Iraq. As the Baghdad pact was originally originated by Iraq for the security of Middle East; therefore, it was the outcome of northern tier. However, it was pivotal in the sense that Dulles‟ conditions were satisfied with the measures as defense for the Middle East was the outcome of the internal arrangement rather than imposed from outside.36 It is interesting to note, for collective security arrangement in the Middle East USA was supporting the idea and initiatives for the last many years, but when formally the pact came into being, USA did not join the pact formally. The reasons might be different, for instance; if USA would join the pact, it might create ill-feeling in Egypt and among the other Arab countries. Further, Israel might demand another mutual agreement because Iraqi-led pact might become potential threat for Israel, and it would become a hard issue in the upcoming presidential elections.

The possibility of Pakistan‟s membership of the pact was strong from the first announcement of its plans. On January 20, Pakistan‟s Foreign Office issued a statement: “The announcement of January 13, 1955 indicating agreement between Iraq-Turkey is an important step towards the establishment of a collective security system for the region in which Pakistan by reason of her geographic position, her vital national interest, and close religious and cultural affinities with the other countries of the Middle East must naturally be closely concerned”.37

34 Burke, Pakistan Foreign Policy, p. 170. 35 Dawn (Karachi), February 25, 1955. 36 Ibid. 37 Burke, Pakistan Foreign Policy, p. 170.

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There was no doubt that Pakistan‟s willingness to join the Pact became even more apparent. On March 9, Dawn stated that Pakistan‟s accession to the Pact was expected at any time.38 On March 17 Dawn stated that the reason Pakistan was holding off joining was to allow Jordan and Iran to accede.39 Fadhil-al-Jamali, the Iraqi delegate to the Bandung conference, revealed Prime Minister Mohammad Ali had told him that Pakistan would join within a month and would be followed by Iran. He said they discussed the pact several times behind the scene at the Afro-Asian conference.40

Ayub khan said that Americans‟ participation would be obligatory for the survival of the pact. According to him, it would be beneficial for the American and for the state of Pakistan.41 The then prime minister of Pakistan categorically stated that the fundamental aim of the foreign policy of Pakistan was to strengthen its position in the region and secure international peace; therefore, it was going to ink Iraq-Turkey Mutual Cooperation Pact.42 Nevertheless, Pakistan formally became the member of the pact on June 30, 1955 under the pressure of USA, Britain, and Iraq.43 On September 4, 1955, USA formally recognized the pact in press release.44 Form the very inception of the state of Pakistan policy makers always gave special attention to the bonds with the Muslim countries though there were clashes among the Muslims world. Pakistan, being an integral part of the Muslim world continuously involved in all the schemes and projects, which were taking place especially in the Middle East, about the defense of the area. And it would not be wrong to say that Pakistan was fully aware of the threat of communism to the Middle Eastern countries.45 In a nutshell Pakistan joined the pact according to the conditionality of the US, the assistance and collective security umbrella would only be used against the aggression of communism and not for intra-states conflict. Pakistan then realized that pact would further intensify the insecurity of the region but at least give asymmetrical edge to Pakistan on India.46Pakistan‟s entrance into Baghdad pact truly encouraged the

38 Dawn (Karachi), January 21, 1955. 39 Ibid. 40 Ibid. 41 The New York Times, May 9, 1955. 42 Khan, Friends Not Masters, p. 194. 43 Chudhury, “Pakistan and East Asia”, p. 13. 44 The New York Times, September 5, 1955. 45 Burke, Pakistan Foreign Policy, p. 171. 46 Ibid.

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Americans as it became the most trusted ally of the US in Asia and one of the members of SEATO and had pledged to secure the area from communist threat extended from Turkey and Philippines.47 It is true that Americans were fully aware of the regional security compulsions with India; therefore, defense commitments were linked to protect the area from communistic nefarious designs. However, despite of all these concerns Pakistan‟s joining was duly encouraged and supportive.

3.5 BENEFITS OF THE ALLIANCE

Pakistan and Untied States both were on the same page about the exiting situation and doing the interpretation according to their own national interests. Yet, both the countries had inter-related interests to contain the USSR and communist China. The nearest thing to complementary interests would be American concern with the Sino-Soviet alliance while Pakistan concerned with an alignment against India and not against Afghanistan and communist powers. These interests would be, for all practical purposes, virtually identical. The actuality of India‟s neutrality and the Kashmir issue introduced disparate and even conflicting interests into the structure under laying the alliance. The conflict could not be resolved under these conditions and could affect the success of the alliance. So, the American-Pakistani alliance existed; therefore, not so much because of complementary interests but because of identical interests despite conflicting ones as existed in all alliance in different ratios.

Furthermore, US was considering the potential threat of communism; therefore, it pursued the policy of containment. The declared official policy of the Americans was very clean and that was to support and give strength to the alliance system and encourage those states which were at the frontline and securing the interest of the US. The fundamental objectives of the policy were to enhance the capabilities of those states which were willing to contain communism and endeavoring for the free world. This was the reason; the defense capacity of Pakistan was ameliorated and its sense of insecurity of Pakistan was removed. Only through this process pace of development could be ensured.

It was a great opportunity for Pakistan to receive military and non-military aid from the US which was searching allies and could counter communist threat in the region. Nevertheless, the basic aim of Pakistan to join the defense pact was to enhance

47 lIbid.

59 the capabilities to counter the hostile approaches of neighboring non-communist country - India. There is no denial to the fact; one of the motivating factors of joining the US-led defense pact was the existential threat from the side of India. By receiving American‟s military assistance the security-vanguard in fact wanted to strengthen military capability so that to bring India at bargaining position on Kashmir. The reality is that in time of defense pact US did not actually understand the regional security concerns of Pakistan especially from Indian side. Pakistan wanted to receive military and other national assistance majorly to counter communist and non- communist states. While contrary to it, American policy makers were only focusing to contain expansionist designs of communism. The alliance between Pakistan and USA was continued with their respective national interests and both perceived to draw benefits from each other. However, it was pivotal to highlight the political, economic and military assistance which Pakistan received from US under the alignment policy.

3.6 MILITARY/POLITICAL BENEFITS

The argument that Pakistan did mortgage its international position and autonomy to serve its national need for security seemed entirely irrelevant. It is true that the US was initiating alliances throughout the world during the mid 1950‟s, but this did not show Pakistan to be an American colony; rather, it signified Pakistan‟s willingness to capitalize on the global strategy of the US. Pakistan was able to use an alignment policy as a means of committing the US to economic and military aid programs. In fact, it was argued that the very fact of alignment showed Pakistan‟s power.48 Emphasis on its loyalty to the alliances might appear to be a loss of Pakistani independence but this was a freely chosen tactic used by the Pakistanis, partly because they believed in what they were doing and partly as a means of maximizing aid.

President Ayub Khan and former Prime Minister Z. A. Bhutto agreed that Pakistan needed military aid and political support for Kashmir issue, and that alignment was a means of securing aid.49 In other words, because of Pakistan‟s geographic situation, Pakistani leaders felt that securing military aid was imperative. Pakistan‟s success in its “alignment for aid commitment” strategy was due not only to Pakistani

48 Selig S. Harrison, “India, Pakistan and The US: A case Study of a Mistake”, The New Republic, (August 10, 1959): p. 16-17. 49 Z. A. Bhutto, Foreign Policy of Pakistan: A compendium of Speeches Made in the National Assembly of Pakistan 1962-1964 (Karachi: Pakistan Institute of International Affairs, 1964), pp. 86-87.

60 tactics but also to one very important environmental factor: the cold war. Pakistan‟s interest in alignment to gain aid was congruent with the American desire to provide aid to willing nations against communist aggression. The policies of the two nations tended to reciprocal reinforcement. Pakistan aligned to get aid for its defense against any possible aggression by India; the US aided to consolidate the alliance. This tactic succeeded in gaining economic and military aid for Pakistan but nothing more.

Pakistan‟s success by obtaining military and political support from the US was up to the mark. However, it is absolutely impossible to give the exact dollar value for military aid to Pakistan because of governmental secrecy. In spite of the secrecy, a rough estimate can be made with some confidence. Various authorities made estimates ranging from $ 750 million to $ 2 billion. New York Times estimates from $ 1 billion to $ 1.5 billion; Louis Dupree gives the figures as $ 1.4 billion and Khalid Bin Saeed estimates from $ 1.2 to $ 1.5 billion.50 Since, the lowest figure ($750 million) includes only granting military aid and as Pakistan purchased some military equipment from the US, including credit purchases, the $ 750 million estimate is too low. Even this low figure indicates that Pakistan has been remarkably successful in securing military aid. Since, this figure tends to support the argument that Pakistan had been successful in gaining military aid, here is some tenuous evidence that the figure is close to the truth.51

The military aid program for Pakistan seems to have been quite inclusive. The Air force, Army, and the Navy each received a wide variety of aid including equipment, training, and facilities. The Pakistan Air Force received jet fighters, T-33 trainers, few helicopters, facilities at Peshawar airbase as help in staffing the Air Force Colleges.52 To be more specific, there seems to be general agreement that this included 100 F- 86 Sabre jets, 10 or 12 F-104 Star fighters and 25 B-57 bombers.53 The total number of air crafts delivered including trainers and transporters, was as high as 192. In addition, approximately 150 Sidewinder air-to-air missiles were also delivered.54

50 The New York Times, April 10, 1971. 51 Harold A. Hovey, United States Military Assistances: A study of Policies (New York: Frekerick A. Praeger, 1965), pp. 12-14. 52 The New York Times, July 6, 1960. 53 Dawn, April 24, 1968. 54 The New York Times, September 8, 1965.

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The Army also had its share. While the total number of tanks delivered was not known, one estimate placed this number at 600.55 In addition to M-4 Sherman medium tanks and M-24 Chaffee light tanks, 200 M-47 and M-48 Patton medium tanks were supplied. Other equipment included trucks, trailers, armored personnel carriers, and self-propelled artillery. In addition, the US financed a construction programme which provided improved supply depots, maintenance shops, ammunition depots, hospitals, and barracks.56

Major General Fazal Muqeem Khan‟s History of the Pakistan Army makes it clear that the Army did very well with its American connection. While he was aware of gaps and complained that the army was sufficiently well-equipped; he did feel that the Army had gained much through the American military aid program. He says:

“United States aid has greatly increased the defensive capabilities of Pakistan’s small army. It now possesses greater fire-power, better mobility, and cross-country performance, and command and control facilities. It has become a hard hitting force”. In contrast with the Air force and the Army, the Navy did not receive that much. It received only one submarine, 6 destroyers, 3 frigates, one salvage tug, a 20,000 ton fleet oiler, and some air-sea rescue helicopters.57

The US Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG) was considered a logistics mission and it did have a role in teaching the use and maintenance of the equipment received. In addition to the training inherent in the MAAG mission, hundreds of Pakistani officers, especially from the Air force and Navy, were sent to the US for training with American equipment and techniques. The alliances also gave Pakistan some experience through participation in military exercises of CENTO and sending observers only to SEATO exercises.58

According to Ayub Khan the American military aid was to strengthen the defense capabilities of Pakistan and reduce the existing imbalance between India and Pakistan, and this aid also removed the incumbent sense of insecurity replaceing it

55 Ibid. 56 Hovey, United States Military Assistance, p. 99. 57 Dawn, March 12, 1959. 58 Khalida Qureshi, “Arms Aid to India and Pakistan”, Pakistan Horizon 20, (February, 1967): p. 139; Ahmad Ali Khan, “Pakistan and the World: Twenty Years of External Relations”, Pakistan Quarterly 18, (Summer/Autumn, 1967): p. 62.

62 with a sense of security”.59 This would seem to indicate that the Pakistanis also felt that their alignment to gain aid had succeeded at least up to 1962. Although due to the alignment policy Pakistan received large amounts and diverse types of military aid, yet it did not succeed in obtaining the desired quantity or quantum of aid. Alignment secured much more American military aid than nonalignment would have. Pakistan‟s weakness was evident in its inability to secure full resumption of military aid after 1965. In spite of this weakness, Pakistan‟s ability to influence American polis seemed quite impressive. Pakistan was able to capitalize on the priority concern of the US (containment of Communism) in order to secure increased protection against India.

The military assistance and defense corporation with Pakistan enhanced its political image and secured the political benefits. Although Pakistan alignment policy ameliorated its diplomatic support, yet the neutral attitude of America towards Kashmir issue severely disappointed the security manager of Pakistan. When Pakistan was formally entered into defense pact in 1954, impasse existed between India and Pakistan on the Kashmir issue. Even though, when USSR took a neutral stand on the issue of Kashmir before the Security Council which was the initial stages of the Kashmir dispute, USA played a crucial role inside and outside the U.N to bring both the countries on the negotiation table to resolve the issue amicably. As the US was a permanent member of Security Council and many resolutions had been passed by it, the US wanted fair plebiscite in Kashmir.60 In the meanwhile, on March 8, 1954, SEATO also demanded the early settlement of Kashmir problems. This is the reason that Nehru firmly reacted by saying that the defense alliances were being used against India and it would be negative ramifications. The agreement of Pakistan was logical to some extant because the Kashmir dispute did not mean the annexation of princely state with the Pakistan or India but it is a matter of right to self-determination on which both the states were agreed.

Arguably, the support of the US to Pakistan also strengthened Pakistan against the communist activities in East Pakistan. Economic and other internal crisis which erupted with the passage of time were thwarted through defense assistance. The alignment with the US made the ruling elite capable to cope the internal and external security threats.

59 Ayub Khan, Friends Not Masters, pp. 117-118. 60 M. Ahsen Chaudhri, “Pakistan and the United States”, Pakistan Horizon 9, (December, 1956): p. 202.

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3.7 ECONOMIC BENEFITS Pakistan‟s entry in the American sponsored multilateral alliances (SEATO and CENTO) was necessary for development and the desire to obligate the US to participate in Pakistan‟s development through economic aid. This reason was precisely congruent with American policy makers. There were hints in 1954 that Pakistan‟s economic needs would be considered with special sympathy because of alliance commitments. American officials supported economic aid to Pakistan as it was necessary to enable Pakistan to fulfill alliance assurances. However, Pakistan aligned itself to secure aid, and the US extended aid to make Pakistan a better ally. This similarity of interests resulted for Pakistan in becoming a prime recipient of American economic assistance.61

The US economic aid to Pakistan started in fiscal year ending on 30 June 1951 with a grant of $ 600,000 in technical assistance. This was followed by $ 10,000,000 in technical assistance and project type aid for Fiscal Year 1952, $ 12,000,000 for 1953 and $ 25,000,000 for 1954. In addition, in 1953, when Pakistan was experiencing one of its worst food crises, the US provided a special grant of 700,000 tons of wheat, valued at $ 73.7 million. Hence, before the US-Pakistan alliance, Pakistan received only a modest amount of American assistance.62

Immediate inking and entrance of Pakistan in Manila and Baghdad pact economic aid was consistently increased with security assistance. In Fiscal Year 1955 alone the amount of aid totaled $ 110,200,000 an almost five-fold increase over the previous year. In Fiscal Year 1956 the amount was raised to $ 146,200,000. By Fiscal Year 1970 the US had obligated a net total of $ 3,713.8 million economic aid to Pakistan in the form of grants, loans and sale of agricultural commodities. The bulk of American aid to Pakistan during 1950‟s was in the form of grants and during 1960‟s in the form of loans. Loans are obviously less burdensome for the donor and less repugnant to the dignity of the recipient country.

To coordinate assistance to Pakistan, the consortium on aid to Pakistan, popularly known as the Aid to Pakistan club, was set up in 1960 under the aegis of the World Bank. Its members were: the US, Canada, the UK, France, West Germany,

61 Ayub Khan, Friends Not Masters, pp. 117-118. 62 Ibid.

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Belgium, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, the World Bank and its affiliate, and the International Development Association (IDA). In 1968 Sweden joined the group. Through Fiscal Year 1969 the consortium had obligated $ 3,192.7 million to Pakistan, the US being the largest contributor, having provided 43% of the total amount.

Over the years, the US helped Pakistan through various inter related instruments. These may be classified as follows: (1) Development Grants for Technical Assistance, (2) Development loan program, (3) Public Law 480 program, and (4) the Indus Basin Development Fund.

One of the most outstanding achievements of 1960‟s was the high growth rate of agriculture which provided about 70% of the people with a living and was the largest single contributor to the GNP (46%). During the Second Five Year Plan (1960-65) agricultural production increased at an average annual rate of 3.4% well above the rate of population growth (2.7%). Aid nearly thrice the growth rate which was realized during the 1950‟s (1.3%).63

The fact that Pakistan was successful in deriving economic aid is also illustrated by comparison with aid to India. Through Fiscal Year 1969, India received $ 8, 246.7 million (excluding military aid). Of all less developed countries, Pakistan received the fourth largest amount of American economic assistance, after India, Korea, and Viet Nam. Even during the Foreign Assistance Act period (Starting in Fiscal Year 1962), during which the proportion of grant aid was reduced, Pakistan received $ 661.1 million in grants while India received only $ 776.7 million. From 1962 to 1969, 28.29% of American aid to Pakistan was in the form of grants while grants to India totaled 14.54% only.64

All countries involved committed $ 1,210,434,000 to this project. The US share of this was $ 651,810,000, of which $ 121,220,000 was in the form of a dollar grant, and the rest of the American commitment was in the form of a rupee grant. Although Pakistan could not developed itself from the aid received the US as other less developed countries developed themselves in proportion to grants but if total

63 Pakistan, Planning Commission, Final Evaluation of the Second Five Year Plan 1960-65, 1966, p. 6. 64 Ibid.

65 economic aid is compared with other countries, including military aid , it is apparent that Pakistan was one of the most important recipients of American aid.65

The US extended considerable economic development assistance up to 40% of Pakistan‟s development budget outlays. The actual per capita aid to Pakistan was estimated at approximately fifteen dollars in the period between 1954 to 1965. America also helped in flood relief operations in both East and West Pakistan by providing medica1 personnel and equipment. The American Agency for International Development (AID) trained hundreds of Pakistani officers for Public administration, agricultural sector, public health, and other specialized fields.

As the defense capabilities of Pakistan were weak, one of the major aims of the economic assistance to Pakistan was to strengthen the state defense. Comparative study indicates, after the defense pact 1954 Pakistan acquired the military assistance while India received development aid. Let both the countries channelized the funds for the US-led projects. Thus, the money which was received by Pakistan from USA under the pact in term of developments projects or military purposes was being used for the same purpose due to which Pakistani economy got strengthened though the aid was extended for military purposes.

In 1954, Pakistan received developmental as well as military aid under the mutual security assistance program. The fundamental aim of the assistance was to fortify the defense of Pakistan by its own and contribute to free world. Pakistan rationally channelized American assistance for political, economic, and defense stability. Moreover, Pakistan also offset its defense burden. The reality was that without the economic assistance bringing stability in economy only through indigenous sources was much difficult task. In this era the economy of the state boosted tremendously.

In time of partition the then Indian leadership left no stone unturned to damage Pakistan. India did not transfer the genuine military share to Pakistan which was decided under the joint defense council (JDC). Even military equipment stores and ordinance factories were stopped by India. Furthermore, share of cash was not handed over to Pakistan. Apart from this, other initial problems such as administrative

65 Ibid.

66 problems, refugees‟ rehabilitation issue, water dispute, and annexation of princely states further augmented the sense of insecurity among the ruling elites of Pakistan. The situation was further worsened by the speeches of Indian leadership in which Achariya Kriplani and Sardar Patel were on the top. Nehru‟s hard and rigid attitude over the issue of Kashmir gave impetus to hostile environment. Another important problem was the geographical distance between East and West Pakistan. Owing to this distance there was a psychological gap between the people of east and West Pakistan. In this situation, American assistance not only made Pakistan to acquire latest military equipment but also to increase its troops and mitigate the sense of insecurity.66There is no denial to the fact, joining of defense alliances and partnership with US gave a kind of confidence and satisfaction to the government and people of Pakistan. The rational decision was pivoted because it ensured the existence and survival of the country. The benefit of joining the alliance was tremendous as many western powers pressurized India to conduct a free and fair plebiscite in Kashmir. Similarly the fear of Indian aggression was also curbed.

However, the alliance was equally beneficial both for the US and the central location of Pakistan among the Muslim world, and close proximity with USSR made Pakistan blue eyed for USA and other western powers. Moreover, among the Muslim World‟s politics Pakistan was an important player especially in the Middle Eastern politics. Economically and politically stable Pakistan could only option for the US in the gulf oil area by thwarting the adventurism of international communism.

In addition, on July 18 1959, under the agreement the US received the facility of communication and established spy satellites at Badaber, near Peshawar. It was an ideal location as the US may easily spy the border areas of USSR and China.67 The fruits reaped by the US from this base were presumably worth the price of military aid to Pakistan.

It is also on record that during the alliance era Pakistan supported the US on all major international and regional issues. It voted for the postponement of the question of China‟s entry into the United Nations. Even it supported the US stand on Korea and even condemned the Soviet suppression in Hungary (1968) and endorsed

66 Chaudhri, “Pakistan and the United States”, p. 205. 67 Wyne Ayres Wilcox, India and Pakistan (New York: Foreign Policy Association, Headline Series, 1967): pp. 66-67.

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America‟s position on disarmament proposals. In 1958 Pakistan supported US and Britain during the Lebanese and Jordanian crises. Such blind and illogical support to American policies made Pakistan a satellite of the US. As former Prime Minister Z. A. Bhutto noted: “Irrespective of Pakistan‟s fundamental vital interests they and the were wholly committed as a satellite of a particular power”.68

The above discussion shows that the alliance relationship served the interest of both countries as far as short term objectives were concerned. Because Pakistan did not allow its hard earned freedom to be lost whatever the price, it strengthened its sovereignty and independence through American support.

3.8 COSTS

The states entered into alliances in order to supplement one another‟s capability. The strict national efforts to increase one‟s capability and probably more so, alliance entail purely political costs in addition to material ones. These measures consist of counter attack, counter-alignment, or other adverse responses by the targeted states.

In the alliances, it is an existential fact; the great power can secure its interests much beautifully while the small states suffer a lot politically as well as economically. The same was the case with Pakistan. In the alliance Pakistan suffered more as compared to achieving its settled goals. No doubt that Pakistan got new friends in alliance, but annoyed many states. However, it would be fruitful to take an appraisal of cost which Pakistan paid in terms of strategic, political, and economic sectors.69

3.9 POLITICAL

The major cost of alliance relationship was paid in the form of Pakistan‟s relations with India, Muslim countries, and communist powers. Although Pakistan joined the security alliance to isolate India for obtaining support for Kashmir and to acquire the necessary arms, yet Pakistan was unable to secure the first two main objectives. Pakistan‟s inability to secure strong support from the US for a favorable Kashmir solution met with failure. But in this case, Pakistan‟s lack of influence was matched by American lack of influence, the US being unable to contribute to any solution of the problem.

68 Ibid. 69 Ibid.

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Many political observers supported Pakistani expectations that alignment with the US would bring American support for Kashmir settlement. But Pakistan‟s hopes were not fulfilled.70 Ayub Khan admitted that Pakistan was unable to secure unequivocal support of the US for its case on Kashmir. Even former Prime Minister Z. A. Bhutto said that the US did not really try to influence India complained: “Pakistan has not succeeded in converting the United States to its point of view through bilateral or multilateral means, including complete identification with its interests. India and the United States are now on better terms, but even when relations between the two countries were strained and there were no differences between Pakistan and the United States, Pakistan could not persuade the United States to use its influence with India to resolve disputes with us. The United States hesitated to exert its influence on India in favour of aligned and friendly Pakistan, even though it was in a position to do so. No earnest attempt was made to promote an equitable settlement”.71

President Ayub Khan conceded that the US did not use influence it had with India to solve the problem. One reporter indicated that Ayub Khan thought that US could force India to hold Kashmir plebiscite by threatening to withhold most, if not all, economic aid to India. Ayub Khan acknowledged that in 1964, the US consistently supported Pakistan to the extent of allowing Kashmiri people to exercise the right of self- determination, it went no further.72

The fact cannot be denied that Pakistan was very disappointed when the US lessened its pressure on India for Kashmir dispute and contented its substantial economic assistance.73 Furthermore, Sino-India war took place in 1962 in which American openly gave military assistances to Indian due to which Pakistan was much upset.74 One the one hand for the sake of preservation of its global abjections America was supplying military equipment to India while on the other hand regional balance of power was completely disturbed.

Indian approach towards Kashmir dispute was completely altered. Nehru blamed Pakistan for bringing cold war in the region. The promise which Nehru made

70 Khan, The Pakistan American Alliance, pp. 195-209. 71 Z. A. Bhutto, Myth of Independence (London: Oxford University Press), p. 139. 72 Tahir Kheli, The US-Pakistan: The Evolution of an Influence Relationship, (New York: Praeger Specia Studies, 1982), p. 138. 73 Khan, The Pakistan American Alliance, p. 197. 74 Bhutto, Myth of Independence, pp. 62-68.

69 about the resolution of Kashmir and holding of plebiscite was denied.75 Ayub khan‟s realization of friends was intensified when India in 1957 deployed its troops on the eastern border of Pakistan. Ayub khan advised the then prime minister Liaqat Ali khan to find friends and strengthen arm forces as to ensure the sense of security.76 It is an existential reality that by the end of 1953 Indian threat of aggression had gradually mitigated and the two prominent leaders of Pakistan Sikandar Mirza and Ghulam Muhammad had a congruence of opinion to hold free and fair plebiscite in Kashmir in accordance with the wishes of Kashmiris.77 Nevertheless, the rigid attitude of Nehru was not changed and repeatedly criticized Pakistan for its alignment with the west. He wrote to his counterpart in Pakistan that India would be affected due to Pakistan‟s alliance with the US, but the Kashmir issue would be in limbo. However, Secretary of State Rusk stated that the defense of the sub-continent was indeed indivisible and the US generally supported the position of Pakistan and that the wishes of the Kashmiri people were important to a permanent solution.

But, even with major unresolved issues between Pakistan and India, the US had a vital interest in the security of both nations from external aggression because the US had a global perspective; the regionally-oriented Pakistan was frustrated on Kashmir.78

This situation necessitates coining of the generalization that small powers have leverage in smaller concerns. They are able to concentrate on a small number of vital (regional) interests virtually disregarding the international system. Pakistan could not attain its regional goal i.e., Kashmir, without the external help, and the US was unwilling to jeopardize its international (containment of communism) position for Pakistan‟s regional goal. In short, Pakistan and the US had markedly different priorities. But this situation differs from the generalization insofar as the small power‟s need for great power‟s assistance. Small power‟s leverage in regional concerns is lost when the small power requires great power‟s support: for its regional policies.

75 Sangat Singh, Pakistan’s Foreign Policy: An Appraisal (Lahore: Farhan Asia Publishers, 1977), p. 55. 76 Khan, Friends Not Masters, p. 40. 77 Kuldip Nayar, Distant Neighbours: A Tale of the Subcontinent (New Delhi: Vikas Publishing House (Pvt.) Ltd., 1975), p. 59. 78 Michael Edwards, “India, Pakistan and Nuclear Weapons”, International Affairs 39, (October, 1967), p. 656.

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During his 1961 visit to the US, President Ayub Rhan claimed that president Kennedy had agreed to mediate, but his comments indicated that the President had only agreed to apprise Nehru of the American concern about the need for the solution of Kashmir problem. For instance, in 1956, Prime Minister Nehru stated that aid and the alliance had destroyed the foundations of his plebiscite proposal for Kashmir.79 Prime Minister Mohammad Ali Bogra had admitted that American aid made relations with India more difficult.80

Finally, Pakistan was unable to influence the US on Kashmir issue and United States was unable to fully support Pakistan‟s stand on Kashmir issue. There is no doubt that the US did not mediate in the Kashmir dispute; therefore, the question of its achieving a settlement did not arise. Its desire to support both nations for global purposes, led to the Pakistani complaints that the US was not doing enough to help achieve Pakistan‟s regional goals. According to George Liska great powers often have to manage regional conflicts in order to maintain a favorable global situation. He does qualify this by stating, however, that this role will be less readily played when the lines of regional and global conflicts coincide.81 Hence Kashmir problem shows that the US was not anxious to play the manager‟s role even though the lines of regional and global conflict did not coincide.

Disenchantment with American failure to help solve the Kashmir imbroglio was expired and Pakistan realized that their goal of American pressure on India to resolve the Kashmir dispute would not be realized. Pakistan apprehended that the Kennedy Administration would give India generous amounts of economic aid because of India‟s success in maintaining democratic institutions. Pakistan concluded that Kennedy had greater respect for neutralists than for allies.82 Government officials also argued that Pakistan, as a firm ally, was dismayed by some American‟s advocacy of massive aid to neutralist India.83 President Ayub‟s trip to America in July 1961 confirmed that the Kennedy Administration had received complaints about favoritism

79 Josaf Korbel, Danger in Kashmir (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966), p. 329. 80 The New York Times, March 6, 1954, p. 3. 81 George Liska, Nation in Alliance (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1962), p. 25. 82 Dawn (Karachi), November 10, 1960, p. 7. 83 Aziz Ahmad, American Alliance with Asian Countries (Washington: Embassy of Pakistan, Information Division, 1960), p. 11.

71 to India. Ayub reiterated his dislike for American aid to India and said Pakistan was re-examining its membership in SEATO and CENTO and might adopt a neutral stand.84

Pakistan‟s reservations about the US military aid to India in 1962 were no factual. President Kennedy did not consulted Ayub Khan about the proposed aid to India which shows that the US was already agreed to give aid to India..85Pakistan‟s weakness was also made apparent during the Sino-Indian Border War (1962) by its failure to take advantage of India‟s predicament. President Ayub Khan‟s failure to march his armies into Kashmir was perceived by many Pakistanis as a policy dictated by the US. Further, the Pakistani government believed that it was not a serious clash and only a border skirmish. Bhutto even called it a “phantom” war. However, the perception of threat was the Indian asserted pressure on Pakistan to resolve the Kashmir issue under the dictates of New Delhi and if not accepted then to invade and destroy Pakistan.86

President Ayub Khan‟s fear of Indian aggression was increasing and it could be minimized only through massive American arms aid. There were also complaints of a reduction in American military aid to Pakistan as a result of the arms aid to India.87 Former Prime Minister Z. A. Bhutto complained that the US betrayed an ally which had made great sacrifices for the sake of the alliance.88 There were open accusations of American attempts to secure East Pakistan‟s secession.89 Finally, Z. A. Bhutto charged “the American military aid to India increased in almost geometrical proportion to Pakistan‟s protestations”.90

Nevertheless, the American arms aid to India resulted in Pakistani weakness. But it does not betray Pakistani powerlessness. While military aid to India in 1962 was a major source of Pakistani dissatisfaction with its alliance partner, it in effect, confirmed beyond any shadow of doubt Pakistani government‟s apprehension that the US was an ally which would aid only against communism.

84 The New York Times, July 7, 1961. 85 Khan, The Pakistan American Alliance, p. 138. 86 Bhutto, Myth of Independence, p. 55. 87 Dawn (Karachi), December 18, 1963. 88 Bhutto, Myth of Independence, pp. 57-58. 89 Dawn (Karachi), December 4, 1962, p. 1. 90 Bhutto, Myth of Independence, pp. 137-138.

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Pakistan had good reason to feel dissatisfied with SEATO because it would receive no protection from SEATO against an Indian attack. The US had inserted a reservation in the treaty that its obligation under Article IV, paragraph 1, would extend only to cases of communist aggression. Foreign Minister Zafarullah Khan argued that all aggression was evil, but he was unable to prevent the US from entering the rider clause.

The Baghdad Pact (later CENTO) orientation was basically towards the Middle East. Pakistan being the largest Muslim state and because of its geo-strategic location was vital for great powers. Arguably, Pakistan was eagerly interested to join CENTO as it was a representation of the Muslim World as compared to SEATO in which many Muslim states were not happy about possible entrance of Pakistan. However, Pakistan‟s entry in Baghdad Pact was a protection against any attack by India and not for containment of communism.

Alignment with the West created enmity in the hearts of soviets. They were perturbed from such kind of situation and Pakistan‟s entry into such type of aggressive alliance.91 This is right that from the very beginning Pakistan‟s relations were not in a right direction, yet it was free of hostility. The Soviets supported the Indian cause of United India; however, when partition was materialized, USSR took a neutral turn and no any negative statement was issued against the partition process. After the partition India adopted the policy of non-alignment due to which Soviet leaders were unhappy. They considered that non-alignment policy of India was actually an imperialistic tactic by which they were strengthening the US imperialistic designs.92

Nehru was invited by the then American President Trueman. In the same time Soviet leadership invited the prime minister of Pakistan. Liaqat Ali khan had given consents to visit USSR but visited the US. Nevertheless, the relation between the countries (Pakistan-USSR) were not distorted and remained pleasant.

The foreign policy of USSR was very clean towards South Asia before 1954. But it started assertive role in the region to neutralize the west policy of

91 Ibid. 92 Harish Kapur, “India and The Soviet Union”, Asian Survey 7, (Winter, 1971): p. 195.

73 containment.93 This is true that USSR‟s entry into South Asia was made possible owing to deep hostility between Pakistan and India. In 1955, when prime minister Nehru visited USSR, he was warmly welcomed by the Soviets and glorified him with the title of great leader of independence movements of India. At the end of the year the Soviets leaders also visited India on the invitation of Nehru. The soviet leaders during the visit severely criticized the involvements of Pakistan in the US-led defense and military pacts.94

As retribution, for Pakistan‟s unfriendly acts, the Soviet leadership openly supported India‟s claim to Kashmir and declared that Kashmir was an integral part of India. They also supported Afghanistan‟s Durand line or Pukhtunistan.

During the Khrushchev-Buiganin visit to India in November 1955, the two Soviet leaders offered aid and declared Kashmir a part of India.95The leadership of USSR and India further condemned the joining of Pakistan in the US-led pact which would, according to them, extend the arena of cold War in the region.96In addition the leadership of USSR also supported the cause of Pukhtunistan for Kabul.97

When Americans were using the air facility at Badaber near Peshawar (West Pakistan) in July 18, 1959, Khrushchev told the Pakistani Ambassador in Moscow that a “Red Circle” had been drawn on the map around Peshawar.98

Contrary to it, in 1956 Bulgarian government gave a positive gesture indicating about mutually beneficial economic cooperation between Soviet Union and Pakistan and also offered technical knowledge to Pakistan for the peaceful use of atomic energy.99 Moreover, in the year 1956, the PM of USSR visited Pakistan and participated in the of Pakistan and firmly stated in his speech that resolution of Kashmir issue was vital for Pakistan and also offered an economic aid.100 The foreign minister of USSR Molotov also offered assistance for the

93 S. P. Seth, “Russian‟s Role in Indo-Pakistan Policies”, Asian Survey 9, (August, 1969): p. 614. 94 The New York Times, December 14, 1955. 95 Barry Buzan, South Asian Insecurity and the Great Powers (London: Macmillan Press Ltd., 1986), p. 183. 96 Burke, Pakistan Foreign Policy, p. 209. 97 The New York Times, December 18, 1955. 98 Dawn (Karachi), May 18, 1960. 99 Ibid., February 27, 1956. 100 Burke, Pakistan Foreign Policy, p. 211.

74 establishment of steel mill in Pakistan.101Regrettably, the positive postures and feelings of goodwill were not taken eagerly and the relations were remained at the lowest ebb. This was the reason, in coming years Soviet leadership expressed enmity when they vetoed Kashmir case on different platforms. This act actually, encouraged the Indian leadership against the rigid stance of Pakistan on Kashmir.

Contrary to the act of USSR, Chinese leadership took a neutral stance. In 1956 Chinese leader Chou-En-Lai visited India as well as Pakistan. As compared to Soviet, China appreciated Pakistan-India peculiar nature of relationship. It was the time when China enjoyed fame of a past master in diplomatic finesse. In 1954-55, when Pakistan joined western sponsored alliance system, Chinese attitude was different from Russia. Addressing the first National People Congress of the People‟s Republic of China on 23 September 1954, Chou-En-Lai criticized the newly formed SEATO but insisted that “the principles of co-existence should apply to China‟s relations with all Asian countries including Pakistan”.102 Even more significant was Chou-En-Lai‟s parting message to Pakistani Ambassador General (Retd) U. A. M. Raza. The Chinese premier gave a very positive statement about the joining of Pakistan in the US-led pacts as the circumstances had impelled Pakistan to join the pacts and it was hoped the struggle for the world peace would be continued from the side of Pakistan.103

During the Bandung conference in 1955, Chinese Premier Chou-En-Lai invited Pakistani Prime Minister Mohammad Ali Bogra to visit China so that they could explore the possibilities of a link with each other. Later, Prime Minister H. S. Suhrawardy made a ten day visit to China in October 1956. He was cordially received by Chairman Mao-Tse-Tung and other Chinese leaders.104 Chou-En-Lai told Pakistani newsmen that there was no substantial reason to severe the relations with Pakistan because of its alignment with the US. China would continue to keep strong relations with Pakistan.105

Chou-En-Lai‟s views were embodied in a joint communiqué issued at the conclusion of his visit to Pakistan in February 1964: both the countries‟ prime

101 The Pakistan Times, March 25, 1956 102 Burke, Pakistan Foreign Policy, p. 213. 103 Dawn (Karachi), November 27, 1954. 104 Ibid., October 24, 1956. 105 Ibid.

75 ministers recognized the importance of friendships and stated that artificial barriers like different political systems and different approaches towards the issue could not create hurdles in their strong relationship. “They are happy to place on record that there is no real conflict of interests between the two countries”.106 After the negotiations a joint statement was issued in which it was incorporated that the people of Kashmir were the sole stake holders and the dispute would be resolved according to their desires.107 Thus comparatively china‟s position was in favor of Pakistan and against India.

In 1949 when China‟s communist party formed government, it was trying for membership for the U. N. Suharwardhy was much impressed from the positive gesture of Chinese leadership; therefore, wrote a letter to the then American president Eisenhower to accept the claims of China in U. N. and forced her to recognize it. But the demand was not accepted by the president and showed his inability regarding this measure.108 It is pertinent to mention here that in beginning Pakistan supported Chinese point of view but when Pakistan joined the US-led military alliances, Pakistan often voted for American sponsored resolution. The Muslim states were also unhappy of Pakistan‟s joining the West-led alliances especially Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Afghanistan were annoyed. Egypt stated to the extent that the pacts were against the Arab aspiration and these were the products of outside world. Apart from this, regarding Baghdad pact, Egypt‟s stance was clear that Britain involvement in the Arab world created deep suspicion among the Arab countries. This was the reason, Egypt followed the policy of USSR and encouraged India on Kashmir. USSR declared Kashmir as the integral part of India and Pakistan‟s claim on the territory was baseless. H. S. Soharwardhy on the other hand took the criticizers of Egypt very seriously and responded harshly that for the sake of friendship with India Egypt was giving such kind of statements. Further, he also condemned the Egypt-India nexus against Pakistan and Indian‟s recognition to Israel. The fundamental objection of Egypt on Baghdad pact was that it was imperialistic design which was a product of west. It would be fruitful if it were generated from the Arab soil. In addition, Iraq‟s involvement in the pact was equal to the division of Arab solidarity and integration.

106 Ibid., December 25, 1956. 107 Ibid. 108 Ibid., December 31, 1956.

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During the Pakistan-Egyptian relations reached their lowest ebb. President Nasser complained that Pakistani Foreign Minister Hamid-ul-Haq had gone back on his promise to give full support to the Egyptian position on Suez at London Conference in 1956. Nasser also rejected the Pakistan offer of a contingent for the United Nations emergency Forces. He had accepted Indian troops and had decided to keep Pakistani forces out because Pakistan was allied with Britain in the Baghdad Pact and Egyptians felt that due to the ties with the west, Pakistani forces might not get out of Egypt when Egypt wanted them to do so. Egyptian media started a campaign against Pakistan, and they declared that Suhrwarady was the “tail of colonialism”, a greater lover of Britain and America than the American themselves, and Pakistan was labeled as Egypt‟s enemy number One.109

Saudi government also strongly opposed the Baghdad Pact and urged Pakistan to drop her membership of the Pact and return to the right path. Saudi media argued that Pakistan which had always felt proud of its Islamic faith and declared its respect for all Arabs and Muslims should have joined Turkey, it “feels honored by cooperating with the Jewish state”.110 On the other side, Pakistan also disliked the statement of King Saud of Saudi Arabia, when speaking as the guardian of the Muslim Holy Places; he publicly thanked Prime Minister Nehru‟s policy towards the Indian Muslims and admitted that the fate of Indian Muslims was in safe hands.111This attitude of Saudi government definitely upset the Pakistani nation and government.

Owing to Pakistan‟s participation in the US-led alliances Pak-Afghan relations also became hostile. One unite structure was not good and adaptable to alliance formation. The situation got worst when USSR openly supported Afghanistan against Pakistan on the issue of Pakhtunistan.112 Afghan embassy at New Delhi issued a press release that US was strengthening Pakistan due to which freedom seeking people of Pakhtunistan were in danger.113 Yet, history depicts that the relations of both the countries have been contentious since the partition of subcontinent. In 1958, when Ayub Khan came to power, he aspired for good relations with Afghanistan and hoped the Afghan government would not put up Pakhtunistan issue. But the Afghan leaders

109 Dawn (Karachi), August 11, 1957. 110 Ibid., September 26, 1955. 111 The Hindu, December 11, 1955. 112 The New York Times, December 18, 1955. 113 Ibid., December 21, 1953.

77 asserted that a solution of the Pakhtunistan problem should be reached in implementing the U. N. charter principle of self-determination.114

Due to Pakistan alignment with the West, USSR inclined towards Afghanistan and Afghanistan started to get economic aid from USSR. Afghanistan received $300 million technical and economic assistance by USSR in the late 1960.115 Furthermore, Afghanistan stance on the issue of Pakhtunistan was further hardened due to open support of USSR which contributed to the stoppage process of normalization between the two counties.

3. 10 INDIAN REACTION AGAINST WESTERN PACTS India was furious when Pakistan joined American sponsored multilateral alliances (SEATO and CENTO) in 1954-1955. India charged that Pakistan had brought the Cold War to the sub-continent. Although the US policy in the region aimed at containment of communism but it was in conflict with India‟s policy which revolved around to keep Pakistan weak and isolated.

India blamed the US for her association with Pakistan in both bilateral and multilateral security arrangements. It began to pursue a position in international affairs that later came to be known as non-alignment. At the same time (1953) certain new developments in the region, such as the possibility of building up collective security arrangements in Asia and South Asia as a part of American containment policy emerged. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles visited the subcontinent in May 1953. India made it plain to him that she was not willing to participate in the proposed collective security systems. After the Indian reaction against collective security systems, Dulles in fact regarded and referred Indian policy of nonalignment as an “immoral” kind of neutralism.116 On the other hand, Pakistan promptly responded to the plan for collective security pact. Consequently, the US decided to make Pakistan her ally and give it military aid. The Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement between Pakistan and the US was concluded in May 1954. Pakistan even became a member of SEATO and the Baghdad Pact which was later renamed CENTO, once Iraq left the Pact.

114 Dawn, March 6, 1960. 115 Burke, Pakistan Foreign Policy, p. 206. 116 Norman D. Palmer, The United States and India: The Dimension of Influence (New York: Praeger Special), pp. 141-143.

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Nehru strongly concerned American collective security system and reacted by saying that Pakistan‟s acceptance of foreign military aid would bring cold war nearer India‟s borders. On 24 December 1953, he stated in Rajya Sabha:

“If any military aid comes to Pakistan from the United States it is obvious that Pakistan drops out of that area (No war area in Asia) that is a serious thing. It means that the cold war, as it is called, comes to Pakistan and, therefore, comes to India’s borders on the West and the East, on both sides. It means that if a hot shooting war developed it also comes right upto the borders of India”.117

President Eisenhower was worried about the Indian reaction. When he, in February 1954, announced his decision to extend military aid to Pakistan and to enter into a mutual security arrangement with it, he also wrote a personal letter to Nehru assuring him that the military aid was not directed against India and that he was prepared to offer similar aid to India and that he was recommending increased economic and technical aid for India. The President also assured:

“I can say that if our aid to any country including Pakistan is misused or directed against another in aggression, I will undertake immediately, in accordance with my constitutional authority, appropriate action both within and without the United Nations to thwart such aggression”.118

Although India objected to the US military aid to Pakistan, the fact remained that India had been receiving military aid under the Indo-US Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement since 1951. India was also getting substantial economic assistance from the US which enabled it to divert her own resources substantially to the strengthening of her armed forces. It is paradoxical that while India herself was receiving direct and indirect military aid from the US, it vehemently objected to the US military aid to Pakistan.

Another reason for Nehru‟s opposition to America‟s arming and strengthening to Pakistan was that in the presence of a strong Pakistan he could not hope to gain the influence desired by him in the Indian Ocean region. Describing about his meeting with Nehru in late 1953, Vice President, Richard Nixon, wrote:

117 Rajendra K. Jain, US-South Asian Relations 1947-82 (New Delhi: Radiant Publisher, 1983), p. 200. 118 Palmer, The United States and India, p. 21.

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“He (Nehru) strongly opposed the controversial proposal of US aid to Pakistan, and I was convinced that his objections owed much to his personal thirst for influence if not control over South Asia, the Middle East, and Africa”.119

However, Nehru regarded American military aid to Pakistan as a threat to India‟s influence and power position in South Asia, assuming that this aid would disturb the natural balance between great power, India, and a small state, Pakistan. He thought that the US military aid would encourage Pakistan to assert its claim over Kashmir.

He also had the fear that the Western powers, after becoming allies of Pakistan would side with her on the Kashmir issue. He feared that Pakistan would proceed after being able to speak from a position of power to take a more aggressive stand on the Kashmir issue and to follow adventurist military policies. The Times of India and The Hindustan Times also published editorials strongly against SEATO. They stated it would prevent any settlement of Asian problems through negotiations120 and might even generate the very tensions and suspicions it was supposed to prevent.121 Prime Minister Nehru‟s condemnation of SEATO very strong as he said in the Lok Sabha; “I confess I see neither any lessening of tension nor any advance towards peace (because of SEATO). The reverse is true. .. .There is a consistent reference in the treaty to its defensive area. This area does not comprise merely the territory or the countries which are parties to that Treaty but goes beyond it. This area can be designated by those countries by merely declaring that any given place is also in that area. This, I submit, is a dangerous extension of the idea of defense”.122

After reviewing the “sad history of an alliance approach”, the Prime Minister concluded by stating, “If you want peace in the world, you have to come to grips with the problems. It cannot be done by threats or by having these alliances”.123

However, India‟s reaction to the idea and evolution of the Baghdad Pact was consistent with her attitude to the original military aid to Pakistan and SEATO. In a Lok Sabha debate on foreign affairs much of which centered round military alliances,

119 Ibid. 120 The Hindu, July 3, 1954. 121 Times of India, August 6, 1954. 122 The Hindu, July 3, 1954 123 Ibid.

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Mr. Nehru observed, „The Middle East has been split into hostile chaos because of the security pacts‟. The whole Middle East is in discord because of pressure to join Pacts”.124 One member suggested that countries in SEATO and MEDO should not be allowed to attend the forthcoming Bandung Conference as they would violate the security of the meeting.

The Indian Prime Minister Nehru again referred to the greater tension and conflict that he believed the Baghdad Pact had created. “It has certainly put one country against another country among countries that were friendly to one another. I do not know how anyone can say that this has brought security and stability to Western Asia”.

It is a fact that during the development of the Baghdad Pact, India made strong diplomatic overtures to Egypt. According to top diplomat K. M. Pannikar as Ambassador to Cairo was indicative of her desire to keep Egypt and the Arab League from becoming involved in western-sponsored defense alliance.

However, after Pakistan signed the Baghdad Pact, Indian- Egyptian relations became more and more cordial. In June 1955, Prime Minister Nehru again visited Premier Nasser in Cairo. In a joint statement, Nehru and Nasser declared that “military alliance and power entanglements increased tensions and fear and suspicions can only be removed by friendly approaches and by creating a sense of security”.125 Prime Minister Nehru and Premier Nasser made strong bids in the Middle East for acceptance of their thesis that common safety would rest better on a policy of non- alignment than on one of pre-arranged involvement.126

Nevertheless, Indian response to the Baghdad Pact was in keeping with her avowed policy of eschewing military alliances and underwriting the developing nations‟ tendency toward non-alignment. Following Iran-Iraq‟s joining of the Western alliance, India acted strongly to reinforce the Arab countries‟ commitment to neutralism. Besides close relations with Egypt, New Delhi moved closer to Syria, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia. When King Saud visited India in November 1955, the Times of India commented:

124 Ibid. 125 The New York Times, July 13, 1955. 126 Ibid.

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His (Saudi’s) visit means more than an occasion for expression of mutual goodwill. It testifies to the growing cordiality between this country and the wider Arab World, and their close identity of outlook on international affairs. Despite her close economic links with the West, Saudi Arabia, along with Egypt has opposed the Turkish-Iraqi Pact, and has been instrumental in keeping a large part of the Middle East within the area of peace.127

India thought that American military aid to Pakistan would force India to divert resources needed for basic development purposes to unproductive program of security and defense.128 Indian officials in the US and the United Nations began to give private hints to their American counterparts that the proposed aid to Pakistan would cause permanent loss of India‟s friendship.

Moreover, the US-Pakistan treaties, unintentionally perhaps, opened new doors to Indo-Soviet ties. So India and the Soviet Union began cultivating each other because of their respective regional and global interests converged against SEATO/CENTO and common desire to contain China in Asia for their different reasons.

3.11 STRATEGIC Pakistani alignment with the west in the defense alliances did not benefit it a lot. The military aid was subjected to the approval of America while on the other hand USA exempted herself from the major obligations.129 Comparative analysis depicts that Pakistan was under the severe obligations especially in time of war than the Mutual Security Assistance Agreement (MSAA) which took place between Pakistan and the US completely transformed the training pattern of the armed forces. It is important to highlight here the agreement made the Pakistan heavily dependent on American equipment because British traditions and procedures had largely been changed by the agreement. As a result, when arm embargo imposed on South Asia especially during the Indo-Pakistan war in 1965 and 1971, it was Pakistan which was severely damaged and became powerless rather than India. Thus, as dawn commented that the small states interests are sternly affected when they are in alliance with the

127 Times of India, November 28, 1955. 128 Stanley Walpert, Roots of Confrontation in South Asia: Afghanistan, Pakistan, India and the Super Power (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982), p. 143. 129 Hamza Alavi, Pakistan: The Burden of US Aid (Boston: New England Free Press, 1980), pp. 26- 27.

82 great power.130Pakistan‟s alignment with the US, no doubt, covered the large area which starts from Turkey to Philippine, yet annoyed many countries in the region.

Pakistan‟s alignment with western countries actually alienated the Soviet Union and India. President Ayub Khan stated that the lack of contact with the Soviet Union led to misunderstandings with that country and a Russian decision to give full support to India.131 Full support to India involved, inter alia, vetoes in the United Nations Security Council, thus thwarting consideration of Kashmir issue. Pakistan was aware that Russian enmity was one cost of the alliance. Even Premier Khrushchev threatened to destroy Peshawar, when a US plane (U-2) was shot down over the Soviet territory.132

Moreover, the Russian strategic policy was to encircle Afghanistan by military and economic assistance to the government as well to the Afghan arms.133 Since, India and Afghanistan had gradually established their relations with Soviet Union and receiving heavy weaponry, it boosted the stand of Pakistan to join Western-led alliances so as to get military gains.134

3.12 ECONOMIC Pakistan could not get success in term of widening the economic scope through mutual defense pact and alliances. It was expected that with the passage of time defense budget would be reduced but challenging security situation in the region was demanding huge allocation of budget to the defense sector. Many Pakistanis, including President Ayub Khan stated that one of the main reasons for joining SEATO was the desire for economic aid.135 This concern for the economic benefits of alliance was manifest in several statements made by Foreign Minister Manzur Qadir during 1959 and 1960.136 But, the US was not willing to turn SEATO into a duplicate of other multilateral aid dispensing organizations, such as the United Nations and the Colombo Plan. Although SEATO started several training programs; yet compared to the bilateral economic aid relationship, SEATO aid was insignificant.

130 Dawn (Karachi), April 26, 1967. 131 Khan, Friends Not Masters, p. 156. 132 Burke, Palmer, Pakistan Foreign Policy, p. 23. 133 Ibid. 134 Dawn (Karachi), February 12, 1964. 135 Sarwar Hassan, Strategic Interests of Pakistan, (Karachi: Pakistan Publications. 1964), p. 14. 136 Dawn (Karachi), April 8, 1959.

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It is a hard fact that alignment policy of Pakistan with the West gave many setbacks rather than potential benefits. The direct economic benefits from CENTO- SEATO, and after 1965, the obviously small military benefits of alignment scarcely justified continued Pakistani membership in the pacts. Thus, Pakistan had been dependent on American economic development assistance and had limited leverage with the US in economic matters.

3.13 CONCLUSION In a nutshell Pakistan‟s involvement in the US led alliances gave a golden opportunity to Soviets to enter into the politics to South Asia. Before 1953 USSR was neutral over the controversial issues of the South Asian countries especially on Indo- Pakistan rivalry. But, USSR openly supported India on Kashmir issue and provided support to Afghanistan on the matter of Pakhtunistan after Pakistan‟s participation in the alliances. More, the annoyance of Muslim bloc specially the Arabs was also faced by Pakistan which to the great extant affected the states regional and international interests.

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CHAPTER – 4 PAK-US STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP AFTER THE INCIDENTS OF 9/11 & SECURITY COMPULSION OF PAKISTAN

4.1 INTRODUCTION Pakistan was under the immense pressure of Washington for joining the US- led military campaign which was against the Taliban rule and Al-Qaeda in Afghanistan. Due to the restrictions, compulsions and instability of Pakistan‟s internal and external geographical environment the strategy of General on post 9/11 was badly affected. It was Musharraf‟s future vision which made him to apprehend if he is going to stop his cooperation with Washington. Not only Pakistan‟s aid dependency and shattered economy were at stake but its nuclear assets were also at risk. General Musharraf was consistently in fear that non-cooperation with Washington, New Delhi may squeeze Kashmiri freedom struggle which was unacceptable for Pakistan at any cost. Musharraf addressed the nation on 19th September, 2001 and said that „our primary importance is the security of our country from external threat. Then to boost up the fragile economy and our third priority is to protect strategic and nuclear assets‟. He went on saying that India wants alliance with the US for the declaration of Pakistan as a terrorist state. They wanted to affect our nuclear and Kashmir cause.1They are also working to install anti-Pakistan establishment in Afghanistan.

Musharraf‟s view was to get more and more benefits from the US by providing Pakistan‟s support in the war on terror. By speaking publicly, Musharraf said the Pakistan‟s nuclear and missile assets along with the Kashmir cause were not on the table of talk, he clearly accepted that they were expecting assistance of economic nature and were ready for cooperation with the US. In Afghanistan in post- Taliban era he ensured that by giving a helping hand to the US, Pakistan must be given high respect as an honorable state.2 And in coming days, Pakistan started its cooperation policy with the US and became a frontline state in the war on terror to vanish Taliban dominancy. It was in favor of Pakistan to join hands with the US in war on terror because of the fact that Pakistan was facing internal as well as regional security challenges.

1 “Text: Musharraf Rallies Pakistan”, BBC News, 19 September, 2001. 2 Ibid.

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4.2 A SECURITY MEASUREMENT WITHIN PAKISTAN Growing economic crisis and intensity expanding parochial violence among different sects were the problem that Pakistan was confronted internally. Joining the war on terror with the US gave Pakistan a gate way to improve law and order situation and to revive the economy of Pakistan. Washington gave no assurance of providing assistance to Pakistan to boost its economy although several practical measures were made in this regard.

4.3 FRAGILE ECONOMY The economic conditions of Pakistan before 9/11 were dwindling. Pakistan‟s economy started its move towards decline in 1990‟s after having a significant growth in 1980s. Due to frequent and abrupt changes in policies, poor supervision, bulk of money spending on military issue rather than on public, mismanagement of economic resources and weak governance of the state‟s institutions all contributed to the decay of Pakistan.3 Financial condition of Pakistan was at nose-dive because of allocation of public money on military and defense sector. Pakistan‟s human index (HDI), according to United Nations human Development Report 2000 was ranking it very low. In addition to that, Pakistan‟s nuclear testing in May 1998 jolted the confidence of investors and subsequently the US and other countries imposed coercive economic sanctions on Pakistan.4 The US restricted its financial support only to developmental projects and the annual budgetary support fund of $1.56 billion in the account credit, which was allocated to Pakistan earlier in 1999, was also stopped by the international Monetary Fund (IMF). For countering narcotics and food assistance Pakistan received only $5.4 from the US in the year 2001.

Pakistan‟s economy was moving towards downward when Musharraf came into power in October, 1999. This era was characterized by low economic growth rates, rising debt burden and low level of foreign investment. Pakistan‟s economic indicators were giving bleak reading as;  The inflation rate was 5.7%, while the per capita income of Pakistan was only $526 per year 1999-2000.

3 See for details, “Pakistan: Joint Staff Assessment of the Interim poverty Reduction Strategy Paper”, World Bank Report No. 23189-PAK, (Washington: World Bank, November 2001), p. 2. 4 Sohail Mehmood, The Musharraf Regime and the Governance Crisis: A Case Study of the Government of Pakistan (New York: Nova Science, 2001), p. 62.

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 The Gross Domestic Product (GDP) fell down to 4.2% while the per capita income of Pakistan was only $526 in 1999, which was 6.3 percent in 1989-90.  Pakistan also faced a downward movement in investment ratio; it was 19.4% in 1990-91, 8% in 1996-97, while in 1998-99 it fell to 3.6%.  On debt servicing and defense sector, more than 84% was spent from Pakistan‟s national revenue.  50% of GDP in 1999 was representing the black economy of Pakistan.  On social services, Pakistan failed to spend a significant amount.  A target of 88% was set for primary gross enrolment by social action program but in 1998-99, it was well short of target.  An infant mortality was 83% in health sector which was higher to Bangladesh (73%) India (70%) and Sri Lanka (15%) in 1998-99.5

Consequently, Pakistan became a state in debt in last years of General Zia-ul- Haq‟s rule and the following ten years of democracy, Pakistan was burdened with debt accumulation. An artificial prosperity was kept by the loans but in paying off those debts. Due to increase in borrowing for the return of existing debt, Pakistan got entangled in the intricate web of debt. In the year 1999, the debt of Pakistan increased to 2907 billion rupees, which was 802 billion rupees in 1990. Because of this factor, the GDP was accounted for 99.8% . Pakistan had an outstanding debt of Rs.4003.3 in 20016.

The debt service estimate was Rs.338.2 billion in 1999-2000. It amounted approximately 83% of the total the revenue aid 45.5 % of total expenditure. The paid amount of interest on domestic and foreign debt was another horrifying page in the profile of Pakistan‟s debt. It was Rs.130.5 billion in 1996-97, while in 1999-2000, it amounted as 240.2 billion. This was enough display of Pakistan‟s being badly trapped in burden of debt serving for fiscal imbalance was increased due to the lower tax efforts. In 1996-97, the GDP ratio of tax moved upward and reached to 14.5% but after that it was a constant decline and fell to 12.8% in 1999. Therefore, the

5 Ishrat Hussain, “The Role Politics in Pakistan‟s Economy”, Journal of International Affairs 63, No. 1, (Fall/Winter, 2001): p. 6. 6 Bashir Ahmad and Faisal Bari, “Pakistan: Economic Challenges for New Millennium”, in Craig Baxter (ed.), Pakistan on the Brink: Politics, Economics and Society (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2004), p. 148.

87 development expenditure in regard of „twin menace‟ received a great blow and it reached a very low level of 3% of GDP in year 1999-2000. In 1990-91 it was 8.4%.7

In the policies of Musharraf priority was to raise tax revenues for fiscal consolidation and reduction in Pakistan‟s external debt profits. In November 2000, he said that for him up gradation of economy is foremost important. He said;

“Only with viable economy will the security of Pakistan be guaranteed. Economic revival is the key to everything. Out of a nation of 150 million people, only 1% pays income tax. Our debt burden is $38 billion, and we have to prioritize reducing it. My program, simply put, is to concentrate on reducing our fiscal deficit, improving our trade balance and broadening our tax base. By eliminating few subsides on wheat, reduction 12% in public sector jobs and from 20 to 5 percent decrease in interest rates”.8

Musharaf took several measures for the stability of economy along with the reforms in General Sales Tax (GST) on electricity; the government also imposed tax on agricultural income. The oil price mechanism was followed by the government as economic recovery package which resulted in abrupt rise from 7.5 to 22.5 percent. Significantly, as part of economic recovery measures the defense budget was reduced 5% by Musharraf. A significant change was noticed in the decade as reserves in State Bank were increased from $0.3 billion to $1.5 billion. A standby arrangement with Pakistan for a period of nine month was approved the IMF prior to a three year poverty reduction and growth facility (PRGF) in a fiscal year 2000-01.9 All the tranches were released in time, while all the reviews were successfully completed by the IMF. The budget deficit which was 6% in 1999 was reduced to 5.2 percent in 2001 as a result of these steps the interest payments were still $11.6 billion due to which the deficit remained $ 5.2 billion. However, the inflation which was 6% in 1998, jumped down to 3% in 2001.

Pakistan‟s economic recovery was still in a weary position; although for the stimulating economic measures were taken. With a largest of 5.0 percent, Pakistan made little growth 2.6 percent which turned it to disappointing year. This less growth

7 Stephen Cohen, The Idea of Pakistan (Washington: Brookings Institution, 2004), p. 250. 8 Marry Ann Weaver, Pakistan: In the Shadow of Jihad and Afghanistan (New York: Straus and Giroux, 2002), p. 23. 9 Pervez Musharraf, In the Line of Fire: A Memoir (London: Simon and Schuster, 2006), pp-183- 184.

88 performance prevailed in almost all sectors of economy with 7.1 percent in manufacturing, 2.6 percent in construction and 4.4 percent in services sector. Pakistan faced many problems due to slower growth of economy. In 2001 poverty rate increased from 32.6% to 34 percent. In 1999 the Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) was $511 million and declined to $ 352 million was also noticed in the coming year. Although, tax reforms were made but tax revenue was less than 13 percent of the GDP. A decline from 2.4 percent of GNP to 2.1 percent was noticed in education. In 1995-96, the expenditures allocated for health was 0.6 percent while in 2000-01 it showed a decline to 0.5%.10

In 2001, per citizen indebtedness of Pakistan was higher than income per capita and Pakistan‟s GDP was lower than the total accumulated debt. The value of rupee was declining and it hit 18.6 percent against dollars, which badly stricken Pakistan‟s economy. Due to these reasons, Pakistan had to join hands with Washington against Taliban in Afghanistan so as economic incentives could be grabbed.

4.4 RELIGIOUS EXTREMISM AND SECTARIAN VIOLENCE Pakistan was badly damaged by religious extremism and sectarian violence well before 9/11. The number of people killed in sectarian terrorism in the period between 1889-2001 clearly indicates the impact and influence of extremism and violence on Pakistani society. In this period 1,733 incidents of sectarian violence happened across the country in which 1,258 people were killed.11General Zia-Ul-Haq Islamization politics, Iranian revolution of 1979, Pakistan‟s support to Afghan Taliban against Soviet Union, and later on the Afghan civil war were the few factors for extremism and sectarian violence that broke out in Pakistan. It is important to discuss all these factors briefly.

4.5 GENERAL ZIA-UL-HAQ POLITICS OF ISLAMIZATION General Zia‟s attempt to legitimize his own military rule in the shadows of Islam gave a significant rise to religious intolerance and sectarian violence in Pakistani society during 1977-1988. JUI (F) a Sunni Deobandi Islamic religious

10 Cohen, The Idea of Pakistan, p. 253. 11 See “Sectarian Violence in Pakistan” Available at: http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/database/sectkilling.htm, accessed on 14 June 2016.

89 political party and JI were patronized by him. Islamization politics of General Zia gave Islamic clergymen the authority to control Madaris which gave rise to many controversies.12 Students in Madaris were taught the lesson based on the strict interpretation and application of Shariah. The religious intolerance and sectarian violence provided bases to Zia Islamization politics. Shia and Sunni communities broke the bond of unity due to the endorsement of Deobandi interpretation of Islam. The minority Shia community was threatened by the imposition of Zakat and Usher in 1980 which defined Pakistan as a sectarian state during his regime. TNFJ was consequently come into being because of the strict policies introduced by General Zia. Their first demand of TNFJ was to exempt Shia community from paying Zakat. Though, Zia refused it, but still they were becoming so aggressive and resultant against them Anjuman-e-Siph-e-Sahaba Pakistan was established in 1985. Anjumn-e- Sipah-e-Sahaba later became Siph-e-Sahaba (SSP) Pakistan. The sole objective was to declare the Sunni sect as the religion of the state and to incorporate in the constitution the identity of Shittes as minority.13

Besides, the division of Sunni-Shittes, the Sunni group itself was divided into Deoband and Barelvis and their controversies started over the control of mosques. Due to this, Deobandis got the control of several mosques of Barelvis. The nexus between Deobandis and Sunni-ahl-e-Hadith sects strengthened as a result of rising influence of Saudia Arabia in Pakistan. Dobandis were collecting the Zakat and Usher with impunity while the Ahl-e-Hadith groups were controlling mosques.14 Zia took significant steps in regards to revision of text books and curriculum to teach students about the ideology of Pakistan and Islam.15 Extremism, sectarian violence and intolerance gained deep grounds due to healthy environment provided by the teaching narratives and restricted Islamic principles of citizenship in the Madaris of Pakistan.

4.6 IRANIAN REVOLUTION Iranian revolution created a wide gape between the Shia community and state of Pakistan after 1979. In Pakistan the two groups Sunni and Shiites were going

12 Moonis Ahmar, “Sectarian Conflicts in Pakistan”, Pakistan Vision 9, No. 1, (2008), p. 6. 13 Riaz Ahmad Shaikh, “Developing Extremist-Marasha Education in Pakistan”, in D. M. Nault (ed.), Developing Asia: Interdisciplinary, Post Neoliberal, and Transnational Perspectives (Florida: Brown Walker Press, 2008), p. 184. 14 Ibid. 15 Mir Zohar Hussain, Religious Fundamentalism in Developing Countries (Westport: Greenwood Press, 2001), p. 26.

90 towards the opposite extremes because of the Iranian revolution. After the revolution, Shiites were becoming more cosmopolitan and it gave birth to (Threek-e-Nifaaz-e- Fiqh-i-Jafriya) which subsequently transformed into Tehreek-e-Jafaria Pakistan (TJP). TNFJ was openly supported by Iran. In reaction, Zia-ul-Haq supported SSP with the financial support of Saudi Arabia and Iraq so as to vanquish the growing influence of Shiites community in the province of Punjab.16

In the mid-1980s violent sectarian conflict started between SSP and TNSF in Punjab. A Sunni backed cleric, Allam Ehsan Elahi Zahoor was assassinated in 1987 in Lahore. The repercussions of this incident were horrific and Asif Hussani, a leading Shiite leader, was killed in Peshawar which provoked further the conflict of sectarian violence. The murder of Maulana Haq Nawaz Jhangvi, the co-founder of SSP, intensified the sectarian wave of violence in 1990. The rumor was spread that he had been killed by Shittee militants who were supported by Iran. Consequently, Iranian counsel general, Sadiq Ganji was killed by Sunni militants in Lahore. This resulted in a sudden increase of sectarian violence in Pakistan between Sunnis supported by Saudies and Shiitee supported by Iran.17

In 1990, the militant wings of TJP and SSP were formed and it intensified the sectarian violence. In 1994, another group TNFJ and Sipah-e-Muhammad Pakistan emerged as a prominent Shiite militants and it got involved in anti SSP campaigns, violence and target killings. SMP killed Zia-ur-Rehman, an SSP leader who was coming for hearing in Lahore high court in January 1997. It was a blatant terrorism act and coasted the lives of journalists and twenty two police constables. In response, the Iranian Cultural Center in Lahore was burned fiercely by hundreds of out raged demonstrator of SSP. The Iranian Cultural Centre Director was also gunned down by them with staff members in February 1997. Lashkar-e-Jhangvi became one of the most dreadful and violent sectarian organization in Pakistan under the leadership Riaz Basra in 1990. They were charged for the brutal act against Shiite leaders. In Momipura Lahore, 22 people were killed while praying in January 1998. They also attempted to kill Nawaz Sharif the then Prime Minister of Pakistan in 1999.18

16 Frederic Grare, Reforming the Intelligence Agencies in Pakistan’s Transitional Democracy (Washington: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2009), p. 26. 17 Shaikh, “Developing Extremist-Marasha Education in Pakistan”, p. 184. 18 Suroosh Irfani, “Pakistan‟s Sectarian Violence: Between the Arbist Shift and the Indo-Persian Culture”, in Satu Limaye et al. (ed.), Security in South Asia (Honolulu: Asia –Pacific Centre for Security Studies, 2004), p. 159.

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4.7 AFGHAN JIHAD The radical religious conflict in Pakistani society was widespread during Afghan jihad because these groups and their militant wings were under the support of Saudi Arabia, the US and the intelligence agencies of Pakistan. During all these activities many students of the Madaris were trained who subsequently became the leaders of Afghan Taliban and wedged violent activities.

It is debated a lot that the war against Iran in Afghanistan and increased sectarian violence in Pakistan had direct links with Saudi Arabia and the Sunni organizations were strengthening with the passage of time. Pakistani secret agency ISI had a prominent role in boosting up their strength. Harkat-ul-Ansar (HuA) was formed by merging Harkat-ul-Jihad-e-Islami and Harkat-ul-Mujahedeen in 1993. In the southern Afghanistan, Afghan Taliban came into power who was in reality the students of Sunni Deobandi Madaris. The distribution of Saudi fund during the Afghan Jihad came to Ahl-e-Hadith Sunni parties of Afghanistan, due to which Hizb- e-Islami of Gulbadin Hikmatyar got prominence over others. To reduce the influence of Iran in post-Soviet Afghanistan Sunni sectarian outfits were transported to the borderland of Pak-Afghan. The conflict was blown up between Shiite and Persian speaking for gaining power and position. This was backed by Mujahedeen groups in Pakistan with the support of Saudi Arabia and the US.19

4.8 TALIBAN REIGN (1996-2001) Millions of Afghans became refugee and fled to Federally Administrated Tribal areas (FATA), and Baluchistan to take shelter. In these areas they earn the doctrinal influence of Deobandi Madaris run by JUI.20 Taliban from these Madaris emerged in the leadership of Mulla Muhammad Omar. They were supported by Pakhtuns across Pakistan which gave them power and came in controlling position in various Afghan districts.21They started to control law and order and security in these districts. Through the relationship with Taliban, the JUI boosted itself and became dominated in almost all areas of Pakhtuns where they are in majority. To fight against anti-Taliban forces, thousands of Pakistani youth rushed to

19 Christophe Jaffrelot, Pakistan: Nationalism without a Nation, (Delhi: Manohar, 2002), p. 92. 20 Richard P. Cronin, “Afghanistan: Challenges and option for Restructuring a Stable and Modern State”, Congressional Research Service 24, (April 2002): p. 12. 21 Larry P. Godson, Afghanistan Endless War: State Failure, Regional Politics, and the Rise of Taliban (Washington: University of Washington Press, 2001), p. 161.

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Afghanistan for jihad. After coming back from Jihad they had an adequate experience of battlefield and training camps. They became experienced fighters having an ideological indoctrination. Al-Qaeda was the host for a large number of SSP, LJ and HuA cadres, giving them the skill of military training in Afghanistan. These cadres fought against to support Al-Qaeda and Afghan Taliban. The youth trained in these camps became bigots and they started to Islamize their own societies through extremists‟ way in Pakistan. As a result, these militants got power and occupied the areas in KP and FATA. The fact was expressed well before 9/11 that Pakistan might became Talibanized.22

http://pique.pk/wp-content/uploads/2015/01/o-AFGHANISTAN-PAKISTAN-MAP- BORDER-570.jpg, (Accessed on 23 July 2016).

22 William Maley, “The War against Terrorism in South Asia”, Contemporary South Asia 12, No. 2, (June, 2003): p. 207.

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4.9 KASHMIR JIHAD Deobandi and Ahl-e-Hadith brand of militant groups such as HuM and Lshkar-e-Tayyaba (LT) came into during Kashmir jihad in 1989. In case of unexpected or even expected attack of India from Rajisthana they would act as second line of defense as pointed out by General Aslam Beg. Pakistan army chief permitted the establishment of Deobandi Madaris in and Rhimyar Khan Districts province of Punjab. The youth which is largely unemployed recruited across the country and after formal training they are directed towards their goals i.e. to attack India and liberate Kashmir from infidel forces. Many groups were given support to challenge the unlawful invasion of India and make Kashmir a free state.23

The sectarian violence and militancy had become a day to day chore when Musharaf came into power in 1999. In sectarian violence, 2000 people were injured and 220 were killed within the span of two years from October 1999 to 2001. Hassan Abbas has pointed out that Mushararraf had to encounter a large number of Madaris in the country, which were in fact, giving nourishment to sectarian groups.

“Through the active fostering by Zia-ul-Haq, the funding of Saudi Arabia, espoused by the United States, and the venal abandon of Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif the seed of religious fanaticism sown more than two decades earlier had come to confront (Musharraf) as fully grown trees perversely balanced by the amply offers of state”.24

To promote sectarian harmony and cooperation, Musharraf took several imitative. Almost 10,000 Madaris were brought into public education system through the transparent process of registration, curriculum reform and financial audit on 18 June, 2001. On the occasion of 25th National Seerat Conference, Musharraf addressed the religious leaders, “Islam is vibrant and forward looking but more than that claim it is the most tolerant of faiths”.25

He further stated “How does the world judge our claim? It look upon us as terrorists. We have been killing each other. Our claim of tolerance is phony in eyes for our internal strife. The outside world is asked to declare us terrorists. Some way

23 Cronin, “Afghanistan”, p. 18. 24 M. Maqbool Khan , “Geo-Politics of Fata after 9/11”, IPRI Research Journal 11, No. 1, (Winter, 2011): p.62. 25 Hassan Abbas, Pakistan’s Drift into Extremism: Allah, the Army, and America’s War on Terror (New York: M. E. Sharpe, 2005), p. 202. .

94 we are primitive. Other ways, we are a failed state. It hurts badly. Religious and sectarian harmony is, therefore, is inescapable necessity in Pakistan.”26

Musharraf was serious enough to place Pakistan in the comity of the nations as modern and progressive country. There is no denial of the fact that his initiatives in this regard were quite impressive and appreciable.

4.10 REGIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY CALCULATIONS Due to failure of pro-Taliban Afghan policy, nuclear and missile technology acquisition from China and North Korea, 1998‟s atomic explosions and support of Kashmiri mujahedeen, Pakistan stood alone at both regional and international level. In such conditions Pakistan had no chance to stand against the US invasion in Afghanistan.27

4.11 FALLING INTO AFGHAN POLICY The impact of Taliban regime was increasing with each passing day and it frustrated Pakistan well before 9/11 due to adverse effects on Islamabad‟s domestic and foreign matters. The quest for a peaceful and friendly regime in Kabul led Pakistan to help Taliban. To decrease the influence of Iran and India was another reason in Pakistan to support Taliban. Along with that, it was in the interest of Pakistan‟s to keep its influence in Central Asia.28

Rasul Baksh Raees, a political and security pundit categorized Pakistan‟s pragmatic interests towards Taliban regime. It was the power of Taliban regime that provided stability in Pakhtun majority area of Afghanistan. It was a great success for them because; these areas were plagued with war and lawlessness. The fact was that almost ninety percent of Afghanistan was in the hands of Taliban before 9/11. Taliban were in favor of Pakistan and they provided Pakistan a chance to establish strong ties with Central Asian Republics (CARs) with regard to its trade and energy. Actually, it was Taliban‟s influence that vanquished Indian impact from Afghanistan.29

26 Mary Ann Weaver, Pakistan: In the Shadow of Jihad and Afghanistan (New York: Straus and Giroux), p. 23. 27 C. Christine Fair, “The Counter Terror Coalitions: Cooperation with Pakistan and India”, Santa Monica, (California: Rand, 2004), p. 55. 28 Marvin G. Weinbaum and Johanthan Harder, “Pakistan‟s Afghan Policies and their Consequences”, Contemporary South Asia 16, No. 1, (March, 2008): p. 26. 29 Deepa Ollapally, “Unfinished Business in Afghanistan: Warlordism, Reconstruction and Ethnic Harmony”, United States Institutes of Peace,(April, 2003): p. 9.

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Pakistan‟s political and strategic relation with Taliban brought about severe limitations. The relation between Pakistan and Taliban gave Taliban an opportunity to mold Pakistan‟s policies for its own favor. Consequently, the Taliban influence was increasing day by day. In 2001, they refused to hand over the trainees of LJ. These trainees were used by the Afghan authorities to promote sectarian violence in Pakista. Resultantly, the border between Pakistan and Afghanistan was neglected and it gave a gate way for drug smuggling across the borders. In addition to this, Pashtun nationalism doctrines were cultivating the extremist tendencies in .30

The rivalry between the opposite groups of Iran and Central Asian Republics increased due to Pakistan support for Taliban which became a hindrance in the way of political and economic cooperation between Pakistan and Central Asian Republics. Pakistan‟s relations with Tajikistan were adversely affected by the presence of Taliban in Tajik Civil War. Pakistan‟s hopes to establish good relations with Uzbekistan were shattered by the support of Taliban for the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU).31

Musharraf‟s efforts to recognize the Taliban government by Central Asian Republics is worth mentioning. For example, Musharraf insisted Kazakh and Turkmen governments to hold direct talks with Taliban for oil transit through Afghanistan to Pakistan. During his visit to Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan in November, 2000 Pakistan was lying to get an agreement on the political set up to Kabul. For this, the neighboring countries were invited for table talk. But these efforts went in vain due to Pakistan‟s hand shake with Taliban. With the help of India and Russia, these countries started to back up anti-Taliban alliance. Tehran was of the opinion that America, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan were the culprit for supporting the Taliban government.

Support of the US for Taliban was consists of long term objectives in the region. America was considered the Taliban as force of stability in Afghanistan which would protect the US interests in Central Asia. Nevertheless, the policy was continued

30 Ahmad Rashid, Taliban: Islam, Oil and the New Great Game in Central Asia (London: I. B. Tauris, 2002), pp.185-187. 31 Rizwan Hussain, Pakistan and the Emergence of Islamic Militancy in Afghanistan (London: Ashgate, 2005), pp. 34-35.

96 by 1998 when the attacks on the US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania took place.32 It was believed that Saudi millionaire and pioneer of Al-Qaeda and hero of Afghan Jihad who was residing in Jalalabad, was involved in the attacks. It was reported that Osama has provided the amount of $3 million for buying defection to open road to Kabul in September 1996. In a retaliation policy of the US it provided the justification to her to attack the camps where Al-Qaeda militants were getting training especially the Afghan areas of Kandahar, Jalalabad, and Khost in 1999. The relations between the US and Taliban, which were going to be healthy, got blow because of the attacks of Al-Qaeda and retaliatory policy of the US. Apart from this, the gas pipeline project of Turkmenistan-Afghanistan and Pakistan was postponement due to the US involvement 1999. It is worth mentioning, the bombing of the US personnel in Afghanistan was a clear cut signal to the security establishment of Pakistan to review its pro-Taliban policy.33

Internationally, Pakistan‟s image was going to be distorted and it was getting isolation because of Islamabad‟s strong relations with Taliban. But, it is also important to be noted that with the passage of time Pakistan‟s influence on the Taliban was mitigating. Taliban‟s leader Mulla Muhammad Omer and other hardliner members of Taliban did not accept the request of General Pervez Musharraf and did not cared about the wish of the international community to demolish the pre-Islamic Statute of Buddaha in the province of Bamiyan and other Afghan heritage in March 2001.34

Pakistan was in a very complex situation because of its connection with the Taliban government. Mulla Omer‟s extreme interpretation of Islamic Sharia‟h, adoption of discriminatory approach against minorities, tough policies towards women, refusal of the closure of the militants‟ camps of Al-Qaeda and other conglomerates and handing over Osama put the decision makers of Pakistan into a deep dilemma.35 Time and again the security managers of Pakistan tried to bring the Taliban under their thumb but all in vain. By 2001, Islamabad was under the severe

32 Weaver, Pakistan: In the Shadow of Jihad and Afghanistan, p. 115. 33 Hussain, Pakistan and the Emergence of Islamic Militancy in Afghanistan, p. 218. 34 Zahid Hussain, Frontline Pakistan: The Struggle with Militant Islam (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007), pp. 42-43. 35 Musa Khan Jalalzai, Taliban and the Great Game in Afghanistan (Lahore: Vanguard, 1999), pp. 118-121.

97 pressure from international community to cut off its ties with Taliban and the diplomatic recognition which Pakistan had been granted in 25thMay 1997 should be withdraw. Resentment showed by the US, and even the Chinese government on Pakistan for its failure to persuade Taliban on any issue.

The fact cannot be overlooked that Islamabad paid high cost of its diplomatic ties with Taliban, yet the hard reality is, severing relations with Taliban means to permanently insecure the western border of Pakistan and inviting instability in Pakhtun belt. But attacks on Pentagon and the World Trade Center completely altered the regional and international dynamics of relations among the states and Pakistan took U-turn of its pro-Taliban approach to anti-Taliban stance because of Al-Qaeda‟s bases in Afghanistan.

4.12 DUALITY ON KASHMIR POLICY Since the day of partition the issue of Kashmir had been a major issue between two nuclear powers. Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) is regarded by Pakistan as a disputed territory. Pakistan had taken this issue to the UN and along with this several attempts had been made to call for free and fair plebiscite in Jammu and Kashmir. As Kashmir, being a Muslim populated state wanted to be a part of Pakistan with the support of the UN. This wish of the people of Kashmir has always been denied by India; it does not want to hold free elections. Thus, Kashmir issue remains a bone of contention between two nuclear powers and can be considered as a thrown stuck in the truth.36

After incident of 11 September 2001, great power kept their eyes on disputed Kashmir between Pakistan and India. This could lead both the countries to border line of war. This thought became a hot debated topic after May 1998; when Pakistan and India both successful made nuclear tests. further deepened the view of a nuclear war. General Musharraf the then Pakistan‟s Chief of Army Staff had realized the importance of the blanked relation between Pakistan and India. He Achieved his set of goals and drawn a “softer line”. General Musharraf had made his calculation and decided to lower down the intensity and to divert attention of the world to the important side of Kashmir.37

36 Ahmad Rashid, Descent into Chaos: The United States and the Failure of Nation Building in Pakistan, Afghanistan and Central Asia (New York: Viking, 2008), p. 50. 37 SaminaYasmeen, “Pakistan‟s Kashmir Policy: Voices of Moderation?”, Contemporary South Asia 12, no. 2, (June, 2003): p. 190.

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4.13 ISOLATION FROM THE US IN 1990 The implementation of the Pressler amendment in 1990 washed away all efforts made by the Pakistani government to impose the Kashmir Policy. However, The victory of the Mujahedeen gave a range of military opportunities to the Pakistani military elites. It tried to change the status quo of Kashmir by causing riots along the Indian controlled parts of Kashmir which no doubt was a raising political, economic and military costs. The idea was that to engage India in wars and halt its economic development. Importantly, India vis-à-vis the international comity was not in position to pressurize Islamabad to step down from the support of insurgency. Peter Lavoy, points out that the European and Russian support for the Kashmiri Muslims often reject to buy Indian products and arms. Funds and assistance for the Pakistanis flowed from China and Saudi Arabia.38

4.14 PAKISTAN’S NUCLEAR CAPABILITY The Pakistani Military believed that because of Pakistanis superior nuclear capabilities they could balance out any advantage that India may possess in terms of its Military. However the opinion of the International community changed after the nuclear tests in 1998. An event the Pakistani public could not really appreciate until fighting broke out in Kargil, The northern end of the LOC separating Pakistan and parts of Kashmir. In May 1999 the Pakistani army initiated a so called tactically brilliant maneuver by blocking the Srinagar-led highway. A vital transportation hub in Indian controlled parts of Kashmir.39

According to Robert Wirsing, Pakistan did not gain any support in its cause towards the Kashmir issue internationally. Even after a popular Kashmiri Muslim uprising against inhuman Indian treatment. Hence Pakistan decided to heat up the situation to bring in the international community taking advantage of the nuclear uncertainty. Pakistan decided such a flare up would go in their favor, pushing India to reach an agreement over the Kashmir issue. The claim of India is that all the Hindu and Muslim areas of Kashmir should be annexed with India as Mharaja of Kashmir a made an agreement of affiliation with India in 1947. Pakistan claims, however, that the following agreement was signed under duress and all states other than the ones claimed

38 Matthew P. Taylor, “Pakistan‟s Kashmir Policy and Strategy since 1947”, (PhD Dissertation: Naval Postgraduate School California, March 2004), pp. 68-69. 39 Sumit Ganguly, Conflict Unending, India-Pakistan Tension since 1947 (New York: Columbia University Press, 2001), p. 42.

99 by the Chinese are by fraud. The international community however deemed the conflict between the two neighboring nuclear states as irresponsible. The situation further escalated when the Pakistani foreign minister Shamshad Ahmad stated that any further progression in the current conflict would cause Pakistan to “use any weapon in their arsenal to defend our territory”.40 The international community saw this statement as a nuclear threat and hence the Kargil conflict turned into a full-fledged conventional war with India. The situation became sensitive further when America received intelligence of a preparation of Pakistan‟s nuclear assets for possible deployment. Pakistan however denied the fact. Nevertheless, the fear of a nuclear war prompted Washington to pressurize Nawaz Sharif from withdrawing from Kargil, which he obliged unconditionally. The US saw Pakistan as the instigator of the conflict and stated that the issue be solved peacefully. They persuaded Islamabad to resort to talks to sort out the issue. Even General Musharraf who is known as the instigator to the conflict felt that the war scare was harmful for the progress of the two countries as well as their image as nuclear countries. Importantly, to place Pakistan as a responsible state to take political decisions to solve such conflict General Musharaf understood the need for political process could help normalize the ties between India and Pakistan.41

While Musharaf understood the value of reducing tensions between the two states however his Islamist cohorts disagreed to any agreement on the Kargil conflict. The two different opinions in the country became apparent in the course of the Agra Summit in July 2001. Musharaf constantly talked about a flexible approach to the problems such as the Kargil conflict. However, he stated that no mechanism of peace and any confidence measures cannot be succeeded until Kashmir dispute cannot be resolved.42

The Agra Summit failed to have the desired effect for the two countries as the duality in Pakistan‟s Kashmir Policy. However India had their faults too. They failed to see the centrality of Kashmir and later the agreed draft had to be amended to include cross border terrorism something Musharaf was likely to concede. The talks proved the hardliners right that India never wanted to solve the situation through negotiations in the first place.

40 Sumit Ganguly, The Kashmir Question: Retrospect and Prospect (London: Frank Cass & Co, 2003), p. 48. 41 Robert G. Wirsing, Kashmir in the Shadow of war: Regional Rivalries in a Nuclear Age (New York: M. E. Sharp, 2003), p. 79. 42 “Pakistan May Use Any weapon”, The News, 31 May 1999.

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Syed Salahuddin the leader of the Mujahedeen stated that a failure in the talks would lead to further attacks in Kashmir because they have no other alternative but to fight. The JI leader Qazi Husain Ahmed appreciated the stand Musharaf took at the summit. He stated “The president and his delegation rightly said there would be no thaw in the bilateral relations in the two nations until India considered Kashmir a disputed territory”. Although this strategy kept the Indian troops at bay in Kashmir, there was no visible solution to the problem until 9/11.43

4.15 SAFETY OF NUCLEAR AND MISSILE ASSETS BY SECURITY MANAGERS

The foremost priority before the Musharaf regime was to secure the missile and nuclear arsenals. General Musharaf determination can be gauged by the introduction of his reform policy in command and control system through the establishment of National Command Authority (NCA) for states nuclear assets and missile system.44 Since Pakistan is not a signatory to Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) therefore, through this mechanism Islamabad wanted to give a positive signal to US and other European countries about its strong mechanism for non-proliferation which is under tight control of NCA.

Since the commencement of Pakistan‟s nuclear program Americans have suspicions about its non-proliferation. President Jimmey Carter and his administration adopted different policies to stop and roll back Pakistan‟s nuclear program from mid 1978 to 1979. Policy makers of Pakistan considers nuclear program of its vital national interest, therefore had adopted non-compromising attitude despite US strong political and diplomatic pressure. Pakistan received its first financial blockade in 1990 and second in 1993 when America cut off Pakistan‟s aid due to its nuclear program.45 Policy makers of US were infuriated because of Pakistan‟s non-compliance approach towards its nuclear program and they demanded to put Pakistan in the list of states which are sponsoring terrorism. Americans were also suspecting that Pakistan is cooperating with North Korea in building of her nuclear program and also exporting nuclear technology to Iran, Libya and other Muslim countries.46 After the nuclear

43 Syed Riffat Hussain, “Pakistan‟s Changing Outlook on Kashmir”, South Asian Survey 14, no. 2, (December, 2007): pp. 199-200. 44 See, “National Command Authority Established”, Associated Press of Pakistan, 3 February 2000. 45 http://www. Gwu.edu/-nsarchiv/nukevault/ebb333/, (Accessed on July 16, 2016). 46 Ibid.

101 bomb blast of Pakistan in 1998 in response to India nuclear explosions concerns of US were highly ameliorated. The situation in international arena for Pakistan was further complicated because of nuclear explosions and irresponsible tactical maneuvering of Kargil in 1999. US wanted to restrict Pakistan‟s nuclear capability to the minimum deterrence by the end of 2000 and thwarted its competition with India.47 In five hour stopover in Pakistan the president Bill Clinton insisted to the authorities to sign CTBT, not to transfer nuclear technology to the other states, cut off fissile material production and thwart the installation of missile systems. In response, General Musharraf extended assurance to the to the US president that being a responsible nuclear state Pakistan will not export or transfer the technology and weapon of mass destruction to any state of the world. Moreover, Bush administration also pressurized Islamabad to roll back its nuclear program and inked CTBT while on the other hand American attitude towards Indian nuclear program was flexible and extended de jure recognition to its program owing to this approach of US Pakistan‟s concerns are accentuated and take hard stance regarding its nuclear program.48 It also creates apprehensions that USA is not happy from Pakistan‟s nuclear program and seeks to dismantle its nuclear capability. In June 2001, General Musharraf expressed the apprehension that „Pakistan will maintain minimum nuclear deterrence and will never be compromised‟.49 These were the fundamental factors which impelled Musharraf to join US-led war on terror to capture the Al-Qaeda members because refusal could snatch its status of as a nuclear state. The situation was highly sensitive to the extent that „critical nuclear weapons component‟ were shifted immediately after two days of September 11, 2001 with the fear of American strikes on nuclear sites. Thus, for the security of nuclear assets General Musharraf entered into an alliance in the global war on terror.

4.16 EVENTS OF 11 SEPTEMBER 2001& MUSHARAF’S RESPONSE After the events of September 2001, Pakistan came under the pressure to change its pro-Taliban Afghan policy. The attacks on the world Trade Center and the Pentagon were believed to be wedged by Al-Qaeda stationed in Afghanistan. In the eyes of Bush the Taliban providing help and bases to Osama bin laden for carrying out attacks against the US had to be removed. After the attacks Bush addressed the

47 http://www. armscontrol.org/act/2009_07-08/khan#41, (Accessed on, August 5, 2016). 48 C. Raja Mohan, “India, US and Non-Proliferation”, The Hindu, 25 September 2003. 49 Faraz Hashmi, “Nuclear Deterrence Vital to Security”, Dawn, 30 June 2016.

102 nation and stated” there would be no any kind of distinction would be made between the perpetrators who planned the attack and those who provided the sanctuaries to.”50Taliban demanded the solid proof which however the US refused and launched the War on terror regime against the Al-Qaeda. Thus, national security officials of the US immediately focused to take Pakistan on board. They realized that if they wanted to control Afghanistan politically and militarily Islamabad had to be engaged. Pakistan had a borderland area with Afghanistan and had an Indian Ocean through which the US can target the Taliban hideouts in Afghanistan by using it air space. In the eyes of the US involving Pakistan would help also to gather intelligence to track Al-Qaeda operatives.51

http://1.bp.blogspot.com/_vW1GG83Zr1U/Susu9T42JKI/AAAAAAAADnI/he3z8uMs0s/s400/BUSH MUSH.bmp(Accessed on 13 August 2016).

Richard Armitage, the US Deputy of State with General Director General of Inter-Services Intelligence Mehmood Ahmad who was in the US for a official visit where he was asked to form a coalition with the US against such acts of terror. Armitage admitted that General Mahmood was immediately willing to respond. The same day they met again where General Mahmood was given certain non-negotiable US demands that General Mahmood agreed to. The US ambassador to Pakistan Mary Chamberlain met General Musharraf who was given the specific list of US demands General Musharraf decided that if he did not accept the conditions Islamabad will be further isolated and more importantly Pakistan could be part of the coalition owing to its relations with

50 Naeem Ahmad, “State, Society and Terrorism: A case Study of Pakistan after September 11”, (Ph.D. Dissertation: University of Karachi, 2007), p. 82. 51 Syed Farooq Hasnat and Themina Rashid, “Implications of the 9/11: A Pakistani Perspective”, IPRI Journal 4, no. 1, (Winter, 2004): pp. 93-106.

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Taliban regime. The UN Security council resolution 1368 approved the use of force on the perpetrators of the attack of 9/11 which created more pressure on Pakistan.

To minimize the reaction built by the US General Musharaf is known to have said in his memoirs that Armitage threatened to “bomb Pakistan into the stone age “if they did not co-operate. He questioned “If we could not join them could we confront them and bear the man slaughter? The answer is No. we could not.”52

Pakistan was facing a lot of economic problems and had to reach international help to boost its economy. The US could easily crash Pakistan‟s economy in case they would not cooperate. Moreover if Pakistan would not cooperate they would be seen as a terrorist state. The emergent US-India relationship could be due to the hasty response by Musharraf to the US demands. According to Musharraf an alliance with US would reverse the upward trend and help them economically and politically. After confrontation from retired generals, seasoned diplomats and politicians on 18th September 2001 Musharraf maintained the factor of pressure in his statement.53

Earlier on the 16th September of 2001 Pakistan gave the Taliban a 3 day deadline. It was clearly mentioned to Taliban that the US will take the military action if Taliban refused to hand over Osama Bin Laden to the US. But, Taliban stance was rigid in term to provide them solid proofs of Osama involvement in the attacks. Mohammad Omer the leader of Taliban was ready to talks with the Americans but the Bush administration refused to hold talks. Ultimately, the US air force launched an onslaught on Afghanistan. On September 19, 2001 Musharraf addressed his nation „that his decision was based on key interests, he signed the coalition under a few conditions‟:  Pakistan military will engage only in military actions in their own country.  The US-led coalition should try to minimize collateral damage in Afghanistan.  Post-Taliban government should not be hostile to Pakistan.  Washington should support Pakistan in the Kashmir issue.  The US should not seize Pakistan‟s nuclear and missile assets.54

52 Steven R. Weisman, “President Bush and the Middle East Axis of Ambiguity”, New York Times, 13 April 2002. 53 Rizwan Zeb, “US Interest in South Asia in Post 9/11 Era: Effects on Pakistan”, Margalla Papers, (2004): p. 75. 54 Abbas, Pakistan’s Drift into Extremism, p. 220.

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On 24th September 2001 the coalition took shape as a set of agreements took place between the two nations. Pakistan included UN instating support including a blanket flyover, landing rights, and access to air and naval bases and supply to fuel. Pakistan also provided the access to the ports of Pasni and Karachi without any fee that is usually part of the agreements.

Diplomatically Pakistanis and the US decided to make a coalition government in Kabul as well as grading Kabul as demilitarized. The coalition government included a faction of the Taliban breaking away from the mainstream Taliban to a Post-Taliban political process. Northern Alliance although opposed the idea and neighboring countries of Afghanistan such as Russia did not like the fact of mainstream Taliban in the coalition government.55

In early October 2001, Colin Powell the secretary of state at the time opposed the idea of a seizure of Kabul by the Northern alliance in order to avoid a setback for Pakistan. The ISI, CIA and MI intelligence agencies saw Jallaludin Haqqani as a leader of the moderate Taliban and promised him part of the post-Taliban government in return for his services. He visited Islamabad for a search of board based government but because of a miscommunication between US authorities. He later waged a guerilla war against the upcoming US-coalition army. In another attempt the ISI decided to contact Mullah Zaeef the leader of the moderate Taliban to help against the hard lined Taliban, but he refused. It just goes on to show the cohesion between the Taliban movements.

In an attempt to destabilize the Taliban movement General Musharraf removed General Mahmoud as the head of ISI to be replaced by General Ehsanul Haq, a moderate officer, was ensuring that his change in policies towards Afghanistan would in fact be implemented. As a result, General Ehsan closed down two ISI offices that were known to have ties to the militants in Afghanistan and Kashmir.56

Nonetheless, all ties of the ISI towards the Taliban movement were not diminished however the ISI‟s presence did tilt the balance towards the US-coalition. Removing ISI definitely dented the progress of the Afghan Taliban but despite the

55 Eric S. Mangolis, “Pervez Musharraf has Little Choice”, Daily Times, 2 October 2006. 56 Peter Wilson Parabhakar, Wars, Proxy Wars and Terrorism: Post Independent India (New Delhi: Mittal Press, 2003), p. 166.

105 decision taken by Pakistan and the US Kabul was taken in by the Northern Alliance. This acted as a major setback for Pakistan mainly due to Northern Alliance‟s pro Indian and pro-Iranian position.

In December 2001 Hamid Karzai, a Pashtun, set up a new interim government and became a Transitional Administrator. However the Northern Alliance was still the most powerful section of the government, controlling most factors such as military and foreign affairs.57

In response to the help provided by Pakistan the US removed the nuclear and military sanctions on Pakistan. By December 2001 an aid package worth $1 million was sent by the US to Pakistan to focus on the economic stability and in emergency provide support to the US operations in Pakistan. The Paris Club of International creditors changed Pakistani‟s bilateral debt to help their economy. The US being a biggest shareholder helped Pakistan financially and the $3.5 million loan from IMF taken by Pakistan was easily paid off as the US paid $1 billion in economic and military assistance. In 2002 the USAID reopened to invest in education, jobs and health. These efforts by the US also included paying off Pakistan‟s 400 million debt and 38 billion foreign debts.58

4.17 CONCLUSION Pakistan‟s decision to join the US war on Terror was result of different internal, regional and international reasons. Before 2001 Pakistan was in fragile position with the military regime, overthrowing an elected government and the public sector debt destroying the economy and seemed to be going towards religious extremism due to the sectarian conflicts and violence in the country.59

In the regional context the Taliban movement and Kargil incidents put Pakistan in a very awkward situation and pushed it towards an international isolation. Musharraf firmly clarified that his agreement towards the US-coalition was simply to secure the interests of Pakistan including building an economy and lowering the international pressure. Pakistan‟s frustration, however, increased due to seizing of

57 Fair, “The Counter Terror Coalitions”, p. 14. 58 Gilles Dorronsoro, Revolution Unending: Afghanistan, 1979 to the Present (London: C. Hurst & Co., 2005), p. 132. 59 Antonio Giustozzi, Decoding the Taliban: Insight from the Afghan Field (New York: Columbia University Press, 2009), p.66.

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Kabul by Northern Alliance with the backing of the US. However, Pakistan‟s involvement in the US coalition provided lot of benefits to the country. It provided relief and perseveration of huge economic benefits. It also helped Pakistan to regain its lost image in the international community and to get rid of isolation. Islamabad‟s image as economically weak state was improved, yet in the long run its engagement with the US proved to be more of a liability than an asset for Pakistan.

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CHAPTER – 5

PAKISTAN-US CONFLICTING APPROACHES TO CONTAIN RISING MILITANCY AND FOMENTING INSURGENCIES

5.1 INTRODUCTION After the horrific incident of 9/11 the commencement of Pak-US comradeship once again came into existence. This relationship was created an immense dividing between Pakistan‟s official and militants who were in contact with them. The demands were placed by Pakistan as well as the US. Pakistan demanded assistance regarding military equipment while the US demands were focusing logistic renderings to the American and NATO forces in Afghanistan. The allegations of the US on Pakistan about the possible links with insurgents were denied by Pakistani authorities. During the war against terrorism America gave status to Pakistan as a „Non-NATO Ally‟. This major breakthrough provided Pakistan the infringe benefits like military assistance and other sort of military equipment. This agreement between two states was rooted upon mutual interests as America would render financial support in term of compensation and Pakistan would surely take part in war against the extremists as a coalition partner of the US.1

Moreover, after the agreement between the two partners number of other types of agendas was discussed. These agreements were inked and filed by both officials, yet contrary to this no practicality was observed in reality. The meetings were taken placed under the umbrella called „Strategic Dialogue‟. These negotiating processes were cementing the route for Pakistan to expand its support and ancillaries in terms of education, technological advancement to address energy crisis in the region, taking Pakistan out of its financial stagnation and the provision of the moderate scientific instruments for the common welfare.2 The negotiating process was preceded by the Pakistan‟s foreign ministry and the US State affairs. Moreover, the US civil nuclear agreement with India made Pakistan a bit in hot water in term of parity in the region

1 Robert Wirsing, “Introduction: Emerging Trends and Developments in Pakistan‟s FATA Implications for the United States”, NBR Analysis 19, no. 3, (August 2008): p. 10. 2 David Shelby, “US, Pakistan Launch Strategic Dialogue on Economics, Security: Discussions Also to Include Education, Science, Technology, State‟s Burns Says”, Washington File, April 27, 2006.

108 because civil nuclear deal was also a need for Pakistan. These sorts of collaboration were contemplated by the Pakistani authorities valueless having pertinence with coal and augment production in the country. The US transaction the areas of financial assistance to the other countries was the creation of distrust between two states. The US diminutive role in term of security support was insufficient for Pakistan. This point was raised and discussed in the dialogues of the initial stages in the spring season 2006. Viability of Strategic Dialogue process created trust deficit between the officials of partnering states in subsequent years. This trust deficit had deep domestic repercussions especially for Pakistan.3

Furthermore, the Strategic Negotiations together with the DCG (Defense Consultative Group) tried to declare conspicuously that the aim of the negotiations was to allocate the resources in accordance with the requirement. Infect, DCG was responsible to play a pro-active role in the arrangements and to facilitate the military liaisons and information transactions. At the end, both the countries in the joint official pronouncement declared the crucial role of DCG which got central position for information sharing and exchanging ideas. Apart from this, for strengthening the war against Taliban in Afghanistan Pakistan‟s borderland both the countries moved forward and established further two groups which are going to be discussed as follow.4

5.2 PAK-US STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP AND ISSUES OF FINANCIAL AID THE SECURITY ASSISTANCE WORKING GROUP

It was supervised by the US DSCA (Defense Security Cooperation Agency) to negotiate upon the ancillaries of military equipment and to up-grade the existing system. Pakistan commenced the meetings with the US to put down its military needs and necessities in front of the US authorities.

The Military Cooperation Committee The essential function of this committee was to make a plan for joint Pak-US military drills. With the passage of time reservations were revealed not only by the Americans but also by Pakistanis about the experiences of DCG. Both the countries native people criticized the dialogue processes as well as it‟s the agenda. The primary

3 “Pak-US DCG Joint Statement”, Daily Times, Islamabad, Pakistan, September 20, 2003. 4 Wirsing, “Introduction: Emerging Trends”.p.12

109 concentration was the provision and sale of the military disposals to Pakistan which caused the severe drift between the two states. This distrust deficit widened the gap between the two states which weakened their fight against the radical extremists. The US officials alleged that Pakistan‟s interests for the military paraphernalia are the merchandised one, yet that is the main duty of the Security Assistance Working group. Both the countries could not be succeeded to draft a SOFA under DCG. When the draft of SOFA was going to be prepared Pakistani authorities leaked that some of the provisions were against the dignity of Pakistan. Anti-American media in Pakistan declared that the US had a desire that Pakistan should compromise on her sovereignty.5 SOFA presents the both countries officials‟ consent that the US military personnel would possess the freedom of entering in Pakistan‟s territories without the permission or breaching the country‟s constitution. In the meanwhile, military establishment of Pakistan clearly demanded the closure of notorious captive cells such as Guantanamo Bay, Bagram Jail and Abu-Gharib which were unconstitutional. Further, atrocities committed by the American troops in Iraq and extra-judicial trials diminished the belief of Pakistanis on the justice system of the US courts and military tribunals.6 The element of hate and resentment was indicated by the US State Affairs Department about the relief and recession of American constitution to the Pakistanis officials while having the observations upon the Pakistan criminal law system.

While Pakistan‟s objections upon the term of SOFA was clear and it was stated that SOFA is derogatory term in negotiating process and any here proposal should not be entertained by any means. The re-pondering calls were declared by the US authorities regarding the SOFA negotiating process that is based upon the technical team of experts. While on the Pakistani side, it repeatedly sabotage the process calls into question. Pakistan claimed that it wanted tangible proof of the US commitment. The SOFA importance was depicted in terms of one of the pre- requisites for the fulfillment of such agreements with Pakistan. The cancellation of the mutual assent probably recapitulates the Pakistan rather than America to keep the option open for itself. The long-term bilateral relations were ignored by Pakistan for the sake of short-term goals.

5 Shireen M. Mazari, “US Yearns for Pak Capitulation”, The News, March 8, 2008. 6 Ibid.

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The progressive negotiating table was annually arranged chiefly in 2002-2003 and 2006. However, the declaration of the state of emergency by the military dictator Mushrraf also caused the cancellation of the negotiating meeting in 2007. The US officials procrastinated the next DCG meeting till the political stability in Pakistan. Yet, during this phase the American officials would improve the accounting measures for the Coalition Support Funds (CSFs) to ensure the Congress requirement for the fiscal year 2008 that out of $300 million $250 million must be allocated for counterinsurgency endeavors. Despite this, for discussing the counter-terrorism, counter-narcotics and border security, human trafficking and other related issues the joint working group on counter-terrorism and law enforcement (JWG-CTLE) were established in 2002 after the meeting of DCG-JWG-CTLE officials in the US state department. Other meetings took place in Islamabad with the members of interior ministry of Pakistan.7

It is important to understand that trilateral military commanders (Pakistan- Afghanistan-USA) commission was composed with the fundamental motive to create and find the Afghan insurgency solutions near Pak-Afghan border and inside Afghanistan. It was decided that the commission would lead towards the construction and ground-breaking foundation interest and to build confidence between Pakistan and Afghanistan. Later on, the addition was made for NATO and ISAF (International Security Assistance Force) commanders in Afghanistan. In 2009, approximately the numbers of the meetings were aggregated up to twenty six in Kabul. Inclusion of COAS, and COGS (Chief of General staff) by Pakistan in trilateral relation commission further strengthened the position. The participants expressed their level of contentment that this kind of commission would definitely build more confidence between Pakistan and Afghanistan.8

There is no denial to the fact that commission faced hard challenges. It was flanked to lessen the deficit of trust between Pakistan and Afghanistan and also failed to curtail the deficiency of discontentment between Pakistan and other shareholders. The US soldiers were gun down near the Pak-Afghan border side by the Frontier Corps in May 2007 right after the tripartite meeting was held to deal with the security of Pak-Afghan border. Pakistan‟s force blamed miscreants but the inculpation was

7 Ibid. 8 “Tripartite Commission of Pak, Afghan, NATO Forces Met Today”, Geo News, April 11, 2009.

111 disapproved by the Afghan and the US military forces.9 In January 2008, Serena Hotel in Islamabad was attacked by the suicide bomber and assassination attempt was also committed on Hamid karzai. These incidents once again highlighted the role of ISI. As it was blamed by the Afghan officials‟ that ISI is involved in such kind of attacks. It was therefore, perceived that may be Hamid Karzai will pull itself out of the commission but he did not take this step. In February 2008, Pakistan did not attend the meeting of commission. However, in June 2008 the US defense officials reported that meetings have revived.

The condemnation of Pakistan was obvious because of the violation of its sovereignty by the US air forces near Pak-Afghan border. These air-strikes have got counter allegations by the killing of 11 Frontier Crops border attack created much intolerance in Pakistan on 8th June 2008. The explanation possesses that the air attack was launched in self-defense on the US military as taken in advance as punitive measures even more the US claimed that the paramilitary forces were attacked in far- flanged area of Afghan countryside by those extremists who were incubated in Pakistan. About this violation of air attacks the defense ministry did not take any acute action but the State Department apologized. Moreover, in a briefing it was declared that the air strikes were legal due to retaliation of the coalition forces in justifiable self- defense policy along with the video clips released for further explanation.10

On July 2008, Hamid Karzai gave astonishing threat when the Afghan troops were deployed near the Pakistan‟s border. The productivity of the commission was a question mark for them. The military leadership gave positive statements. After the meeting it was announced in the joint press release; including the praise of Pakistan‟s soldiers. Yet, it is existential fact that large number of attacks took place from the land of Pakistan and FATA is the safe-haven for the insurgents. Later on, commission stated; “The meeting reviewed the security situation in areas along the Pakistan-Afghan border. The commission expressed satisfaction at the existing level of cooperation and reiterated its resolve and commitment to contribute towards peace and security in the region”.11

9 After the August 2008 meeting, the joint statement issued expressed “satisfaction at the existing level of cooperation and reiterated their resolve and commitment to contribute towards peace and security in this volatile region.” See “ISAF Satisfied with Cooperation”, Nation, August 20, 2008. 10 Stephen Graham, “US Releases Video of Clash Along Afghan Border”, USA Today, June 12, 2008. 11 Qudssia Akhlaque, “Role of Tripartite Body Becomes Controversial”, The News, September 5, 2008.

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The bitterness between the two sides, one was comprised of Afghan, NATO, and ISAF and on the other side Pakistan, was increased in 2008. This created temporary suspension of security negotiating process. After, taking the job responsibilities the ISAF Commander-in-Chief Gen. David McKiernan‟s arrival to Pakistan and started the activities of security negotiation commission in June 2008.The continuation of the subordinate body (Border Security Sub-Committee) was agreed and commission meeting was rescheduled in August.12

Security Assistance Programs Agreement between the two countries to root out the threat of terrorism huge amount of compensations was allocated to Pakistan‟s law enforcement forces under the designated CSF program with the aim that the participation of Pakistan in war on terror is in the best interest of America‟s goals. It was argued that the fundamental function of CSFs was to reimburse the amount to Pakistan occurred during the fight against militants rather than capacity building. Yet, the Pakistan‟s military establishment used the amount to purchase the military equipment and did not use it for countering the militancy.13 This assistance included the re-imbursements, sales of various sorts of weapons and to enhance the internal security measures. Furthermore, the percentage of amount that was spent upon the development of different welfare program was $3.1 billion. The spending audit of the development program funds was pleaded from the US side, yet on the contrary, the US authorities received offensive reaction by Pakistan regarding the audit of funds.

Military Reimbursement It is worth mentioning that an immense amount of the US aid was rendered to Pakistan for the strength, empower and military actions against insurgents near some of the Pak-Afghan border territories and for that purpose $5.1 billion was allocated in the CSF. Pakistan is one of the largest recipients of aid in the US war against militancy which is 81% amongst the allies in terms of re-imbursement.14

12 Baqir Sajjad Syed, “Islamabad, ISAF to Reactivate Tripartite Commission”, Dawn, June 28, 2008. 13 “Pentagon Puts Brakes on Funds to Pakistan”, Los Angeles Times, May 7, 2008. 14 Charles Michael Johnson Jr., Combating Terrorism: US Oversight of Pakistan Reimbursement Claims for Coalition Support Funds, Testimony Before the Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs, Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, House of Representatives, Washington, D.C.: US Government Accountability Office, June 24, 2008.

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The main reason for the issuance of large amount of funds under CSFs was to do collaboration in the activities of the forces of Pakistan and expenditure of war in borders. Moreover, the program also provided increases supply of amount if Pakistan takes more stern actions against insurgents. These funds were restricted only for mega surgical actions against the insurgency and not for the casual operations. Pakistan‟s demands were placed for the followings:  Air support and patrol gasoline for air assistance  Air traffic control and air supplies to the affected areas  Maritime interests and patrols  The entrance of the US forces in FATA.15 In fact, for ensuring the transparency and audit in CSFs the US defense controller given the constructive guidelines to Pakistan. It was demanded that for incremental costs of support documentation was essential and these were also important for understanding the mechanism of calculation. Yet, in 2003 GAO later found that these modest requirements were often not met: “Few of the Pakistani claims we reviewed met the criteria contained in the Comptroller’s Guidance. [The US Department of] Defense reimbursed Pakistan more than $2.2 billion, or 76 percent, of Pakistani army claims from January 2004 through June 2007, without obtaining sufficient information to support how the costs were calculated”.16

According to the New York Times one of the US Bush‟s official expressed his comments that critiques points out that the CSFs go directly to the ministry of finance where the usage of the funds takes place in accordance with the presumptive government needs and desires even giving the gross amount of payment to Pakistan is more than hush money to have little part in global war against militancy.17 As Bush administrations interviewed by New York Times; “Much of the American money was not making its way to frontline Pakistani units. Money has been diverted to help finance weapons systems designed to counter India, not Al Qaeda or the Taliban. [T]he United States has paid tens of millions of dollars in inflated Pakistani reimbursement claims for fuel, ammunition and other costs”.18

15 Ibid., p. 7-8. 16 Ibid., p. 9-10. 17 Craig Cohen and Derek Chollet, “When $10 Billion Is Not Enough”, Washington Quarterly 30, no. 2, (Spring 2007): pp. 7-19. 18 Ibid.

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In reality the allocation of CSFs seems to be the favor for Pakistan by the US so that the objectives in the war against terrorism can be achieved.

There is no denial to the fact that the US state officials criticized the dubious role of Pakistan army and leveled corruption charges, yet all allegations were skillfully neutralized by the DoD and provided the an information with suitable justifications that annual budget system of Pakistan is insufficient to produce the factual facts in documents. DoD further provided the information and assurance that no increase or decrease of CSFs in terms of costal modifications and variations. It is fixed and related to the infantry deployment in FATA. DoD also expressed that the multiplicity in the troops deployment was needed the sure-amount to meet the main activities related to peace and security. The amount need increase as the deployment of soldiers need more financial assistance to Pakistan. Advocates of the CSFs also proclaimed that the reimbursements could not be used for other purpose except against militants. However, they acknowledged the fact that CSFs was utilized to buy a technical system to fight against India. It was stated further that the funds were in complete control of Pakistan once they are transferred to the ministry of finance of Pakistan. More, the troops which were approximately 120000 were still deployed in FATA which have decreased the activities of militants. The State Department of the US also paid tribute to Pakistan for its precious loss of material and lives in the war against insurgency and it was only one year to give funds to Pakistan. The self- payments were used during the process of sanction and delivery to Pakistan by the US. Later on, the US expressed willingness for more compensation and incentives if Pakistan helps us out from the Afghan regions. Cohorts also emphasized that the maximum amount of CSFs was given to Pakistan. It must be empowered the Pak-US relationship. They further pointed out that the imposition of stringent accountable terms took place because of distrust emerged between the countries.19

But, the supporters of CSFs to Pakistan emphasized that it should have to provide better documentation of funds transferred under CSFs. Further, the reconciliation process with insurgents‟ caused more incursions and fatality in Afghanistan so the CSFs should have included with IMF by which the US could P tightly control Pakistan.

19 David O. Smith, “Facing Up to the Trust Deficit: The Key to an Enhanced US-Pakistan Defense Relationship”, Strategic Insights, 6, no. 4, June 2007.

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Training of Military and Sale of Weapons The US funds were allocated by 20% that became 2.2 billion through IMF and other program to Pakistan since 9/11. In addition $1.6 million were rendered through IMF. In addition, $300 million were given in the name of „Base Fund‟ in 2005. The initiation of IMET (International Military Education and Training) along with the allocations of funds Pakistan bought from America the military projectiles in 2008. The only condition was that the projectiles and training should be relevant to curb the militants‟ activities.

By the support of IMF Pakistan got number of other platforms which were viable in fighting against terrorists. Purchasing the usual projectiles would not be helpful in counter-militancy, more than $227 million were endowed to enhance the up-gradation of F16 that had the contradiction of the congressional agreement in which it was clarified that the funds must be used against counter-militancy.20

Pakistan bought more expire F16 from American air system, by the name Excess Defense Articles even the solicitation was made for the P-3B so as to carry the E2C Hawkeys born that possess the warning suits. Though, this request was move beyond the first stage. Through Excess Defense Articles program approximately 14 F 16 A/B, 16 T-37 for military training were received by the assistance of IMFs.$4.6 billion used for extra-ordinary ammunitions by Pakistan.

Afterwards, having the elements of severe criticism once again DoD took place in 2005 a step to counter the allegations on Pakistan, as the purchasing of F16 and P3C for surveillance were definitely productive in war against terrorism. Defense ministry alleviated Pakistan‟s way of purchasing the US missiles and other needed weapons particularly using in FATA.21

On practical grounds the training of the native soldiers and creation of mind- to-mind communication and professional Excellences amongst the US and Pakistan military forces, the provision of the international security trainers was given to Pakistan under the name of IMET. The significance of these trainers and trainings were highly effective for the Pakistan army to ensure their vital role in national

20 Ibid. 21 Richard F. Grimmett, US Arms Sales to Pakistan, Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, CRS Report for Congress, Order Code RS22757, updated on January 28, 2008.

116 politics. These training would alter the behavior of Pakistan‟s army towards the stability and consistency of democratic system in Pakistan. In 1990 IMET stopped working when the circumstances were critical between two countries. But in FY 2002-2004, 1 billion was given on annual basis. In 2006, the number of the officers was 106 and the total trainers were 275 to guide them in military assistance. The purpose was to get know-how about the weapons which Pakistan received from the US.22

The Security Development Plan This program was essentially introduced for Pakistan‟s military to enhance its capability to vouchsafe its border territories with Afghanistan. Tenure of the training was consecutive six years to save Pak-Afghan border from the cross intervention by the extremists. The consent and triangle coordination of Pakistan, US embassy and the US Central Command were on board. In FY 2007-2008 $2 billion was provided to run the training then in the FY 2009 $1 billion was demanded as variations in supplemental budget. Main focus was fixated to enhance the operational capabilities of FC. It is a paramilitary force to curb militancy in FATA but works under the control of Pakistan‟s army XI crops.

The classification of the FC corps is in two divisions one belongs to FC KP, based on purely Pushtoons and keeping the responsibilities of protection of FATA. There general headquarter is in Peshawar. On the other hand, FC Baluchistan including soldier from various ethnicities are not purely Balochies. There general headquarter is in Quetta. The officers are seconded by Pakistan army. The total number of soldiers in FC is approximately 80000.

Due to lake of proper training, medical sources and other necessary tools of war FC (KP) received defeats and sufferings many times. This FC was used in low- intensity conflict. It was not equipped with advance weaponry to fight against militancy. There is no denial to the fact that FC possesses severe kind of inabilities, yet the priority was given to FC by the security establishment because of the availability of native speakers in the force.

22 Richard Boucher, Assistant Secretary of State for South and Central Asian Affairs, “On-the- Record Briefing on US-Pakistan Relations”, December 21, 2007.

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First part of the plan was to train the trainers by the US trainers. The inauguration of the two camps took place, one in KP and the other one was in Quetta with thirty US command trainers who will train roundabout 8400 FC soldiers. It was supposed by the US that exploitation of the native soldiers keeping their natural capability of linguistic and geographical competences was vital. These all would surely give gross support in intelligence sharing and understanding. In reality, fragile circumstances of Pakistan‟s did not allow the specificity of the training locations. The training was given in an uncertain place. Further, it was expected that in future the US trained trainers would play an essential role in the defense of Pakistan.

However, the program got criticism because of the dubious role of FC as direct and indirect promotion of religious fighters in Afghan-Russian war in Afghanistan. This role increased the influence of insurgents in the region on huge level.23 But the DoD again seriously defended the FC and added that the proper training would eradicate such destructive weaknesses from FC. DoD also confessed the active role of FC in protecting and aiding the Taliban in the FATA territories during the peak of insurgency in Pakistan.

Another settled target of the training was the enhancement of bilateral relations between the forces of Pakistan, NATO, ISAF and Afghan soldiers to create a common and indivisible role in the elimination of extremism in this part of the region. This program was name as BCCS. This unity and same page would provide a “Common Picture” of the operations.24 Further, the LNOs in Torkham border will meet and share the new plans and ideas regarding conducting the operations. Thus, the US blamed Islamabad that program failed as Pakistan has denied to send its forces against the militants in FATA‟s far-flanged areas.

Furthermore, another objective of the project was to prepare the army‟s high profile unit which renders the dramatic response to the drastic insurgent appearance in the region called SSG. Another name was given to it termed as „21stQuick Reaction Squadron‟ and it would be used in FATA with the utilization of chopper mobility training.

23 Gen. Dan K. McNeill, “A Sober Assessment of Afghanistan: Outgoing US Commander Cites 50% Spike in Attacks in East”, Washington Post, June 15, 2008. 24 Ibid.

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SSG did not always take part in all the operations conducted in FATA, for it is efficacious role in the defensive strategy for the national defense. Further, given the revival stage to the Pakistan‟s force the COAS General Kayani uttered to Americans that more deployment on Western border is impossible for Pakistan, as the conventional war has potential indications. So, the force would be deployed on Indian borders.25

In May 2009, the prejudice which was rooted in the public for the Pakistani forces were erupted because of the sufferings of local people as the forces started to heavy bombardment against the natives of FATA. Therefore, to neutralize the situation COAS clearly indicated: “Owing to its vast experience, the Pakistan Army remains the best suited force to operate in its own area. Uncalled for aspersions through various quarters on our training methods orientation are apparently due to lack of knowledge and understanding of our training system in vogue. [He further said that the Pakistan Army has developed a full range of counter insurgency training facilities, tailored to train troops for such operations”.26

The hard fact cannot be denied, Pakistan army was taking measures according to availability of its resources and regional interests, yet to adopt the strategy under the US dictation to secure its interests would further undermine the sovereignty of Pakistan.

Assistance Received by Pakistan for its Internal Security Keeping in view the elimination of the religious extremism and the contra- bound activities along with border sides having proximity with Afghanistan including smuggling, human-trafficking and other incalculable in-humanitarian activities, the following efforts are clearly documented by the US Department of State and Justice:27  To inculcate the managerial and leadership qualities in lower police soldiers to enhance their moral and communicative skills.  To launch a bio-metric system for the strengthen figure identifications and to collect the criminal record.  For sharing the information about the militants to control insurgency, establishment of interdepartmental coordination for communication and detections.28

25 Ahmed Rashid, “Pakistan‟s Worrisome Pullback”, Washington Post, June 6, 2008. 26 “No Counter-Insurgency Training Needed: Kayani,” 2009. 27 Seth G. Jones, Olga Oliker, Peter Chalk, C. Christine Fair, RollieLal, and James Dobbins, Securing Tyrants or Fostering Reform? US Internal Security Assistance to Repressive and Transitioning Regimes (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, 2006), pp. 125-160. 28 Fair, Securing Tyrants or Fostering Reform? pp. 49-51.

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These all efforts were taken to make more powerful the secrete agencies of Pakistan‟ along with the borders side that include the anti-terrorism, border control of exit and entry check points on Pak-Afghan borders and to complete elimination of the poppy smuggling from Afghanistan to Pakistan.29

In fact, all these struggles brought to the minimal level achievements in FATA owing to have the uneven and mountainous geographical location near the Afghan borders. Yet, to curb the activities of insurgents by the forces were highly exigent. Due to huge gap between military funds provided by the US and practical cost occurred posed negative internal security impacts upon the range of such counter- terrorism activities.

5.3 PROVISION OF ASSISTANCE FOR NON-SECURITY PURPOSES Assistance for Economic Growth and Development The raise of amount given as funds to Pakistan, other than security in 2005- 2007 was $401 million which was before $340 million. It became almost 13% of the total funds provided to Pakistan. The majority of the rendered amount had been utilized in fiscal and enhancement assistance with the aid named the Economic Support Fund.

The essential supports were being delivered to Pakistan in the sectors of sanitation care development, education improvisation and the stabilization of Pakistan economy to withstand against recession, deflation and stagnation. Further, right after 9/11 some of the outstanding debts were paid to the concerned states by the US on behalf of Pakistan so that economic stability can be ensured. Particularly, during the year of 2005 the fundamental variation in funding area was found specifically the areas which were given more emphasis in the field of academic sector to be redeveloped on the level of primary and secondary levels so as to give benefits to the common populace of Pakistan. They gave more prominence to enhance the capability of Instructors to provide constructive guidelines to students.

Addition to this, horrific earthquake in the year 2005 hit the far-flung areas of Pakistan where the health care and sanitary needs were required as medical requirements. The US approved $70 million to ensure better health facilities to the

29 Ibid., pp. 52-56.

120 needy of the areas. Moreover, for the rehabilitation of the people and reconstruction of the damaged areas the USAID rendered maximum financial assistance for the accomplishment of such developing programs which possessed the amount $193 million.30These all steps were taken to build cordial relations and gain public support by the Pakistanis, yet on the contrary, no cementation of the appeasement was emerged. The allocations of funds were not only program-specific but also in form of net cash to ensure best level of efficacy. The supposition feature was to get the development of humanitarian assistance.

The effectiveness of the developing programs were reviewed that whether these projects would strengthen the ratio of change in the life of the commons in FATA as the administration of Pakistan had failed to bring any kind of substantial progress in FATA. This was also a sort of conjuncture that lack of interests in the projects allocated funds may fall in the hands of insurgents that would make the situation severe. Due to the security concerns settled objectives could not be achieved.31

5.4 NON-US ECONOMIC AND DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE TO PAKISTAN

Direct financial support of the US was the foremost priority for the infrastructure and development of the humanitarian aids and services to the people of Pakistan. Non-economic assistance also provided infringed benefits to Pakistan. In fact, the low interest rates were one of the subsidies that offered to Pakistan. Main banks including World Bank, Asian Development Fund, Islamic international bank, Japan and UK international bank were on the top in providing relaxation and less free policy to stabilize Pakistan‟s economy while having the inclusion of low minimal interests on the loans taken by Pakistan.

Asian Development Bank (ADB) comparatively the World Bank issued gross amount of loan between 1993 to 2003. The lending amount was $6.5 billion from ADB and $5.1 billion from World Bank for the similar phase.32 Later on an amount of $2 billion was barrowed more by Pakistan.

30 USAID, “USAID/Pakistan Earthquake Reconstruction News Releases”, 2006–2009. 31 Jane Perlez, “Aid to Pakistan in Tribal Areas Raises Concerns”, New York Times, July 16, 2007. 32 The World Bank, Pakistan: An Evaluation of the World Bank’s Assistance, Washington, D.C., No. 366 18, June 15, 2006, p. 63.

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There were some settled conditions of ADB for lending the amount. First, to improve the prevailing governance system that will inspire the commons to trust and to eradicate trust vacuum between bureaucracy and the people of Pakistan. Second, for poverty alleviation introduction of projects to ensure good and standard quality food to the common people at low rates. Third, the construction of mega transportation structures for the sake of uninterrupted transportation continuity. Fourth, limitation of reconstruction programs for the urbanization. The aims of all these improvements were to ensure the concept of good governance, to strengthen the justice system and transfer of governmental powers to the gross root level.33

The trust and transparency of the delivery were accentuated in the process of completion of the projects. ADB released three kinds of loan to Pakistan for its inevitable programs, chiefly, for the promotion of electricity transmission $600 million were allocated. Furthermore, for the development of farming and agriculture sector particularly in Punjab province where the irrigation system is at highly poor level, therefore for the improvement of canal and irrigation system $900 million were issued. Addition to this, $2 billion were allocated for the betterment of the super high ways so as to reduce the casualties in road accidents. More, financial aids also included the supporting amounts for the earthquake affected families. Another favor was the minimal return interest given to Pakistan.

ADB was the first bank in rank in the lending of funds to Pakistan. Besides this, the next one was World Bank which provided the loan to Pakistan. However, modifications were imposed on governmental policies of Pakistan. World Bank included three structures when lent amount of loan to Pakistan in 1993; first conditionality was monetary critical crisis, afterward the explosions of the nuclear experimental tests during 1998. Being in coordination and rescue structural basis the funding amount was $750 million. After consecutive three years in 2001-2002 the funding amounts were $350-$500 million provided to in accordance with structural adjustment agreed to Pakistan for the promotion of finance betterment. Moreover, some funds directly issued to the provinces of KP and Sindh to continue the efforts for devolution.

33 Asian Development Bank, Pakistan Country Strategy and Program Update 2006–2008, Manila, Philippines, August 2008, pp. 2-3.

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WB paid enormous concentration on the improvement of agriculture sector particularly in Punjab and Sindh. In this regard, $900 million were provided to Punjab and $100 million were given to the province of Sindh. Aim was to improve water facilitation and construct dame for sound production. Projects like Tunsa Barrage $193 million were lent to Punjab and $150 million were given to Sindh. For water irrigation and power supply approximately $350 million was given not only to Punjab but also to Sindh. 34

The social reforms and economic development were the vital conditionality of the WB which was related to the monetary lending. The major role played by IMF which extended helping hands to Pakistan during the deflation, inflation, recession and stagnation of Pakistan‟s economy specifically in the year 2008. But, these all helping and loan measures were based on some conditionality to provide the sound foundation to Pakistan‟s economic structure and stability to its current fiscal policies. The electrical tariffs, increase in the recollection of the taxes, control of the deficit particularly keeping the point of inflation in policies to allure the foreign investors to invest in Pakistan. The total amount of loan was $11 billion along with the instructions and guidelines for making more stringent the monetary policy of the State Bank of Pakistan.35

Besides, healthy support of United Kingdom cannot be ignored in the fields of humanitarian service, chiefly in the cases of pregnancy to make the foundation of high level facilities to the newly born babies and good health care to the mothers. The amount which was allocated to Pakistan was $126 million in the year of 2006 in which the extremists‟ activities were at the peak. Moreover, Japan rendered for the development of transportation facilities for the common convenience. This fund included the expansion and rehabilitation of the high ways to stop the accidental futuristic phenomena. The funding amount was $167 million. Even UK gave for the poverty alleviation and marketing promotion to increase the commons live and involve in positive activities rather than inclined towards the negative activities. For these projects the given amount was $12 million in 2003. Keeping in concentration the governmental governing system UK provision took place for the betterment of public sectors to have the basic rights of the common people. The second largest aid

34 Ibid. 35 Fair, Securing Tyrants or Fostering Reform. p. 47.

123 was issued which was $858 million. These two countries (afore-mentioned) played an important role in the promotion and stability of Pakistan. It further strengthened bilateral relations between the two countries. Moreover, the financial assistance had also been given by the other countries such as Canada, Norway, and Germany etc for the infrastructure development of Pakistan.36

5.5 THE US PUBLISH DIPLOMACY AND DEMOCRACY PROMOTION EFFORTS

For establishing sound political structure and to create social awareness among public regarding their role in democratic process of the country, initiative was taken to ensure participation of common populace. This program was started in 2007 by the appellation of ESF (Economic Support Fund). For Conducting of training to the politicians the important steps were to strengthen committee system in parliament and to able Pakistan to adopt its own procedure of election. Further, for the active role of media and the awareness of the media staff about the development and participation of masses in democratic system and for the empowerment of the common masses programs were also enlisted in the US initiatives.37

The importance of the young generation cannot be ignored in the contemporary world. Keeping in view the young Pakistanis the US priority was fixate upon them. The first initiative was to bring about 2000 youngsters who were qualified to be trained more about English language and civics. These students would surely spread the light of ethics in far flung FATA. Moreover, it was decided that 3000 to 4000 people would stay in the US for getting the various sorts of language courses which were effective for the common people.

5.6 THE DOWNSIDES OF CONDITIONALITY

Since, the insurgency was on the rise in border areas, the US in 2007 put stringent conditions upon funds supply to Pakistan in term of curbing the extremists‟ activities. Particularly to control the expansionism of Taliban in FATA and other parts of the city areas of KP. All the above conditions caused the trust deficit between Pakistan and the US. Pakistan‟s suspicions about the US commitments and temporary security measures cold the relations of both the states.

36 Daily Times, April 29, 2008. 37 Ibid.

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In 2009, Pakistan received significant amount under Kerry-Lugar Bill which was passed by the US Senate.38 The bill had the conspicuous demarcation about the military and non-military assistance to Pakistan. Due to paying consideration to the loss of gross number of civilians in war on terror the bill was based that the triple increase of the funding amount to Pakistan $1.5 billion. The military funding support was conditioned under non-military aid:

 The prevention of military intervention in political system as well in judicial process.  The elimination of militants‟ sanctuaries in Pakistan especially of Afghan Taliban.  To stop the movement of different groups such as Al-Qaeda and its associates in Pak-Afghan borderland and the urban areas of Pakistan.

This bill contained the amount of $7.5 billion from 2009 to 2013 to depict that there is no duplicity on the part of the US.39

American Congress sanctioned the bill with majority votes to hand over the fund amount which has no pertinence with the military aid. The amount was $1.5 billion that had the rigorous fixation upon the spreading of light in the country by means of widespread educational activities. The act „Pakistan Enduring Assistance and Cooperation Enhancement‟, which is also termed as 2009 PEACE ACT was passed. Moreover, the approval of approximately $400 million accepted by the congress to augment the power in anti-extremists projects. This legislation of Congress was passed with focused terms and conditions which include the nuclear system protective measure and assurance of its non-proliferation to the adjacent as well as other states.40

Not only lower house but also upper house of the US showed their profound reservations upon the colossal amount of funding amounts and other crucial infringe benefits availed by Pakistan with no salubrious results pertinent to the US strategic goals. They demanded that all the military and security assistance must be clear record in terms of accountability and audit of all those approved to Pakistan.

38 The US Congress, 111th Cong., 1st Sess., Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act of 2009, Washington, D.C., S. 962, 2009-2010. 39 See the text of the US Congress, 110th Cong., Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act of 2008, Washington, D.C., S. 3263, September 26, 2008. 40 Dan Robinson, “Pakistan Aid Bill Clears House Committee”, , May 21, 2009.

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5.7 THE DOWNSIDES OF THE US SUPPORT FOR INDIVIDUAL PAKISTANI LEADERS

(Pakistan’s Individual Leaders Rreceived the US Downsides Support) Military role is highly influential in third world countries specifically in Asia. The military intervention and dethrone of any civilian political leader is not any new news for the people of Pakistan. Musharraf support was highly criticized by the civil society and intellectuals with the following solid reasons;  Using of national army against its own people causing more resentment among the people against the state.  Bases which have been provided to the US for air strikes and infantry assistance during the time of attack on Afghanistan and Iraq.  Americans‟ backing for dictatorship and not for democracy for Pakistan.  Dragging Pakistan into the war on terror which is not only security threat but also financial detriment for Pakistan.  Launching of military operations in FATA which are converting people into anti-government.41

The stepping down of dictator Musharraf was analyzed by many critiques that this decision was the final stage of Musharraf‟s professional as well as political career. Besides, the US support was criticized by the numerous civilians owing to give helping hand to Musharraf not as COAS but also President to the republic of Pakistan. Even, in one fanfare high officials of the US met Musharraf which was severely criticized by democratic forces in America.42

In September 2008, general elections took place and civilian government was restored. Under the president ship of it was believed by the masses that Zardari was a kleptocrate and not a reliable person while few believed that he would wave off all the accumulated presidential powers and would restore the parliamentary setup.43

41 Ibid. 42 “Musharraf Asks US for Greater Market Access for Pak Products”, Daily Times, April 29, 2008. 43 Crocker‟s statements in “You, Not US, Must Decide Democratic Model for Pakistan”, Daily Times, March 27, 2007.

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5.8 PAK-US MARRIAGE OF CONVENIENCE TO CONTAIN RISING MILITANCY AND FOMENTING INSURGENCIES THROUGH MILITARY OPERATIONS

After the incident of 9/11, (Jihadists‟ attack on World Trade Centre and Pentagon), General Pervez Musharraf joined American-led alliance and started to target Al-Qaeda members and other affiliated conglomerates. Under the alliance state of Pakistan allowed and provided air, land and sea port facilities to America and NATO troops. Logistical and other related facilities were also provided. Security vanguards through military operations started to target the foreign militants and to dismantle their operational networks in FATA. Since, the combat operations were intensified in Afghanistan by the US and NATO‟s troop number of local insurgencies abruptly spiraled in Pak-Afghan border land. On the other when the Pakistani security forces also expanded the operational activities in Pakistan indigenous militants groups gathered under the banner of Threek-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) in 2007 and built their base in FATA. Under the guidance of Baitullah , militants‟ outfits created havoc by suicide bombing inside Pakistan.44

Rising militancy compelled Pakistan to satiate its thrust of revenge, therefore many local operations were started to eradicate the menace of insurgency in the native land. In these operations, the US supported Pakistani forces in term of financial assistance. The military operations were started in 2001. Following are the important military operations which were initiated to mitigate the insurgents‟ threat.45  Operation Enduring Freedom (2001-2002)  Operation Al-Meezan (2002-2006)  Operation Zalzala (2008)  Operation SherDil, Rah-e-Haq, and Rah-e-Rast (2007-2009)  Operation Rah-e-Nijat (2009-2010).  Operation Zarb-e-Azab (15 June 2015)

Having the acute and factual analysis of all the military activities and operations against the insurgents, to the level and comprehension of the common perceptions, no remarkable achievements were being received by paramilitary forces

44 C. Christine Fair, and Seth G. Jones, “Pakistan‟s War Within”, Survival 51, no. 6, (December 2009): pp. 161-188. 45 Paul Gordon Lauren, Diplomacy: New Approaches in History, Theory, and Policy (New York: Free Press, 1979), pp. 43-68.

127 in FATA and its adjoining areas. On the other hand, improvement is the fundamental key factors of any process, the same thing happened in the operations in FATA. With the passage of the time, some mega achievements were took place. In reality, the stage came when agreements between Militants and Government were started to be inked. Important terms and conditions of the agreements were the followings:  The government would compensate the real estate losses to the local indigent militants to appease their grievances by means of financial assistance.  The military will be re-called to their barracks.  The political legitimate rights will be given to the capable insurgents to participate in the political structure of Pakistan.  The permission of possessing the weapons to some extent by the militants for their self-protection.  The militants would not involve in any kind of detrimental activities against the international forces in Afghanistan.

Nevertheless, the agreement failed due to the lack of trust between the two parties. The deal had not contained any solid verification, so the failure was certain. This agreement ended in smoke because of having no appropriate mechanism of their application and lack of national consent.

Indeed, being in gross level of dilemma Pakistan‟s political and military leadership got ideological vacuum whether to operate against or go for agreement with the insurgents.46 Being possessed the geographical proximity with India; always the borders are being found having the belligerent situations. The threat of conventional war with India is surely hanging on the heads of Pakistan‟s military forces. The initiation of proxy war of Pakistan against India the strategy was shifted from FATA to Indian borders.47 Therefore, launching the operation against militants by the Pakistan‟s military to keep in control the law and order situation in borderland.48

46 “Pak Army Needs No Foreign Training: COAS”, The Nation, May 16, 2009. 47 Cyril Almeida, “Kayani Spells Out Threat Posed by Indian Doctrine”, Dawn (Karachi), February 4, 2010. 48 Kramer, “Counterinsurgency in Chechnya”, International Security 29, no. 3, (Winter 2004-05), p. 8.

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Before going into the detailed discussion about the utilization of different counter-insurgency operations it is pivotal to understand the capacity of law enforcement agencies which were at war against militants.

Pakistani Forces (Three Sorts) Fighting against terrorism Pakistan utilized majorly three kinds of man powers to eradicate the cancer of extremism form its soil specifically on the top was national army, second it was the Frontier Corps, possessed by majority of native Pushtoon soldiers, and third force was Frontier Constabulary. The classification of these forces was bifurcated in accordance with level of intensity of insurgency of the localities. In 2008-2009, the total number of the paramilitary forces availability in FATA was approximately 120000 soldiers who constructed their garrisons in various points in FATA.49

1. Pakistan Army For any nations in the world national arms forces are contemplated as the spinal cord which is the chief defensive organ in the country. The number of the personnel of Pakistan Army is just 55,000. These soldiers are currently on their actual operational activities. Besides, 50,000 are currently reservists. In accordance with the land-based strategic values and points it has establish nine headquarters across the country. In addition, with the tenth corps which is also called Army Strategic Force Command was placed.50 The army of Pakistan is vitally trained to fight with India on different earth levels specifically on even lands, mountainous areas, and deserts to ensure the defense of the country. Though this is culture to some level is modified and varied due the need of the circumstances in modern theory of relations. It was assumed that during the tenure of COAS, General Kayani, who decide of the doctrine related to the involvement of the forces in anti-terrorism operations. But this all assumptions were dissipated when Kayani recapitulated that despite of the insurgency in the country, India Pakistan war may take place in the line of control with Pakistan‟s border so the heavy deployment must be on the Indian borders to defend Pakistan.51

49 Gurmeet Kanwal, “Losing Ground: Pak Army Strategy in FATA and NWFP”, New Delhi: Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, Issue Brief No. 84, October 2008. 50 International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 2009 (London: Routledge, 2009), p. 13. 51 Ahmed Rashid, “Pakistan‟s Worrisome Pullback”, Washington Post, June 6, 2008.

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Furthermore, the force, which was supported or backed by the US Special Operations Forces (SOF), participated in many risky and hazardous operational activities. This force appellation is SSG (Special Services Group) inside the Pakistan‟s national force. This force unit came into existence in 1956.This SSG unit involved in the training of many Afghans during the Soviet Union incursion on Afghanistan in the year of 1980. Even, SSG had participated in the covert operational activities either against the Soviets troops.

2. Frontier Corps Frontier corps comes under the authority of Pakistan‟s interior ministry but it central operational command is with Pakistan‟s army. When and where it should be used purely belongs to the national army. It is divided into two main bifurcations chiefly related KP one group and the other group related to Baluchistan. The entire number of the frontier corps is approximately 80000. Frontier Corps of KP is used in FATA and its main headquarter is in Peshawar main city. This group of Frontier Corps is under the command of XI Corps currently in terms of operational participation of activities. This unit contains the majority of Pushtuns. On the other hand, the other group of Frontier Corps belongs to Baluchistan. This group is based upon the different ethnic soldiers not like KP group immaculately Pushtuns, headquarter is located in provincial city of Quetta.52 Moreover, the earlier group of Frontier Corps is also termed as „FATA Choice‟ because the majority soldiers are being recruited from the Tribal Areas. The benefits of these local inhabitants recruitment are as follow;  They are expert of the native dialects or vernacular languages  They better understand the terrain of the land.  They have strong attachment with the people on the other side of borders.  They have the maximum level the understandability of the behavior of locals.  They have familiarity with Pukhtoon culture, tradition and civilization.

Despite of these productive features still some of these Frontier Corps soldiers were found in the hidden assistance and cooperation of the militants along with the de facto border between Afghanistan and Pakistan. Even stating more conspicuously by

52 Hassan Abbas, “Transforming Pakistan‟s Frontier Corps”, Terrorism Monitor 5, no. 6, (March 2007). pp. 47-48.

130 one of the American high officials and advisor of Afghanistan Secretary Condoleza Rice and David Kilcullen reported that in infiltration from the other sides of borders under the supervision during the daylight. These infiltrations in or interruptions in Afghanistan caused severe damages not only to lives but had also inflicted financial losses in the Afghanistan. These militants directly crossed the border in the light of the direction given to them by Frontier Corps.53 Indeed, in the year 2004 some of the factual facts highlighted the involvement of some of the soldiers of the Frontier Corps as supporters to the insurgents.54

3. Frontier Constabulary and Frontier Police The fundamental responsibility of the FC) is to maintain law and order situation especially in the national territories of FATA and settled areas. These areas mainly includes the Pak-Afghan borders nearly Torkham, Chaman etc. Moreover, the FC soldiers were also deployed in the capital city of Islamabad and Punjab province as they received security threats in their respective areas from militants. Owing to the strategic technique applications in recruitment policy the common soldiers are recruited from the native tribal people and the officers are recruited from national police.55

After taken the decision of military operations against extremists in the country, the law and order was the primary priority of the law enforcement agencies across the country. The FC forces were deployed in settled areas where the insurgents took huge benefits from their existence through the severe attacks on them. These attacks included suicide attacks, attacking with heavy artillery in face fight with them. FC, on ground realities, possessed no modern and advanced weapons to face the insurgents. Many casualties took place to the FC. Similarly, Frontier Corps NWFP province possessed the Frontier Police Force which is used in the localities to maintain law and orders. This force has the urgent need of modern equipment and suitable moderate techniques of training to stand before the militants.56

53 David Kilcullen, The Accidental Guerrilla: Fighting Small Wars in the Midst of a Big One (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), p. 57. 54 M. Ilyas Khan, “Mixed Signals”, The Herald, March 2004, pp. 63-65. 55 Ibid. 56 Hassan Abbas, Police & Law Enforcement Reform in Pakistan: Crucial for Counterinsurgency Counterterrorism Success, Report of the Institute for Social Policy and Understanding, April 2009.

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5.9 SUPPORT TO OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF)

Pakistan‟s role is highly vital in the political spectrum and geographical proximity in the Asia‟s locations. As the US decided to launch military offensive to weed out the Taliban government after the attacks on the US during on September 11, 2001 America needs the support of Pakistan during the operational activities in Afghanistan against the Taliban‟s regime to dethrone them. This dethroning will cement the way to appease the circumstances across the world.

Then, America‟s pre-requisite of the support of Pakistan in the operations of the war on terror after the brutal attack of Al-Qaeda in the US. Pakistan‟s promise to support and provide assistance on the maximum level to the America‟s paramilitary forces, yet some of the complexities emerged by the end of September 2001. But all the matters were sorted out. Fighting against the Taliban‟s government, it became one of the allies of America, Pakistan‟s participation were available in two fundamental aspects regarding the war anticipatory strategy. First, the permission of the air space to the American forces to have the utilization and air strikes on Afghanistan. Besides, some of the air bases and military camps were rendered to American intelligence specialists who will operate the operational activities. The intelligent agency in these camps will do the comparative analysis of the diplomatic relations and the logistic support of Taliban from Pakistan.57Moreover, due to using the territories of Pakistan, American needed to have mutual coordination with Pakistan to create consent upon the war on terror in this part of the region. Then the US embassy in Islamabad by the name of Pakistan-American facility in the embassy; to share the essential data regarding the important leaders of Al-Qaida, some of the bases which were used by the US military as well as intelligence forces, these were Shamsi, Dalbandin, Jacababad and so on. In fact, American operations needed the ultra-modern war equipment to defeat Taliban in Afghanistan. So, America installed the advanced Radar system for getting the air information on the extensive range of the Pakistan air-space.58

57 Pervez Musharraf, In the Line of Fire: A Memoir (New York: Simon & Schuster 2006), pp. 201- 207. 58 K. Alan Kronstadt, Pakistan-US. Anti-Terrorism Cooperation (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, March 2003), p. 12.

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The second vital assistance was given to American operations was the heavy deployment of the various paramilitary forces along with the intelligence chiefly, ISI and Frontier Corps. These were actually to prevent the infiltration of Taliban form the territories where the threat of infiltration was expected. So Pakistan deployed specifically two brigades of the arm forces on Pak-Afghan border. One of the brigades was 9th division and the other was from XI Corps. In 2001-2002 these brigades were deployed to empower the internal security measures and give helping hand to America against war on terror. For taking into consideration the reaction from the extremists‟ side Pakistan felt the dire need to the some extent the quick-special forces in FATA. For this reason some of the forces were deployed in Wana and Kohat both are located in Waziristan‟s agency. The number of the paramilitary forces was approximately 4000.59

In 2001, Pakistan‟s deployment on Kuram agency and Khyber agency prevented the entering of militants from Afghanistan to Pakistan. When the decision was taken to take military actions against militants and Al-Qaida in the very mountainous terrain territory called . The emergence of unfavorable phenomenon occurred when the skirmish between militants and paramilitary forces of Pakistan started operation in October 2001 when militants were crossing the Pak- Afghan borders near Bajur agency (Nawa Pass) clash took place between the insurgents and Pakistani forces.60

Pakistan multiplied the number of soldier in North and South Waziristan when America initiated military operations in Paktika province more specifically in the village of Shah-e-Kot.61 Pakistanis paramilitary forces conducted various operations in the South Waziristan in which they captured innumerable amount of weapons of different sorts particularly from Azam Warsak and Kanza Punga where they got various kinds of explosive, ammunitions and arsenal used by the militants. Then in May, the National Tochi Scouts launched operations against the insurgents near Miranshah in Waziristan. To capture the foreigners and other high valued figures

59 Gary Berntsen and Ralph Pezzullo, Jawbreaker: The Attack on Bin Laden and Al-Qaeda: A Personal Account by the CIA’s Key Field Commander (New York: Crown Publishers, 2005). pp. 67-69. 60 Rahimullah , “Fall of the Last Frontier?”,Newsline (Karachi), June 2002. 61 Paul L. Hastert, “Operation Anaconda: Perception Meets Reality in the Hills of Afghanistan”, Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 28, no. 1, (January-February 2005): pp. 11-20.

133 which were crossing the borders for the purpose to take shelter from Afghanistan. Pakistanis forces entered into Para Chinar valley which is located in Khyber Agency near NWFP province.62Many Afghans and other foreigners in Baluchistan province were captured in these operations that had close links with Al-Qaeda network. All these captives were kept by the paramilitary forces along with assistance of the ISI. Some of these captives had been given to America. These all given captives were kept in different locations in Afghanistan namely Badgram, Kandhar and other hidden cells of government. More, some of these captives were kept with Pakistanis forces either.

In reality, despite of the past adequate experiences of the involvement in the wars with India and in Bangladesh, where the army intervention and using the force to control the uprising circumstances of the Bengalis in 1971, did not display the prudence in war strategies by side of Pakistanis forces. Pakistan military forces fought in 1973-1977 in Baluchistan. The high profiled insurgent was also killed in one of the military operations in Baluchistan during the year of 2005. All these sorts of experiences have given no significant advantages in the fight against terrorism.63 Fights in Baluchistan and Bangladesh caused heavy collateral losses in the regions. But, war on terror was the vital issue for the paramilitary forces of Pakistan because of having not damages and they turned the table of war on terror to the conventional war towards India.

The real circumstances revealed that in Afghanistan the government of Taliban was ended with outstanding support of Pakistan. During this dethroning of an established government of the fundamentalists, this remarkable event placed Muasharraf in the peak of his life‟s career. More, the public gross level attention was given to Musharraf. He was welcomed and appreciated across the world due to his stance against extremism for sake of becoming allayed and gets financial assistance from other foreign countries. In that era the American ambassador was Wenday Chamberlin. This was the best stage for Pakistan to get the flow of foreign aids like water flowing in the stream. The plight state turned from adversity into prosperity. 28.Many insurgents ware arrested form the different local territories where the border

62 International Crisis Group, Pakistan’s Tribal Areas: Appeasing the Militants, Brussels, Islamabad (December 2006), p. 14. 63 Peter Patchell, “Pakistan‟s Secret War in Baluchistan”, The Guardian, December 21, 2007.

134 proximity was. After in closed inspection and investigation they were set free by the Pakistan military in 20002.64 Keeping the acute sharing of intelligence information

Pak-US coordination cement the route for the joint operation in various places of Pakistan to capture the militants and Al-Qaida leader who were participated directly or indirectly in 9/11 or the other attacks during different times on the US or other countries‟ forces. Chiefly, Abu Zubaihdaah taken in custody from Faisalabad city, he is the valued face of the Al-Qaida, who was involved in the US consulate bomb attack in Karachi in September 2002.65

In spite of capturing those insurgents who were on the great intensity level need to the American forces. Further, Pakistan fixated its severe crackdown and custody of the only Al-Qaida groups. This provided the emergence of other subgroups in the Pakistani territories.66 Having the minute level of sharp observation of the operations against the insurgents, Richard Armitage clearly stated that Musharaf‟s military utilization was only against the elements of Al-Qaida rather than Taliban. Pakistan‟s own focus was on the top dogs of Al-Qaida too in reality. Pakistan helped to arrest some of the key figures such as Abu Zubaihdaah, Abu Al-Faraj AL-Libbi, and Khalid Sheikh Muhammad and so on. The sole operation against Al-Qaida was recalled by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) chief in Pakistan‟s station stated purely that the US and Pakistan both states policy was to get riddance of Al-Qaida. This proved that Taliban were considered as spent force in the region.

Last but not least, operation enduring freedom was deemed to be neither successful nor un-successful as not paying heed to the ‟ important key figures and Al-Qaida leadership like Ayamen Al-Zawahir and Usama Bin Ladin. These were two decisive reasons pushed Pakistan into dark ages and TTP emerged in Pakistan‟s tribal belt where the instability and chaos upraised. The only success was the over- throwing the solid regime of Taliban in Afghanistan. Capturing some of the Taliban and Al-Qaeda leaders from different parts of Pakistan was a positive omen that was highly pro-active in terms of ignition of anti-government propagation. Many were handed over to America and some were kept in Pakistan or released.

64 Zaffar Abbas, “Operation Eyewash”, The Herald (Karachi), August 2005, p. 64. 65 Musharraf, In the Line of Fire, pp. 237-240. 66 Ashley J. Tellis, Pakistan and the War on Terror: Conflicted Goals, Compromised Performance, (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2008), p. 7.

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5.10 OPERATION AL-MIZAN Dethronement of Taliban‟s government in Afghanistan turned the faces of the Taliban into the adjoining territories on Pak-Afghan border. For keeping the authority of the state above and not to provide militants to establish state within state Pakistan initiated the operation termed as MIZAN (Justice). After the poisonous attack of the militants in Wana South Waziristan on paramilitary force camp called Azam Warsak in which nearly 24 to 30 soldiers were killed in 2002 infuriated military establishment.67 Military operations were conducted with the aid of the US war strategists to empower Pakistan army in taking weapons against the insurgents. Furthermore, the assistance of the US operation experts was also based on the free movements of Al-Qaeda leader triggered into Pakistan so as to bring them to books. Then, some of the militants attacked several time the US military camps near Afghan borders namely Shkin in Afghanistan. Militants established their rule in FATA specially Waziristan which was the critical stage for the Pakistan‟s forces. Therefore, initiation of military actions was indispensible to target the insurgents more lucidly the foreigners in the regions of South Waziristan. During the tenure of Musharraf being as COAS, Al-Qaeda deputy head issued religious decree (Fatwa) of the killing of Musharraf. Here the conflicts of interests appeared. Musharraf was attacked several times by the Taliban and Al-Qaida. However, he was not assassinated. His assassination endeavors were observed either on practical grounds when he had a narrow escape in suicide attacks. Consequently, Musharraf willingly lunched military actions against the militancy in Pakistan.68The US financial assistance continued to Pakistan to convince the security vanguards to be involved on massive levels in fight against miscreants in FATA. This persuasion gave the US an edge to curb anti- American figures in Pakistan. America‟s financial supports were allocated profusely to the influential security agencies and the prominent central intelligence agency ISI (Inter-Services Intelligence), including police and FC which was approximately $2 billion per annum.69 It is certain that the conduct of the military operations against the insurgents needed the huge number of soldiers‟ deployment in FATA, so Pakistan

67 M. Ilyas Khan, “Descent into Anarchy”, The Herald (Karachi), March 2004, p. 62. 68 Ahmad Rashid, Descent into Chaos: The US and The Disaster In Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Central Asia. The US and Disaster in Pakistan, Afghanistan and Central Asia (New York: Penguin Books, 2008), p. 270. 69 Craig Cohen and Derek Chollet, “When $10 Billion Is Not Enough: Rethinking US Strategy Toward Pakistan”, Washington Quarterly 30, no. 2, (Spring 2007), pp. 7-19.

136 sent approximately seven to eight thousand military personnel, possessing the various units from national army during the time of continuation of Al-Mizan in FATA.

As it is certain from the historical and operational point of view that all the national forces cannot conduct any operations in the region without the coordination with all its divisions to counter the nefarious designs of the enemies; Pakistan‟s infantry unit needed the support of Pakistan Aviation to meet the challenges in rocky terrain in FATA. Aviation unit played significant role in air-strike attacks on militants. More, it also provided logistics support, and medium transportations specifically in the year 2002. Waziristan and Tochi scouts involved in operational exercises in FATA. For the regular operational activities one Special Services Group SSG and other regular troops were used to control the situation. On actual ground, some of the military check posts were placed in the Waziristan. Next, the government high official had given the task to political agent and other concerned authorities to identify the supporters who provide the assistance to the militants in the agency. The traditionally chosen heads of the village called “Malaks” were taken in confidence to identify the native militants who were in cooperation and had settled the foreigners in their localities. Round about 70 indigents were identified by the natives. There is no denial to the fact that they were from the renowned tribe of .70 While the initiation of surgical operation in January and October in various places in both South and North Waziristan caused the stringent repercussions from the opponents by means of attacking at nights firing rockets from unknown location on military camps in Waziristan. In October merely 2500 military personnel were dispatched to launch surgical operation in the village of Baghar in South Waziristan. On the return, the soldiers were attacked by the terrorists.71

After the induction of the minor level of the military operations in Waziristan the circumstances trigger from bad to worse not only in South but also in North Waziristan agency. Pakistan‟s intelligence services also indicative signs of the presence of Al-Qaeda‟s activities in the month of March specifically in Waziristan‟s valley of WANA.

70 “International Crisis Group”, p. 14. 71 Rashid, Descent into Chaos, p. 62.

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In retaliation it was essential to initiate the rescue operations in Kalosha II. The residents, who belong to the militant area, kidnapped some of the FC soldiers particularly in Waziristan. Military operations were essential in the tribal area because numerous militants had become highly influential and active in many areas such as Muhammad Sharif, Naik Muhammad, Molvi Abbas, Noor-ul-Islam, Muhammad Wazir etc. These all militants cordially provided shelter to the foreign militants in the area.72

In March 2004, military started operation and siege the West Wana, where traumatic circumstances were faced by the military force. In this operation one army officer was killed, besides, 15 soldiers of Frontier Corps were also included. Further, owing to unpredictable situation as the forces were defeated and 14 soldiers were made hostages. The irreparable losses related to finance and transportation occurred to the military conveyances in the area of AhamdZaitribe. In the areas of Karikot, Shin Warsak, DzhaGundai severe resistance was faced. Even the military scattered in appropriate networking tunnels in Wana. The tribal‟s tug of war with the militants impelled military to spread the forces operations to the areas of further 50 kms. First, the surgical operations required 700 soldiers then the number exceeded to the maximum strength of 7000 soldier to encircle the terrorists. This operation included the air-strike supports form the Pakistan Air Force in which they used choppers and other jets against the militants. Thus, at the end the chief of the operation announced triumph over the militants in Wana.73

Launching the operation in Kalosha, Pakistani forces destroyed the hidden entrenchments and other depots of the militants in the locality. During the operations, numerous sorts of military paraphernalia were captured by the forces. More, the major channel of connection of Al-Qaeda in Kalosha was also dismantled. After, this military actions terrorist dispersed secretly from Kalosha. Then, the local militants inaugurated the attacks on Pakistan‟s military in the areas such as Bermal, AngoorAdda, Laddha, Shwal etc. Military for the sake of security established garrisons which created the extreme level of rage among the people of Kalosha.74

The influence of the foreign militants in Shakai Valley was going to be increased. Not only the US but also Pakistan‟s intelligence reports were given to

72 Amir Mohammad Khan, “Spiralling into Chaos,” Newsline (Karachi), March 2004, pp. 34-36. 73 M. Ilyas Khan, “Who Are These People?”The Herald (Karachi), April 2004, pp. 60-68. 74 SailabMahsud, “Caught in the Cross fire,” The Herald (Karachi), April 2004, pp. 66-67.

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Pakistan army to initiate the force strategy against the militants chiefly in oppositions to Uzbeks, Chechens and other local inhabitants of the village where approximately over 200 hundred foreign militants were involved in insurgency. In 2004, forces formally launched operation against these militants.

Taking into the widespread role of the terrorists in the region military troops including American Trained Force and FC, that number of them was Ten thousand, were deployed there. The air-strike aids gave the maximum strength to the forces. PAF used the exact night precision weapons to bombard the locations of the militants.

With the supports of the intelligence agencies the forces commenced the operations in the areas. This operation caused the internecine to the opponents in the battle ground. Over 50 terrorists were killed and many of them were wounded. From the side of military force four fighters were died and fourteen got injured. The shelling of and bombardment on localities the choppers dropped the soldiers. The intelligence assistance information was given by the US CIA operatives to the forces. From a number of compounds loaded Lorries were captured possessing the multimedia equipments such as TV, computers, LCD etc.75

Being a front line ally of the US, Pakistan received aid of air-strikes from America to attack the militants‟ places in South and North Waziristan specifically in the areas of Madakhel and Dhogvillage in the year 2004. One of the most wanted members of Al-Qaida Hamza Rabia died in the operation. He was the main operative member in the group, running the affairs of Al-Qaida in the region in 2005.76 Paying concentration to the realization of the British in the part of the region, Pakistan‟s forces used the same strategy to prevent the futuristic damages to the military forces. They inked an agreement with the local insurgents to maintain long- standing peace and avoid the military damages in the areas. The agreement was in contrast with the state laws and constitution. This was the same mechanism which was adopted by the Brothers for tribal area. Later on, Bruisers started violence against the tribal people who were unruly and violated the terms of agreement which were to ensure peace in the locality.77

75 Musharraf, In the Line of Fire, pp. 269–270. 76 Rahimullah Yusufzai, “Whose Country Is It Anyway?”The Herald (Karachi), February 2006, pp. 27-32. 77 David Loyn, Butcher and Bolt: Two Hundred Years of Foreign Engagement in Afghanistan, (London: Hutchinson, 2008), pp. 45-46.

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Operation came to an end in 2004 particularly in Kalosha. The government and the militants signed an agreement under the supervision of KPK information provincial minister Syed Iftikhar Hussain Shah and other fifty members of the Jirga (Tribal Elders). This council also included the members from the famous religious political party JUI. To pacify the circumstance and to prevent the collateral harms on both sides in the area was the priority. Meanwhile the collation partner of the JUI in Baluchistan was the Musharaf‟s party Muslim League (Q).JUI was in contact with the following groups i.e. Sipa-e-Sahaba, Jesh-i-Mohammad, Lashkar-i- Jhangvi, Taliban etc.

In March, dozens of people were made hostage by the militants in Klosha. The military had a sole demand of handing over foreign militants, yet in the meanwhile militants gave the counter-conditions such as compensation will be given which has been dismantled which are eighty three in number, un-siege the localities from the forces and to release 163 militants which were captured during the military operation in the area.

It is pertinent to mention here that religious scholars always played a vital role in appeasement and pacification of the pandemonium at any place; government needed the religious scholars‟ assistance to persuade the militants to negotiate. This terminal negotiation between government and extremists held on 27th March 2004 in Waziristan. The renowned Mufti included Mufti Naik Muhammad, Mufti Sharief Muhammad and thirty-three other qualified competent religious personnel from Deoband Seminary group, tribal leaders from Zalikhailtribe adjacent to Wana participated.78 Traditionally Jirga is held in public places, but this time round, it was conducted in Madrasa near Wana and due importance was also given to the clergy class in making agreements. The agreement was accentuated upon the below given fundamental points:  All the foreigners will adopt the formal registration process with the government  No interference of the army in FATA affairs.  Military will be confined to their barracks in FATA.  Militants will not attack on forces in the area.  No national infrastructure will be attacked by the militants.79

78 Aliens Asked to Surrender by 30th,” Dawn (Karachi), April 25, 2004. 79 Ibid.

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Nevertheless, the agreement had the points which were contrary to the constitution of Pakistan; the militants‟ view was that they have got the legal license to weaponize themselves. The reconciliation was solely in the favor of militants not the army. The reimbursement was demanded but who will render the amount to real victim family of the localities. This concord also cemented the route for the political legitimacy of the militancy in FATA. Agreement revealed the more power of militants over the national army of Pakistan.

The relevant authorities of the security establishment met the various religious scholars to negotiate about the accord. The tribal tradition defines that if someone‟s rival approaches to the opponent‟s areas this is a tacit surrender. The senior journalist especially on Afghan affairs and FATA Rahimullah Yousufzai presented his view in the following words;

“This is very important in the tribal context because an army general [General Safdar Hussain] is going to Nek Mohammad Wazir’s place. Instead of the militants coming to the army, the army is going to their place, which means they recognize their strength and their influence. Then you go to a Madrassa, which was in a way one of the headquarters of the militants”.80

General Safdar Hussain approached to militants and gave the message of peace and mutual respect. The general presented festoon to Naik Muhammad as a sign of adoration. The general delivered a stamp speech to the tribal masses. He condemned the US attack on Afghanistan and stated that no single Afghan was involved in 9/11 attacks.

The fallacy was stated that the army forces came after Niak Muhammad and he did not approach to the force to make an agreement. This presents the powerfulness of the militant in the area.81 After this accord he was assassinated by the US military through an air-strike in Waziristan. He displayed his empowerment but in reality he lost his life. The concord was declared null and void.82Government tried to persuade Ahamad tribe to continue the peace negotiation process but the trust deficit ended the agreement within six months.

80 Rahimullah Yusufzai interview with Frontline about Nek Mohammad, October 3, 2006. 81 Iqbal , “I Did Not Surrender to the Military, Says Nek Mohammad”, Friday Times, April 30-May 6, 2004. 82 Ismail Khan and Dilawar Khan Wazir, “Night Raid Kills Nek, Four Other Militants”, Dawn (Karachi), June 19, 2004.

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During the surgical and non-surgical operations, forces arrested several senior Al-Qaida heads in Waziristan such as Abu-Firaj-Al-Libbi, Khalid Sheikh Muhammad, Abu Talha, Abu Zubaidha etc.

These above mentioned leaders of Al-Qaeda were brought into books with the help of authentic information gathered by not only Pakistani intelligence but also CIA operators in Pakistan.83 Stating the liaisons between Pakistan‟s intelligence agencies and the US intelligence was in critical stages said by the former US intelligence chief Gorge Tenet. One of the US under-secretaries of state Defense Dov Zakheim stated about the peak of Musharraf‟s regime and socio-politico modifications altercations in Pakistan. He was against radicalization in Pakistan and the US officials firmly believed that without Islamabad active participation problem of radicalization and militancy cannot be solved.

Nevertheless, operation Al-Mezan could not achieve its settled objectives. Foreign militants joined hands with the local militants and stared to increase their influence in the area by eliminating the traditional role of „Maliks‟ and replaced them with theocratic class in the areas. Operation which was conducted against the miscreants were restricted to battlefield with no fruitful results. Further, religious political parties in Pakistan were in support of the militants and glamorized them great „Jihadies‟ who are fighting against the army which is fighting American war in FATA. Peace accord also could not achieve the objective of peace and the fact was acknowledged by General Prvez Musharraf. Yet, the agreement with Taliban emboldened the militants which permeated adverse effects. Pakistan interior ministry revealed while giving briefing to General Prvez Musharraf on national security; “Talibanisation has not only unfolded potential threats to our security, but is also casting its dark shadows over FATA and now in the settled areas adjoining the tribal belt. The reality is that it is spreading”.84

The final remarks was recapitulated either in the advisory notes of the official authorities stated that the appeasement policy has empowered the militants whose next conversion will spread into the adjoining territories of FATA. Surly, this

83 Musharraf, In the Line of Fire, p. 240. 84 Ibid.

142 settlement of the militants will cement the way to the extreme level of threat to national security.85 The drastic emergence of the militants has emboldened them as DIA also warned the authorities with the words;

“Pakistan’s border with Afghanistan remains a haven for al- Qaida’s leadership and other extremists. In a September accord with the Pakistan government, North Waziristan tribes agreed to curtail attacks into Afghanistan, cease attacks on Pakistani force expel foreign fighters. However, the tribes have not abided by most terms of the agreement”.86

The increased influence of the militants in FATA has generated state within state. It imports the establishment of parallel government in the controlled areas. These terrorist used the occupied areas as their unbeatable sanctuaries to ambush on the NATO and the US forces in Afghanistan. With the passage of time people were walking away of their Maliks and the people were more inspired by the Taliban‟s Ex- Chief Mullah Muhammad Omar. To gain the public support in the area militants adopted planned mechanism. In initial stages they declared ban upon the usages of the multimedia equipment for instance, TV, Radio etc. Moreover, it was imposed to prolong the beard in the regional residential areas and killings of the pro-government tribal leader by the militants so as to prevent the role of government in FATA.

Moreover, the militants were gaining support in FATA. As judicial system introduced by Taliban in the localities which was under their control provided justice much faster as compared to the government slow provision of Justice. One of the militants‟ leaders stated that the military operation degraded the values of the tribal people and sabotaged the reconciliation process with the civil administration of FATA. The prestige and the influence of the tribal leaders were weakened due to forces operations as described by Abu Zahab.

The arresting and killing of miscreants especially of Al-Qaeda supervised to the some extent by the US policy-makers. The US which provided her services in National Security Council and latter appointed as an ambassador to Afghanistan Zalmy Khlilzad raised voices for the inadequate punitive measure against the culprits in FATA. He also uttered about the hidden sanctuaries of terrorists in Pakistan. Yet, all these allegations were rebuffed by the high the US officials.87

85 Ismail Khan, “Talibanisation Imperils Security, NSC Warned: Immediate Action Urged”, Dawn (Karachi), June 22, 2007. 86 Intikhab Amir, “Whose Writ Is It Anyway”, The Herald (Karachi), 4, April 2006, pp. 80-82. 87 Ibid.

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5.11 OPERATION ZALZALA During the time of General (Ret) Jan Mohammad (KPK Governor) who brokered the negotiation process with militants in FATA in September 2006. He entered into an agreement with Taliban in North Waziristan agency (Miranshah). The agreement was mainly concerned with the following points:  Tribal Maliks would not be targeted and kidnapped  The pro-government influential figures would not be targeted.  They will neither attack Pakistani forces nor the Afghan forces to maintain stability in the regions.  No forceful conversion of life-style in FATA.88

But this time as well, the former activities were hostile than the past. They did not stop kidnapping, robberies, injuries and killings which are fundamental strategy to increase their influence. Khasadars, untrained local forces were not in position to control the nefarious acts of militants. These all phenomena gave the indicative signs of their power and influence increase in FATA chiefly in North Waziristan.

It is obvious that when one region is de-stable then its effects the adjacent areas too. The same thing occurred in South Waziristan where the peace dialogues end in smoke. The failures of the peace negotiation in South Waziristan it was decided to start military offensive with the code Zalzala (Earthquake). The core purpose was the eradication of the militants from the local areas. South Waziristan was captured mainly by the militants under the leadership of Baituallah Mehsood. The government first signed an agreement called Sararogha agreement in 2005 with terms and conditions that the military force will evacuate the Mehsud areas and compensation will be paid to the affected tribes‟ losses, Frontier Corps soldiers will be deployed in South Waziristan, the number of the Frontier Corps forts will be four and the control of the area will be rendered to Baitullah Mehsood‟s supporters. But this agreement came to end in August 2007 when the quagmire augmented between Taliban and forces in FATA.89

While taking out itself from the internal war with the militants the forces gave birth to the emergence of parallel force against the Baitullah Mehsood in North

88 Ismail Khan, “Why the Waziristan Deal Is a Hard Sell”, Dawn (Karachi), October 14, 2006. 89 “Accord in Bajaur to Curb Terrorists”, Dawn (Karachi), May 31, 2005.

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Waziristan. Arch rival of Baitullah Mehsood‟s namely Mullah Nazeer, who was secretly to take stand against the foreigners in Waziristan Agency. Meanwhile, two hundred Pakistan solders were captured while conducting operation. Afterward, the Nazir‟s tribe gave hospitality to Uzbeks but due to possessing the gross level of aggression this act of hospitality failed too. The Pushtoon‟s hospitality has the traditional name „Melmastia‟ based on its own parameters. The militants distributed food and other necessaries of life in the area not only to local but also the foreign insurgents. This gave a well gesture for symbiotic feelings between domestic and foreigner militants. No doubt that the government was in cooperation with Mullah Nazir but media brought the military relations with Mullah Nazir‟s into the limelight in front of the entire nation.90 The supports of Mullah Nazir gave multiple benefits according to some high authorities of Pakistan. For instance, it is a counter-balance force against TTP, the defeat of anyone will surely strengthen the forces in Waziristan and the military will be able to seize strategic hill tops.

Fighting between the two groups cemented the route for the exile of some foreigners from the agency chiefly by Mullah Nazir. During these swampy situations military deployed soldiers on narrow hilltops of Waziristan to take control of the crucial strategic locations.91

Lack of stability pile up in Pakistani media as well as in common populaces regarding fragile government write in FATA. In 2007, the Operation Silence in Lal Masjid (Red Mosque) increased the wrath of masses against the forces and government. ISPR announced the Red Mosque as sanctuary for the extremists in capital city of Islamabad. Both intelligence agencies of Pakistan and the US assessed that Baitullah Mehsood was involved in the violent extremist suicide attacks so as to take revenge from the government. Intelligence apparatus of the states clearly stated that Baitullah Mehsood was involved in the assassination of former prime minister of Pakistan Benazir Bhuttu in December 2007.92

The situation between Pakistani forces and Taliban became critical again in the year 2008, when terrorist ambushed on Sarorogaha. This is military official

90 Ismail Khan and Alamgir Bhittani, “442 Uzbeks among 58 Dead: Fierce Clashes in S. Waziristan”, Dawn (Karachi), March 21, 2007. 91 Rahimullah Yusufzai, “Eviction or Safe Passage?”,Newsline (Karachi), May 2007. 92 Joby Warrick, “CIA Places Blame for Bhutto Assassination”, Washington Post, January 18, 2008.

145 speculation that approximately over two hindered soldiers involved in fight on Sararogha fort in South Waziristan. In fact, this was then captured by the forces. During the incursion of the militants on the fort, they utilized the heavy artillery like rockets and other ammunitions for breaking the walls of the fort. It caused severe casualties and damages to the forces owing to surrounding incursion.93The utilization of heavy weapons by the military forces against the militants in FATA was explained in the interview of Baitullah Mehsood. He declared clearly about the ammunitions of military to use these explosives and projectiles against the foreigners who attack on Pakistan and not against the local people of FATA. This means they brought into usages all the required weapons to defeat local insurgents in the territory.94 While the decision was being taken by the high official, the military used the pre-warning to the locals of South Waziristan to evacuate the territory. The initiation of Zalzala operation was initiated after the consecutive attacks on adjacent vicinities of the fort. The pre- warning leaflets dropped through helicopters by military forces so as to inform the locals chiefly in Ladha, Sarawakai, and Splitoi.

The 14th Division launched the operation against the key figures of Baituallah Mehsood in South Waziristan. This operation was based on sole agenda to capture the operators of the Mehsood‟s network, specifically those who were highly proactive in insurgency in the region. On the other hand, the motto was not to kill the foreigners who were involved in Afghanistan or Kashmir. The surgical operation was launched in Spinkai and Kotkai. The military supposed that one of the notorious Qari Mehsood Hussain was not arrested and killed in the military operation during the Zalzala. On the contrary his house was soiled by one of the air strike attack. He was one of the suspects who was involved in training of suicide bombers in the region.95

In operation, infantry, air force jets, tanks and other military sources were used. The ultra-modern technological electrical equipments were being brought into use to prevent the occurrence of the improvised explosives in the digs.96 The discredited campaign against military was on its peak not only through preaching but also uploaded videos on „You tube‟. The anti-government video clips were uploaded

93 “Militants Overrun Pakistan Fort”, BBC News, January 17, 2008. 94 “Al-Jazeera TV Interviews Pakistan Taliban Chief”, BBC News, May 29, 2008. 95 “Taliban Chief Ideologist Survives „Zalzala”, Daily Times (Lahore), May 26, 2008. 96 “Iqbal Khattak, “Army in Waziristan Better Equipped, More Relaxed”, Daily Times (Lahore), May 21, 2008.

146 to astray the multitudes of the localities and take the sympathy of the others nationalists.97 Having the application of the needs of the US “Do More” policy, the fallacy was spread that Pakistan‟s forces are infidels. Therefore, in the operation heavy weapons were being used against Muslims in FATA.98 After few months‟ military cleared some of the areas of Spinkai form the insurgents. But, the burning issue was the decree of the Mullah regarding the slaughter of the soldiers. The militants‟ point of view was that Pakistan military have non-Muslim soldiers and are fighting on behalf of the US in FATA.99 Yet, over the next several month military got strength and cleared the area of Spinkai and other small villages from the militants.

Major General Tariq Khan said that their division destroyed the factory, hiring the teenagers in South Waziristan so as to prepare suicide attackers to strike on military and civilians across the country. In reality, the question regarding the success of the military operation especially Zalzala was certain; some of the high valued targeted areas were declared clear. Major General Tariq Khan pronounced with great honor and vanity that „I had cleared South Waziristan for instance, D.I. Khan to Jandola. The other areas can be cleared from the militants by me‟.

The Zalazla operation was highly based on costs because of heavy shelling and bombardment in which 4000 houses were completely destroyed in South Waziristan. The enmity was increased after the displacement of locals whose number exceeded than two hundred thousand only from South Waziristan in Sarawakai, Splitoi, Malai etc. These operational activities were especially observed by the high political, military and intelligence heads for making it more productive.100

The effects of the air-strikes and heavy shelling destroyed the fuel stations, roads and other infrastructures in the regions. Even the local manufacturing places were soiled with the earth because of heavy bombardment in the area, not even a single shop was remained un-damaged in Spinkai Village.101

97 Iqbal Khattak, “Pakistan: Mehsud Says Local Taliban to Begin Media War; Slams Reporter‟s Murder”, Daily Times (Lahore), May 27, 2008. 98 Khattak, “Army in Waziristan.”Daily Times (Lahore), May 21, 2008. 99 Zaffar Abbas, “Taliban Ousted, But Spinkai Is Now a Ghost Town”, Dawn (Karachi), May 19, 2008. 100 Zulfiqar Ali, “Over 4,000 Houses Destroyed in Waziristan Operation: Report”, Dawn (Karachi), November 8, 2008. 101 Abbas, “Taliban Ousted.” Also see Declan Walsh, “Demolished by the Pakistan Army: The Frontier Village Punished for Harboring the Taliban”, The Guardian (U.K.), May 20, 2008.

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The operational measures were more broaden into the far distant areas of the South Waziristan. Army disposals and mass ammunitions were used in detection and destroying the militants camps and other training spots. During the operations, the military discovered lots of explosives and modern fighting stuff. It was also stated by the authorities that the suicide bombers‟ jackets and remotes were also found. The teenagers were exposed to the process of brainwash to attack on the military and government areas. The drawback of the operation was the implementation of the punishment on collective basis. To this look, more ignitions were created in the lives of the innocent tribal peoples. The local bazaar was placed long away from the village side so as to fixate the concentration on the security measures appropriately.

The collective punishment strategy was adopted from FCR (Frontier Crimes Regulations). So no one, who is innocent, can raise any sorts of objectionable questions regarding the military operations in FATA. Both movable and immovable properties were confiscated inside and outside the FATA even of the heads who rendered their helping hands and sources against the militants in South Waziristan. Namely, one the tribe‟s leader Shahab Ali shah from Mehsood‟s tribe faced the confiscation and seizure of his property even outside FATA.102

Last but not least, the operational activities were highly flanked in the sense of capturing the main territories in Waziristan. The US officials who were experts in intelligence department stated clearly the Mehsood‟s stalwarts being again involved in re-infiltration of insurgent and immoral acts in FATA.

The military policy of withdrawing, paved the ways for the militants to regenerate the suicide trainings in Spinkai Village. This camp of training was run by Qari Hussain Mehsood.103 The innocent tribal showed aggressive resentment for the national forces due to application of collective punishment policy on entire tribe. This caused irrevocable loss to the intelligence support to the military from the tribal locals. From top to bottom the revulsion and abhorrence spread like the rays of the sun.104

102 Joshua Partlow and Haq Nawaz Khan, “Tribe Members Held Accountable: Pakistani Order Says Mehsuds Can Be Targeted over Taliban Leader‟s Crimes”, Washington Post, July 21, 2009. 103 Amir Mir, “Story Behind Manawan Fidayee Attack”, The News (Karachi), April 1, 2009. 104 Stephen Graham, “Ghost Village Haunts Pakistani Plans to Make Peace with Tribal Militants”, Associated Press, May 19, 2008.

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5.12 OPERATION SHER DIL, RAH-E-HAQ, & RAH-E-RAST Being the indulgence of forces in the Southern parts of the tribal territories where to some extent the significances of the surgical operation were projected its positive indications. The extremists spread secretly their wings to the other parts of FATA and KPK. The military policy was to launch the operations in those areas as well. Infact, Baitullah Mehsood projected some insurgents to South and North parts of FATA due to the appropriate application of his occupying strategy. So, he spread some of fighters to the other parts such as Swat, and Bajur agency. The highly influential commanders of these agencies were Faqir Mohammad, Fazlullah and Suffi Mohammad; the mottos were so rustic to expand the activities of insurgents in other parts of FATA.

5.13 OPERATION SHER-DIL (LION’S HEART) This operation was initiated particularly in Bajur agency. The authorized officials felt the increase of insurgency against the forces and pro-governmental authorities for instance ISI, Frontier Crops and Police of KPK. Due to unavoidable needs the decision of the operation took place with the following objectives of the security managers.  To prevent the rapid growth of insurgency in the agency.  To take the control of the arteries of the militants‟ channels.  To ensure the writ of the government in the agency.  To stop the attacks on government agencies and personalities.  To make the military strong for retaliation to the militants

A high profiled ISI official along with some tribal figures lost their lives in an un-known incursion in Bajaur agency in March 2007. This activity stroked the blood of the official authorities to commence the nerve-racking counter strikes to manage the insurgents in Bajaur. The decision was tit for tat.105

After, the counter measures the militants became more active in terms of taking revenge from the government. Some un-forgetful suicide attacks occurred simultaneously near Army‟s Headquarter in Rawalpindi. The first suicide bomber crashed his car full of explosives with intelligence personnel bus in which

105 Anwar ullah Khan, “ISI Official, Three Others Killed in Bajaur Ambush”, Dawn (Karachi), March 28, 2007.

149 approximately hundred ISI staff members were badly suffered. Another suicide bomber hit his car with the military check post which was outside of the military headquarters; these attacks made the circumstances more infuriated.

Qari Zia-ur-Rehman eroded the pro-government forces especially Levies from their check points in the initial phase of 2008. Majorly in June the bank robbery was on its peak and the pro-government officials were irritated by the threat of suicide attacks. Pakistan‟s army convoy and military disposals were attacked by the terrorists in Bajaur. Right after this incident the decision of Operation Sher-Dil was taken on 9th September 2008.106

Due to authentic information regarding the hubs of militants‟ sanctuaries operation was inevitable in which various units of military took place.

The operation was supported with heavy artillery of the national forces including the usages of tanks, jets, projectiles etc. Heavy shelling took place in Bajaur agency. The militants were backed secretly and crossed the Afghan border. The forces found an enormous underground channel which connected lots of houses secretly. Many houses belonging to the culprits were bulldozed by the military. As one of the Pakistan army member stated;

“They have good weaponry and a better communication system than ours. . . . Their tactics are mind-boggling and they have defenses that would take us days to build. It does not look as though we are fighting a rag-tag militia; they are fighting like an organized force”.107

Over all the operation indicated its significant signs in the context of confiscating the explosives, ammunitions, propagating literatures for brainwash, radio frequencies equipments etc. The strong hold of communication and correspondence were soiled by the army in Bajaur. This all phenomenon came on to the last legs in December 2008. Round about one thousand militants and sixty three soldiers were killed in the operation from both sides.108

106 Mukhtar A. Khan, “A Profile of Militant Groups in Bajaur Tribal Agency”, Terrorism Monitor 7, No. 6, March 19, 2009, p.1. 107 Ismail Khan, “Battle to Be Won or Lost in Bajaur”, Dawn (Karachi), September 21, 2008. 108 Anthony Lloyd, “Captured Battle Plan Shows Strength and Training of Taliban Forces”, The Times (London), November 11, 2008.

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While paying concentration to the regional stability of the security forces with collaboration of the civilian agents formed the Lashkars (Local Defense Forces). To the perspectives of the policy the fundamental objective was to protect main arteries of the agency and preserves the tribal innocent community from militants‟ attacks. Salar Zai tribe was the first which formed the Laskaar against the militants like Dara Adam Khail tribe and Orakzai tribe. On 6th November the bloody attack occurred during the Jirga that caused the killing of twenty members of the Jirga. This was the first unbeatable revengeful act from the terrorists‟ inside in Bajaur agency. The military dropped leaflets in Mohmmand agency to counter the militants through Lashkars. After the firm operational activities, forces moved to next operational action in Mohmmand agency to stem the activities of insurgents.

5.14 OPERATION RAH-E-RAST (PATH OF TRUTH)

An area containing the geographical proximity which gives the liaison to areas is lucid presentation to everyone. These locations possess the strong bond of culture and religion observances. The rapid and dramatic growth of TNSM which was a dump fundamentalist group, the leadership of Mulana Suffi Mohammad created havoc in the valley of Swat. Its religious propagation and increase in political stature created the threat for the national government to launch the operation in Swat. This operation was termed as Operation Rah-e-Rast. To vouchsafe the tourists‟ resorts and to give relief to the people of mountainous areas was the purpose.

In late November first phase of Rah-e-Rast was initiated. Despite, endeavors of the local, forces conducted innumerable of search operations and cordon of the areas to curb the militants. Contrary to this, the role of TNSM grew rapidly in Swat valley. More, in July, approximately thirty police and paramilitary forces were expelled from various check points in Mengorah and other area of Swat valley by TNSM. In July 2008, the second phase of the operation was launched with some more stringent security measures in the valley. Operational activities demanded the heavy and unbeatable units of the forces.109

Comparatively taking surgical actions in North valley was most complex and complicated against the terrorists. The military activities moved to the Southern part

109 Akhtar Amin, “Government Moves Additional Army Contingents to Swat”, Daily Times (Lahore), October 19, 2007.

151 either. Military utilized the heavy ammunitions and air strike attacks as showing their gross resentment and retaliation against the militancy in Swat valley.110

When in January the official decree of „Shoot-at-Sight‟ was issued in Swat. This action of the forces ignited the militants and they started attacks on school, military check post etc. The fundamental reason was to show their stubbornness against government.

At terminal time of the operational activities in the Swat the situation was pacified when the forces and fundamentalist of the valley concluded an agreement for the implementation of Islamic Law in Malakand Division. This agreement is known as Malakand agreement. It was decided that all the judicial cases will be handled by the religious scholars and authorities who is termed as „Qazies‟. This act brought the deliverance of quick and rapid justice transaction to the common population of the Division. Further, the same justice system would also be extendable to the areas such as Swat Valley, Chitral District, Khohistan District, Bunner, Shangla and Lower Dir.111

The spreading of this operational acts aggravated more the circumstances in the light of the emergence of robbery of the Banks, arson of the governmental properties, attacking on educational complexes, skirmishes with the forces in various districts, the scope of militants‟ acts and illicit operations which were based on inhumane or immoral acts caused the threat of life to the locals of the afore mentioned areas.112

5.15 OPERATION RAH-E-RAST (PATH OF RIGHTEOUSNESS) This operational activity was meant to arrest the stalwarts of Baitullah Mehsud, MullanaSuffi Mohammad and Fazlullah. The regional commanders were Muslim Khan, Mohammad Khan and such others were the targeted objectives. The specific aim of the operation was to clear Swat and adjacent areas, to arrest and kill the terrorists in agency and to take back the control of the militants‟ occupied areas.113

110 Khashnud Ali Khan, “Why and How Did the Operation Commence in Agency and Bajaur Agency?”Jinnah (Pakistan), September 30, 2008. 111 Nizam-e-Adl Regulation, 2009. A copy of the text can be found at “Text of Pakistan‟s Shari‟ah Law 2009”, BBC Monitoring South Asia, April 14, 2009. 112 Abdur Rehman Abid, “Taliban Ambush FC Convoy, Foil Buner Deployment”, Dawn (Karachi), April 24, 2009; 113 Abdur Rehman Abid, “Taliban Ambush FC Convoy, Foil Buner Deployment”, Dawn (Karachi), April 24, 2009.

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The military used all its strategies and instruments to eliminate the cancer of terrorism in the regions. Military got re-control of main city and intersections where the city high ways were connected. Military had gotten the rebellion captive areas again especially the main hub of Mingorah city on May 24th. Along with the central city of the agency other sub-village came under the government writ either. Military also declared the capturing of explosives and other innumerable sorts of projectiles.114 Taking of counter-insurgency measures were pivotal not only for national prosperity but also to deliver message of a responsible country to the people where approximately three million native were displaced from their residential area. IDPs (Internally Displaced Peoples) from Mingorah, Swat and other war-torn areas took place due to the operation. It is, no doubt, considered the heavy migration after since 1994 Rwanda‟s Migration.

Disguise in appearance, some of the militants got refuge in the name of IDPs. Some of them dispersed across the country. This scattering paved the routes for the militants in terms of local recruitment. Even, they were beneficiary of subsidy of displaced peoples.

5.16 OTHER OPERATIONS 74000 military involved the assistance of the intelligence and other forces conducted countless operations across FATA and the parts of KPK so as to eradicate the plague of terrorism. In 2008-09, other than the operations which have been discussed, the famous surgical and non-surgical operations were included, Eagle Swoop in Kohat District, Serat-i-Mostaqeem in Khyber agency, Mountain Sweep IIin South Waziristan agency and Mountain Scanner in North Waziristan.115

5.17 EFFICACY OF THE OPERATIONS Acute analysis of the operations concludes maximum level of success in two spectrums. First, the coordination between Frontier Crops and Pakistan army controlled the insurgency in the areas. Secondly, the US and Pakistan‟s military assistance cemented both countries relationships in terms of taking stance against war of terror for the stability of the regions. This time the operational activities got on the

114 Iftikhar A. Khan, “Army Takes „Complete Control‟ over Mingora”, Dawn (Karachi), May 30, 2009. 115 Ibid.

153 gigantic level comparatively with the former operational activities. For mutual comprehension the duty of the Major General Tariq Khan was to provide acute information by conducting brief sessions with the US officials and International Development Office of Transaction for financial and regional development funds. These funds were used for rehabilitation and reconstruction purposes in FATA. The surgical operations were conducted by the US military in adjacent borders of Afghanistan and the intelligence sharing was handed over to the Pakistani officials to prevent the futuristic mishaps and to reshape operational activities. The data was collected from Turkham, Nawa passes. This information was based upon the acute suppositions and hearsay. In Miranshah village one the religious scholars (Mulana Abdul Khaliq Haqqani) who ran a seminary warned that the both US and Pakistani forces will be attacked with remote bombs and suicides attacks if they tried to enter in the village. The seminary name was Guslhan-i-Uloom. Furthermore, he reclaimed again that Pakistani army is accomplice equally in the drone attacks killing the innocents in Waziristan agency.116

In these operations the renowned tribes gave their helping hands to government though militants gave them threats and assassinated the important figures of tribe. The operations resulted the existence of the forces in the agencies. Collective punishments, drone attacks, forceful expelling caused the departure of the people from the agencies to other calm areas for their survivals. This was the peak of frustrations in tribal peoples against the state and army. Though, Through the operations of Rah-e-Rast and Rah-e-Haq some of the areas were re-taken but the strong hold were still existed in the Swat Valley. The fundamental benefits were taken in political, social and economic spectrum by the militants.

5.18 OPERATION RAH-E-NIJAAT The escalation of violence was on the rise in 2008-2009 across the whole country. These facts depicted the failures of operation Zalzala in Waziristan. Even, the Baitullah Mehssod got more influence and power in Waziristan. TTP violence incursions increased from 2005 to 2009 grossly. The total numbers of these attacks were 2148 which were pertinent with religious, sectarian and political.117

116 Interview with Maulana Abdul Khaliq Haqqani in The Herald (Karachi), July 2007, pp. 66-67. 117 Pakistan Institute for Peace Studies, Pakistan Security Report 2008, Islamabad, 2009, p. 3.

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The significant objective of operation Rah-e-Nijaat was to accentuate the essential routes of lines of communications (LOCs), having pertinence to water and air and land routes. LOCs were powered the government write and fragile TTP network grossly. Baitullah Mehsood gained the support of another tribe namely , clan of Baitullah Mehsood‟s tribe, meanwhile the two tribes opposed their support to TTP specifically Shaman and Bahlolzai. COAS General Ashfaq Kiyani explained the purpose of military operation. The military actions are all anti- foreigners and inhumane terrorists not anti-Mehsood tribe in Waziristan agency.118 In 2009, the coordination of Pakistan army and Pakistan air force along with the US assistance initiated the both surgical and non-surgical operation in South Waziristan. The US assistance was based on intelligence. Twelve soldiers were hit in the struck back skirmish with the militants near Afghan borders on June 30th. In drone strike of US TTP Baitullah Mehsood was killed on 5th August 2009 in his tribal land South Waziristan. After his death Hakeemullah Mehsood was throne to lead the TTP, but his days were numbered too. He was killed in the same way as his predecessor was targeted in the US drone attack on January 2010. Yet, TTP violence was in increase when five personnel members of the WHO (World Health Organization) killed when a suicide bomber entered in its office located in the capital city Islamabad on October 5, 2010. In the coming week of October, a suicide blast killed more than fifty civilians. The following day the more stringent retaliation appeared from TTP. Militants attacked dramatically the military general headquarters (GHQ), where the involvement of the dozen of the terrorists found. This unexpected incursion made approximately forty soldiers hostages in the military headquarter Rawalpindi.119 Military commenced ground operations on 17th October in Waziristan agency. These operational actions were immensely aided by the Pakistan Air Force having the inclusion of gunship choppers and jets to destroy the militants‟ camps.

Heavy deployment of the military was needed in the Eastern border with India, where the two SSG (special services group) battalions and two infantry brigades were placed to ensure national security purposes while facing the arch-rival India. Along with these battalions, brigades, Frontier Crops and other paramilitary

118 Iftikhar A. Khan, “Kayani Writes to Mehsuds, Seeks Tribe‟s Support”, Dawn (Karachi), October 20, 2009. 119 Massoud Ansari, “Security: A Series of Unfortunate Events”, The Herald (Karachi), November 2009.

155 forces also deployed with Indian borders. To this look, military forces were equipped with the heavy projectiles. Military initiated road petrol and night precision attacks on TTP camps.120 The focal aims were the capturing of strongholds of TTP in Ladha, Sararogaha, and Makin areas. Striking the afore-mentioned three areas, the high official stated that the hard backlash can come out from militants because of surgical military operations. The command and control structure of TTP was much stronger in Sararogha of South Waziristan.121 The first step was to clear the roads specifically the main high ways and other major routes leading to the major villages for instance Ahmadwam, Ragha.122

Military faced the straight backlashes but the vigorous response was shown productively to the militants which caused causalities particularly in Alizai Mehsood tribe Kaniguram.123 Military warned the Nazir‟s Tribe to quit their assistance and other logistic support in the name of aid and peace agreements with TTP. Further, the eradication of sanctuaries of TTP will be pivotal step. Military alert the well-known Mullah GulBahadar to stop financial and other support and to take firm stand against TTP. Military also encouraged the local Lashkares to be established so that militants cannot strong their position in the agency. The agreements and Lashkars empowered the military to capture most of the areas such as Makin, Sararogha, and Ladha.124 Less resistance was indicated by the TTP that they are going to re-establish in the territories from where they can retaliate and could spread the violence. The statements of TTP commander declared that due to less resistance against military was to protect the man-power as well as the projectiles for the futures battles against the military.125 These operational activities impelled large numbers of militants to enter into the adjacent border of Afghanistan (Paktika) near South Waziristan. Some of them went to the nearby agencies for instance Orakzai Agency, Khayber Agency Shawal Valley etc by the end of 2010 when the military operation was completed.

120 Sailab Mehsud, “Army Embarks on Rah-i-Nijat Finally”, Dawn (Karachi), October 18, 2009. 121 “Street Battles Rage in Uzbek Militants‟ Stronghold”, Dawn (Karachi), November 2, 2009. 122 Five More Militants Killed in South Waziristan: ISPR”, Dawn (Karachi), December 10, 2009. 123 Zahid Hussain, “Laddah, Sararogha Cleared; Street Fighting in Making”, Dawn (Karachi), November 18, 2009. 124 “Fifteen Militants Killed in Waziristan Operation: ISPR”, Dawn (Karachi), December 28, 2009. 125 “Pakistan Taliban to Increase Suicide Attacks”, Xinhua General News Service, November 14, 2009.

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Regarding the questions of success of the operation of Rah-e-Nijaat, military ceased the hideouts of militants, the control of LOCs, TTP networks was dismantled to the gross level and most of the villages for instance, Ladha, Makin, Sararogha in South Waziristan in very short span of time. Besides, Incalculable weapons were got by the military by the end of 2010.126Nevertheless, main network of communication and strength of TTP remained to the some extent, as before. Some militants escaped to the other agencies having proximity with South Waziristan agency for vouchsafe.

TTP inhumane activities engraved their roots across the country in December 2009. Militants‟ attack on Rawalpindi mosque, where retired and in-service military personnel were praying were killed and injured. These mortalities and injuries infuriated not only the high ranks officers but also lower ranks military officers.127 Scorch-earth by the military was continued in South Waziristan. Nevertheless, due to military operations the state faces number of challenges. Disappointment scattered in common populace of the Waziristan agency. No amelioration of social, economic and political matters took place in reality which highlighted the total failures of the military set up in Waziristan agency at the end of 2009. IDPs (internally displaced people) settled to the adjacent districts such as Dera Ismail Khan and Tank so as to protect their families.128

Comparative analysis of 2008 and 2009 got the sky and earth differences which were severely grave and gloomy for the national stability and peace. Total numbers of militants‟ attacks in 2009 were augmented to 3816 in which 12632 people were killed and 12815 were badly wounded. 32 per cent increase in the ratio of the militants‟ attack across Pakistan was recorded. Similarly, 37 per cent increased in mortalities, 25% increase in total number of injuries across the country right from 2008 afterwards. 25 per cent increase was recorded in suicide bombings. Pakistan‟s causality ratio of the civilians exceeded than Afghanistan‟s civilians.

126 Four Militants Killed in Waziristan Operation”, Dawn (Karachi), January 2, 2010. 127 “TTP Claims Peshawar Suicide Bombing”, The News (Pakistan), December 27, 2009. 128 Ibid.

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5.19 OPERATION ZARB-E-AZAB (2015) On December 16, 2014 a horrific incident took place in Peshawar, the capital of KPK. A school which is run by Army (APS) was attack by the terrorists of TTP. In this attack the terrorists brutally killed the students of the school. The political leadership and military leadership first time in joint All Parties Conference vowed to take stern action against the militant groups which have established their save sanctuaries in one of the biggest agency „North Waziristan‟. Full-fledged military offensive was started with the name of „Zarb-e-Azab on June 15, 2015. In the offensive land and air force was used. People of Waziristan were displaced due to operation and for the time being they were habilitated in different parts of KPK especially Bannu and Dera Ismail Khan. Later on, the sphere of the operation was extended to the other provinces such as Punjab, Sindh and Blochistan. Due to operation Zarb-e-Azab terrorism related incidents have been reduced by 23 per cent in two years.129

http://ipor.com.pk/wp-content/uploads/2015/05/Untitled.jpg.

5.20 MILITARY OPERATIONS’ IMPACT ON THE SECURITY FORCES Since the independence of Pakistan army conducted full-fledged military operations in FATA. 126. Pakistan military lost numerous soldiers in counter- insurgency operations. Success varies from place to place in FATA. Talibans‟ regime was descended soundly. Many Al-Qaida operatives were killed or became captives. Military operational activities in Bajaur, Swat, South Waziristan, and North

129 Geo News Bulletin, 25 November 2016.

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Waziristan powerfully re-controlled and cleared the territories which were under the control of insurgents. However, security forces were facing many challenges as socio- economic and political stability could not be achieved to the great extant. This is the reason that numbers of operations were also conducted by the security forces of the US and NATO in Afghanistan and Pak-Afghan borderland areas. Arguably, Pakistan‟s military was in dangerous situation as in 2007, the then president and army Chief General Musharraf ordered the soldiers not to wear the uniform because of possible threat from the militants. Moreover, some military men were not happy on these operations as stated that they have been recruited to fight with Indian army rather than to kill his own people. The opposition was widening because of two reasons. First, Musharraf was not acceptable to the sizeable portion of Pakistanis due to his approach towards militancy. Second, masses were resentful to use military in FATA and the other parts of KPK and to kill its own people.

To understand the people support for the military operations in FATA survey was conducted by USIP with the collaboration of PIPA and found ambivalence results. 48 per cent people were in favor of military operations while 34 per cent were against the operations. Nevertheless, majority of the people disapproved the military operations against Lal Masjid. Further, the institute found that 44 per cent are in favor to hunt down Al-Qaeda members while 36 per cent opposed it.130Similar results were also received when asked about the capturing of Taliban who cross the Afghan border and entered into the land of Pakistan. Yet, results in rural areas of KPK and FATA is different as majority of the people support Afghan Taliban because they are fighting the US and NATO troops. Another research institute IRI (International Republican Institute) collected the results that initially the masses were against the military operations in FATA and in 2009 peoples‟ opinion was completely changed as majority of the people supported the operations. However, majority of the people were in favor of Malakand operation. Peoples‟ opinion regarding peace deals with the militants was mixed. 74 per cent of the population was in favor of peace agreement especially in Swat as it will bring peace in the area. Nevertheless, later on the opinion was changed because of brutal activities of the miscreants.131 Despite this, about the political reforms when the people of FATA was asked about the FCR reforms, 46 per

130 Pakistan Institute for Peace Studies, Pakistan Security Report 2009, Islamabad: Pakistan Institute for Peace Studies, 2010. 131 Ibid.

159 cent of the people were in favor of modification in FCR while 26 per cent favored complete annulment of FCR. The minority 08 per cent wanted that FCR should be intact. These kinds of mixed feelings of the masses created a big challenge for the security apparatus of Pakistan about the operation and cooperation with the US.

5.21 CONCLUSION Since 2001, the performance of military in term of military operations was the mixed one. Many areas were cleared which were under the control of militants but could not sustained its success. Renowned writers point out the flaws in military operations such as lack of proper training for counter insurgency and dearth of sophisticated equipments.132As Pakistan forces were not involved in counter- insurgency operations before 2001, therefore security forces had limited operational experience against the militants and were more focused against India. In operation Al- Mizan weakness of the military were revealed in term of clearing and holding of territories. Nevertheless, better improvement was seen later on especially in the operations of Sher Dil, Rah-e-Rast and Rah-e-Nijat. For improving the operational capabilities of Pakistani forces US provided huge financial aid and intelligence sharing to Pakistan‟s military.

However, security vanguards approach was not population centric. Conventional orientation and hard ware demands were Indo-centric and unawareness of domestic threat from non-state-actors gave tough time to military. For controlling the domestic violence there is a need for strong military institution which was ignored by the successive civilian and military regimes. Even after 2001, in military aid there was no specific portion and tiny part was allocated to police. Counter-insurgency literature has substantiated the fact that only the institution of police can ensure the tranquility in the locality.133 Moreover, civil bureaucracy has also failed in the provision of relief to the people of war-torn areas, assistance to IDPs and getting support from the locals during military operations. Owing to this situation, military was impelled to incline towards scorched earth policy especially in South Waziristan, Bajur and Swat. This tactic created resentment in the heart of the people of FATA against the forces and the

132 Shuja Nawaz, FATA-A Most Dangerous Place: Meeting the Challenge of Militancy and Terror in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas of Pakistan (Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic International Studies, January 2009), p. 34. 133 Seth G. Jones and Martin C. Libicki, How Terrorist Groups End: Lessons for Countering Al- Qaeda (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation 2008), pp. 145-149.

160 state. Apart from this, Islamabad policy of strategic depth was one of the fundamental factors which became a source of strength for militants. Soil of FATA was a place where proxy groups‟ safe sanctuaries were maintained with the objectives to use them in Afghanistan, Kashmir and India. Pakistan‟s stance was cleared towards some of the militants‟ organizations which were enjoying the active support of the ISI and military establishment. This strategy undermined the capability of the forces and gave space to militants to strengthen their position on ground. However, some of the militants‟ leaders were killed and captured by the forces which were the part of problem or through intelligence sharing and drone strike by the US.134

American policy after the incident of 9/11 consists of „carrot and stick‟. Immediately after the entrance of Pakistan into the US-led war on terror, the US lift sanctions and flow of military and non-military aid was started. More, Musharraf actively participated in the war. However, with the passage of time conflict of interest emerged on the surface. No doubt, hunting down the Al-Qaeda members and TTP‟s miscreants both Pakistan and the US were on the same page, but there was a divergent approach towards Haqqani network and Mullah Omer‟s Taliban. The Pakistan stand was that, they are not a threat to Pakistan, while contrary to it, the US and NATO forces were being attacked by these groups due to which the US interests were not secured.

It is pertinent to mention here the mobilization of the masses and their support for the military operations. Since 2001 to 2009 majority of the people were not in favor of military operations but after the breaking of peace deal in Swat and capturing of Buner by the militants, people were actively mobilized and demanded military operation. Apart from this, another failure lies on the shoulders of civil bureaucracy which could not rebuilt and intact the people of conflicting areas. IDPs were spread across the country especially the urban areas of KPK. This created resentment in the hearts of the people against the government. Success of the military operations cannot be plunked and militants cannot be staving off until critical issues resolved.

134 Ayesha Siddiqa, “In the Line of Fire”, The Herald (Karachi), December 2006, p. 60.

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CHAPTER – 6 CONVERGENCE AND DIVERGENCE IN PAK-US STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP

6.1 INTRODUCTION International politics is based on national interest while making relationship with other states in the world community. There is any enmity or friendship rather it is the need of the time and interest which brings the nations close and drifts them apart. When the needs coincide the nations come closer and when the interest is conflicting they go farther. This particular process is called convergence and divergence of national interest. This phenomenon is evidently seen between the relations of Pakistan and the US.

The common interests of the two countries which brought them together were the threat of attack from India and the counterterrorism. Pakistan‟s wanted to develop enough capacity to be able to answer any aggression from India. Though India was successful in making defense relationship with the US after 9/11 but global war on terrorism made Pakistan and the US as close allies.1

The US commander General David Patraeus said that it was the right of every nation to defend its interest by making collaboration with any other nation if the need arises. Pakistan and the US had common interest but at the same time they had their own interests.2 The incident of 9/11 opened up a new defense relationship between the two countries. Though this new situation created convergence between the two countries but there was divergence at the same time. First divergence was that the US had put sanctions on Pakistan and second it was supporting Talibans in Afghanistan who were backing Al-Qaeda in the name of Global jihad3and particularly it was against the US. Nonetheless the incident of 9/11 brought the two countries close. Thus, South Asia became the war zone generally Pakistan and particularly Afghanistan. Nicholas Burns the US State Department under Secretary stated that the war on terror would be fought in Pakistan and Afghanistan. The incident of 9/11 was

1 Zafar Nawaz Jaspal, “Enhance Defense Cooperation between The United States and Pakistan”, Strategic Insights 4, No. 4, (June 2007): pp. 46-47. 2 Ikram Sehgal, “The Pak-US Strategic Dialogue”, March 18, 2010. Available at: http://www.defence.pk/forum/strategic,geopolitical-issues/50996-pak-us-strategic-dialogue.html, Accessed on, 16 May, 2016. 3 According to Islamic Tradition and Religion „Jihad‟ means a Holy War against anything Un- Islamic or Evil in the name of Allah by the Puritans.

162 used for strengthening the alliance which had been weakened by the nuclear test in 1998. Both the allies right from the beginning had divergent approaches like in dealing with extremism the US would prefer socio-economic and political ways apart from using power.4

The incident of 9/ 11 made America realize that Pakistan could be helpful to the US in various areas especially in war on terror. This was also realized by the US that the relationship with Pakistan could be beneficial in war on terror, nuclear non- proliferation and access to Central Asia5 and it was also acknowledged by the Department of States and by the Department of defense that Pakistan had extra- ordinarily supported the US.6 On the other hand Pakistan army concluded that its support to Taliban had become very difficult. Because there were problems of finances and the political will to handle the assailants. The US helped Pakistan in both the requirements to stimulate Pakistan for war on terror. Since the environment in Pakistan was weak, this compelled Pakistan to join the US lead war on terror. Musharraf tried to take the benefit of the deepening relationship with US for his reinforcing his control over the state power. Shukat Aziz the then Prime Minister said in the Council of Foreign Relations in New York that the alliance of Pak-US was important for the regional solidarity. Pakistan had been the most allied ally of the US and this time it seemed as this alliance would remain for a longer period of time unlike earlier experiences. The presidents of the both countries met in New York in 2001 both of them agreed on resuscitating alliance and developing a new era of development of the relationship. Both countries were hopeful that this partnership would be helpful in preserving peace, firmness and monetary development at regional and global level.

After making this partnership based on solid grounds it was also determined that both the countries would have close contact and would frequently be in touch. This partnership was considered as matured and the US Secretary of Defense said,” The partnership between Pakistan and the US is “strategic” and reciprocally “beneficial” and the US would endeavor to make it resilient”.7

4 Nasim Zehra, “Pakistan-US Relations Break Past Patterns after Sept 11”, Daily Arab News, 26 March, 2005. 5 Christopher Layne, “The Uni-Polar Illusion Revisited”, International Security 31, No. 2, (2006): pp. 58-59. 6 http://www..fas.org/sgp/ers/row/IB94041.pdf, Accessed on 26 May, 2016. 7 Rizwan Zeb, “US Interests in South Asia in Post 9/11 Era: Effects on Pakistan”, Margalla papers: Islamabad, (2004): pp. 35-38.

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6.2 CONVERGENCE IN THE INTERESTS

Partnership in the War on Terror

After the 9/ 11 attack America did not take much time to decide attack on Al- Qaida. President Bush said, “Terrorism against our nation would not stand”.8This was the beginning of the war on terror and the US wanted a jam-packed support from Pakistan. Carnegie said, “If the US wants Pakistan‟s genuine support than it has to advance and reinforce communal trust”.9 Since Pakistan had attached boundaries with Afghanistan therefore it was the appropriate choice. Pakistan‟s choice for joining against terrorism had another aspect if it had not done so India would have taken the benefit of the situation and Pakistan would have been left alone in the world community moreover the issue of security would have become the major problem.10 If we look into the interests of the both countries we can conclude that Pakistan‟s interest is limited that is economic and preservation of its resources on the other hand the US had larger areas of interests which can be termed as regional and global.

Both the countries joined the hands the US lifted the sanctions and provided economic and military support to Pakistan. Thus Pakistan‟s long desire to have dealings with international community opened up. Thought this extremism was rooted in Zia‟s time with the policy of Islamization. When Musharraf announced backing the war against terrorism told the benefits in these words, “the benefits of supporting the war were many.11 First we would be able to eliminate extremism from our society and flush out the foreign terrorist in our midst. We could not do this alone; we need the technical and financial support of US to be able to find and defeat these terrorists”.12 General Musharraf said in a press conference with President Bush at Waldorf Astoria, “I see the dawn of a new era of relationship between Pakistan and the US”.13 Condoleezza Rice the US National security Advisor talking to CNN said that Pakistan

8 Lindsy Daalder, America Unbound: The Bush Revolution in Foreign Policy (Washington D.C.: Brooking Institution Press, 2003), pp. 97-99. 9 Ashley J. Tellis, “Pakistan and the War on Terror: Conflicted Goals Compromised Performances”. Reported by, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace Washington D.C. on January 18, 2008. 10 Pervez Musharraf, In the Line of Fire: The Memoirs (UK: Simon and Schuster, 2006), p. 202. 11 Rehman Fazal, “Pakistan and the War on Terrorism”, Strategic Studies Islamabad 23, No. 30, (2003): p. 58. 12 Musharraf, In the Line of Fire, p. 203. 13 The New York Times, November 11, 2001.

164 was close ally of the US in the war on terror and its policy now is totally different from the policy before 9/11.14 She further said that Pakistan is fully backing up the US and for Pakistan the praiseworthy phrase was used “The Most Allied Ally”.15

Collaboration in Operation Enduring Freedom (Incursion of Afghanistan) The operation was in response to the attack on 9/11. The purpose of the operation was to eliminate Al-Qaeda and made them unable to carry out such kinds of attacks moreover they should not be able to use that place for terrorists‟ activities. The US was interested in ousting Taliban‟s regime from Afghanistan for this it needed the logistic and intelligence support which could be provided by Pakistan. The US Assistant Secretary of the State for South and Central Asian Affairs Richard A. Boucher said that Pakistan support was very important for the US to achieve its goals in Afghanistan. Without this support the goals could not be attained. Pakistan extended all kind of support to the US even provided air bases.

Placement of Troops on Pak-Afghan Boarder Pakistan has a long boundary with Afghanistan and it has deployed 90,000 armed forces and built 1000 check posts to stop the entrance of insurgents. Even after taking that much amount of hard work Pakistan was still blamed for not doing enough. An analysis shows that Pakistan has done more than it could do. In the past there were 200 check posts and only 7000 forces. It shows the efforts of Pakistan in containing the terrorism.

Intelligence Support President Bush said on an occasion that the US was determined to dismantle Al-Qaeda and this time it would be a different approach. It would not be only military force that would destroy Al-Qaeda but there would also be financial support to contain the terrorists.16Pakistan was involved in the war against Russia therefore it had a lot of information about Afghanistan. ISI could help the US in providing intelligence reports without which it was very difficult for the US to eradicate

14 Blitzer, W. Amanpour, C., Holmes, M. (Host), Interview with Condoleeza Rice: Interview with Rudy Giuliani, Cable News Network, August 8, 2004. Available at: http://elibrary.bigchalk.com. (Accessed on, 23 July 2016). 15 Christine Fair, Keith Crane, Christopher S. Chivis, Samir Puri, Machael Spirtas, Can the United States secure an Insecure State? (USA: Rand Corporation, 2010), p. 3. 16 President Bush Discusses Progress in the Global war on Terror”, White House Press Release, Fact Sheet and Briefings. Available at: http://elibrary.bigchalk.com, Accessed on 06 July, 2016.

165 terrorism. Imtiz GuI writes in his book that “the CIA and Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) have been heavily dependent on the human assets of ISI for operation and surveillance regarding war on terror”.17 Musharraf said at Pak-US nexus in war on terror, “there is total coordination at intelligence level between the two forces: there is coordination at the operational level, at strategic level, even at tactical level. So therefore we are working together, and when the situation arises, we need to take right decisions to strike”.18 The result of the collaboration was that the top leaders of Al- Qaeda like Abu Zubaydah and Khalid Sheikh were captured. It was the main example of the support of Pakistan Intelligence.19 When Pervaiz Musharraf decided to join hands with the US after 9/ 11 and to eradicate extremism he changed the Director General Mehmood ISI with Lt. General Ehan-ul-Haq. He was given the task of removing those who were inclined to radicalism. Thus, 40% of the ISI were changed. All the intelligence activities were done by ISI. This time the role of ISI was not like it was in 1980, this time ISI and FBI worked together in collaboration though FBI did not launch operations it only steered them while around 2000 operations were carried out since 9/ 11.

Provision of Air & Water Routs Pakistan was kind enough that it did not only provide intelligence support to the US but also provided air and water routs to support the aligned forces in Afghanistan. The US was given three bases at Pasni, Jacobabad and Dalbandin. It was in the agreement that drone flying from Pakistan will not be accepted to avoid the displeasure of the people. Pakistan‟s Daily Times English newspaper mentioned Rand Corporation report of 2004 which says “Pakistan provided the US access to numerous military bases and helped establish facilities including Intermediate Staging Bases at Jacobabad, Pasni, Dalbandin and Shamsi predator basing at Jacobabad and Shamsi, and access to other bases used by over 50 aircraft and 2000 coalition military personnel at these locales”.20, Pakistan not only provided air bases to the US but also

17 Imtiaz Gul, The Al-Qaeda Connection: The Taliban and Terror in Pakistan’s Tribal Areas (New Delhi: Penguin Books, 2009), p. 201. 18 Bush Says US-Pakistan Collaborating and Strategizing against Extremist”, State Department Documents, September 2006. Available at: http://elibrary.bigchalk.com, Accessed on 12 May 2016. 19 Jerusalem Post , March 4, 2003. 20 Zahid Hussain, Frontline Pakistan (UK: Penguin Books, 2007), p. 46.

166 gave the facility of anchoring ships at Pasni. Moreover has reduced its movement at sea. Marine Corps Gazette of June 2002 “the Coalition Naval Operations at Pasni were the largest amphibious operations in size, duration and depth that the Marine Corps had conducted since the Korean War. In all, 8000 Marines, 330 vehicles and over 1350 tons of equipment/logistic were off loaded at the beach and later flown to Kandahar from Pãsni”.21Pakistan had given all support to the US because all the bases provided were near the afghan border so that logistic support might be reached the aligned forces. Yet, the US Pakistan started strategic dialogue to strengthen the bilateral relations.

Pak-US Strategic Dialogue The strategic Dialogues were to strengthen the relations between the US and Pakistan. the process of the dialogue started in 2006. The Strategic dialogue meant to think over and find the ways to make advancement in the field of Education, Science, Economy and Energy.22 Mahmud Ali Durrani the former ambassador in Washington said that the decision to hold talks between the US and Pakistan consistently was a very good step in developing the bilateral relationship.

Shared Desire for Peace in South Asia The issue of peace in South Asia had been the concern of Pakistan and the US also agreed on the peace prevalence in the region. Both the countries agreed that peace in the region would ensure peace in the world.

1. The Nuclear Sub-Continent: Bringing Stability to South Asia Pakistan‟s name was published as “Nuclear ” to which sectary for Foreign Affairs said that the nuclear test by India disturbed the strategic balance in the region and it was important for Pakistan to reinstate the balance. Pakistan conducted the test for the peace and security of South Asia.23

21 How Pakistan Served as Launching Pad for War”, Available at: http://defense.pk/threads/how- pakistan-served-as-a-launching-pad-for-war.41232, Accessed on, 13 September, 2016. 22 Muhammad Ali Durrani Former Ambassador of Pakistan to the United States Answering the Question from the Press in Washington. Available at: http://forum.pakistanidefense.com/index.php?showtopic=70251, Accessed on, 12 June, 2016. 23 Shamshad Ahmad, “Nuclear Sub-Continent: Bringing Stability to South Asia”, Foreign Affairs 78, No. 4, (1999): pp. 123-125.

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Pakistan’s Suggestion for Peace Pakistan was aware of the facts that nuclear race in the region would be of great consequences if not dealt with right from the beginning. Therefore Pakistan proposed the following suggestions “It proposed a nuclear weapons free zone in South Asia; a joint repudiation of procurement or production of atomic weapons; shared appraisal of atomic offices; observance to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and International Atomic Energy Agency shields on atomic offices; a two-sided atomic test boycott; and a missile-free zone in South Asia”.24

Disincentive & Regional Constancy in South Asia Pakistan ambassador to UN Zamir Akram said that the security issue in the South Asia was in danger. Because India has developed an idea called „Cold Start‟ means the capacity of attacking quickly while remaining safe in the conventional war. Moreover India‟s agreement with the US has made it hegemonic power in the region. These agreements show that there was no check over India‟s fissile technology. He further said that Pakistan‟s nuclear device is for deterrence and if South Asia had to be made a region of peace India had to be stopped and brought under control in expending his nuclear capacity with the increase of conventional arms. Peace I the regional is not possible until measures taken to stop the race. India is a threat to Pakistan security and the development of the nuclear weapon became the cause of Pakistan‟s interest of its security and peace in the region.25

The US Quest for Hegemony and Regional Stability General Kayani visited Sri Lanka on 27 June, 2013 where a lot of military agreements took place between the two countries. He said,” The desire for peace is our greatest strength, which places us at high moral ground and affords us the poise and confidence to exercise restraint, even once incited or provoked. He further said that Pakistan would help Sri Lankan forces to attain excellence. In his speech while addressing the passing out parade ceremony of the Sri Lankan cadets at Sri Lanka Military Academy situated in Diyatalawa, he said that Sri Lanka with its army and Pakistan had the relationship based on high level of trust and cooperation. Their

24 Ibid. 25 Stephanie Spies, “Deterrence and Regional Stability in South Asia: A Recap”. Available at:http://esis.org/blog/deterrence-and-regional-stability-south-asia-re-cap, Accessed on, 29 July, 2016.

168 partnership proved successful in the wake of odds to maintain peace in their respective countries and regions at large. He hoped that the trust in the joint efforts would further strengthen the partnership in future.26

The top priority agenda was military field training commanded by Pakistan Army, reports sources of GHQ. The other points of agenda were corresponding military role in UN as peace keeping forces, communal intelligence and tactical collaboration in defense sector. The intimacy of relationship were developed by Pakistan‟s role played in favour of Sri Lanka against Tamil insurrection. Pakistan‟s help in upholding handy kids was also appreciated. The closeness of relationship can be guessed by the statement: “Sri Lankan Army has proved its mettle under the most trying circumstances and has emerged victorious not only in the context of purging the menace of militancy and violence but also in pursuit of post conflict peace and stability”.27He further said that Pakistan stood by around the period of thirty years of the conflict and the rebuilding time with full support whether material or moral to their nation and armed forces. Pakistan proved to be a true friend to the great nation of Sri Lanka. Thus both the countries came closer as true and genuine friends at the time of need.28

Brigadier (Rtd.) Asif Raza while talking to the news reporters said, “The military relations of Pak-Sri Lanka had reached its peak. The Pakistan military had jumped into the fray to help Sri Lanka defeat the Tamil Tigers. There is a kind of appreciative cognizance within the Sri-Lankan government and military ranks that Tamil insurgents would not have been defeated had it not been Pakistan‟s support. This very factor guides the course of diplomatic and military ties between the states”.29 This is also evident from the fact that every twelve months military sources hold training for Sri Lankan cadets and troopers at Pakistan Military Academy (PMA) Kakul for midcareer and long courses. He also talked about other military courses for Sri-Lankan cadets and met many other high ups there which is the testimony to the cordial relationship he between the countries.30

26 Ibid. 27 Sikander Shaheen, “Quest for Hegemony to Harm regional Stability”, The Nations, June 30, 2013. 28 Ibid. 29 Ibid. 30 The Nations, June 30, 2013.

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President Asif Ali Zardari visited Islamic Republic of Iran to attend the oath ceremony of the 7th president. During his visit he met his counterpart Hassan Rouhani. He stressed upon the need of improving socio-economic aspects of the countries. He also talked about peace and stability of the region. The both leaders said that consistency of the relationship between the two nations would be continued. They also agreed upon strengthening the ties further especially in the field of economics and trade. They opined that the then trade situation was not up to the mark. It needed great improvement. They stressed that the relationship needed to be smoothed further by taking result oriented actions. The joint projects like Pak-Iran gas pipe line, electricity, wheat export, and rail road connectivity were also discussed in the meeting. They further discussed that there should be un interrupted communication between the people of the two countries so that they may come closer. Moreover their economic aspects may also be improved.

Intensive US Involvement for Heightened Role in South Asia South Asia has a very important position on map of the world. Its importance went up with the US predominance in the world. This part of the world is in its very uncertain situation with the prevalence of terrorism in the region, Kashmir issue, nuclear proliferation etc. moreover India and Pakistan are always at logger‟s head with the long history of opposition leading to the race of nuclear arms. These issues in addition with some more have given importance to the US agenda in the region. Moreover the end of cold war brought the US close to India in the region as compared to Pakistan. The presence of the US in the region for its vested interests and its allies in the new world order makes it more important.31 The US heed toward India and indifference towards Pakistan displayed the intention of the US that it wants to play a regional surrogate.32

Bilateral Relations between Pakistan and the US There had been ups and downs in the relationship of Pakistan and the US. Sometime the relationship was called friendly, sometime hostile and again sometime

31 Umbreen Javed, “Intensive US Engagement for Enhance Role in South Asia”, South Asian Studies 25, No. 1, (2010): pp. 65-66. 32 Tariq Jan, Foreign Policy Debate: The Years Ahead (Islamabad: Institutes of Policy Studies, 1993): p 130.

170 called indifferent and yet another time termed as intimate. However, the important thing is that even in the worst relationship both the countries maintained the working relationship intact.33

Pakistan was given the focused attention during the cold war.34 Then it was left alone with its problems. Again with invasion of the Soviet Union in Afghanistan in 1979, Pakistan became the front line state. At the same time anti Pakistan lobbying remained active, the glaring example of which is Pressler amendments. President Bush stopped aid to Pakistan in 1990 showed that the US had fulfilled its desire. Once again the relations went bad on the nuclear issue and military coup. But soon after the incident of 9/11 the US approached Pakistan to be on the front against terrorism35and the title given to Pakistan on non NATO allied ally. The Pakistan US relationship had great impact on the foreign Policy of Pakistan.36

India-US Nexus

The US interest had always been remained in developing relationship with India because of its size, huge population, market capacity and international occurrence. That is the reason in the formation of the US policy in the region India factor always had important and decisive role.66 One can say that the two countries have two things in common: ideology and objectives.37 The visit of President Bill Clinton to India for a week in 2001 was to strengthen the relationships and for the same purpose dual military exercise was also conducted. Both the countries had the same views about terrorism. Thus India got an opportunity to convince the US that Pakistan was involved in the occupied Kashmir which must be stopped. On the other hand the US wanted to use India to contain China as a rising power.

33 Rais Ahmad, Forty Years of Pakistan-United States Relations (Karachi: Royal Book Company), p. 7. 34 M. Raziullah Azmi, Pakistan-American Relations: The Perfect Past (Karachi: Royal Book Company, 1994), p. 62. 35 Abdul Sattar, Pakistan’s foreign Policy 1947-2009 (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2010), p. 385. 36 Qazil H. Kizalbash, Pakistan’s Security Foreign Policy (Lahore: Progressive Publishers, 1988), pp. 224-226. 37 Malik Hafeez, US Relations with Afghanistan and Pakistan: The Imperial Dimension (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2008), p. 128.

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6.3 INTENSIONS BEHIND THE US INTENSIVE INVOLVEMENT IN SOUTH ASIA

The US Engagement in South Asia has the Following Reasons Nuclear Proliferation The most important issue on the US agenda in the South Asia had been nuclear non-Proliferation. Though India had attained the nuclear power much earlier than Pakistan but the nuclear test in 1998 raised the issue and the concern for the US. In addition to this the harsh relationship of Indo-Pakistan and their traditional enmity between the two countries worried the US. Moreover United State has been acting as an observer of the both countries. The deputy Secretary, Strobe Talbot told the reservations of the US government.  Averting nuclear arm race in the region.  Consolidation of non-proliferation regime.  Endorsing dialogues between Pakistan and India to recover relations.38

There are number of reasons for the US for nuclear non-proliferation in the region. The US wants there should not be technological transference to other countries. Moreover nuclear war breakout between India and Pakistan would be disastrous for the South Asia. Similarly Iran‟s nuclear program would also be a hazardous for the region.39

Kashmir Issue South Asia is one of the regions in the world presenting high level conflict which can lead to war between the countries Pakistan and India. The dispute is over Kashmir. The grievousness of the situation can be guessed from the wars fought between the two countries in 1947-48 and 1957. And in addition to this there was a limited war in 1999.40Kashmir is the bone of contention between the countries which needs to be addressed for the peace and tranquility of the region. The crisis of Kargil reawaked the importance of finding permanent solution to the problem for perennial peace in the region. Thus, the US showed some interest in this connection and tried to bring the two countries on the table of negotiation. This was important because there

38 Rashmi Jain. The United States and Pakistan 1947-2006 (New Delhi: Radiant Publishers, 2007), p. 97. 39 Dr. Vinay Kumar Malhotra, Indo-US in Nineties (New Delhi: Anmol Publications, 1995), p. 50. 40 Devin T. Hagerty, South Asia in World Politics (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2006), p. 232.

172 was threat of terrorism in the region. Moreover, the US is well aware of the reality that the solution to the problem must satisfy the two countries with the acceptance of the people of Kashmir.

Economic Interest Since India is a big market and it opened up its market in 1991 for the investment of the US. America showed its interest in it but a safe environment was the requirement which could be attained with the involvement of the US in the bilateral struggle for peace. There were two things important to be done for the economic interest of the US. First is to make sure its presence in region, second is to protect its economic interest. It was the US policy to protect India‟s market.

Terrorism It was the US who had produced the Jihadist against Soviet Union and it was again the US who had equipped them with arms. Therefore, the US was quite aware of the strength of the Jihadists. After the US withdrawal from the Afghan war the Jihadist turned their guns against America which was threat for it. The US handled this problem by involving the two key players of the region in it.

Propositions for the US involvement It was well planned by the US government to get involved in Pakistan indirectly with the help of public relation instead of directly getting involved facing issues of contention. The plan entailed to have access through the USAID to the people of Pakistan. In the same way to enhance their bilateral relations the appropriate steps would be offering assistance against militant activities and increasing trade relations.41 It was proposed that the US should support the international corroboration machinery while it is to be followed by Pakistan and India in the South Asia. This strategy would bring the two countries closer. Moreover it would be incumbent upon the US to praise the efforts for regional stability.

The US Desire for Peace and Stability in South Asia The US and Pakistan were very much hopeful that they would play their role positively in bringing peace in the region despite of the fact that India and Pakistan

41 Meggaen Neely, “Stability in South Asia: A Role for the United States?”. Available at: http://esis.org/stability- south-asia-role-united-states, Accessed on, 23 March 2016.

173 had persistent tension for a long time. George Little, the Pentagon Press Secretary addressing to reporters said that the US wanted peace and stability in the region. In addition the Defense Secretary also said that they were against terrorism where ever they were and they were the enemies of all killing civilians indiscriminately whether Pakistani, American or Indian therefore they should unite to handle the common menace.42 Victoria Nuland State Spokesperson said that they urged both sides to stop fire and maintain normal trade and travel across the line of control.

Pakistan Foretells the US Support towards Regional Stability Hussain Haqqani the then Pakistan‟s ambassador said on July 2010 that Pakistan would not allow anyone to challenge the writ of the government. He also said that the US would play its positive role in bringing peace in the region. In an interview with The Washington Examiner he said, “We are sure lessons have been learned and there will be no walking away this time”.43He further said Pakistan would continue the joint efforts with the US and Afghanistan till the total annihilation of militants. He also brought forward the efforts of the Pakistan anti-terrorist forces. He appreciated their efforts by conducting operation in Swat, Malakand and Tribal area. He further said, “Our people and security personnel have paid a huge price, in terms of human lives, in this fight”.44

Energy Rich Central Asia The position of Central Asia has enhanced in the international politics generally and particularly in politics of South Asia. It has become more popular as compared to Middle East for its oil and gas reserves. The importance of South Asia is for the unique kind of metals in the world. The land of the region is favorable for irrigation. The western countries are drawing towards it for the resources.

The US Interests in Central Asia The importance of Central Asia arose for the US after the 9/11 incident. This region was thought a landlocked, unattractive have the governments of Muslims autocrats. The incident of 9/11 changed the strategic wisdom in the policy of the US.

42 Ibid. 43 “Pakistan Expects US help Towards Regional Stability”. Available at:http://www.maverickpakistanis.com/2010/07/pakistan-expects-us-help-towards-regional- stability, Accessed on, 25 May, 2016. 44 Ibid.

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Therefore the US made use of the tragic situation to gain maximum of the benefit.45The US entered the region deeming the happy prospects but came across the problems of radicalism, danger to energy supply and faced the difficulty of the non- coastal area. Even then the US kept its interest alive in the region. The surrounding countries like Russia, Iran, China and Pakistan make the area important for the US to control them. There is no doubt the presence of the natural resources is another reason for America‟s interest. The main points of interest for the US are security, energy and democracy. The Caspian region holds the importance Fossil fuel. And the main security issue to stop the energy resources from branching off. Even the difficult access to the area does not make it less important geo-politically and geo- economically.

Following factors catches the attraction of the US policy makers  Substantial extent of fossil fuel of a fine quality.  Assay to make certain nuclear non-proliferation in the region since the area has several nuclear locates.46  Assist CARs in mounting oil and gas industry, enhancing their economic growth by abnegating flow of oil and gas thru Russian pipeline link.47  Weakened Russian‟s politico-economic ambitions.48  To help CARs in endorsing democratization process and stand against religious extremism.  To assist CARs in innovation of armed forces and boost Turkish sway in the region.  Through the above mention discussion the elongated objectives of the US can rightly be described. This is the reason; it is contemplated that the US will stay in the region for a long time. This was also discussed with representative of Pentagon on January 3, 2002.49It can also be expected that the US military involvement in Central Asia has short-term objectives and is interconnected with the objectives afore mentioned.50  To Control the internal and External Affairs of Afghanistan.

45 The Times of Central Asia, December 5, 2002. 46 Ibsen Clock, “American Asian Relations”, Eurasian Studies 3, No. 3, (1996). 47 Asama Shake Khwaja, “Pakistan and the New Great Game”, IPRI Paper 5, (2003): pp. 15-16. 48 Ibid. 49 The Times of Central Asia, January 10, 2002. 50 The Times of Central Asia, January 17, 2004.

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 Conceivable extension of anti-terrorist operations by target area operation parallel to Iraq. In such surroundings the US military bases in Central Asia are anodyne than in Middle East.

Pakistan’s Interests in Central Asia Pakistan would not be able to extend advance technology to the Central Asian states yet Pakistan has designed an excellent diplomatic relation with the said states. That is the Quetta plan of action forms with the members of ECO would reach high in the achievements if executed thoroughly. The important step for economic interest requires establishing proper communication system. In this connection resuming the flights to Tashkent and Almaty is an encouraging step. Further Gawadar port connected with Central Asian Republic would uplift the trade and commercial activities in the region. Economic growth needs to develop transportation measures. The long rail way track from Chaman to Kandahar is the rightly taken step. 94 Thus the expectations for soaring up of the activities are very high.51

Pakistan’s Position and the Post 9/11 Geo-Politics of Oil and Gas Pipeline Afghanistan‟s geo-strategic location is well recognized in the world for it provides routes for oil and gas from Central Asia. It is expected that the rising need of energy of the developed world would further attract the investment in Afghanistan. Pakistan is aware of the fact that if it happens so this would also bring investment in Pakistan as well because the routes must pass thorough Pakistan. Both Central Asia and Pakistan are important for each other. Pakistan provides economical outlet route for oil and gas through Karachi and Gawadar ports. In this connection Pakistan, Afghanistan and Turkmenistan had signed an agreement that would be the first outlet of oil and gas for Turkmenistan.52

6.4 DIVERGENCE IN PAK-US INTERESTS The incident of 9/11 turned South Asia as the play ground of „war on terror‟ and to play its role America had to reshape relations with regional states. The most critical point reached when the US entered its forces in Afghanistan, Pakistan and Central Asia. There was change in the US policy to handle the threat of terrorism.53

51 The Nations, November 8, 2003. 52 Ibid. 53 Ijaz Khan, “Pakistan‟s Post September 9/11, 2001 Afghan policy Shift: Impact on Pak-India- Afghan Geopolitics”, Journal of Asian and African Studies 42, No. 5, (2007): p. 67.

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This new stance of America was not less than a test for Pakistan. And the most crucial test would be the situation when America‟s objectives are gained in the area whether it would continue its policy or change it out rightly as it had done when Russia had withdrawn its forces from Afghanistan. It was a hard time for Pakistan. Pakistan had to recognize the new set up for getting out of this enigmatic state. Thus Pakistan adapted the new arrangement at the caste of its security issues.54

6.5 NUCLEAR DEVELOPMENTS IN PAKISTAN Pakistan had been the focus of attention in the world for its nuclear program. In spite of the huge criticism and complexities Pakistan had managed to conduct six technical explosions on May 28, 1998.

Birth of Nuclear Technology: First Decade (1950-1960) The nuclear program has its history in Pakistan. Prof. R M Chaudhari was the first man who laid the foundation of nuclear program in Pakistan. He migrated to Pakistan in 1948 and set up a nuclear research laboratory in government college Lahore in 1954, where he trained students who played their role in the development of nuclear weapon at later stage. He had furnished the laboratory with Mev Cockcroft Walton accelerator there that is considered the landmark achievement in the development of the program. The young scientists were given sound foundation. Therefore Prof. R M Chaudhari can rightly be called the father of nuclear program in Pakistan.55

Higher Nuclear Human Resource Development: Second Decade (1960-1970) This is the time when a second great mane came to the lime light in the horizon of Pakistan‟s nuclear program is Dr. I.I Usmani. He was the chairman of Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC) from 1960 to 1972. The commendable work Mr. Dr. Usmani has done for the nuclear program is the human resource development. Dr. Usmani with Prof. Dr. Salam the then science advisor to the president carried out the training program for the young scientist in the developed countries to augment the nuclear program. For this program the laboratory established by R. M. Chudhary was used to train the young Scholar. When the scientists came back from abroad provided a solid base for the nuclear program. As a result Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission made five megawatt research reactor with the help of the

54 Moeed Pirzada, “Kashmir: Indian Strategic Initiatives Since 9/11 and Imperative for US Policy in the Region”, IPRI Journal 11, No. 1, (winter 2003): p. 126. 55 N. M. Butt, “Nuclear Developments in Pakistan”, IPRI Paper 5, (2004): pp. 45-46.

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US. The main work that paid off was the training of nuclear engineers to plan and operate nuclear power reactor. Another outstanding work Dr. Usmani had done the installation of power reactor of 137 MW at Karachi with the help of Canada. At that time India was also becoming nuclear power which has rightly been prophesied as a peril by Z. A. Bhutto the then foreign minister and said Pakistan could also do the same.56 The development of nuclear agriculture center, nuclear medical center and nuclear mineral center or denotation and a plant for the enhancement of Uranium were also the contribution of Dr. Usmani. But the most important was the human resource development which was based on merit. This time can be termed as golden time in the nuclear history of Pakistan.

Civilian Nuclear Expansion & Nuclear Defense” Two Decades (1970-1990) Pakistan nuclear program was also significant from 1972 to 1991. Moreover the hearsay of nuclear weapon was in the air all around. India did its nuclear test in 1974 which compelled Pakistan to go for it to keep the power balance in the region.57Pakistan in response to India also conducted nuclear test in 1998 with full responsibility of PAEC.

Pakistan Nuclear Program and the US When Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto came to power he entreated security assurance from the US which was turned down. Furthermore India was not inflicted any sanctions nor it was questioned who had given this technology to it. Bhutto was of the opinion that instead of being betrayed in the garb of reason, Pakistan should go for the acquisition of nuclear technology. For this purpose Bhutto engaged the services of A. Q. Khan. It is also believed if the US had agreed to Bhutto‟s request Pakistan would not have joined the nuclear club.58 However, the US offered Pakistan to give 120 fighter planes but on the condition to give up the contacts with France which Pakistan refused to do. Again the US offered Pakistan that it would make the facility available for Pakistan which was being established for Iran if Pakistan stops reprocessing project. Again Pakistan refused.59

56 Ibid. 57 Levy Adrian and Clark Cathrine Scott, Nuclear Deception: A Dangerous Relationship between the United States and Pakistan (Walker & Company, 2008), pp. 11-12. 58 Z. A. Bhutto, The Myth of Independence (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1969), p. 98. 59 Kausar , Aur Line Kat Gayee (Lahore: Jung Publishers, 1987), p. 147.

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Pakistan under the US Sanctions Sanctions were imposed on Pakistan in 1970 so that the US might talk to India about the nuclear test carried out secretly in 1974. However partial renewal of aid was made in 1975 and again the sanctions were imposed in 1979 under Foreign Assistance Act (FAA) section 699 for developing Uranium facility.”60

Pakistan‟s nuclear test in May 28, 1998 earned worldwide denunciation. It was followed by the imposition of economic sanctions by the US under the arm control act (AECA) known as Glenn amendment including with Import Bank Act of 1945.According to this act economic and military aid would only be given to those countries that have signed the Nuclear Proliferation Treaty (NPT).61 Moreover, they are not involved in the importing or exporting of Uranium. The government of the US would inflict sanctions, terminate foreign military financing, stops US government sponsored financial assistance, disapprove loans or help from international financial institution, forbids the US bank sponsored loans and bans on import and export of certain goods. Following the same attitude the US put sanction on the annual aid of $162 billion. All these disappointing steps Dr. A. Q. Khan continued working on the make the desired device.62 The first device was made in 1983 followed by a number of cold tests to see its exactness.63Pakistan had been under observation since 1990 under the act known as Pressler Amendment. This act bound the president to make sure that Pakistan did not have a nuclear device, failing to do so the President Bush put sanctions on Pakistan. A small portion of relief in the sanction was given in shape food assistance in 1997-1998 the estimated amount was $ 5 million. Further there was amendment in the bill which would allow the issuance of $ 368 million for military hardware order made earlier.

Sanctions Are Relieved: During the Clinton Administration After the imposition of sanctions in 1998 another act named Agriculture Act was passed which would make adjustment in AECA which exclude some of departments from the sanction. On 21 October, 1998 congress voted for the powers

60 Dianne E. Rennack, “India and Pakistan: Current US Economic Sanctions”, CRS Report for Congress 2002. Available at: http://fpsc.state.gov/documents/organization/6202.pdf, Accessed on, 26 March 2016. 61 M. Shahid Amin, Pakistan’s Foreign Policy: A Reappraisal (London: Oxford University Press, 2000), p. 79. 62 A. Q. Khan, “The Journey to our Tests”, The News, 28 May, 1999. 63 Interview on Radio Pakistan by, “Dr. Samar Mubarakmand, Senior Scientist of PAEC”, Reported in the Gulf Today, 19 May, 1999.

179 with the president to remove sanctions on non-military things. The same way another law was passed to give the president powers remove economic sanctions imposed. Pakistan was the US department of Agriculture (USDA) and transactions on commercial bank loans.

During Bush Administration In 2001, the US gave the signals that it was going relief in the imposition of sanctions. In the same year Pakistan Foreign minister and secretary of state of the US met in Washington to discuss the issues of Taliban, Afghanistan, democracy, terrorism, nuclear proliferation and the sanctions.64

However Pakistan remained in the list of the countries that were not privileged because of the derailment of democracy. But in September 24, 2001 an agreement was signed allowed debt of $ 379.

Security Quandaries of Nuclear Armed Pakistan When Pakistan was declared as a nuclear power the security question in the environment went high. There were doubts that the two countries who are traditional enemies might not get engaged in the nuclear war. However Pakistan‟s policy remained to avoid any sort of instigation from India. Pakistan did not show off the eminent achievement. But at the same time Pakistan attained the equal position to maintain peace in the region. However the declaration of Pakistan as a nuclear power at this period of time was not appropriate since Pakistan itself was going through time frailty and this could make it exposed to danger. The main issue of security was from India. The development of the nuclear ability deterred India to show its muscles in the region. Though Pakistan had to pay a heavy price for it and earned global quarantine and a lot of pressure.65

This is surprising that the world shows it apprehension about the nuclear program but in Pakistan leadership least bothered about the external pressure. The concern was the regional environment.66 Now Pakistan realized the importance of the world community because its survival as the nuclear power is dependent upon them.

64 Fidler Stephen and Edward Luce, “A Fine Line: The Bus Administration has Signaled that it wants to Forge Closer Ties with India”, Financial Times, June 1, 2001. 65 Dawn, 26 May, 2000. 66 Ibid.

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Pakistan’s Nuclear Choices Pakistan‟s option for the nuclear power was a lurking security danger from India. Both the countries fought wars. Pakistan had started its nuclear program right from the beginning since its coming into being but its full determination was shown in 1974.67

Pakistan had shown its reservations about India‟s nuclear program before its becoming nuclear power. Pakistan had conveyed its concern that India‟s step for nuclear power would make Pakistan‟s situation vulnerable in the region. The stressful situation remained on the rise between the two countries throughout. There was number of reasons for the antagonistic situation between the two countries the most prominent is Kashmir‟s issue. India‟s stance in the region is hegemonic which incurred the more defensive attitude for Pakistan.

This is the main reason for Pakistan to opt for nuclear program. But the question of unlike treatment of the world compared to Iraq and North Korea is valid in its place. The international community overlooked the Indian nuclear program because of its geo strategic location, democratic IDs and economic growth on the other hand Pakistan got concession for its alliance with the US.

Symbolic denunciation of India‟s nuclear test vitalized Pakistan to conduct nuclear test since G-8 and P-5 could not come to understanding on one point.68Those forces in Pakistan who had concern about India‟s nuclear detonation decided to give equivocal posture to her. It is believed that Pakistan‟s option for the nuclear program increased its power of bargaining. Some people thought that it was all for distracting the attention of the people from the domestic issues. When India went for nuclear test there was civilian government in Pakistan. But that civilian government was under the military government. The military government stressed the civilian to go for the same in response.69

67 S. Ahmad, “Pakistan‟s Nuclear Weapons Program: Turning Point and Nuclear Choices”, International Security Journal 26, No. 4, (1999): pp. 183-184. 68 S. Ahmad, “The Nuclear Debate”, News Line, June, 1998. Pp. 191-192. 69 Lt. General (Ret.) K. Matinuddin, “Nuclearization of south Asia: Implication and Prospects”, Spotlight on Regional Issues 17, (1998): pp. 33-34.

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Nuclear Pakistan’s Security Predicament It was difficult time for Pakistan after conducted the test. It faced serious security threats because of its tense relation with India. Pakistan exerted efforts to neutralize the situation by calling these tests as for security reasons. By this time the civilian government was overpowered by the military one.70 The development of the nuclear weapon increased the threat that the conventional between India and Pakistan would turn into nuclear war which would be very devastating. Moreover India‟s advancement in the nuclear weapon could also carry serious consequences. And if Pakistan opted for war with India this time china would not be in that position as it had been before to side with Pakistan for different reasons. One of the reasons is the ethnic troublesome situation in Xinjiang. Moreover in 1990s china normalized its relations with India. Now China wants Indo Pakistan to normalize the relations. After becoming nuclear powers both India and Pakistan China seemed more critical on India but at the same time stressed that both the countries might sign Nuclear Non- proliferation Treaty (NPT). Further China also forbade the US to provide anti-ballistic missiles technology. And if it happens so it would have bad effects on the nuclear program of Pakistan.71 When India conducted nuclear test Pakistan was pressurized by the world community not to go for the same. But the world community failed to give any security assurance to Pakistan thus the internal pressure increased to go for the test definitely. The fact is that there were no serious efforts from the international community avert Pakistan‟s nuclear test.72

Pakistan‟s becoming nuclear power had its effect on its weak economy. Since Pakistan relies on the foreign loans and aid the donor countries like Japan put sanction on Pakistan. Adding to misery the local and foreign investors took their investment out of Pakistan and Pakistan could not recover this loss.

Another factor apart from economic consequences there was sectarian aspect which made Pakistan‟s position weak as a nuclear power. Pakistan is a multi-sectarian society and this was used as a trump card for getting concession for removing the imposed sanctions.

70 M. E. Carranze, “Rethinking Indo-Pakistani Nuclear Relations: Condemned to Nuclear Confrontation”, Asian Survey 26, No. 6, (1996): p. 572. 71 Zahid Hussain, “Laying the Groundwork”, News Line, June, 1998, p. 24. 72 Dawn, 16 February, 1999.

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The US Role: Past and Present

When India went for nuclear test in 1970 the US expressed its concern about security of the region and started pressurizing Pakistan not to go for the same. However Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan and the US intentionally gave little attention to it though overtly some sanctions were imposed but those sanctions only miner in intensity.73

The US administration again invited India and Pakistan to join the agreement of nuclear free South Asia. The purpose was to make this zone free of nuclear threat. But at the same time America was not unmindful of the ground reality that is direct threat from India and Pakistan therefore it did not take any strict measure against them. The US handled the South Asia situation by following the policy of engagement so that the nuclear deeds of India and Pakistan might be affected.

The US stance of conceding to Pakistan shown by the Brown Amendment in 1996 was in fact apprehensive for regional geo-strategic situation instead of its focus on non-proliferation. The US did not take any stance on the China and Pakistan nuclear collaboration. The reason was that the US had its trade interest with China. In fact the wording of the sanction was the use of nuclear technology, which encouraged Pakistan in becoming an unconcealed nuclear power in 1998.

After India‟s nuclear test America pressurized Pakistan diplomatically and then warned it clearly about the consequences for choosing the nuclear path. Pakistan took it light keeping mind like the earlier premonitions. Moreover Pakistan assumed that it would take help of China, Saudi Arabia and UAE in that connection but this time the US took stern step and tool the matter to international forum. America this time went to the international forums even asked China to favor the US in imposing sanctions on Pakistan. These reprimanding measures came with conditional offers for both India and Pakistan for mitigation in sanctions.

When Pakistan reached the collapse of the economy it deliberated to make laws for ban on the transfer of nuclear technology.74Pakistan came to terms with the US to save itself from the collapse of the economy thus US lifted up sanctions. The

73 M. Reiss, “Safeguarding the Nuclear Peace in South Asia”, Asian Survey 38, No. 12, (1993): p. 10- 11. 74 Dawn, 11 March, 1999.

183 relief was in shape of postponement of $33 billion external debt and the loan of $ 4 billion.75 The promise of lifting up sanctions from India and Pakistan were hindered by the American administration who tilted towards India and the US policy from non- proliferation of nuclear technology changed to peril evading. But Pakistan still believed that the US will favor in nuclear its position.

Nuclear Weapons & Regional Stability The solidarity of the South Asia remained uncertain. When India and Pakistan became nuclear powers they got engaged in Kargil. Pakistan was also helping the Kashmiries since 1980. All these things worsened the relations of India and Pakistan. Thus, the regional temperature went high because of the nuclear technology. To ease the tension both the countries resumed to talks which lived for a short while. The former chief of Pakistan Army said that in spite mark difference in conventional arms India would not dare to attack Pakistan because of its being a nuclear power.76

Pakistan‟s military officer said in the conflict of 1999 that India could not extend the across the line of control because of Pakistan‟s being nuclear power. But on the other side Indian said that it had the capacity to deter Pakistan‟s nuclear power. These opposing statements made America to intervene and pressurized Pakistan not to support Kashmir so that nuclear war might not start.77

Pakistan’s Nuclear Commands The response to the incident of Kargil by the US to India was implied that the US recognizes the nuclear capacity of India. The US told India to show restraints on nuclear power instead of saying to relinquish. Thus, it is proved that the US had its tilt towards India.78

India took this stance of America as it was without any economic or military sanctions. The US would recognize the deployment of the nuclear weapon. India issued a draft saying how the nuclear arsenal would be transported. It was to the check the response of the world community. The draft says that the weapon would be

75 Ibid. 76 Zahid Hussain, “On the Brink”, News Line, June, 1999, PP. 24-25. 77 The News, 31 May, 1999. 78 S. Talbott, “dealing with the Bomb in South Asia”, Foreign Policy 78, (1999): pp. 111-113.

184 transported by aircraft and submarine. The draft also entailed that this was an authorized policy and hoped the US would also support it.

Pakistan rejected the policy of giving up this technology but kept it clandestine for it was the only way to avoid the unfavorable economic and technological constraints. So Pakistan continued its expansion. Pakistan‟s nuclear weapon made in response to India‟s initiation therefore its deployment by India would also give Pakistan the right to deploy the nuclear weapon as well.79

Pakistan’s Security in Nuclear South Asia There are three aspects of Pakistan nuclear security that is military decision, relations with India and India‟s direction for nuclear policy. In fact military had its full control over the decision which came to lime light in the Kargil incident. Pakistan‟s stepping back in the kargil scenario created disappointment among the military ranks. The civilian government put all the blame on military chief for appeasing discontent of the civilian. Resultantly the civil government was ousted by the military coup.80 Now the power of decision was the military what so ever had mistrust in India. Thus, the relation between India and Pakistan worsened. Further there was no nothing like diplomatic communication between the countries. In India it was opined that in spite nuclear weapons only conventional weapons could be used in war but in Pakistan it was different, they believed that in case of attack Pakistan could use nuclear weapon for the safety of its territory.

The Pentagon’s Surreptitious Tactics to Secure Pakistan’s Nuclear Arsenal The presence of Osama Bin Ladin in Abotabad near the military academy put the chief of the army staff in an awkward position. He had to the face the tax payers who had been providing the amount of $ 2 billion per year on the cause which appeared as the Pak army was unaware of it. They were ignorant of Osama bin Ladin‟s whereabouts. And he had to answer his ranks how this territorial trespassing took place. The same way he was talking about the nuclear weapon being in safe hands. He had to satisfy the curious minds.81

79 Statesman, 18 August, 1999. 80 “US Urged to Set up rational security Architecture”, Dawn, June 1, 2000. 81 Dawn, 5 February, 2000.

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This incident of Osama bin Laden raised the questions of the safety of the nuclear weapon, when Pakistan proved to be the hub of terrorists and Pakistan was the country transferring to North Korea and Iran nuke technology. President Obama considered the nuclear weapon a great danger if terrorists had the access to it. He added, “AI-Qaeda is trying to secure nuclear weapons a weapon of mass destruction that they have no compunction at using”.82

Graham Allison the director of Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard mentioned three threats: first, the terrorist may get access to weapons, second nuclear technology may be transferred to other states which are direct threat to the global peace and third extremists may use the weapons for political mayhem.

In response Pakistani spokesperson totally rejected the question of nuclear weapons was at jeopardy; rather the warheads are separated from the nuclear arsenals and the delivery system. Therefore there was no question of its being slipped into the hands of terrorists. An officer of Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) said in an interview to National Journal rejected the US worry about the safety of Pakistan‟s nuclear program and said, “of all the things in the world to worry about, the issue you should worry about least is the safety of our nuclear program. It is completely secure. It is in our interest to keep our bases safe as well. You must trust us that we have maximum and impenetrable security. No one with ill intent can get near our strategic assets”.83The Chief of the army forces showed his concern about the security of the nuclear from the US rather than any other threat.

Unfastened Weapons Strategic Plans Division (SPD) is an organization in Pakistan considered to be the most reliable. Pakistan‟s spokesman said that the society of Pakistan is the amalgamation of religious and political diversities yet the organization is determined to keep the arsenals in the hands of people thoroughly investigated and unprejudiced officers are deputed. He further said that the civilian scientists are selected after

82 Al-Qaeda trying to Secure Nuclear Weapons, Says Barak Obama. Available at:http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/barackobama/7583173/Al-Qaeda-trying to secure-nuclear weapons-says-barack-obama.html, Accessed on 25 May, 2016. 83 Jeffery Goldberg and Marc Ambinder, “The Pentagon Secrete Plans to Secure Pakistan‟s Nuclear Arsenal”, Available at: http://www.nti.org/gsn/articl, Accessed on, 12 August 2016.

186 screening with satisfaction. The screener was made more thorough when two scientists met with Bin Laden in 2001. In this regard the then president said in his statement”,84 I think it‟s over stated that weapons can get into bad hands” in an interview to National Journal”. But this was not sufficient at the time when Abbotabad incident took place. After few days of the raid a popular text read “if honk you horn, do so lightly, Pakistani army is asleep”.85

Some of the incidents took place go against Pakistan like an attack on a bus near Sargodha air base another attack on school bus outside Kamra air base yet another incident of suicide attack near Wah cantonment. It was assumed that these were the places where nuclear arsenal was kept. Another major security question was raised when two Surveillance planes were blown in combat attack. In interview many security officers did not exclude the possibility of the involvement of someone inside.

Pakistan’s Suspicion Pakistani scientist and the father of Pakistan‟s nuclear program Dr. A.Q. Khan on several occasions said to the Americans that they were against Muslims for centuries. They also asked them why they were against Islam. Moreover they said that Hindu nuclear bomb was the same kind of weapon but America‟s tilt towards India and partial behavior with Pakistan was beyond the understanding of the Muslims. Even one of the retired Chief of Army Staff termed it disgrace on the part of America who used his friends and then turned their back when they were of no use.

It is commonly believed in Pakistan that America that America is trying to get control of the nuclear program in Pakistan. Moreover it does not want Muslim countries to get into the nuclear club. This assumption cannot be totally ignored as Graham Allison said, “it is not delusional for Pakistan to fear that America is interested in de-nuking them. It is prudent paranoia”.86

The US War Strategies Pakistanis considered that the nuclear weapon was the target of the US therefore it was bent upon finding weak points of it so that Pakistan might be forced to roll back the program. The Pakistan‟s internal situation like corruption, terrorism,

84 Ibid. 85 Ibid. 86 Ibid.

187 and ethnic rivalries provided opportunity to the US to make a plan of attack. This is evident from the statement given by the Former deputy director of counterterrorism said that the threat of Pakistani nuclear weapon has reached the US which has become the challenge for the US intelligence. On many other occasions America has mentioned that it had taken measures for the nuclear crisis in Pakistan. Condoleezza Rice on an occasion said, “We have noted this problem, and we are prepared to try to- deal with it”.87 Such comments had been made by many other American officials.

The US intent was to detect the location of the nuclear program for this purpose they exerted all efforts to achieve success. The aim was to incapacitate Pakistan for using nuclear arms. They would try to annul the long range nuclear weapon in the next stage. And at the final stage they have a well planned preparation which would result in the missile attack on the nuclear dugout.

Reduced Priority Pakistan‟s security officers were aware of the fact that the US is after the nuclear program of Pakistan to destroy it. This made Pakistan to go closer to China. It is displayed by the statement of the prime minister of Pakistan, “Sino-Pak relations are “higher than the mountains, deeper than the oceans, stronger than steel and sweeter than honey”.88 This statement was of course to show America that Pakistan also had another option. On the other hand, the US starting explaining itself by saying that it was all to get information about Al-Qaeda moreover these nuclear arsenals might not fall into wrong hands. America‟s policy to the relation with Pakistan was on the basis that it realized it that waging war in Afghanistan is not possible without the help of Pakistan, even it is not possible to come out of it without its support.89

6.6 ISSUE OF TERRORISM The Ascendant of the US-Pakistan Conflict: The US Tactics towards South Asia before 11 September 2001

The US of America was developing strategic relations with India before the incident of 9/11. President Bill Clinton visited India in 1997. But the ascendance of

87 Al-Qaeda Trying to Secure Nuclear Weapons”, Available at: http://www.telegraph.co.uk, Accessed on, 12 September, 2016. 88 “Pak-China Friendship is Higher than Mountains, Deeper than Ocean & Sweeter than Honey”: PM. The Nation, December 19, 2010. 89 Goldberg and Binder, National Journal, November 9, 2011.

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BJP in India put hurdles which Vajpaye tried to remove hindrances to bring smoothness to the relations with the US.90

The US was desirous of making relation with India. It devised a complete program in this regard. In this connection dialogues between the US deputy secretary Strobe Talbot and Indian Jaswant Singh were arranged. They held talks several times. To give it importance president Clinton visited India again in 2000.

The relation of India and the US were on sound footings. Bill Clinton administration remained adamant in the relations. When Bush came to power he revisited the foreign policy. He also revisited the anti-ballistic missiles treaty with India.91

Ashley J. Telis restructured the relationship with the countries in South Asia. He devised that the relationship would be on the basis of usefulness rather than other considerations. US put India as incipient power of South Asia and considered it worthy of relationship. Pakistan was considered a weak country open to the problems like terrorism and needs help to cop the social problems. There US made strong military lies with India and waived off the imposed sanctions while Pakistan remained sanctions without any solid reason. US remained superfluous in removing sanctions from Pakistan. Glenn-Symington sanctions were removed but other sanctions which really meant something remained intact.

Early US Miscalculations in the Wake of 11 September 2001 Pakistan restarted its support to Taliban from 2004. But the incident of the attack on the parliament in India and the cause of the US in Afghanistan suffered therefore, the US pressurized Pakistan to restrain from supporting such activities. The then prime minister of Pakistan took a moderate stance to show compliance to the US. Thus, the activities of the Taliban restricted.

The groups of Taliban divided into two. They called themselves Pakistani Taliban. They were divided into two groups. One of them was against the foreign element coming into Pakistan and the other group started attacking their own country.

90 Barry John, Tony Clifton, SudipMazumdar and Russell Watson, “Why only a Bomb would Do”, Newsweek, October 19, 1998. 91 Ashley J. Telis, “The Merits of DE Hyphenation: Explaining US Success in Engaging India and Pakistan”, The Washington Quarterly 31, No. 4, (2008): pp. 21-42.

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They were supported by the Lashkar-e-Jhangvi Punjab. Many groups of Taliban united under the name of Tehreek-e-Taliabn Pakistan.92 These groups spread out to Swat and Punjab. Pakistan army started a comprehensive operation against Taliban. And Pakistani media claimed that in this operation 35000 people lost their lives.93

Whether the shift from one policy to the other was real or only symbolic is still not clear to the people of Pakistan. But Musharraf talking on the policy clearly said that the turn in the policy was because of the alliance with the US and there was also India factor involved in it. He said, “They want to isolate us, and declare us as a terrorist state. In this situation if we make wrong decision it can be very bad for us. Our critical concerns are our sovereignty, second our economy, third our strategic assets (nuclear & missile), fourth our Kashmir cause. All four will be harmed if we make the wrong decision. When we make these decisions they must be according to Islam”.

President Bush hailed the stance of Musharraf. Pakistan was partner with America in war on terror. Pakistan assured that it would change its policy of supporting Islamic militants. In return, the US gave three pledges to Pakistan. First was Kabul would not be given to Northern Alliance. This was a mercenary‟s party and was at war with Taliban. Northern Alliance supported by India, Iran and Uzbekistan.94

The second promise given by the US was to resolve the Kashmir issue. If the Kashmir issue was not resolved the two nations‟ theory would remain unfulfilled. In this regard the secretary of state Cohen Powell tried. The third promise was given by the US that the nuclear program of Pakistan would not be disturbed. In fact the promise did not remain for long. It made military agreement with India. This stand of the US was for the term policy keeping in view the China‟s rising in power.95

In Pakistan it was believed that global war on terrorism has got nothing to do with the strategic interest. In 2004 the development in Afghanistan appeared not to be

92 C. Christine Fair, “The Militant Challenge in Pakistan”, Asia Policy 11, (2011): pp. 105-135. 93 “Threat to Life: Haqqani Fears He might be Murdered”, Pakistan Express Tribune, January 4, 2012. 94 The News, September 12, 2011. 95 Ashley J. Tellies, India as New Global power: An Action Agenda for the United States (Washington DC: Canegie Endowment for International Peace, 2005), pp. 47-49.

190 in favor of Pakistan. And the US could not see the depth of India involvement in Afghanistan. All these events lead to the conclusion that at the end Pakistan had gained nothing.

Pak-US Relations: Harmonious & Inharmonious Interests The relation of the US and Pakistan entered into a tense zone by the episode of Abottabad, and killing of two Pakistanis by an American. But the real tension started when Pakistan refused to start operation in North Waziristan. However the tension was brought down but again it escalated when NATO forces attacked Salala check post.

Both the countries had similar objectives like fighting against terrorism and at the same time dissimilar targets to achieve. In this regard General said, “The relations are further overwrought due to clash in security interest vis-à-vis Afghan Taliban”.96 The Pak- US relation again started going downwards when the US changed its strategy and tried to bring Taliban on table for talks. Moreover, the US also specified funds for execution of this action. In this regard some prisoners from Guantanamo were also released and Taliban also opened their office Dhoha. But Taliban kept on their terrorist activities which ultimately tension between Pakistan and the US.

It was not an easy task to bring Taliban on the table of talk. They also wanted their sway in Afghanistan. On the hand Pakistan did not want Alliance forces to stay for long in Afghanistan. But the US and Pakistan were on the same page that both of them did not want Al-Qaeda to spread its roots in Pakistan and Afghanistan. Again the point of disturbance between the two countries was drone attacks which were started from 2004. In those drone attacks a lot of Al- Qaeda leaders were killed. 193. But these drone attacks were never acceptable for the general people of Pakistan. The former prime minister said, “I don‟t care if they do it as long as they get the right people. We‟ll protest in the National Assemble and then ignore it”.97

96 Shezad H. Qazi, “US-Pakistan Relations: Common and Clashing Interests”, Available at: http://www. worldaffairsjournal.org/article, Accessed on, August 12, 2016. 97 Wiki Leaks: Gilani Open to Drone Strikes on „Right People‟, The Express Tribune, December 1, 2010.

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Pakistan’s Role in Global War on Terrorism & Divergence with the US Pakistan has a very important role in war on terror. Pakistan‟s geographical location is such that its boundaries are attached with China, Iran, Afghanistan and India. Pakistan was called front line state in this regard. It supported its alliances like the US in sharing intelligence which was of great value and without which the US could not wage its war successfully. Moreover it provided air basis and logistics conveyance support. All these efforts by Pakistan made use and allied forces to carry out action in Afghanistan.98

Targeting & Hunting AI-Qaeda Operatives Pakistan‟s support to the US in war on terror was the cause of success. The US could not win this war without the support of Pakistan. The US also forced Pakistan to take action in tribal area against extremist elements. The operation was launched in Waziristan which earned ignominy of Pakistan in that area moreover a lot of loss of lives and property was resulted yet America wanted Pakistan to do more.

Pakistan’s Efforts for Regional Peace It is not possible to bring peace only with applying force. There are other ways as well for bringing peace in the area. Pakistan utilized those possibilities which are mentioned below:

Shakai Agreement 2004 The first peace agreement was made with Nek Muhammad. But this agreement was sabotaged by the US by killing Nek Muhammad. The US was not in favor of agreements with Taliban. Here we can say that it was the US short sightedness because at the America itself decided to sit on the table of dialogue with Taliban.99

Peace agreement with Baitullah Mehsud with Sarorgha 2005 This agreement faced the same consequences and Baitullah Mehsud was also killed. The need of compact agreement had arisen which could remain for longer period of time. For such action strong political will was required.100

98 Ibid. 99 Masood Khan, “Pakistan Role in Global War on Terrorism: and Areas of Clash with United States”, Available at: http://defence.pk/threats/pakistan, Accessed on, May 12, 2016. 100 Badar Sattar, “Talking Peace Again”, Dawn, February 3, 2014.

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Miranshah Agreement 2006 Another agreement with elders of North Waziristan took place. In this agreement it was decided that that the government will compensate the losses made during the operation in Waziristan, it will free the prisoners and the government will withdraw the forces from the tribal area. In return the tribal people not allow any infiltration of foreign element. In this agreement the government was proved to be the weak party because the tribal group reorganized themselves and developed the confidence of success over the government.101

Bajaur Agreement 2007 Another agreement with the same consequences was made in Bajaur Agency. The cause of the failure was the judicial crisis. But this time government also used power as well.102

Factors Hampering Pakistan’s Efforts in War against Militancy

Lack of Funds The most important and the neglected area, by the world especially the US, of fighting against terrorism was its meager finances. It is utmost important that those countries who really wish to eliminate terrorism must support Pakistan in this regard. Pakistan itself is not position to cope its economic issues with financial support of terrorism.

Lack of Training to Fight Guerilla Warfare The terrorist are well trained in guerilla warfare, while our FC, police and law enforcing agencies are not trained in this regard. That is why the law enforcing agencies are not able to handle the situation effectively. It is very important to produce well trained people who can confront the terrorists.103

Trust Deficit with theUS Terrorism is not the only problem of Pakistan it is the world‟s problem and the US is the main partner of Pakistan therefore it has been called the most allied ally, even then there has been trust deficit between the two countries. The support of ISI

101 “Miran Shah Peace Pact Signed: Free Movement Restricted”, Available at: http://www.ajj.tv/2006/09, Accessed on August 28, 2016. 102 Ibid. 103 Ibid.

193 and other departments of Pakistan and as the front line fighter against the extremism yet the US demands to do more which seems as it is mocking Pakistan instead of working as a real partner. It is really very important that there should be some understanding of Pakistan and the US at least in coping the problem of terrorism.

Drone Attacks/ Civilian Causalities &Resentment The most ill thought strategy for hitting the terrorist is the Drone attacks. Drones are blind they can‟t see whether militants have been killed or civilians. In the Drone attacks there were many civilian killed who had got nothing to do with the terrorists. Thus, the Drone attacks earned bad name for America as well as created difficulty for Pakistan to handle.

Lack of Human Intelligence It is not possible to win a war only with weapons unless you have full support of human intelligence. It is also true that the lack of human intelligence is connected with economic factor. Whatever the case it may be but the truth is that human intelligence is very important in which Pakistan was lacking and on the other hand the opponents were successful in targeting the security forces in Pakistan. Moreover, the spies who were captured were not given severe punishment. If they had been punished severely no one would have dared to do thing again in Pakistan.104

Pak-US Deadlock and Insinuations for Regional Stability As usual the US changed its policy and gave up the support to all the operations under going to die away. India took the benefit of the occasion by engaging itself in Afghanistan. There were three groups in India one of them was of the opinion that by remaining behind the screen India can achieve its goals to make itself stronger in the region. The second group was against this idea because there was a serious life threat in this adventure. The third group was of the opinion that the adventure should be under taken but the safety measures should also be taken. They further opined that this would increase India‟s potential and it would become powerful in the region.105

104 Masood Khan, “Pakistan Role in Global War on Terrorism”, Accessed on , May 12, 2016. 105 Ibid.

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Now Pakistan‟s major concern was not Kashmir it was how to curtail the wings of India to become the regional power. The things were not the same as these were before 9/11 and after 9/ 11. Mullah Omer who disliked the US and NATO forces also added Pakistan into the same list. The only group which was in Pakistan control for the proxies was Haqqani group.106Pakistan desperately tried to regain the same position in Afghanistan as it had before 9/ 11.

When there is not compact partnership based on trust there is no hope of its going the long way. There seemed no harmony in the partnership between the US and Pakistan. As it is said by the former CIA officer Bruce 0 Riedel in Times Magazine, “I can see how this gets worse” and 1 can see how this gets catastrophically worse i don‟t see how it gets a whole lot better”. Similarly Pak retired diplomat ZafarHilaly expressed his view by saying “this relationship is not headed anywhere- our ways part, our paths are divergent”.107

Pakistan‟s deep involvement with the US against Taliban created a weak situation in side Pakistan. because these Taliban were brought together to fight against Russia. They feel a sort of unity in the religion to fight against the infidels. The US policy was planning to reduce dependence on Pakistan. Pakistan also drew back the hand of cooperation. It also refused to give access to Dr. A.Q. Khan, black market of nuclear weapon. Some elements in the US favored withholding aid. And in Pakistan, military and some civil high ups are of the view to takes strict measures against the US stance.

There had been a lot of divergences in the relation between the two countries. There had been common interest but that convergence remained for a short while. In this way the relations between the two countries did not go long way. The US wanted to keep its ground presence in Afghanistan. In the same way it was interested in Central Asian countries for oil reserves and other resources.

106 Don Rassler and vahid Brown, The Haqqani Nexus and the Evolution of Al-Qaeda (New York: Combating Terrorism Centre, 2011), p. 130. 107 Zafar Hilali, “Since Salala”, Available at: http://tribune.com.pk/story/334539/since-salala, Accessed on September 09, 2016.

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The US Strategic Slant towards India

The South Asian countries especially India and Pakistan had been the focus of interest in the area for the US. But, the US was more tilted towards India as compared to Pakistan. The ups and downs in the relationship of the countries made Pakistan think over the question whether the US is Pakistan true ally or its alliance is only on need based.108

The visit of Bill Clinton to India showed that the US wanted to develop long term relations with India. There seemed the US wanted to find multi dimension area for relationship with India. On the other hand Pakistan was treated with official posture.109

President Bill Clinton administration was worried about the China as growing power. Cohn Powell the secretary of state called China a threat for the US economy. Thus, the US bent upon making relationship with India. Many sanction imposed on India were waived, went back on Kashmir issue. Condoleezza Rize said in India that the US wants firm relationship since both are partners in the region and in the global forum.110

Indo-US Strategic Agreements It is the worth mentioning agreement that took place on 17 April, 2002. It says:  8 Raytheon Co long range weapons spotting radars the deal worth‟s $146 million.  These radars had the potential to detect long-range mortars, artillery and rocket launcher.111  Israel‟s Falcon airborne early warning system that cost $ I .2 billion in June 2004.112

108 Arshed Mehmood, “US Strategic Tilt Towards India”, Frontier Post, March, 2013. 109 Ibid. 110 Personal Interview from Prof. Dr. A. Z. Hilali, 19 August 2016, henceforth, Interview Dr. Hilali, 19 August, 2016. 111 Dawn, April 18, 2002. 112 The Hindustan Times, May 23, 2003.

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 Transference of missile technology to reinforce Indian defense system. On June, 18 2005 Bush administration proclaimed civil nuclear collaboration with India.113

The agreement and support was of much benefit for India for it helped it enrich its nuclear development program.

Pakistan Insight about Mounting Indo-US Strategic Partnership Pakistan was not pleased with the deal and Pakistan again conveyed its grievance to the US government. It said that this deal of the US made with India would distance the power balance in the region. Pakistan‟s foreign minister said, “1 believes that the government‟s reaction over this issue was not sufficient to match the gravity of the situation. Pakistan should convey its serious concern to the US as a non- NATO ally. He further said that the US should make it clear, that its enhanced and close military collaboration with India will not have threatening effects for the national security of Pakistan”.114

The US India agreement as strategic partner has put Pakistan in jeopardy. India‟s already superiority in conventional weapons and the three wars had been fought between these two countries, India‟s support to anti Pakistan groups in Afghanistan all these things created a situation which is quite a threat to the security of Pakistan. It is evident from the US demeanor that it does not consider both the countries equal even Pakistan has been given the title of the most allied ally and its supports against terrorism.

US Policy Swing & Trust Deficit with Pakistan President Pervez Musharaf said that the strategic shift of the US policy to India is the evidence of great trust deficit between the US and Pakistan. This deficit is to be removed as soon as possible otherwise this action would create a great disappointment among the people of Pakistan. He said, “Pakistan is under the grab of terrorism. The situation demands a clearer understanding of ground realities in South Asia, bridging the acute trust deficit and developing a unity of thought and action among all coalition players,” he went on saying, “Blame games, rigidity, arrogance

113 Raja Mohan, “India and the Balance of power”, Foreign Affairs 85, No. 4, (July 2006): p. 28. 114 Fani Muhammad Ishaque, “The Indo-US Strategic Partnership: Implication for Pakistan”, Journal of Pakistan Vision 10, No. 2, (Pakistan Study Centre, Punjab University): p. 139.

197 and insensitivity towards others‟ interests will always remain counterproductive”.115 He added that Pakistan is undoubtedly a dupe of extremism rather a guilty party. He uttered that “Pakistan‟s national and social fabric was torn apart”.116

He also criticized lndo-Afghan role by calling it the “malicious role of India and the Afghan government in maligning Pakistan‟s military and intelligence,” .Musharraf alleged: “We know what Indian consulates are doing, especially in Kandahar and Jalalabad.”“We also know that Afghan intelligence, military and Foreign Service personnel go to India for training”, and “not a single Afghan official comes to Pakistan, despite Pakistan‟s longstanding offer of free training since my time in office”.117“The continuous military presence of the US forces and operations in Afghanistan, indiscriminate drone attacks with increasing collateral damage in the Tribal Areas of Pakistan, and finally the violation of Pakistan‟s sovereignty in a cross- border strike against Osama bin Laden are all now seen most negatively by the people of Pakistan”.118Pakistan must take step that may determine its route considering the ever changing attitude of the US in its policy and lack of consistency in relationship.

Pak-Iran Gas Pipeline: An Irritant for the US A pipe line of gas between Iran and Pakistan was decided on March 11, 2013. It was supposed that this pipe line would carry 760,000 cubic feet of gas to Pakistan daily. Tehran agreed to give loan of $500 million the one third of the total cost that was $1.5 billion. This pipe line supposed to meet the extreme energy crisis of Pakistan. It was hoped that with the construction of the pipe line the economic and security ties of the two countries would also improve. The two presidents said in a joint statement “The completion of the pipeline is in the interests of peace, security and progress of the two countries ... it will also consolidate the economic, political and security ties of the two nations.” The director of British-based Maple croft risks consultancy Anthony Skinner said “The Pakistani government wants to show it is willing to take foreign policy decisions that defy the US, particularly when such crucial issues as energy security are at stake”.119

115 Interview Dr. Hilali, 19 August 2016. 116 Ibid. 117 “US Tilt Towards India Created Trust Deficit with Pakistan”, Daily Times, June 10, 2011. 118 Ibid. 119 “Pakistan Risks US Sanctions Over Iran Pipeline”, Dawn, March 11, 2013.

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This pipe line agreement was accepted by the US. For creating hindrances on the way to the energy crisis it got Pakistan involved confusing deviations. The US State Department spokeswoman Victoria Nuland said “We have serious concerns, if this project actually goes forward, that the Iran Sanctions Act would be triggered. We have been straight up with the Pakistanis about these concerns.” She further said: “We have heard this pipeline announced about 10 or 15 times before in the past. So we have to see what actually happens”. She repeated that the US is working to expand Pakistan‟s vigor supplies through other means: “This pipeline project, if it actually goes forward we have seen that promise many times would take Pakistan in the wrong direction right at a time that we‟re trying to work with Pakistan on better, more reliable ways to meet its energy needs”.120

Pipeline Sabotage the US Control in the Region The gas pipe line was an action that would stop the influence of the US in the region. I would more worrisome for the US if China had come forward to get involved into the matter. Draitser said “peace pipeline” will be an accomplishment, particularly if China chooses to get involved “In this very plausible scenario, China would finally get the „holy grail‟ it has sought for years: land-based access to energy imports from the Middle East. For China, an energy-starved economy that continues to grow, this would greatly enhance their regional position”.121 He continued “It would also transform the balance of power in Asia, as the era of the US domination of energy resources in the Middle East would be over”.122

Iran Gas Pipeline: Pakistan Employs the US Disagreement as Trump Card The US categorically rejected the idea of pipe line from Iran and forwarded other options for Pakistan. The other options had their own draw backs. The US government forced Pakistan to go for other options like coal at Thar (Sindh). Pakistan asked the US to support in this regard. And partnership with a private company Engro tool place.123

120 Ibid. 121 “Iranian-Pakistan Gas Link has gain in Pipline for Zardari & Ahmadinijad”, Available at: http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013, Accessed on, September 13, 2016. 122 Ibid. 123 The Express Tribune, September 19, 2011.

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Raymond Allen Davis Incident and Diplomatic Immunity Debate On January 27, 2011 an American national R. A. Davis in Lahore, the province of Punjab, opened firing and gun down to men in the day light which were reportedly according to Davis were chasing him and were trying to kill him therefore, in self-defense he opened fires. When the security forces arrested him and started an investigation he stated that he is working as an employee in the US consulate and claimed diplomatic immunity. Pakistani authorities charged him under the criminal sections. This act created infuriation among the masses against the agent and severely criticize the US involvement in the legal system of Pakistan. American consulate, Secretary of State Hilary Clinton and even President Obama pressurized the Pakistani authorities to release the Davis under the Diplomatic Immunity Clauses. Pakistan could not bore the pressure of Americans and released Davis on March 16, 2011 after the families of the two killed men were paid $2.4 million in Diyya (Blood Money). Judges then acquitted him on all charges and Davis immediately departed Pakistan. This incident created grudges between Pakistan and the US which negatively affected strategic partnership and weakened the cause of fight against terrorists.124

Operation Neptune Spear (Abbotabad Raid) On May 2, 2011 American Special Naval SEAL unit raided Osam Bin Laden Compound in Abbotabad, the district of Khyber PukhtunKhwa. In this raid Osama and his guards were killed and his family members were arrested. The raid on the compound was launched from Afghanistan. After the completion of operation soldiers took Laden body to Afghanistan and later on buried it in Sea. This operation created confusion among the masses and Pak-US relations further worsened because Islamabad raised the question of violation of sovereignty. On the other hand, Washington was claiming that Pakistan‟s defense minister and other security top brass of Pakistan were negotiated before the raid. Where the Pakistani officials were denying the claim in the same time different militant groups threatens Pakistan that they will take revenge from the forces. There is no denial to the fact, this incident also widened the gap of trust between the two partners.125

124 “Blood for money for blood”. Available at: http://www.economist.com/blogs/banyan/2012/05/raymond-davis- Case, Accessed on, September 9, 2016. 125 “What the Snowden Files Say about the Osama Bin Laden Raid”, Available at: https://theintercept.com/2015/05/18/snowden-osama-bin-laden-raid, Accessed on, 20 May, 2016.

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Salala incident a blow to Pak-US Partnership On November 26, 2011 two NATO Apache helicopters attacked Salala Army Check post which is located in Mohmand agency. In this attack 24 Pakistan army personnel were killed many wounded. This incident created resentment and anger in the masses as well security establishment of Pakistan. In a response Pakistan army completely cut off the supply line of NATO forces via Pakistan and immediately evacuated Shamsi Airfield which the American were using for drone striking in Pakistan and Afghanistan. Washington was claiming that it was merely an accident while Islamabad stated that the attack was deliberate and the US should immediately conduct an investigation. The trust deficit was further widened between Pakistan and the US even the parliamentarians of Pakistan were demanding to revisit the term and conditions of the engagement in the war on terrorism. Nevertheless, on July 3, 2012, Hillary Clinton the US Secretary of State, formerly apologized on the incident and the human losses inflicted on the Pakistani army. The security apparatus of Pakistan, later on, restored the NATO supply routes via Pakistan.126

6.7 CONCLUSION Pak-US strategic partnership has been the hot topic among the political and security experts of the world. The both countries not smooth on the issue they were diverged. The alliance of the two countries on war on terror has left Pakistan into more troubles and miseries. Yet, the US showed it tilt towards at the end. Pakistan‟s engagement in North Waziristan made Pakistan suffer a lot. And there in Afghanistan the US supported president Hamid Karzai happens to be pro- Indian. Moreover Afghanistan‟s security forces are being trained there in India. Pakistan would never like to be delimited by India region but it is being happened with the support of the US. The war on terror was imposed upon Pakistan and Pakistan was forced to take part against Taliban. When Pakistan took action the group of Taliban took refuge in Pakistan as well as Al-Qaeda. There in Pakistan Taliban started attacking the government as well as civilian targets. The issue of A. Q. Khan and the pipe line dragged the two counties to divergence. The US pressurized Pakistan to withdraw from the pipe line agreement or face the sanctions. It is not possible for any state to make achievement without the help of other state. This is very much true in case of

126 “Pakistan Buries 24 Troops Killed in NATO Air strike”. BBC News, November 27, 2011.

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Pakistan and the US. Whenever, the US needed help it came closer and when the need was over it went back and started imposing sanctions. Peace in the region is the issue both the countries converge upon. Peace in the region especially in Afghanistan is in the interest of the US. It is also in favor of Pakistan as well. Iranian Pipe line issue was in favor of Pakistan and the region but it was against the interest of the US. There the two countries diverged.

In short the partnership with the US in war on terror was a huge disadvantage for Pakistan because Pakistan fought the US war in its own country. Where it alienated its own people and suffered a lot of economic and collateral damage. The need in the relationship is to develop trust so that the achievement may be made.

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CHAPTER – 7

DOMESTIC AND REGIONAL IMPLICATIONS OF PAK-US STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP

7.1 INTRODUCTION Pakistan‟s engagement in the US led war on terrorism and performing the role as frontline state inflicted more harm than benefits. Internal and external security of the state is at complete risk and political and economic condition demand supporting push. Militants and insurgents started their anti-state activates in robust boom. Military has taken the full control over the political landscape and civil institutions have become toothless tigers as the credibility has entirely eroded. Arguably, Pakistan has achieved a significant success against the militant organizations and insurgent groups, yet the groups such as Therik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), Al-Qaida (AQ) and Punjabi Taliban (PT) have intensified and expanded their fatal activities over the last few years. As a consequence the state has been facing the violent wave of violence and sectarian rift. On external fronts Pakistan has pungent and strained relations with its eastern and western borders. The Kashmir dispute between India and Pakistan and Delhi‟s constant propaganda against Pakistan to foment insurgents in the Indian held valley has brought both the countries at daggers drawn. Similarly, Islamabad and Kabul‟s tension is always at peak due to war against militancy.

This chapter thoroughly analyzes and pinpoints the political, economic dimensions of Pakistan in the coalition with the US of America in the war against terrorism. This chapter is basically divided into three parts. The first part deals with the implications on Pakistan‟s external and internal political dynamics in the containment of militant culture. Part second assess the strategic implications on the security of the state. Part third deals with economic costs which Pakistan has been bearing for the last one decade in curbing the threat of fierce militancy.

7.2 POLITICAL IMPLICATION OF MILITANT CULTURE Militant culture has historical roots in Pakistan. However, after the watershed event of 9/11 and Pakistan‟s decision to fight the global war on terror has profoundly affected the political culture on internal and external fronts.

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7.3 DOMESTIC POLITICAL DYNAMICS OF PAKISTAN Below are the internal political dynamics which have taken place since the last ten years in struggling to contain the militant culture and insurgencies. The role of the US, Pakistan army, and Jihadists is crucial in this regard as in their line of actions are creating political instability.

Political Maneuvering of General Pervez Musharraf Decision of General Musharraf to involve in the global war on terrorism and fight as frontline state gave extraordinary benefits. Safeguarding the corporate and institutional interest of Pakistan army can be categories as his brilliance.1Moreover, his support also legitimizes his dictatorial regime in the eyes of world communities. According to commentator, when the event of 9/11 occurred it brought an eminent opportunity for Musharraf to expand and legitimize his military regime. When the US secretary of state called Musharraf and out rightly asked about his involvement in the US war on terrorism. He immediately joined and got side with the US. It can be safely commented that being a weak state in term of military and economic resources Pakistan did not have any opportunity except to join the US bloc. Had Pakistan adopted the policy of neutrality and took an open support to Afghan Taliban definitely it would have bear the wrath of west in term of military operations and economic sanctions.

On 6th of October 2001 when the coalition forces started Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) in Afghanistan, Muharraf declared and extended his tenure as Chief of Army Staff for indefinite period and prolong his rule.2 To make his term more secure and centralized his powers he introduced controlled democracy and held referendum in which he declared himself as the president of the country for further five years as well. Number of amendments was incorporated in 1973 constitution in August 2002 through Legal Framework Order (LFO). He introduced the National Security Council (NSC) and staunchly arguing to defend the step: “if you want to keep the military out, you have to get them in”.3Musharraf was of the opinion that the

1 Teresita C. Schaffer, “US Influence on Pakistan: can Partners have Divergent Priorities?”, The Washington Quarterly 26, No. 1, (Winter 2002-03): pp. 177-178. 2 Aqil Shah, “The Transition to „Guided‟ ”, in Jim Rolef (ed.), The Asian Pacific: A Region in Transition (Honolulu: Asia-Pacific Centre for Security Studies, 2004), pp. 215216. 3 “Shahid Hussain, “Musharraf Empowers Himself”, Gulf News, August 22, 2002.

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“Military takeovers will not be a possibility because we have taken those who can make the rash decisions”. Major political parties resisted the amendments in the constitution made by the Musharraf and were severely against the institutionalized military role in policy making and political decision making. Eminent leader of the political party indicated about the negative role of NSC “it is permanent hanging sword over the head of an elected popular government and parliament”4 and the same role was performed by NSC in the later years.

The role of military was expanded in the bureaucracy and economy in the Musharraf regime. Civil institution had completely militarized as the retired and in service army personnel were recruited in the civil institutions. Resultantly, military became the largest serving institution in the state as round about twelve hundred army men in service and retired were posted in the key position of educational institutions, state-run enterprises and ministries. Military also got controlled in information and totally revision of the curriculum.5

Political environment was totally controlled by Musharraf. 2002 elections were manipulated by the major religious political parties specially in the province of Khyber Pakhtukhwa and Baluchistan MMA formed the government and the so-called progressive political parties such as Pakistan People party (PPP) and (PML-N) were badly defeated and sidelined from provincial political arena.6 The unprecedented triumph of MMA in the general elections of 2002 and becoming of second largest political party in Baluchistan is due to the non- presence of the leadership of PPP and PML-N. The alliance also got overwhelming majority in the province of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KPK). The alliance placed the third largest force in the lower house (National Assembly). MMA shaped coalition government with Muharraf patronized Pakistan Muslim League-Q (PM-Q) in Baluchistan and formed its own government in the province of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa.

There were multiple factors which contributed to the success of MMA and its ascendency to power. Sentiments of Pukhtune nation was fomented in public gatherings by the religious political parties and gave perception against the

4 Saleem Shahid, “Amendments to Give Martial Law Permanence”, Dawn, August 24, 2002. 5 Shaun Gregory and Jams Revill, “The Role of Military in the Cohesion and Stability of Pakistan”, Contemporary South Asia 16, No. 1, (March 2008): pp. 39-61. 6 Joshua T. White, Pakistan’s Islamists Frontier: Islamic Politics and US Policy in Pakistan’s North-West Frontier(Arlington: Centre on Faith & International Affairs, 2008), p. 48.

205 government for supporting the America war and equally involved in the killing to their Pukhtune brethren in Afghanistan. Bond of MMA alliance can be gauged as they started the theological debate7 about the role of state of Pakistan in the US-led war campaign and put aside their all ideological and political difference. The joint mechanism was chalked out by supporting the Taliban movement in Afghanistan, to support the Pushtune in the border land and to gather and support anti-Americanism in the country. Alliance initiated its campaign by shaping the mind of public to cost their vote for the political parties which are supporting the Jihadist forces in Afghanistan and gave massage to hypocritical forces which are supporting the war on terrorism in the region. Military regime confirmed it ideological proxies‟8 strategies by supporting anti-Americanism in different parts of the country and spare space by taking number of measures such as introduction of bachelor condition for the national assembly members, giving religious seminaries degrees equal importance as the university bachelor and put aside the two mainstream political parties from the electoral process. The perception was also given to Bush administration by Musharraf that the extremist Islamists are strengthening their position in the tribal areas of Pakistan and Pak-Afghan border land therefore, for the sake of thwarting their ideological and physical proliferation existence of military regime in the centre is pivotal.

MMA being a supporter and sympathizer of Taliban built a kind of environment which favored and congenial to the Jihadists groups. This facilitation caused the influx of money, weapons and recruits from Pakistan to Afghanistan. Some reports confirmed that the Inter-Services Intelligence ISI supported the Afghan militants financially through Jamiat-Ulma-e-Islam (JUI-F) and also provided the strategic guidance in the Pushtune areas Quetta (The capital city of Baluchistan).9 The reward and assistance to the centre by MMA can be acknowledged by toning down the voices of separatist national parties and other rogue elements of Baluchistan which were creating anti-state sentiments in Baloch youth. Islamization process in much civil institutions was started in the Musharraf era because of the enduring and close

7 Farhana Ali, “US-Pakistan Cooperation: The War on Terrorism and Beyond”, Strategic Insights 6, No. 4, (June 2007), p. 5. 8 Raheem ul Haque, “Strategic Depth: Does it Promote Pakistan Strategic Interests?”, Research & News Quarterly, No. 11-13 (Lahore: Centre for Public Policy & Governance, For man Christian College University, April 2011),pp. 11-12. 9 Magnus Norell, “The Taliban and the Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal (MMA)”, China and Eurasia Forum Quarterly 5,No. 3, (2007): p. 74.

206 nexus of military, religious political parties and the militant groups.10 Extraordinary dependence of military regime on the Islamic parties encouraged the later to extend their overt and covert support to the militants groups in FATA and Baluchistan. Interesting point is this, that MMA reciprocated the support from Legal Frame Work order (LFO) in 2007 through which General Musharraf became a powerful president and was ruling the roots of the country.11 Thus, it can be say safely, that alliance was duly encouraged and supported by the military establishment with the expediency to retain and sustain support for military‟s policy objectives vis-à-vis India and Afghanistan.

Political maneuvering to hold into power by General Pervez Musharraf, many analysts are of the view that the presence of religious forces in the national parliament provided a justification to the presidency of Musharraf as if the international community is not willing to see dictator as head of the state than the world should ready of the consequences of radical Islam rather than moderate and progressive Islam. America‟s support was ensure by Musharraf military regime by holding the argument that reactionary elements in the state and the parliament can gain control over nuclear weapons and can be transferred to their sympathizers. The argument was furthered endorsed by the “Operation Silence” conducted by military on “Lal Masjid” on 7th of July 2007 in Islamabad. He successfully created an impression through national and international media that between the capture of Islamabad and extremists forces he is the sole identity and can counter the ideological narratives in the state. Yet, in fact inflicted irreparable damaged to the image of the army and law enforcement agencies. The officers of the middle rank totally lost their trust in their leadership and the war against militancy.12

Another unconstitutional act of Musharraf was the proclamation of emergency on 3rd November 2007 and imposition of Provisional Constitutional Order (PCO). Many political pundits argue that it was not mere an emergency it was an effectively martial law. While General Musharraf declared that emergency was imposed because

10 Manjeet S. Perdesi, “The Battle for the Soul of Pakistan at the Islamabad‟ Red Mosque”, in Sumit Ganguly andC. Chritine Fair (ed.), Trading on Hallowed Ground: Counter Insurgency Operations in Sacred Spaces (Oxford:Oxford University Press, 2008), pp. 94-95. 11 Norell, “The Taliban and the Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal (MMA)”, p. 74. 12 Shukat Qadir, “Still an Uncertain Future”, in Stephen Cohen (ed.), The Future of Pakistan (Washington: Brooking Institute, 2011), p. 167.

207 of the country‟s precarious security situation and to thwart the expansion of radical forces. The opponent critiques point out the measure taken by him was actually the alarming bell of judiciary. It was supposed that judiciary is going to nullify the October‟s re-elections for the presidency of Musharraf.23 Therefore it was a pre- emptive assault by him. Interestingly, he ordered on 15th December 2007 to turn down the PCO and reinstate the constitution13 but he did not restore the Supreme Court judges who decline to take oath under PCO. Therefore, his PCO laid the seeds for the disintegration of 2008 post election political order. It is an existential fact that political landscape was very much charged against that Musharraf because of his political maneuvering in 2008 elections. Political parties extremely exploited the political situation which were against Muharraf regime and initiated their campaign on the dominant issues such as strengthening of institutions, restoration of judges, National reconciliation order (NRO), war against militancy and terrorism and revival of economy.14General Musharraf has resigned from the office in August 2008 due to political, judicial and public pressure, but political fragmentation is continued. The state institutions at the verge and their workability and credibility are at stake. Extremists and radical elements against whom the General was committed to take stern action were safely flourished in his ear.15 His Machiavellian approach of managing and handling the security issues and deal the FATA as an enemy territory speaks louder of his ineptness.

Challenge of Militant Culture and Civil-Military Imbalance After the event of 9/11 military was involved in curbing the militant organizations. Many Islamist organizations considered the engagement of Pakistan in the US-led war on terrorism as a hypocritical act. Military increased its role in the civil administration and the institutions overtly and covertly and political administration seemed to be powerless in important policy making process. This situation created the civil-military imbalance in the country.16when Pakistan People Party (PPP) came into government after February 2008 elections; there was great

13 “After Bhutto‟s Murder: A Way Forward for Pakistan”, ICG Asia ReportNo. 74, (Brussels: International Crisis Group, January 2, 2008): p. 8. 14 Ashok K. Behuria, “From Fragmentation to Coalition: End of General Musharraf Politics?”, Strategic Analysis 32, No. 3, (May 2008), p. 335. 15 Ibid. 16 Talat Masood, “Civil-Military Relations and the 2007 : Impact on the Regional Security Environment”, China and Eurasia Forum Quarterly 5, No. 1, (2007): p. 54.

208 chance in the hand of the government to balance the civil-military relations. PPP no doubt, won the elections but the party received sympathy votes from the public because of the tragic and sudden assassination of the party chairman Banazire Bhutto in December 2007. After the end of Muharraf regime military involved in containing the militancy and insurgencies in various parts of the country, yet discredited after his prolong military rule. Therefore the then new army chief Genenral Ashfaq Pervez Kayani decision was very wise to send back the military into barracks.17However, conducting successful military operation in Swat and South Waziristan agency against radical Taliban in 2009, General Ashfaq Pervez kayani got much popular support and trust and became the sole and ultimate patron of the national security affairs and foreign policy of the state. On the political front, in the wake of fight against militants the PPP-led government lost its credibility in the eyes of the public because of the failure of the government on addressing the public issues such as restoring law and order situation, tackling corruption, and reinstating the crippled economy. Once again the military got space and started intervening in the administration and enhanced its clout in civil affairs.

Arguably, the political government proved its ineptness as the government failed to in providing the sufficient administration, security and reconstruction responsibilities in FATA and Malakand division. This failure created space for the role of the military establishment and started to govern the areas and clear the areas form the Taliban mongers which have been almost creating havoc and victimizing the inhabitant of the FATA. The civil administration kept itself at distance from the security related matters and responsibility put on the shoulder of General Head Quarter (GHQ)to take decisions about running the administration and security of the area. This thinking created meaningful administrative vacuum which could not be filled after clearing the area from the influence of the Taliban. It would not be wrong to say that he had become in many ways indispensible identity like his predecessor.18 Extraordinary encouragement by the political government to Genaral Kayani also needs to be highlighted. His tenure was extended for three years from 2010 to 2013 with the plea that the military has achieved remarkable success in the military operations in Malakand, Swat and South Waziristan. Further, his unflinching support

17 Tarique Niazi, “Is the Military Still in Charge in Pakistan?”, Foreign Policy in Focus, December 14, 2010. 18 Shukat Qadir, “Still an Uncertain Future”, p. 48.

209 for democratic process and close ties with the military officials of USA and NATO were also considered for prolonging his tenure. Nevertheless, number of scholars, legalists and political pundits gave an opposing observation by stating that the political government support and much reliability on General Kayani for resolving the internal and external security paradoxes strengthened individual power and weakened the institutional supremacy. Eminent lawyer and human rights activist Asma Jehanger are of the view that extension was provided to the Chief of Army Staff (COAS) owing to the pressure of military. But many analysts opined that the upcoming political governments and democracy in the state will suffer a lot. It will take an years to mitigate the influence of the military establishment in the security related matters and foreign policy.19

In a nutshell, February 2008 elections and unpopular Musharraf regime sent the military back to perform their constitutional role. But the government failure and ineptness to counter the indigenous insurgencies erupted after the war on terror gave an impetus to the Khaki establishment. In policy making process the sole institution was involved specially the shaping the foreign policy towards USA, India and Afghanistan. In near future military is least interested to weaken it its hold over the foreign policy related issues. The friction between the present government, which came into power after 2013 elections, and military bear witness that the later is not willing to give up its hold over the subject of foreign policy. In fact, the future civil- military relations will be shaped by the developments which are taking place after the occurring of event of 9/11 and increased security paradox of Pakistan. The army will continue its role and interfere in the political landscape because security managers consider that political leadership is not capable to chalk out a comprehensive strategy to contain the militants physical and ideological proliferation and has failed to conduct strong foreign policy especially towards Afghanistan, India and US and this situation will, infect, frail the civil institutions which already are in fragile position.20

Pakistan-US Alliance and Its Impact on Political Landscape Pakistan-US alliance to contain militant culture enhanced the influence and role of later in the internal politics of Pakistan. America‟s penetration in the internal affairs of Pakistan is due to her eagerness that Islamabad should continue and ensure

19 Niazi, “Is the Military Still in Charge in Pakistan?”, p.114 20 Lawrence Ziring, Pakistan at the Crosscurrent of History (Lahore: Vanguard, 2004), p. 336.

210 its efforts against the militant outfits which are not only creating disturbance in Pakistan but also attacking the US and NATO troops in Afghanistan and then take refuge in the border land area. Pakistan Arab Spring which took place in 2007by which the lawyers, members of civil society, human right activists and media mobilize the opinion of the masses against General Musharraf and his regime because through the arbitrary use of his authority sacked the then chief justice of Pakistan Aftikhar Muhammad Chudhary.21 In this scenario the US tried to protect its interests. America also prepared a political script by which she tried to make Bhutto- Musharraf deal so that Islamabad could continue its struggle in containing the militant culture and keep check on the militant groups which are attacking the US interest in Afghanistan. Further, the US wanted to present the civilian face of Pakistan to the world community because it was blamed for supporting the dictatorial regime, therefore, Banazir Bhutto, who was on self-exile, was brought to Pakistan with the offer of de-facto prime minister ship of the country. This approach of US endorsed the widely spread point of view that she is exploiting the political condition of Pakistan for safeguarding its own interest and ensure Pakistan‟s involvement in war on terrorism.

Many Political analysts, without any hesitation, argue that Pakistan people party (PPP) was brought to power with the tacit approval of Washington so that the policies ought to be continued in the region. Some pundits opine that soon after the general elections 2008, the US urged the Pakistan Muslim League (Q) which was on opposition benches to support the PPP-led coalition government and in the meanwhile, taking into confidence the Pakistan Muslim League (N) led by Nawas Sharief that Washington will continue the support for the cause of independence of judiciary as fundamental condition for forming the coalition government.22 There is non-disputes the reality, the voters who cast their votes against the government of Musharaf in 2008 elections, their dissenting voice depicted that they were actually against the US policies and the support of military regime. America remained eager to establish such kind of political setup which pursues her interests so that continuity could be sustained. So, the penetration of the US in the internal policies of Pakistan,

21 Abhishek Kaicker, Pakistan and Democracy: Before and After Musharraf (Toronto: Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada, 2007), pp. 7-8. 22 Syed Saleem Shezad, “Pakistan Shift Through Election Aftermath”, Asia Times, February 21, 2008.

211 by the end of 2008, was extremely widened. It is the reason, majority of the population was distressingly feeling that the pivotal feature of the country is no more Musharraf rather controlled by Washington.23

It was expected that Obama administration will take measure for mature and sustained democratic process in Pakistan but its policies were the continuation of Bush administration regarding the political landscape of Pakistan. Introduction of „Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act 2009‟ (Karry-Lugger Bill) is considered by the security mangers of the state as a calculated move by Washington to intervene in the internal structural and services matters and organizational affairs of the armed forces. The proposed bill stated that the future military assistance will be associated with the non-interference of the military in the politics of the country and the budgetary allocation, promotions of the military officials and strategic planning will strictly be under the control of civilian government. Interestingly, the assistance also tied with the certification of the secretary of state of the US.24 In addition, Washington wanted to ensure that the military will conduct and eliminate the safe havens of terrorist‟s hideouts. It categorically stated the name of „Quetta Shura‟ Taliban and the compounds of Lashkar-e-Taiba in Muridke in the province of Punjab.

Strong opposition erupted among the masses against the humiliating provisions of Karry-Lugger bill. It was widely believed that the US wanted to change the security paradigm of Pakistan with the desire to safeguard its regional interests and completely ignoring the national interests of Pakistan. Moreover, deep down perception also took place among the people that the US has been supporting the coalition government of Asif Ali Zardari as the later is a hard supporter of democracy and proved to be beneficial to advancing her agenda. For instance, Washington raised deep concerns about the clash between the two major political parties, such as PPP- led coalition government and PML-N in 2009, over the restoration of judges of the Supreme Court. As Washington recognized the weaknesses of the PPP-led coalition government, therefore, quietly pushed Nawaz Sharief to join hands with Asif Zardari and form coalition government. It was encouraged so as to safeguard its agenda with involving Pakistan to curb the religion driven insurgencies.25

23 Mathew J. Nelson, “Pakistan in 2008: Moving Beyond Musharraf”, Asian Survey 49, No. 1, (2009): p. 27. 24 Aqil Shah, “Getting the Military Out of Pakistani Politics”, Foreign Affairs 90, No. 3, (June 2011): pp. 74-80. 25 Omar Waraich, “How a US Aid Package to Pakistan Could Threaten Zardari”, Time, October 8, 2009.

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The US involvement can be assess from the actuality, that Ashfaq Pervez Kyani, the than Chief of Army Staff discussed with the then ambassador in March 2009 to make a scheme and pressurize Asif Zardari to resign from his office of presidency and replace him with Awami Nationa party chief Asfand Yar Wali.26 Nawaz Sharief also paid thanks to the US in meeting for General Kyani‟s extension of office as army chief. The US ambassador stated:

“The fact that former Prime Minister believes the US could control the appointment of Pakistan’s Chief of Army Staff speaks volumes about the myth of American influence in Pakistan, here”.27

A hard reality should be acknowledged that due to the complex security issues, its counter militancy measures and its economic policies are no more governed internally. Washington assistance in term of finances has become pivotal tool for running the state administrative machinery. Event of 9/11 totally changed the political environment of the country because of the structural presence of the US and its deep indulgence in political activities as well as military, political and religious leadership. In this scenario all the ruling forces were focusing their own interests. The interests of civil government, military establishment and the policies of America were in complete ambiguity as consequences. Washington‟s involvement in policy making of Pakistan erupt anti-American sentiments among the masses and they wanted to mitigate the structural presence of America in the country and leadership must give emphasis to transparency in the policy making and provide good governance.

7.4 EXTERNAL POLITICAL DYNAMICS Geo-political landscape of Pakistan was profoundly disturbed, owing to growing influence of India and to the some extent Iran in Afghanistan. Anti-Taliban force, Northern-Alliance which is anti-Islamabad, has been taking deep roots in Afghanistan and creating a hard environment at Pakistan external front. Militant culture which has been strengthened since 9/11 is also backed by its western fronts. Non-cooperation by Kabul loses Pakistan‟s stance on Kashmir as well.

26 Jane Perlez, David Sanger and Eric Schmitt, “Nuclear Fuels Mamos Expose Wary Dance with Pakistan”, New York Times, November 30, 2010. 27 Declan Walsh, “Pakistan‟s President Asif Ali Zardari Prepared for Assassination”, The Guardian, November 30, 2010.

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Political Implications in Afghan Region In the hard struggle of containing the insurgencies in the border land area of Pakistan and Afghanistan, Pakistan was completely isolated from the political process of Afghanistan in the post-Taliban era. Bonn conference, December 2001, on Afghanistan considered to be the defeat of Pakistan on political and diplomatic fronts. It was proposed by the conference that interim government would be established under the presidency of Hamid karzai which means political power will be in the hand of, anti-Taliban force, Northern Alliance. Pakistan has severe concerns about the Northern Alliance as it is a force which is always pro-India and anti-Pakistan. Pushtoons which are in majority in Afghanistan and in the past political scene is dominated by them are losing their grip in political structure.

India supported the Northern Alliance in 90s and after that the event of 9/11 strengthened its position. Staunch Afghan hardliners, the members of Northern Alliance are the active stake holders of the new Afghan government.28There is no denial of the fact that Pakistan has been countering the challenge of militant culture and fomenting insurgencies, yet it is a matter of profound concern about India‟s collusion with Northern Alliance and to dominate the regime in Kabul and to divert its policies against the regional interests of Pakistan. Indeed, the government of Hamid Karzai created space for New Delhi to enhance its influence in Afghanistan by receiving $1.3 billion as social and economic development. It has proved futile that Pakistan‟s military training assistance of 300 million dollars has no value before such a huge amount given by India.29

New Delhi investment is continued. It has been running number of projects for the development of Afghanistan. Strategically pivotal project is Zaranj-delaram highway which is 218 kilometer long and connects Iranian port of Chabahar with Afghanistan Garland highway. It further links Kandhar, Kabul, Fayzabad to Tajikistan and Farah and heart to Turkmenistan further, Mazar-e-Sharief to Uzbekistan in central Asia.30India‟s strategy of building of highways has created anxiety to Islamabad. The

28 Harsh V. Pant, “India in Afghanistan: A Test Case for a Rising Power”, Contemporary South Asia 18, No. 2, (June2010): p. 140. 29 Haider Ali Hussain Mullick, “Obama‟s Afghanistan-Pakistan Quandary-Part II”, Yale Global, April 15, 2009. 30 Aparna Pande, Explaining Pakistan’s Foreign Policy: Escaping India (New York: Routlage, 2011), p. 82.

214 success of Gawader deep port sea, at this point, can be affected as it has been envisioned that it will Central Asia and Afghanistan would be connected with Indian Ocean through on belt which would be emerged as a trade and energy corridor.

The situation has become more worrisome because of suspicion of Islamabad about the close nexus between Iran and India to increase their influence in western Afghanistan and to mitigate the Pakistan‟s influence in eastern Afghanistan.31Rashid states that New Delhi‟s strategy of reconstruction is actually to undercut the influence of Pakistan bin Afghanistan. Through manifold assistance by India to Afghanistan manifest the designs of former to emerge as bigger economic and regional power.

Moreover, Islamabad perception about the Northern Alliance is considered to be full of doubts. If Northern Alliance forms the government it would be against the national interests of Pakistan. It will not recognize the Durand line as dejure border and always claim for rights of Pustune area of Pakistan. The vacuous claims of Afghanistan can get roots in the Pushtune areas of Pakistan and movement can be imagined in future for the cause of separate homeland for the Pushtune areas of Pakistan and Afghanistan which will be called the greater Pushtunistan and will be equal to dismember Pakistan. Islamabad took the matter much seriously when Afghan president stated that Durand Line is line hatred between the brothers (Pushtunes of Pakistan and Afghanistan) and Kabul does not accept the line. Fear further increased when Afghan government officially declared to celebrate and commemorate „Pushtune Day‟ on August 31 each year. The US special envoy for Pakistan and Afghanistan Mark Grossman stated in his official statement about the status of Duran Line and declared it international border. This statement was harshly rejected by Afghan officials and declared it irrelevant by anyone about the legal status of Duran Line. In response Islamabad clearly rejected the stance and declared that the Durand Line issue has been resolved and closed.32

Nevertheless, Afghanistan‟s suspicions still exist about the Pak-Afghan border. Time and again afghan government blame Pakistan that in FATA there are secrete havens of militants groups which operate and assault on NATO and afghan

31 Christine Fair, “Pakistan Relations with Central Asia: Is Past Prologue”, Journal of Strategic Studies 31, No. 2, (April 2008): p. 220. 32 “Line a Settled Issue‟ Says Pakistan”, Dawn, October 26, 2012.

215 forces and then take refuge in tribal areas of Pakistan. President Karzai further argued that intelligence institutions are giving full support to these militants.Clashes occurred on border in 2003 between the troops of Pakistan and Afghanistan. Allegations were leveled on Pakistan that it has built bases 600 meter near the border of Afghanistan. However, Pakistan rejected all the blameless allegations posed by Kabul with the plea that the government has conducted operations against the militant outfits which are operating in Mohmand Agency.33

Soon, after these accusations range of protests and demonstrations started against Pakistan in various cities of Afghanistan such as Kandhar, Lagman, Mazar-i- Sharief and Urozgan is witnessed of high protests. On July 8, 2003 protest turned into violence in Kabul and Pakistan embassy was attacked. Resultantly, relation between the countries was at daggers drawn. After the tragic incident, both the countries‟ soldiers often involved in clashes and sometime high causalities are reported from both the sides.

The relations further worsened when Pakistan chalked out a strategy to fence its 1510 km border to bitterly control the cross-border migration and infiltration of insurgents. But the proposal was declined by Kabul claiming that if fencing takes place Durand Line will be considered permanent border and plea of Afghanistan would get weak.34This is the fundamental reasons that tribes of both sides of the line are intervening the border areas. Interestingly, Kabul which repeatedly throws dust on the role of Pakistan and it provides shelter to the militants‟ organizations in its soil but entirely turns its eyes of the role regarding Bugti insurgents which have established safe-havens in the land of Afghanistan. It has been proved that Kabul has provided refuge to round about 200 militants of Bugti tribes including Brahamdagh Bugti, a leader of rebel and reportedly involved in terror-related activities in the province of Baluchistan. In 2007, General Pervez Musharraf alleged that Brahamdagh Bugti is enjoying full freedom of movement and frequently travel in different cities of Afghanistan with the full support of the government and also raise money which is used for operational activities against the security forces of Pakistan. When Barahamdagh Bugti was demanded by the state of Pakistan, Hamid karzai refused to hand over him by saying ‟rising insurgencies does not make the

33 “Integrated Regional Information Networks (IRIN)News, October 30, 2003. 34 “Mr. Karzai Can‟t have it Both Ways”, Daily Times, March 12, 2006.

216 terrorist.35Furthermore in August 2012, Rehman Malik the then interior minister also blamed that Brahamdagh and other affiliated insurgents travel to abroad (India, UK, Switzerland etc) on afghan passport.36Arguably, Kabul unflinching physical and financial backing to Baloch separatists is one of the fundamental reasons of the hostile relations between the countries.

Kashmir Dispute and India-Pakistan Hostile Relations Pakistan‟s fight against insurgency negatively affected the Kashmir cause. Two striking points profoundly damaged the Kashmir policy and also throw political repercussions on India-Pakistan relations in the post 9/11 scenario. Firstly, Pakistan stance on Kashmir can be weakened politically even though General Musharraf and Indian Prime Minister mutually came into an agreement to settle long standing issue. Delhi and Islamabad both built a consensus to continue back channels. Self- government will be provided to both parts of Kashmir with complete demilitarization in phases and joint mechanism will be constituted to administer both parts of the territory. But, the dream could not be materialized owing to occurrence of Mumbai tragedy and the process of composite dialogue was suspended. Political community in Pakistan did not support the measure of composite dialogue as they are of the view that military dictator unilaterally is taking decisions particularly about the faith of Kashmiries without taking into consideration the sentiments of the masses of Pakistan.37Secondly, Delhi had completely changed the dimension of its policies from peaceful resolution of Kashmir dispute and focused to blame Pakistan for cross- border terrorism approach in India and Indian-held Kashmir.38Pakistan is, reiterately, accused by India that stern action has not been taken against militants‟ outfits and no any strategy is chalked out to bring the monsters into justice especially those who were involved in Mumbai carnage. Restricted dialogue offer ((Discuss only militants Cross-Border Issue) made by India was rejected. Yousaf Raza Gilani stated that negotiations without the agenda of Kashmir would be futile. It is the practice of the civilized world that they resolved their matters by talks rather than force.39 Indians‟

35 Declan Walsh, “Wiki Leaks Cables Reveal Afghan-Pakistan Row over Fugitive Rebel”, The Guardian, November 30, 2010. 36 Imran Mukhtar, “Kabul Fomenting Baluchistan Unrest”, The Nation, August 4, 2012. 37 Apoorve Shah, “Pakistan‟s Times in the Shadows”, Wall Street Journal 7, No. 3, (2010): pp. 34- 35. 38 Tayyab Siddique, “peace and Kashmir”, The News, January 12, 2010. 39 “India Doesn‟t Want to Talk on Kashmir”, Daily Times, February 2010.

217 rigidity towards dialogue and association of peace process with the sole issue of jihadists cross border activities which depicts Delhi‟s lake of interests towards normalization. On the other hand vanguards of Pakistan firm political and strategic reasons do not accept the demands of India with conditions due to which deadlock has reached permanency.

Worries of Islamabad for Indians‟ deep influence in the policy-making of Kabul can be justified. Security vanguards of Pakistan are realizing that gaining footholds by India in Afghanistan are, actually, containing Pakistan longstanding strategy of proxy in India-held Kashmir. Pakistan‟s military way of fight “War of Thousand Cuts” continues to keep sustainable pressure on New Delhi so that to bring her to settle the issue of Kashmir. The strategy has also aim to engage Indian military in Hamalyan region and to divert her attention from rest of Pakistan. Security managers justify the strategy as a force of equalizer by which larger and advanced Indian military would be given tough time. This is the reason that Islamabad watches Indian interference in Afghanistan with much suspicion and consider that the chances of Pakistan‟s success would be reduced in Kashmir as attention would be diverted to Afghanistan.

Aqil Shah opines that Pakistan believe that India strategy to enhance influence in Afghanistan is actually a „pincer movement designed to reduce pressure in Kashmir‟.40India‟s Cold Start Strategy threat tense further the already hostile security environment between Islamabad and Delhi.41Therefore, security managers of Pakistan preferred to move to „back channel‟ diplomacy to resolve Kashmir dispute. , PML-(Q) leader, words reflects the new policy adopted by military elites: “Many problems have accumulated since the time Musharraf left. India now boasts of a cold start doctrine, there is also looming water war, the situation in Baluchistan and India’s role in Afghanistan. The Pakistan army also feels that India left no stone unturned to isolate it internationally”.42

The military setback from the process of peace can be gauged from the fact that in 2008 militants‟ infiltration was increased as compared to 2007. The numbers were further multiplied in 2009 due to which border conflicts arose between the

40 “What is the problem with Pakistan?” Report on Roundtable Discussion, Foreign Affairs, April 2, 2009. 41 Ikram Sehgal , “Stabilizing Af-Pak”, The News, May 6, 2009. 42 Mariana Babar, “The Pindi Manifesto”, Outlook India, March 1, 2010.

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Pakistani and Indian troops.43It was, infect, the first time when Indian-focused militants‟ outfits publically emerged on the surface and calling the people for Jihad against India. Two leading organizations Lashkr-e-Tayyaba (LeT) and Jaish-e- Muhammad (JM) provoked the sentiments of the people of Southern Punjab. They also held public processions in Kotily, a town in Pakistan administered Kashmir, and enthusiastically vowed by them to continue Jihad against India until liberate Indian- held Kashmir. Head of United Jihad Council (UJC), Patron of all Indian-focused militant organizations, and chief of Hizbul Mujheeden (HM) Syed Salahuddin stated that negotiations and diplomatic channels have failed to materialize any results about the faith of Kashmir and the only option to liberate the seized territory is wage jihad against the infidel forces. “We reject the process of negotiation as these have failed to ensure the freedom of Kashmir”.44

Moreover, in 2009, with the support of ISI, LeT, JM and HuM started to recruit the youth and prepared them for Jihad against India from Azad Jammu and Kashmir (AJK). The strategy depicts that Islamabad will not stay away of the tactic of „proxy warfare‟ until Kashmir dispute reached its logical conclusion.45However, Delhi is also rigid in its stance towards the issue and pay no regard to the UN resolutions and desires of the Kashmiri people. This inflexibility from both sides and offensive tone can lead to nuclear conflict.

7.5 STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS OF PAKISTAN- US PARTNERSHIP Pakistan coalition in the US-led war against terrorism posed new type of security threats to the security managers of Pakistan due to the presence of the US and NATO troops in the western boarder of Pakistan. Following section explain the internal as well as external security threat to the state of Pakistan.

7.6 INTERNAL SECURITY THREATS TO PAKISTAN Pakistan‟s efforts against the Islamist militant completely changed the security environment of Pakistan. Growing waves of religious extremism, militancy and sectarianism emerged as a fundamental threat to the security of the state in the aftermath of 9/11.

43 Graham Usher, “The Afghan Triangle: Kashmir, India, Pakistan”, Middle East Report 39, No. 2, (July 2009): pp. 20-21. 44 “LeT, Hizb Vow to Intesify Jihad against India”, Economic Times, March 25, 2010. 45 Graham Usher, “The Afghan Triangle”, p. 20.

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7.7 EMERGENCE OF ISLAMISTS MILITANT ORGANIZATIONS The US invasion of Afghanistan on October 7, 2001 and dethroning the regime of Taliban on December 2001 provoked the Islamists Jihadi outfits in Pakistan. More, the lower cadre of military personnel and intelligence agency were also infuriated on the act of the US in time of the invasion of America. Scores of Pakistani based militant groups were placed in Afghanistan. They were hand hit and killed by the carpet bombing of the US air strikes. Militant organizations such as Harkat-ul-Mujahideen bore severe human losses as 340 fighters including the important commanders were killed in Afghanistan.46

Under the US pressure, General Pervez Musharraf banned five militant organizations in January 2002. Number of members of these militant outfits was assured by the law enforcement agencies. The lower cadre members lost contacts with their leadership. These members were out of control from central command and joined the ranks of Al-Qaida. There is no denial of the fact, that security vanguards miscalculated the militants‟ approach towards Pakistan. They are of the view that the militants will realize the security compulsion of Pakistan whereby the Al Qaida and sectarian outfits were targeted and due assistance will be handed to the Afghan Jihadis.47

Nevertheless, the militant groups intensified their activities against the Musharaf for his support to America as coalition partner. Muhammad Amir Rana, a security analyst state, that different newspaper of Pakistan received leaflet from a new extremist militant organization Al-Saiqa” on 30th January, 2002 it was categorically stated that Pakistan is a Dar-ul-herb (Abode of war) and Dar-ul-Kofar (Abode of infidels)” and provoking the masses to wage jihad against the state of Pakistan and to target the security forces. Massage of Al-Saiqa clearly depicts that Jihadi outfits turned their violent activities against the law enforcement apparatus as well as government.48

46 Ahmed Rashid, Descent into Chaos: How the War against Islamic Extremism Being Lost in Pakistan, Afghanistan and Central Asia (London: Allen Lane, 2008), p. 60. 47 Asif Shezad, “Pakistani Militancy Spreads to Countries Heartland”, Associated Press, June 16, 2010. 48 Muhammad Amir Rana, “The Punjabi Taliban”, Dawn, July 9, 2010.

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General Pervez Musharraf initiated a step for resolving the Kashmir dispute with India in 2004. Owing to the immense pressure by the US Musharraf banned the Kashmiri Jihadi organizations such as LT and JM. The decision of the government compelled the Kashmiri militant groups to move to FATA to ensure their survival as ISI (Inter-Services intelligence) Kashmir cell was also closed in 2004. Furthermore, in 2006, the then ISI chief General Ashfaq Kayani decided to close down the militant camps which were located in Azad Kashmir and the different parts of Hazara. This decision narrows down the distance between the militant groups of Kashmir and FATA. Both the groups warmly build their nexus. These were the well trained fighter. They spread their activities in the areas of FATA, Swat, Waziristan and Dara Adem khel where they found their sympathizers as well. In the meanwhile the splinter groups of JM and LT took refugees in the valley of Swat under the patronship of Mulvi Fazlulah. They also trained the local militant and spread ideological narratives through organized campaign. It was reported in 2009, that JM splintering factions are brutally involved in fighting against the armed forces of Pakistan in tribal areas.49

It is an existential reality that fragmented group emerged with new name and ideology since 2009. These groups include al-Qital, Ithad-e-Mujahidden khurasan (IMK), Punjabi Taliban, Lashkare-e-Baluchistan, Al-Azam brigade, Al-Muktar, Al- Furqan, Asian tigers and Bader Mansoor. There were some of the groups which focused specific kind of goals. For instance, Asian tigers were involved in kidnapping. Similarly, the government spies who were working for CIA-led drone operations, were targeted by IMK, and Al-Qital focused on target killing. Security analysts‟ opines that the division among the militant groups solves the safety as well as financial problems for the militants.50

7.8 BIRTH OF PAKISTANI TALIBAN IN FATA Pakistani militants justify their existence on the land of Pakistani soil to conduct raids on American and NATO troops in Afghanistan. In the meanwhile they also support the defensive Jihad against the state of Pakistan to ensure the survival of Pakistani Jihadists because of Islamabad‟s decision to become partner of the US

49 Omer Waraich, “Why Pakistan Must Widen Hunt for Militant Base”, TIME, October 13, 2009. 50 Zufiqar Ali and Pazir Gul, “Differences Crop up among Waziristan Militant Outfits”, Dawn, September 16, 2011.

221 against Taliban.51 The challenge of tackling the militants in FATA was further complicated when in October 2002 Mutahida-Majlis-e-Amal (MMA) came into power in the provinces of Khyber Pukhtunkhwa and Baluchistan. JUI-F and JUI-S which were in alliance in MMA were the staunch sympathizers to the militant groups which were fighting in Afghanistan. This is not a matter of surprise as Taliban got political shelter in the shape of MMA. In 2003 severity of attacks on foreign troops were multiplied in Afghanistan. In the beginning of 2003 likeminded militants were grouped together under the label of Taliban but it was a loose coalition. They declared their struggle against the US and NATO forces and vowed to implement Islamic Shari‟ah in the tribal areas of Pakistan. Militants‟ activities worsened in 2004 when General Musharraf conducted military operations in North and South Waziristan to combat Al-Qaida Jihadists and other conglomerates. These operations were proved futile because many locals joined the ranks of Taliban which boost the morale of militant outfits.52

In this scenario, MMA openly supported the stance of Taliban as they were waging Jihad against infidel forces and Pakistani military operations were condemned. It was argued that the security vanguards should be involved in negotiating process with them and settle the way forward for peace. But the outcome of accords with the militants were not more than but to give space to militants organizations to reinstate themselves and to focus their operational activities in Pak- Afghan border.

Renowned security analyst Muhammad Amir Rana depicts that to control the territory, Taliban adopted four pronged strategy. The strategy covers political, administrative, social and economic aspects. In the first step, they booked the criminals and impose taxes on the people to continue their operational activities. Second, they started to kill the powerful chieftain who could challenge the authority of Taliban. For strengthening the firm control they killed round about six hundred tribal elders who are traditionally known as Maliks. Third, they established their own system of justice. Through this mechanism they ensured the speedy, simple and corruption free justice system. Forth, they appointed the members as their

51 Claudio Franco, “The Threek-e-Taliban Pakistan”, in Antonio Giustozzi (ed.), Decoding the New Taliban: Insights from the Afghan Field (New York: Columbia University Press, 2009), p. 289. 52 Khalid Aziz, “Pakistan‟s Dilemma in FATA”, The News, September 16, 2008.

222 administrators which were trustworthy to them. Rana states that the traditional concept of collective security was eliminated by Taliban which affected the role of political administration in FATA. Nevertheless, the people of FATA supported the militants in their areas since they had long been denied from economic and social rights by the state.53 Close observation, however depicts that Taliban movement gave some sort of empowerment to the downtrodden communities of the tribal areas. Introduction of legal system with transparent and quick way and provision of economic and social justice legitimize the role of Taliban in the local administration.54

Furthermore, no flexibility was shown by the militants towards the NGO‟s and modern education system. Female educational institutions were the fundamental targets of Taliban. It was considered to be a threat to the political and ideological movement of Taliban. Hard stance can be assessing from the fact that in the years of 2007-08.Sixty-one teachers were targeted and twelve local and twenty five foreign NGO‟s were closed down in FATA. For strengthening the movement Taliban adopted the mechanism of kidnapping the security and state apparatus. For instance on August 30, 2007 Taliban kidnapped 200 Pakistani army personnel in South Waziristan agency and demanded the release of their Taliban companions who were in prison. With the efforts of the members of peace Jirga, Taliban released 213 soldiers on November 4, 2007 in exchange of 25 Taliban prisoners.

With the passage of time, Taliban intensified their activities against the US and NATO troops in Afghanistan from the soil of FATA. Raids were conducted on the security forces of Pakistan as well. Moreover, the militants firm their presence in the districts of KPK province.55 Interestingly, MMA, after at odd with the militant groups in various statements, used to acknowledge the growth of Taliban and their operational activities, and at the sometime they played the role as facilitator because no comprehensive mechanism was directed to monitor the advancement of insurgents in the province of KPK. It is pivotal to mention that due to no check on the activities of the militants of Sufi Mohammad of TNSM and TTP got strong footholds in the

53 Muhammad Amir Rana, “The Taliban Consolidate Control in Pakistan‟s Tribal Regions”, CTC Sentinel 1, No. 7, (June 2008): pp. 7-8. 54 Khalid Aziz, “Prospects of Peace and security in Afghanistan and Pakistan”, June 20, 2008. Available at: http://www.khalidaziz.com/art_php?aid=109, Accessed on May 2, 2016. 55 Magnus Norell, “The Taliban and the Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal (MMA)”, p. 78.

223 valley of swat and their position was strengthened.56 Along with this civil administration had failed in Swat and frontier regions to recognize and aware the national security apparatus about the growth of Talibanization and the culture of militancy.57

Apart from this, range of commanders of Taliban in their separate capacity conducted number of operation in different agencies. In 2007, with the support of Al- Qaeda, as one of the analysts is of the view, they loosely unified under the banner of TTP. In 2004, secret documents were recovered from Al-Qaeda commander‟s hideout which revealed that Al-Qaeda does not want to involve in fighting with Pakistani forces and they focused on snake head (US). It is considered a mechanism of Al- Qaeda to give tough time to the coalition forces and keep the army of Pakistan engaged in FATA with militants of TTP. Arguably, between 2002 to 2007 there was a phase of coexistence and cooperation between Al-Qaeda and Afghan militant groups in FATA, FR and in Swat with favorable condition. The weak strategy of the US and security vanguards of Pakistan in the tribal areas gave birth to Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) which later on became a potential threat to the state of Pakistan.

7.9 SECRETE COMPROMISE AMONG AL-QAIDA, PUNJAB BASED MILITANT ORGANIZATIONS AND PAKISTANI TALIBAN

Pakistan engagement in the US led war on terrorism radicalized the society to the great extent. Despite other impact, phenomena emerged as the nexus built among the Kashmir focused militant groups and sectarian organizations with Al- Qaeda and tribal based militant groups, especially with TTP. Security manager faced the grave threats from these nexus.

Linking relationship of Al-Qaeda, TTP and Punjabi Taliban In 2001, five members coalition of the militant group was established under the spiritual leadership of mufti Nizamuddin Shamsi who was the patron in chief of Banuri Madaris (Religious seminary) to take revenge from the American and NATO troops in Afghanistan. The coalition was declared with the name of Brigade 313.58

56 Joshua T. White, Pakistan’s Islamists Frontier, p. 56. 57 Hassan Abbas, Inside Pakistan’s North-West Frontier Province: The Political landscape of the Insurgency (Washington: New America Foundation, April 2010), p. 7. 58 313 is a number of Fighters who fought with the Quresh in side of Prophet (S.A.W) on March 13, 624 A. D.

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These coalitions consist of Punjab-based outfit called Punjabi Taliban. It includes Kashmiri focused Jihadi groups, for instance, LT, JM, Harakat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami Harkat-ul-mujaheedin-al-alami (HUMA) and Punjab based sectarian outfits such as sipah Sahaba Pakistan (SSP) and Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LJ) brigade 313, immediately started its activities and started to attack the Christian community in Murree, Islamabad and Taxila as retaliation for the US invasion and occupation of Afghanistan. It is also believed that in kidnapping of Denial Pearl American journalist, brigade 313 was involved, in Karachi. Further, the fighters of brigade also carried out attack on the then president General Pervez Musharraf on December, 2003.59 The incident was a clear indication of the nexus between al-Qaeda and Punjab based militant groups. The situation became more complex when more than fifty six force personnel were duly charged of these linkages with JM and involved in planning to assassinate Musharaf.60

It is important to note, that when the security forces of Pakistan were involved in targeting and hunting down the al-Qaeda members and its affiliated conglomerates small Pushtun group, TTP and Punjabi Taliban were strengthening their linkages and ideological connections. Rayan Clarke states, that Pakistan Talibans were loose group of militant outfits and through this process, they could not strengthened the bounds and come under the organization of Mullah Omer‟s Taliban movement though reiterately they vowed to pledge allegiance with Mulla Omer; as there was no central authority and loose central command different functions were moving largely towards al-Qaida instead of Afghan counterparts.61 Pakistani officials stated on different occasions that TTP is being financed and closely collaborating with al-Qaida. As Rehman Malik said, that TTP is a front face of al-Qaida. Al-Qaida ideological, tactical, strategic and logical assistance to TTP made the later one a proxy. TTP started more lethal activities against the security forces of Pakistani civilians by using improvised explosive device (IED) and suicide bombing.62

Political analysts and security pundits are agreed that after the operation Silence, which took place in 2007, became one of the key factor for bringing Al- Qaida, TTP and Punjab based militants outfits to close of one another, but due to

59 “Sectarianism Strikes at the Top”, Daily Times, May 31, 2004. 60 Raheem-ul-Haque, “Strategic Depth”, p. 11. 61 Ryan Clarke, Crime-Terror Nexus in South Asia (Abington: Routledge, 2011), p. 141. 62 Ibid.

225 weak planning of the then president-cum-general to conduct military operation to get the suspects out of Lal-Masjid and adjacent female Maddrassah Jamia Hafsa give birth to various splinter militant groups from Punjabi Taliban.63

The splinter groups joined the ranks of al-Qaida and TTP. It was estimated that round about 5000 individuals from religious seminaries of different parts of southern and northern Punjab had reached the training camps of TTP in South and North Waziristan agency to take revenge from the security forces on conducting Lal mosque operation.

Operation silence gave birth to some fierce and new outfits which called themselves Lal Masjid affectees.64 It is important to mention the two groups that is Ghazi force and Janood-ul-Hafsa (Soldiers of Hafsa) was involved in detrimental activities against the state. It was highly conceived that Ghazi force have built close linkages with TTP, brigade 313 and al-Qaida and collaborated with TTP when security apparatus conducted the operation Rah-e-Rast in Swat in 2009.

It is important to mention, that in the Shura of TTP which consisted of 40 members representatives of the Punjab based militant groups was there.65 Punjabi militant outfits later on became viable tool to facilitates the operational activities of al-Qaida and TTP in the urban areas of Punjab and rest of the country. Pakistani based renowned counter terrorism analyst commented on the ranks of TTP, Al Qaida and Punjabi Taliban that ideas, logistics and money is received from gulf region while al- Qaida is a provider of chemistry, Punjabi Taliban make plot to attack and martyr are provided by TTP.

7.10 COOPERATION OF AL-QAIDA, TTP AND PUNJABI TALIBAN STRATEGY AND IMPACTS ON THE SECURITY OF PAKISTAN

Multiple fronts covered by the cooperation of al-Qaida, TTP and Punjabi Taliban

The collaboration of three militant groups was against the Pakistani forces to engage them into multiple fronts so as to pressurize the forces to end their military

63 Animesh Roul, “Little-Known Ghazi Brigade: Now a Major Player in the Punjabi Jihad?”,Terrorism Monitor 8, No. 8, (July 2010): pp. 4-6. 64 Zafar Abbas, “Khwaja‟s Murder Points to Home Truth”, Dawn, May 3, 2010. 65 Raheel Khan, “Untangling the Punjabi Taliban Network”, CTC Sentinel 3, No. 3, (March 2010): pp. 8-9.

226 operations in the FATA region. Therefore, for the sake of diverting the attention of the forces the militant outfits started their operational activities in other provinces such as the areas of Punjab, Karachi, Quetta and Pakistan administered Kashmir other then KPK and FATA. In the operational activities of militants they largely focused to target the security forces and their installations. Apart from this, they focused the soft targets to attack specially those who are promoting obscenity and flourishing un- Islamic ethos such as banks, CD shops, barber shops, internet cafe etc. and those areas and institutions which are less porn to security and where they can cause multiple causalities such as hospital, parks, educational institution school, colleges, universities etc. Press clubs, market even mosques and attacks on funeral of renowned political and security members. The activities of the militants had transformed the society into radicalization and heavy civilian casualties were occurring.

Attacks were intensified in the areas of Punjab due to Lal Mosque Operation in 2007 by General Pervez Musharraf. In 2009, Pakistani forces intensified the capacity of the operations in swat valley and South Waziristan. Resultantly, suicide attacks and bomb blasts ratio was also multiplied. From 2007 to 2010 round about 33 suicide attacks took place only in the areas of Punjab. In suicide bombing six hundred people were died and 112 were also killed in the other activities of the militants such a bomb explosion and target killing.66 notable security analyst Ikram Sehgal pointed out that due to the successful operations of the military and Para-military forces in Swat and FATA areas, the militants will try to invoke their militant cells in South Punjab so that to keep their survival.67This is the reason that war zone, later on, was changed from FATA to the areas of Punjab in the year, 2009.

The security establishment of Pakistan pointed out that nexus among the different militant outfits was apparent. Attack on Sri Lankan team in March, 2009 and suicide attack on special investigation agency in Lahore on March 2010 gave an impression about their combined operational activities. With the passage of time many groups emboldened their activities in June, 2009. Ghazi force attacked on the office of Rescue 15 (a police help line) in Islamabad. Moreover, United Nations world food program office was also targeted in October, 2009 by the same force. Punjabi Taliban, TTP and Al- Qaeda jointly created havoc in Karachi by their terrorist activities like police headquarter

66 Hassan Abbas, Dawn, May 3, 2010. 67 “Punjabi Taliban, “A Growing Threat”, Dawn, May 30, 2010.

227 in Karachi was attacked in 2010 reportedly by the close collaboration of Brigade 313 and TTP. In addition, Punjabi militant, Badar Mansoor and TTP jointly stroked the University of Karachi, in which four students were severely injured in December, 2010. In addition to that the militant groups extended their operational activities in the areas of Azad Jammu and Kashmir in 2009, two suicide attacks were made by the militant group of Lashkar-e-Zil. The same outfit was also involved in suicide attacks and bomb blast in 2010. The group claim as al-Qaida affiliates. Renowned journalist Saleem Shezad stated that the group Lashkar-e-zil (shadow army) actually consists of the members of brigade 313, TTP the foreign terrorist organizations and also includes the personnel of forces Iraqi Republican Guards.68

7.11 MULTIPLICATION OF SECTARIAN & SUB-SECTARIAN VIOLENCE IN PAKISTAN

To damage the state legitimacy and weakened its authority specially in Karachi, Lahore and Quetta the three militant outfits al-Qaeda, TTP and Punjabi Taliban started a struggle to divided the communities on the basis of sect and ethnicity, therefore exploited the sectarian tendencies of the massive.69 Target killings on the basis of sectarianism were high between 2001 to 2013. It is estimated that during these years 2,518 people were killed while 6,261 citizens were badly injured, which are considered three times of figure of 1989-2000. Of 2007 to 2010 sectarian attacks were recorded high. It was estimated 90 per cent high than the previous years. Defense pundits states that as the Lashkr-e-Jhangvi is much influenced from al- Qaida‟s doctrine therefore, majority of the attacks had been launched by this organization. However, the activities of Siph-e-Muhammad Pakistan, a Shitte sectarian group cannot overruled as they are also involved in killings of the citizen on the sectarian lines.70

It is pertinent to mentioned here that TTP, al-Qaida and LJ consider that there are the Shiite and Iranian who are responsible for dismantling the Saddam Hussain‟s rule in Iraq by facilitating and collaborating with the Americans. This is the reason

68 Pakistan Security Report 2010” (Islamabad: Pakistan Institute for Peace Studies (PIPS), January 2011): pp. 12-13. 69 Ahmad Humayun and Aly Jiwani, “Pakistan‟s Brewing Sectarian War”, Foreign Policy 26, May 26, 2011. 70 “Pakistan Security Report 2012” (Islamabad: Pakistan Institute for Peace Studies, January 2013): p. 25.

228 that the militant groups not only targeted the Shiite but also the Iranian symbolic installations in the country. On September 3, 2010 furious suicide attack took place on the Shiite sacred day of al-Quds in which 55 people were dead and more than 200 were severely injured. The attacks responsibility was claimed by TTP and LJ.

There is no denial of the fact that in the beginning TTP and other militant organizations were focusing on urban areas of Pakistan, but later on they also exploited the sectarian clashes between Shiite and Sunni communities in the tribal areas especially in the Kurram agency. The fundamental aim of this strategy was to build pressure on the security forces of Pakistan. SSP and LJ extended their cooperation to TTP to create havoc in Orakzai agency in which ten percent are Shitte population by fueling the sectarian rift. By this cooperation the three organizations achieved their goals. TTP was successful in making the culture of Talibanization and SSP and LJ extended their sectarian agenda.

Inspite of this, intra-sectarian clashes were also generated. Sunni Bralvi sectarian lives were also exploited. Sunni, Ahle-Hadith and Wahabi considers Barlvi as non-Muslim because they believe in the sanctity of the saints and consider them as middle men between Allah and power which is according to the Deobandi and Wahabi sect is absolutely wrong. Of 2006 to 2010, sectarian attacks created havoc on the Baralvi community. The apex leadership of Baralvis in Karachi was brutally killed in April, 2006 in a suicide attack. The great Sofi saint Rehman Baba tomb was blown up by the militants in Peshawar in March 2009.

Similarly, another renowned Sufi saint, Abdul Hassan Hajveri, community called Hazrat Data Ganj Bukhsh shrine was also targeted by suicide bombers in July, 2010 in which 45 people were killed and many more sustained serious injuries.71 The activities were largely condemned across the world, but it is a matter of realization for the security vanguards, sectarianism is a potential menace which can, later on, become a permanent cause of instability for the state and society and can shatter the confidence of the masses on their security institutions.72

71 Data Darbar Attack”, Dawn, March 3, 2006. 72 Ibid.

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Attacks on the western Interests by the militants in Pakistan After the incident of 9/11 militants created havoc for the western and for their businesses in Pakistan. They launched severe attacks on the consulates and embassies of the western countries. More, they kidnapped the foreigners and recorded their beheadings movies. The US interest were categorically under strike in Pakistan. Despite this, Pakistan allowed the NATO tankers to use Pakistan‟s routes. The oil tankers were directly attacked by the militants. The HUM offshoot militant organization Hurkat-ul-Mujahidden-al-Alami launched attacks on the interest of west in Karachi. They stroked the US consulate in June, 2002. Similarly, suicide attack was made on American consulate in March, 2002. In this attack the US diplomat David Fyfe with other three people was killed. The US president George W. Bush was reached Pakistan on an official visit and the attack took place on the same day to send a clear message of resentment by the militant outfits to the US.

The focused target of the militant group since 2008 especially of Abdullah Azamam Brigade, which is an affiliated group of TTP, was to target the oil-tankers and containers of NATO forces. The fundamental purpose of these attacks was underline the capability and to disturb the operational activities of the US and according to an estimate from 2008 to 2012,360 attacks were launched on the NATO‟S oil tankers, containers and terminals of companies which were using the soil of Pakistan and supplying military equipment‟s and other logistics support goods to forces involved in Afghanistan against the Taliban.73

These types of attacks created political rifts between Pakistan and the western countries. For example, in September 2008 polish engineer Piotr Stanezak was abducted by the Taliban from the Attock area of Punjab. This incident created heated tension between the two countries. In February, 2009 Taliban demanded from Pakistan‟s government the release of Taliban captives but the government denied due to which Taliban beheaded the polish engineer. Poland blamed the government that some officials of the Pakistani government were involved in the killing of stanza. Therefore, the government of Pakistan not only captured the Taliban who had killed the polish engineer but also the facilitators. Pakistan overruled all the charges of

73 “Pakistan Security Report 2012”, p. 26.

230 polish government, therefore Poland requested for assistance to the US so that the culprits could be brought to justice.74 Moreover, in June, 2008 Danish embassy was attacked by suicide bombers having affiliation with Al-Qaeda. In this attack eight people were killed and 30 were badly wounded. This incident severely caused tension between Pakistan and Denmark.

Strikes on Western Foreign Aid Groups in Pakistan TTP, Al Qaida and Punjabi Taliban formulated a joint strategy to attack the non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and other foreigner-funded groups on the preemption that these are working against the tenant of Islam and they are converting the Muslim into non-Muslim and provoking the women for unemployment. The four employees of plan international a British based NGO which was working for the children development‟s district Manshera of KPK were killed by the militant.75 The same case was also reported in Peshawar in November 2008, when Stephen D. Vance an America worker was moving towards his work and was kidnapped. In addition, on March 10, 2010 militants launched a horrific attack on another the US led NGO (world vision international) which was working for those people who got survived in 2005 earthquake in Mansehra (KPK) these kind of activities of the militants severely affect the projects of NGO‟s and many aid agencies cut off their aid to Pakistan owing to which backward areas of the country suffered a lot.

7.12 MILITANTS’ APPROACH (AL-QAIDA AND AFFILIATE OUTFITS) TO ENGAGE THE WESTERN FORCES IN FATA

Different Jihadi organizations have ideologically contented with each other under Al-Qaeda to wedge global jihad against the western forces inside and outside Pakistan. Pak-Afghan border-land area has become a hub of various militants outfits such as TTP, Al-Qaida, LT and Islamic-jihad-Union (IJU) the powerful strikes of the militants not only enhanced their prestige but also give clean message to the attacking countries that to review your engagement in the US led war on terrors and to stay away from war with Taliban.

It is worth mentioning here that TTP provided training to the fighters of al- Qaeda so that they would be able to strike the western countries. In January 2008,

74 Poland Asks US to Help Find Killers”, The Sydney Morning Herald, February 1, 2009. 75 “Pakistan Attack Kills Aid Workers”, The Guardian, March 10, 2010.

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TTP prepared two suicide bombers to attack subway system in Barcelona, but the plot could not be succeeded. The plot was, later on, confirmed by the spokesman of TTP, Mulvi Omar, that the suicide bombers were under the allegiance of Hakimullah Mahsud. The purpose of attack was that Spain is engaged in Afghanistan against the Taliban groups.76

Furthermore, on May 1, 2010 Pakistani origin Faisal Shazad was arrested when he was going to detonate car-bomb near time square. TTP also took the responsibility that Shazad was trained and assisted by TTP. However, the plan could not be successful, though it was designed to act as a fuel an explosive. When Shezad was escaping to Dubai he was arrested by the law enforcing agencies of America.77Germany was also under the eye of militant group of Pakistan. Sauer land group consisted of two German and a Turkish resident in Germany who were trained by TTP in the tribal areas of Pakistan and target was allotted to them to attack on the US Ram stain airbase which is located in Germany. But fortunately the attack was thwarted.

It has been believed by the security official of UK that in July 2005, bombing, which took place in London was actually perpetrated by al-Qaeda. The plan in which 52 people were killed.78 This is the reason that security vanguards of United Kingdom do not hesitate to say that as the al-Qaeda safe havens still exist in the tribal areas of Pakistan. On 14 October 2009, the then prime minister of United Kingdom stated before the House of Commons that United Kingdom has been facing serious terror threat from the Pak-Afghan border land area. As long as Al-Qaeda exists in the mountains of Pakistan terror threat would be emanated and United Kingdom will be under attack. Counter-terror and security pundits of EU opine that radicalization in Europe would be ameliorated as the radicalized people are moving towards conflict prone areas and getting training who then will then create havoc in Europe when they will be back with new doctrines and philosophies.79

76 Peter Bergen and Bruce Hoffman, “Assessing the Terrorist Threat”, Bipartisan Policy Centre Washington, (September 10, 2010): p. 12. 77 Spencer S. Hsu and Greg Miller, “US Government Charges Pakistani Leader Hakeem Ullah Mehsud in CIA Attack”, Washington Post , September 1, 2010. 78 “Tribute Paid at 7 July Memorial”, BBC News, July 7, 2009. 79 Peter Finn and Greg Miller”, Europe Cites National Training in Terror”, Washington Post, September 30, 2010.

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Terror plots of al-Qaeda, TTP and other Jihadi organizations penetrate terror n the heart and minds of the people of the west. International community is now discussing the fragility and weakening potential capability of Pakistan against these militant outfits which were the solid threat to regional and global peace and stability.

7.13 LINKAGES BETWEEN TERRORISM, ORGANIZED CRIME AND NARCO TRADE

For the sake of running the organized activities of the militant, many outfits joined hand with the criminals, smugglers and timber mafia so as to support the militants financially as well as provide physical safe havens. The UN report pointed out, round about $1 billion smuggling of drug take place annually via Nangarhar, Kunar in Eastern Afghanistan into FATA. This trafficking take place under the tight control of TTP and Al-Qaeda affiliates militant groups who provide security to the drug traffickers, but they, in return, give toll-tax to Taliban. Of this money they purchased latest weapons and other war equipment. New recruits are also facilitated by this money. The report also published by Pakistan military, it is estimated that annually Taliban collect $200 million from drug-money.80 Those Taliban fighters, who become wounded during their operational activities, were treated medically by the drug traffickers by giving their expenses in shape of tax. It has also been reported that Taliban also used to receive tax from NATO containers. Taliban received from 2000 to 5000 rupees per truck and NATO‟s oil tankers and containers.

Militants had established the sleeper cells. These cells were financing the operational activities of militant groups in general and TTP in particular. Kidnapping, bank heist and extortion were the fundamental sources of finance of TTP. Commonly the targeted cities were Karachi, Lahore and Peshawar. Taliban reportedly kidnapped seventy people from Karachi and Lahore to enhance their finances. Interior ministry of Pakistan published a report in which it was categorically mentioned that in 2009, 80% bank-heists, the people who were involved, were from FATA and were linked with TTP to finance the organization. It is also worth mentioning here that only from Karachi, TTP and its conglomerates collected 250 million rupees between November 2008 to April 2009 by adopting the methodology of kidnapping. The group was also involved in extortion especially from the contractors who used to provide fuel to the

80 Shahan Mufti, “Funding the Pakistani Taliban”, Global Post, August 7, 2009.

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US led coalition forces in Afghanistan.81 TTP, through these profits, not only carry out its operations successfully but also able for its organizational management. An intelligence report estimates, criminals collected 1000 million rupees in Karachi to financially assist TTP from January 2007 to January 2009.82

Apart from all these sources, militants received huge amount from smuggling of consumers goods, luxurious vehicles, timber valuable minerals and weapons. Many Taliban factious were involved in the smuggling of tobacco inside and outside Pakistan. It has been reported by senior intelligence officer that militants collects 15 to 20 percent income to run their organization through the smuggling of tobacco. Bagh, the leader of Lashkar-e-Islam in Khyber agency and a rival group of Lashkr-e-Aansar (LA), collected huge amount of tax from drug baron. These drug smugglers are involved in smuggling of international brand of cigarette such as Dunhill, 555, Marlboro, Benson & Hedge to Afghanistan and many other countries while they have established the factories in FATA and localities especially in Bara and adjoining parts of Khyber agency. In the meanwhile, these international brands were also smuggled from Khyber agency to Kohat, Bannu via Waziristan to Afghanistan. As these areas were under the influence of pro al-Qaeda affiliates groups and the militants of Islamic movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) therefore, in exchange of protection to convoys they received handsome amount from the drug traffickers.83

Furthermore, the role of timber mafia cannot be overruled in facilitating the operational activities of the militant groups. According to the report of federal investigation agency such groups which are in affiliation with Jaish-e-Muhammad and have their existence in district Mansehra and Batagram collected substantial amount from the local timber mafia. As the district of Swat and other adjacent areas were under the control of Mulvi-Fazul-Haq from 2007 to 2009 the timber mafia and gemstone smugglers used to pay huge amount to him so that security to their illegal business is ensured.84

81 Clarke, Crime-Terror Nexus in South Asia, p. 43. 82 Huma Yousuf, “Launch Point for Mumbai Attacks, Karachi Faces Rising Militancy”, The Christian Science Monitor, January 14, 2009. 83 Farzana Shah, “Taliban Thrive on Tobacco Smuggling”, The Nation, July 19, 2010. 84 Kamila Shamsie, “Pakistan‟s Floods are not Just a Natural Disaster”, The Guardian, August 5, 2010.

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It is worth mentioning here that according to some reports Al-Qaeda was also in agreement with some of the criminal groups. In this context the name of Dawood Ibrahim is important to be discussed. It had been stated in the report, that the C, company of Dawood Ibrahim which consisted of 5000 criminals had an alliance with al-Qaeda because both the groups were using the same routes for smuggling. it would not be wrong to say that such an example shows unique criminal-terrorism fusion model.

External Security Challenges to Pakistan Pakistan, on its external front, was facing multiple challenges of coalition forces in Afghanistan with huge presence of Indian consulates was the foremost threat to its western border. Further, though American forces were in Afghanistan to combat with the militant groups, yet in its boarder policy US wanted to check and contain the influence of china in its neighboring countries. It was a big challenge for Pakistan to technically manage the partnership with US and not to wave off the strategic relations with China. More, US-Iran tension on the nuclear enrichment of the later was also affecting the security milieu of Pakistan.

7.14 SECRETE OPERATIONS OF CIA AND RAW ON THE SOIL OF PAKISTAN

Theatre of war on terror was not restricted to Afghanistan only various operations by CIA and RAW started inside Pakistan under the carpet. It was believed by the security analysts that fundamental aim of these operation which have been initiated to clandestine the militant outfits was actually to control the nuclear arsenals and to damage the port project. This is the reason that CIA and RAW operatives have restricted their activities particularly in Baluchistan and tribal areas. Apprehensions were stated by ISI chief of Punjab wing brigadier Muhammad Aslam Ghuman that Baluchistan liberation army BLA and Baluchistan republican agency (BRA) are getting massive instrumental and financial support from CIA and Xe services to create disturbance and agitation in Baluchistan to take control of the province. In their plan controlling of nuclear and Gawadar port was paramount. The intelligence agencies of India and the US not only supported the BLA and BRA but also TTP in FATA and Swat.85 The US and India both were disturbed about the fast

85 “Xe Behind Baloch Insurgency, Terror Hits”, The Nation, March 14, 2011.

235 development of Gwadar port. There is no denial of the fact, the energy corridor which starts from energy-rich central Asia to Indian Ocean via Afghanistan and Pakistan. This was a dream of the regional players to control these routes and it was going to be materialized with the establishment of Gawadar port.

Therefore, India increased its involvement in Afghanistan to surpass Pakistan and to get energy benefits from central Asian republics. In the great game strategy of India the routes which one connected with the maritime port must be under the control of India so that it can presume its interests in the energy rich central Asian countries from china and Pakistan.86 This is the reason that India was much worried because of Gwadar project, for, if Gwadar built, then it would be difficult for India to secure its interests in the region and it is realized that Gwadar port would have been long term strategic implications. In November 2008, it was categorically stated by defense journal review that disintegration of Pakistan will bring many fold benefits for India. First Chinese dream to operates Gwadar port would be broken up which is the shared objective of India and the US. Secondly, the expansionist policy of china would automatically be thwarted in the region and then the way will be open for India to get access to the land routes to energy rich central Asian republics.

It is believed by the security managers of Pakistan that round about 1000 operatives of Special Forces of the US such as FBI, CIA and Xe worldwide services with the close collaboration of RAW agencies are overwhelmingly involved in destabilizing the tribal areas, Lahore, Karachi and the parts of KPK.87 Indian spy agencies and the numbers of CIA have entered into different militant outfits and are planning to create disturbance in different parts of Pakistan. In May, 2013 Islamabad clearly alleged Indian consulates which are located in Southern Afghanistan, are supplying the heavy arms and ammunition to the militant groups to create destabilization in North-South Waziristan agencies and financial support was also extended to the militant groups by the spy agencies of the US and India. In May 2003, Pakistan publically denounced Indian-involvement in Baluchistan, FATA and the urban areas of Pakistan. Indian consulates which were located in Afghan province of Jalalabad were attacked by militants. Chief Minister of Baluchistan Jam Yousaf

86 Sumit Ganguly and Nicholas Howenstein, “India-Pakistan Rivalry in Afghanistan”, Journal of International Affairs, (October 2009): p. 133. 87 Asif Haroon Raja, “Get Rid of CIA Network:, Pakistan Observer, March 14, 2011.

236 openly stated that spy agency of India RAW has established 30 to 40 camps in the hidden parts of Baluchistan in which recruits were trained with 10,000 per month was given to them as salary.88

Security establishment also believes that Baluchistan Liberation agency (BLA) headquarter is in Indian consulate which is located in Kandhar and all the planning of terrorism is prepared by Baloch insurgents under the direction of RAW. In July, 2009 meeting was held at Sharm-ul-Sheikh in which the prime minister of Pakistan Yousaf Raza Gilani handed over a comprehensive dossier to prime minister of India Manmohan Singh about the alleged activities of RAW in the province of Baluchistan. These were the fact which cannot be denied. BLA chief Brahamdagh Bugti‟s pictures in which he is meeting with RAW member were also presented. DAWN, later on, also confirmed meetings of RAW personnel with Sher khan and Brahamdagh Bugti and the later‟s visit to India was also a part of substantial evidence.89 After a detailed meeting in Sharmul Sheikh a joint communiqué was issued in which it was categorically mentioned that Pakistan feels potential threat in Baluchistan and other parts of the country. Interestingly, in a joint communiqué New Delhi admitted its spy agency RAW connections with Baloch insurgents to intensify insurgency in the province.

Apart from this, security vanguards also believe that Mangal Bagh who was running the small militia called Lashkr-e-Islam especially local in nature, having close connections with RAW in Afghanistan. The other militants‟ chief such as Abdul Wali, Taliban commander of Mohmand agency had been receiving financial bounties from RAW cells in Afghanistan. RAW support to TTP in FATA was obvious, though by smuggling, RAW was delivering weapons, literature, medical requirements and medicine to militants of TTP so that they could continue their operational activities vigorously. Observers claim that BLA and TTP came closer because of the support of CIA and encouragement by the RAW. They pointed out that the militants, who had been banned by the state were pushed by CIA and RAW to stand up and to join hands with TTP in Baluchistan. Moreover, CIA adopted a coming strategy and trained ex- Afghan soldiers and sent them to FATA in 2007-08 to enter into the ranks of TTP so

88 “RAW Camps in Balochistan”, Dawn, August 31, 2004. 89 Baqir Sajjad Syed, “Proof of RAW Involvement in Terror Acts Given to India”, Dawn, July 22, 2009.

237 that the organization may get strength and kill the elders who are pro-Pakistan and anti-US.90 In a national security committee session which was being headed by the senator , it was clearly stated by the ex-ISI chief lieutenant general Shuja Pasha that terror activities and destabilization of the country foreign powers are directly involved.

US Policy to Contain China & Pakistan’s Security Milieu America was much aware about the geopolitics of the region and knew that the strategic objectives of the US can be achieved only when turn Pakistan as a reliable Pakistan in the cast of Afghanistan. Furthermore, in the upcoming years dependence on Pakistan would be increased rather than Afghanistan. By this strategy America wanted to achieve two fold goals. Firstly, to change the nature of relationship between Pakistan and China and to give Islamabad realization to turn from China and cement strong bilateral strategic relations with the US. Secondly, Iran-US standoff, which was persistent headache for the US, turned it to its favor.91 Now the clash of interests emerges between Pakistan and the US. Pakistan considers china as a natural ally in Afghanistan. Both the countries are deadly sure that they will support each other‟s policies in Afghanistan and in the broader regional content. Contrary to it, the US consider China as its regional and global competitor and hurdle in the way of its strategic and economic interests because of chine‟s rising economic and military power. Therefore, with the war against terrorism it is also fundamental objective of the US to contain the raise of china regionally as well as globally. It is worth mentioning here that in the pretext of war on terrorism one of the fundamental objectives of the US entrance into Asia pacific and central Asia was to encircle the activities of china. For containing the Chinese activities, the US is supporting and encouraging India to play a leading role in the region and increase its influence so that china could be balanced. China acknowledges that conflict with the US is looms ahead.92

Arguably, US-India close nexus in different field such as Indo-US nuclear deal, support of India in nuclear supplier group and emerging economy of India make her the blue eye first in the Bush administration and later in Obama administration.

90 “Proof of India‟s Involvement in Militancy Fund”, Dawn, November 3, 2009. 91 Humera Iqbal, “Pak-Afghan Ties in the Light of Pak-US Strategic Dialogue”, Regional Studies Islamabad XXIX, No. 1, (Winter 2010): p. 15. 92 Andrew Small, “China‟s Caution on Afghanistan-Pakistan”, The Washington Quarterly 33, No. 3, (July 2010): p. 86.

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Unclenching support to India in South Asia was no doubt a potential threat to the interest of china not only in Afghanistan but also in the whole region of India which emerge as a counterweight to china. This is the fundamental reason that china supports the interest of Pakistan in Afghanistan. The interests of Pakistan and china can bitterly be protected in peaceful and stable Afghanistan. Only then Pakistan can get land routes to Central Asian Republics (CARs) and to the great extent it interest of strategic depth against India. It would not be wrong to say that there is convergence between China and Pakistan‟s interests in bringing down the Indian influence in Afghanistan as well as in south Asian region.

It is in the interest of china to cooperate with Pakistan in nuclear field. Pakistan had signed an agreement with Pakistan to build two nuclear reactors at Chashma nuclear complex. To overcome the problem of energy crisis in Pakistan such kind of agreements with neighboring countries are pivotal. Strategic balance in South Asia can only be ensured through these kinds of accords especially after the civil nuclear deal in 2008 between India and the US. A situation in which Islamabad is in persistent pressure to do more by the US, China‟s agreements with Pakistan will not strengthen its relations but also give extraordinary encouragement to Pakistan. Chinese security managers point of view is very clear that strategically relationship with Islamabad is very important to minimize the US and Indian growing influence in the region and to secure its strategic interests.93 Paradigm shift in the region is going to be transformed in a time when the US forces are going back from Afghanistan and extremist Hindu PM; Narindra Modi is ruling the roots of power who wants a greater and influential role in the regional and global arena.94 In the context of all these developments any potential agreement especially of nuclear creates doubts in the hearts and minds of American which puts rifts in relations of the US and Pakistan. Moreover, Pak-China strategic nexus are also harmful to the Indian interests as well in the region in the context of its hegemony on the neighboring states. If India fails to maintain its advances in the region it would then negatively affect the strategic interests of the US in the region state department official clearly stated that the US will veto any initiative of China in turn of gaining civil nuclear reactor to Pakistan in nuclear supplier group (NSG). No doubt, these decisions do not have any value

93 Ibid. 94 “Army Tells Nawas No More Talks with Taliban, Takes Matter in Its Own hands”, The News, May 24, 2014.

239 because NSG runs its procedures through consensus of opinion.95 Such kind of attention by the American officials depicts that any type of nuclear agreement between china and Pakistan is not acceptable to the US. Furthermore, it also generates a fear in the policy makers of Islamabad that one of the objectives of Washington is to dismantle the nuclear assets of Pakistan and this fear was substantiated by General Kayani‟s quoted words which he stated at press conference in November 2010 in which He stated that the real aim of the US strategy is to denuclearize Pakistan.

US-Iran Deadlock and Its Impact on the Security Milieu of Pakistan Pakistan security environment is badly affecting by the conflicting interest of the US and Iran in Persian Gulf region. After 1979, the US has been in consistent struggle to change the regime in Iran while on the other hand Iran is a vital strategic neighbor of Pakistan. For culminating the nuclear programs of Iran US has imposed so many economic sanctions on Iran.96Pakistan‟s energy sector has been facing detrimental situation due to the sanctions. Renowned expert on Iran-US relations Zahid Ali provides accurate analysis about the US-Iran deadlock and its impact on Pakistan‟s strategic goals. He says that Iran has great number of oil and gas reservoirs and the major purchase of Pakistan‟s import is crude oil which stands at 97.5% of its total export to Iran. The US hard economic sanction may impel Iran to increase the prices of crude oil or have an option to completely thwart oil supply to Pakistan. In this situation Pakistan‟s marginal trade and commercial relation with Iran may desperately effected which is bad omen for the economy of Pakistan. Pak-Iran gas line project, which is very important for Pakistan is a symbol of strong relations between both the countries, may move towards suspension as Zahid argued.97

It is important to mention here that Sunni militant group Jundullah which is reportedly backed by the US will get stronger due to Iran-US standoff. It is in the interest of Washington to support the militant group so as to create instability inside Iran. The group reportedly involved in militant activities especially the group has focused Sustan Baluchistan a province of Iran in which majority of the Baloch Sunni are habilitated. Tehran blamed Pakistan that its secret agencies are involved in supporting the militant outfit on the behest of America so that regime in Iran can be

95 “US to Vote Against China-Pak Nuclear Deal at NSG”, Times of India, July 23, 2010. 96 “New Iranian Entities under UN Sanctions”, BBC News, June 9, 2010. 97 Dr. Zahid Ali Khan, “US Post 9/11 Persian Gulf Policy: Iran‟s Concerns and Option”, IPRI Journal 11, No. 1, (Winter 2011): pp. 57-58.

240 changed.98 Pakistan Iran relations got contentious in 2007. When Jundullah group ferociously attacked Zahedan, the provincial capital of Sistan Baluchistan, in which 13 revolutionary guards were killed. The supreme leader of Iran Ahmad khatami publically declared and alleged Pakistan. He mentioned that the soil of Pakistan is safe sanctuary for the terrorist group. Further he stated that no doubt that Pakistan is our border neighbor, but gradually and slowly it is losing neighboring manners.

There is no denial of the fact that Islamabad pay special attention to the relations with Tehran, but the state officials of Iran criticize the security establishment of Pakistan for its failure to curb terrorist outfits which are disturbing Pakistan-Iran relation. In 2010, Pak-Iran relation got normalized when Islamabad provided assistant to Tehran in apprehending the Jundullah‟s leader Abdullah Malik Rigi, who was later on, hanged by Iran. Nevertheless, presently Jundullah is fully operational and openly threaten to target Pak-Iran gas pipeline project. In this perspective Iran-US standoff will further increase the security concern for Pakistan. It will not only put negative impact on its energy sector but will also spoil the security of Baluchistan as non-state- actors are taking benefits of the clashes between the US and Iran.99

7.15 ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS OF PAKISTAN’S STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP WITH THE US

Being a frontline state in global war on terror it has to bear massive economic cost as investment and economic growth went slide down due to disruption and panic created by the militant groups in their terrorist activities. In the fiscal year 2001-02 estimated cost of war bore by Pakistan was $2.669 billion.100 The Fiscal year in Pakistan starts from 1st July till 30th June of next calendar year. Nevertheless, with the passage of time, war in Afghanistan against Taliban and Al-Qaeda was going to be prolonged; therefore, Pakistan was persistently facing the challenge. The cost of war on terror, estimated by Ministry of Finance of Pakistan in the fiscal year of 2001-02, was $2.669 billion which reached to $6.940 billion by 2007-08 (48.6% change since 2001-02). The cost was further increased by $9.180 billion by 2008-09 and $13.560 billion during the fiscal year 2009-10 alone. There is no denial of the fact that in the last 14 years Pakistan suffered $107 billion loss due to its war against terrorism.

98 Raja Karthikeya, “Jundullah a Wedge between Iran, Pakistan”, Asia Times, August 7, 2009. 99 Khan, “US Post 9/11 Persian Gulf Policy”, pp. 56-57. 100 “Economic Survey 2010-2011” (Islamabad: Ministry of Finance, Government of Pakistan, June 2011): p. 219.

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Similarly in the fiscal year 2013-15 Pakistan bore $4.53 billion and in 2013-15 the loss was a $ 6.63 billion. It has been observed that from 2001-2011 financial loss was increased, and after 2011 losses were decreased to 49%. It is estimated by the state of bank of Pakistan that due to so called involvement of Pakistan in the US led war on terror, Pakistan is facing Rs.3/- billions every day and Rs.93/- billion every month. The cost of war on terror went upward in June which reached to $102.51 billion.101 In 2004-05 total direct cost was enhanced from Rs. 67 billion in 2004-05 to Rs.262 in 2009-10. The indirect cost also increased from Rs.192 billion in 2004-05 to Rs.707 billion in 2009-10.102

https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/b/b9/Socio- Economic_Status_of_Pakistanis.png.

Direct Economic Cost All security-related costs are included in direct costs. Costs such as military related, purchasing of high tech weaponry and armaments. Furthermore, expenditure on law enforcement personnel and costs on private security also comes in the category of direct economic costs. In addition to this, government established infrastructure, machinery and equipment specially their major sectors, which contribute to economy such as agriculture, industry services and compensate the people who have been damaged due to Pakistan‟s engagement in the war against terrorism, have a direct impact on the economy of Pakistan.

101 Sardar Sikander Shaheen”, Pakistan Lost Rs 8,264 Billion in War on Terror”, Daily Times, June 3, 2014. 102 “Economic Survey 2009-2010” (Islamabad: Ministry of Finance, Government of Pakistan, June 2011): p. 7.

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Defense and Security Expenditure Pakistan‟s entrance as a front line ally in the US–Led way against militants and terrorists negatively affected the economy of the state and increased the government expenditure. Security and police expenditure were increased massively. Total expenditure, in 2000-01 to 2007-08, was Rs.177 billion to Rs.460 billion per annum. The average percentage is 14.6% while, after 2007-08 defense related expenditure were greatly increased which was Rs.805 billion. Annual percentage was 20.5 percent per annum in 2010-11.

Pakistan army started major strikes since 2007-08 in the valley of swat, Malakand and FATA. Owing to this operation, economy of the state was negatively affected. The nature of operations was very high. Such kinds of operations demands special training of the armed forces, to counter the strikes of militant groups. Intelligence gathering instruments also needs investment and the prices of such equipments are high. Similarly, for the sake of transportation and communication specialized weapon-light with armored Combat vehicles, helicopters for transportation and vehicles for logistics are very important. Moreover, the dreaded strategy adopted by the militant groups was the use of improvised explosive Device (IED). To tackle this strategy, expensive instrument were bought which was, no doubt, a burden on the economy. Resultantly, defense budget was further increased and developmental projects were halted.103It is estimated that on swat operation $2 billion were spend which are half of its coming from Pakistan‟s own budgetary resources. The soldiers, who were directly participated in the operations against the miscreants, were increased since 2009 owing to increase in the salaries of army personnel. The salary part was increased by Rs.70 to 80 billion while 100 billion increased in the non-salaried part in the annual budgetary allocation due to engagement of Pakistan in the war against terrorism.104 Despite this, Islamabad, for the security related purposes have spent additional $6 billion since 2007 which is 2.4 % of the average gross domestic product (GDP).

Finance ministry of Pakistan has published a paper “poverty reduction strategy” which revealed that for strengthening the security, the government has allocated Rs.29.463 in 2009. To severity of threat, the money was increased to Rs.34526 billion in 2010.105

103 Dr. Huma Mir, “Pakistan‟s Defense Budget 2010-2011”, Pakistan Observer, June 13, 2010. 104 Mehtab Haider, “Defense Budget Likely to go up by Rs. 130 bn”, The News, February 22, 2010. 105 Khurshid Ahmad, “Pakistan Amidst Financial Emergency”, Weekly Plus, January 21, 2011.

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For healthy law and order situation, Punjab government allocated Rs.24172 billion comparatively outpaced amount than the other three provinces from July, 2010 to December 2010. However, later on the Punjab province allocation of funds was decreased due to better law and order situation in this period. The improvement in law and order took place because of successful military operation in South Waziristan, Swat and Orakzai Agency. Nevertheless, in the province of Sindh and Baluchistan sectarian violence have created havoc. This allocation of amount was increased in the annual budgets to improve the law and order situation and to curb the menace of sectarianism and terrorism.

Loss of Infrastructure and Public Establishment To counter the extremist agenda, after the event of 9/11, state and society in Pakistan was damaged as a whole. Roads, schools, bridges, police stations, check posts and other official buildings were severely damaged. In the fiscal year 2010-11, Pakistan received $1.72 billion for physical loss of infrastructure.106 To tackle the militancy in the area of Malakand, army started military operation due to which health sector and water supply scheme were partially and fully damaged. Furthermore, the NATO forces which are at daggers drawn against Taliban in Afghanistan. The tankers which were supplying goods and other logistical equipments badly damaged the highways in the country. It was stated by the former Minister for Communication; Arbab Alamgir Khan that Rs.15 billion worth damage was caused to national highways of Pakistan by NATO and Isaf forces supplied tankers and containers which are destructing communication system of the country. Since 2001 to 2010 total damage to highways was estimated Rs.150 billion.107

Compensation to War Inflicted Population Pakistan‟s fiscal deficits and economic losses were multiplied as government started to compensate the victims and their families who were adversely suffering due to bomb blasts and suicide attacks. The government distributed Rs.321.571 million as a compensation to those who were injured and killed in the act of terrorism.

106 “Economic Survey 2010-2011”, p. 220. 107 “NATO Vehicles Caused Rs. 15 bn Damage to Highways”, Dawn, December 29, 2011.

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7.16 INDIRECT ECONOMIC COST Pakistan‟s engagement in the US-led war on terrorism inflicted heavy indirect economic costs including the loss in potential GDP, flight of foreign investment, fall in stock market capitalization, huge trade deficit and damage to other local economies. Furthermore, the other sectors which are pivotal for stabilizing the economy such as tourism, provision of job opportunities, increase in insurance costs and Internally Displaced People (IDPs) were dreadfully suffered.

Nose Dive Decline Growth Rate in GDP Pakistan‟s conflicting areas investors do not take interests to invest and lost their capital. The same was the case with Pakistan. Due to its engagement in the war on terror growth rate and investment was desperately and massively affected. Economic activities at local level were completely stalled due to permeating uncertainty, violence and general panic since the beginning of 2008. Economy of Pakistan has risen from 4.7% in FY 2002-03 to 5.5% in financial year 2006-07. And average growth rate of GDP was recorded 6.5 percent.

Decline in Foreign Direct Investment In the financial year 2003-03, foreign direct investment was up sliding but in the financial year 2003-04 it was badly damaged due to increase in activities of the militants. In 2009, FDI inflows in Pakistan declined to the great extent from $ 5.4098 billion to $3.199 billion in 2008 and 2009, declining of inflows in Pakistan was also recorded. It was a decrease of 56.9 percent as against as $ 204 billion.108Reduction in FDI was the direct result of the military operation of Pak army in thy areas of Swat and South Waziristan Agencies. As a result of these operations, militants enhanced their operational activities with panic, violence and suicide bombings in the country. In just three years, 62 percent downfall in FDI inflows was recorded. The FDI was steadily stopped down from $2.1508 billion in 20140 to $ 0.8126 billion 2011-12.

The investors who were interested to invest in Pakistan were stopped by the US and allied countries. This action further worsened the economic condition of Pakistan which was already in shattering position. The foreign intending investors entirely changed their opinion against Pakistan.109

108 “Investment in Pakistan 2011”. Available at: http//: investmentinpakistan.pk/pdf/IG2011/part1.pdf, Accessed on, May 4, 2011. 109 Pevez Iqbal Cheema, “Global War on Terror: Pakistan‟s Contributions”, (Islamabad: South Asian Strategic Stability Institute, 2009): p. 8.

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Increased Trade Deficit

Trade deficit tightly griped the economy of Pakistan. In 2002-03 trade deficit was only $1 to 2 billion but it was increased by $20 billion in 2007-08 and in 2009-10 it was recorded $ 16 billion. It further increased to $ 21.27 billion during the year 2011-12. Moreover, in July-February, 2012-13, total trade deficit was $13.187 billion and in July-February 2013-14 it was recorded at $ 12.542 billion. Pivotal variable such as FDI were changed completely due to wave of terrorism owing to which trade deficit gap was widening. It is an interesting fact, inflow of FDI was recorded high in those sector which were seems to be safe and non-terrible such as oil, gas and services sector. It would not be wrong to say, that FDI survived in enclaves and the sectors which desperately needs for FDI such as trade and manufactured sectors were neglected. A part from this, the export sector also bore the brunt of costs as this sector contribute to 12 percent to GDP and provides as potential base to employment. Export of the country was badly mitigated because of low investment in the sector. Further, trade deficit also increased due to higher shipment, insurance and security costs.

Shattering of Local Economies

The province of Khyber Pukhtunkhwa (KPK) played a frontline province in the global war on terror. This is the reason that the local economies of this province were badly suffered. Law and order situation in the province was not satisfactory due to which industrial sector was in fast decline. Dark picture stated by , the Vice President of Sarhad Chamber of Commerce that due to war against militancy and terrorism 1,660 industries had completely been closed while before the war the number of industries which were in running position was 2,254.110 Employees of the industries also suffered as depicted by Zulfiqar Ali. Before the war total number of work force in these industries was 84,000 which reduced to 40,000 due to closure of the industries.111

Economy of Swat largely consists of fruits exports. Militancy and operations conducted by forces badly affected this sector. Swat was the center of various kinds of fruits orchards with multi utility processing industries. Before the war on terror and in normal condition round about 400 to 500 trucks transported the fruits from the valley

110 Imran Ali , “Terror War Dents NWFP Industry; 1,660 Unites Closed”, The Nation, March 9, 2010. 111 Ibid.

246 of Swat to the other parts of the country. But violence and operations of the armed forces especially in 2007-2009, fruits production cost and wasted from 55 to 70 percent.112

7.17 NEGATIVE IMPACT ON TOURISM In 1970, tourism was declared as industry in Pakistan. For the development of tourism Pakistan tourism department was established to built the infrastructure so that tourists from inside and outside the country can visit the areas specially the resort places. But due to war on terror this sector has been badly affected and bore huge economic losses. Swat a place of attraction for the tourists was badly suffered because of militancy. In 2009, Asian Development Bank and World Bank issued report in which they stated that in the division of Swat and Malakand there were 500 hotels out of which 60 hotels have been closed which is a tremendous financial loss to this sector. Further, round about 40,000 people were directly and indirectly associated with the department of tourism in Swat and Malakand. They all lost their jobs due to war against terrorism.113 Resultantly, local industry of tourism in the northern areas especially Swat and Malakand suffered a lot. Moreover, the foreign countries issued precautionary measures to their nationals not to travel Pakistan for tour purpose especially after the occurrence of incident in June 23, 2013 in which the militant killed nine tourists at Nanga Parbat (Gilgit Baldistan) in which the tourists of Russia, China and the US were included.

Owing to unsatisfactory law and order situation huge financial losses were suffered by Pakistan cricket board. Pakistan was declared as co-host by international cricket board (ICB) for 2011 cricket world cup but that honor ship was later on withdrawn due to worse law and order situation in the country. Cricket matches were shifted to the other co-host countries such as India, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka which were to be played in Pakistan. In 2008, the cricket champion trophy was snatched from Pakistan and was given to South Africa to host the matches by international cricket board (ICB). The decision was taken due to the increase number of adverse activities of terrorists and prevalence of panic in the country. Marketing Department of Pakistan Cricket Board has described that since 2008 Pakistan Cricket Board had

112 “Economic Survey 2010-2011”, p. 220. 113 “Preliminary Damage and Needs Assessment: Pakistan North West Frontier Province and Federally Administered Tribal areas”, Asian development Bank and World Bank, November 30, 2009, pp. 7-64.

247 lost 27 Euros revenue because of the violent wave of terrorism.114 Overall it had been estimated that due to this war tourism industry had been losing 800 million per year and may be high with the passage of time.

7.18 INTERNALLY DISPLACED PEOPLE & ITS COST Pakistan‟s military started an operation in the valley of swat and tribal agencies to curb the activities of militant outfit and to dismantle their structures. These were the full-fledged military operations which forced the people of the areas to leave their homes until situation get normalized. The state had to spend million per year for the rehabilitation of people who were internally displaced.115 Two billion rupees were spent on IDPs alone in 2007-08. In 2009, full-fledged operation was started with the code name of Righteous Path in Swat and Malakand Division against the group of Mulvi Fazullah also called Radio Mullah. This operation caused internal migration of the swat‟s people to the other parts of the country, no doubt at the end of 2009, majority of the IDPs had return to their homes and vast of the area had been cleared by the forces. New waves of IDPs started when the forces carried out the operation against the militants in different agencies of FATA. In June, 2013 the government of KPK registered 1.1 million IDPs. However, according to FATA Disaster Management Authority (FDMA) when Pakistan army started operation Zarb-e-Azab round about 0.8 million people were fled from their homes and became IDPs.116

7.19 INCREASED IN POVERTY AND EMPLOYMENT LOSS

Financial resources tremendously depletes where the violence and panic is widespread and major chunk of finances are being allocated for the security of state. In this situation, the dream of alleviating poverty cannot be materialized. Employment market in Pakistan receives 2.5 million people of job seeking. For the sake of accommodating the new entrant there should be sound economy which grows at the rate of 7-8 percent per year. However, massive unemployment and poverty is at upward spiral owing to uncertain law and order situation, lack of investment and the energy crisis. The wheels of economic development have completely clogged.117

114 “Pakistan Counts Cost of Cup Shift”, BBC News, April 18, 2009. 115 Shebaz Rana, “Myth Vs Reality: US Aid to Pakistan Dwarfed by Economic Cost of War”, The Express Tribune, March 20, 2011. 116 Zahir Shah Shirazi, “North Waziristan IDPs Figure Reached 800,000”, Dawn, July8, 2014. 117 Dr. AShfaque H. Khan, “Bad Inheritance”, The News, July 2, 2013.

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Finance Ministry of Pakistan revealed in paper-11 which deals with poverty reduction that unemployment has increased in the conflicting areas of the country. As majority of war-torn areas are the rural one. Therefore, poverty level enhanced in these areas. It was mentioned in the report that ratio of poverty has increased in 2008- 09 which was recorded 37.5 percent. The ratio was in decline in 2007-08 (23.9%). It means 16.4 percent increase was made during one year. The World Bank report, entitled world development indicators (WDI) 2013 was also very shocking. It is stated that in Pakistan 60 percent masses are living below the poverty line while 21 percent population has been surviving with $ 1.25 per day.

It is pertinent to mention, that in the valley of Swat the rate of unemployment was high due to persistent instability. The militants had banned the female education in toto. Moreover, than 42 percent of boys‟ schools were completely destroyed in the valley. During 2007-08 to 2009 an estimate was recorded in which 1, 50,000 students left education and nearly 8,000 female teachers lost their jobs due to widespread violent militancy in the valley.

7.20 RISK TO FOOD SECURITY In 2009, a report was published by Pak-US business council that majority of the food items and other related commodities are smuggled to Afghanistan via Pakistan due to instability and uncertainty in the later country. As the traders and businessmen get more profits in Afghanistan therefore, they try to smuggle their items there. This, resultantly create the scarcity of food and price hike within the country.118

7.21 LOSS IN TAX COLLECTION, INFLOWS OF PRIVATIZATION AND SWELLING BUDGET DEFICIT

International trade activities were also impacted negatively, because of war on terror. Growth of economy was declined sharply, imports were also declined and tax collection ratio was also mitigated. Privatization‟s inflows were massively declined. Apart from this, credit risk was also increased due to which borrowing from the market was very difficult. Saving bonds of Pakistan was also declined. Budget deficit was also recorded by Rs.510 billion and debt liabilities were increased by Rs.10, 700.5 billion in 2010-11.During 2011-12, 1761 billion rupees budget deficit was

118 Pervez Iqbal Cheema, “Global War on Terror”, p. 13.

249 recorded119 and public debt jumped to 667 billion. Increase debt could lead to high inflation, higher cost of borrowing etc. In a nutshell, Pakistan engagement as strategic partner in the war against terrorism desperately clogged the wheel of economic progress and prosperity in the country.

7.22 CONCLUSION Pakistan‟s entrance into a strategic partnership with the US desperately effected it socio economic, political and strategic interests. The event of 9/11 paved the way for the super power (the US) on one hand, and on the other regional powers such as India started to exert its power to influence the other regional states and secure its interests. Moreover, India also chalked out a mechanism to damage Pakistan‟s regional interests and constraint it ability to act. As Pakistan‟s strategic depth policy was stronger in Taliban regime than any other era, therefore, with the ousting of Taliban government of India started to enhance its influence with the assistance of northern alliance. Conflict in the region due to war on terror provided golden opportunity to the intelligence agencies of CIA, RAW and NDS to provoke the insurgencies and separatists movements in Pakistan.

Immediate impact of Pakistan‟s alignment with America in the global war on terrorism was on its political structure which was badly destabilize with growing radicalization of society and shattered security situation. Radicalization which was considered to be restricted in FATA and the other parts of the province of Khyber PakhtunKhwa was in full swing in south Punjab and Karachi. It can be easily assessed that in coming years religious extremism may hit the other parts and larger segments of society. In spite of this, horrific tactics of war suicide bombing completely changed the shape of modern warfare. Suicide bombers hit civilian and military installations and also attacked the innocent civilians of 2002 to 2004, 400 suicide attacks took place in Pakistan, in which 6038 people were died and 12565 were severely wounded.120 Arguably, against Pak-US alignment Al Qaida TTP and Punjabi Taliban alliance emerge on the surface. The nexus among the militants not only destabilize Pakistan internally but exert their influence in Afghanistan India and western countries to target Pakistan and the US interests. Pakistan most pivotal interest in

119 Imran Ali Kundi, “Deficit Balloons to Rs. 1,761 Billion”, The Nations, September 1, 2012. 120 “Fidayeen (Suicide Squad) Attack in Pakistan”, Available at:http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/pakistan/database/fidayeenattack.htm, Accessed on,August 30, 2014.

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Afghanistan and its stance of Kashmir got weak. In July, 2010 prime minister of Britain David Cameron categorically stated in his official visit to India that Pakistan is exporting terrorism in Afghanistan, India and across the world.121 Such a statements by the leaders of states who shape and reshape the discourse of international politics partying Pakistan as an anarchic and hopeless state which needs assistance specially through military interventions.

Nevertheless, the negative thinking and discourse cannot outlook Pakistan commitment in the war against terrorism. From 2001 to 2003, 60000 troops were engaged as an agreement in the war on terror which was later on increased 140000 and 150000 in 2009 and 2010 respectively. Comparatively more than the forces of the US, NATO, and Isaf which totally are 100000 engaged in Afghanistan against Taliban. Total cost of war bore by Pakistan and the US in this war from 2001 to 2014 is $102.51 billion.

Above analysis leads to the conclusion that stability of Pakistan can only be ensured with the promotion of democratic values unless security concerns of Pakistan alleviates with Afghanistan and India and economic recovery ensured which largely depends on the stability of Afghanistan panic will be permeating in Pakistan. The hard fact should also be acknowledged by the decision and policy makers of the US that military campaign to hunt down the Al-Qaida and toppling of Taliban regime did not accomplished the settled objectives of the US and security of Afghanistan was further aggravated and stability and peace was affected badly in the region. In socio- economic and political front Pakistan is still in vulnerable position while political power in Afghanistan could not be centralized.122 On the basis of these facts, the next chapter will conclude this study and put forward the policy recommendations that how menace of militancy can be controlled in Pakistan, Afghanistan and Pak-Afghan borderland area through strategic partnership between Pakistan and the US and peace, stability and prosperity can be ensured not only in Pakistan but across the region.123

121 “Pakistan Must Not be Allowed to Promote Export of Terror, Says David Cameron”, The Guardian, July 28, 2010. 122 “Afghanistan and Regional Geopolitical; Dynamics after 11 September”, The National Intelligence Council, (Washington), Conference Proceedings, (18-19 April 2002), p. 4. 123 Ibid.

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CHAPTER – 8

CONCLUSION AND POLICY RECOMMENDATION

8. 1 INTRODUCTION The event of 9/11 brought the US near to its old partner (Pakistan), so as to clear the border land area from the Al-Qaeda operatives and other affiliated militant outfits. The aims of the partnership were to bring peace in Afghanistan and to hunt down Al-Qaeda leadership. The existential fact cannot be overruled that Pakistan faced the adverse effects due to joining hands with the Americans and international community. Pakistan also faced internal political instability and regional accusations in the way of fighting the war on terrorism. Economy of Pakistan badly suffered and religious extremism was on the rise. Internally changed political dynamics of Afghanistan in which Talibans were replaced by northern alliance minimized the role of Pakistan and enhanced the influence of New Delhi; therefore, the situation was demanding to change its Afghan policy to perform acting role in Afghan peace process with other stake-holders and to redirect the process under the guidelines of the US. The near security shift in the region has shaped and reshaped the relationship of many countries. Importantly, America‟s support to New Delhi in Afghanistan and its role in reconciliation process has increased security concerns of Islamabad. The US should acknowledge that without addressing Pakistan genuine security concerns stability in Afghan-Pak region cannot be materialized. The US ill-crafted policy towards Pak-Afghan region will provide space to militant forces to strengthen and empower themselves with the flow of deprived and unemployed youth. The wave of terrorism would be further intensified.1

If the US wants positive and progressive role of Pakistan, this mostly depend on policies of Americans and their sincerity towards the issues. But the foremost vital approach from the US side would be not to see Pakistan from the prism of Al-Qaeda and Taliban. The American interests in the region can successfully be secured if the US relies on Pakistan without any suspicion.2

1 Alexender Envas, “Pakistan and the Shadow of 9/11”, The RUSI Journal 156, No. 4, (August 2011): pp. 64-65. 2 Ibid.

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Pakistan‟s entrance into the global war on terrorism has adversely not only affected strategic partnership but also reshaped its foreign and internal dynamics to the great extent.

War on Terrorism and Pak-US strategic Engagement Pak-US strategic partnership is the outcome of the event of 9/11. Though president Obama and his administration talk about long term engagement with Pakistan but Washington‟s ill-crafted policies create doubts in Islamabad. There is no denial to the fact that Pakistan has been doing more than its capacity. But there are some challenges which are beyond the capacity of Islamabad. Trust deficit in Pak-US partnership and Washington tilt towards New Delhi by signing a strategic nature of agreements with it and providing greater role in Afghanistan, aggressive approach of America towards china, growing hatred among the masses for the US due to its aggressive approach in FATA and the borderland areas, are the challenges which cannot be addressed without solid cooperation. Every point needs to be discussed comprehensively.3

South Asian Politics and Pak-US Engagement Pakistan‟s engagement started with the US from the later entrance in the region of south Asia. However, policy makers get involve in anxiety due to overwhelming support to New Delhi especially in the field of defense. it is genuine reservation of Islamabad about the greater role of India in Afghan reconciliation process and infrastructure development. This approach of the US is a direct threat to the security interests of Pakistan in the region. America may face tough response from Pakistan it the US does not regard the interests and provide a due space to Islamabad in Afghanistan. Contrary to it, India gets encouragement when Washington declared to fight Al-Qaida is a major threat because India then tried to link Kashmir‟s self- determination movement with terrorism. The hard fact should be acknowledged, that Islamabad cannot turn its focus from eastern to western border unless long standing issue of Kashmir cannot be resolved between India and Pakistan.

Furthermore, emerging china is also a constant threat to Washington‟s regional interests in Asia; therefore, one of the objectives of the US is to give greater role to New Delhi so that it could keep a check on the strategic activities of Beijing.

3 Javid Hussain, “Dead-Lock in India-Pakistan Talks”, The Nations, March 2, 2010.

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On October 4, 2011 an agreement was inked between Afghanistan and India under the direction of the US. The agreement was consisted that to enhance economic, scientific and, technological sharing. However, the most threatening aspect of the agreement is to train the Afghan National security forces (ANSF) by the Indians so that they can fight with the Taliban after the withdrawal of the NATO and the US forces from Afghanistan. If India trains Afghan military forces, definitely, Pakistan will equally face the harder threat from its Eastern and Western border. Pakistan‟s offer to provide training to the Afghan forces was rejected by the US; therefore, Pakistan sees Indo- Afghan strategic engagement from the lens of indo-US strategic partnership.4

The major reason for making the agreement was Pakistan‟s support to Haqqani Network which was a constant source of threat to the NATO and American forces. Further, President Hamid Karzai started negotiation with the US, Russia, China, India, and European Union to talk with Afghan militant groups except Pakistan based militant groups. Worries of Islamabad were genuine in term of greater role of New Delhi in political reconciliation process. New Delhi and Washington both were agreed to minimize Pakistan‟s role in Afghanistan, and direct communication channels would be started with Afghanistan – based Taliban. It is believed that Indo- Afghan agreement will impel Pakistan to bring the Afghan Taliban to the negotiating table. If Pakistan does not play the role in this regard, it can be deserted as trouble- maker to peace process.

Christopher Hitchens, a renowned writer, supports the greater role of India in Afghanistan with the plea that India and the US had an alliance before the 9/11 incidents. But, Islamabad rejects the perception with an argument that there are many analysts who point out that the role of Islamabad is undeniable in the war against terrorism. The role of Pakistan is important in depressing the resurgence of Al-Qaeda and other militant outfits in borderland. More, by supporting Pakistan Washington can create balance in the region. Michal O, Hanlon also points out that it would be against the logic to replace Pakistan from India.5

Reduction of Pakistan‟s role in Afghan peace process may impel the security managers of Pakistan to intensify the asymmetrical warfare in Afghanistan and if

4 Farhat Taj, “India-Pakistan Alliance: Implications for Pakistan?” Daily Times 5 Sajjad Shaukat, “US Designs to Destabalize Asia”, Pakistan Observer, July 25, 2011.

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Washington failed to stop the strategy, it would be detrimental for the whole region. Another area of resentencing of the US policy is Washington-Delhi Nuclear agreement. This move will further incline Pakistan towards Chinese bloc to erect balance of power in the region. On 20th July 2011, Hilary Clinton encouraged India to play greater role in shaping the future of the region. While, on the other hand, restricted the role of Pakistan by war on terror and eradicating the groups which are disturbing the peace of Afghanistan and Kashmir. Apart from this, the other important figures of Obama administration such as Johan Karry also stated in June 2013 that for rebalancing the power politics in the region alliance with India is essential. It would not be wrong to say that the development which is taking place in south Asia is not a good omen for the security of the region. The two powerful blocs are taking place in south Asia. Both the blocs are in constant struggle to diminish each other‟s influence in the region. It can be describe as super power-politics in the region but it can be turned into nightmare for the small states.6

Established US policy for Afghanistan and its Shocks on Pakistan Not only America strategic inclination towards India will influence and affect Pakistan‟s domestic and external affairs but also the US Afghan policy will affect Pakistan to a great extent. Islamabad has reservations on the US „Af-Pak‟ policy because Pakistan and Afghanistan are treated as identical countries. It was argued by Musharraf, “Afghanistan” has no government and the country is completely destabilized while Pakistan is not like Afghanistan. Moreover, there is an Indian factor and Kashmir struggle in the whole game. The US tried to „de-hyphenate‟ Pakistan and India after 9/11, treating them as if they had no ties with each other. This has ignored a variety of historical, cultural and political factors which connect India and Pakistan. The result is emergence of incoherent Afghan policy on the part of the US. If the US removes „war on terror‟ lens from Indo-Pak landscape, it can provide an opportunity to examine Afghan conflict as well as Kashmir issue. The factors which annexed with the US policy towards Afghanistan are pivotal to be discussed.

Pashtunistan Issue: and De Facto Partition of Afghanistan Policy makers of Pakistan have a suspicion about the Washington approach towards Afghanistan which may be based on division of Afghanistan on the ethnic

6 Shahid Javed Burki, “Pakistan and the New Great Game”, The Express Tribune, January 16, 2012.

255 lines. Some officials in Washington suggest that partition of Afghanistan on ethnic lines may be helpful to pull back the western forces from northern Afghanistan. The task should be given to protect the areas of north and western Afghanistan. Through this strategy the US would be able to target Al-Qaeda anywhere with the help of Drones, cutting down Taliban‟s movement across Durand line and end safe havens in FATA.7 According to a commentator, the US seems to be committed to divide Afghanistan into two parts;  The north and the west region.  The south and the east region. In this regard, “the US has secretly supported presidential candidate Abdullah Abdullah in the 2009 elections and is busy for strengthening him”.8 He says that US want to “create resistance within eastern and southern Afghanistan against the Taliban by distributing money to buy up loyalties”. Saleem mentions that “the US will urge Taliban against Pakistan to teach Islamabad a lesson” for its support to Taliban insurgency in Afghanistan.

The movement will be titled as Pashtun nationalist movement. The policy would Push the Pashtun people to stand with the Taliban and struggle for independent Pashtun state. If this defacto partition policy is succeeded, it would be potential threat to Pakistan. Islamabad started military operation in Pushtun areas of KPK and FATA to clog the permeating insurgency in the area. They all then will disband to annex with independent Pushtunistan. New Delhi is completely on board and supporting the move of the US. It was mentioned in Indian defense review. “A partitioning of Afghanistan into a Pashtun held South and East and a non-Pashtun North and West will inevitably lead to the merger of FATA and KPK into a larger Pashtun homeland. The outcome will give strategic benefited to India”.9

Afghanistan: A Paradise for the Militants of Pakistan For eradicating militancy from the Pushtune areas of KPK and FATA Pakistan army started full-fledged military operations in the valley of Swat and tribal agencies.

7 Rober D. Black Will, “Paln B in Afghanistan: Why A De facto Partition is the Least Bad Option”, Foreign Affairs, No. 1, (Fearer 2011 ): pp. 42-50. 8 Saleem Safi, “US Plans for the Region”, The News, September 25, 2010. 9 Major General Dhruv C. Katoch, “Will Pakistan Implode”, Indian Defense Review 26, No. 1, (March 2011): pp. 150-151.

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These operations caused the escape of Mulvi Fazlullha and Mulvi Faqir Muhammad to Afghan areas of Kunar and Nuristan which were safe havens for anti-Pakistan militant groups. The operations were conducted after the series of horrific incidents in different parts of KPK. Arguably, it is the responsibility of NATO and Afghan forces to take stern actions against the groups who are attacking Pakistan by using Afghan territory. The interesting thing is that four to six hundred people with full arms are crossing the border without any detection. It is believed by the security mangers of Pakistan that the attacks by the militants on Pakistan have tacit approval of the Americans and Afghan government. Mian Iftikhar, the then information minister, categorically remarked the incompetency of the NATO and Afghan forces to deal the militants groups especially the Fazlullah and Faqir Muhammad outfit. If they failed to curb their activities, Pakistan under the international law may exercise the right of „hot Pursuit‟ to intervene in Afghanistan‟s territory and dismantle the groups. But it will create border tension which can be escalated into full-fledged war and can disturb the whole region. It may further give impetus to the US notion of De facto partition of Afghanistan which is also detrimental to the future of South Asia. .10

Haqqani Network: Vital Stakeholder in Afghanistan The US has failed to bring the stability in Afghanistan. Islamabad is very disappointed and has grave concerns on it. Pakistan does not want to see a “weak and fragile” political set up after the complete US and NATO withdrawal that will cause increased political instability. Pakistan does not want to see a further jolt form its western borders in case of weak and fragile Afghan scenario. The constructive role of Pakistan is undeniable especially in the dialogue process between Taliban and the US. It is, therefore, should be recognized that Haqqani Network is one of the important stake-holder and without his involvement in the reconciliation process in Afghanistan peace in the region cannot be materialized. This is the reason, that when Pakistan military launched its long awaited operation (Zarb-e-Azab) against militants in North Waziristan on 15 June 2014, several press reporters opined that the Haqqani group militant were permitted to leave North Waziristan before the military raids began.11

10 Qaser Butt, “Pak-Afghan Commission: Upper Dir Incursion to Figure in Talks with Kabul”, The Express Tribune, June 8, 2011. 11 Envas, “Pakistan and the Shadow of 9/11”, pp. 64-65.

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The desire of Pakistan to bring Haqqani network as a stake-holder in the Afghan reconciliation process poses challenges for the US. The US link Haqqnai network with Al-Qaeda whose ultimate goal is to pave way for “Global Jihad” .

Hilary Clinton, the then secretary of State in her interview to Reuters in October 2011 stated that Haqqani Network and other like-minded conglomerates are constant threat to the US, Afghanistan, and the other political stake-holders but the only way forward is hope which can be achieved through negotiation.12

Now the future will decide that Haqqani network come into the negotiation and cooperate with the US and Kabul or not? However, for Islamabad, it is a matter of concerned that after the end of Zerb-e-azab Haqqnai network will once again come back to North Waziristan and make it safe heaven. If it happens, Washington may take a final action against the Haqqani network which would bring US-Pakistan relations to breaking point.

Long Term Presence of the US Security Forces in Afghanistan Pakistan security establishment has deep reservation about the US long-term stay in Afghanistan. Genral Johan Allen while giving his interview to the New York Times. “We would probably see some number of advisers, trainers, intelligence specialists here in Afghanistan for some period of time beyond 2014.”13 US-Afghan bilateral security agreement (BSA) is concluded by the new Afghan government in 2014. In this connection, Islamabad has expressed concern over suspicious article 6 of the pact which deals with the “external aggression”. In other words, the land of Pakistan can be used by the foreign forces against Al-Qaeda and Taliban. David Sanger, quoted Bruce Reidel that the US is in need of Afghanistan as a “base to strike targets in Pakistan”.14Islamabad is of the view that the US long term presence in Afghanistan will provide excuse for the militants to continue their activities in that war-torn country and beyond. Thus, the long term presence of the US forces in Afghanistan seems to be illogical. After the Salala incident on November 2011 and subsequently closing of Shamsi air base which was used by the US for drone

12 Amir Mir, “Haqqanis Sidestep US Terror List”, Asia Times, October 15, 2011. 13 Alissa J. Rubin, “US General in Afghanistan Says Troops may Stay Past 2014”, New York Times, December 20, 2011. 14 David A. Sanger, “Drawing Down, With a Vigilant Eye on Pakistan”, New York Times, June 22 2011.

258 operations is a clear manifestation of Pakistan‟s firm stand on this issue. Afghan Talibans also insist on the full withdrawal of all foreign troops as a per-condition to becoming part of political system in Afghanistan.

Pakistan’s Internal Security Concerns and the US approach Militant landscape has provided the opportunity to the intelligence and private detectors of the US in Pakistan. The target of these contractors was to internally break militant groups by creating clashes among them and to use them against Pakistan so that the US objectives can be achieved successfully in Pakistan. The private contractor in Pakistan Ramond Davis was arrested by Pakistani police on January 27, 2011 when he killed reportedly the two ISI operatives on Lahore in broad daylight.15 Investigation revealed that according to Davis, his task was to investigate the trial between Afghan Taliban and Al-Qaeda but the real picture was completely opposite. Davis established links with number of militants and extremist groups and used to recruit deprived and unemployed youth especially from the Southern Punjab to start bloody insurgency. After Ramond Davis case Islamabad restricted intelligence sharing with Washington.16

The Davis incident built a fear among the security apparatus of the country. They started to believe that the excuse of Al-Qaeda may give justification to cease the nuclear assets of Pakistan. The incident of Osama killing which took place in May 2, 2011 further strengthened the believe of the security managers of Pakistan about CIA‟s nefarious designs towards nuclear arsenals of Pakistan. Immediately, after Osama raid the then army Chief General Kiyani called General Khalid Kidwai (Commander of Strategic Plan Division) to ensure the protection of nuclear assets. General Kadwai gave firm assurance to protect the weapon at any cost. Moreover, 138th corps commander meeting gave assurance to the protection of the strategic assets.17 Pakistan steadily and gradually is increasing its conventional and non- conventional capabilities because of the US discriminatory approach towards Pakistan and India. Indo-US nuclear agreement will disturb Pak-India strategic balance. Islamabad‟s non-signing of Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT) is the outcome of the US imbalanced approach towards the matters. Alarming belles are already in full

15 “Did Ray Davis Shoot Two Pakistani Agents?” ABC News, February 2011. 16 M. K. Bhadra kumar, “Pakistan Confronts US Afghan Strategy”, The Hindu, April 27, 2011. 17 http://www.ispr.gov.pk/front/main.asp?o=press_release&id=1736, Accessed on, 27 May 2016.

259 swing as Islamabad committed to build fissile material. It was reported in 2011 by Washington Post that Pakistan has more than hundred nuclear weapons and almost all are directed towards eastern border.18

Policy Shift of the US and Budget Concern Budget and financial program which were started by the US in the way of war on terrorism especially the financial support to Pakistan was cut off because of divergence of opinion regarding the conducting of operation in North Waziristan which created resentment in the heart of Pakistani people. The US with the passage of tome decreased military and non-military aid to Pakistan. It was reported, the civilian aid which was $ 1.5 billion in 2010 was reduced to 1.09 billion in 2011 and in the subsequent years the figures were the same. However, Obama administration gave assurance to keep the assistance continue through civilian aid projects.

It was suggested by the policy makers in the US to attach the US aid with the performance of Pakistan in the war of terrorism. Renowned Wall Street Journal depicts that the conditions should be divided into two categories. One is called „basket‟ which should be consist to identify Osama location, cooperation with the NATO and Isaf forces in Afghanistan and combined strategy to curb the terrorist groups. The second one should be related to overall improvement in the partnership.19

Another demand of the US from Pakistan is to stop the supply of Improvised Explosive Devises (IED) which is being used by the Afghan militants against the US and NATO troops. The US congress is also worried about it and demands assurances from Pakistani security managers over the matter of IED. However, Pakistan showed reservation about the aid cutoff which definitely may make the relations contentious. Pakistani authorities have clearly mentioned to Washington that partnership will not be run according to the desires of the US. There is a need to understand each other interests.

The doubts exist among many American officials about aid cutoff which may adversely affect the broader partnership of Pak-US. Monitoring of economic assistance to Pakistan by the US is a sign of trust deficit. If the US cut the assistance it will be presumed in Islamabad that Americans do not want continuation of the partnership. Nevertheless, no doubt, many officials in Washington feel that many acts

18 The Washington Post, January 30, 2011. 19 Adam Entous and Siobhan Gorman, “US Links Pakistani Aid to Performance”, Wall Street Journal 15, (August 2011): pp. 47-48.

260 of Pakistan are frustrating and infuriating Washington but the US will repeat the history of 1990 and 2000 to leave Pakistan at lurch.20

Anti-Americanism Feelings in Pakistani Society Anti-American sentiments increased among Pakistanis because of the US self- centered and intricate approach towards Pakistan. CIA agent Davis is arrested and then released because of grave US pressure. Moreover, violation of Pakistan‟s territorial sovereignty by CIA drone operations and later on Salala incident further made the relations contentious. These incidents not only sabotage the states relations but also create hatred in the masses. The hard task in front of Islamabad is to maintain balance between Washington policies and anti-US feelings among the people of Pakistan. This anti-American realization is negatively affecting Pak-US strategic partnership. Americans should acknowledge the reality that hatred among the masses is due to the intricate mechanism of Washington. In Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) CIA and ISI are closely working but in the same time Pakistan is accused by the American officials for supporting the militant groups which are giving tough resistance. The US has failed to see its weaknesses in Afghanistan. Yet, to sat that Pakistan‟s sacrifices are futile are no doubt giving birth to anti-Americanism in Pakistan. The US media is concern about the casualties of NATO and American forces but silent about the US choppers attack of Salala and drone strike in Detta Khel of North Waziristan. Due to these incidents anti-US feelings have been developed to the level that Pakistani wants to review the engagement terms or completely end the partnership.21

It is pertinent to mention that blaming Pakistan for its involvement in Mumbai attacks in 2008 and not to investigate the incident of Samjhota Express which is a brazen act of brutality is double standard of western intelligentsia. The killing of the head of the Maharashtra Anti-Terrorist Squad Hemant kayaker who was the investigator of Samjhota Express incidents also creates doubts. For Mumbai incidents Ajmal Kaseb was blamed for the killing. But in reality, Indian extremist organization was excessively upset at Hamant kayaker who had already arrested lieutenant colonel Prasad Prohit, a serving of India army officer for his conspiracy in Samjhota Express

20 The Guardian , May 24, 2012. 21 “Nationwide Rallies Condemn Strikes”, The Nation, November 28, 2011.

261 incident and Malegaon blasts. Pakistan views it a strange and suspicious silence of the US on such issue further frustrate Pakistan.

Furthermore, American deep pressure on Islamabad about not to support the Jihadi groups who are fighting for the cause of Kashmir while on the other hand no any hard warning to India about the atrocities committed by Indian army in India-held Kashmir inculcated the feeling of resentment in masses of Pakistan against the US. This American attitude is multiplying Anti-American sentiment in Pakistan. In fact, Indian intricate enmity is no small feat in Pakistan; however, the US misplaced policies and ill-righted strategies towards Pakistan accomplished it, which itself is a great worry.22

It is an existential fact that Pakistan took an important and significant decision by joining the US-led combine war on terrorism in order to protect its special vested interests in Afghanistan and Kashmir; for instance to secure its strategic assists, to improve and recover its economic cycle and above all to prevent a public reaction from within. Although, this decision apparently did affect the policies of Pakistan, no structural modification took place in the policy of Pakistan. Instead of restructuring, Pakistan rebalanced its policy. It played a pivotal role in serving the US-led coalition. It assisted the US by targeting Al-Qaeda agents and intelligencers. Moreover, it launched struggle against the insurgents of Tahrik-e-Taliban Pakistan.23

Nevertheless, Pakistan avoided confronting Afghan insurgents and other groups based in Pakistan, who were fighting ISAF/NATO forces in Afghanistan, so that it may achieve its foreign and domestic policy objectives. It can be described that „Pakistan has pragmatically retained exquisitely a delicate balancing act in its relation with the US and with Afghan Taliban‟.

Pakistan is standing on a cross road. On one hand its major objective is to avoid internal reactions from the groups of people who strongly support and advocate the cause of Taliban. Since Pakistan is playing its due role in the front line against terrorism, most probably it may result in backlash from the sympathizers of Taliban. On the other hand, Pakistan is much troubled by Washington‟s carrot and stick

22 M. Hilali, “India‟s Self-Inflicted Terror Attacks”, Pakistan Observer, July 21, 2013. 23 Personal Interview from Prof. Dr. A. Z. Hilali, 10 August 2016, henceforth, Interview Dr. Hilali, 10 August 2016.

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(reward and punishment) approach towards it, for it has aroused feelings of anger and discontent inside the military. Because, some of the military officers think the US-led war on terror is a constant danger to the strategic interests of Pakistan in Afghanistan and Kashmir, for Washington exhibits its special favour to New Delhi.24

The confusion aroused after the attack on General Head Quarter (GHQ) and Meheran Naval Base in 2009 and 2011 respectively which depicted that the grouping in military institution has taken place on the issue of good and bad Taliban. The feared clogged the civil and military establishment to target Haqqani Network in North Waziristan.

More to the point, Islamabad never seriously launched an onslaught against the militant personnel who come in the category of „good Taliban‟ such as Afghan Taliban, Hizb-e-Islami, Haqqani network and Lashkar-e-Tayyaba. If it would do so, all these groups may turn against. This instance was experienced by Pakistan in 2002. When General Musharraf sent the army into the tribal areas to eradicate Al-Qaeda operatives and Afghan militants, he faced a strong opposition from within the state. Pakistan became worried about the backlash.

The tribesmen did not think this raid of Pakistan Army against the insurgents in FATA. They thought it as breach of the norms of hospitality. With this notion in mind people in agencies became antagonistic toward Pakistani Army. Seeing this situation Islamabad resoled to turn down the instructions and dictation of the US in order to maintain internal peace and stability and prevent the local tribes becoming united against the state of Pakistan. Thus, Pakistan did abstained from launching a thorough operation against these insurgents, rather it adopted a “segmented counterterrorism” approach. In this way it fragmented Al-Qaeda network and some sectarian groups and discontinued their activities. On the other hand it made peace talk with the local tribes and militants but it did not show serious interest in the elimination of Afghan Taliban who are at daggers drawn against the western forces and Afghan army led-by Karzai.25

24 Moeed W. Yousaf, “The US-Pakistan Relationship and Finding an End State in Afghanistan”, CTC Sentinel 3, No. 9, (September 2010): p. 8. 25 Ashely J. Tellies, “Pakistan‟s Record on Terrorism: Conflicted Goals, Compromised Performance”, The Washington Quarterly 31, No. 2, (Spring 2008): pp. 12-14.

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This strategy of Islamabad resulted in failure because it could not overt the ideologically motivated tribesman. Pakistani policy of supporting good Taliban has paved way for Afghan Taliban, Al-Qaeda, TTP and Punjab based militants to find a safe haven. Contrary to this situation, it also has to fight in the front line the US-led war coalition in the war on terror for its political, economic and strategic delicate balancing act. Islamabad finds itself between the devil and the deep blue sea. On one hand, America and NATO officials are not satisfied with Islamabad through cooperation in the war against terror, while contrary to it, the Islamist groups and the leadership of TTP revolted against the government of Pakistan for accompanying America in the war.

It is crystal clear that Pakistan is reluctant to aim at. Afghan Taliban, Pakistan not only refuses to take action against them but some of the ISI officials asset them for certain purposes. Besides this it is also a fact that Pakistan does not target them because it does not have a strong hold on all the insurgent groups.26

Nevertheless, now Pakistan is actively involved in a counter terrorism campaign against both TTP and all Punjab based Taliban. In an interview president Zardari told to a Turkish newspaper “Hurriyat” that no country has made greater contribution in the war on terror than Pakistan. By now round about 49,000 precious lives has been sacrificed but the people‟s response was positive in the favor of Pakistan Army. Pakistan Army enjoyed public cooperation in carrying the campaign. But contrary to it, the US could not win the favor of Pakistani Nation during the war on terror neither had they approved of its strategic vision for Pak-Afghan region. The elements of anti-Americanism in Pakistan have also hindered Islamabad‟s policy of counter terrorism to execute properly. Anti-Americanism has recognized that the US is against Islam. They think America as the essential source of Evils prevailing in the Islamic as well as non-Islamic world. The religious hardliners called America as an Anti-Islamic while the moderate liberal in Pakistan considers American policies as anti-people.27 These anti-American sentiments can be an impossible hurdle for Pakistani Army to succeed in their mission i.e overcoming insurgency in the region and fight Haqqani network on a broader level more effectively. Ultimately America

26 Zia Khan, “The Fission of Lashar-e-Jhangvi”, The Express Tribune, November 17, 2010. 27 Ibid.

264 should develop a realistic approach regarding its expectations from security managers. Only then it may devise more effective plans.

According to their plan Taliban instigate the people against the political and ideological legitimacy and want to establish their own. This practice widens the gap between the state and its people. May be that, all the people do not advocate Taliban‟s cause but many of them are convinced by Taliban‟s cause fighting for a holy purpose. They have been attracted by the Islamic garb wrapped by Taliban. This Islamic legitimacy has been inculcated by Pakistan itself during Afghanistan Jihad 1980s and during Taliban‟s rule in 1996-2001. In term of cost about 150,000 troops moved to the western border and has borne heavy expenditure of $ 102.51 million between the financial year 2002 and 2014. At present Pakistan had reached to such a point where it can no more bear anymore cost of war. Whereas America no more proved Pakistan duly financial support, and Pakistan‟s economic condition is quite critical. If Washington refuses to provide economic assistance to Pakistan Army it means the US does not want to help Pakistan‟s forces to accomplish its strategic goals in the war on terror.28

Pakistan is a developing country, as viewed by Daniel Byman, and is suffering from various structural problems include civil-Military conflict, weak economy and fundamentalism. Structural instability directly affects the state politics. This weakness aids insurgency by becoming an obstacle in executing the national strategies against terrorism and insurgencies. Such structural weakness creates a vacuum between Pakistan and the US due to which trust deficit emerge.

Pakistani army needs the assistance from the local population and general public of Pakistan in order to minimize the risk and cost of the counterterrorism campaign. For instance the local people of Swat and Malakand got united against TTP and TNSM because they knew that those groups were a danger to the peace and serenity of the reign. Thus, they stood by the Pakistan forces and made secure all possible assistance.29

28 Shibil Siddiqi, “Report: Pakistan‟s Ideological Blowback”, Foreign Policy in Focus, June 25, 2009. 29 Ibid.

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8.2 RESEARCH FINDINGS After a thorough research and studying different dimensions of Pak-US strategic partnership amidst conflicting approaches towards militancy it has been extracted as follow; First, In the Sixty five years of history of Pak-US alliance the US supported Pakistan in field of defense rather than focused on its economic uplift and human development. Pakistan-US strategic partnership was largely based on military to military interactions. The projects which were started in the name of people‟s prosperity under the Pak-US strategic partnership were annexed with the Pakistan‟s role in the war against terrorism. Once military operations came to an end, military as well as civilian aid had been cut off and stern sanctions and conditions were imposed.

Secondly, Pakistan has inclined towards the US because of two factors. Firstly, through coalition Pakistan receives multiple kinds of economic packages and technological advancements and secondly, keeps India away of entering into the American bloc. Partnership Thus, from the very beginning there is a clash of interests between the US and Pakistan towards dealing the issues of communism and terrorism.

Thirdly, Pak-US strategic partnership against militancy is going to be weakened because there is clash of America‟s global interests and Pakistan‟s regional interests. Security vanguards of Pakistan may revisit it policy towards the militant groups in the near future which are constant source of threat to the security of Pakistan. However, Islamabad at present is in process of negotiation with those militant groups who are fighting for the cause of the liberation of Kashmir and installing pro-Pakistan government in Kabul. Dubious role of the US towards the contentious issues between India and Pakistan vis-à-vis Afghanistan and Pakistan Such as Kashmir, Sir Creek, Siachen, and Pashtunistan have made Islamabad doubtful. Moreover, Policy of India towards the encirclement of Pakistan has strengthened the concept of „proxy warfare‟.

Fourthly, despite number of deep divergences in Pak-US strategic partnership and adoption of conflict of approaches to militancy in Afghanistan, Pakistan and its borderland area the policy makers of both the countries believe that the strategic

266 partnership will be survived in the long term with slight modifications in its terms and conditions because of the reason preservation of American interests in the region and sustainable stability in Afghanistan the role of Pakistan is crucial. On the other hand Pakistan does not want to lose its defense and civilian economic benefits which it is reaping from the US.

Fifthly, the US U-turn from Pakistan and its inclination towards India by providing it a larger space in Afghanistan has impelled Pakistan to increase its dependency on the militant groups who are fighting in Afghanistan. This approach of dependency has severely damaged the image of Pakistan in the comity of the Nations vis-a-vis pushed the Pakistani society towards religious extremism. However, there is no denial to the fact, that there is a conflict of approach between the Partner states about dealing the subject of fomenting insurgencies and militancy in Pak-Afghan border land area, yet both the States are persistently in bond of partnership and are endeavoring to merge each other interests to defeat the Al-Qaeda and other regional militant groups.

8.3 POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS Trust deficit in Pak-US strategic partnership further added to the political insecurity and economic crisis. In Afghanistan chapter Pakistan is the biggest stakeholder on the issue of post 2014 Afghanistan. It provided shelter to 2.5 million Afghan refugees, 49,000 precious lives were laid down after 9/11 and it suffered to calamitous damage to its economy.30

According to view point of Islamabad the more the war on terror prolongs, the tougher it becomes for Pakistan to manage with balancing act. Thus, it wants to have a direct access to Afghan Taliban Hiz-e-Islami and Haqqani network for a comprehensive reconciliatory discussion on the issue. The reason is that America does not put forward explicit political approach on the indefinite continued military operation in “Af-Pak” region.31

30 Moeed Yusaf and Huma Yusaf,et. al., “Pakistan, the United States and the End game in Afghanistan: Perception of Pakistan of Pakistan‟s Foreign Policy Elite” (Washington: United States Institute of peace, July 2011), pp. 2-3. 31 Anatol Lieven and Maleeha Lodhi, “Bring in the Taliban”, New York Times, April 22, 2011.

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The fundamental aim of Pak-US strategic partnership is to take wise step for bringing peace and stability in the “Af-Pak” region and it is possible only to mutually develop Afghan reconciliation plan by the US and Pakistan. Through this combined plan Taliban insurgency can be put to an end. Taliban, Kabul, Washington and Islamabad might be able to take initiative of fruitful negotiation. The insurgency will go “back to their nests” to take part in the reconciliation talk under well-defined conditions. In 2011, Hillary Clinton suggested that Taliban would have to stop violence, do away with Al-Qaeda and obey the constitution of Afghanistan for a peace process to work.

Thus, it is very much important for Pakistan on political and ideological grounds to renounce these groups and term them as anti-state, anti-nation and terroristic.

Political and ideological dimension of Pak-US strategic partnership against the war on terror has made confusion among the people of Pakistan. Political crisis, religious extremism, and terrorism have tightly griped the country. The state‟ institution is not clear how to respond to this state of affairs. It has badly failed and unable to define the “war on terror” in clear words. Is this is a Pakistan‟s war or American‟s war?

After all these restrictions and limitations on Pakistan‟s balancing act in the war on terror Pakistan Army made operations in Swat and South Waziristan in 2009 with fruitful results. These operations coerced Taliban to retreat and restrict their sphere of activities to a great extent. This act of the security forces of Pakistan is strong evidence of their willingness to eradicate Taliban and insurgency from their homeland. They captured vacated and built the areas cleansed of Taliban‟s presence. It suggests the clue that Pakistan has the will and capable enough to dislodge the Taliban from their safe havens in FATA and Malakand division. No doubt, Army has weakened TTP.

The lack of trust in Pakistan and the US strategic partnership makes the reconciliation process very difficult. According to Ahmed Rashid‟s the US had failed to convince the security managers of Pakistan that how to control Haqqani network.32

32 Hina Rabbani, “The Express Tribune”, December 22, 2011.

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On 2nd May 2011, when the US forces took action against Usama in Pakistani parliament members and officials showed a great concern on this incident. They called a joint session of parliament. It was asserted “to re-visit and review Pakistan‟s terms of engagement with the US”. They also made it clear that in future Pakistan will cooperate with the US in the US led war on terror “depending upon Pakistan‟s genuine security concerns”.33

Pakistan‟s foreign office emphasized that Pakistan wants a smooth and persistent partnership with the US that should be free of all sorts of „strum and deranges‟. In response to it, US official also acknowledged the fact that Washington and Islamabad know their good and bad, they know their benefits from a joint action, but this action must be balanced against national interest and sovereignty of the state. It is the right time for both of the countries to get agree on realistic goals and make peace and stability a reality in the borderland.

Positive change occurred in the relation of Islamabad and Washington; both the countries have toned down expectations from each other after the US presidential election in 2012. After his re-election as a president, Obama changed his foreign policy. He assured full political support in the matters of foreign policy, especially Pak-US strategic partnership.

American has abstained from interference of Pakistan‟s counter insurgency strategy regarding Lashkar-e-Tayyaba. Moreover, after the Mumbai incident in 2008 Pakistan has intensified its operational mechanism against Al-Qaeda and its conglomerates which have in fact cemented military and intelligence cooperation between Pakistan and India. Islamabad will also receive a positive response from Americans that they will no more put any hard and fast condition on Islamabad economic and security support.34

In Pakistan, in general elections 2013 PML-N led by Nawaz Sharif came into power. On his coming into power Sharif promised to initiate a table talk with the leaders of TTP. He preferred to resolve the problems peacefully instead of using violence.

33 Ibid. 34 “Nawaz Sharief Talks for Taliban Talks”, Dawn, May 20, 2013.

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Eventually, when the peace talk resulted in failure, the US fully supported Pakistan in the military operation in North Waziristan. Above all, in September 2012 America declared the Haqqani group as terrorist organization. Pakistan endorsed it and compelled them to come to the table talk. This positive change in policy helped Pakistan earn a place for itself; and it got involved in the reconciliation process of Afghanistan more vigorously.

Pakistan is not supposed to act upon all the directions of Washington blindly in the execution of its policy in the war against militancy. Because, Pakistan has some certain strategic, economic and political interests which it cannot ignore. There are sources of insecurity, domestic political constrains and geopolitical imperatives; none of these compulsions can be neglected. In June 2011, the former PM, Yousaf Raza Gilani, asserted that, “the strategy of Pakistan against the terrorism is multi- dimensional which is the need of the hour. The four-D strategy is going to be placed, (Dialogue, deterrence, development and defeating the terrorist‟s ideology) so as to liberate the society from the clutches of monsters”.35

At present, Pakistan has been confronting numerable challenges. There is a constant fear of the collapse of Pakistan but despite all these worries the future of Pakistan is not as bleak and pessimistic as depicted. Pakistan‟s institutions are able enough to function through weak capabilities. For instance, the military is still disciplined; it possesses command and control over a substantial nuclear armory and keep the power in conventional warfare to ward off the threats emerged internally and externally. Apart from this, the role of judiciary in Pakistan which is going to be vibrant and moving towards its independence is nearly to be accomplished in the upholding the rule of law and supremacy of the constitution would be ensured. Moreover, civil society is also gaining its place in the country which is mobilizing the people to think freely and independently.36

Apart from this, Pakistani nation has displayed courage in addressing some of the most difficult challenges. The people of Pakistan have stood against terrorism and extremism and are ready to fight militants for their political and economic benefits. This was practically seen in the wake of Swat operation when millions of IDPs moved

35 Ibid. 36 Hassan Abbas, “Pakistan 2020: A Vision for Building a Better Future”, Asia Society, May 2011.

270 from Swat into different parts of the country and people fully supported and assisted them. This example shows their strong will and interest in eliminating terrorism and militant culture from the state.

In view of this entire improved situation like rising supremacy of the constitution power and free media and vigilant and politically active society, the state of Pakistan has no danger of falling down or collapse. Instead, there are conducive circumstances for reformation and development in the country. Maleeha Lodhi maintains that the socio-economic change over the decade in the recent past has “created a larger, more politically assertive middle class, and engendered a stronger and more connected society. Once politics catches up with these changes the foundation would be laid for a functional and responsive state”.37

Yousaf Nazar one of the renowned political economist points out that Islamabad should review its foreign policy and try to disassociate itself in this regard; it is important for Islamabad to get rid of any type of hard relationship with the west. Pakistan in a paradigm shifts engaged itself with regional countries and surrounding states china, Iran, Russia and most importantly India instead of the West to empower its economy. In this regard it is pivotal that domestic, regional and international issues be resolved and should be shaped their foreign policies on economic lines. Furthermore, controlled and hijacked democracy would be replaced by truly empowering the masses and the US priorities should be focused to achieve its elongated objectives.38It is the most significant fact that Pakistan has earned “international good-will, even though this has yet to be translated into concrete pledges of assistance”.39

Arguably, the geo-strategic location of Pakistan makes it important in the world map. It is important for the regional as well as world community to ensure the stability and survival of Pakistan. Pakistan may also go ahead in this regard with the help of internal, global and most of all with full support and assistance of the US.40The significance of Pakistan ought to be recognized by the long term us- Pakistan relation.

37 Ibid. 38 Personal Interview from Zermina Baloch, 21 August 2016, henceforth, Interview Zermina, 21 August 2016. 39 Ibid. 40 Personal Interview from Dr. Muhammad Zubair, 17 July 2016, henceforth, Interview Zubair, 17 July 2016.

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Pakistan is playing a very important and significance role under terms of strategic partnership in Afghanistan and the borderland area. The role of America is important to establish the friendly environment in the region and Pakistan‟s collaboration with China, Iran, India, central Asia and Russia will be beneficial for the US as well. The detail of politico-strategic, internal and external security and economic recommendations are given below which will further strengthen the Pak-US Strategic partnership and will remove the factors of trust deficit.

8.4 POLITICAL MEASURES  Pakistan needs a centralized democratic system to strengthen democratization as well as civil institutions.  Washington should continue working on brining unanimity among the Pakistan political parties, nongovernmental organizations and civil society. The US should take in confidence the Islamic political parties to achieve the goal of democratic rule in the country. Furthermore, the US may also stop these parties from anti American posture.  Pakistan should clear in its stand on the war on terror so that the gape could be narrow down between the people of Pakistan and its government.  Pakistan as well as the US media should play a positive role by providing a platform to engage the security experts of both the countries in an open communication and discussion. Sensitive issues regarding US-Pakistan engagement in „war on terror‟ must be discussed so that peace and stability in the region could be materialized.  Pakistan must include FATA into “mainland Pakistan” so that instead of being voted they should participate in governing and ruling in the political system of Pakistan.

It is pertinent to mention here that president took a viable step on August 13, 2011, by amending the political party order 2002 by which political parties were permitted for the campaign and the people of the area can politically participate. In this regard the package which revolves around FATA‟s political, administrative and judicial uplifting was uttered which is a step in the right direction. The future ruling parties should continue the practice.

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8.5 POLITICO-STRATEGIC

 Pakistani establishment make it clear to the American policy makers that India is a potential threat to Pakistan and has been deeply involved through the land of Afghanistan to destabilize the province of Baluchistan and rest of the country. Therefore, cooperation with the US can only be survived if any kind of concrete peace agreement takes Place in Afghanistan between Pakistan and India.41  The role of Pakistan in Afghan peace process cannot be denied. Support of Islamabad in Afghan peace process would be a good omen for all the stakeholders in the region. In the meanwhile, Pakistan should also play a role to convince the Taliban forces to break nexus from Al-Qaeda and other foreign Conglomerates which are only Sabotaging the process and are a big hurdle in the way of political process in Afghanistan.42 Similarly, the US dialogues with Pakistan are very important to understand Pak-US national interests and if there is any kind of clash of interests, it must be resolved on priority basis.  This is true, Pakistan has been giving offers to Tajik-dominated Afghan National security forces(ANCE) as it would be better to engage the Pushtune ethic group in the army and to influence later on Tajik and Uzbeks in Afghanistan and to establish political broad based government.  Durand line, the contentious issue between Afghanistan and Pakistan, is important to be resolved If the US plays a constructive role. Moreover, the US should also try to resolve the issues between Pakistan and India. It will not only bring peace in the region but also Pak-US partnership will be strengthened.  It should be accepted by the security managers of Pakistan that India is also one of the stakeholder in the Afghan peace process. It is, therefore, essential for both the countries to bring transparency in their policies and actions and to acknowledge each other‟s demands. If non-state-actors are perpetrating terror from Pakistani soil, Islamabad should take stern actions. Similarly, conspirators

41 Personal Interview from Rahim Ullah Yousafzai, 15 May 2016, henceforth, Interview Rahim Ullah, 16 May 2016. 42 Ahmad Rashid, “The-US Pakistan relationship in the Year Ahead”, CTC Sentinel 5, No. 1, (January 2012): p. 4.

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and perpetrators who were involved in the incident of Samjhota Express, attack on Indian Parliament and Mumbai attacks should be brought into justice.  The US active role in resolving the Kashmir dispute between India and Pakistan would be commendable. America can facilitate the negotiating process and even pressurize the parties for resolving the issue.43

8.5 MEASURES FOR INTERNAL SECURITY  There should not be even narrow space for any terrorist or insurgent groups in Pakistan and allow establishing „state within the state‟ and challenge the right of the government in any part of the state. Counter insurgency campaigns should be started vigorously against the militant groups through military and political tactics.44 In this regard religious political parties such as J1, JUI-(F) can play effective role in the persuasion process to convince militant forces to submit to writ of the government, constitution and laws and involve in the political process.  Security managers of Pakistan should not mix up Counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency phenomenon. For tackling the current weave of terrorism there is a need for strong counter-terrorism strategies.  For tackling the extremist ideas there is a stronger need to develop counter- extremist narratives. For this purpose the forces such as media, clergy class and educational institutions can play affective role. Moreover, open and sustained public dialogue is also important to counter the youth radicalization.  The eminent factor of radicalization is the public school curriculum and the syllabi of religious seminaries; therefore, it is necessary to bring vibrant changes in the Schools‟ curriculum and register all the religious seminaries so that the tolerant picture of Islam can be presented.  Military has recently conducted successful operations in FATA and dismantled the terrorists‟ network. Now, the role of civil administration is much crucial to consolidate the military gains. US should give assistance to Pakistan so as to enhance the capabilities of civil administration.

43 Moeed Yousaf, “Rational Institutional Design, Perverse Incentives and the US Pakistan Partnership in Post 9/11”, Defense against Terrorism Review 2, No. 1, (Spring 2009): pp. 26-27. 44 David Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice (London: Praeger Security International, 2008), pp. 55-56.

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 The security managers should chalk out a comprehensive strategy to cope especially L J. Harmony among the different sects can only be achieved when the religious extremism is in tight control.45  In the contemporary condition the role of law enforcement agencies have been multiplied. However, their weakness in countering the wave of terrorism speaks volumes. There is a greater need of coordination among the law enforcement agencies (Army, Police, and Intelligence). For this purpose great authority and autonomy should be given to NACTA.46  The US should also provide technical and financial assistance to enhance the capabilities of Pakistan in surveillance. For the sake of active and effective response to the militants Pakistan needs protected vehicles, night vision communication system and transport aircrafts.  In the counter-insurgency measures Pakistan has been adopting the various approaches by targeting the hard-core militants and negotiating with the “moderate” militants. However, American approach has been damaging the counter-terror efforts of Pakistan by targeting the militants which are willing to talk by drone strike and commando raids which are not only causing human causalities but also increasing hatred among the masses of the US and Pakistan.

8.7 ECONOMIC MEASURES  The US Af-Pak policy should not be applied on Pakistan as the US has unique relations with Pakistan. America should address the economics issues of Pakistan and work for the economic and human development.47  Developmental projects such as education, health and infrastructure in which the state of Pakistan is already working needs financial assistance in which the US can play vital role. The other institutions (World Bank and Asian Development Bank) should jointly finance these projects.48  Confidence of the investors has been reduced due to deteriorating law and order situation. For their encouragement export-import Bank loans and overseas development private investments corporation facilities should be ensured and guarantees should be provided by the government of their

45 Personal Interview from General (Rtd.) Hamid Khan, 19 June 2016 henceforth, Interview Hamid, 19 June 2016. 46 Personal Interview from Aamir Raza,17 July 2016, henceforth, Interview Aamir, 17 July 2016. 47 Personal Interview from Dr. Muhmmad Bilal, 19 April 2016, henceforth, Interview Dr. Bilal, 19 April 2016. 48 Ishrat Hussain, “Building Ties without Aid”, The News, February 14, 2012.

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investment. The investors should be encouraged to invest in energy sector especially in hydroelectric power and natural gas.49  Economy of Pakistan is serving actually on textile and apparel commodities but only 0.2 percent is important to the US because of high custom duty which is more than 10 percent; therefore, the tariff should be lowered down by the US.  An important legislation which is under consideration before the congress in America with the title „reconstruction opportunity zones‟ (ROZs) needs to be passed soon. The fundamental aim of this legislation is to give duty free access of those products which are produced by FATA and the areas which were devastated by the earthquake in 2005.  Pakistan-Afghanistan relations should not be packed under security and defense strategies. Present era is called the economic era and relations between the countries can only be strengthened through trade ties. Pakistan should work in Afghanistan as a soft power and invest in war-torn country. There is no denial to the fact that in October 2015 both the countries have signed an agreement which is called „Afghanistan-Pakistan transit trade agreement‟ (APTTA) with the goal to increase the bilateral trade by $ 5 billion in the upcoming years which is, no doubt, a good gesture of peaceful relations.50  After the defeat of Jundullah Pak-Iran relations are moving in the right direction. Yet the US pressure on Pakistan regarding the gas pipeline should be removed. The US should assist the project so that the (IPI) project can be accomplished. Similarly the other projects called „Turkmenistan-Afghanistan- Pakistan and India‟ (TAPI) also need US support so as to complete the project soon and dividends should be planked.  For improving the living standard of the people in Pakistan and the doubts about the use of aid money the US can use the NGOs and other institutions. This mechanism will strongly improve the relations.51

It is an existential fact that the recommendations which were put forth here cannot completely address the complex crises of Pakistan but these are crucial for cementing the Pak-US strategic partnership amidst conflicting interests in the war on terror and for long term sustainable partnership in future.

49 Personal Interview from RifatUllah,15 May 2016, henceforth, Interview Rifat, 15 May 2016. 50 Raja Karthikeya, “Jundullah a Wedge between Iran, Pakistan”, Asia Times Online, August 7, 2009. 51 IshratHussain, “Shared Growth”, The Herald, July 4, 2011.

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NEWSPAPERS . The Dawn (Karachi, Pakistan). . The Frontier Post (Peshawar, Pakistan). . The Nation (Lahore, Pakistan). . The News (Rawalpindi, Pakistan). . The Daily Times (Lahore, Pakistan).

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FOREIGN NEWSPAPERS . Boston Globe (USA). . The Guardian (Manchester). . The Independent (London). . The Laos Angeles Times (USA). . The New York Times (USA). . The New Yorker (New Jersey). . The Sunday Observer (London). . The Sun(London). . The Times (London). . US Today(New Jersey). . Washington Post(USA)

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Chairman Department of Department of Political Prof. Dr. A.Z. Hilali Political Science, University Science, University Of 10 August 2016 Of Peshawar. Peshawar. Raheem UllahYousaf Senior Security Analyst and The News Bureau Office, 15 May 2016 Zai Journalist. Saddar Cant Peshawar. Sub Editor, The News, Rifat Ullah Peshawar 15 May 2016 Peshawar Assistant Professor Department of Political Department of Political Dr. Sami Raza Science, University Of 13 Sept2016 Science, University Of Peshawar. Peshawar. Senior Research Fellow Area Study Center, Zermina Baloch Area Study Center, 21August 2016 University of Peshawar. University of Peshawar. Professor Department of Department of Political Prof. Holli A. Semetko Political Science, University Science, University Of 17 July 2016 Of Peshawar. Peshawar. Assistant Professor Department of Political Department of Political Dr. Muhammd Zubair Science University of 17 September 2017 Science, Emory University, Peshawar Atlanta, GA, USA (Late) Prof. Dr. Senior Instructor in PITE, PITE, Peshawar. 19 April 2016 Muhammad Bilal Peshawar. Ex-Ambassador of Sri Ambassador Emory University, Atlanta, Lanka & Deputy High 19 October 2017 Creekmore GA, USA. Commissioner to India