COMBATING IN : POST 9/11 - A NEOCLASSICAL REALIST PERSPECTIVE PhD DISSERTATION

This Dissertation is submitted to National Defence University, Islamabad in partial fulfillment for the degree of PhD in International Relations By ARSHAD MAHMOOD NDU-IR/PhD-13/S-023

Supervisor PROF. DR. SHAHEEN AKHTAR

Department of International Relations Faculty of Contemporary Studies National Defence University, Islamabad Pakistan, 2019

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Student’s Declaration

This is to certify that this dissertation titled “Combating Terrorism in Pakistan: Post 9/11 – A Neoclassical Realist Perspective” submitted by the undersigned is accepted in its present form by Department of International Relations, National Defence University, Islamabad, Pakistan. It is based on my own research work and has not been submitted to any other institution for any other degree.

______Dec 2019 Arshad Mahmood

i Certificate of Completion

It is hereby recommended that the dissertation submitted by Arshad Mahmood titled “Combating Terrorism in Pakistan: Post 9/11 – A Neoclassical Realist Perspective” has been accepted in the partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of PhD in the discipline of International Relations.

______Supervisor

ii Dedication

I dedicate my work to those Pakistanis who laid their lives for the greater cause of fighting the menace of terrorism and confronting the obscurantist mindset, considered as an obstacle in the way of progressive and prosperous Pakistan.

Table of Contents Ser Subject Page No 1. Introduction 1 Statement of the Problem 8 Objective of the Study 8 Significance of the Study 9 Theoretical Framework 9 Literature Review 13 The Research Design and Methodology 25 Scope and Limitations 26 Organization of the Study 27 2. Chapter 1 - Theoretical Framework 28 1.1 Defining Neoclassical Realism 28 1.2 Understanding Counterterrorism in Pakistan through Assumptions 34 of Neoclassical Realism 3. Chapter 2 – Terrorism and Counterterrorism in Pakistan: An 46 Evolutionary Overview 2.1 Terrorism as Global Phenomenon – Perspectives on its Existence 48 2.2 Causes of Extremism and Terrorism in Pakistan 56 2.3 Evolution of Post 9/11 Pakistan’s CT Strategy 59 4. Chapter 3 – Systemic Forces and Pakistan’s Counterterrorism 72 Strategy 3.1 Evolution of Security Dominated Asymmetric US-Pakistan 73 Relations 3.2 9/11 – A Strategic Challenge to Pakistan’s National Security 77 3.3 Lack of Trust in Event Driven US – Pakistan Relations 82 3.4 US and Strategic Stability in South Asia 89 3.5 The Impact of Systemic Forces: A Neoclassical Realist Explanation 91 5. Chapter 4 – Regional Level Dynamics in Pakistan’s Counterterrorism 94 Responses 4.1 Indian Factor and Pakistan’s CT Policy 94 4.2 Factor and Pakistan’s CT Policy 107 4.3 The Relevance of Neoclassical Realism 118 6. Chapter 5 – Impact of Domestic Variables in Shaping Pakistan’s CT 120 Policy 5.1 Ideological Moorings 120 5.2 Psyche of Leadership 125 5.3 Domestic Sentiment – Internal Polarization 129 5.4 Capacity Issues of Civilian Security/ Law Enforcing Institutions 131 5.5 Counterterrorism State Structures: Administrative and Judicial 132 5.6 Interplay of Domestic with the Regional and Systemic Factors 134 7. Chapter 6 – A Framework for Combating Terrorism in Pakistan 140 6.1 An Appraisal of Systemic Realities and Domestic Constraints 140 6.2 Weaknesses in the Existing CT Strategy of Pakistan 144 6.3 Lessons Derived from Selected CT Case Studies 148

iv Ser Subject Page No 6.4 Policy Recommendations 151 6.4.1 Systemic Dimension of CT Strategy 152 6.4.2 Regional Strand of CT Strategy 153 6.4.3 Domestic Reforms to Augment CT Strategy 155 6.4.3.1 Address Cognitive Variables 155 6.4.3.2 Structural Reforms 158 6.4.3.3 Constitutional and Judicial Reforms 162 8. Findings and Recommendations 165 9. Conclusion 171 10. Bibliography 178

v Acknowledgement

I am grateful to Allah almighty for bestowing upon me his blessings and enabling me to complete this task which was onerous in its kind. It was revealing to evaluate foreign policy of Pakistan, characteristics of its domestic institutions and structures, while comparing these with regional constraints and systemic forces.

I extend my gratitude to National Defence University management and the Department of International Relations for overall facilitation. I acknowledge with immense pleasure and reverence, the professional approach and total grasp of the subject exhibited by my worthy supervisor, Dr Shaheen Akhtar. Without her timely and candid suggestions and proficient scrutiny, I would not have been able to complete this assignment.

I would also acknowledge cooperation of National Defence University library staff. It may not be fair if I forget my office staff that rendered invaluable help in formatting of draft.

______Dec 2019 Arshad Mahmood

vi Abstract

The study explores dynamics of Pakistan’s Counter Terrorism (CT) strategy since 9/11 from a neoclassical realist perspective. It argues that Pakistan’s strained regional security milieu, weak civilian law enforcing and CT coordination agencies, coupled with asymmetric relationship with the US, have been shaping Pakistan’s CT policy since 9/11. Terrorist attack on mainland USA on 9/11, 2001, triggered a paradigm shift in the landscape of international and regional security having impact on Pakistan’s polity and national security. South Asia, particularly Afghanistan and Pakistan figured out prominently in the US national security objectives. US succeeded to garner international coalition and brought about tremendous pressure on Pakistan to support US against Al-Qaida and regime in Afghanistan. India seized the strategic opportunity by not only aligning with the US counter terrorism strategy in the region but offering military bases as well. This strategic move by India precipitated Pakistan’s security dilemma with two front threat scenario.

US- Pakistan divergence over prosecution of war on terror impacted a comprehensive response against this menace of global, regional and domestic security. India by capitalized on anti- Pakistan international sentiment strengthened its position in Kashmir and attempted to lump freedom struggle with terrorism. Internal religious-political polarization in Pakistan, psyche of ruling elite and capacity constraints of civilian law enforcement, CT coordination agencies and prosecution and judicial institutions complicated the effective fight against terrorism at home. The external support to domestic terrorist entities destabilized Pakistan and paved way for horrific APS carnage in December 2014. However, the event acted as a catalyst in uniting Pakistani nation and vowing to eliminate this scourge comprehensively. By 2018, Pakistan military with national support succeed in defeating terrorist groups and purged FATA of all terrorist entities. However, non-kinetic aspects of National Action Plan (NAP) merit enforcement in true letter and spirit. The study too, provides a comprehensive framework for combating terrorism in Pakistan.

Key words: war on terror, terrorism, extremism, internal polarization, CT strategy, regional approach and systemic pressures.

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List of Abbreviations

ANP Awami National Party ANSF Afghan National Security Forces APHC All Parties Hurriet Conference APS Army Public School AQ Al Qaida AQIS Al Qaida in Indian Subcontinent ASWJ Ahle Sunnat Wal Jamat BMD Ballistic Missile Defence CA Constituent Assembly CENTO Central Treaty Organization CF Coalition Forces CGS Chief of General Staff CIA Central Intelligence Agency C-in-c Commander-in-Chief CMD Credible Minimum Deterrence CPEC China Pakistan Economic Corridor CSD Cold Start Doctrine CSF Coalition Support Found CTD Counter Terrorism Department ERF Extra Regional Forces EU European Union FATA Federally Administered Tribal Area FC Frontier Corps (under military) and Frontier Constabulary (under provincial Police) FSD Full Spectrum Deterrence FSF Federal Security Force GB Gilgit Baltistan GoP GWOT Global War on Terror HQN

viii HuM Hizb-ul- or Harkat-ul- Mujahideen IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency IFIs International Financial Institutions IMF International Monetary Fund IMU Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan IoK Indian Occupied Kashmir ISAF International Stabilization Assistance Force ISI Inter Services Intelligence (Pakistan’s Military Intelligence Service) ISIL in Iraq and Levant ISIS Islamic State in Iraq and Syria the Arabic acronym is Daesh IS-K Islamic State Khurasan JA Jamat-ul-Ahrar JeM Jaish-e-Muhammad JI Jamat-e-Islami JuD Jamat-ud-Dawah JUI (F) Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam (Fazlur Rehman) KPK Khyber Pakhtunkhwa KSA Kingdom of Saudi Arabia LEAs Law Enforcing Agencies LeJ Lashkar-e-Jhangvi LeT Lashkar-e-Tayaba LoC Line of Control MAK Maktab Al Khidmat ME Middle East MFN Most Favoured Nation MIRVs Multiple Independent Re-entry Vehicles MMA Mutahidda Majlis-e-Amal MNNA Major Non NATO Ally MQM Muhajir or Mutahidda Qaumi Movement MTCR Missile Technology Control Regime MWM Maslis Wahdat-ul-Muslimeen

ix NACTA National Counter Terrorism Authority NAP National Action Plan NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization NDS National Directorate of Security (Afghan Intelligence) NIEs National Intelligence Estimates NISP National Internal Security Policy NLI Northern Light Infantry NPT Nuclear Non Proliferation NRO National Reconciliation Ordinance NS Northern Scouts NSG Nuclear Supplier Group NWFP North Western Frontier Province (old name of KPK) OBL QCG Quadrilateral Coordination Group OIC Organization of Islamic Conference PAOs Proactive Operations PLO Palestinian Liberation Organization PML Pakistan Muslim League PoPA Protection of Pakistan Act PoW Prisoner of War PPP Pakistan’s People Party QST Taliban RAW Research and Analysis Wing (Indian Intelligence Agency) RuF (Operation) Radd-ul-Fasad SAARC South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation SEATO South East Asian Treaty Organization SSP Sipah-e-Sihaba Pakistan ST Sunni Tehrik TNFJ Tehrik-e-Nifaz-e-Fiqah Jafaria TNSM Tehrik Nifaz-e-Shariat-e-Muhammadi TNWS Tactical Nuclear Weapons

x TTP Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan UAE United Arab Emirate UK United Kingdom UN United Nations UNSC United Nations Security Council UNSG United Nations Security General USA United State of America WOT War on Terror ZeB (Operation) Zarb-e- Azb

xi Introduction 9/11, 2001, the terrorist attack on twin towers not only challenged the super power but worked as a catalyst for the US to command international support against Al-Qaida. It also directed US national security priorities. In addition to Middle East, Afghanistan emerged as prime area of US strategic interest. The international community including Russia and China also sympathised with the US on the eve of horrific act of terrorism. President Bush and his administration declared unequivocally that the perpetrators would be hunted down and the US would make no distinction between perpetrators and the harbourers of the terrorist network. Taliban government in Afghanistan refused to hand over suspected mastermind of terrorist attacks- Osama Bin Laden (OBL) to the US. Owing to geography and movement of Al-Qaida leadership between Afghan bordering regions and Pakistani side of Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), role of Pakistan appeared as critical part of US strategy to oust Taliban regime and eliminate Al-Qaida core leadership hiding in Afghanistan- Pakistan region. President Musharraf was rather dictated to cooperate on US terms which were ‘non- negotiable’. Pakistan’s arch rival India, capitalized on the opportunity and offered full support to the US war on terror including military bases in case Pakistan declined to offer. Musharraf’s volte-face in 2002 against mujahideen of Afghan war was taken as strategic betrayal by the extremist groups internally and Afghan Taliban. For initial years of cooperation with the US (till 2004) the uneasy calm prevailed before formation of domestic terrorist organisation Tehrik-e- Taliban Pakistan (TTP) in 2007. The red military operation in Islamabad (2007) to evict religious zealots challenging writ of the government and resultant casualties accelerated the momentum in TTP’s terrorist activities inside Pakistan. US started to express her dismay over Pakistani cooperation and the mistrust between two countries grew up at a rapid pace after 2007.The allegations of ‘double cross’ by Pakistani security and intelligence agencies echoed in the US power corridors. The US print media too, published specific incidents, ostensibly gathering information from selective leaks with patronage of US intelligence1. Year 2011 was the worst period in Pakistan-US relations

1 “The Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) is the “deep state in Pakistan tasked with the overarching remit to ensure that Pakistan remains a security state.” The Uncertain Role by the ISI, Pakistan: Violence vs. Stability A National Net Assessment by Anthony H. Cordesman Arleigh, A. Burke chair in strategy and Varun Vira Centre for Strategic and International Studies, online available at https://csis-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs- public/legacy_files/files/publication/110607_Stabilizing_Pakistan.pdf (accessed on 7 may 2019). Also see David Ignatius, From Pakistan’s ISI, an act of folly, Washington Post, 22 September 2011, online available at https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/post-partisan/post/from-pakistans-isi-a-covert-act-of-war-

1 and CT cooperation remained suspended for many months due to Raymond Davis saga, attack on OBL compound and US air strikes on Pakistani border post with Afghanistan. Pakistan as a country had to face the US wrath for alleged terrorist sanctuaries on its soil and militancy of unprecedented magnitude by Al-Qaida and TTP affiliated groups. Pakistan Military/ISI, civilian law enforcing agencies and general public had to bear the major brunt. Pakistan military was specifically branded as “infidels” for maximum religious hatred of Deobandi/Wahhabi jihadists2. Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ) emerged as the veritable arm of Al- Qaida and TTP in province and other parts of Pakistan3. TTP and its affiliates were sponsored by foreign intelligence- Indian and Afghan intelligence services. The cumulative effect magnified Pakistan’s internal threat spectrum to alarming levels and Zardari government then sanctioned military operation in Swat and South during 2009/104. Then Army Chief, General Kiyani was given a free hand to plan and execute military operations in terror - stricken regions of the country. Assault on Karachi Air Port in June 2014 was a massive challenge to the security of strategic assets, triggering immediate response from the Government of Pakistan. Pakistani Military launched Operation Zarb-e- Azb in June 2014 against TTP factions in North Waziristan and Khyber Agencies of FATA. The horrific massacre of 140 children in Army Public School (APS) Peshawar on 16 December 2014 shook the nation’s conscience and there emerged a national consensus to take on terrorism in a comprehensive manner through an all-encompassing National Action Plan (NAP) or a de-facto CT strategy of Pakistan. Since 2015, the operation was pursued with full vigour and the terror infrastructure was dismantled from FATA. Pakistan Military clinched the victory but at the huge cost of loss of precious lives. Pakistan’s effort was partially acknowledged by the US nevertheless. While viewing the current spate of terrorism in the context of past trends, it might be established that till mid-seventies Pakistan remained a moderate and progressive Muslim state, it was only after 1979 Iranian revolution and Soviet invasion of Afghanistan which exported sectarian extremism and terrorism in this region. Obvious sectarian differences and-folly/2011/09/22/gIQAWSbZoK_blog.html?noredirect=on&utm_term=.7b8ebd354586 (accessed on 6 May 2017. 2 Fazlur Rahman, Revival and Reform in Islam (Oxford: One world Publications, 2006), p.5. 3 Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP) was raised in 1984 in response to Tehrik–e– Nifaz-e– Fiqah Jafria (TNFJ), which was raised in 1979 after Iranian Revolution. General Zia is blamed for promoting sectarianism, especially Deobandi School of thoughts. With addition of Al Qaeda in Pakistan– Afghan region, Salafi or Wahhabi philosophy has also penetrated in this region and among sectarian / militant organizations, (quoted by Zimmermann, pp.185-190). 4 Rahman, Revival and Reform in Islam, p.5.

2 between Iran and kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) triggered sectarian rivalry. Secondly, Sunni global was unleashed against Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, and Pakistan became a fortress of global holy war. Thus, laying the foundation stone of extremism and terrorism in the county for years to come. General Zia-ul-Haq, after overthrowing Bhutto, took religion seriously and was convinced that only religious minded soldiers and professionals in any field could deliver5. He moulded his military hierarchy accordingly and a wave of institutional Islamization swept across Pakistan military during his rule from 1977 to 1988. Protection of Pakistan’s Islamic ideology was as important as security of geographical boundaries of the country6. Mushrooming of Madrassas (seminaries) with the support of CIA and Saudi money was witnessed in Pakistan and the country played a pivotal role in securing victory for the US during Afghan jihad against Soviet Union. However, the seeds of extremism sowed in 1979 presented bitter reality of myopic national security strategy pursued by then Zia’s regime in Pakistan7. Subsequent elected governments of Benazir Bhutto and from 1988 to 1999 did little to modify the foreign policy with India and Afghanistan. The response from other side was also less than desired. Due to improvised explosive devices being blasted allegedly in concert with Indian and former Soviet Union’s intelligence in 1980s, especially in former frontier province of Pakistan and other major cities, Pakistan had to concentrate on internal security concerns rather than resetting foreign policy priorities with neighbouring India and Afghanistan. US pulled out of Afghanistan in 1991 and the regional menace of extremism and terrorism transformed into various terrorist entities with the passage of time. Initially, Al-Qaida filled the vacuum and after 9/11 Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) encroached Al-Qaida’s space in Afghanistan. TTP also found ISIS as new ideological and financial mentor other than Al-Qaida. Since 2015, National Action Plan (NAP) is CT strategy in vogue, to be implemented under oversight of Ministry of Interior. The perils of backlash and anticipated sacrifices by all were not difficult to discern after assassination of Punjab Home Minister in 20158. The perception of Indo-Afghan intelligence sponsoring TTP and the US intelligence- CIA looking

5 Stephen Philip Cohen, The Idea of Pakistan (Washington: Brooking Institution Press, 2004), p. 84. 6 Ibid., P.85. 7 Sreedhar,ed., Pakistan After 9/11 (New Delhi: Manas Publications, 2003), pp. 179 - 180. 8 Dawn Islamabad, 17 August 2015. “Punjab home minister Colonel (retired) Shuja Khanzada was killed in a in his political office in Shadi Khan village, Attock, (85 kilometres west of Islamabad), along with 16 others”. After elimination of chief of Lashkar-e- Jhangvi, Malik Ishaque along with his son and brothers, the terrorists retaliated and killed Mr Khanzada- The minister was responsible for raising and looking after the counter terrorism department of Punjab Police.

3 the other way being much stronger in Pakistan9. Role of the US too, as independent variable, forcing Pakistan to adopt pro-US CT policy, figured out prominently especially after 9/11. US policies and role as an honest broker of peace in South Asian region were viewed with scepticism in Pakistan and other regional countries like Iran and China. The political rhetoric and intimidation through military and economic tools by the US only alienated saner voices in Pakistan. It is in this context that the study explores post 9/11 role of the US. The pressure was exerted on Pakistan by the US to adopt a CT strategy which should supplement US strategic objectives in Afghanistan irrespective of backlash on domestic front in Pakistan. The domestic sentiment and popular opinion was against the US intervention in Afghanistan. Pakistan’s role of supporting the US and abandoning the Afghan Taliban was viewed negatively in the neighbouring Afghanistan. US demanded review of Pakistan’s policy towards Kashmir cause, a sensitive matter in Pakistan and no government could imagine withdrawing or revisiting the policy of political, moral and diplomatic support to Kashmir cause. General Musharraf’s policy of keeping Kashmir issue on the back burner was resented by large segment of Pakistani population. There occurred a spiral in extremism and terrorism allegedly sponsored by Indo-Afghan intelligence agencies. It caused loss of thousands of lives of common Pakistanis and security forces. Hostility along Line of Control and unprovoked Indian shelling causing civilian casualties and killing military personnel further aggravated Pakistan’s security situation on the eastern border. Pakistan’s foreign policy choices with India and Afghanistan and relations with the US were impacted by the security dilemma. Hostile Afghanistan added into Pakistan’s security predicament especially in the form of millions of Afghan refugees that spilled over due to Afghan conflict in adjoining region of former FATA and Balochistan. Afghan soil being used by anti- Pakistan terrorist entities with Afghan security institutions facilitating terror financing and training to these terrorist groups including TTP, became serious challenges in addressing trust deficit and jointly fighting the menace of regional terrorism.

9 Pakistan handed over dossiers containing evidence of Indian involvement in Balochistan, Karachi and FATA, to the UN and USA. Arrest of senior RAW operative, a serving officer of Indian Navy, believed to be a regional coordinator and placed at Chahbahar port of Iran, further reinforced the perception of Indian involvement in destabilization of Pakistan. US and Indian desire of defeating regional terrorism leaves many questions about the desire and actions, after arrest of Kalbhushan Yadev from Balochistan province of Pakistan on 30 March 2016. “Former Adviser to Prime Minister on National Security and Foreign Affairs, Sartaj Aziz, said on 12 September 2015 that India’s role in promoting terrorism in Pakistan is not a secret anymore”, quoted in Dawn Islamabad, 12 September 2015.

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In post 9/11 scenario, the mujahideen of yester years being declared as “forces of evil” and legitimate target of US forces to be eliminated at all costs was another challenge for Afghanistan and Pakistan. The unprecedented US pressure on Pakistan was capitalized by India to pressure Pakistan and alter the whole South Asian security landscape in her favour with the US patronage. After Afghanistan, Pakistan became most affected country due to peculiar geography, ethno-religious affiliations and its role in Afghan jihad of 1980s. Its weak institutional capacity (civilian law enforcement and coordination agencies) was an impediment to raise robust state structures and institutions in line with modern democratic civilian governance best practices. Due to internal polarization, lack of a comprehensive CT strategy and national consensus to ensure across the board implementation of national action plan, had been serious constraints in Pakistan’s CT responses. Definition of Terms Terrorism Terrorism as a concept or term is contested and ambiguous in official and academic discourse. Academics, politicians, security experts and journalists use a variety of definitions while defining terrorism. Some definitions focus on the terrorist organizations’ mode of operation, others emphasize the motivations and characteristics of terrorism; the modus operandi of individual terrorists etcetera. The prevalent definitions of terrorism entail difficulties, “both conceptual and syntactical”. The Webster.com has given full as “the systematic use of terror especially as a means of coercion” 10. According to Oxford dictionary, “the unlawful use of violence and intimidation, especially against civilians, in the pursuit of political aims”11. The ambiguity in definition at times impacts legitimate freedom struggles being launched to seek inalienable right of self-determination and freedom to exercise ones free will. For example freedom struggle by Palestinian and Kashmiri population against state sponsored armed occupation are at times lumped with terrorism. It is thus a common perception that terms not opposed to basic values of liberal democracies such as

10 According to Webster.com the terrorism has been defined as the use of violent acts to frighten the people in an area as a way of trying to achieve a political goal. It is one of the definitions because there is no consensus definition in the international literature. Available at http://www.merriam- webster.com/dictionary/terrorism (accessed on 27 August 2016). 11 Definition of terrorism as per Oxford dictionary, online available at https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/terrorism (accessed on 7 May 2019).

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“revolutionary violence and national liberation” etcetera carry fewer negative connotations than the term, terrorism12. Terrorism is defined by the US State Department as “premeditated politically motivated violence perpetrated against non-combatants by sub national groups or clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an audience”13. Gibson stated that “political terrorism is a distinctive disorder of the modern world. It originated as a term and arguably, as practice less than two centuries ago, both organised and irregular warfare began with human race. Political terrorism emerged as a concept only in 179314. Robertson defined terrorism as a “political strategy whereby groups or individuals use violence against civilians or symbolic targets to persuade a government to change a specific policy.” He further quoted a former US Foreign Service diplomat Marc Nicholson who defined terrorism as “terrorists seek to wear down the voting majority until it is so sick of strife and uncertainty as to consent to a political solution by meeting the minority’s demands”15. Terrorism, according to Boaz Ganor, “is the source of the cliché, “one man’s terrorist is another man’s freedom fighter,” which stresses that much depends on understanding and international perspective of the one engaged with defining of terrorism16. The targets of terrorism are, sadly, civilians. Terrorism is thus distinguished from other types of political struggle and violence, waged to seek political rights. Terrorists exploit the relative vulnerability of the civilian underbelly and thrive on tremendous media coverage after perpetrating horrendous acts of terrorism, by killing innocent civilians, with no regard to caste, creed and colour. Operational Definition Understandably there is no consensus definition of terrorism due to political, socio- psychological and ideological sensitivities. While evaluating primary data by Government of Pakistan and certain authentic reports by the US State Department, I have selected an operational definition for this research work. The selected definition reads; “the unlawful use of violence and intimidation against civilians, security personnel and installations by non-

12 Boaz Gonar, “Defining Terrorism: Is one Man’s Terrorist another Man’s Freedom Fighter”? On line available at https://www.ict.org.il/Article/1123/Defining-Terrorism-Is-One-Mans-Terrorist-Another-Mans- Freedom-Fighter (accessed on 28 August 2016). 13 Yonah Alexander, Combating Terrorism Strategies of Ten Countries (New Delhi: Manas Publications, 2003), p.25. 14 John D. Elliott and Leclie k. Gibson eds., Contemporary Terrorism Selected Readings (Maryland: Printed in USA, 1978), p.12. 15 Anne E. Robertson, Terrorism and Global Security (New Delhi: Viva Books Private Limited, 2010), p.5 16 Gonar, “Defining Terrorism: Is one Man’s Terrorist another Man’s Freedom Fighter”?

6 state actors, in the pursuit of political and ideological objectives”. War on Terrorism War on terrorism is a contested phrase and is interpreted in many ways in different countries due to political reasons. The US campaign to hunt down perpetrators of 9/11 was unleashed under the slogan of global war on terror. It was mainly fought and remained confined to Middle East, selected regions of Africa and Afghanistan. The war had consequences for affected regions and countries, and Pakistan was most affected country after Afghanistan due to geographical proximity. Britannic.com defined war on terror as “term used to describe the American-led global counterterrorism campaign launched in response to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 200117. It is not only terrorist groups who target civilian population, at time states too, fabricate intelligence to settle their political scores. While subscribing to the notion of nations’ fabricating evidence to punish opponents, Ian Henshall, The New Evidence (2007)18 narrated certain incidents which are viewed with suspicion in US history of initiating war with other nations. He included incidents like US vessel attacked by Vietnam for starting war in Vietnam, similar dispute over Pearl harbour dragging US into World War II, the Iran- Contra scandal in 1980s and the terrorist attack of 9/11. All are viewed as top secret incidents manipulated by CIA and president’s top aides19. The argument of powerful nations using terrorism as an instrument for regime change and accomplishment of political objectives against targeted countries could be substantiated by citing few examples in recent history. One example is use of force against Iraq on the pretext of presence of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMDs) which later proved to be a fake intelligence to facilitate military action by the US20. The other case in point is India managing to get freedom struggle in Jammu and Kashmir declared as foreign sponsored terrorism after

17 Richard Jackson, “War on Terrorism United States History”, online available at https://www.britannica.com/topic/war-on-terrorism (accessed on 5 May 2019). 18 Ian Henshall, The New Evidence The original best seller, fully updated and revised with startling new facts (London: Constable and Robinson Ltd, 2007), pp.22-23. 19 Ibid. 20 Farid Zakaria, “Iraq War was a Terrible Mistake”, online available at http://edition.cnn.com/2015/10/26/opinions/ zakaria-iraq-war-lessons/index.html (accessed on 23 December 2017). “The United States replaced the regime in Iraq and gave the new one massive assistance for a decade. The result? Chaos and humanitarian tragedy.” Iraq war was illegal and breached UN charter says Annan, on line available at https://www.theguardian.com/world/2004/sep/16/iraq.iraq (accessed on 7 September 2016). “The United Nations secretary general, Kofi Annan, declared explicitly for the first time that the US-led war on Iraq was illegal. Mr. Annan said that the invasion was not sanctioned by the UN Security Council or in accordance with the UN's founding charter. 7

9/11 with the US backing21. Similarly, post 9/11 US attack on Afghanistan generally accepted under article 51 of the UN charter, right of self-defence but otherwise not sanctioned by the UN22. Though, US succeeded to garner sufficient international support from major EU countries, Russia and China for endorsing her offensive against Afghanistan. Counterterrorism and Anti-Terrorism It is important to distinguish between anti-terrorism and counter terrorism campaigns, strategies and measures. Both the terms are used without much difference as far as their connotation is concerned. They have definite meaning and the actions under each category merit different planning and execution mechanism. Mockaitis defined both the terms: “counter terrorism includes a broad spectrum of responses from conventional war against states that harbour terrorists to enforcement of actions against domestic terrorists within the country”. Whereas, anti-terrorism is largely passive and consequence management. It is mainly reactive whereas counterterrorism is decidedly proactive”23. Statement of the Problem The event of 9/11 unleashed US global war on terror which immensely impacted Pakistan's national security policy forcing paradigm shift in counter terrorism (CT) strategy of the country. Hostile regional milieu and divergence in elite perception over strategy to counter extremism and terrorism, capacity constraints of civilian law enforcing and CT coordination agencies were major weaknesses in Pakistan’s CT responses. Within this context, the study examines three strands of Pakistan’s CT policy and attempts to suggest a framework to combat extremism and terrorism in Pakistan. Objective of the Study The objective of the study is to evaluate effects of systemic pressures on Pakistan, especially by the US in fighting international and domestic terrorism, analyse hostile regional environment causing internal de-stabilization of Pakistan and influencing Islamabad’s CT responses and to examine domestic components of CT strategy – perception of ruling elite, internal polarization, weak capacity of civilian Law enforcing and CT coordination agencies and prosecution and judicial institutions.

21 US Department of State, Bureau of Counterterrorism and Countering Country Reports on Terrorism 2015 Report. Online available at https://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2015/257523.htm (accessed on 22 December 2017). 22 Though war in Afghanistan was not UN sanctioned however, it is generally perceived as legitimate under article 51 of the UN Charter. Because US was able to muster sufficient international support for US attack on Afghanistan immediately after 9/11. 23 Thomas R. Mockaitis, The New Terrorism Myths and Realities (New Delhi: Pentagon Press, 2007), pp. 93-99.

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Significance of the Study This study offers three tier analysis of Pakistan's security policy and CT strategy in the post 9/11 backdrop which helps in clarifying many misperceptions about Pakistan's role in war against terror. The interplay between regional security environment and Pakistan's internal security constraints will help in course correction with regards to relations with its neighbours and adopting more creative CT measures. Additionally, analysis of Pakistan’s CT policy through the lens of neo-classical realism offers a comprehensive overview of the three- dimensional determinants of Pakistan’s CT policy and the relevant findings may serve as useful policy inputs for more effective CT strategy to the practitioners and academics. Hypothesis Pakistan's hostile regional security milieu and weak civilian law enforcing and CT coordination agencies amidst domestic polarization, coupled with asymmetric relationship with the US have been shaping Pakistan’s CT policy since 9/11. Variables Independent Variable: Asymmetric relationship with the US. Dependent Variable: Counterterrorism policy of Pakistan since 9/11. Intervening variables: Pakistan’s regional security environment and constraining capacity of law enforcing and CT coordination agencies amidst domestic polarization. Research Questions 1. What is the effect of asymmetric Pakistan-US equation on Islamabad’s CT Policy? 2. Why Pakistan’s regional security environment affect the design of its CT policy? 3. How weak capacity of Pakistan’s civilian institutions responsible to enforce law and coordinate national CT effort under internal polarization impacted its CT response? 4. How neoclassical realism helps in understanding Pakistan’s counterterrorism policy since 9/11? Theoretical Framework Neoclassical Realism Neoclassical realism serves the basis of theoretical framework of the study. This framework affords three levels of analysis i.e. systemic level; asymmetric relations with the US, and the US pressure guiding or forcing a particular approach to fight terrorism in the country and facilitating US war on terror in Afghanistan. Regional level; relations with two regional countries- India and Afghanistan and extent of their interference in fuelling extremism and terrorism in Pakistan. At domestic level, the state institutions especially civilian law

9 enforcing agencies and judicial structures dispensing justice to terrorists brought before courts and leadership crafting national CT responses are the areas of emphasis. While core fundamentals of realism i.e. statism, self-help and survival are universally applicable and shape the foreign policy approach of any country yet, these were perceptibly being denied to the state of Pakistan under regional threats and systemic pressures. The latest and progressive version of realism - neoclassical realism seems more plausible to incorporate the three levels of analysis. Neoclassical realism introduced by Gideon Rose in 1998 not only covers external or systemic pressure influencing states’ behaviour and relations with other countries, but it effectively encompasses regional nuances and domestic characteristics of the states’ institutions and internal security structures, thought to be critical in fighting terrorism24. Neoclassical realism embraces the domestic policies and behaviour of the masses in formulation of foreign policy, being combination of classical realism and neorealism, particularly Waltz explaining role of international structures, domestic players and ensuring a balance of power in the region25. Being outgrowth of neorealism, neoclassical realism explained that states were affected with international structures colliding and creating security challenges in various regions. The intentions and perceptions of any country could change when national interests are challenged and countries realign to their national interests. At the same time, neoclassical realism poses question why states under same international pressure behave in a different manner? The conceptual paradigm offered a search to queries as to why systemic pressures influence the state policies concomitantly internal behaviour of the state, its masses and ideational power to accommodate people’s perception about particular issue pertaining to each nation while formulating foreign policy guidelines. It is because of the fact that each nation has its own national security priorities and domestic pressures while reacting to every crisis. Pakistan’s response to 9/11 attacks on the US was an unpopular decision at home yet it served Pakistan’s national security interests. Besides, international structures and competition, there is yet another important dimension that is competition in soft power – ideological issues, relations with business

24 Nicholas Kitchen, “Systemic Pressures and Domestic Ideas: A Neoclassical Realist Model of Grand Strategy Formation”, Review of international studies, 36 (1). pp. 117-143. ISSN 0260-2105, DOI: 10.1017/S0260210509990532, © 2010 British Institute of International and Comparative Law. This version available at: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/27670/ (accessed on 7 February 2015). 25 Waltz explained the international and domestic structures within context of balance of power and asserting that nations often use force to ensure a balance of power in a particular region. Kenneth N Waltz, Theory of International Politics (California: Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, 1979), pp.104-106.

10 community, cultural and academic exchanges and the image projection. This issue is close to social constructivism and liberalism because constructed images and precedence of domestic factors over systemic ones, place neoclassical realism as a midpoint between the other two paradigms. Thus, this overlap affords flexibility of incorporating approaches which may be affiliated with liberalism or constructivism- especially society, norms, values, culture, power of knowledge and opinion moulding with narratives etcetera. Operationalization of theory and various variables impacting Pakistan’s CT responses amidst systemic pressures, regional compulsions and domestic constraints offer certain leads with regards to relations with the US, regional countries and domestic sentiment. The cognitive variables had been at their play most effectively wherein international media had been blaming Pakistan Military/ ISI for fomenting unrest in other countries and creating perceptions which had been undermining Pakistan’s supreme sacrifices in war on terror and role in regional stability. The current bellicosity by India on Line of Control (LoC) and crackdown on Kashmiris was a testimony to the fact that it was pure power politics pursued by the regional power India. Even after handing over of dossiers to the UN and the US, the international community remained quiet on Indian interference into internal affairs of a sovereign member of the UN- Pakistan. While Pakistan was to abide by the obligations of UNSC Resolutions 1267, 1373 and 1540 on host of issues related to international terrorism. Sabre - rattling by India against Pakistan looked a finer blend of systemic pressures exerted on Pakistan to deliver favouring US strategic interests in the region that indirectly were to benefit its strategic ally- India. Despites veiled promises nothing in concrete was offered to Pakistan, thus consuming its meagre resources. Discrimination at systemic level against Pakistan continues on other fronts as well. For example, in strategic domain that disturbed strategic balance in South Asia. It emboldened bigger regional player -India to browbeat its relatively smaller neighbours. Another serious issue was related to Indo-US framework for strategic and defence cooperation and US support to India for entry into Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) cartel despite being non-signatory to Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). US lobbied specific waiver for India and facilitated her induction into NSG and other export control and technology transfer regimes like Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). Hectic lobbying was under way to ensure Indian accession to NSG at the earliest26. Whereas,

26 India made a desperate effort to get NSG full membership in NSG Plenary in June 2016 but failed due to opposition from China and few other counties which insisted on signing of NPT first as a prerequisite to NSG. US not letting go of India's NSG membership on line available at

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Pakistan was being denied similar treatment by the US, and NSG member states on one pretext or the other. AT systemic level other leverages like manipulation through international financial institutions had been actualized to extract concession from Pakistan, on end game in Afghanistan and relations with India. At regional level, a regional power -India is deeply entrenched inside Afghanistan under the garb of reconstruction and is complicating Pakistan’s CT efforts. The Indo-Afghan hostility has not only destabilized Pakistan internally but impacted the fight against regional terrorism as well. Indian threat of aggression after Pulwama terrorist attacks in Indian occupied Kashmir on 14 February 2019 is a stark reality of regional factors transforming into systemic domain and satisfying certain Indian domestic sentiments as well. Especially true, in case of Modi government, entering into elections and playing Pakistan card. Blatant violation of human rights and blinding and maiming of Kashmiri youth by Indian occupation forces is not getting due attention of UN agencies and the major international players. Thus national and strategic interests are guiding the interstate relations in case of Kashmir issue. Whereas, Pakistan is expected to remain absolutely neutral disregarding its legitimate concerns about Kashmiris whose relatives and kith and kin reside on Pakistani side of LoC. A demand far from reality of Kashmir being integral to Pakistan’s security and the neoclassical realism dictates of states’ right to defend itself and ensure its viability to exist. In case of Afghanistan, the situation is no different. Pakistan’s concerns over foreign interference into its internal affairs are shrugged off and on the contrary the country is expected to help facilitate reconciliation in Afghanistan with little regard to Pakistan’s regional security interests. Internal dynamics and characteristic of the state institutions especially civilian law enforcing agencies and judiciary could not cope with the magnitude of challenge by the terrorism entities. The civilian security institutions like police and paramilitary forces suffered heavy losses and were ill- trained to fight hardened terrorists. Terrorist forces and their proxies at home intimidated the witnesses and threatened investigation officers and judges thus impeded the dispensation of criminal justice system in the country. Interference by India and Afghanistan further complicated Pakistan’s CT operations. Terrorist http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/us-not-letting-go-of-indias-nsg- membership/articleshow/53002395.cms (accessed on 6 September 2016). "India has a strong record and we believe deserves to be included in the NSG, US State Department spokesman John Kirby said in a media briefing on 1 June 2016”. Online available at : http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/articleshow/53002395.cms?utm_source=contentofinterest&utm_medium= text&utm_campaign=cppst. Since no member of MTCR objected to Indian accession into regime, therefore, India was granted membership of MTCR unopposed on 27 June 2016. India joins Missile Technology Control Regime, The Hindu, 27 June 2016.

12 organisations like TTP are hiding at Afghan soil and attacking Pakistani security forces with impunity. The US forces and intelligence too is seemingly either complicit or ignorant of anti-Pakistan activities. Under such paradoxes of policies by the US, India and Afghanistan, Pakistan domestic sentiment and CT policies are seriously handicapped. The capacity issues of law enforcing and coordinating agencies notwithstanding, the nexus of systemic and regional factors magnifying security dilemma for the country is undermining Pakistan’s domestic efforts towards fighting terrorism. Literature Review Most of the literature focusing on terrorism and counterterrorism in the post 9/11 period is US war on global terrorism, fighting Al-Qaida and its affiliates. There is also substantive body of literature on counter terrorism from the Pakistani perspective covering ideological, geopolitical, economic and sectarian dimensions. The existing literature has been reviewed in three broader categories. First: genesis of extremism and terrorism in Pakistan along with evolution of its CT strategy. Second: role of regional countries in compounding Pakistan’s security dilemma thus impacting its CT strategy. Third: post 9/11 relations with the US in the context of fighting terrorism and divergence over CT strategy to fight regional terrorism and restore peace in Afghanistan. The nature of relations with regional countries especially India and Afghanistan were specifically viewed from the perspective of security dilemma directly being caused by Indian hostility along LoC and indirect destabilization using Afghan soil and its security/intelligence agencies. Afghan security agencies are not only colluding with Indian intelligence but providing safe havens to terrorist organization- TTP as well which is responsible for hundreds of cross border attacks and death of thousands of Pakistani security personnel and civilians. For this beside secondary sources, reliance was made on visit to military and intelligence set ups and interviewing experts on the subject. The role of the US in creating a specific perception of Pakistan and security and intelligence agencies towards fighting terrorism in Afghan-Pakistan region, alleged sanctuaries of Afghan Taliban/Haqqanis at Pakistani soil and broader US-India strategic convergence over future of Afghanistan and South Asian security architecture figured out prominently during the review process. The existing literature on issue of terrorism in Pakistan has been reviewed which is in abundance. Mostly Western and Indian scholars have written books and research articles on Pakistan’s internal dynamics, perception of ruling elite and its institutional capacity or will to fight terrorism. A few Pakistani academics also highlighted peculiar national security paradigm and role of military in governance and foreign policy towards India and

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Afghanistan. There is no dearth of critique on Pakistan’s CT efforts, role of its military and intelligence agency in alleged support to regional terrorism especially in Afghanistan and Indian occupied Kashmir (IoK). Though western scholars do hint on US coercive diplomacy with regards to seeking CT cooperation from Pakistan and possible Indian involvement in destabilization of Pakistan yet, are cautious as compared to their comments on Pakistan. Indian scholars focus on terrorism in Kashmir and blame Pakistan and its military for all the trouble in the region including Afghanistan. Relevant books and research articles were consulted to understand the dynamics of extremism and terrorism in South Asia in general and Pakistan in particular. However, for in-depth analysis of the problem and drawing relevant conclusions, I relied on primary sources of information like government policy documents and various policy statements issued by the concerned Pakistani Government departments, dealing with the issue of extremism and terrorism. The constraints of non-availability of declassified documents notwithstanding, policy guidelines and papers by National Counterterrorism Authority (NACTA) were of immense value to understand and evaluate Pakistan’s domestic counterterrorism strategy. NACTA, being supra counterterrorism body in Pakistan not only interacts with all concerned government departments dealing with security and terrorism, but issues policy guidelines on extremism and terrorism causes and countermeasures, besides alerting all concerned on imminent threats of terrorism in the country. NACTA guidelines on various issues of counterterrorism strategy have specifically been consulted and added under primary sources in bibliography part of the thesis. National Internal Security Policy (NISP) 2014 is national policy framework on internal security and host of actions related to countering extremism and terrorism. NISP, while serving as framework guides various government departments to undertake certain actions in unison to combat terrorism and execute reforms with a view to fighting violent extremism. Guidelines issued by NACTA are in conformity with NISP and important ones include; counter terror financing to regulate NGOs and INGOs and raising of counterterror financing units in collaboration with other national institutions; national counter extremism policy guidelines to eliminate violent extremism in concert with 305 national stakeholders; national counterterrorism narrative required to be formulated under NISP 2014, to defeat terrorists’ ideology with counter ideological narrative; 20 points National Action Plan (NAP) spelling out almost executive orders for implementation of actions by various national departments and policy guidelines to be followed while planning and executing madrassa reform in Pakistan.

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In addition to NACTA specific actions and policy guidelines, certain anti-terrorism Laws were analysed to draw inferences and suggest policy recommendations under conclusion part of the thesis to make these laws further robust. Anti-terrorism Act 1997, Anti- terrorism At 1997 amended 2014, Protection of Pakistan Act 2014 - granting greater powers to arrest and prosecute terrorists expeditiously. Under this act admissibility of “E” evidence and confessional statement of the terror suspect recorded before an official of law enforcing agencies taken as legitimate confession were enacted. It was a major shift in Pakistan’s anti- terrorism laws. Prevention of Electronic Crimes Act 2016 was scrutinised with a view to analysing impact on counterterrorism strategy in general and effects on security of strategic installations. In addition, number of anti-terrorism laws enacted since independence of country were downloaded from NACTA website to contextualize the history and efficacy of anti- terrorism laws and efforts by successive Pakistani Governments in Pakistan. The quoted documents related to Pakistan’s counterterrorism policy have been cited in bibliography under primary sources. For analysis of relations with independent variable and most important actor in Afghanistan/South Asia especially after 9/11, the US, relevant documents were downloaded from US departments’ websites. For example US State Department document- Country Reports on Terrorism 2015, 2016 and 2017 were consulted to compare assessment and data on terrorism in Pakistan and the region; 9/11 Commission Report reflecting directly and indirectly nature of extremism and terrorism in Afghanistan, bordering region between Pakistan and Afghanistan and linkages with other South Asian countries; US National Strategies for Combating Terrorism, 2003 and 2006 and National Strategy for Counterterrorism of the United States of America 2018, and US National Security Strategy 2017 with direct implication for Pakistan and regional countries were of immense value to grasp US concerns, priorities in Afghanistan and expectations from role of regional countries especially Pakistan. The period signalling emergence of divergence between two countries over cooperation in fighting Al-Qaida and Afghan Taliban and other regional terrorist groups i.e. the US and Pakistan, in 2007 and onwards has been validated by quoting National Intelligence Estimates issues by the office of US Director National Intelligence in 2007. The peculiarities of Trump era have also been analysed by consulting US National Security Strategy 2017 and US National Strategy to Combat Terrorism 2018. Trumps’ tweet directly implication Pakistan for not doing enough in supporting US to fight terrorism in Afghanistan yet receiving aid worth billions of dollars from previous administrations since 9/11 was

15 instructive. Pakistan did play its role in bringing Taliban to negotiation table but abrupt cancellation of dialogue between the US and Afghan Taliban by President Trump in September 20019, was a setback to peaceful resolution of longstanding Afghan dispute. Relations between US and Pakistan seemingly improved due to facilitation in US- Afghan negotiations howver, sticking point by each country and a new regional challenge in shape of revocation of special status of Kashmir by Indian Government has overshadowed the US – Pakistan engagement over Afghan imbroglio. Relevant documents pertaining to US Departments have been cited in bibliography under primary sources. The author’s hands on experience in counterterrorism matters for a long time while serving under Ministry of Defence helped in understanding motives behind domestic terrorism, its linkage with regional and international terrorism. Number of former military/intelligence officials, bureaucrats and journalist/academics were interviewed in an informal manner to validate varying perspectives and arguments on the issue of terrorism found in secondary sources. Visit to various detention centres in official capacity was invaluable experience to gather empirical evidence to validate data and proving the hypothesis. The knowledge gained through observation method by visiting terrorist detention centres, helped in crosschecking the authenticity and deep interpretation of various phenomena and beliefs attached to terrorism. A brief account of literature on the subject is covered in ensuing paragraphs. Hafeez Malik in his work, Dilemma of National Security and Comparison in India and Pakistan (1993) covers broader canvas of South Asia and US strategic interests in the region (including period of two Pakistani civilian governments, of Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif)27. Hassan Abbas, Pakistan’s Drift into Extremism (2005)28 and Shuja Nawaz, Cross Swords (2008)29 concentrated on internal dynamics of Pakistan, civil-military relations and power struggle between civilian and military elite. Shuja Nawaz presented a detailed account about how Pakistan’s political leadership and military establishment had been squabbling over grabbing of share in the Power pie. Nawaz’s account also reinforces the perception that civilian leadership too, could not divorce itself from security establishment due to political expediencies30. Shuja Nawaz’s perspective on security establishment and internal power play

27 Hafeez Malik, Dilemma of National Security and Comparison in India and Pakistan (New York: St Martin’s Press Inc., 1993), pp.9-18. 28 Hassan Abbas, Pakistan’s Drift into Extremism Allah, the Army and Americas War on Terror (New Delhi: Pentagon Press, 2005), pp.26 -28. 29 Shuja Nawaz, Crossed Swords: Pakistan, its Army and the Wars within (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), p.95. 30 Ibid., pp.94-96.

16 carries credibility because he is brother of Asif Nawaz, former Pakistani Chief of Army Staff and possibly enjoyed the special privilege of having access to records, which would not have been accessible to any ordinary researcher31. Ahmed Faruqui, Rethinking the National Security of Pakistan; the Price of Strategic Myopia (2003)32 covered the aspects related to mainly national security issues of Pakistan and strategic myopia exhibited by the rulers during 1971, leading to break up of the country. Jonah Blank, on the Mainframe Islam and Modernity among the Daudi Bohras (2001)33 exclusively focused on Musharraf’s rule and typically reflected western viewpoint on many faces of Musharraf, for betraying the USA, and covertly working with coalition of religious parties, known as Mutahida Majlis – e – Amal (MMA), especially Maulana Fazal – ur- Rehman. Deepa M. Ollapally, The Politics of Extremism in South Asia (2008) termed all post 9/11 actions by Musharraf Government; banning former jihadi outfits as more of an eye wash34. Musharraf – MMA alliance was viewed by western critics to scare the US and the West with extremists’ take over, especially nuclear assets. The narrative which is far from ground realities in Pakistan and avowed security apparatus by Pakistani government to ensure safety and security of nuclear assets35. On causes of extremism in Pakistan, as an ideology, Stephen Vertigans, Militant Islam (2009)36, highlighted ideological differences between Shiite and Sunni sects and evolution of animosity through fatwas since Ibn Taymiyya. The author has related Islam with theory of Sociology and deduced pertinent lessons. He seems to have presented a balanced research on Islamic ideology. Jonah Blank, Mullahs on the Mainframe Islam and Modernity among the Daudi Bohras (2001)37 also touched upon sectarian differences by presenting an insight into various sub sects of Shiism, including Bohras. An exclusive insight about Jihad in Kashmir has been offered by Hindi, the Army of Madinah (1999); by focusing on purely ideological motivation and teachings of Islam about Jihad in Islam, with particular focus on Kashmir. The Muslim scholar, Fazlur Rahman, Revival and Reform in Islam (2006), sounded

31 Ibid., p.92. 32 Ahmed Faruqui, Rethinking the National Security of Pakistan, the price of Strategic Myopia (Burlington, USA: Ashgate Publishing Company, 2003), PP.10-11. 33 Jonah Blank, Mullahs on the Mainframe Islam and Modernity among the Daudi Bohras, (Chicago: The University of Chicago, 2001). 34 Deepa M. Ollapally, The politics of Extremism in South Asia (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), PP.85-86. 35 Pakistani Government and its Strategic Plan Division repeatedly clarified that their nuclear assets are well guarded and secure from any sabotage or seizure etcetera. 36 Stephen Vertigans, Militant Islam A Sociology of Characteristics, Causes and Consequences (London: Routledge, 2009), pp.40-42. 37Blank, Mullahs on the Mainframe Islam.

17 rather radical in approach, and presented an excellent research work on revival and reforms in Islam38. Harmonie Toros, Terrorism, Talking and Transformation (2012) pointed out dichotomies in oft - repeated discourse by the terrorist organizations and stressed the need of constructing a realistic discourse to discredit terrorists’ narrative39. A balanced counter narrative is considered critical in Islamic world, to not only rectify the distortion purposely inserted by terrorist ideologues but to explain the true essence of Islamic peace and tranquillity; not only with but with entire humanity. Yoginder Sikand an Indian scholar, compiled a book by translating Urdu version of Khutbas (lectures) by Indian religious scholar, Maulana Wahiduddin Khan, Jihad and Inter Community Relations in Islam (2010). In this book a moderate and balanced view on extremism and jihad has been presented. It seems a good scholarly work, unveiling pertinent explanations regarding no place of extremism in Islam, thus having relevance while examining causes of extremism in Pakistan, from ideological standpoint. On role of Iran and Saudi Arabia in promoting sectarian extremism in Pakistan, Vali Nasr in The Rise of Islamic Capitalism (2009) while explaining philosophy of Iranian revolution explained the larger game by both the countries. “The Iranian Revolution ended in , but it did not begin with wide spread support for the outcome”40. The process flourished in South and Central Asia as a result of the war against the erstwhile Soviet Union in Afghanistan. The conflict brought together Egyptians, Saudis, and other nationalities in a conflict zone where they learned about Islam in the context of violence41. This period also witnessed the influence of more radical elements coming out of the Deobandi madrassa streams in Pakistan. This provided greater opportunity for exposure to the jihadi elements from Egypt and elsewhere, which exported the ideology of some of the

38 Fazlur Rahman, Revival and Reform in Islam (Oxford: One world Publications, 2006), p.25. 39 Harmonie Toros, Terrorism, Talking and Transformation (London: Routledge, 2012), pp.15-35. After issuance of National Internal Security Policy (NISP), NACTA was asked to formulate a national counter narrative to discredit Taliban agenda and expose their true designs of enforcing of obscurantist forces. The narrative was expected to create a fresh discourse to change people’s mind and prepare Pakistani nation for a comprehensive fight against terrorism. According to para 20 of NISP, “constructing a robust national narrative on extremism, sectarianism, terrorism and militancy is the corner stone of an ideological response to non- traditional threats. Such a narrative is essential for coming up with common ideological denominators in a diverse society." Religious scholars, intelligentsia, educational institutions and media are the key stakeholders for constructing and disseminating the National Narrative. NACTA will facilitate a dialogue with all stakeholders to strengthen democratic values of tolerance respecting diversity of the society. NISP is on line available at http://nacta.gov.pk/policies/NISP.pdf (accessed on 1 September 2016). 40 Vali Nasr, The Rise of Islamic Capitalism (New York: Free press, 2009), pp.117-120. 41 “These Egyptian Islamists were to form the core of a cohesive Arab movement based in Afghanistan. The CIA actively sought volunteers from Muslim countries across the globe to fight the Soviets, emphasizing Islamic solidarity together with pledges of full financial support. Pervez Hoodbhoy, The Genesis of Global Jihad in Afghanistan, online available at http://eacpe.org/content/uploads/2014/02/Genesis-of-global-jihad-in- Afghanistan.pdf (accessed on 30 August 2016).

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Saudi fighters. Saudi Salafis merged with Deobandi school of thought in Pakistan and ratcheted up the scale of terrorism in Pakistan – Afghan region. After Al-Qaida in Arabian Peninsula, more violent ideological wing with the name of Islamic State in Iraq and Levant (ISIL) or Arabic acronym Daesh made the headlines by capturing large swathes of territory in Iraq and Syria42. (Albeit the organisation is marginalized to certain pockets in Syria after coalition operations in Iraq and Syria in 2017/18). Al-Qaida and Daesh both had been propagating contentious debates like “Clash of Civilizations or “Crusades” against Muslims. After decimation of Al-Qaida from Afghanistan, ISIS is consolidating its hold over selected areas in Afghanistan. The organisation acts as an ideological mentor of TTP and is reported to have been financially supporting TTP terrorist acts inside Pakistan. Cemil Aydin, The Politics of Anti- Westernism in Asia Visions of World Order in Pan-Islamic and Pan- Asian Thought (2007) asserted that term Muslim unity goes back to the mid of 1870s, and the transnational vision of Pan Islamic solidarity as a geo-political concept belongs to the 1880s. Therefore, Al-Qaida and probably Neocons of Bush administration only renewed that historical acrimony between the two communities43. Aydin pointed yet another intriguing historical fact that despite rivalries between Ottomans and Christian Empires, during great rebellion in 1857 by Muslims of India, Ottomans sided with civilized British Empire44. Daesh draws inspiration from former Muslim jihadists who preached violence like a Palestinian, Al-Qaida jihad ideal, preaching violence in religion45. Literature on US-Pakistan relations and Post 9/11 war on terrorism is full of controversies and allegations against the State of Pakistan and its security and intelligence agencies for playing a double game especially after 2007. The National Intelligence Estimates (NIEs) by the US National Intelligence Council unveiled a “dodge” by General Musharraf and first time blamed Pakistan for not fully cooperating with the US and turning a

42 “The self-proclaimed Islamic State is a hybrid jihadist group with a declared goal of establishing a “lasting and expanding” . Its strategy for survival and growth blends military, political, social, and economic components. Yet the U.S.-led international intervention against it has largely been limited to air strikes. Lina Khatib, Islamic States’ Strategy: Lasting and Expanding, online available at http://carnegieendowment.org/2015/06/29/islamic-state-s-strategy-lasting-and-expanding-pub-60511 (accessed on 31 August 2016). 43 Cemil Aydin, The Politics of Anti- Westernism in Asia Visions of World Order in Pan-Islamic and Pan- Asian Thought (New York: Colombia University Press, 2007) pp.60-61. 44 Aydin, The Politics of Anti- Westernism, p.32. 45 Samuel M-Katz, Relentless Pursuit (New York: Tom Doherty Associates LLC, 2002), p.37. “Nice attack: truck driver named as France mourns 84 killed in Bastille Day atrocity – as it happened”, reported by Guardian on line available at https://www.theguardian.com/world/live/2016/jul/14/nice-bastille-day-france-attack- promenade-des-anglais-vehicle (accessed on 3 September 2016). Also see Stephen M. Walt, “ISIS a Revolutionary State New Twist on the old Story”, Foreign Affairs, Volume 94, Number, November/ December 2015, pp. 42-44.

19 blind eye towards militants, crossing into Kashmir and Afghanistan. “General Musharraf has promised to pursue and break up the Taliban, but the Taliban leaders have been moving unimpeded between the tribal areas and Afghan villages, while Pakistani troops looked the other way. No one believes that Pakistan’s intelligence service has been purged of Taliban sympathizers”46. Woodward’s account in Bush at War (2010) and Obama’s Wars (2010) really exposed the era of Neo- Cons, dominated by Bush, Dick Cheney, Donald Rumsfeld, Condoleezza Rice, Richard Armitage, Richard Boucher and Paul Wolfowitz etcetera, who were proponent of bulldozing all states coming in their way after 9/11 and coercing Pakistan to submission47. Similarly, Woodward’s perspective on Obama’s War, highlighted a changed strategy of including FATA into Af- Pak region and escalating the drone war in FATA48. Bruce Riedel in Deadly Embrace (2011) focused on critical analysis of Islamic extremism in Pakistan, Al-Qaida and implications of a jihadist state in Pakistan. Bruce Riedel is the architect of Af- Pak Strategy and a known critic of Pakistani Establishment who tried to drag in ISI and Pakistani Military in internal affairs of Afghanistan, for supporting so called good Taliban and Haqqani Network (HQN). The complexity of relations between Pakistan and USA has also been acknowledged by US Defence Sectary Robert Gates in his book- Duty49. Samir Puri, Pakistan War on Terrorism Strategies for Combating Jihadist Groups Since 9/11 (2012), too, in his perspective alluded that Pakistan’s slide into war on terror provoked war into its borders which is being subsided with US assistance50. Reports of Daesh leaders and fighters being escorted by Afghan security forces and being air lifted from the encirclement of Afghan Taliban reinforce the perception once aired by former Afghan president Karzai. Karzai had claimed that Daesh fighters were being brought to Afghanistan from Syria in US helicopters51.

46 Excerpts from NIEs 2007 and DNI’s Annual Threat Assessment quoted by New York Times, “a senior administration official said that even if General Musharraf had the right intentions, it’s not clear he’s got the capability, which is why the United States is rushing to supply him with more money and weapons. And even as they speak publicly about throwing their support behind General Musharraf’s efforts against radicals, administration officials in private find themselves re-enacting those Clinton-era debates about how to dismantle a terrorist haven inside a sovereign country”. Available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/07/22/weekinreview/22mazzetti.html?_r=0 (accessed on 28 August 2016). 47 Bob Woodward, Bush at War (New York: Simon &Schuster, 2010), pp.58-61. 48 Woodward, Obama’s War, pp.47-55. 49 Robert M. Gates, Duty (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2004), p.388. 50 Samir Puri, Pakistan War on Terrorism Strategies for Combating Jihadist Groups Since 9/1 (Oxon: Routledge, 2012), pp.33-34. 51 Karzai blamed the US for colluding with ISIL and patronizing presence of ISIS fighters in Afghanistan. Online available at https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/11/hamid-karzai-colluded-isil-afghanistan- 171110191715544.html (accessed on 11 August 2018).

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While scanning literature on terrorism, certain Western scholars sounded equally extremist in their views while commenting on the religion of Islam. Franklin Graham is one of them who is an Evangelical preacher, is quoted by Khan Zia Hussan, Muslims and the West (2007) to have said, “Islam is a very evil and wicked religion”. Similarly, desecration of holy Quran by Pastor Terry Jones, in Florida, was extremely regrettable and condemnable52. Christine Fair, The Madrassas’ Challenge, Militancy and Religious Education in Pakistan (2009, Rand Corporation), while commenting on perception about Madrassas (seminaries), considered to be breeding grounds of extremism and terrorism in Pakistan and the region at large, offered quite revealing findings, which are generally close to perception of common Pakistanis. She added, “there may be a few Madrassas which may be imparting training to militants and secondly the education level of most of the suicide bombers and militants was observed to be on higher side as compared to their peers in Madrassas”53. A lot had appeared in domestic press since October 2011, about suspected presence of hundreds of CIA operatives like Raymond Davis, operating in Pakistan ostensibly, being permitted by Ambassador Haqqani, by exclusively relaxing the visa regimes for hundreds of personnel of US Special Forces54. Such allegations are part of contentious issues in Pakistan and await corroboration in the apex court of Pakistan. Lately (February 2019) the Supreme of Pakistan has dispensed the case by directing the federal government to decide on merit whether to try Hussain Haqqani or otherwise. Musa Khan Jalazai, The US War on Terrorism in Afghanistan (2003) gave a critical account of US War on terror, its strategic objective and regional security architecture that US had planned for itself and her chief regional ally India. The US war on terror is viewed with scepticism and US military might is blamed for killing civilians and maiming women and children. “It’s morbid fascination for hi-tech military

52 US Pastor Terry Jones made outrageous statement about burning of copies of the Holy Quran on the eve of 9/11, 2001 and attracted condemnation from Muslim World, the intent was widely condemned by the American people as well. Andres Jauregui, Terry Jones, Quran-Burning Pastor, Hangs Effigy Outside Florida Church (photo), HuffPost, updated 6 December 2017, online available at http://www.huffingtonpost.com/news/terry-jones-quran-burning/ (accessed on 2 September 2016) 53 C. Christine Fair, The Madrassas’ Challenge, Militancy and Religious Education in Pakistan (Lahore: Vanguard Books (Pvt) Ltd, 2009), pp.67- 69. 54 'Memogate' scandal deepens as American accuser threatens to tell all, reported by Guardian on line available at https://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/jan/12/memogate-scandal-pakistan-isi-haqqani (accessed on 3 September 2016). “The allegations made by Mansoor Ijaz reach all the way up to President Asif Zardari and could end up with treason charges against the country's former US ambassador, Husain Haqqani, or even the president himself. But critics say that the charges are a fantastical and thinly-veiled attempt by the military to hound the government from power, aided by the hostile courts that have taken up the case with alacrity.”

21 might, its insensitivity of alien cultures and many phrases have been used to explain this war”55. Counter terrorism has also been declared as part of global governance by some of the scholars like Beyer, Counter terrorism and International Power Relations the EU, ASEAN, and Hegemonic Global Governance (2010). According to Beyer, Counterterrorism is being pursued globally through multinational cooperation in order to manage national policies aiming to reduce terrorism. The term “hegemon governance includes both possibilities; the hegemon cooperating as equal or coercing other nations as hegemon to seek cooperation of its choice”56. The example classically fits into Pakistan-US asymmetric relations wherein US is never satisfied with cooperation from Pakistan and the demand of doing more is unending. According to Anna Cornelia Beyer, the US is declared hegemon which uses power against adversaries and employs coercion and influence via others. The US “acts here partly as policy entrepreneur convincing other nations for participation in Global War on terror (GWOT)”57. War on terror has been used to capture so many policies under a political- ideological umbrella that a single-issue area is hardly discernible. Being a super power, the US opted to lead a fight against terror and became the sole actor in US national security strategy; “we will not hesitate to act alone, if necessary to exercise the right of self-defence by acting pre-emptively against such terrorists”58. With such declarations US reinforced its proclivity for unilateralism and pre-emptive strikes against developing threats. Louis Rene Beres, Terrorism and Global Security the Nuclear Threat (1987) brought in another interpretation of terrorism that is and its prevention. “It is in each states’ interest to develop foreign policy from a systemic vantage point, and by defining national interest in terms of strategies that secure and sustain the entire system of states”59. The world leaders should begin to match the awesome agenda of world order reformed with effective strategies of response. US response after 9/11 is worth emulating by the other countries for controlling terrorism in their respective regions60. Chomsky explained an imperialists’ perspective of terror and abuse of power. When nations abuse power, they do not realize some day their masses may have to endure the

55 Musa Khan Jalazai, The US War on Terrorism in Afghanistan (Lahore: Sang-e- Meel Publications, 2003), pp.16-17. 56 Anna Cornelia Beyer, Counter terrorism and International Power Relations The EU, ASEAN, and Hegemonic Global Governance (New York: I.B. Tauris &Co Ltd, 2010), p.135. 57 Ibid., p.136. 58 Ibid., p.137. 59 Louis Rene Beres, Terrorism and Global Security the Nuclear Threat (Colorado: West view press, Inc., Fredrick A. Praeger Publishers, 1987), pp.54-55. 60 Bruce Bonger, Psychology of Terrorism (New York: oxford University Press, 2007), pp.25-28

22 retributions. He further quoted Eisenhower, the US president in 1950s, saying that the US National Security Council (NSC) analysed that Arab civilians hate USA for supporting corrupt and brutal sheikhdoms and blocking civil liberties and socio-economic development. The same hate supported OBL against USA in recent times61. Chomsky while comparing great powers alluded to a universal truth that all the great (imperialist) powers behave in a similar way. For example, Greta Britain after First World War seriously considered using poison gas to control rebellion in Egypt and Kurdish region of Iraq. CT policy is part of overall national security policy. A policy could be defined as cited by Davidson Smith, Combating Terrorism (1990), “can refer to a set of expectations and intentions, or to a series of actions and their consequences or to all of those together”62. The policy could be direct action (active) or indirect action (passive). In CT domain, direct actions are kinetic actions involving use of force by law enforcing agencies or in worst cases by the military whereas, indirect actions employ non-kinetic measures. In use of force there are certain guiding principles e.g. supremacy of civilian rule of law, civilian control by democratically elected constitutional government, and the use of minimum force to preserve internal order and security. “Military resources are used in a backup role on extreme occasions---- but the military is regarded as an adjunct not as a primary source of response capability, and always under firm control of the civilian authority”63. Under national security policy terrorism cannot be accepted and analysed in isolation it is closely linked with other menaces of the world as Dr Lodhi underscored in 2004 UN report by panel of experts, by suggesting five other clusters of threat to the world in addition to terrorism along 9Cs solution as part of CT policy64. The five contributory clusters of threat are: 1) economic and social including poverty 2) interstate conflicts 3) internal conflicts 4) the proliferation, loss or use of WMDs 5) transnational organised crimes. Dr Lodhi proposed a broad gauge (9Cs) CT strategy in her keynote address at a seminar organised by the Institute of Regional Studies Islamabad in 2005. Conclusions from her CT policy have been included in chapter 6, an envisioned framework to combat terrorism in Pakistan.

61 Noam Chomsky, Power and Terror Post 9/11 Talks and Interviews (Lahore: Vanguard Books (Pvt) Ltd, 2004), pp.86-87. 62 Davidson Smith, Combating Terrorism (London: Routledge, 1990), p.28. 63 Ibid., p.49. 64 Keynote address by Dr Maliha Lodhi on “Global Terrorism Genesis, Implications, Remedial and Counter Measures” (Islamabad: Institute of Regional Studies Islamabad, 2005), p. xvii. 9Cs heave been interpreted by the author in the context of CT policy both at home and abroad and there may be difference of opinion in essence of proposed CT strategy by Dr Lodhi.

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While reviewing literature on terrorism and counterterrorism, debate by R Jackson et al65 on studying terrorism as a phenomenon and interpretation of orthodox scholars versus new version given by proponents of Critical Terrorism Studies (CTS) was found interesting. Pre-9/11 terrorism and dynamics of post 9/11 terrorism are mutually contrasting by invoking new paradigms of various disciplines of social and behavioural sciences. Terrorism was transformed as a new spectacle in national security priorities of various countries in post -9/11 thinking by researchers and scholars and heads of the governments. US provided necessary steam to the paradigm wherein terrorism was studied as an instrument of foreign policy by other nations; using certain groups as proxies to destabilize targeted countries beside deep evaluation of motivation behind making of a terrorist and terrorist networks. The menace of non - state actors being patronized as proxies by hostile intelligence agencies emerged prominently in South Asian terrorism studies. Therefore, the debate of terrorism as a phenomenon, its anthropological roots, and motivation of making a terrorist and suicide bomber fall in the realm of CTS66. CTS as an alternate was found useful yet, core of this thesis was anchored around analysis of domestic factors, regional dimension and asymmetric relation with the US shaping Pakistan CT policy. Thus, were best answered by orthodox scholars- under assumptions of neoclassical realism. Before identifying specific gaps in the literature, certain perspectives gathered from the academic woks of western and Indian scholars are highlighted to contextualize regional dynamics and systemic linkage of terrorism in Pakistan and South Asia in general. Major shift in US alliance in South Asia emerged after de-hyphenation of relations with India and Pakistan, especially after signing of a strategic partnership with India on 17 September 2004, covering intent of forging defence and strategic cooperation between two countries. Pakistan felt alienated yet, she was clearly communicated by the US side that US- India relations may not necessarily be reflection of US relations with Pakistan. Therefore, Pakistan should learn to live with new reality. Thereafter US pressure was consistently applied on Pakistan to deliver on Indian demands; whether it was issue of cooperation to rein in non-state actors or broader regional terrorism. Most of the literatures highlights negative role of Pakistan and its security and intelligence agencies in destabilization of Afghanistan by supporting Haqqani Network

65 Richard Jackson, Marie Breen Smyth and Jeroen Gunning eds., Critical Terrorism Studies A new Research Agenda (London: Routledge Taylor and Francis Group 2009), pp. 8-9. 66 Among first major debates in post-9/11 period was sparked by Robert Papes, “Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide terrorism” quoted by in Richard Jackson, Marie Breen Smyth and Jeroen Gunning eds., Critical Terrorism Studies A new Research Agenda (London: Routledge Taylor and Francis Group 2009), p.16.

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(HQN) and sponsoring jihadi organizations fighting in IoK. Role of India in destabilization of Pakistan, exacerbating her security dilemma amidst serious challenge from domestic terrorism is downplayed. The international community rather demands evidence. On the contrary Indian allegations against Pakistan are not only accepted but projected in electronic and print media without asking for specific evidence. Enhanced relevance in international system and geo economic significance played their role in forging US-Indian alliance and pushing Pakistan to the fringes. Gaps Identified in the Existing Literature Three gaps have been identified in the existing literature on the subject during the process of extensive review. One; there is no worthwhile academic work that provides analysis of Pakistan’s CT policy from neo-classical realist perspective and examines the interplay of systemic pressures with the domestic compulsions in shaping Pakistan’s CT strategy Two; There is also hardly any study that examines the impact of regional security environment, together with Pakistan's weak law enforcing and CT coordination institutions and domestic polarization on Pakistan’s CT strategy. Three; there is virtually no work that provides three tier analysis of Pakistan’s CT strategy in the post 9/11 period This study attempts to fill in these three gaps and offers insights for envisioning a new framework for combating terrorism in Pakistan The Research Design and Methodology In research work, ontological position has been taken as foundationalism/objectivism, whereas epistemological position conforms to realism. Though under realist epistemology, methodologically, qualitative and quantitative both research methods are possible. However, for evaluation of values, norms, beliefs, deep perceptions and stated positions of the governments and terrorist organisations, qualitative research design has been preferred as research methodology. Logically, qualitative research is broader in nature and is considered more feasible for deeper understanding of various arguments, motivational themes and interpretation of data. Secondary data was collected from government reports and records whatever was accessible besides books and research articles. Reports compiled by National Counterterrorism Authority (NACTA) and think tanks were of immense value. It is a case study method involving study of an episode spread over decades in Pakistan and the region at large. Various facets of terrorism like ideology, motivation, terror training, terror financing

25 and facilitation at home, and foreign patronage by hostile intelligence agencies are covered under one whole entity i.e. terrorism in Pakistan including CT strategy to combat the menace. For primary sources; selected experts (bureaucrats and academics) former security and intelligence officials were interviewed/ interacted in an informal way to corroborate the data and validate the hypothesis set forth in the main argument of thesis. Besides unstructured interviews; another research instrument of primary data collection i.e. observation, overlapping between participant and un-participant observation method was used to collect data by visiting various terrorist detention centres. The author had the advantage of sitting with interrogators for hours spanned over many days to observe the habits, ethnic background, and ideological affiliations and motivations to select various targets etcetera. By virtue of my official employment I had been looking after certain detention centres for months so my observation could be termed as participant as well. Because I had been living in the same compound and observing people for prolonged period of time without divulging my objective of presence (research). Data collected through informal interactions with experts and observation method was useful in making my research as empirical as possible. My tenure of service as counterterrorism analyst at Ministry of Defence Government of Pakistan, spanned over a decade and interaction with western experts on terrorism employed in their respective embassies in Islamabad, and visit to Austria in 2014 for attending seminar on counterterrorism by Global Counter Terrorism Forum was a rich reservoir of knowledge. Visits/ interaction with military commanders and intelligence officials and attending briefings on various aspects of counterterrorism operations in official capacity was a great help to evaluate the veracity of information available in various forms and sources while writing my dissertation. Scope and Limitations Scope: It is three tier analysis of terrorism in Pakistan- through the lens of neoclassical realism. The research encompasses period under review from 9/11, 2001 to December 2014- 2014 as a benchmark indicating US/ISAF drawdown has been selected. (Though developments till submission date of thesis i.e. till first half 2019 will be incorporated). Limitations: Justifiably, no access was possible to review government record of cooperation with foreign countries and friendly intelligence agencies. Only own professional reach was capitalized. Unlike US for example, in Pakistan there is no culture of declassifying the classified reports of intelligence agencies revealing secret operations and details of cooperation etcetera.

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Organization of the Study The study has been organized in six chapters; besides Introduction and conclusion. Introduction is based on scope of study, main argument and problematizes the issue of terrorism being contested at three tiers- systemic, regional and domestic. Chapter one is the theoretical framework which explains the assumptions of neoclassical realism, operationalization of theory covering three tiers and application of assumptions of neoclassical realism. Chapter two terrorism and counterterrorism in Pakistan: evolutionary overview focuses at dynamics of extremism and terrorism in Pakistan, linked with Afghan jihad and Pakistan’s policy of sponsoring global jihad against erstwhile Soviet Union and a paradigm shift in Pakistan’s CT outlook after 9/11 2001. Chapter three systemic forces and Pakistan’s counterterrorism strategy explains nature of asymmetric relations with the US, evolution of security dominated transactionary relations and post 9/11 dubious distinction of strategic partnership marred with controversies and allegations, and US finally resorting to coercive diplomacy and arm twisting as bigger partner in the equation. Chapter four regional level dynamics in Pakistan’s counterterrorism responses encompasses nuances of relations with hostile neighbouring counties- India and Afghanistan, a constant security dilemma from the east and since 9/11 Indo-Afghan nexus magnifying the security threat spectrum. Chapter five impact of domestic variables in shaping Pakistan’s CT strategy comprises of variables like elite perception towards terrorism, internal polarization on strategy how to tackle extremism and terrorism in Pakistan. Chapter six envisioning a new framework for combating terrorism in Pakistan offers policy recommendations as food for thought for academics and government officials for considering various actions/ reforms at three levels- systemic, regional and domestic. This chapter offer policy recommendations as part of strategic reorientation, cognitive variables of CT strategy to counter terrorism through ideological counter narrative, and structural reforms process address the capacity deficits in the civilian law enforcing agencies and judicial institutions. Finally the conclusion offers insights of the study with macro level recommendations. The next chapter explains theoretical framework of the study and provides insights based on neoclassical realist paradigm to understand subsequent chapters of study

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Chapter 1 Theoretical Framework In this chapter, various facets of neoclassical realism have been explored and analysed in the context of understanding Pakistan’s CT Strategy in the post 9/11 timeframe. The analysis encompasses three tiers i.e. systemic pressures, regional nuances and domestic realities which forced Pakistan to adopt a particular model of foreign policy and CT strategy. Terrorism in Pakistan is linked with regional and international variables thus; neoclassical realism affords various theoretical tools to evaluate the efficacy of actions by Pakistan at three levels. Since the end of Cold War, many scholars had been grappled with the idea and relevance of theories of foreign policy. Their focus had been on external factors or behaviour of the State. The domestic circumstances and factors were ignored in classical realism67. This chapter comprises of two sections: section 1.1 defining neoclassical realism and section 1.2 understanding terrorism in Pakistan through the assumptions of neoclassical realism. 1.1 Defining Neoclassical Realism In 1998, Gideon Rose introduced the term ‘neoclassical realism’ that traced a new approach to studying international relations. Rose noted correctly that “unfortunately, there is no simple, straightforward classical realism”68. Rather the term covers a host of authors who differ greatly from one another in assumptions, objectives and methodology. For Rose, the term neoclassical realism “explicitly incorporates both external and internal variables, updating and systematizing certain insights drawn from classical realists’ thought”69. On the one hand, this approach retained its identity of traditional neo-realism described by Kenneth Waltz, while highlighting new systemic and structural challenges, further divided the debate into distribution of power- balance of power theory. Waltz thesis stirred the debate of security maximization states and power maximization states, often categorized as defensive realism and offensive realism respectively. Waltz’s work is generally known for promoting defensive realism whereas Mearsheimer’s thought process is more about power maximization and supports offensive realism. The proponents of neorealism contend that it is systemic forces and pressure which determine the behaviour of a state and ultimately its foreign policy and relations with other nations. Whereas, neoclassical

67 Andrew K. Hanami, ed., Perspective on Structural Realism (New York: Palgrave Macmillan Ltd, 2003), p.105. 68 Gideon Rose, “Review: Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy” World Politics, Vol. 51, No. 1 (Oct. 1998), p.146. Published by: Cambridge University Press Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/25054068 Accessed: 27/07/2010 16:42. Also Hanami, Perspective on Structural Realism, p.107. 69 Rose, “Review: Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy”, p.107.

28 realists believe that systemic forces alone cannot influence the behaviour of a state it is rather combination of external and internal factors which dictate the final course of action by individual states. According to Taliaferro, “the impact of power capabilities on foreign policy is indirect and complex, because systemic pressures must be translated through intervening unit-level variables such as decision-makers’ perceptions and state structures”70. Therefore, neoclassical realism encompasses the fundamentals of classical realism - national interest, psyche of leadership, power politics and characteristics of neoclassical realism- domestic sentiments, quality of state institutions and perception of its elite, responsible for shaping nations’ economic and diplomatic outlook71. Neoclassical realism lays significant emphasis on domestic sentiment and characteristics of the state in formulation of foreign policy. However, in international system domestic policies are influenced by regional dynamics and systemic realities. As these approaches are subject to constant debate under rapid globalization, economic interdependence and revolution in information technology especially the factors like states with similar parameters and acting under the same external conditions display different conduct in the international arena72. The answer includes domestic policy, dissimilar interests, how state institutions work together (as a system of institutions with a monopoly over the use of force) and with society, and the way some phenomena are perceived. Waltz terms international system more stable under two superpowers under the principle of mutual destruction and predictability73. Arguably after disintegration of Soviet Union, the world became more chaotic and sub conventional threats started to simmer in various regions of the world. A broad definition of neoclassical realism would describe it as the search for an answer to why the pressures of global and regional factors produce a certain type of foreign policy. In other words, neoclassical realism studies “the transmission belt” of foreign policy74.

70 Steven E. Lobell, Norrin M. Ripsman and Jeffery W Taliaferro, ed., Neoclassical Realism, The State and Foreign Policy (Cambridge: Cambridge University press, 2009), p.5. 71 Nicholas Kitchen, “Systemic Pressures and Domestic Ideas: A Neoclassical Realist Model of Grand Strategy Formation”, Review of International Studies, 36 (1) 117-119. ISSN 0260-2105. DOI: 10.1017/S0260210509990532 this version available at: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/27670/ 72 Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, “State Building for Future Wars: Neoclassical Realism and the Resource-Extractive State” Security Studies 15, no. 3 (July–September 2006): 464–465, Copyright © Taylor & Francis Group, LLC DOI: 10.1080/09636410601028370 (accessed on 15 March 2017). 73 Dr Mihai Zodian, Neoclassical Realism and the Security Environment, online available at http://smg.mapn.ro/gmr/Engleza/Ultimul_nr/zodian-p.103-112.pdf (accessed on 15 June 2017) (accessed on 12 August 2018). 74 Brian Rathbun, “A Rose by Any Other Name: Neoclassical Realism as the Logical and

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This approach does not imply a revision of neo-realism, however, as it continues to view the pressure of the global environment and systemic factors as the crucial elements influencing the activity of countries along with host of domestic factors. Indeed, Rose and his followers, such as Steven Lobell, Norrin Ripsman, and Tufts Geoffrey Tagliaferro, view neoclassical realism as a theory of foreign policy. Realism, like Marxism and other paradigms such as liberalism is first and foremost a philosophical position and other variants of classical realism- neorealism and neoclassical realism are “heirs to a philosophical tradition dating to the writing of Thucydides and Sun Tzu in fifth century BCE”. Generally, all scholars studying the behaviour of states and the rulers, focus on human nature, its behaviour in varying challenges and effort to maximize security and or power by utilizing internal resources of the states, at the disposal of ruling elite75. The influence of certain internal political factors may increase under pressure from the global system and globalization. For instance, competition between countries is developing not only along the hard power line, but also in the soft power domain – in the economic and, more importantly, ideological spheres. It is not only executive and its armed forces to shape external environment and relations with other states, it is involvement of all segments of society especially business community and civic society at large. So, this mix of hard and soft power- classical realism, neorealism and neoclassical realism construct a balanced behaviour of the states. Neoclassical realism undoubtedly contains the ideational and soft power of constructivism alongside structural factors under neorealism. Jurists like Romanova have rather termed neoclassical realism as an outgrowth of structural or neorealism76. From the epistemological viewpoint, the dominance of systemic factors over domestic factors sets neoclassical realism apart from liberalism, which stipulates that domestic policy predetermines foreign policy. Neoclassical realism can be seen as the midpoint between the traditions of realism, on the one hand, and liberalism, neo-institutionalism and constructivism, on the other hand77. There seems a contrast in the perspectives of Morgenthau and EH Carr; Morgenthau contends that conflict is not simply the product of systemic effects generated by will to power but the intensity of the states’ security dilemma is dependent upon

Necessary Extension of Structural Realism”, Security Studies, 17: 304, 2008, Copyright © Taylor & Francis Group, LLC DOI: 10.1080/09636410802098917. 75 Lobell, Ripsman and Taliaferro, eds., Neoclassical Realism, the State, and the Foreign Policy. 76 Tatyana Romanova, “Neoclassical Realism and Todays Russia”, online available at http://eng.globalaffairs.ru/number/Neoclassical-Realism-and-Todays-Russia-15681 (accessed on 14 June 2017) 77Rose, “Review: Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy”.

30 internal properties of the State “which impacts upon structures of the international system”. Whereas, EH Carr proclaims that anarchy is outcome of international system and internal characteristics of the State and post sovereign global society could be achieved by invoking global norms and universal citizen, for which he faced criticism for being proponent of critical theory rather than realism78. The debate of relationship among different variables under neoclassical realism could be analysed on the touchstone of main argument wherein the variables have been set forth are; the independent variable (the US/external environment or the systemic), the intervening variable (regional security environment and weak institutional capacity; the entire set of factors inside a nation-state – institutions, the relationship between state and society, public perception, and ideology) and the dependent variable (combating terrorism in Pakistan and its linkage with domestic and foreign policy of the country ). The neoclassical realism mainly focuses on the transitional zone, on how the intervening variable determines the dependent one. However, the pressure of systemic factors is the main subject for analysis, which are traditionally pertinent to structural or neorealism. It is because of the fact that Post 9/11 pressures from the US actually dictated the type of CT strategy which Pakistan should adopt to fight domestic terrorism and its contribution towards US war on terror. The leaders while taking major decisions consider the reality of public perception and classified information fed through state institutions. Therefore, the final decision on foreign policy would wittingly or unwittingly absorb the fundamentals of neorealism and neoclassical realism as balancing act between systemic and domestic factors. The classical realism (the core) may not allow a balance, because the decision may be at times more inclined towards neo or neoclassical realism dictates, depending upon the intensity of international pressures or domestic sentiment. It is mainly because in the anarchic nature of international system, relative power distribution, and other structural variables such as nature of domestic structures and geography set the parameters how states will react in each situation and define their national interests79. Counterterrorism strategy is though different to typical military operations against external threat thus, involve all segments of society and civilian law enforcement agencies. Military could be called in to assist paramilitary forces but in Pakistan’s case the threat was

78 Tom Dyson, Neoclassical Realism and Defence Reform in Post-Cold War Europe (Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), pp.96-97. 79 Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, State Building for Future Wars: Neoclassical Realism and the Resource-Extractive State, Security Studies 15, no. 3 (July–September 2006): 482, Copyright © Taylor & Francis Group, LLC DOI: 10.1080/09636410601028370 (accessed on 15 February 2017).

31 enormous and military had to take over counterterrorism operations by its self. The civilian law enforcing agencies rather assisted military in execution of CT campaign in Swat and former FATA region. Historically, political culture and civil-military relations are different in each country. The concordance theory recognizes this difference with respect to each nation and stresses the necessity to establish domestic structures which guarantee constitutional role of every institution within defined limits. While analysing the principles of concordance theory and correlating with Pakistan’s political culture, it was not only political culture to blame, but there were other factors like least attention to building of civilian institutions and the political elite looking toward Army in each crisis80. Counterterrorism in Swat and former FATA regions was an ordinary law enforcement operation by traditional security forces like police and frontier constabulary. The hardened criminals supported by hostile intelligence agencies offered formidable resistance to police and the regions were handed over to military for launching of proper counterterrorism operations. Police remained at support role like rout protection and handling of internally displaced persons. Initially, military too, was not equipped to fight this asymmetric warfare and had to suffer heavy casualties. However, morale of military and resolve of its leadership finally prevailed and military successfully evicted terrorists from these regions. Since 2018, only terrorists attempting to sneak back into cleared areas or TTP attacks from Afghan soil are being tackled. The terror infrastructure in FATA and Swart regions has completely been dismantled. Anarchy in the region and internal turmoil may force the state to either look inwards or threaten its neighbours with a view to overcoming internal discord with the help of masses under the pretext of foreign aggression. While anarchy is not essentially prevalence of chaos and lawlessness it is rather absence of central sovereign or the central government. For example, in the post-World War II era, two super powers dominated the world scene and provided a central controlling authority in respective regions and blocks. After disintegration of Soviet Union, the US emerged as a sole super power, which exploited the vacuum by unilaterally imposing new order of its own and tried to even alter the geographical frontiers of other countries including forcible regime change with a view to facilitating implementation of their grand strategy in the region(s) of interest81. In corollary to same Pakistan’s bigger

80 Rebecca L. Schiff, A Concordance Theory of Civil- Military Relations (New York: Routledge, Taylor and Francis Group, 2009), p.18. 81 Kenneth N Waltz, Theory of International Politics (California: Addison- Wesley Publishing Company, 1979), pp.115-116.

32 neighbour India feels to have attained the status of a regional power and exercises her self- professed right of browbeating the relatively smaller neighbour. The assessment by Waltz on behaviour of state and its rulers to divert attention of masses may resort to external aggression, “the states plagued by internal strife may then instead of waiting for the accidental attack, seek the war that will bring internal peace”82. In the Indian Subcontinent, India had been attempting to deflect internal challenges by threatening war with Pakistan on the pretext of internal interference in the sovereign country- mobilization of forces on international border in 2002 and the current volatility on Kashmir border are cases in point. However, Waltzian vision further alluded that the defects in each country causing war may not guarantee the perpetual peace. Therefore, the nations must consider the internal dynamics- quality of leadership, governance, rule of law, and the challenges being posed by the systemic forces83. Neoclassical realism encompasses the essence of liberalism, social constructivism and neorealism as identified in preceding paragraphs. The factors under neorealism have been discussed in greater detail however, factors falling under partially liberalism and social constructivism include; civil society of a country whether active or passive, its political affiliations, economic strata and ethno- religious biases, legitimacy of incumbent government and national ideology whether accepted by majority of population or otherwise. The degree of accord among the economic, political, and religious elites over national ideology is even more significant in today’s world. A well-functioning and attractive state model secures a place for a country in the global competition of values. On the other hand, a model facing constant challenges from domestic forces not only undermines a country’s foreign policy, but also makes it a less convincing power or partner in the world. The degree of institutionalization is indicative of the level of development of the state and society. Each state institution performs a definite function, but in its actions the institutions are guided and influenced by domestic culture, rule of law and the credibility of ruling and economic elite. Dyson asserts that the realism is highly contested school of thought, encompassing military and material factors influencing behaviour of the state in international system. The approach is synonymous to the approach of individuals who rely on their own for self-help to compel other actors to respect their interests, “hence the central premise of realist thought that international outcomes are consequent upon the material and military power that states

82 Kenneth N Waltz, Man, The State and War a Theoretical Analysis (New York: Columbia University Press, 2001), p.81. 83 Waltz, Man, The State and War, p.83.

33 can wield”84. Neoclassical realism seems more amenable to absorb factors like economic integration, role of international structures and institutions, power of knowledge and ideas. 1.2 Understanding Counterterrorism in Pakistan through Assumptions of Neoclassical Realism Various principles of neoclassical realism, incorporating systemic factors, regional compulsions and domestic constraints have been highlighted in a table format to explain application of theoretical framework. Table 1.1: Three tiers neoclassical realist variables vis-à-vis post 9/11 Pakistan’s CT policy. Level Variables Relationship with Post 9/11 CT Policy Systemic Imperatives of asymmetric  Pakistan under tremendous pressure had to cooperate US- Pakistan Relations in post 9/11 US War on Terror and affect a paradigm shift in its Afghan and Kashmir policy.  Pakistan was pressured with allegations of duplicity –

articulation of ideational power through media.  Tools like seizure of military aid and coalition support fund and drone attacks were employed.  Pakistan was stressed to do more, whereas Pakistani Divergence in CT Strategy concerns over interference by regional countries were

 shrugged off.  Tagging of Indian concerns in Jammu and Kashmir with Afghan conflict further complicated CT strategy.  Strategic balance in South US-India defence and strategic partnership disturbed Asia strategic balance in South Asia. Thus impacting Pakistan’s domestic CT responses. Regional Indo-Afghan nexus Two front threat scenario exacerbated security dilemma of Pakistan. Pakistani authorities claimed irrefutable evidence of foreign interference. Indian Hostile and  India is acting as regional bully by high jacking a Hegemonic Attitude regional forum of SAARC and scuttling every prospect of regional development and economic integration.

84 Tom Dyson, Neoclassical Realism and Defence Reform in Post Cold War Europe (Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), p.95.

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Level Variables Relationship with Post 9/11 CT Policy  Her hegemonic attitude is a constraint towards settlement of disputes with neighbours through the principle of sovereign equality, mutual interest and cooperation. Kashmir Dispute Unresolved Kashmir dispute remains a lingering source of hostility between India and Pakistan.

Domestic Perception of Elite,  Pakistan witnessed discord among ruling elite, right Leadership perceptual wing political parties and civil society. shocks/Ideology and  US war on terror viewed as a strategy to alter South domestic sentiment Asian security landscape with India in the lead.  Enormous internal challenges influenced CT responses. Capacity issues of law Weak civilian law enforcement agencies and insufficient enforcement and judicial judicial system could not cope with the enormity of the institutions challenge of terrorism. Source: Author’s personal interpretation of theoretical framework. Combating terrorism in Pakistan is a complex phenomenon due its relations with regional countries and US interest in the region. Therefore, the challenges in combating terrorism in Pakistan and at regional level are phenomenal. Beside challenges, each country will have different kind of opportunities to turn them into its favour. Pakistan’s case is unique because the country was used as proxy by the USA during Afghan jihad from 1979 to 1989 (till Soviet withdrawal). The events since 1979 and especially post 2001, have directly impacted the security milieu in South and West Asia85. Pakistan witnessed power play between two super powers under structural realism, either side maximizing security with brutal display of force and creating security dilemma in South and Central Asian regions besides, threatening each other’s hegemony in traditional zones of influence. Soviet Union had been threatening to occupy areas including Pakistan and projecting power to Middle East and squeezing the strategic plane of USA. Or conversely USA, mustering global resistance under Afghan jihad and forcing ouster of Soviet Union from Afghanistan and altering the

85 Barry Buzan and Ole Waver, Regions and Powers the Structure of International Security (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), p.20.

35 balance of power in former Soviet Republics which later became Common Wealth of Independent States (CIS) or commonly known as Central Asian Republics (CARs). What transpired because of clash between two super powers, albeit through proxies, is history and Afghanistan became the sanctuary of former jihadi forces. Osama Bin Laden (OBL) and his affiliates converted the country into a stronghold of global jihad, ultimately demonstrating their power in the form of spectacular 9/11 attacks on mainland USA. 9/11 is perceived to have been a trigger that altered the South Asian security landscape, propelling India to the forefront. US administration clearly stating that de-hyphenation of relations with India and Pakistan is a reality and relations with both the countries will not be a mirror image of engagement with either side. It signalled a clear departure from Cold War policy and strategic alliances due to changed strategic balance in South and Central Asia. In this backdrop, the intent is to critically evaluate the role of the US as international force and independent variable, exerting influence as regional player as well. US presence in Afghanistan, regional security environment and Indo –Afghan nexus imperilled fight against terrorism in Pakistan and the region at large. The capacity and characteristics of the civilian law enforcing and judicial institutions, leadership, relationship between state and society are various facets of domestic factors under neoclassical realism. Post 9/11 combating terrorism in Pakistan is also impacted due to weaknesses in domestic institutions that lacked coordination among various CT coordination agencies at federal and provincial levels. Such institutions particularly that were responsible for collection, collation of intelligence and then dissemination of information to concerned law enforcing agencies for execution of CT operations. Role of National Counter Terrorism Authority (NACTA) is handicapped for want of all operational components being operationalized. Gradually the civilian institutions are being raised and strengthened yet, lot more is desired to combat terrorism at home and preempt extremist forces cultivating their cells in urban centres. Disconnect between state and society and perception of elite on terrorism is another issue complicating fight against terrorism as a national cause. The internal security structures are weak and civilian law enforcing agencies are not capable to defeat the monster of terrorism especially in FATA and Balochistan without assistance of Pakistan military. Pakistan’s foreign policy suffers due to structural inadequacies - noninvolvement of professional diplomatic institutions for input to cabinet especially during military regimes or civilian monocratic style of governance. Invocation of principles of neoclassical realism being derived from domestic factors can guide foreign policy choices and priorities.

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The peculiar characteristics of each state like ideology are also at play for application of various facets of neoclassical realism. In Pakistan its ideology is distinct which paved way for partition of Indian union and creation of a separate homeland for the Muslim majority regions being geographically contiguous. Neoclassical realism as middle growth position between constructivism and neorealism afforded reasoning to debate this facet of ideology which emerged as single most powerful factor for creation of a separate homeland for the Muslims of Subcontinent. This notion mediates the external environment and influences the domestic political process and perception of policy makers which in turn shape particular foreign policy behaviour that either exacerbates or alleviates bilateral problems vis-à-vis other country(s)86. This approach touches upon the debate in Pakistan i.e. rule of law, constitutional framework for all institutions, and strengthening them for national harmony. The democratic institutions in Pakistan are evolving and are criticized for shortcomings. Grare, too, termed democracy in Pakistan as “transitional democracy at best”87. Sectarian strife causing religious hatred against other sects was another fissure in Pakistani society which had been influenced not only by domestic development but more due to regional events. In post 9/11 period, various external players, representing Shiite and Sunni sectarian affiliations had been manipulating this division and fault lines in Pakistan and Afghanistan. Civil war and competing interests of regional countries and systemic forces were further complicating the delicate issue of religious differences and sectarian sensitivities. The sectarian dimension of anti-terrorism coalition of Muslim countries under Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) had been viewed with suspicion by the Iranian government. Albeit the head of this coalition clarified number of times that this forum was purely for coordination of anti-terrorism strategy without targeting any specific country. It might be a delicate issue which could affect fight against terrorism in Pakistan and Afghanistan. The relations between Iran and Pakistan too, are uncertain due to worries over participation of Pakistani military in perceptibly anti-Shiite counterterrorism force stationed at KSA. Though, the force is just a skeleton of symbolic command structure headed by former Pakistani Army Chief General Raheel Shareef. Behind closed doors the group of countries might have pledged some forces to be mobilized in emergency yet, there are no dedicated forces concentrated in KSA. Mustering of fighting force in emergency at KSA by

86 Lai Yew Mang, Nationalism and Politics in Japan’s Relations with China, A Neoclassical Realist Interpretation (New York: Routledge, 2014), pp.33-34. 87 Frederic Grare, “The Challenges of Civilian Control over Intelligence Agencies in Pakistan”, Book Chapter 18 December 2015, Bangladesh Institute of Law and International Affairs.

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Islamic countries remains questionable. Zahid Hussain termed the coalition as “Phantom Islamic Army” a Sunni coalition meant to fight extremism, actually turned out to be anti-Iran coalition. The 41 nations Arab Islamic- American Summit had clearly divided Islamic world on sectarian lines and Pakistan is trapped in the quagmire of sectarian war, which was otherwise supposed to fight the extremism88. The previous government of Nawaz Sharif had declined to join any coalition which may be used to attack any Islamic country. The incumbent government of Prime Minister Imran Khan too, categorically rejected any possibility of joining any armed conflict in the Muslim world. Pakistan had to ensure a subtle balance between domestic sentiment (highly anti US) and systemic variables, forcing Pakistan to adopt a foreign policy which should not only supplement US interests but stay in line with evolving security construct of South Asia including Afghanistan to a large extent. Neoclassical realism as theoretical framework encompasses characteristics of the state, its foreign policy choices, relations with neighbouring countries and systemic forces. Neoclassical realism being new, and an outgrowth of neo or structural realism widens the scope of classical realism by absorbing all its offshoots including the flavour of social constructivism to some extent (e.g. relationship between state and society and ideational power). The post 9/11 terrorist entities fighting the US in Afghanistan and anti-Pakistan TTP operating from Afghanistan and attacking Pakistani security forces and civilian population are the baggage of US backed Afghan jihad of 1980s. Certain Muslim countries like KSA, UAE and Egypt also sponsored the fighters from all over the Muslim world. Thus, pre- 9/11 radicalized jihadist are difficult to be convinced to give up their fight in post 9/1 changed strategic environment. The events like Sardar Daud’s coup in Afghanistan in 1973, Soviet invasion of Afghanistan 1979 and Iranian Revolution 1979 are the cataclysmic land marks in the history of Pakistan which transformed Pakistani society into ultra-religious mind-set and gave birth to violent upheavals in the political landscape of the country89. The Afghan jihad and General Zia’s era will be remembered for promotion of sectarian extremism on one hand yet, the timeframe and peculiar strategic environment offered a window of opportunity to Pakistan to perfect its nuclear weapons programme on the other side90.

88 Zahid Hussain, “A Dangerous Coalition” Dawn, 24 May 2017. 89 Luqman Saeed, Shabib Haider, and Roger P. Martin, “Historical Pattern of Terrorism in Pakistan” Routledge, Defence and Security Analysis, 2014, vol 30, no.3 209-210, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080.14751798.921450 (accessed on 7 February 2015). 90 Agha Shahi, Pakistan’s Security and Foreign Policy (Lahore: Progressive Publishers, 1998), pp.51-53. Agha Shahi further commented on 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan; the only hope to highlight violation of sovereignty of small neighbours by powerful neighbour lay in recourse to international diplomacy; to seek

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It may not be prudent to assume that in Pakistan it was domestic politics or national security imperatives which always dominated the foreign policy of Pakistan including relations with neighbours. Especially in post 9/11 scenario, the systemic pressure from the US was instrumental in the outcome of foreign policy choice adopted by Pakistan. For example, decision by General Musharraf to side with the US for fighting Al-Qaida and international terrorism, was purely influenced by systemic pressures. The domestic mood, national interest in the eyes of common Pakistanis and predominantly religious parties suggested the opposite. Even the latest strategic reorientation by Pakistan’s Military/ Intelligence agency is greatly influenced by internal compulsions, national consensus to eliminate terrorism alongwith the pressure of major external players. The challenges can be viewed from the principles of neo and neoclassical realism because internally, Pakistani leadership was facing tremendous pressure to side with Taliban, and internationally US was furious and demanding unequivocal support to US objectives in Afghanistan91. After 2007, US narrative and Musharraf’s conflict with superior judiciary in Pakistan, did work and the public opinion swung in favour of civilian democratic government and elections. The nexus of constructed narrative of restoring democracy and ensuring civilian supremacy was exposed after revelation of Memo gate in Pakistan in May 2011, implicating civilian government under former president Zardari and his trusted associate Hussain Haqqani, Pakistan’s ambassador to the US. Haqqani is accused for conspiring to invite US military’s intervention; to humiliate Pakistan Military and restore civilian supremacy in Pakistan forever92. As far as exploitation of local culture was concerned the Pashtun traditions were misused and a nationalist Pashtun government was allegedly managed in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KPK) province, for propagation of soft secular Pashtun culture to counter terrorism. Taliban ideology was condemned for violating Pashtun traditions by killing innocent men, children and women. The same Pashtun government was whispering that military was not doing enough to eliminate terrorism from FATA and KPK in 201293. It implicitly reinforced the constructed narrative of blaming Pakistan Military for being

through peaceful settlement of disputes by opting for negotiations, good offices and mediation, the amelioration of situation arising from the use of force by a super power. 91 David Malet, “Faith in the System: Conceptualizing Grand Strategy in the Post 9/11 World Order” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, 725, DOI: 10.1080/10576100802206541 (accessed on 7 February 2015). 92 The opposition leader of the time, Nawaz Sharif lodged a petition in the Supreme Court of Pakistan and then Army Chief and DG ISI also testified Haqqani’s involvement in Memo gate by depositing affidavits in the Supreme Court, in 2012. 93 Ismail Khan, Awami National Party Airs Misgivings about Anti-Terror War Seriousness, Dawn, 7 October 2008.

39 selective in counterterrorism operations. It was glaring example of a disconnect between state and security institutions and the ruling political elite. The cognitive variables under neoclassical realism especially psyche of leadership and capacity of institutions to combat terrorism is vital in any country however, they wield special significance in South Asian region94. Asymmetric relations with the US place Pakistan at a disadvantage and at times, vital national interests are partially compromised. Escalation along LoC and Indian military targeting civilian population under the garb of preventing infiltration by Kashmiri freedom fighters crossing from Pakistani side of Kashmir magnify Pakistan’s security dilemma from the eastern border. Latest faceoff between India and Pakistan (February 2019) along LoC reinforces Pakistani security concerns and renders the whole edifice of regional cooperation to fight terrorism as meaningless. This latest confrontation was triggered by a terrorist act in Indian Occupied Kashmir (IoK)/ Pulwama on 14 February 2019 allegedly to have been perpetrated by non-state actors affiliated with a proscribed terrorist organisation stationed in Pakistan. Peter Hough alluded that phenomenon of non-state actors is not new though it is modernized with advent of modern and speedy means of communication95. By capitalizing on influence in Afghanistan, especially military and intelligence elite, Indian intelligence cultivated its sources and attempted to settle the scores by fomenting terrorism and unrest in FATA, Karachi and Balochistan. The outcome is the amalgamation of terrorism by non-state actors and terrorism being sponsored by the state (India). India blamed Pakistan for sponsoring terrorism as an instrument of foreign policy against India, whereas Pakistan believed that it is India which is foiling Pakistan’s counter terrorism efforts, by abetting and sponsoring TTP affiliates and Baloch nationalists. The international community and the US generally downplay allegations against India, despite documentary proof in the form of a dossier, substantiating involvement of Indian intelligence inside Pakistan96. Same

94 Choi Jong Kun, “A Neoclassical Realist Account on External Security of Weak Powers towards Great Power The US-Libya from 1977 to 1992”, online available at http://www.jongkunchoi.com/research/journal-article (accessed on 6 June 2017). 95 Peter Hough, Understanding Global Security (Oxon: Routledge, 2004), pp.75-76. 96 Lately the India Government moved International Court of Justice (ICJ) for gaining access to its serving Naval officer, who was arrested for coordinating spying network in Pakistan and has been tried and sentenced to death by the military court in Pakistan. The ICJ stayed his capital punishment and concluded the hearing awaiting the announcement of the verdict. Irrespective of ICJ verdict, on consular access and capital punishment, involvement of India as a state in internal affairs of Pakistan stands vindicated after arrest of senior spy who is fully being owned by the Indian Government. Permission to Kalbhushan’s mother and wife to meet on 25 December 2017 was termed as a goodwill gesture on humanitarian grounds by the Government of Pakistan.

40 dossier was handed over to the UN Secretary General and the US Secretary of State in October 2015. Thus, terrorism in South Asian region is a complex web of strong domestic sentiment and geo - strategic interests. In Pakistan, terrorism and counterterrorism strategy is impacted with internal polarization on strategy to tackle and capacity deficits of national counterterrorism coordination authority like NACTA and allied prosecution agencies. It is fuelled by interference of regional countries and systemic pressures. The competing regional interests over political dispensation in Afghanistan, trouble in Kashmir and Indo-US nexus attempting to alter geo-strategic landscape of South Asia are hampering any sustainable solution to regional and international terrorism. Tang described that “an immediate cause of the security dilemma is states’ uncertainty and fears about each other’s intentions to do harm under anarchy”97. Under neoclassical realism, Pakistan’s concept of security dilemma implies that no one nation will be allowed to accumulate power at the cost of other nations and work for distribution of power under political and economic alliances/ adjustment. Thus, stability is closely associated with regional security because security can be seen as a more extreme version of politicization98. Relations among regional countries- Pakistan, India and Afghanistan are critical for regional stability because action of one nation affects the other one especially when they have the history of suspicions, wars and outstanding disputes. India- Pakistan relations classically fit into this debate because not only mutual relations are marred by bilateral suspicion frequently, but the countries have fought three wars since independence from British raj (rule) in 1947. The contention of perceived threat is also valid in South Asian security context. The hostilities along LoC with potential to escalate with any incident of terrorism at Indian soil reinforce the perception of perceived threat. Post Pulwama face-off between two countries exposed the fragility of peace in South Asian region. Kashmir cause in Pakistani society is a popular sentiment as well as core issue between India and Pakistan. Thus, no government in Pakistan could ignore extending political, diplomatic and moral support to the ongoing freedom struggle in Kashmir. Paradoxically, the systemic forces by design downplay the blatant human rights violations in Indian occupied Kashmir and join the Indian chorus by terming the freedom movement as terrorism in Srinagar valley. A clear case of human rights violation and deprivation of right of

97 Shipin g Tang, “The Security Dilemma: A Conceptual Analysis” Security Studies, 18:3, 591 DOI: 10.1080/0963641093133050 (accessed on 7 February 2015). 98 Barry Buzan, Ole Waever and Jaap de Wilde, Security A New Framework for Analysis (Colorado: Lynne Reiner Publishers, Inc., 1998), p.23.

41 self-determination under UN charter, is pushed under the wrap of bilateralism because India offers major economic incentives and Pakistan does not fit into chessboard of political economy of major players especially USA. With the passage of time the enmity grew stronger, leading to three major wars on issue of Kashmir- and any terrorist act (from Kashmiri perspective freedom struggle) could engulf entire region in the flames of dangerous war between two nuclear armed neighbours. Post Pulwama aerial fight (27 February 2019) between two air forces along LoC substantiated the contention. According to Hough the issue of Kashmir is no more close to resolution because it has now taken the form of a “nuclear rivalry”99. Three affected countries forming trio of South Asian regional security complex will have to review their traditional stance over bilateral disputes and cooperate to formulate and execute strategy of fighting terrorism in respective countries and the region. Incidentally, USA even in this case, happens to be an important player given its economic, strategic and regional security interests. It may not be misplaced notion to term regional terrorism in South Asia as part of global security challenge that requires cooperation of not only regional countries but the major powers as well to formulate a joint strategy to defeat terrorism. Both the countries (India and Pakistan) continue accusing each other for interference and are defending their case in International Court of Justice predominantly, espionage at Pakistani soil by the Indian spy. The mistrust and hostility is so intense that only international facilitation could help resolve the bilateral disputes100. Relations with the US as independent variable, either as a result of direct engagement or pulling the strings through other countries, can be gauged at the touchstone of neoclassical realism because unlike neorealism, it focuses on international relations along with internal dynamics and characteristics of the state and its institutions as well. While relating the relations with neighbours and international powers, the dynamics of US- Pakistan – India relations are fragile though not zero sum from US perspective101. Given the growing differences over stability in Afghanistan, Pakistan- US relations could be to Indian manipulations in Afghanistan. The debate of military controlling Pakistan’s policy towards Afghanistan and India may be attributed to peculiar security challenges being posed from the eastern border and since 9/11 western border too, aggravating the threat spectrum. The other very relevant argument of military involvement in policy towards Afghanistan and India could be; military

99 Peter Hough, Understanding Global Security, pp.52-53. 100 Buzan, Waever and Wilde, Security A New Framework for Analysis, p. 24-25. 101 Bruce Riedel, Avoiding Armageddon (Washington: Brookings Institution Press, 2013), pp.137-145.

42 leading the counterterrorism fight on western border and sitting eye ball to eye ball with Indian army along LoC. Besides, Indo- Afghan factor, the relations between the US and Pakistani militaries and intelligence agencies are significant factor propelling Pakistan military on the forefront since post 9/11 counterterrorism campaign. The intelligence agencies of both the countries had been operating in unison and conducting joint operations against Al-Qaida operatives. Undoubtedly, ideational power under neoclassical realism, akin to constructivism was employed by the US and Indian media in post 9/11 timeframe to construct a narrative suiting US strategic objectives in Afghanistan and pressuring Pakistan to cooperate in fighting war on terror on US terms. Indian media and academics had been projecting the impression that trouble in IoK is similar to terrorism in Afghanistan or terrorist attack against the US. India partially succeeded in convincing the US and international community that freedom struggle in Kashmir is actually extension of terrorism being waged in Afghanistan. Kargil episode in 1999 dented the freedom struggle by Kashmiris. It may be pointed out that since two years pure domestic uprising by unarmed civilians in IoK did dilute the Indian propaganda. The use of ideational power transformed the domestic political equation and systematic propaganda against Pakistan military after sacking of Chief Justice of Pakistan by General Musharraf in 2007 and generating anti- military sentiment. Military was blamed to be responsible for all the ills in Pakistan, in addition to highlighting much touted civilian supremacy especially after lawyers’ movement of 2007. The international media and think tanks had been consistently playing out a narrative suggesting Pakistan being drifted to a failing state index and its strategic assets being vulnerable to falling into the wrong hands, especially from 2007 to 2014. Military bashing was adopted as a tool to undermine the centre of gravity of Pakistan’s defence. Additionally, there had been a systematic onslaught by international media and academics labelling Pakistan as a country tolerating extremist and terrorist activities at its soil, ostensibly with ulterior motives102. Pakistan is often termed by Indian scholars as a country pursuing coercive escalation by developing tactical nuclear weapons and allegedly coercing its bigger neighbour India, and simultaneously encouraging and tolerating Kashmiri fighters crossing into IoK. Despite fighting terrorism alongside USA and rendering tremendous sacrifices, the attitude of Trump administration is no different from situation

102 Hussain Nadim, “Neither Friends nor Foe: Pakistan United States and the War in Afghanistan”. Lowy Institute online available at https://www.lowyinstitute.org/publications/neither-friend-nor-foe-pakistan-united- states-and-war-afghanistan (accessed on 7 May 2019.

43 since 2014. The hawkish US national security team and the Trump factor are certainly tough challenge for Pakistani government and its military looking after security along Afghan- Pakistan border. However, after US interest in negotiated settlement of Afghan conflict, lately (December 2018) President Trump approached Pakistani government and sought its help in peaceful settlement of the dispute. The other dimension of ideational power is a strategic construct in South Asia wherein, Pakistan is pressured to voluntarily cooperate with IAEA and the US over nuclear security and non-proliferation issues. Whereas Pakistan’s legitimate share in strategic export control regime and transfer of nuclear technology is ignored. Pakistan is an energy starved nation, and the nuclear energy is a viable solution because the country possesses requisite technical expertise in the field. Another issue of transparency over nuclear programme through verifiable cooperative mechanism {which may never materialize due to discrimination against Pakistan after Indian de-facto entry into Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) and formal membership of Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR)} is raised as part of international narrative to discredit Pakistan’s nuclear programme. Confluence of geo-strategic interests was manifested when US pressured Pakistan on the issue of Mumbai attacks on 28 November 2008 and demanded full cooperation over identification and later prosecution of terrorists, suspected to have perpetrated this crime. While no sane person could endorse such a heinous crime against innocent civilians yet, US over involvement made the whole saga of terrorism, emanating from the shore of Indian Ocean rather suspect. Indian obduracy to implicate Pakistan and not sharing the evidence for prosecution of suspected individuals rather spoiled the case of cooperation. In Pakistan, it is believed that the combination of systemic pressures and regional interference for attainment of common objectives is at play at the cost of Pakistan’s strategic interests103. The ideology and extremist narratives specifically constructed by intelligence agencies (US and regional countries) was orchestrated to convince the extremist forces of Pakistani origin (TTP and its affiliates) that they were being funded and trained for waging jihad against ‘apostate’ Pakistani military and the forces of virtues were supporting them to enforce Sharia. The ideational power under neoclassical realism, by capitalizing on socio- cultural and religious norms was executed to achieve political objects. TTP was encouraged

103 A senior former intelligence official was interviewed on 20 March 2016, who on the condition of anonymity confirmed the US involvement and a deliberate attempt to embarrass Government of Pakistan through diplomatic channels, and to push ISI on back foot. This all happened to get certain groups banned by the UN, the US and the Government of Pakistan. Even in Mumbai attacks 2008, Pakistan was pressured to prosecute certain non-state actors without sharing any concrete evidence.

44 to attack Pakistan military, behead soldiers, civilians and sympathizers of military in FATA, and terrorize masses so that Pakistani Government is forced to approach Afghan and US counterparts for reining in of TTP, with latent bargain104. In order to create synergy between two groups, an effort was also made by Afghan and Indian Intelligence to unite Swati militants and Baloch sub nationalist with the help of NDS and Afghan security forces which were harbouring them at Afghan soil. The terrorist groups were deeply entrenched in FATA and were challenging the writ of the state of Pakistan. Though military operation was launched initially in South Waziristan in 2010 yet, a decisive counterterrorism campaign in entire FATA was initiated in June 2014 (launching of Operation Zarb-e-Azb). The military operation in FATA was pending and people of Pakistan did endorse it and termed it as apt and timely for elimination of terrorism from the country. However, Pakistan was subjected to heightened tension along LoC and threat of surgical strikes by India. Despite contribution in elimination of regional terrorism, Pakistan was threatened with dire consequences by the US and military aid worth US $ 255 million, meant to sustain operational and logistics costs of Pakistan’s military operating in FATA was cut. Thus, the roots of classical realism cannot be ignored though its offshoots may have had different shades like neoclassical realism or structural realism. The US effort to blame Pakistan for not extending full cooperation after 9/11 and threats of dire consequences if it did not cooperate with the international coalition in fighting terrorism were propagated in international media to extract maximum concessions from Pakistan105. After theoretical framework the following chapter covers an overview of causes of terrorism in Pakistan and evolution of Pakistan’s counterterrorism (CT) policy.

104 Presence of weapons and equipment currently being used by some regional counties were found with Swati terrorists who had surrendered before military in 2011. The local commanders confirmed successfully apprehending dozens of former Fazlullah fighters. 105 A.Z. Hilali (2013) “Contemporary Geopolitics of FATA: An Analysis of Afghanistan-Pakistan Border Region”, The Journal of Slavic Military Studies, 615-616, doi:10.1080/13518046.2013.844502 (accessed on 7 February 2017). The security and intelligence official who served in operational area and interrogated suspects, found to be in possession of foreign weapon and currency, revealed on the condition of anonymity that Afghan and Indian intelligence officials were actively involved through Afghan sources and abetted bloodbath inside Pakistan by TTP terrorists.

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Chapter 2 Terrorism and Counterterrorism in Pakistan: An Evolutionary Overview This chapter discusses various perspectives on existence of global terrorism, fallouts of regional terrorism in the shape of Afghan jihad of 1980s, Taliban regime fanning sectarianism in Pakistan in 1990s, and post 9/11 terrorism threat spectrum of Pakistan spread over internal security challenges with linkages to interference by regional countries and international pressure. Pakistan had no concrete counterterrorism policy in 1980s and 1990s. It was rather struggling to contain sectarian strife in the country, precipitated by Iranian revolution and Wahhabi philosophy of Saudi Arabia, exported during Afghan jihad. Pakistan’s post 9/11 counterterrorism policy was forced by the event of 9/11 and to instantly confront monster of terrorism at home besides unprecedented systemic pressure from the US. The regional countries especially India and Afghanistan exploited the situation and added into Pakistan’s security woes. This chapter contains four sections: section 2.1 Terrorism as Global Phenomenon- Perspectives on it Existence, 2.2 Causes of extremism and terrorism in Pakistan, 2.3 Evolution of post 9/11 Pakistan’s counterterrorism strategy. While inferences could be drawn from the and internal disturbances in countries like Sri Lanka, India and UK yet, Pakistan’s case is unique wherein fighters from entire world were persuaded and sponsored by the major Muslim countries under the patronage of the super power- USA. Pakistan was converted into a bastion of a global jihad and militant forces continued posing serious threat to internal security of Pakistan and Afghanistan. The climax was a 9/11 terrorist attacks leaving the US and the world perplexed. The incident of 9/11 pushed Pakistan to a crossroad to decide; either tolerate the former jihadis and risk US fury or withdraw its support and join the international coalition against the “forces of evil”. Pakistan opted the latter, but the cost was predictably huge. In Pakistan the society is divided on various lines like sectarian affiliations, ethnic, secular and political orientation of ruling elite. The psyche and perception of leadership played a major role in creating environment which finally favoured pragmatic approach of tackling the menace of terrorism. The domestic sentiments were influenced with the pressure of regional countries and unabated demand of the US to cooperate and do more in the war on terror and bringing about peace in Afghanistan. A specific Chapter 5 is devoted to identification and articulation of various variables representing domestic factors of foreign policy and CT strategy of Pakistan. Therefore, in this chapter pre and post 9/11 CT policies by various governments in Pakistan with linkage to regional compulsions and the US factor

46 have been included. Thus, the enquiry would revolve around interplay between domestic variables and external factors shaping the CT policy of Pakistan since Afghan jihad of 1980s. Various interpretations of post 9/11 war on terror in line with political consideration of elite and extremist forces in the country warranted a befitting counter ideological narrative to neutralize the terrorist appeal and highlight true spirit of religion of peace i.e. Islam. Toros stressed the need of constructing a realistic discourse to discredit terrorist narrative as an ideological counter. Pakistan is in dire need of constructing an ideological discourse so that Taliban’s obscurantist ideology is neutralized106. The latest National Internal Security Policy (NISP) 2014-18, also addresses the need of constructing national ideological narrative by National Counter Terrorism Authority (NACTA) and articulating it with all available means so that the opinion is moulded to reject the extremism by TTP and other terrorist organisations107. It may serve as an alternative to wean away misguided youth from the folds of extremist forces108. US presence in Afghanistan and drone attacks killing civilians inside Pakistani territory affect Pakistan’s capacity to fight terrorism inside its territory and regional terrorism. Growing Indo- US nexus and politico- diplomatic pressure are exacerbating Pakistan’s security dilemma on two fronts- east and the west. Terrorism is sponsored and sustained by many factors and various actors are contributing in this regard. In addition to soft power tools like counter ideological narrative, Scholars like James J.F. Forest in Intersection of Crimes and Terror (2013), touched upon another issue of dealing terrorism in the category of organized crimes like drug trafficking etcetera. There is a need to tackle this issue alongside organized crimes so that concerned agencies could carry out counter actions against the criminal gangs109. The ongoing swoop by law enforcing agencies (LEAs) in Karachi is a typical amalgamation of terrorism with organized crimes and people suspected to have been supporting the mafia gangs which are believed to have been involved in terror financing, directly or indirectly are being rounded up and prosecuted. The Government of Pakistan is seized with the specific task of turning the

106 Harmonie Toros, Terrorism, Talking and Transformation (London: Routledge, 2012), pp.15-35. 107 After issuance of National Internal Security Policy (NISP), NACTA was asked to formulate a national counter narrative to discredit Taliban agenda and expose their true designs of enforcing sharia of obscurantist forces. The narrative was expected to create a fresh discourse to change people’s mind and prepare Pakistani nation for a comprehensive fight against terrorism. NISP is on line available at http://nacta.gov.pk/policies/NISP.pdf (accessed on 1 September 2016). 108 National Counter Terrorism Authority of Pakistan has prepared a draft counter extremism narrative which is likely to be vetted by the parliament. See Dawn Newspaper of November 1, 2017. The policy has been issued to all concerned. 109 James J.F. Forest, Intersection of Crimes and terror (London: Routledge, 2013), pp.10-18.

47 terror financing tap off as part of actions being initiated under policy guidelines by Financial Action Task Force (FATF)110. 2.1 Terrorism as Global Phenomenon- Perspectives on its Existence Internationally, terrorism is an abused term and powerful nations declare certain actions by weaker nations as acts of terrorism and endorse punitive measures; either economic sanctions or military action under chapter VII of the UN. The glaring example is presence of WMDs in Iraq and later proving to be a hoax and mistaken intelligence to facilitate military action by the US111. The other case in point is India managing to get freedom struggle in Kashmir as foreign sponsored terrorism after 9/11, including Hizb-ul- Mujahideen led by Salahuddin being declared as specifically designated terrorist organisation by the US112. It is rather widespread attempt to make all definitions of terrorism meaningless, by lumping together terrorist activities and the struggle to achieve national liberation113. When Taliban challenged the sole super power, they were labelled as terrorists and the global war on terror was unleashed against their legitimate government in Afghanistan (their excesses and violation of UN charter on rights of minorities and political opponents notwithstanding)114. On causes and hatred against other communities by the Muslims as claimed by the President Bush during his address to the nation, immediately after 9/11 attacks, Achariya differed with the discourse about the inevitability of conflict between Islam and the West. He says, “I would argue that the tendency to subsume all types of regional conflicts under the rubric of Islamic terrorist threat ------is problematic”115. Achariya gave another version on religion, values and culture while quoting Huntington’s thesis, emphasising that “clash of

110 FATF Team not Happy with Pakistan’s Efforts to Combat Terror Financing: Report of 11 October 2018. Online available at https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/faft-team-not-happy-with-- efforts-to-combat-terror-financing-report/articleshow/66162378.cms (accessed on 12 December 2018). 111 http://edition.cnn.com/2015/10/26/opinions/zakaria-iraq-war-lessons/index.html (accessed on 23 December 2017). “The United States replaced the regime in Iraq and gave the new one massive assistance for a decade. The result? Chaos and humanitarian tragedy.” 112 Chapter6, Foreign Terrorist Organisations. Bureau of Counterterrorism and Countering Violent Extremism, Country Reports on Terrorism 2015 Report. Online available at https://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2015/257523.htm (accessed on 22 December 2017). 113 Declared stance of all Governments of Pakistan, to extend political, diplomatic and moral support to Kashmir cause (oft - repeated allegations of sponsoring militancy notwithstanding), quoted by Abdul Sattar in Pakistan’s Foreign Policy, p.56. 114 Though war in Afghanistan was not UN sanctioned however, it is generally perceived as legitimate under article 51 of the UN Charter. Because US was able to muster sufficient international support for US attack on Afghanistan immediately after 9/11. On the contrary, Iraq war was illegal says Annan, on line available at https://www.theguardian.com/world/2004/sep/16/iraq.iraq (accessed on 7 September 2016). “The United Nations secretary general, Kofi Annan, declared explicitly for the first time that the US-led war on Iraq was illegal. Mr. Annan said that the invasion was not sanctioned by the UN Security Council or in accordance with the UN's founding charter. 115 Seminar on Global Terrorism Genesis, Implications, Remedial and Counter Measures (Islamabad: Institute of Regional Studies Islamabad, 2005), p. 317.

48 civilizations” thesis has the virtue of recognising the role of religion and culture as forces for conflict”116. Holloway, while describing the Huntington’s clash of civilization thesis cautioned readers about the concept, “seductive simplicity”. He further added that conflicts in Middle East had little to do with “civilizational identity”117. Achariya further added that most cases of fundamentalism arise when new affluent class takes religion as a form of self-assertion. It is thus a middle-class phenomenon and may not be taken as a by-product of poverty or illiteracy118. Economic argument based on relative deprivation seems plausible if we consider the ranks of extremist groups in Pakistan especially drawn from Madrassas yet, the first Pakistani martyr in Afghanistan was an undergraduate from a government college in Karachi and not a madrassa student”119. Achariya also quoted Mahathir Muhammad equating occupation of Palestine as humiliation during OIC summit in 2003. Relatively weaker nations of Islam defeated and humiliated by the West cannot fight their conquerors and tormentors thus, terrorism is an easier form of taking revenge. In the post 9/11 timeframe killing of hundreds of innocent Muslims in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Somalia and Yemen with drones also inflamed the fire of revenge against US forces and its citizens. The suicide bombers in Pakistan and Afghanistan were motivated to target US forces in Afghanistan and Pakistani forces at Pakistani soil, allegedly abetting US drone attacks. The terrorist organisations like Al-Qaida and ISIS capitalized on the issue of drone strikes and motivated youth to avenge the killings of their loved ones. Ahmed termed the use of drones in FATA and Afghanistan as violation of American judicial system dominated by jury. The president’s right of ordering extra judicial killing under the garb of making US safe was not justified120. According to Ahmed in America two camps are striving against Muslims; one is determined to eradicate Islam; the other is promoting moderates to defeat radical Muslims and promoting meta narrative of clash of civilizations121. The intellectuals like Anne. E Robertson gave another revealing interpretation of terrorism by drawing parallel with hate crimes and ethnic cleansing of communities which are weaker and oppressed. Al-Qaida and ISIS are blamed for misusing Islamic injunctions to

116 Amitav Acharya, Age of Fear Power versus Principle in the War on Terror (New Delhi: Rupa &Co. 2004), p.35. 117 David Holloway, 9/11 and the War on Terror (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press. Ltd, 2008), p.8. 118 Acharya, Age of Fear Power versus Principle, p.39. 119 Deepa M. Ollapally, The politics of Extremism in South Asia (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), p.87. 120 Akbar Ahmed, Thistle and Drone Americas War on Terror or War on Tribal Islam (Lahore: Vanguard Books (Pvt) Ltd, 20013), p.255. 121 Ibid., 309.

49 brutalize non-Muslims, but non-Muslims too, did not hesitate to uproot fellow citizens. He highlighted that the 1492 was the onset of European renaissance and is plagued with excesses to initially Jews in Spain, who were expelled and forced to settle in Balkans under Ottoman Empire and other Eastern European countries. In 1499 seven years after the decree of expulsion, the Spanish state gave its Muslims the same choice to convert or leave. Therefore, ethnic cleansing and religious exploitation was common in every religion and civilization122. Terrorism could be explained during different phases (time frame) or activities reflecting political, religious or ethnic / national sentiments. If we glance the history of extremism / terrorism in the World War II context and bring to modern times till 9/11, the situation is likely to crystallize with greater clarity. The first wave or phase could be absorbed from withdrawal of American forces from the jungles of South East Asia, saw the terrorism placed in the form of ethnic separatism and national liberation. The period witnessed unleashing of shrinking of the French and British Empires and encouraged by self- determination language of the Atlantic charter. Colonial people in Algeria, Cochin Chine (Vietnam), Pakistan and Cyprus, often sought with violent means to get rid of foreign yokes and struggle to create their independent nations states. “People voluntarily kill, or die for collective causes that register groups’ esteem, dignity, and honour”123 Attempt by Palestinian guerrillas to highlight sufferings of Palestinians under Israeli occupation in 1968, was example of national resistance against foreign occupation124. Then came the phase of extremism and militancy which crossed Middle East, Afghanistan, South East and South Asia, with religious movements in countries like Algeria, Chechnya, India, Indonesia, Philippines and beyond with the dream of establishing fundamental Muslim States, by throwing away influence of Western culture. The sole aim is to establish Caliphate and introduce Sharia law. The philosophy gained sympathies of common people with little support of Muslim rulers. Al-Qaida is one such pan- Islamic group which propagated global jihad to oust foreign occupation (US) and establishment of Sharia law. The well-known extremist parties joined Al-Qaida for furtherance of pan – Islamic agenda. “Though Pan- Islamic movement appeared in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, concomitantly with the rapid transformation of traditional Muslim politics into nation states. The man who did more than

122 Mahmood Mamdani, Good Muslims, Bad Muslims, America the Cold War and the Roots of Terror (Lahore: Vanguard Books (pvt) Ltd, 2005), pp.6-10. 123 Marianne Heiberg, Brendan O’Leary and John Tirman, Terror and the States (New Delhi: Manas Publications, 2009), pp.189-190. 124William F. Shughart II, “An analytical ”, 1945-2000. Online available at Shughart, W.F. Public Choice (2006) 128: 7. doi: 10.1007/s11127-006-9043-y (accessed on 23 August 2016).

50 any other to lend an Islamic cost to totalitarian ideology was an Egyptian school teacher, Hassan al Banna (1906 - 49). He was deeply influenced by Egyptian nationhood. He formed Muslim Brotherhood in 1928 with the express goal of counteracting Western influences”125. Pakistan being turned into the bastion of Jihad against Soviet occupation of Afghanistan in 1979, witnessed nurturing of Jihadi philosophy with mushrooming of Madrassas in Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KPK), and Punjab (especially southern part). It is persisting for 30 years and resulted in the radicalization of youth which has now turned their guns to their mentor and are posing serious challenges to security of Pakistan. The dynamics of left wing terrorism also overlapped with extremist ideologies, therefore, it will be of interest to describe the facets of left wing terrorism. These were either ethno- nationalist movements or resistance against illegal foreign occupation by groups in Europe, Latin America, USA and Middle East, which took the campaign of coercion, kidnapping, assassination and bombing at public places to terrorize the masses. They are believed to have been struggling to further rogue Marxist Leninist Maoist political agenda and demanded social justice. These include; Red Army of Germany in 1960, the Italian Red Brigade 1970, Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO), USAs’ Black Panthers and Symbionese Liberation Army (SLA). Last two group embraced Maoist dictum that “Power grows out the barrel of the gun” and adopted modus operandi of carrying out racist armed struggle similar to common criminals. Countries like Turkey, Span, Netherland and Ireland also witnessed the left-wing terrorism126. The radicalization process flourished in South and Central Asia as a result of the war against the erstwhile Soviet Union in Afghanistan. The conflict brought together Egyptians, Saudis, and other nationalities in a conflict zone where they learned about Islam in the context of violence127. This period also witnessed the influence of more radical elements coming out of the Deobandi madrassa streams in Pakistan. This provided greater opportunity for exposure to the jihadi elements from Egypt and elsewhere, which shifted the ideology of some of the Saudi fighters. Saudi Salafis merged with Deobandi school of thought in Pakistan and intensified the scale of terrorism in Pakistan – Afghan region. These Salafis, were

125 S.V Salahuddin, Islam, Peace and Conflict (New Delhi: Pentagon Press, 2008), PP.4 -5. 126 Heiberg, O’Leary and Tirman, Terror Insurgency and the States, pp. 194-95. 127 “These Egyptian Islamists were to form the core of a cohesive Arab movement based in Afghanistan. The CIA actively sought volunteers from Muslim countries across the globe to fight the Soviets, emphasizing Islamic solidarity together with pledges of full financial support. On line available at http://eacpe.org/content/uploads/2014/02/Genesis-of-global-jihad-in-Afghanistan.pdf (accessed on 30 August 2016).

51 originally believed to be pro-regime (Kingdom of Saudi Arabia) in 1970s, because the regime tacitly supported Salafism. However, these ideologues turned ferociously against Saudi regime due to effects of Al-Qaida’s ideology128. Pakistan happens to be the major affectee, it not only faced the onslaught of ideological motivation but also confronted the fury of local militant groups, who had forged alliance with Al-Qaida and they were acting as local proxy for perpetuation of Al-Qaida ideology in Pakistan and Afghan region. TTP happened to be a staunch supporter of Al-Qaida. Though it is follower of Deobandi sect of Sunni Islamic jurisprudence yet, they are close to Salafism and have no serious ideological differences with each other as for as enforcement of Sharia and fight against apostate forces anywhere in the world is concerned129. The hatred against community on the basis of racial superiority, economic interest and religious inclination is no secret and could be found in all the major religious traditions. However, the worrisome trend of use of violence and resort to mass murder strategy especially by Al-Qaida and its affiliates in Afghanistan - Pakistan region, Middle East and Africa was witnessed. Lately more violent ideological wing with the name of Islamic State in Iraq and Levant (ISIL) or Arabic acronym Daesh made the headlines by capturing large swathes of territory in Iraq and Syria (though could hold most of their strongholds till late 2017 only)130 When finding opportunity, Al-Qaida struck targets in USA and Europe and stirred up contentious debates like “Clash of Civilizations or “Crusades” against Muslims. There is historical fact about clash of civilization or clash between two religious entities that is Muslims and Christians, especially during the era of Ottoman Empire which comprised large non-Muslims areas with sizeable population of Christians. Aydin asserted that term Muslim unity goes back to the mid of 1870s, and the transnational vision of Pan Islamic solidarity as a geo-political concept belongs to the 1880s. Therefore, Al-Qaida and probably Neocons of Bush administration only renewed that historical acrimony between the two

128 Al Qaeda exploited US presence in Saudi Arabia and accused USA for exploitation of Saudi oil and abetting of Israel to inflict untold miseries on Palestinian population. The idea worked, and vast majority of Arab supported it. It was only after mass murder strategy of Al Qaeda against civilians in Arab world, Afghanistan and Pakistan when they lost their ideological appeal. An internationally recognized view point, verified by international journalists and think tanks during formal and informal interactions. 129 A classic example of Al Qaeda and TTP collusion, when terrorists succeeded to penetrate and attack the citadel of military power, GHQ in October 2009, and struck another deadly blow by destroying most precious surveillance aircrafts of Pakistan Navy (P3 Orion), by raiding PNS Mehran on 22 May 2011. 130 “The self-proclaimed Islamic State is a hybrid jihadist group with a declared goal of establishing a “lasting and expanding” caliphate. Its strategy for survival and growth blends military, political, social, and economic components. Yet the U.S.-led international intervention against it has largely been limited to air strikes. On line available at http://carnegieendowment.org/2015/06/29/islamic-state-s-strategy-lasting-and-expanding-pub- 60511 (accessed on 31 August 2016).

52 communities131. The ghastly act of terrorism in (16 March 2019 ) claiming lives of 50 Muslims and injuring dozens by a self-proclaimed supremacist re- energized 19th century fault line between Muslims and Christians. Aydin pointed yet another captivating historical fact that despite rivalries between Ottomans and Christian Empires, during great rebellion in 1857 by Muslims of India, Ottomans sided with civilized British Empire132. By resorting to violence, Al-Qaida has done no service to Islam and they also harmed the political and economic interest of the countries of origin of its operatives. Al-Qaida operatives thrived on exploitation of anti-American sentiments in the Middle Eastern region where it is popularly believed that region’s oil resources are exploited by the US and major European countries. The historical difference between Christianity and Islam with regard to Crusades were also accentuated for political and religious gains. It is not only ideological struggle but surely a battle of power politics; to establish the governance of their choice and drive the unwanted elements (non-believers) from the caliphate of Al-Qaida. This caliphate could be in Pakistan – Afghan region or in Middle Eastern / African countries. Daesh had declared self-proclaimed caliphate in the regions of Iraq and Syria, which crumbled under its weight after two years in 2016, in face of US bombing and actions by Iraqi Forces. Daesh proxies in Pakistan and Afghanistan speak of Khorasan Caliphate (comprising Pakistan, Afghanistan, Central Asian States and Iran). Daesh draws inspiration from former Muslim jihadists who preached violence like a Palestinian, Al-Qaida jihad ideal, Abdullah Yusuf Azzam “proselytizing violence in religion”. He was preoccupied with rifle alone: “no negotiations, no conferences, and no dialogue was his motto”133. Initially, vast majority of Muslims supported Al-Qaida because of their popular political theme and anti-American sentiment yet, after exposure of its brutal face in Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Yemen, Somalia, Afghanistan and Pakistan, the organization now enjoys negligible support in Pakistan134. When we look at the other side of the picture that is not very bright either. If Al-Qaida committed crimes against humanity and estranged the non- Muslims, which cannot be condoned, the non-Muslims too, are at times demonstrating less than desired tolerance and religious restraint, much against the avowed policy of secularism

131 Cemil Aydin, The Politics of Anti- Westernism in Asia Visions of World Order in Pan-Islamic and Pan- Asian Thought (New York: Colombia University Press, 2007) pp.60-61. 132 Aydin, The Politics of Anti- Westernism, p.32. 133 Samuel M-Katz, Relentless Pursuit (New York: Tom Doherty Associates LLC, 2002), p.37. 134 Little Support for Terrorism Among Muslim Americans, Pew Research Centre Religion and Public Life, online available at https://www.pewforum.org/2009/12/17/little-support-for-terrorism-among-muslim- americans/ (accessed on 26 March 2019).

53 and championing of global human rights. The example of extreme sense of hate and insensitivity to the religious emotions of Muslims can be cited in case of religious extremism exhibited by US Pastor Terry Jones who had staged the drama of burning the Holy Quran by declaring the holy book as the source of all ills and violence in the Western World, at the cost of extreme pain to Muslims’ religious sentiments135. Occasional misbehaviour with Muslim women wearing scarf in France and Belgium ultimately led to horrific acts of terrorism and revenge136. Taliban too, during their prime rule in Afghanistan did the same thing while destroying the statue of Buddha in Bamiyan Province, and maltreating religious minorities, despite the requests of almost all the countries of the world to the contrary. On the basis of definition of terrorism and guerrilla warfare, it would be pertinent how states could misconstrue this concept and misuse it to grind their political axe137. Needless to mention that violent activities committed by a state against civilians are forbidden by international conventions and are clearly defined as “war crimes” (in the context of a war situation) and as “crimes against humanity” (in other situations)138. It would be worthwhile to point out types of terrorism which are as diverse as the terrorist groups. The terrorist groups could be divided as left wing, right wing, nationalists, state sponsored, anarchist and religious139. All forms of state involvement in terrorism are usually placed under the general category of “terrorist states,” or “state sponsored terrorism”140. The comity of nations too, is blamed for selective cooperation due to political objectives and sponsoring terrorism in

135 “Of course, this is not the first time Jones has tried to burn a Quran. Back in 2010, Jones received a call from then Defense Secretary Robert Gates asking to stop a planned burning, because doing so would put U.S. soldiers at risk around the world. Jones did go through with a burning in April of 2012 and supervised a burning in 2011. On line available at http://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo- ay/2013/09/11/221528510/pastor-terry-jones-arrested- before-planned-quran-burning (accessed on 31 August 2016). 136 “The roots of the problem are complex: France has a history of violence in its encounters with the Middle East and North Africa and a domestic Muslim community with long experiences of discrimination and feelings of exclusion from French society. France’s prisons have become a recruiting ground for extremists. And the French radical right is growing in influence, stoking tensions through rhetoric that is often anti-immigrant and anti-Muslim”. On line available at http://time.com/4407810/nice-attack-france-target-jihadists-terrorism/ (accessed on 30 August 2016). 137 Robert M. Cassidy, Counterinsurgency and the Global War on Terror Military Culture and Irregular war (New Delhi: Pentagon Press, 2006), p.21. 138 “The term crimes against humanity have come to mean anything atrocious committed on a large scale. This is not, however, the original meaning nor the technical one. The term originated in the 1907 Hague Convention preamble, which codified the customary law of armed conflict? This codification was based on existing State practices that derived from those values and principles deemed to constitute the “laws of humanity,” as reflected throughout history in different cultures. Crimes against humanity: murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation, and other inhumane acts committed against civilian populations, before or during the war; or persecutions on political, racial or religious grounds in execution of or in connection with any crime within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal, whether or not in violation of the domestic law of the country where perpetrated.” On line available at http://www.crimesofwar.org/a-z-guide/crimes-against-humanity/ (accessed on 31 August 2016). 139 Barry Davies B.E.M., Terrorism inside a World Phenomenon (London: Virgin Books ltd, 2003), p.28. 140 Magnus Ranstorp ed., Mapping Terrorism Research, State of the Art, Gaps and Future Direction (London: Routledge, 2007), pp.31-32.

54 hostile countries. States that support terrorist organizations, providing financial aid, and ideological support, military or operational assistance are called states supporting terrorism. States that initiate direct action and perform terrorist activities through groups outside their own territory constitute states operating terrorism. Whereas, states perpetrating terrorist acts abroad through their own official bodies, intentionally attacking civilians in other countries for political aims without declaring war are categorized as states perpetrating terrorism. The threat of contemporary terrorism has been described and compiled in a bureau of operations and research international association of police chiefs under title: “contemporary terrorism and selected readings”. The reading identified three categories of terrorist threat: one, urban guerrilla warfare which essentially operates against the legitimate government through the patronage of foreign hand and popular support second, transnational threat which is more pronounced because it is launched with the combination of multi-ethnic, multi lingual and ideological motivations beyond borders third, international terrorism which is combination of almost all three categories but especially internal or local and transnational threat combined141. The prognosis that terrorism will continue in twenty first century for many decades, flows from certain causes and motivations e.g. ideological, political, and national animosities remaining unresolved and thus encouraging terrorists to instigate violence to accomplish their political, ideological, economic and social objectives142. The reasons to pursue terrorism are publicity after major terrorist attack causing destruction and disrupting the government business. Secret communication, facilitation, financing and arms ammunition, and equipment are readily available. International support networks in the form of ideological enclaves, networks of non-state actors and states that patronize terrorists for political objectives are promoting global terrorism143. CT policy is part of overall national security policy. A policy could be defined as cited by Smith “can refer to a set of expectations and intentions, or to a series of actions and their consequences or to all of those together”144. The policy could be direct action (active) or indirect action (passive). In CT domain, direct actions are kinetic actions involving use of force by law enforcing agencies or in worst cases by the military whereas, indirect actions employ non-kinetic measures. Force should be used where absolutely essential because it

141 John D. Elliott and Leclie k. Gibson eds., Contemporary Terrorism Selected Readings (Maryland: Printed in USA, 1978), pp. 4-7. 142 Yonah Alexander, Combating Terrorism Strategies of Ten Countries (New Delhi: Manas Publications, 2003), p.7. 143 Ibid. 144 Davidson Smith, Combating Terrorism (London: Routledge, 1990), p.28.

55 causes collateral damage and civilian casualties could turn the public opinion against counterterrorism operations. This trend was witnessed in Afghanistan when excessive force was used by NATO forces causing civilian casualties. Under national security policy terrorism cannot be accepted and analysed in isolation it is closely linked with other menaces of the world as Dr Lodhi underscored in 2004 UN report panel of experts, by suggesting five other clusters of threat to the world in addition to terrorism along 9Cs solution as part of CT policy145. The five contributory clusters of threat are: 1) economic and social including poverty 2) interstate conflicts 3) internal conflicts 4) the proliferation, loss or use of WMDs 5) transnational organised crimes. 2.2 Causes of Extremism and Terrorism in Pakistan While exploring history of extremism in Pakistan, Jayarama asserted that civilian governments in Pakistan ceded unprecedented political space to the security establishment. The factor of Islamic parties, especially Jamaat- e – Islami, (JI) and intervention of USA were also constant as for as role of security establishment in political arena was concerned146. The desire of remaining relevant to power corridors, religious scholar like Maulana Maududi, calling General Yahya as “Champion of Islam” is eye catching147. The regime of General Zia-ul- Haq from 1976 to 1988 contributed towards flourishing of Islamic teachings and mushrooming of madrassas. According to Ahmed in Pakistan, fundamentalism was mobilized and made sectarian by the government of General Zia-ul- Haq148. Thus, sectarian extremism was allowed to embellish in an institutionalized manner let alone imagining any CT policy till 9/11, 2001. According to Vali Nasr, during General Zia’s regime, the religious identity was integrated into state ideology to achieve the goal and process of development with purported Islamic values149. Rather than over relying on Islamic bondage, the situation could have been handled in a more political manner, may be Pakistan was saved from being dismembered in 1971150. The scholars like Rizvi actually hold Field Marshal Ayub Khan responsible for

145 Keynote address by Dr Maliha Lodhi on “Global Terrorism Genesis, Implications, Remedial and Counter Measures” (Islamabad: Institute of Regional Studies Islamabad, 2005), p. xvii. 9Cs heave been interpreted by the author in the context of CT policy both at home and abroad and there may be difference of opinion in essence of proposed CT strategy by Dr Lodhi. 146 P.S Jayarama, India’s National Security and Foreign Policy (New Delhi: ABC Publishing House, 1987), pp.3- 4. 147 Hassan Abbas, Pakistan’s Drift into Extremism Allah, the Army and Americas War on Terror (New Delhi: Pentagon Press, 2005), p.57. 148 Khaled Ahmed, Sectarian War Pakistan’s Sunni-Shia Violence and its Links to the Middle East (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), p.23. 149 Seyyed Vali Reza Nasr, Islamic Leviathan: Islam and the Making of the State Power (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), p.81. 150 Brigadier A.R. Siddiqui, East Pakistan The End Game an Onlooker’s Journal Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2005). pp.102-103.

56 sowing the seed of discontentment, ethnic extremism and harbouring the ambition of grabbing political power151. Pakistan had been under pressure for reining in the terrorists in Indian occupied Kashmir (IoK) and Afghanistan after Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan (since 1991), during civilian governments of Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif and later during military rule of Musharraf till 2001. General Zia-ul-Haque, the chief architect of Pakistan’s policy towards Afghan jihad of 1980s, promoted the culture of global jihad and extreme sense of sectarian radicalization at home. Deobandi sect was patronized to establish seminaries for churning out manpower for CIA’s sponsored Afghan jihad. Petro dollar of KSA and generous CIA support helped mushrooming of seminaries in FATA and other parts of Pakistan. The seminaries enjoyed special veneration and their graduates were accorded recognition with compatible degrees in the mainstream education system, with 10 extra marks. Therefore, from 1979 till late 1990s, the policy had been coexistence with religious extremism. General Zia introduced radical changes in the syllabus for various training courses, promotion examinations and offered incentives to military officers who were devout Muslims and preaching others as well152. In the Officer’s messes of Pakistan military, alcohol was banned in the bars and strict adherence to Islamic teachings and values were encouraged at all levels153. The Islamization as package in all forms and manifestations was bound to impact all Pakistanis and particularly those fighting in Afghanistan and Kashmir. After General Zia’s death in an air crash in 1988, Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif ruled the country for two tenures each but could not complete their term of five years. The allegations of corruption and gross mis-governance are also to blame for their ouster. These democratically elected governments had to cooperate and stay the course with the security establishment which was deeply entrenched in Afghan Jihad154. The biggest threat for both the leaders was confrontational form of government policies over division of powers between

151 Dr Arshad Rizvi, The Political System of Pakistan, A Constitutional Study (Karachi: paramount Books Pvt Ltd, 2014), pp.200-201. 152 The army officers were tasked to preach Islamic teachings and values by General Zia-ul- Haq in 1980s. 153 During General Zia’s regime, the commanding officers of the military units were supposed to lead Zuhar (noon) prayer in the military unit premises. 154 Imtiaz Gul, “Pakistan’s Reverse Revolution” The Islamization of Pakistan 1979-2009, Viewpoints Special Edition p.13., The Middle East Institute Washington DC, on line available at http://wwwmei.edu (accessed on 10 August 2016). “Forced into international isolation and hamstrung by a mighty military establishment whose strength was rooted in the Afghan jihad of the 1980s, none of the four civilian governments in the 1990s could turn Pakistan’s foreign policy around, particularly its India and Afghanistan policy.” When in 1999 then-Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif attempted to open up to India, the army undercut the move in May 1999 and the country was brought to an open war with India because mujahideen had occupied strategic heights in Jammu and Kashmir in Dras and Kargil Sectors. This revived the acrimony between India and Pakistan, and sowed discord between Sharif and then-Chief of Army Staff General .

57 state institutions and the inequitable distribution of resources under the federal framework155. Benazir as a person was secular in nature yet, her government supported Taliban and her Interior Minister General Naseer ullah Baber (retired) used to say “these (Taliban) are my boys”. Nawaz Sharif and his party is believed to be pro – Right wing therefore, he was comfortable with rise of Taliban and did make serious efforts to forge unity between Afghan Taliban and Northern Alliance in 1990s156. From 1989 to 1999, the decade witnessed another dimension of militancy when new Lashkars (militias) were formed to wage jihad in Kashmir and help their Kashmiri brethren come out of the Indian clutches. This was also period of tension between India and Pakistan. Lashkare-e-Tayaba (LeT) and Jaish-e-Muhammad (JeM) were two main groups which had been fighting in Indian occupied Kashmir (IoK). This period was though a democratic rule yet, no major changes were affected by civilian political leadership in post Zia-ul- Haq Islamization and Jihad policy. Nawaz Sharif though, at latter part of his premiership stint tried to break the inertia by signing Lahore Declaration with Indian Prime Minister Vajpayee in 1999. However, Kargil adventure by General Musharraf in 1999 scuttled the Lahore declaration resulting into removal of Sharif government and his exile to Saudi Arabia157. The Kargil episode may have afforded Pakistan tactical gains militarily yet, the Kashmir freedom movement suffered and India along with USA labelled the operation as an act of terrorism by non-state actors supported by the state of Pakistan158. Until 2001, Pakistan was following its domestic policy of supporting ruling Afghan Taliban after prolonged civil war and bloodbath and extending support to Kashmiri freedom fighters in Indian Occupied Kashmir (IoK) with little trouble at home except occasional sectarian violence in the country. The extraordinary incident of 9/11 brought the war on terror to fore and Pakistan had to directly confront the wrath of sole super power- USA. Pakistan

155 Roger D Long, A History of Pakistan (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2015), pp. 671-672. The foreign policy under civilian governments had been dismal from 1988 to 1999.The democratic governments had been struggling to just stay in power, albeit half of stint against stipulated five years stay in office. Neither Nawaz Sharif nor Benazir Bhutto were able to give any worthwhile foreign policy direction. 156 Benazir had to deal with ethnic violence in Karachi, when JUI and Senator Sami–ul - Haq planned to send some madrassa students (Taliban) to Afghanistan to help keep vital roads open. Nawaz Sharif had to follow suit, under pressure of security establishment. It was active interference from Pakistan and formal declaration of of Afghanistan with outside support. It was also beginning of Talibanization of Pakistan (proved in 2004 onwards). Online available at http://ipac.kacst.edu.sa/eDoc/2006/158103_1.pdf. (Accessed on 3 December 2015). 157 While interviewing former military and intelligence officers, it was established that Northern Light Infantry troops along with Kashmiri mujahideen fought valiantly and really took Indian Army by throat after occupying heights across the Line of Control ranging from 5 to 10 kilometres, somewhere in December 1998/January 1999. 158 The international sentiment was against any act of terrorism perpetrated by non-state actors. India benefitted with US support.

58 offered full support to US military for attacking Al-Qaida bases and Taliban regime in Afghanistan and left the issue of terrorism in FATA to evolving security environment around Afghanistan- Pakistan bordering regions. Support to Kashmiri freedom fighters also figured out in the post 9/11 anti-terrorism scenario. The decision by Musharraf to discourage cross border movement of Kashmiri freedom fighters in 2003/04 proved to be the last straw on the proverbial militants’ camel’s back. The militants were disillusioned with Musharraf’s virtual surrender (as per extremists’ interpretation) to India, under the US pressure159. There was bickering and resentment and certain militant organizations of Kashmiri origin splintered and joined Al-Qaida by shifting their bases to FATA and later on TTP provided an ideological umbrella to terrorist entities, who were resenting change of policy by the Pakistani security establishment and the government. It is mainly because of perception that US intentionally coerced Pakistan to take a policy shift without a solid quid- pro- quo from India. Seemingly, India is rather encouraged to pursue anti- Pakistan policies after relief in pressure from Kashmiri militants, who were fighting Indian security forces. Arrest of senior Indian spy and his confession for sponsoring militancy by supporting the Baloch nationalists in the province of Balochistan and Tehrik-e- Taliban Pakistan (TPP) reinforce the popular perception of Indian interference in Pakistan160. Both the entities are involved in worst kind of terrorism and brutal massacre of innocent Pakistani women, children and law enforcing agencies’ personnel. 2.3 Evolution of Post 9/11 Pakistan’s CT Strategy The US invasion of Afghanistan pushed top Al-Qaida leadership including Osama Bin Laden (OBL) and Afghan Taliban to FATA, and Pakistan was forced to mobilize its military to FATA first time in the history since independence, in 2002-2003. Musharraf’s somersault on domestic and regional counter terrorism policy coupled with military presence in FATA was viewed as infringement in tribal norms and culture by Pakistani Taliban besides being dubbed as action under US pressure. Al-Qaida declared Pakistani government and its military as apostate and its functionaries being liable to be killed in accordance with Salafi ideology. Till

159 Role of non-state actors is established in close coordination with establishment since liberation of Kashmir (1948), Operation Gibraltar (1965) and AL Badar / Al Shams groups of JI in Bangladesh in (1971). LeT and JeM are two controversial groups, blamed for terrorism in IoK. JeM and its chief were implicated in terrorist attack against Indian air base of Pathan Kot on 2 January 2016. The joint inquiry still remains inconclusive between India and Pakistan. 160 Surat Khan Marri, The Serviles Baloch Resistance (Quetta: Gosha-e- Adab, 2014), p.93. The Baloch Nationalists view all mega projects as exploitation of Baloch natural resources and Pakistani security forces and as occupation forces since 1947. Marri quoted Carnegie, USA that, “mega projects are meant to exploit Baloch resources”. It says that Balochistan failed to benefit from its natural resources, gas, which was discovered in 1953, was supplied to Multan ad Rawalpindi in 1964 (cities of Punjab Province) but Baluchistan’s capital city Quetta was provided gas only after establishment of military garrison in 1986.

59 late 2004-2005, Pakistan’s strategy was to avoid confrontation with the US as well as Taliban, while ensuring presence of its military in FATA to prevent proliferation of terrorism in urban centres. Various peace agreements were signed with local Taliban commanders of FATA to appease the leadership and win their support for peace in the region. Pakistani Taliban started targeting Pakistani soldiers thus aggravating the bad blood leading to open conflagration between Pakistan military and Pakistani Taliban, especially after 2007/8. In the hindsight, military operation in Lal (Red) Mosque Islamabad in 2007 turned out to be a game changer in turning the tables on Pakistani security forces161. Musharraf’s collusion with Mutahida Majlis-e- Amal (MMA) in former frontier province was a serious jolt to Pakistan’s CT strategy in the province, worst affected with terrorism. Additionally, government in former frontier province led by alliance of religious parties did not permit military operations against Tehrik Nifaz-e- Shariat-e- Muhammadi (TNSM). They refused requisitioning the military, a constitutional prerequisite for any military action in aid of civil power, from 2003 till 2008162. Sufi Muhammad and his son in law Fazlullah also known as Mullah Radio, strengthened their hold through brutal enforcement of sharia laws of their brand. The situation in Swat gradually worsened to an extent that federal government of President Zardari had to order a military operation in 2009 to evict the terrorists and restore writ of the provincial government. Till 2008, military had been reacting against Taliban violence without pursuing a clearly defined counter terrorism (CT) strategy. The Pakistan Peoples Party’s (PPP) government authorized military leadership (General Ashfaq Pervez Kayani) in 2009 to formulate a CT strategy and implement it as well. He was given a free hand and the political leadership took the ownership of all actions by the military; initially in Swat in 2009 and later in South Waziristan in 2010. General Kayani’s doctrine if one may call it, anchored around eliminating Taliban threat of taking over settled areas in frontier province concomitantly stabilizing the cleared regions before opening up the front of entire FATA and inviting uncalled for destabilization of the country. While explaining conflicts, Louis Kriesberg (2013) explained constructive conflicts “seemingly intractable conflicts do not begin that way

161 A cleric at Red Mosque, Islamabad July (2007) turned rebellious and started imposing restrictions on residents of Sector G-6, Islamabad. Kidnapping of female employees from Chinese Parlour, located in F-8 Sector of Islamabad precipitated the security operation against the compound. The exact figure of casualties is not known because media was not allowed to cover the incident. Many Pakistani believe that Musharraf acted under pressure of powerful countries to save his declining regime. It acted as trigger in Pakistan as for as new wave of terrorism and suicide bombing is concerned. 162 Pakistan had deployed 180,000 troops along Pak – Afghan border whereas 45 plus NATO nations could muster only 140, 000 personnel, currently the strength is just about 10,000 personnel. The deployed figure is negligible because most of the troops are employed on training of Afghan Security Forces and logistics etcetera.

60 but become so over time as a result of actions committed by and actions not taken- by the adversaries and possible intermediaries”163. The statement classically fits into Pakistan’s security challenges from FATA; either not taking action after 2007 (formative year of TTP and Red Mosque suicide squad) or taking actions, which were too late in 2014164. General Musharraf attempted to engage militants fighting Pakistan military in FATA in 2005 and 2006 to find a negotiated settlement of the conflict by unveiling a 3 D (dialogue, deterrence and development) CT strategy. However, due to ideological differences and strategy to tackle terrorism at home, there was negligible progress except signing of short lived truce agreements with local Taliban commanders in FATA. PPP government also pursued 3 D strategy by extending ownership of the elected leadership of the country from 2008 till 2013. This strategy was just a political rhetoric because military oversaw CT operations with delegation of power to plan and implement actions at its own. The government of Nawaz Sharif having exhausted the options of negotiated settlement of internal unrest in first half 2014, decided to go for an all-out military operation to flush the militants from all agencies of FATA. After decision to launch military operation in entire FATA and purge settled areas from presence of Taliban, the politico- military leadership decided to launch a military operation code named as Operation Zarb-e- Azb in North Waziristan and Khyber Agencies in June 2014. It was unanimously realized that in order to neutralize support base and bust network of facilitators in urban centres, integration of police, civil society and people at large is critical for total elimination of scourge of terrorism. Therefore, a number of judicial and administrative reforms in the shape of a National Action Plan (NAP), envisaging various actions at national level were approved. The 20-point NAP on counterterrorism was announced by Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif in a televised address to the nation in the aftermath of Army Public School (APS) carnage on 16 December 2014. The cardinal points of NAP, a de-facto CT Strategy are as follows165: 1. Implementation of death sentence of those convicted in cases of terrorism. 2. Special trial courts under the supervision of Army. The duration of these courts would be two years. 3. Militant outfits and armed gangs will not be allowed to operate in the country.

163 Louis Kriesberg and Bruce W. Dayton, Constructive Conflicts from Escalation to Resolution (New Delhi: Row man and Littlefield Publishers, 2013), p.195. 164Dayton, Constructive Conflicts from Escalation to Resolution, pp.194-196. 165 Copied from Facebook page of Pakistan’s Interior Minister, Mr Ahsan Iqbal, online available at https://www.facebook.com/ahsaniqbal.pk/posts/10152492466851078 (accessed on 24 December 2017).

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4. NACTA, the anti-terrorism institution will be strengthened. 5. Strict action against the literature, newspapers and magazines promoting hatred, decapitation, extremism, sectarianism and intolerance. 6. All funding sources of terrorists and terrorist outfits will be frozen. 7. The defunct outfits will not be allowed to operate under any other name. 8. Establishing and deploying a dedicated counter-terrorism force. 9. End to religious extremism and protection of minorities will be ensured. 10. Registration and regulation of religious seminaries. 11. Ban on glorification of terrorists and terrorist organisations through print and electronic media. 12. Administrative and development reforms in FATA with immediate focus on repatriation of IDPs. 13. Communication network of terrorists will be dismantled completely. 14. Concrete measures against promotion of terrorism through internet and social media. 15. No room will be left for the extremism in any part of the country. 16. Ongoing operation in Karachi will be taken to its logical end. 17. Balochistan government to be fully empowered for political reconciliation with complete ownership by all stakeholders. 18. Action against elements spreading sectarianism. 19. Formulation of a comprehensive policy to deal with the issue of Afghan refugees, beginning with registration of all refugees. 20. Reforms in criminal courts system to strengthen the anti-terrorism institutions including provincial CIDs. The actions identified to be implemented by security agencies were executed to a large extent and military court handed down capital punishments to terrorists. Most of these were promptly executed by the military barring a few stayed by superior judiciary. However, civilian prong of NAP was partially implemented- including transition to civilian administration of areas cleared by the military and implementation of constitutional FATA reforms for its integration into KPK province. Another critical facet of NAP is monitoring of madrassas (seminaries), control over hate speeches and counter narrative to defeat sectarian extremism. This aspect is really an Achilles heel of Pakistan’s internal security policy, warranting actions on war footing. Unless major political and religious parties are on board it would remain a political rhetoric alone. The religious-political parties are shielding behind

62 the cause of serving religion by imparting religious training and using these seminaries as political expediency. The millions of students are their bayonet power to deter government and to further their sectarian objectives. Therefore, it is a complex web of socio-economic degradation, myopic interpretation of Islamic jurisprudence suiting one’s sect and a potential force to deter the elected governments. Dharna (sit in) in November 2017, by one of the religious groups validated the contention of vulnerability of any elected government. While Pakistan is an Islamic republic and will continue to be so in future however, the benefits of an Islamic welfare state remain a distant dream for the common Pakistanis. The issue of counter narrative is complex one and it requires a paradigm shift in the societal mind set which should shun violence in the name of religion while respecting and practising divine tenets of universal religion of Islam. National Counter Terrorism Authority (NACTA) alone will not be able to affect a real change. They may only publish papers emphasizing madrassa reforms and certain administrative actions to ban hate speeches and print material. The real change requires a visionary leadership inspiring the masses about the balanced and tolerant view of Islam and projecting a new paradigm infused with golden principles of Islam, guaranteeing rights free of bigotry and discrimination on caste, creed and colour. When the analysis of actions by a sovereign state – Pakistan is carried out through the lens of neoclassical realism, certain trends are visible both at home and at international level. Domestically the military leadership was reluctant to take terrorists head on due to fear of backlash and greater destabilization. The regional security dictates too, merited a cautious approach while US attitude was overbearing and pushed the country to take action in FATA which incited open confrontation with militant groups which were apparently focusing at Afghan bordering region166. Irrespective of regional nuances and pressure by the US, the inquiry revealed that Pakistan had to fight the menace of terrorism squarely sooner than later because the monster was getting too strong to be contained in FATA alone. Post 9/11 period is full of diplomatic coercion, economic exploitation, and threats of use of military force, pressuring the Government of Pakistan to not only cooperate with the US Military and Intelligence Agency (CIA) but to deploy forces in FATA which was unprecedented in the history of Pakistan. The complexity of relations between Pakistan and USA was acknowledged by US Defence Sectary Robert Gates in his book- Duty167. Secondly

166 Bruce Riedel, Deadly Embrace Pakistan America and the Future of Global Jihad (Virginia: RR Donnelley, 2011), p.21. 167 Robert M. Gates, Duty (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2004), p.388.

63 regional countries especially India also capitalized on the vulnerabilities of Pakistan and started patronizing TTP and Baloch sub nationalists to further weaken the State of Pakistan. Therefore, besides domestic sentiment and weak civilian security structures, it is interstate relations in the context of regional dynamics of foreign policy vis-à-vis perception of elite, ideational power which are at play with cumulative effect on foreign policy choices by the state of Pakistan. Immediately after 9/11 Pakistan had been struggling to avoid US rage, prevent Indian ingress into Afghanistan and keep the internal front united. The perpetrators of 9/11 attack were though linked to OBL who was stationed in Afghanistan yet, Pakistan could not remain unaffected during the crisis due to multiple factors like geography and history of Afghan jihad waged from Pakistani soil especially FATA. President Bush while addressing the nation after terrorist attack of September 11, 2001, not only vowed to get the attackers but those who harbour them as well (probably hinting at Pakistan). The transcript reads, “American might in all fields will be utilized to hunt down the perpetrators, I have directed the full resources for our intelligence and law enforcement communities to find those responsible and bring them to justice. We will make no distinction between the terrorists who committed these acts and those who harbour them”168. President Musharraf while addressing the nation on 19 September 2001 accepted the grave situation for Pakistan and emphasised the US demands for supporting their war on terror to; oust Taliban regime and apprehend Osama bin Laden for the horrendous act of 9/11. He mentioned that US administration was demanding assistance in three areas: “intelligence – information exchange, use of Pakistani air space and logistics support, though no operational details have yet been shared with Pakistan”169. “In this situation if we make the wrong decisions it can be very bad for us, our critical concerns are our sovereignty, second our economy, third our strategic assets (nuclear and missiles), and forth our Kashmir cause. All four will be harmed if we make the wrong decision”170. Pakistan under Musharraf regime had been adjusting to US demands but was maintaining a balance whereby its vital national interests in Jammu and Kashmir were not

168 September 11, 2001 Posted: 11:14 PM EDT (0314 GMT), (CNN) -- The text of President Bush's address Tuesday night, after terrorist attacks on New York and Washington: Online available at http://edition.cnn.com/2001/US/09/11/bush.speech.text/ (accessed on 7 December 2017). 169 President (Musharraf) address to the Nation 19 Sept 2001. Online available at https://presidentmusharraf.wordpress.com/2006/07/13/address-19-september-2001/ (accessed on 1 December 2017) 170 President (Musharraf) address to the Nation 19 Sept 2001. Online available at https://presidentmusharraf.wordpress.com/2006/07/13/address-19-september-2001/ (accessed on 4 December2017).

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compromised due to newfound focus on terrorism. Indian lobby in USA had been feverishly projecting the freedom struggle in Kashmir as Pakistan’s sponsored terrorism. On 22 September 2004, President Musharraf while addressing 59th session of the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) in New York highlighted the complex transformation of global order after Cold War and the simmering threats of clash of civilizations and terrorism. He carefully separated the issue of Kashmir and Palestine from the ambit of terrorism because it falls within the realm of right of self-determination. He underlined upheavals in the Muslim world and the lingering disputes of Palestine and Kashmir providing terrorists a cause to fight for, with a view to free their brethren from the clutches of foreign occupation171. The gravity of situation and threat of US aggression after 9/11 was evident from Musharraf’s interview with “60 Minutes” on 21 September 2006, in which he revealed that Richard L. Armitage, the then Deputy Secretary of State, communicated to Pakistan’s Director General Inter-Services Intelligence, who was on a visit to USA, threatened and said: “be prepared to be bombed. Be prepared to go back to the Stone Age.” General Musharraf added, that it was a very rude remark172. In an article published in the local English daily titled "I Stand by My Decision”, on 4 October 2011, President Musharraf defended his decision of siding with the US and explained his rationale of reaching at the final decision- consulting heads of political parties, top advisors and military corps commanders. In his article, Musharraf further mentioned Indian factor while defending Pakistan’s strategic interests and avoiding serious reprisals from the US side. He asserted that India would have been happy with such a response from the US harming Pakistan’s core national security interests. This would surely have been a foolhardiness, rash and most unwise decision. Our strategic interests, our nuclear capability and the Kashmir cause would have been irreparably compromised Musharraf added. He continued, “indeed, we might have put our very territorial integrity at risk”173. In response to a U.S. demand for blanket over flight

171 President Musharraf’s address to 59th UNGA on 22 September 2004. Online available at https://presidentmusharraf.wordpress.com/2007/03/17/united-nations-59th-session/ (accessed on 4 November 2017). 172 President Pervez Musharraf of Pakistan spoke to CBS news on 21 September 2006 while on visit to the US and stated that the United States threatened to bomb his country if it did not cooperate with the American campaign against the Taliban in Afghanistan, claimed on 22 September 2006. Online available at http://www.nytimes.com/2006/09/22/world/asia/22pakistan.html (accessed on 7 December 2017). 173 On the 10th Anniversary of 9/11 Attacks, General Musharraf Defends His Decision to Ally Pakistan with the U.S.-Led War against Terrorism, MEMRI special dispatch 4 October 2011 Online available at https://www.memri.org/reports/10th-anniversary-911-attacks-gen-musharraf-defends-his-decision-ally-pakistan- us-led-war (accessed on 10 December 2017).

65 and landing rights to conduct all necessary military and intelligence operations, he wrote: "I offered only a narrow flight corridor that was far from all sensitive areas." This flight corridor involved the use of two airbases, at Shamsi in Balochistan and at Jacobabad in Sindh provinces174. He also referred to telephone call the next morning by General Colin Powell who was absolutely candid: “You are either with us or against us. This was a blatant ultimatum.” Pervez Musharraf spoke with Stanford political science Professor Scott Sagan in Memorial Auditorium in January 2009 and explained Pakistan’s role in war on terror and the country as a victim of terrorism and the not the perpetrator as allegedly perceived by certain international quarters. He stressed the need of addressing the root causes of the menace of terrorism rather than tackling the peripheral issues. He defended his country's record on combating terrorism and highlighted the US role in the aftermath of Afghan jihad of 1979 when US abandoned the region and left the mess to Pakistan. He said that, "we got nothing everyone left us, abandoned us, and said you are on your own”175. On history of US-Pakistan relations, Waseem stated that Washington and Islamabad experienced periodical shifts in the pattern of their strategic alliance which led to “anti-Americanism of the variety of friendship- betrayal syndrome in Pakistan”176. The securitized issue of Jammu and Kashmir and excesses by Indian Military and legitimate interests in Afghanistan, also inhibited Pakistani government and its military from a decisive policy of stopping militants crossing into Jammu and Kashmir and Afghanistan. Understandably, there is a soft corner for Kashmiri organisations, because people of Pakistan will not tolerate any move which is aimed at curbing freedom struggle in the face of Indian brutalities in the Srinagar valley. The coercion by the US continues unabated and Pakistan is being forced to help achieve political dispensation in Afghanistan which guarantees interests of USA and regional countries. On the contrary Pakistan’s legitimate interests are being overlooked and above all history of Afghanistan is seemingly being ignored; under the veiled threat of economic coercion by withholding the future instalments of Coalition Support Fund

174 Ibid. 175 Adam Gorlick, Musharraf Defends Country’s Terrorism Record, Stanford Report, 16 January 2009. Online available at https://news.stanford.edu/news/2009/january21/mushar-012109.html ( accessed on 5 December 2017). 176 Tony Judt and Denis Lacorne eds., With US or Against US Studies in Global Anti-Americanism (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), p.179.

66 and other punitive measures177. Regrettably, Trump’s administration too displayed little sense of understanding about regional dynamics of the Afghan dispute and opted to pressure Pakistan instead. Puri, in his perspective alluded that Pakistan’s slide into war on terror provoked war into its borders which is being subsided with US assistance178. South Asian security calculus fast tilting into Indian favour is another dilemma for Pakistan, demanding every conceivable action to ensure balance of power in the region. Growing Indian political, economic and military clout resulted into bellicosity along line of control and Pakistani civilian population is being subjected to unprovoked bombing frequently. The development distracts Pakistani military fighting terrorism in FATA to purge pockets of terrorists hiding in the area after military operation since 2014. The strategic alliance after Indo- US strategic partnership since 2005, did pave way for massive Indian influence in the region and her entrenchment in Afghanistan proved to be a source of destabilization in the region especially Pakistan. Preparation of dossier testifying involvement of Research and Analysis Wing (RAW) - Indian Intelligence Agency, in internal affairs of Pakistan is a proof in this regard. Presenting copies of this dossier to the UN Secretary General and the US State Department substantiate Pakistani concerns with regards to Indian interference from Afghan soil179. The Bush Administration had been applauding Musharraf government till such time US interest in Afghanistan were served (from 2002 to 2006). Thereafter incidents like Raymond Davis killing Pakistanis at Lahore, attack on OBL compound and US air strike on Pakistani post at Salala along Afghan border (mainly year 2011) strained bilateral relations resulting into suspension of NATO supply convoys for considerable time by Pakistani authorities. However, both the countries managed to maintain working relations and military / intelligence agencies had been cooperating in fighting terrorism in Afghanistan- Pakistan bordering region. The series of parleys between US State, Security and Intelligence departments’ officials and Pakistani counterparts during November/ December 2017 helped defuse the tension between two countries. In July 2018, there were improved signs of

177 $300m US aid for Pakistan withheld, The News International, 5 August 2016, on line available at https://www.thenews.com.pk/print/140303-300m-US-aid-for-Pakistan-withheld (accessed on 1 September 2016). 178 Samir Puri, Pakistan War on Terrorism Strategies for Combating Jihadist Groups Since 9/11 (Oxon: Routledge, 2012), pp.33-34. 179Access to Jadhav: India goes slow in ‘spy’ case after Tehran launches probe, reported in Indian Express, on line available at http://indianexpress.com/article/india/india-news-india/access-to-jadhav-india-goes-slow-in- spy-case-after-tehran-launches-probe/ (accessed on 2 September 2016). His mother and wife were allowed to meet him on 25 December 2017 in presence of Indian diplomat, at Pakistan’s Foreign office building at Islamabad. 67 cooperation and Afghan government too, acknowledged positive role of Pakistan. Elimination of Mullah Fazlullah in June 2018 by a US drone also helped in improving trilateral relations. The subsequent sudden anti-Pakistan rhetoric, tough stance by the Trump administration and allegations in US National Security Strategy 2017, exposed the fragility of US-Pakistan relations. Pakistan was pressured by being declared as grey in the list of countries for not doing enough to counter illicit financial transactions suspected to be peddled by terrorist entities. The Financial Action Task Force (FATF) warned Pakistan to improve its financial system lest it is declared blacklisted after three months (June 2018)180. Negotiations are going on between FATF and Pakistani government on number of actions taken to implement the reforms agenda in financial sector. The Government of Pakistan launched crackdown against entities declared as proscribed by the UN sanction committee previously. Pakistani security agencies have cracked down on affiliated Lashkar-e- Tayaba, its variant Jamat-ud- Dawa (JuD) and philanthropic wing namely Falah-e- Insaniat Foundation (FiF) and Jaish-e-Muhammad (JeM). The move was aimed at winning US endorsement over verifiable counter terrorism action besides pacifying strong Indian objection on free movement of top 2008 Mumbai terrorists’ attacks suspect and listed as a proscribed entity. The renewed standoff between Indian and Pakistani armed forces since Pulwama attack in IoK, targeting Indian security forces (February 2019) heightened the tension between two countries. Since 2003/4 Pakistani authorities tightened border control to prevent infiltration by Kashmiri freedom fighters from Pakistani side as part of broader post 9/11 CT policy. India succeeded to seek concessions from Pakistan during 2002 mobilization of forces with US support without going to war with Pakistan. Indian Army utilized declining number of terrorist attacks across LoC to bolster defences, erect fence along LoC and installing surveillance equipment. Pakistan’s decision to adopt hands off policy on Kashmir was though a welcome step yet it opened the flood gate of Indian interference in FATA and Balochistan, utilizing Afghan proxies. Post 9/11 environment posed serious challenges to the state of Pakistan and concomitantly presented some opportunities to capitalize as well. Post 9/11

180 Shahbaz Rana, “Pakistan Reviews Draft Action plan against Terror Financing”, The Express Tribune Business, 7 June 2018. The sticking points had been action against Haqqani Network of Afghan Taliban and Pro Kashmir former jihadi organisation like Lashkar-e- Tayaba (LeT), it variant Jamat ud Dawa and philanthropic element Falah-e- Insaniat Foundation (FiF). Just by analysing the target entities, one can imagine the political agenda of India and major powers in pressuring Pakistan to cooperate on their terms.

68 environment and Pakistan’s CT policy presented some challenges but offered few opportunities to the state Pakistan as well. Post 9/11 US-Pakistan cooperation was a huge challenge yet, the partnership offered some opportunities to benefit as well. Since inception Pakistan had to rely on a powerful country (US) for military hardware, the interruptions at critical junctures notwithstanding. Financial bale outs from IMF and other financial institutions was only possible after US positive nod. Even in post 9/11 scenario, US relevance in Afghanistan-Pakistan-India trio is likely to remain dominant. US is not only pressuring Pakistan to deliver on bringing Afghan Taliban leadership to negotiation table but demanding denial of alleged sanctuaries to Afghan Taliban at Pakistani soil and clamping down activities of pro -Kashmir freedom movement organizations in Pakistan as well. Pakistani government started to eliminate terrorism in any form or manifestation from its soil since 2014 - after military operation in FATA. Certain aspects of CT strategy i.e. national action plan warranting monitoring and regulation of madrassas are being fine-tuned by the incumbent government. Another challenge in implementation of post 9/11 CT strategy by Pakistan is strong and bellicose neighbour on the east which is a source of security dilemma from inception and is abetting destabilization inside Pakistan by sponsoring terrorist entities like TTP through Afghan proxies. Handing over of dossier to the UN Secretary General (UNSG) and the US Secretary of State, substantiating Indian interference in internal affairs of a sovereign country is a case in point. Arrest of senior RAW operative at Pakistani soil lends credence to Pakistan’s apprehension of Indian malicious agenda against Pakistani state. India seized the opportunity of 9/11 and managed international pressure in concert with the US in getting freedom fighters declared as terrorists and Pakistan based organizations fighting alongside Kashmiri fighters came under sharp focus. Pakistan was forced to review its policy of sympathizing with freedom fighters crossing into Indian occupied Kashmir (IoK), with no quid- pro- quo from India – demilitarization of IoK, de-escalation along LoC, better economic and diplomatic relations and overall improved atmosphere between two countries. Another neighbour, historically internally disturbed and hostile towards Pakistan; Afghanistan had been a source of destabilization in FATA and other parts of Pakistan especially since 1979 and with a different challenge after 9/11. Post 2014 US drawdown security situation is volatile and unpredictable leaving space open to regional countries and non-state actors. Worsening security situation in Afghanistan compounded Pakistan’s security challenges and inaction by Afghan authorities to evict TTP terrorist from their soil is a constraint in implementation of CT strategy of Pakistan. Due to peculiar administrative

69 status of FATA writ of the government was challenged and traditional law enforcement agencies that is levy and frontier constabulary/ corps needed augmentation by the military. Military operation since 2014 and merger of FATA region with KPK province since 2018 has improved the security situation and terrorist outfits have been flushed from the area. However, blowback effects of instability in adjoining areas of Afghanistan will remain a challenge till completion of better border control and immigration measures along Afghan - Pakistan border. Internally, Post 9/11 disconnect between political and military elite exposed the fragility of decision-making institutions and shortfalls under military rule, energizing varying interpretations and manifestations of national security and foreign policy priorities. Musharraf policies could not control domestic terrorism. Two successive elected governments since 2008 implemented domestic CT policy with varying degree of success to control terrorism. National consensus facilitated announcement of national action plan and implementation of CT strategy across the board since 2015. Maintaining balance between political and religious rights vis-à-vis political blackmail by religious-political parties impeding monitoring mechanism for madrassas and prevention of spread of sectarian hatred impinged upon national counterterrorism efforts. Capacity issues of centralized coordinating agency for cohesive counter terrorism responses at home (NACTA) and civilian law enforcing institutions including police were obstacles in expeditious enforcement of CT strategy. Embroiling army in terrorism-stricken territories after kinetic actions for want of civilian institutions to relieve military is counterproductive. The peculiar regional and international environment offered an opportunity to normalize relations with India and objective diplomacy could have paved way for US facilitation in negotiating permanent resolution of Kashmir dispute. US did intervene and averted conflicts being escalated to an open conflagration; from Kargil, to 2002 attack on Indian Parliament/ mobilization of forces, Mumbai attack in 2008 and constant Indian threat of Pro Active Operations (PAOs) strategy to exploit conventional asymmetry. Pulwama incident of February 2919 exposed the fragility of security situation in Kashmir region highlighting urgency of dealing with Kashmir dispute. With US presence in Afghanistan and ideal relations between Pakistani and US political leadership, military and intelligence institutions at least till 2007 was an opportunity to settle border dispute with Afghanistan and addressing the allegations of terrorists’ safe havens in both the countries. Pakistan had rare opportunity of getting maximum foreign loan written off with better bargain after cooperation with the US howver, the opportunity was missed.

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Chance to revamp domestic institutions especially related to law enforcement in the country, investigation, prosecution and dispensation of justice in the end was partially utilized. CT operations massively impacted regions of Swat, FATA and certain areas of Balochistan. The US and international community should have been urged to come forward and donate for socio-economic uplift of affected regions. The development could have served as an incentive to dissuade youth from enrolment by extremist organisations and improvement in quality of life of locals would have rendered these regions as less hospitable for the terrorist organisations. The vital aspect of socio - economic uplift as part of rehabilitation strategy was missed out. Enactment of CT laws and raising of CT trial courts was another opportunity to be exploited with foreign aid. A chance by Musharraf regime to explain systemic pressure of unprecedented proportion and take parliamentarians, political parties and civil society into confidence for enacting CT laws to make extremism and sectarian hatred as punishable offences was not capitalized. Enactment of Protection of Pakistan Act (POPA) in 2014 was too late and too little an effort in this regard. Having explained evolution of Pakistan’s domestic CT policy with linkage to systemic and regional constraints, the coming chapter discusses systemic forces and Pakistan’s counterterrorism strategy.

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Chapter 3 Systemic Forces and Pakistan’s Counterterrorism Strategy This chapter examines post 9/11 Pakistan-US relations, unprecedented pressure from the US to extend full cooperation to US military and intelligence at the cost of national sovereignty of Pakistan. Pakistan was coerced to cooperate not only with the US but was pressured to review its decades old policy towards Afghanistan and India as well. In pre- 9/11 scenario, Pakistan was occasionally cautioned over incidents of terrorism in India or Afghanistan and its security establishment was blamed for masterminding terrorism in neighbouring countries. Pakistan was threatened to be declared as terrorism sponsoring state during elected governments of Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif in 1990s for supporting Afghan Taliban and sponsoring violent struggle in Indian occupied Kashmir (IoK). Paradoxically, it was US, major European countries and pro US nations of Arab world which had been sponsoring Afghan jihad after Soviet occupation in 1979 and Pakistan was converted into a bastion of global jihad. This chapter encompasses six sections: section 3.1 Evolution of security dominated asymmetric US-Pakistan- relations, 3.2 9/11- a strategic challenge to Pakistan’s national security, 3.3 Lack of trust in event driven Pakistan-US relations, 3.4 US and strategic stability in South Asia, 3.5 The impact of systemic forces: A neoclassical realist explanation. Understandably, due to euphoria of Afghan jihad after evicting Soviet Union from Afghanistan and contributing towards accomplishment of US strategic objectives, Pakistan did not have any CT strategy of controlling jihadi organisations waging war in Afghanistan or IoK. In 1990s, Pakistani governments had been concentrating on elimination of sectarian terrorism which was threatening internal cohesion of the country. However, incident of 9/11 precipitated a paradigm shift in Pakistan’s internal security and foreign policy towards Afghanistan, India and the US. US rather dictated intelligence cooperation for apprehension of top Al-Qaida leadership. Thus, the pro-Afghan jihad culture of violence and religious extremism was internally opposed by the government, and then military government of Musharraf introduced drastic reforms and punitive actions against domestic violence and jihadi organisations. US welcomed the policy of Pakistani government and Pakistan-US cooperation in fighting global terrorism commenced in 20002. Having brought about a change in the perception of Pakistan’s ruling elite and the security establishment over global and regional terrorism, Pakistan’s approach towards terrorism at home and the South Asian security calculus witnessed a major shift. Abrupt reversal of support to jihad in Afghanistan and IoK estranged jihadi organizations who turned their guns to Pakistani military and security establishment, and Pakistani nation had to endure

72 the worst spate of extremist violence and terrorism at home. Ironically, Pakistan was expected to compromise on its legitimate right of defending its territorial integrity and sovereignty with no quid -pro-quo as part of bilateral relations based on mutual interests and mutual respect. However, till 2007, Pakistan received US military and economic assistance for strengthening its defence and economy to fight terrorism. Despite facing the public wrath for supporting US and abandoning Taliban, Musharraf regime and later two democratic governments remained under US pressure to do more on Afghanistan and India. Even the latest US National Security Strategy 2017 urges Pakistan to eliminate alleged Afghan Taliban (Haqqanis) safe havens at its soil and rein in former jihadi organizations, suspected to have been plotting terrorism in IoK. The Pakistani government in office has however, witnessed a changed attitude of the US whose administration has expressed willingness to support negotiated settlement of Afghan dispute and sought Pakistani help in this regard. President Trump formally requested Pakistani Prime Minister for help through diplomatic channels (December 2018). 3.1 Evolution of Security Dominated Asymmetric US-Pakistan Relations After independence, to strengthen geo-political position, address economic vulnerabilities and ensure security from the conspiracies of powerful neighbour (India) Pakistan had to opt for a military alliance with the USA. The country joined Baghdad Pact, SEATO and CENTO and antagonized some of the Muslim countries. India colluded with Tajik elite of Afghanistan and attempted to complicate territorial dispute between Pakistan and Afghanistan181. Undoubtedly Kashmir Issue suffered a setback because Soviet Union supported Indian stance as Kashmir being part of Indian Union under the garb of accession instrument. Ayesha Jalal while quoting Manto (a progressive writer of sub-continent) did not approve of Pakistan joining capitalist block after independence. The Anglo- American block was accused of “perfidy in case of Palestine and increasingly Iran and Egypt as well”182. The US was not keen to support newly independent Muslim state purely on ideological convictions; she was rather looking at strategic advantage of cultivating an ally, which could be used as a bulwark to checkmate the moves of USSR in the West and South Asia183. USA’s military and intelligence interests were vindicated after downing of US spy plane U-2 by former Soviet Union in May 1960 in Soviet territory and capturing its pilot. The

181 Sardar Daud in July 1973, declared that Pakistan was the only country with which Afghanistan had a political dispute - Durand Line and the issue of Pakhtunistan. Amin, Ethno – National Movements of Pakistan, p.156. 182 Ayesha Jalal, The Pity of Partition (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2013) p.189. 183 Muhammad Ahsan Chaudhry ed., Pakistan and Regional Security (Karachi: Fakhri Printing Press), pp.14-15. US also courted India despite being in the opposite block. From 1949 to 1971 US$ 10 billion were given to India as opposed to much trumpeted aid to Pakistan worth US $ 4 billion during the same period.

73 incident exposed Pakistan to retaliatory attacks by USSR (which never materialized though Khrushchev had threatened by encircling Peshawar in Red). The climax of relations with USA turned out to be a disappointment and betrayal when USA stopped shipment of military equipment to Pakistan during 1965 war184. Taking the plea that sanctions were imposed on both the countries (India and Pakistan). Understandably, India was recipient of USSR inventory of equipment; therefore, the real crunch was faced by Pakistan. Malik in Dilemma of National Security gave an intriguing account of Pakistan’s compulsion to guarantee self-help and survival of the newly created independent state, through initiation of diplomatic, military and economic ties. He further disclosed that deliberate siding with the US was endorsed by no less than founder of Pakistan Mr Jinnah after independence. “Mr. Jinnah secretly dispatched Laik Ali to Washington with a request of US$ 2 billion for supporting Pakistan’s Armed Forces”. Thus, back channel diplomacy with the US and US influence emerged right from inception of Pakistan185. The bias of US policy towards South Asia especially to Pakistan had been event driven and at best transactionary. The US did not cooperate to rescue Pakistan in 1971crisis when India conspired to break the country into two halves and exposed Pakistan to Indian aggression in 1965 war, by stopping military hardware. The US-Pakistan relations witnessed another turn in 1970s, mainly due to an opening to China, facilitated by Pakistan. This tilt was acknowledged by then US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger as well186. Thereafter the relations passed through a turbulent phase till 1979 Afghan Jihad and US compulsion to engage Pakistan for furtherance of her strategic interests in Central and South Asia. The decade of security alliance against Soviet Union from 1979 to 1989 was probably the best opportunity for Pakistan to modernize its military, benefit economically and develop its strategic nuclear weapons programme. Despite occasional concerns on Pakistan’s nuclear programme by the US administrations, the presidents looked the other way and indirectly helped Pakistan pursue its nuclear weapons programme covertly. After withdrawal of Soviet Union from Afghanistan and subsequent disintegration, US strategic interests were redefined, and the focus shifted to the Middle East. Pakistan was accused for secretly building its nuclear programme and sponsoring terrorism in Afghanistan and India. Till 2001,

184 Brian Cloughly, A History of the , War and Insurrections (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1999), p.131. UK and USA proved to be the unreliable partners. In addition to China, only countries which supported Pakistan in 1965 were; Indonesia, Iran, Turkey, Jordan and Saudi Arabia (Cloughly, p.133). 185 Hafeez Malik, Dilemma of National Security and Comparison in India and Pakistan (New York: St Martin’s Press Inc., 1993), pp.9-18. 186 LloydI. Rudolph and Susane Hoeber Rudolph, Making US Foreign Policy towards South Asia Regional Imperatives and the Imperial Presidency (New Delhi: Concept Publishing Company, 2008), p.79.

74 the stalemate continued with serious threat of country being declared as a terrorism sponsoring state. After 9/11, 2001 South Asia came under sharp focus of US State Department and Pakistan once again emerged as a strategic partner in the war against terror. Condoleezza Rice acknowledging expansion and revamping of the bureau, encompassing South and Central Asia, heralded a new era of importance of two Asias in the US security and foreign policy objectives187. After Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, the strategic interests of the US warranted courting Pakistan as a frontline ally to check expansion of Communism and defeating Soviet Union in Afghanistan. The strained relations after martial law by General Zia-ul-Haque in 1976 started to improve and the US military equipment and financial assistance started to flow. Pakistan emerged as an important partner and was also exempted from US sanctions under Symington and Glenn Amendments for a period of 6 years ending 1987. However, systematic establishment of infrastructure to recruit, train, equip and launch fighters into Afghanistan promoted a culture of forcibly liberating areas and dictating own terms by defying the legitimate government of Afghanistan. The sacks full of petro- dollar from Saudi Arabia and dollars flowing from CIA coffers ushered into a new era of sponsored and lavishly funded holy war or jihad. The religious parties of Pakistan and thousands of fighters from all over Muslim world capitalized on the incentive and mushrooming of Deobandi madrassas was witnessed throughout the country- more densely in FATA and Southern Punjab. While commenting on relations between governments and security institutions, Gates asserted that while US was working closely with Zia to defeat Soviet Union, he was busy in enacting laws which strengthened “”188. ISI was also reluctant on providing US Stinger antiaircraft missiles and other supplies to the Tajiks of Panjsher valley and other non- Pashtun groups fighting the Soviets in Afghanistan in 1980s189. The religious radicalization instilled in youth was tantamount sowing seeds of terrorism and nurturing them for decade before it became a Frankenstein monster. Pakistan, being the base and frontline state in global jihad had to bear the brunt of backlash after Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan in 1989 and US abandoning the region and leaving the mess for Pakistan and Afghanistan to clean up. From 1990 to 2001, was the era of Talibanization and terrorism in Afghanistan. Due to geographical contiguity with Afghanistan, the sectarian

187Rudolph and Rudolph, Making US Foreign Policy towards South Asia, pp.85-86. 188 Robert M. Gates, Duty (London: WH Allen, 2014), P.335 189 Ibid.

75 terrorism was promoted. Iranian revolution in the same time frame of 1979, added a new dimension of sectarian strife in Pakistan. Afghanistan under Taliban emerged as sectarian haven for Sunni terrorists who after killing Shiites in Pakistan would find sanctuary in Afghanistan. Pakistan was still reeling under the horrible aftermath of Afghan jihad in 1990s sponsored by the US, was confronted with another challenge of fighting the mujahideen (holy warriors) of yester years and terrorists after 9/11. It may not be out of place to conclude that Pakistan’s support to US hastened the end of Cold War because Soviet Union could not maintain its parity in military and economic might vis-a-vis its rival after disintegration in late 1990s. It may not be out of place to conclude that Pakistan’s support to USA really hastened the end of Cold war. After end of Cold War US pulled out, leaving the region in a state of turmoil for which Pakistan and Afghanistan are still paying the price. After 10 years of partnership in Afghan Jihad, US attitude towards Pakistan started to change dramatically and in October 1990, US President George Bush senior refused to certify that Pakistan is a non –nuclear weapon state and does not possess nuclear weapons nor it is engaged in their manufacturing. Pressler Amendment was imposed on Pakistan ostensibly as a punishment for its “loyalty” during Afghan crisis190. Supply of F-16 aircrafts for Pakistan was suspended and an amount of US $ 1.2 billion was withheld. Instead of building relations and improving cooperation, Pakistan-US relations went all time low especially from 1990-1993. Christine Fair asserted that slow process of review of relations between Pakistan and USA after Pressler Amendment was a major hurdle towards full restoration of operational relations191. After Clinton Administration came into power in 1995 the Brown Amendment facilitated waiver of sanctions and military equipment worth about US $ 368 million was released. On the issue of non-proliferation, US Administration was discriminating Pakistan and was soft on India because India too, was busy in developing her nuclear weapon programme. Relations with civilian government from 1988 till 1999 had been unpredictable and Pakistan had to face US pressure on nuclear non-proliferation, missile technology and sponsoring terrorism into neighbouring countries. Government of Benazir Bhutto, being liberal in complexion rekindled hope of improving relations with the US however, the

190 US core interests in South Asia had been changing after major events like withdrawal by USSR from Afghanistan in 1989, nuclearization of South Asia in 1998 and 9/11 attacks. Major Powers and South Asia, collection of papers, presented on international seminar, organised by the Institute of Regional Studies, Islamabad, 11-13 August 2003. pp.4-5 191C Christine Fair, The Counter Terrorism Coalitions with Pakistan and India (Virginia: RAND Corporation, 2004), pp.15-16.

76 government under Nawaz Sharif had to face criticism for being soft on religious elements and alleged links with Osama Bin Laden (OBL) and some Al Qaida affiliates. As a result of military coup in October 1999, Musharraf imposed martial law by ousting the civilian government. He faced international condemnation for sacking elected government and purportedly supporting terrorism in neighbouring countries- Afghanistan and India. From 1999 to 2001, Musharraf had to endure tremendous pressure and was feverishly looking for ways and means to legitimize his military rule and save country from being declared as a terrorism sponsoring state. 3.2 9/11- A Strategic Challenge to Pakistan’s National Security The horrific attack of 9/11 not only shocked the American nation but presented Pakistan with a strategic challenge; either going for paradigm shift in its two decades old policy of tolerating Afghan Taliban at its soil or sympathising special national sentiment to Kashmir cause. The country was faced with the devil and the deep sea like situation because it was super power on one hand demanding unflinching cooperation in all fields and on the other hand a terror monster was knocking at the door to devastate internal stability of the country. Therefore, president Musharraf had to make difficult choices to maintain balance between national security interests and international obligations. While US had the advantage of dealing with single person to extract maximum concessions, Pakistan was deprived of the benefit of institutionalized decision-making process. It is presumed that any government in Pakistan would have decided to cooperate with the US yet, the rules of engagement, respect to sovereignty and confines for CIA to operate in the country would have been different. Regrettably, the civilian government of President Zardari after Musharraf proved to be even more fragile, it is accused to have facilitated visas for CIA contractors without taking its own strategic intelligence agency on board. Thus, it is a matter of institutional input backed up with politically mature and competent leadership. The tragic incident of 9/11, 2001 brought a strategic opportunity for Pakistan to not only mend troubled relations with USA but to improve its domestic structural weaknesses as well. Two countries came close and Pakistan was asked to side with the US whole heartedly. The threats by Mr Armitage reminded the regrettable tale of unequal relationship between states, forcing bilateral relations under the weight of power politics. Pakistani leadership, this time too, failed to take a comprehensive view of Pakistan-US relations and capitalize on this opportunity for tangible material gains. As the relations progressed, Pakistan was conferred with more symbolic title of Major Non-NATO Ally (MNNA). Mush-Bush friendship was reflection of Pakistan’s full compliance of US demands. To imagine the sense of urgency in

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USA, Dr Rice stated that the initial orders by the president to her were revealing, by suggesting US strategy in days ahead. The US presidents’ clarity, expressing priorities was striking, which included; “secure the country, reassure the American people and get the country back to normal as soon as possible. Plan to destroy the terrorist networks and give their sponsor a choice to be with the US or against the US. Prepare to go to war with Al Qaida in a meaningful way – destroying safe havens in Afghanistan – option of boots on ground and no more spasm attack”192. The divergence started to emerge as soon as Pakistan resisted on certain issues which ran counter to its national interest. Since Pakistan had opened its land, air and sea bases to US forces therefore, the compensation for logistics facilities under Coalition Support Fund (CSF) was also suspended at US discretion. It was rather used as a tool to twist Pakistan’s arm in all crises – Raymond Davis episode, attack on OBL compound, Salala incident or in US reckoning less than desired cooperation from Pakistan against Afghan Taliban, Al Qaida and Haqqani Network (HQN)193. Though Pak-US relations have always been asymmetric and Pakistan had been at a disadvantage yet post 9/11 scenario is distinct because US hurled blatant threat of aggression under unilateralism and pre- emption doctrines. The other critical factor was Indian move to facilitate US attack on Afghanistan if Pakistan declined the air space and logistics support. Mounting Indian footprint at Afghan soil is considered detrimental to legitimate Pakistani interests in Afghanistan and the region. While concentrating on the urgency of military operation in Afghanistan and the delicacy of cooperation from Pakistan, Gates commented on inner functioning of the Bush administration and underscored the differences in the war cabinet whenever difficult decisions were to be taken. He also pointed out differences among Joe Biden, Donilon, Emanuel, Jim Jones and Doug Lutes. These Differences were stoked by Joe Biden and the civilian hierarchy which did not understand the military compulsions of operations in Afghanistan194. Powelll was convinced that whatever action US decided to take, it is not possible without Pakistan’s support. Therefore, Musharraf needs to be served with notice,

192Condoleezza Rice, No Higher Honour (London: Simon & Schuster UK Ltd, 2011) P.80. 193 IISS Strategic Comment, Volume 18, Comment 1- January 2012, US and Pakistan: A Troubled Relationship, published on Line 1 March 2012, (2012) US and Pakistan: a troubled relationship, Strategic Comments, 18:1, 1- 3, DOI: 10.1080/13567888.2012.671054, on line available at http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13567888.2012.671054 (accessed on 6 February 2016). “The final act in the 2011 downward spiral in relations took place in the early hours of 26 November 2011, when a Pakistani border post at Salala in the Mohmand tribal agency was attacked by NATO helicopters. The attack was widely seen by Pakistan's intelligentsia as a deliberate act by the US designed to 'show Pakistan who is the boss”. Also see Anne Hull, “Terry Jones: Controversial US Pastor Insists Burning the Koran is not Radical, Independent, 18 January 2015. 194 Gates, Duty, P.338.

78 with great caution195. Dr Rice maintained that Pakistan which had trained militants against Red Army, officials within Pakistan Military and especially its Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) maintained the contacts which grew stronger since Soviet withdrawal. US Secretary of State, Colin Powell wanted to give an ultimatum to Pakistan whether to side the US or against the US196. The attack on Indian Parliament in 2001 has been covered in greater details by Condoleezza Rice in her book No Higher Honour (2011) which was a setback to US war on terror and especially CIA whose operatives were heavily relying on ISI sources. Any crisis at this stage especially the nuclear one was potentially devastating for CIA. Pentagon and Defence Intelligence Agency concluded that India would go for a war with Pakistan because they have decided to “punish Pakistan”. Though US accepted the Indian right to respond to terrorist attack yet India was advised to exercise restraint. “Musharraf was a flawed partner” lacking legitimacy yet he displayed tremendous understanding of post 9/11 security situation of the region in crisis with India, therefore he had to do more197. Musharraf was conscious of the fact that US had de- hyphenated its relations with India and Pakistan. Therefore, these two different sets of relations were henceforth to be treated country specific for promotion of varying US strategic interests in the region. US de-hyphenated relations with India and Pakistan since 2004/5, especially after the visit to India by President Bush198. Dr Rice gave an intriguing account on nuclear proliferation and Pakistan’s intent to fight terrorism in FATA, “India had developed excellent record” of respecting proliferation safeguards in terms of not transferring technology to other countries. Pakistan case was different, it was the “home of nuclear proliferation entrepreneur A.Q Khan who had spread nuclear enrichment technology to North Korea and Iran among other places”199. Pakistan military was ready to engage in Kashmir but not in FATA despite the fact that US had given Pakistan more than US $ 4.5 billion in security related assistance, by October 2005200. US Secretary of Defence, Robert Gate in his book Duty gave another interesting account on US – Pakistan relations and CIA-ISI operational cooperation in 1980s (as deputy director CIA in 1986). He stated that it was for Pakistani Military to decide “which mujahideen group – which war lords got our (US) weapons.” CIA could cajole and exert pressure but President

195 Bob Woodward, Bush at war (New York: Simon& Schuster, 2002), P.58. 196 Condoleezza Rice, No Higher Honour (London: Simon & Schuster UK Ltd, 2011) P.87. 197 Ibid., P.124. 198 Ibid., P.436. 199 Ibid., P.437. 200 “A report presented to Congress reveals that Pakistan received a total of $25.91 billion from the US in terms of military and economic aid since Sept 11, 2001, The Nation, 27 June 2013.

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Zia-Ul-Haque and ISI were the deciders. Post 9/11 ISI-CIA relations are characterized with threats, interference and a turf war between two intelligence agencies, and CIA enjoying unfettered access inside Pakistani territory and intelligence apparatus. The horrible terrorists’ act of 9/11 is viewed with scepticism even by western scholars who view that it was used as ploy for attacking Afghanistan, destroying Al-Qaida and nudging Pakistan to give up its policy of supporting certain extremist groups which were believed to have been operating against US and Indian interests. In order to force Pakistan to take a strategic shift in her orientation a big event was needed to bear upon requisite pressure. US intelligence agencies allegedly, allowed the Al-Qaida operatives by looking the other way when conducting aviation training inside USA and later letting them board the planes to hijack and fly them into targets of choice201. DG ISI, General Mahmood was touring USA when 9/11 happened and had to confront US wrath, being exhibited by State Department, Pentagon and CIA. He was threatened by Richard Armitage in a hard-hitting message, to make a choice “you are either 100% with us or 100 % against us – there is no grey area.” As per Bob Woodward’s narration, General Mahmood was handed over a list of US demands by Armitage and was asked to convey to President Musharraf and was duly informed, for the sake of emphasis that these were “not negotiable”. Colin Powell, Armitage and Christina Rocca had drafted the list in the shape of a “non- paper”, it categorically asked Pakistan to202:- a) Stop Al Qaeda operatives coming from Afghanistan to Pakistan, intercept arms shipment through Pakistan and end all logistical support for Osama bin Laden. b) Give Blanket over flight and landing rights to US Aircrafts. c) Give the US access to Pakistani naval and air bases and to the border areas between Pakistan and Afghanistan. d) Turn over all intelligence and immigration information.

201 People Like Chomsky had been airing certain conspiracy theories and accusing Neocons dominated Bush Cabinet for masterminding 9/11 tragedy for implementing US foreign policy and transforming US armed forces into a region known as graveyard of empires. Chomsky referred Wolfowitz for wishing to repeat Pearl Harbour like attacks in his thesis. Petra Liverani, Analysis of the Sophistry of Noam Chomsky on 9/11, Off Guardian, 11 October 2016. 202 Mehran Gul, “US National Security Strategy: Managing Strategic partnership in South Asia”, Yale Journal of International Affairs, Winter, 2009. On line available at http://yalejournal.org/wp- content/uploads/2011/01/094106gul.pdf (accessed on 1 December 2011). Also see paper read by Dr Hassan Askari at Major Powers and South Asia, collection of papers, presented on international seminar, organized by the Institute of Regional Studies, Islamabad, 11-13 August 2003, p.69. Rajagopalan also covered the September 11 scenario and nuances of US- Pakistan in Rajeswari Pillai Rajagopalan, “Emerging US policy towards Pakistan”, Strategic Analysis, Vol. 26, No. 3, Jul-Sep 2002, The Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses 26:3, 370-379, DOI: 10.1080/09700160208450053,p.372. To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09700160208450053 (accessed on 6 February 2016).

80 e) Condemn the September, 11 attacks and curb all domestic expression of support for terrorism. f) Cut off all shipment of fuel to Taliban and stop Pakistani volunteers from going into Afghanistan to join Taliban. g) Note that, should the evidence strongly implicate Osama bin Laden and Al-Qaida network in Afghanistan, and should the Taliban continue to harbour him and his accomplices, Pakistan will break diplomatic relations with Taliban. Given the circumstances and ferociousness by the US, Musharraf wanted to gain time and present the problem to National Security team rather than completely submitting to US demands. However, General Mahmood’s unconditional commitment had denied him the desired space. During televised address, Musharraf condemned 9/11 attack, severed relations with Taliban and assured US full cooperation (by accepting all seven demands, in fact sealing ex post facto sanction). By aligning with US, Pakistan was presented as villain of the episode as against the hero and producer overnight, with imaginable consequences from obscurantist forces of Pakistan. Attack on Indian parliament (December 2001) and amassing of forces on Indo – Pak border were serious external security challenges. Some of the American generals, reportedly, favoured a limited war and hawks in Indian cabinet and military too were in favour of teaching Pakistan a lesson but fear of quickly escalating nuclear threshold resulted in Indian decision to deescalate. Seizing the opportunity, Indo- US lobby wanted to weaken Pakistan to an extent that it served as a pliant state not only to US impending demands on Afghanistan but to Indian interests as well. The Indo-US move of forcing Pakistan to withdraw support to mujahideen without going to war with Pakistan was a success because through this threat of war Indians and Americans extracted an assurance that Pakistan would not encourage cross border attacks besides dealing with domestic terrorist outfits with iron fist. Musharraf was under tremendous pressure because former Kashmiri Mujahideen and Taliban were annoyed and labelled him as an apostate who surrendered before Crusaders. Thus, the domestic sentiment of public and the military (Musharraf’s Power base) were not happy with the strategic decision of abandoning Taliban and Kashmiri Mujahideen (though Afghan Taliban had long been abandoned immediately after 9/11). The threat of pro –Kashmir militant forces turning weapons to Pakistan Military and resulting into internal fragmentation was a serious challenge. Therefore, Pakistan’s foreign policy choices were constrained with domestic sentiment and ideological considerations. In the end, it was classical realism- national interest reigning supreme rather than domestic sentiment and Musharraf confronted the challenge by

81 sticking to considered decision of supporting the US and the coalition forces combating terrorism in Afghanistan. 3.3 Lack of Trust in Event Driven US-Pakistan Relations After 2007, Bush Administration started to criticize Musharraf for playing double game with the US. The cooperation between two countries and economic and military assistance was subjected to greater scrutiny. It was a time when Americans changed their mind and probably gauged the diminishing utility of Musharraf as against claimed popular regime in Pakistan203. It was also a time when Taliban reorganized them and started to wage their bloody resistance against foreign occupation forces in Afghanistan. Violence by Tehrik-e- Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and its direct assault to take on Pakistani security forces had put General Musharraf into dilemma, whether to continue cooperating with the US or rethink the extent of cooperation. Musharraf regime was fast declining and was looking for a bailout. National Reconciliation Ordnance (NRO) 2008, paved the way for Zardari, tainted with corruption charges during previous tenures of governments under his wife Benazir Bhutto. Thus, transfer of power was facilitated in the wake of US influence, and a coalition government led by Pakistan People Party (PPP) took over the reign of governance in the country in 2008204. As per WikiLeaks, one of the cables by the US Ambassador to Pakistan, Patterson in 2008 clearly suggested that Musharraf was ready to step down provided he was accorded immunity by the opposition parties, brokered by Washington itself”205. Vali Nasr quoted General Kayani, the Chief of Staff Pakistan Army for advising Americans not to fight a war in Afghanistan through surge rather think how to wind up the (lost) war. “You are not going to win this war, and you are not going to transform Afghanistan. This place has devoured empires before you” it will defy you as well. Stop your grandiose plans and let’s get practical and discuss how you will leave”206. 2008 was the year

203 During first term of President Bush, Musharraf enjoyed good relations and allegations against Pakistan for “double game” were muted. However, 2007 proved to be the game changer when US National Intelligence Council (NIC), issued National Intelligence Estimates (NIEs) in which Pakistan’s ISI was blamed for supporting Taliban, and Musharraf Government for playing double game with USA. 204 Aasim Sajjad Akhtar & Ali Nobil Ahmad, “Conspiracy and Statecraft in Postcolonial States: Theories and Realities of the Hidden Hand in Pakistan’s War on Terror” Third World Quarterly, 2015 Vol. 36, No.1, p.99., 36:1, 94-110, DOI: 10.1080/01436597.2015.976022. Downloaded from: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/01436597.2015.976022 (accessed on 6 February 2016). 205 “In separate meetings with Asif Zardari, PM Gilani and chief of army staff Kayani, the ambassador pressed for quick action on immunity for former president Musharraf. Zardari and Gilani said flatly they were committed to providing immunity, but not until the presidential election (now scheduled for September 6, 2008)”. The News International quoting US ambassador Patterson in a cable leaked through WikiLeaks, online available at https://www.thenews.com.pk/archive/print/639128-zardari-had-assured-us,-uk,-kayani-of- musharrafs-immunity (accessed on 10 January 2017). 206 Vali Nasr, the Dispensable Nation (New York: Double day, Random House Inc; 2013), P.11.

82 of full blown insurgency in Afghanistan and FATA. In 2009, Obama sanctioned additional 17000 troops as part of US troops surge after recommendation by Brue Riedel in Afghanistan-Pakistan (AF-Pak) strategy paper. US persuaded Pakistan to go to war with Taliban, paving way for US pull out after improvement in Afghanistan’s security milieu. The success that has allured President Obama to order troops home can be ascribed to Pakistani cooperation as well207. Trust deficit was evident when ISI was criticized for leaking the information to terrorists not only to adapt to CIAs’ method of tracking terrorists but to evade tracking and killing as well. Allegedly they were tipped to shift their hideouts and factories (of explosives and improvised explosives devices, IEDs). The most “vicious and lethal organization, Haqqani Network (HQN) was a major beneficiary”208. Bob Woodward gave an interesting account of meeting between President Zardari and CIA Director, General Michael Haydon and deputy Director Steve Kappas, in Inter-Continental Barclay hotel. Zardari was concerned over civilian casualties first for his “civilian rating”. “Kill the seniors, collateral damage worries you Americans, it does not worry me” said, Zardari209. The issue of tipping to Afghan Taliban leaders about possible US drone strike had been a contentious matter between ISI and CIA and both the agencies had been hammering out the fine tuning of coordination on ground to pre-empt evasion by targets. CIA’s strategy of bypassing ISI and firing drones really killed the spirit of cooperation and destroyed mutual confidence210. Pakistan-US relations had always been difficult because both the nations could not develop requisite confidence in bilateral relations. The relations were marred with suspicion of abandonment at critical juncture of mutual assistance. However, post 9/11 period will be remembered for US arrogance, euphoria of power and the threat of aggression. After uneasy relations between intelligence agencies of both countries, the relations between political leadership also started to develop cracks. The Mush-Bush friendship started to unravel, and Bush started to accuse Musharraf for a “double game” and not moving against groups which were fighting against the US and coalition forces in Afghanistan. US State Department and Pentagon too, joined the chorus of US National Intelligence Estimates (NIEs), released in 2007211. It was a virtual charge sheet against Pakistani Military and ISI – for not utilizing US aid correctly and working against the US strategic interests. The troubled

207Ibid., P.64 208 Ibid., P.70. 209 Bob Woodward, Obama’s wars (London: Simon& Schuster UK ltd, 2010), P.26. 210 Ibid., P.35. 211 Account by Ashley J Tellis, “explaining Musharraf’s counter terrorism policy and US frustration”, online available at http://carnegieendowment.org/files/pb56_tellis_pakistan_final.pdf (accessed on 8 January2017).

83 relations continued after capture and subsequent handing over of high value Al-Qaida operatives to USA (CIA). It had been a pattern that whenever high level Pakistani Political figure or senior military/ intelligence official was visiting USA, the news of capture of some high value Al-Qaida operative would pop up. This really helped in maintaining relations between Pakistan and USA and their two intelligence agencies. The military operation in 2009 in Swat and South Waziristan was well received in USA and taken as a shift in the attitude of Pakistan military to flush out militants from FATA. However, allegation of being soft on HQN echoed in US power corridors and whispers of blocking aid which Pakistan had received about US $ 21 billion in defence assistance and reimbursement of coalition support fund. Year 2011 was particularly traumatic for the US-Pakistan relation because in early 2011, Raymond Davis, a CIA contractor killed two civilians at Lahore. American side claimed that Davis acted in self-defence after seeing those personnel brandishing weapons and threatening him whereas in Pakistan’s reckoning it was an act of recklessness. Common Pakistanis felt betrayed and shocked as to how US was blatantly violating the sovereignty of an independent and supposedly friendly country. After barrage of allegations and counter allegations from both sides, Davis was released after paying ‘Diyat’ compensation under Islamic Law to the heirs of deceased212. The Zardari government had to face embarrassment yet, it was the only way out to save US-Pakistan relations from completely being wrecked. On 2 May 2011, US Special Forces raided OBL compound in Abbottabad city and after 40 minutes’ fire fight took away the corpse of Bin Laden. The incident wrought humiliation to Pakistan Military whose Military Academy was nearby and ISI, a national agency responsible to monitor international terrorists. In Pakistan, the incident sparked a debate whether it was political leadership or military or both which were compromised and did not react against violation of Pakistan’s sovereignty. The civil-military relations were at the lowest ebb and there were speculations of military takeover. Even after OBL commission report, nothing

212 IISS Strategic Comment, Volume 18, Comment 1- January 2012, US and Pakistan: A Troubled Relationship, published on Line 1 March 2012, (2012) US and Pakistan: a troubled relationship, Strategic Comments, 18:1, 1- 3, DOI: 10.1080/13567888.2012.671054, on line available at http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13567888.2012.671054 (accessed on 6 February 2016). “The first indication that the relationship was set to deteriorate once more was the January arrest in Lahore of Raymond Davis, a CIA contract officer who shot and killed two Pakistanis who he claimed had been trying to rob him. A US consulate rapid-response vehicle sent to assist Davis ran into and killed a pedestrian. Davis, whose claim to diplomatic immunity was not accepted by the Pakistani authorities, remained imprisoned for two months until a deal involving the payment of blood money to the families of those he had killed led to his release.”

84 concrete came into public eyes and whole saga of OBL compound and US raid remains a mystery in Pakistan213. Several months later, Pak-US relations were further damaged when North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) conducted air strike on Pakistani border post in Mohmand agency FATA in November 2011. Despite gross US/NATO negligence and brute use of force against an ally, US did not apologize. Pakistani liaison officer at International Stabilization Assistance Force (ISAF) headquarters at confirmed that US side was immediately informed that it was a Pakistani post. The coordinates of all Pakistani posts were shared with the US/ISAF much earlier as a matter of Standard Operating Procedure (SOP). Pakistan responded by shutting down ground- based logistics support and access to supply route to Afghanistan and ousting Americans from Shamsi Airfield, one of the two bases that Americans flew their drone operations. Fair gave a detailed account in her RAND Corporation report (2004) of air bases provided by Pakistan for US air strikes and drone operations. According to her claim; “1) Intermediate Staging Bases (ISBs) at Jacobabad, Pasni, Dalbandin and Shamsi, 2) predator basing at Jacobabad, and Shamsi, 3) access to Zhob and Kohat bases as required, and 4) access to Robray as required for training”214. Pakistani parliament also appointed a commission to review conditions under which cooperation with military and intelligence could be resumed. During the same period a parallel scandal erupted, known as ‘Memo gate’ in Pakistan further straining the bilateral relations215. The centre of Memo gate was a memo delivered by Ijaz, a Pakistani American on behalf of Pakistan’s Ambassador to the US Haqqani with certain assurances on behalf of Zardari Government. The memo accused Pakistani Military/ ISI for not letting civilian leadership work within constitutional confines and assured that once Military/ ISI is tamed, the Zardari Government would abandon long standing policy of “Islamist militancy” under nuclear umbrella and would pursue better relations with India and provide assistance in establishing role of AQ Khan in nuclear black market. Haqqani voluntarily came to Pakistan till he was surprisingly released in February 2012 (from President Zardari’s House). Haqqani is not liked by Pakistanis and is termed as “US stooge” for selling Pakistan’s sovereignty and

213 OBL commission report comprising 336 pages has not been officially released howver, investigative unit of Aljazeera TV obtained the copy which is online available at (though some pages not legible). https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/724833-aljazeera-bin-laden-dossier.html accessed on 9 January 2017). 214 C Christine Fair, The Counter Terrorism Coalitions with Pakistan and India (Virginia: RAND Corporation, 2004), pp.28-29. 215 Mr Nawaz Sharif revealed while addressing a political rally at Sargodha (Kot Momin) on 6 January 2017, a district in the south at about four hours’ drive from Lahore.

85 working against Pakistan’s interests as ambassador in the US216. Ironically memo gate, later Dawn leaks and now ousted Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif claiming that current standoff with the US is linked to his removal from the highest political office vindicate US interference into Pakistan’s internal affairs. Intelligence cooperation with the US had been asymmetric relationship and CIA had been over stepping its understanding with ISI. Every drone strikes in FATA not only alienated the local population but complicated the government’s job because locals suspected that these drone strikes were conducted with the tacit support of the security agencies and the Government217. The drone hit taking out Afghan Taliban chief, Mullah Akhtar Mansour once again exposed the fragility of Pakistan-US relations and differences over drone strikes. US presence in Afghanistan had been a constant source of destabilization for Pakistan either forcing Pakistan to take steps which are unpopular in Pakistan and religious parties resent those, or direct actions like raid on OBL compound or attacking a border post on Afghan border, directly breaching sovereignty and security of Pakistan. Presence of CIA agents and their contractors was another challenge exposing vulnerability of state of Pakistan. Killing of Pakistani nationals by CIA contractor in Lahore in March 2011 was a stark reminder of highhandedness by US intelligence networks in Pakistan. The bad blood created after killing of Mullah Mansur, resulted in the US countermove of blocking F-16 Aircrafts and assistance under Coalition Support Fund and hinting a pressure through a bill by US Congress blocking cooperation between Pakistan and China in Nuclear energy, considered to be counterproductive. With Trump administration in office, new wave of security aid related sanctions were announced by the US State department (January 2017). The sanctions were reportedly incited after Pakistan denied CIA access to Haqqani network operatives who had kidnapped and later freed Canadian American nationals (October 2017)218.

216 C. Christine Fair “The US–Pakistan Relations after a Decade of the War on Terror”, Contemporary South Asia Vol. 20, No. 2, June 2012, p.244. C. Christine Fair (2012) The US–Pakistan relations after a decade of the war on terror, Contemporary South Asia, 20:2, 243-253, DOI: 10.1080/09584935.2012.670204 Downloaded from: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09584935.2012.670204 (accessed on 6 February 2016). The excerpts on specific language of the memo are quoted as, “the memo’s anonymous author suggested that Pakistan’s civilian leadership, once freed of the nefarious influences of the army and ISI, would abandon Pakistan’s long-standing policy of Islamist militancy under its nuclear umbrella, pursue better ties with India, and provide assistance in ensuring that nuclear black-market activities do not resume”. 217 There was an impression that the US had struck a tacit deal with President Zardari and Army Chief, Ashfaq Pervez kayani on the issue of drone attacks, substantiated by Synnott in Hilary Synnott, “Chapter Two: Pakistan After 9/11: The Adelphi Papers, 49:406, 63-98, DOI: 10.1080/19445570903234982, p.90. To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/19445570903234982 (accessed on 6 February 2016). 218 Canadian were freed by Pakistani forces on 14 October 2017, reported in local and international media, CNBC news online available at https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/freed-american-caitlan-coleman-

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The menace of militancy and terrorism in FATA and Swat has been largely eliminated after destroying their bases, terror infrastructure and command and control centres through Operation Zarb-e- Azb since June 2014. The biggest challenge remains, the TTPs top leadership (even after elimination of Fazlullah) and its lieutenants who are hiding in Afghanistan. It is confirmed by credible sources that TTP operatives are hiding in three provinces of Afghanistan- Kunar, Nuristan and Nangarhar. Till such time the top TTP leadership is eliminated the sporadic acts of violence – raids, ambushes, IED attacks and target killings are likely to continue. It is only possible with CIA-ISI cooperation and CIA exerting its pressure over NDS and RAW to deny them safe havens in Afghanistan. US National Security Strategy 2017 recommended increase in the drone strikes directed at targets in FATA. The legality of drone attacks is questionable so is the case of permission by Pakistani Government. It is believed that till 2005/6 CIA had been operating in coordination with ISI, thereafter they changed their strategy – CIA would target the intended terrorist, take him out and share post mission report videos with ISI counterparts. This arrangement was possibly aimed at obeying US presidential decrees and conveying an impression that drone hits are undertaken with the consent of Government of Pakistan219. US having achieved its military objectives, by eliminating core Al Qaida leadership is now in the consolidation phase, leading to partial withdrawal. The drawdown plan has been modified, retaining 10,000 troops till 2017 and possibly being augmented to 16000 as per latest national security strategy, announced by president Trump220. The forces in Afghanistan are equipped with drones, can ask for dedicated air support and retain the capability of conducting sting operations with the help of Special Forces and drone strikes. These forces are being utilized for training of Afghan National Security Forces and for critical logistics supplies. US expect Pakistan to assist in negotiated settlement of Afghan dispute. A toll order

canada-family-says-prayers-answered-n810626 (accessed on 6 January 2017). Pakistan today quoted NY Times that Pakistani authorities denied US access to one of the abductors belonging to Haqqani net work, online available at https://www.pakistantoday.com.pk/2017/12/30/islamabad-refused-to-give-access-to-foreign- couples-abductor-us-media/ (accessed on 8 January 2017). 219Amnesty International released a report which said that CIA drone attacks in Pakistan were responsible for unlawful killings, some of which could amount to war crimes. The rights group named several victims who, it says, "posed no threat to life". Reported by BBC while quoting New York Times, online available at http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-24649840. On the contention of CIA attempting to cultivate agents for operations in FATA and possible options to recruit the manpower, see Vikram Jagadish, “Reconsidering American Strategy in South Asia: Destroying Terrorist Sanctuaries in Pakistan's Tribal Areas” Small Wars & Insurgencies, Vol. 20, No. 1, March 2009, 20:1, 36-65, DOI: 10.1080/09592310802573434, pp.52-53. To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09592310802573434 (accessed on 6 February 2016). 220 “The United States continues to face threats from transnational terrorists and militants operating from within Pakistan”, page 50 of US National Security Strategy December 2017, Online available at https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/NSS-Final-12-18-2017-0905.pdf (accessed on 8 January 2017).

87 indeed, Taliban cannot be whacked to negotiation table; a reality must be known to quadrilateral forum. By killing Mullah Mansour US gained little and after appointment of new Taliban commander, peace in Afghanistan is as elusive as ever221. The situation has seemingly improved and Pakistan hosted a conference in which representatives of Afghan Taliban, Afghan government officials and the US special representative Khalilzad participated. The conference was convened in first week of December 2018, though no official confirmation came from any quarters. There had been series of parleys between US representative and Taliban interlocutors, and emerged as preferred destination of bilateral negotiations. Tangible progress has been acknowledged by both sides with no written agreement yet. In response to unveiling of US National Security Strategy December 2017, the Government of Pakistan reiterated its resolve to continue fighting war on terror and demanded US to acknowledge Pakistan’s contributions. Pakistan Military too, stressed respect to Pakistan’s sacrifices while declining any assistance which is attached with strings and dictation222. Pakistan’s politico- military leadership categorically clarified that there are no terrorist safe havens at Pakistani soil. The sanctuaries are now in Afghanistan from where Pakistan security forces personnel are targeted and killed. US and Afghanistan should work together and eliminate those. The former Pakistani foreign Minister in a rather taunting tone reminded the US that terror sanctuaries have been eliminated from Pakistani soil since long. US should benefit from Pakistani experience and destroy the terrorist infrastructure from Afghanistan. US administration and military hierarchy is sceptical about Pakistani cooperation and is urging total eradication of terrorism from the region. The rhetoric of good and bad Taliban and mantra of do more on media will only spoil the bilateral relations. Both sides should utilize the established channels of communication i.e. diplomatic, political, and military and intelligence. Pakistan is also concerned over US policy of inducting India as a major stake holder in Afghan affairs without allaying Pakistan’s legitimate security concerns. RAW’s involvement in destabilization of Pakistan is now an open secret after busting of Kalbushan Yadav’s network. The US decision of slapping sanctions on security assistance to Pakistan (US $ 255 million and total 1.3 billion US $) against Pakistan at critical juncture of fighting terrorism along Pakistan- Afghanistan border is considered ill-advised and will impinge upon

221 By Helene Cooper, “U.S. Drone Strike Targets Taliban Leader”, New York Times, 21 May 2016. 222 Pakistan military categorically stated that they needed no US assistance but US should recognize Pakistan’s sacrifices. Pakistani foreign offices denounced suspension of 900 million US $ aid related to security assistance and termed the move as counterproductive. See the News International, January 2017.

88 combat capability of Pakistan military, engaged in fighting terrorists in FATA223. In case of any differences between US and Pakistani governments, India is likely to benefit by stepping up interference inside Pakistan, and trading allegations of terrorism being sponsored by Pakistan in Afghanistan. In war on terror Pakistani security forces and people of Pakistan rendered more sacrifices than US and NATO countries combined. As of today, approximately 70,000 precious lives have been lost. On economic front, Pakistan had to endure losses worth US $ 120 billion. The intangible loss like psychological impact and shattering of the very fibre of society in KPK are the losses which will continue haunting the civilian population for decades ahead. The public perception in Pakistan was impacted after US attitude of asking Pakistan to do more without realizing the ground realities, though military commanders in Afghanistan and CIA operatives are well aware of inhibitions on part of Pakistan. Various surveys conducted by private TV channels in Pakistan suggested that 77% Pakistani view USA as their enemy. A survey conducted by Pew Research Centre, Washington also showed that 11 percent of Pakistani’s view US and President Obama favourably, whereas 59 percent grade USA as enemy224. 3.4 US and Strategic Stability in South Asia Besides regional security concerns with regards to Afghanistan and increasing role of India, Pakistan’s strategic interests are also curtailed. After Indo-US strategic partnership, India is being catapulted as a regional power with strategic overtones. US-India Defence Framework 2005, and the by the US assistance in high-tech defence technologies, Aircraft Carrier and anti-submarine warfare may prop India as a counter weight to Chinese influence in Asia- Pacific225. However, Indian strategic capability will radiate insecurity in Indian Ocean and Arabian Sea, causing jitters in Pakistan. India had all along been opposing militarization of Indian Ocean, including USA. However, after Indo- US strategic cooperation, the Indian

223 US announced sanctions on security assistance to Pakistan on 5 January 2017, by withholding US $ 255 million. Earlier in a tweet President Trump claimed the US had disbursed 33 billion dollars “foolishly” to Pakistan since 9/11. Pakistan reminded for having suffered loss of 120 billon US dollars and 14 billion out of US aid as reimbursement of services rendered by Pakistan and not an aid. Pakistan also suffered loss of 70,000 precious lives. Ayaz Gul, US Suspends Security Assistance to Pakistan, VOA, Online available at https://www.voanews.com/a/us-suspending-security-aid- (accessed on 7 January 2017). 224 Russell Heimlich, Pakistanis See US as an Enemy, Pew Research Centre, 12 August 2010, Online available at http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/0210/08/12/pakistanis-see-u-s-as-an-enemy/Pew (accessed on 7 January 2017). 225Indian look east policy is essentially economic policy yet, it is not without security implications in Asia Pacific region. Danielle Rajendram, India’s New Asia-Pacific Strategy: ‘Act East’, online available at https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/indias-new-asia-pacific-strategy-act-east (accessed on 7 January2017).

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Ocean is likely to be not only militarized but possibly nuclearized as well226. Indo- US strategic partnership since 2005 brought a strategic shift in the region and India is being propped as a regional power to countervail China in Indo-Pacific regions227. People in Pakistan are sick of controversies being aired in western think tank over Pakistan’s nuclear programme. Indo-US nuclear deal and accepting India as de-facto nuclear weapon state, with the luxury of installing as many nuclear reactors for military programme as she wishes is a gross violation of nuclear non-proliferation treaty. India has been granted membership of Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) and her full membership of Nuclear Supplier Group (NSG) is just a matter of time. Pakistan feels frustrated that all avenues are being closed for its nuclear programme despite cooperation with IAEA and the US. The US policy of de-hyphenating relations with India and Pakistan may be viewed in the lager strategic interests in Indo- Pacific Asia228. For balance in South Asia, USA should grant some concession to Pakistan as quid- pro-quo for convincing its people over prolonged cooperation in the war against terror. Membership of NSG along with India and facilitation for resolution of Kashmir dispute could rekindle the cold bilateral relations between USA and Pakistan. After US curbs on military aid, Pakistani Military is facing difficulty in maintaining a qualitative parity with Indian military in conventional weapons. Pakistan had been at a disadvantage since long due to mismatch between Indian defence budget and meagre resources being allocated for Pakistan’s Armed Forces. US should also realize the gravity of situation when Indians claim to initiate a limited war and force Pakistan to abandon its policy of supporting terrorism in neighbouring countries, albeit the allegations are vehemently denied by Pakistani side. The whole doctrine is fraught with danger of escalating war because Pakistan having grasped the danger has already developed Short Range Ballistic Missiles, commonly known as tactical nuclear weapons to defeat Indian conventional assault. The debate of using tactical weapons in a conventional war or operational viability of such an option in the battlefield notwithstanding, Pakistan reserves the right to defend itself against foreign aggression. Pakistan claims to have developed a Full Spectrum Deterrence (FSD);

226Surendra Chopra, Post-Simla Indo-Pak Relations Confrontation to De-escalation, 1988), pp. 142-143. 227 Selig S. Harrison and K. Subramanyam eds., Super Power Rivalry in the Indian Ocean Indian and American Perspective (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), pp.224-225. Per Subramanyam, India had been proposing Indian Ocean as a zone of peace but like all other arms control measures this too was exploited by major powers of 1970s and 1980s. India in 2000s, has emerged as a major power to project itself into Indo- Pacific region. 228 Harrison and Subramanyam, Super Power Rivalry in the Indian Ocean, p.13.

90 including against Indian Cold Start Doctrine229. Therefore, Indian aggression under seemingly flawed doctrine will certainly incite use of tactical nuclear weapons, with strong possibility of strategic nuclear exchanges or nuclear war fighting in the battle field. US, by virtue of its presence in Afghanistan and her strategic interests to eliminate terrorism from the region, should realize the perils of widening gulf of conventional asymmetry, forcing Pakistan to rely on tactical nuclear weapons. Any cooperation with India precipitating strategic stability may encourage India to intensify asymmetric operations against Pakistan (already pursuing the same). The tit for tat will only promote terrorism in South Asian region. 3.5 The Impact of Systemic Forces: A Neoclassical Realist Explanation In order to explain the dynamics of systemic constraints impacting Pakistan’s CT policy, pertinent variables under neoclassical realism have been identified to support application of systemic factors in Pakistan’s CT policy. These are mentioned in a tabulated format given below:- Table 3.1: Neoclassical realism variables shaping US-Pakistan CT Relations. Level Variables Relationship with Post 9/11 CT Policy Systemic  Post 9/11 pressure of  Unprecedented US pressure leaving no choice the US and GWOT for Pakistan to imagine alternate options.  Asymmetric relations/  Ruling elite divided over objectives of US war Perceptive biases on terror. It was taken as anti-Islamic and crusade against Muslims by extremist forces in Pakistan.  It is viewed as extension of strategy to prepare India as regional player to contain China. Use of Ideational Power  Pakistan accused for double cross since 2007 by the US. Pakistan’s security concerns were not entertained by the US.  Pakistan was blamed for sponsoring terrorism in Jammu and Kashmir- endorsing Indian stance.  Mantra of do more continued unabated for

229 The meeting of Pakistan’s National Command Authority was held under Prime Minister of Pakistan on 21 December 2017. The excerpts are, while expressing full confidence in Pakistan’s capability to address any form of aggression, the NCA reiterated Pakistan’s policy of developing and maintaining Full Spectrum Deterrence, in line with the policy of Credible Minimum Deterrence and avoidance of arms race. Online available at http://www.ispr.gov.pk/front/main.asp?o=t-pressrelease&id=4459#pr_link4459 (accessed on 7 January 2017).

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Level Variables Relationship with Post 9/11 CT Policy political settlement in Afghanistan. Though US requested Pakistan for help (December 2018).

US-India Strategic  Indo-US new alliance in Asia pacific is a reality Cooperation and an attempt to contain rising China. Opposition to CPEC too, in the same context.  Strategic balance in South Asia disturbed constraining Pakistan’s CT responses. A Pragmatic systemic  A regional dispute resolution mechanism is the approach facilitating fight possible option in finding peaceful solution of against regional terrorism Afghan conflict with international backing.  All regional initiatives by Russia, China and Pakistan should be supported by the US.  Any imposed solution by the US would be a recipe of disaster for regional peace. Source: Author’s personal interpretation of systemic level dynamics of US-Pakistan relations. US relations with Pakistan for seventy years, the lows and highs notwithstanding have deep relevance in Pakistani politics and domestic sentiment. Undoubtedly the systemic dimension is predominant due to US significance in international system yet, her relevance as regional player too, cannot be overlooked since 9/11. US had been guiding Pakistan’s relations with Afghanistan and India since 9/11. Pakistan was pressured periodically especially after every major terrorist incident either in India or Afghanistan to specifically ban certain extremist organizations suspected to have been supporting cross border terrorism. Since Pulwama episode (February 2019) in Indian occupied Kashmir, the tension between India and Pakistan manifested the danger of war between two nuclear armed rivals. After deployment of Pakistan military to fight terrorism in FATA since 2003/4, sabre rattling by the Indian side compounds Pakistan’s security dilemma. The US demanding Pakistan to cooperate without Indian reciprocity reinforces the domestic sentiment – a perception of Indo-US nexus operating to harm Pakistan’s strategic interests in the region. Therefore, tenets of classical realism; anarchic international structures rattling aggression and paradoxically facets of neoclassical realism i.e. domestic sentiment, leadership psyche and domestic

92 institutions shaping foreign policy of Pakistan figure out prominently. Musharraf’s decision of siding with the US under extreme systemic pressures, ostensibly to safeguard Pakistan’s strategic interests is regarded as strategic betrayal by religious-political forces of the county230. The Governments in Pakistan after experiencing a rough patch of relations with the US under Clinton administration, was expecting the Bush Administration to be more amenable to understanding Pakistan’s viewpoint. However, terrorist attacks of 9/11 brought a paradigm shift in Pakistan- US relations and the bruised super power was bent upon browbeating any country coming its way. Secretary of Defence Donald H. Rumsfeld stated that an effective response would be much beyond a war. The use of military force would include all available national tools - military, legal, financial, diplomatic and intelligence. Immediately after 9/11, the US made it clear that there would be no “distinction between terrorists who committed the crime and those who harbour them”231. After examining systemic limitations to CT policy of Pakistan, the following chapter explores the regional level dynamics in Pakistan’s counterterrorism responses.

230 Amelia Hadfield- Amkhan, British Foreign Policy, National Identity, and Neoclassical Realism (New York: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers Inc., 2010). pp.24-25. 231 Rajeswari Pillai Rajagopalan, “Emerging US policy towards Pakistan, Strategic Analysis” cited as Rajeswari Pillai Rajagopalan (2002) Emerging US policy towards Pakistan, Strategic Analysis, 26:3, 370-379, DOI: 10.1080/09700160208450053 on line available at http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09700160208450053, Published online: 03 Apr 2008. “Colin Powel took a milder line while speaking to Senate, confirmation hearings, and stated that: . . . India has the potential to keep the peace in the vast Indian Ocean area and its periphery. We need to work harder and more consistently to assist India in this endeavour, while not neglecting our friends in Pakistan", p.371.

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Chapter 4 Regional Level Dynamics in Pakistan’s Counterterrorism Responses This chapter unveils role of regional countries either fuelling terrorism in Pakistan or not cooperating in combating the menace. Allegations of India and Afghanistan that Pakistan is sponsoring terrorism in neighbouring countries as an instrument of foreign policy, and Pakistan contending that India and Afghanistan are colluding to destabilize the country by supporting terrorist activities of TTP and its affiliates are part of the study. Part one comprises of hostility and security dilemma posed by India and Indian strategic manoeuvres in concert with Afghanistan and the US to harm Pakistan’s territorial integrity and internal stability. Historical perspective of relations with Afghanistan, characterized with mistrust and ethnic animosity are covered in part two of the chapter. Terrorism being used as a ploy by regional states to settle their bilateral differences and Afghanistan becoming a battle ground of proxy war between India and Pakistan is of particular focus. Afghan relations as part of domestic sentiment, regional dynamics and systemic pressures under presence of the US as an independent variable is an intrinsic part of the study232. Since 2001, USA too, is involved in South Asian security architecture, magnifying Pakistan’s threat spectrum. This chapter contains three sections: section 4.1 Indian factor and Pakistan’s security dilemma, 4.2 Afghan factor and Pakistan’s security concerns, 4.3 the neoclassical realist explanation. 4.1 Indian Factor and Pakistan’s CT Policy The roots of India - Pakistan rivalry since inception lay into irrational partition plan through which Hindu and Muslim communities were pitched against each other, culminating at the end of divide and rule, the conquest tactics by the British rulers. The roots of the crisis lay into irrational partition plan through which Hindus and Muslim communities were pitched against each other, culminating at the end of divide and rule, the conquest tactics by the British rulers. However, rivalry between two major communities existed since centuries because Muslims had been rulers of Subcontinent and Hindus felt being deprived of their rights as a majority community. The European and Hindu nationalism were critical for Muslim unity who termed these as tyrants, subjugating lands with brute force. Bishop Heber, a fervent missionary who stayed in India from 1823-1826 reminded Hindus that they (Europeans) found them conquered and “they (the Muslims) are notorious for more

232 Amin Saikal, Modern Afghanistan a History of Struggle and Survival (London: I.B. Tauris & Co Ltd, 2004), p.119. “Moscow in turn regarded this US behaviour as part of an elaborate attempt to turn the whole of South Asia and the Middle East into a bastion for anti-Soviet activities, denying the USSR the degree of security and economic interests which that country should naturally and reasonably have had in the area”.

94 oppressive masters than we ever shown ourselves”233. It may be pertinent to point out that opposed to the perception of Muslims being oppressive, despite power as conquerors, Muslims demonstrated tolerance towards Hindus and other communities of the Subcontinent. Muhammad Bin Qasim in 711-12 conquered Karachi and Multan but announced that “temples shall be regarded in the same light as the churches of Christians, the synagogues of Jews and the fire temples of Magians”234. Pakistan’s national security compulsions were unique from the outset, it had to confront a bigger neighbour which inherited bulk of British Empires’ military industrial complex in India whereas, negligible military hardware factories coming to Pakistan. The partition plan also presented Mr Jinnah and others to either accept the paranoid partition plan or possibly forego creation of an independent state forever. The powerful arm of state (military) was though relatively better organized yet, had no comparison with stronger and larger military component going to Indian side. The Kashmir dispute kept on haunting the bilateral relations, culminating at 1948 War and referring the matter to the United Nations (UN) incidentally, by the Indian Prime Minister Jawahar Lal Nehru235. Despite UN resolutions and Indian commitment of granting people of Kashmir a right to self- determination, to exercise their free will to decide whether to continue living under Indian occupation or opt in favour of newly created country- Pakistan. Kashmiri population continues to suffer even after lapse of seventy years, and the UN Resolutions could not be implemented due to geo-strategic considerations. The latest move by Indian Government to revoke special status of Kashmir by removing Article 370 the Indian Constitution posed a massive challenge to regional security and Kashmiris’ right of self-determination promised through UN resolutions. The bilateral animosity and domestic sentiment in Pakistan resulted into perpetual threat from India and effort of both the countries to harm each other’s interest either in the region or globally. The nuances of foreign policy and regional dynamics are also influenced with constant effort to either further own interest or to checkmate others’ clout, more relevant in case of Afghan conflict. The future relations too, are likely to be guided by policy stance over relations with Afghanistan and seriousness of engaging in bilateral parleys over Kashmir

233Mushirul Hasan, Legacy of a Divided Nation India’s Muslims since Independence (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1997), p.332. 234 R.A. Jairazhoy, Foreign Influence in Ancient Indo-Pakistan (Karachi: Sind Books House, 1995), pp. 164- 165. 235Tariq Ali et al, Kashmir the Case for Freedom (London: Verso, 2011) Chronology 1947-2010. “On 1 January 1948 India formally refers the Kashmir situation to the United Nations and on 5 February 1948 a UN resolution called for an immediate cease-fire and a plebiscite”

95 dispute236. The issue of terrorism is inherently linked with resolution of Kashmir dispute and hedging of stakes in Afghanistan by India and Pakistan. Pakistan had been adjusting itself to varying degree of security dilemma posed by its powerful neighbour India237. Whenever some moves were initiated against Pakistan with a view to maximizing power in South Asia or deliberate actions to actually cut Pakistan to size, Pakistan felt that it is her right to defend its sovereignty and territorial integrity by invoking self-help and survival clauses of realism even if it meant running counter to Indian interests in the region. The security maximization by either side always generated threat to the other, resulting proxy war or all-out war to eliminate that threat. The major events reinforce this assessment; in 1947 India forcibly annexed Jammu and Kashmir which was part of Pakistan as per original partition plan. Frustration over Kashmir dispute triggered 1965 war between the two nations. Dismemberment of Pakistan with active involvement and support of Indian military and intelligence and posing a strategic challenge after overt nuclearization of South Asia and forcing Pakistan to follow suit are various facets of security dilemma posed by the Indian side. Even today Pakistan’s security dilemma has not mitigated, it is rather accentuated with Indian proxy war being waged in FATA, Karachi and Balochistan. Pakistan attempted to seek assistance of the UN and the US by sharing dossiers of Indian involvement in internal affairs of Pakistan238. The allegations proved right with a stroke of good luck for Pakistani intelligence agencies when they succeeded to arrest the mastermind of Indian intelligence network, a senior Indian Navy official who was coordinator of all covert operations to destabilize Pakistan239. India too, had been levelling similar allegations against Pakistani intelligence agency for supporting pro- Kashmir freedom fighters.

236 The stakes in Afghanistan have emerged as too costly to be ignored by both the countries- India and Pakistan. Pakistan has constantly been accusing India for abetting terrorism in FATA and Balochistan, in concert with Afghan proxies has further vitiated the bilateral environment. 237 Pakistan was betrayed on demarcation of boundary (Radcliff Award) in 1947 after independence, and the Indian leadership manipulated major head works and chunk of territory in Jammu and Kashmir going to India, against the stated principles of the partition plan. Pakistan had to face dismemberment in 1971 War with India and it had been internally bleeding with terrorism because of Indian interference into Pakistan’s internal affairs. 238 Pakistan handed over dossier on involvement of India as a state in destabilization of Pakistan, available at http://indianexpress.com/article/world/pakistan-hands-over-dossier-on-indias-interference-to-un-chief-4463237/ ( accessed on 31 March 2017). 239 Kalbhushan yadev arrest and subsequent interrogation proved his involvement in organising a spy network in Pakistan especially in the Province of Balochistan, online available at https://tribune.com.pk/story/1074812/analysis-kulbhushan-jadhavs-raw-move/ (accessed on 2 March 2017)

96

Overt nuclearization of South Asia in 1998 did not provide desired strategic stability in the region240. The ongoing tension (February 2019) between two nuclear weapons states bears testimony to the contention. Both the countries continue accusing each other for internal interference and conspiracies to weaken the other side. Low intensity conflict either in the form of asymmetric operations, or depletion through persistent targeting of Pakistani civilian population along LoC, complicates supposedly strategic stability in South Asia. Post 9/11 environment further weakened the prospects of settlement of Kashmir dispute through militancy and terrorism. Today Pakistan is beset with Indian entrenchment in Afghanistan and consequent instability in tribal regions with Afghanistan across Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KPK) province. Support to Baloch separatists and ethno- sectarian strife in Karachi being sponsored by Indian Intelligence, Research and Analysis Wing (RAW) are serious challenges to Pakistan’s internal cohesion. When all efforts to resolve Kashmir dispute peacefully failed then Pakistani ruling elite and military planned to reclaim Kashmir with the help of Kashmiri masses, resulting into 1965 war between India and Pakistan. 1965 War was a proper military confrontation between two countries as compared to relatively localized resistance and insurgency by Kashmiri freedom fighters in 1948. The expected rebellion and uprising in Jammu and Kashmir failed to attract desired number of mutineers and the unconventional war component failed to achieve political objectives241. Despite being member of SEATO and CENTO, Pakistan had to face US sanctions on military hardware, at the cost of combat efficiency during war with India in 1965242. Soviet Union mediated between India and Pakistan and on 1 January 1966, Tashkent Declaration was signed and all the armed forces of two countries were to withdraw not later than February 1966 to the positions they held prior to 5 August 1965243. The strategic significance of Jammu and Kashmir region once again figured out prominently

240 The irony is that NSG was raised to block nuclear proliferation after Indian diversion of peaceful nuclear technology to weapon programme in 1974, and the same forum awarded India specific waiver in 2008 with US support and other likeminded countries. 241 Both the countries attempted to secure the vital arteries linking their bases of operation. Pakistan attempted to capture area across Akhnur Sector to sever the only railway line linking Jammu and Kashmir whereas, India wanted to interdict The Grand Trunk Road linking major towns of Sialkot, Gujranwala/ Gujrat and Lahore. See Jaswant Singh, India at Risk Mistakes, Misconceptions and Misadventures of Security Policy (New Delhi: Rupa Publications India Pvt Ltd, 2013), p.72. Also see P.S. Jayaramu, India’s National Security and Foreign Policy (New Delhi: ABC Publishing House, 1987), pp.152-153. 242 Robert J. Mc Mahon, The Cod War on the Periphery The United States, India and Pakistan (New York: Colombia University Press, 1994), pp. 37-38. Also, see Indo Pak war of 1965, Office of the Historian, online available at https://history.state.gov/milestones/1961-1968/india-pakistan-war (accessed on 20 April 2017). 243Tashkent Declaration 1966 was facilitated by former Soviet Union, online available at https://www.stimson.org/tashkent-declaration, accessed on 22 April 2017.

97 between two countries244. In 1971, Pakistan fought a third war with India, this time to prevent secession of its eastern wing, through Indian backed insurgency and conspiracy of certain Bengali nationalist leaders. The credit proudly claimed by Indian Prime Minister Modi while touring Bangladesh and Prime Minister Hasina Wajid presenting Indian Prime Minster a portrait of 1971 surrender instrument of Pakistan Army before an Indian General245. The US and other major powers indirectly supported Indian offensive and contributed towards break up of Pakistan246. Post 1947 political history and struggle in Kashmir at times was turbulent and a separate ethno-national consciousness by Kashmiri Muslims away from India remained constantly strong. However, during 1980s, frustration among the Kashmiri Muslims against some of their own leaders grew stronger especially for a decade 1989 – 1999247. The catalytic events dragged Pakistan into controversy heightening tension between two countries248. The trouble continued and Kashmiri militants decided to occupy certain heights in Drass- Kargil Sectors across LoC in Karakorum Range in 1999, to pressure Indian Government for reducing military presence in Kashmir and start dialogue with Pakistan and Kashmiri freedom fighters (represented by All Parties Hurriat Conference, APHC)249. The move by Kashmiri militants, supported by Pakistani Military really surprised the Vajpayee Government because Vajpayee had visited Lahore in March 1999. According to Nanda, Vajpayee’s visit to Lahore was “an extra step beyond expectations” yet; skirmishes along LoC and Kargil Conflict showed no signs of winding down250.

244 Jayarama, India’s National Security and Foreign Policy, p.153. The quoted excerpts are “If a Muslim majority area can remain part of India, then the raison detre of Pakistan collapses------Pakistan is incomplete both territorially and ideologically.” 245 Philip Oldenburg, “A Place Insufficiently Imagined: Language, Belief, and the Pakistan Crisis of 1971”, The Journal of Asian Studies, Volume 44, Issue 4, August 1985, Published online: 23 March 2011, pp. 711-733. 246 Bangladeshi Prime Minister gifted visiting Indian Prime Minister Mr Modi a picture of 1971 Pakistani surrender, and Mr Modi too, boasted for making it happen with Indian support. He presented an audio recording of Indian Naval ship and DVDs of Mujibur Rehman speeches provoking secession from Pakistan. Celebration of breakup of Pakistan after 46 years. Online available at http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/modi-hasina- exchange-1971-memories/article7292276.ece and http://www.pakpassion.net/ppforum/showthread.php?226031- Bangladeshi-PM-gifts-Modi-picture-of-1971-Pakistni-surrender#sthash.ZmumtHvV.dpuf, (both accessed on 20 April 2017). 247 Kashmiris picked up arms and waged an armed struggle against Indian occupation, commencing in 1988/89, information about 1988/89 Kashmir intifada and fidayeen phase is available online at http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/spotlight/kashmirtheforgottenconflict/2011/07/2011715143415277754.html (accessed on 12 April 2017). 248 Nyla Ali Khan ed., The Parchment of Kashmir History, Society, and Polity (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), pp.217-218. 249Bruce Riedel policy paper series on Kargil, online available at http://indianstrategicknowledgeonline.com/web/US%20on%20Kargil.pdf (accessed on 9 March 2017). 250M.L. Sondhi and Prakash Nanda, Vajpayee’s Foreign Policy Daring the Irreversible (New Delhi: Har-Anand Publications Pvt Ltd, 1999), p. 114.

98

Irrespective of stated or perceived politico-military objectives, the Kargil conflict was a move to internationalize Kashmir using military incursions as an instrument of policy251. The Kargil did internationalize Kashmir but became a flash point for an all-out war between two countries with nuclear weapons252. Capitalizing on international sensitivity over terrorism by non-state actors, India lobbied to win support to label Kashmiri freedom fighters as terrorist organisation253. General Musharraf while speaking to Nadeem Malik on SAMA TV on 12 October 2016, categorically accepted that it was Northern Scouts (NS) who fought alongside Kashmiri mujahideen during Kargil conflict. He further revealed that “Pakistan should not shy away in accepting that Kashmiri mujahideen are heroes and we (Pakistanis) support their struggle”. General Musharraf was of the view that LeT is a genuine jihadi organisation fighting in Indian occupied Kashmir, with top of the line philanthropic infrastructure inside Pakistan, Therefore, there should be no question of moving against them without resolving Kashmir issue254. Drawing inferences from the past wars with India, Pakistan’s security dilemma is widened because purely in military strategic reference, Indian force deployment is Pakistan specific. Her bulk of mechanized forces could only operate against Pakistan and not in the mountainous region of China. Her naval assets and air bases are poised towards Pakistan. Her Cold Start Doctrine (CSD) is purely Pakistan specific and envisages to exploit space by conventional forces while remaining short of precipitating nuclear threshold of Pakistan. It is a sensitive matter in Pakistani strategic community who offer multiple interpretations yet, the threat is real and certainly fraught with nuclear exchanges if Pakistan’s strategic spaces or cities are threatened. Unless the force deployment alters, the expression of good intention is immaterial because intentions could change overnight255. Pakistan is still struggling to

251 Samina Yasmin, “Pakistan’s Kashmir Policy, Voices of Moderation”, Journal Contemporary South Asia, Volume 12, Issue 2, 2003, pp.187-202. 252 Peter R Lavoy, Asymmetric Warfare in South Asia The Causes and Consequences of the Kargil Conflict (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), pp.13-17. 253 Ibid. 254 General Musharraf spoke live with Mr Nadeem Malik on SAMA TV, Pakistan on 12 October 2016, the fateful date on which martial law was imposed by him in 1999 by ousting Mr Nawaz Sharif. The contention of Pakistani troops fighting in Kargil stands proven after unequivocal claim and acknowledgement by then Army Chief. The allegations of Pakistan Military/ISI supporting Kashmiri jihadi organisations are not new however, leakage of top secret information discussed between top military brass and the senior most civilian leadership speaks volumes about the urgency of politico-military leadership being on the same page including the Kashmir Issue. Also, see the Dawn News, Cyril Almeida, “Act against Militants or Face International Isolation, Civilians Tell Military”, Dawn, 6 October 2016. 255 Cold Start Doctrine was specifically conceived for the operations under nuclear overhang. Indian Commanders had envisaged resorting to blitzkrieg like tactics to damage maximum Pakistani air assets and seize important pieces of land close to border and LoC, without precipitating the nuclear threshold. It is Pakistan specific doctrine therefore; Pakistani military believes that the intentions could change overnight till such time the capability exits and the force posture stays intact.

99 maintain a reasonable balance against growing conventional asymmetry by developing short range tactical nuclear weapon (TNWs) to deter Indian aggression under much touted CSD. After induction of TNWs, into Pakistan’s strategic arsenal, Pakistan’s acclaimed Full Spectrum Deterrence (FSD) seems to have been working; during Kargil conflict in 1999, 2002 massing of forces along border after attack on Indian Parliament by the terrorist in 2001, and terrorist attack on Mumbai hotels in November 2006256. Even in February 2019, India going for surgical air strikes against so called terrorist camps yet, remaining short of declaring war with Pakistan, may also be attributed to strategic deterrence. In addition to conventional and strategic challenges, Pakistan is being increasingly subjected to low intensity conflict by India and former defence Minister, Manohar Parrikar openly confessed that India would promote terrorism in Pakistan for taking “thorn out with the help of a thorn or in Hindi “Kantay ko kantay se nikalna”. The latest shift in Indian policy towards Pakistan negates Gujral’s doctrine which advocated a stable, united and a sovereign democratic Pakistan is in the interest of India257. Indian military and security establishment is currently plotting against sovereignty and territorial integrity of Pakistan258. Pakistan having faced 1971 debacle at Indian hand, and is facing worst kind of insurgency in Balochistan with support of Indian intelligence- RAW. Indian intelligence is also fomenting terrorism in Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and largest cosmopolitan city- Karachi. After arrest of Indian serving officer of RAW and Indian Government accepting Kalbhushan Yadav as an Indian national and demanding counsellor access, and later approaching the ICJ, unravelled the mystery of Indian involvement in destabilization of Pakistan. The history of bigotry and subjugation as explained in preceding paragraphs bears testimony to the fact that the elements like national ideology, distinct culture and religious orientation between India and Pakistan promoted a narrative of perpetual enmity from India. Three wars (1948, 1965 and 1971) Kargil conflict in 1999, tension on LoC and ongoing terrorism in Pakistani territories reinforce the perception of mutual enmity and bloodthirsty approach. Modi government hurling open threat of aggression and unprecedented escalation

256 Full Spectrum Deterrence (FSD) is a qualitative approach against all Indian threats from tactical to operational and strategic levels to offset the asymmetry in conventional forces. Pakistan was forced to devise some strategy after Indian doctrine of Cold Start and Pro-Active Operations Strategy. 257 Ik Gujral, Continuity and Change: India’s Foreign Policy (New Delhi: Macmillan India Ltd, 2003), p.96. 258 Manohar Parrikar, Indian Defence Minster confessed publicly on media that India will pursue terrorism as an instrument of state policy to avenge terrorism from Pakistan. Online available at http://indianexpress.com/article/india/india-others/kill-terrorist-with-terrorist-defence-minister-manohar- parrikars-idea-2/ (accessed on 29 December 2017).

100 on LoC dashed all hope of reconciliation and rapprochement between India and Pakistan259. With growing Indian involvement and interests in Afghanistan, probably Afghanistan may also figure out in any future conflict between India and Pakistan. This notion of coercing Pakistan is fundamentally flawed because stronger and larger India will not be able to force Pakistan to compromise on its core interests. Pakistan’s weapon of deterrence (the nuclear bomb) and peoples’ resolve to use if their prestige is at stake, must not be overlooked by Indian politico-military leadership before undertaking any misadventure260. The literature on Pakistani security institutions is replete with allegations against Pakistan’s military and intelligence agencies that these had been promoting anti-India sentiment and coaxing civilian leadership to adopt tough stance against India especially on Kashmir issue. Given the history of wars and animosity between two countries, Pakistan military cannot lower its guards. Bob Woodward in his account; Bush at War, 2010, also declared Pakistan’s military in the lead role as far as foreign policy towards India and Afghanistan is concerned261. It may be partially true due to security dilemma from Indian side yet, the dispassionate analysis revealed that Pakistan had no choice but to defend herself against Indian machinations from across two fronts- east and west. Vali Nasr while quoting Hamza Alvi explained the nexus between military and bureaucracy, only organised institutions which had been part of British raj (rule) immediately after independence when the country was sunk into refugee crises, food shortages, laws and order situation, almost war like situation on eastern border and Kashmir262. Post wars acrimony and constant hostility along LoC against India is reminiscent of Indian conspiracy to sow the seeds of discord in Bengali population against western wing of pre-1971 united Pakistan263. President Yahya remained committed to handing over his military rule to civilian politicians but maintained that “he will not preside over the splitting

259 As per ISPR announcement India violated LoC 178 times in 2016 (till November 2016) and killed dozens of civilians and injured hundreds, living in villages astride LoC. 260 Uzma Mumtaz, “India and Pakistan: Conventional Asymmetry and Nuclear Deterrence” POLIS Working Papers Working Paper No 2. 2010 online available at http://www.polis.leeds.ac.uk/assets/files/research/working-papers/working-paper-no2-2010-final.pdf (accessed on 28 March 2017). 261 Bob Woodward, Bush at War, pp.58-61. ISI’s “S” Directorate had been quoted by Woodward for planning and executing insurgency in India and Afghanistan, and bypassing Government of Pakistan. 262 Seyyed Vali Reza Nasr, The Islamic Leviathan: Islam and the Making of the State Power (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), p.46. Jinnah became Governor- General after independence. Pakistan’s military was under the command of a British general until 1951 and the country was ruled by the same bureaucratic, military, and “oligarchic elite” in Nasr’s words. 263 Tahir Amin, Ethno- National Movements of Pakistan, Domestic and International factors (Rawalpindi: Pap– Board Printers, 1988), p.72. “The real reason of constituting one unit (West Pakistan) was to present numerical strength to Bengalis with a view to diluting their political demands, based on population”.

101 of Pakistan”264. Aijazuddin, while referring to old declassified memorandum, tried to explain a perception in Pakistan about tacit US support for splitting of country and supporting Rehman for declaring independence of East Pakistan. While quoting Kissinger he asserted that “US position had been that we support the unity of Pakistan. Some Pakistani politicians have charged- for their own purpose – that the US is plotting East Pakistan’s secession”265. The decade of post General Zia-ul- Haq witnessed another dimension of militancy when new Lashkars (militias) were formed to wage jihad in Kashmir with support of Pakistani security forces and intelligence agencies. This period is also characterized with tension between India and Pakistan and both sides had been trading allegations and counter allegations against each other on account of interference in each other’s affairs. Lashkare-e- Tayaba (LeT) and Jaish-e-Muhammad (JeM) were two main groups which had been fighting in Indian occupied Kashmir (IoK)266. Any statement on policy towards India without emphatic reference to Kashmir dispute will be viewed as appeasement of India by Pakistani Government and omitting mention of Kashmir is taken as blasphemous267. Therefore, both the governments are forced to spend on standing armies, more painful for Pakistan due to much smaller GDP as compared to India268. Nawaz Sharif, at later part of his premiership stint tried to break the inertia by signing Lahore Declaration with Indian Prime Minister Vajpayee in 1999269. However, the initiative suffered after Kargil adventure270. This was the time that extremism and militancy was ripe and had spread from Afghanistan to Kargil and Kashmir. USA / international community were alarmed with the capacity of Al Qaeda to

264 F.S Aijazuddin ed., The White House & Pakistan Secret Declassified Documents 1969-1974 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), p.231. Memorandum for the President (President Nixon) from Foreign Secretary Hennery Kissinger, 22 February 1971. 265Aijazuddin, The White House & Pakistan Secret Declassified Documents, p. 232. 266Robert G. Wirsing, India, Pakistan and the Kashmir Dispute on Regional Conflicts and its Resolution (London: The Macmillan Press Ltd, 1994), pp.114-115. Wirsing views are supported by the statement of US State Department in 1991 saying, -----“that the support was planned and coordinated in large parts by Pakistan’s ISI and that all this was carried out with full knowledge and under auspices of the Pakistan’s Army” 267 No mention of Kashmir dispute at Ufa Summit declaration by India and Pakistan in 2015, perturbed people of Pakistan because dialogue with India is meaningless without Kashmir. Full text reproduced by the Hindu of 10 July 2015. 268 Marvin G.Weinbaum and Chetan Kumar eds., South Asia Approaching the Millennium Re-examining National Security (Karachi: Vanguard Books Pvt Ltd, 1996), pp.1-2. 269 Indian Prime Minister Mr Vajpayee paid an historic visit to Lahore and met his counterpart Mr. Nawaz Sharif in 1999, online available at http://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/IN%20PK_990221_The%20Lahore%20Declaration.pdf (accessed on 17 November 2017). 270 Kargil episode 1999, was a desperate response by Kashmiri mujahideen after repeated atrocities by Indian occupation forces.

102 threaten their interests. They understood and backed Indian concerns and pressured Pakistan to roll back the militancy from Kashmir271. In the wake of 9/11, 2001, under US pressure, Musharraf decided to pursue a policy of peaceful co-existence with India and hinted to dismantle the militants’ infrastructure established since a decade272. After 2006/7 the mistrust started to grow between Pakistan and USA, when US vowed to take on Al-Qaida and other terrorist groups unilaterally with drone strikes273. Indians were keenly watching the developments and they had calculated that this was the best time when Pakistan could be forced to reverse its policy on Kashmir. Attack on Indian Parliament in 2001 provided an opportunity to pressure Pakistan. India amassed forces on the border in 2002, with premeditated plan of coercing Pakistan to submission without initiating war274. Indians in close coordination with USA, orchestrated their plan well and withdrew only under the assurance by Musharraf that Pakistani establishment will not support militants, who were waging jihad in Kashmir. The camps were dismantled in 2003/04 and JeM and LeT were asked to stop their cross-border projections. The strategic shift in Pakistan’s policy estranged militants’ organizations of Kashmir origin, and few of their elements splintered and joined Al-Qaida by shifting their bases to FATA and Afghanistan275. The role of non-state actors gained prominence in the post 9/11 security scenario, and US started focusing on freedom movement in IOK. The US and India had been harping that Pakistan is supporting Kashmiri fighters, operating in IoK besides, abetting infiltration from Pakistani side by Kashmiris living on Pakistani side of Loc and non-Kashmiri fighters. The role of militant organizations like LeT and JeM echoed loudly in Washington and Delhi276. Supposedly non-state actors were either supported by security establishment directly or their

271 Shaukat Qadir, “An Analysis of the Kargil Conflict 1999” The RUSI Journal Volume 147, 2002 Issue 2, pp. 24-30, published online: 20 Mar 2008. On line available at http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/03071840208446752?journalCode=rusi20 (accessed on 15 April 2017). 272 After attack on Indian parliament in December 2001, India massed forces on Indo- Pak border and threatened aggression. The forces remain concentrated for over one year and then Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf was forced to review policy on Kashmir. US played a role behind the doors and India succeeded in securing assurances and later dismantling of offices of former jihadi outfits. 273 David Kilcullen and Andrew McDonald Exum “Death from Above, Outrage Down Below” New York Times, 17 May 2009, OP-ED Contributors. 274 Sumit Ganguly & Michael R. Kraig, “The 2001–2002 Indo-Pakistani Crisis: Exposing the Limits of Coercive Diplomacy” Journal Security Studies Volume 14, 2005 - Issue 2, Pages 290-324, Published online: 23 Feb 2011. 275 Carlotta Gall and Salman Masood, “At Least 40 Militants Dead as Pakistani Military Storms Mosque after Talks Fail” New York Times, 10 July 2007. 276 Role of non-state actors is established in close coordination with establishment since liberation of Kashmir (1948), Operation Gibraltar (1965) and AL Badar / Al Shams groups of JI in Bangladesh in (1971).

103 actions were tolerated because these indirectly reinforced the security along Line of Control in Kashmir277. Ms Pande described the feelings among Muslims either as Islamic identities to keep united with power of religion thrive on anti-India narrative as unifying agenda, she asserted that “It is anti-Indianism, albeit suffused with a touch of ambivalence, has turned out to be a stronger uniting force”278. The Jamat-e-Islami (JI) encouraged role of non-state actor in former East Pakistan using religion as the bondage, to counter covert campaign by Mukti Bahinis (Bengali rebels)279. The government of Hasina Wajid is settling old scores by hanging the former JI zealots280. It may be pointed out that India as a state has started to pursue the policy of implementing foreign policy objectives through the proxy of non-state actors and lost much acclaimed moral high grounds281. Mr Modi and his cabinet ministers like Manoher Parrikar is on record to have stated that Pakistan should forget about Balochistan Province if interference by Pakistan in Kashmir does not cease282. The Hindu extremist groups display Hindu chauvinism by not only threatening Pakistan to wipe out but to physically manhandling Pakistani artists and sportsmen visiting India283. In most case bashing the other side sells well and hostile and prejudiced comments by anchor-persons, sportsmen and celebrities are taken as bold stance at the cost of perpetuating the enmity between two

277 Mehsuds and Afridis from Tribal areas of Pakistan fought along with Kashmiri fighters against forcible occupation of Srinagar by Indian Forces. Robert J. Mc Mahon, The Cod War on the Periphery The United States, India and Pakistan (New York: Colombia University Press, 1994), p. 43. 278 Ira Pande ed., The Great Divide India and Pakistan (Uttar Pradesh: Harper Collins Publishers India, 2009), p.5. Ms Pande gave an interesting account about Islam which has taken two narratives as cultural and as religious idea, but in both ways Islam’s power to unite Pakistan’s disparate communities has fallen short. She attempted to draw conclusions after Muslims of East Pakistan declared their independence and decided to secede from Jinnah’s Pakistan. 279 Counter - Terrorism in South Asia, ORF-Heritage Dialogue, (New Delhi: KW Publishers Pvt Ltd, 2011), p.102. 280 The Government of Hasina Wajid, daughter of Mujibur Rehman, tried activist of Jamat-e- Islami (JI) who supported the stance of JI West Pakistan and surprisingly almost all top leaders were convicted and hanged. BBC News, 10 May 2016, online available at http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-36261197 (accessed on 24 April 2017) 281 Mumbai Terror Attacks: the Making of a Monster, Telegraph online available at http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/india/9985109/Mumbai-terror-attacks-the-making-of-a- monster.html (accessed on 14 April 2017). 282 Mr Parrikar while speaking on Indian electronic media on 25 may 2015, stressed that “India would prefer to take out the thorn with thorn”, metaphorically stating that terrorism will be responded with terrorism. Online available at http://indianexpress.com/article/india/india-others/kill-terrorist-with-terrorist-defence-minister- manohar-parrikars-idea-2/ (accessed on 29 December 2017). 283 By Aparna Pande, “Secular India vs. Hindu Nationalism”, Huffington post, online available at http://www..com/aparna-pande/secular-india-v-hindu-nat_b_6397778.html (accessed on 10 April 2017).

104 nations284. Both sides will have to think over some sort of out of box solution if their relations are to be normalized. They will have to address their blind spots if they want to resolve their bilateral problems285. The persistent threat of aggression and low intensity conflict through Afghan proxies are only reinforcing the perception of hardliners who believe and propagate that Indian leadership only understands the language of violence286. Bleeding civilian population and soldiers of Pakistan military bracing Indian shelling everyday possess strong sentiment of retribution rather than reconciliation. Internally Sikh community is alienated and prone to exploitation287. The regional economic integration is another path which could enhance bilateral cooperation and pave way for settlement of political disputes among nations especially Pakistan, India and Afghanistan. Iranian Chahbahar Port and Pakistani Gawadar port may be developed as sister ports rather than the competitors. Chinese and Iranian side is willing however, Indian government is trying to develop an alternative route to circumvent Gawadar for access to Afghanistan and Central Asian Republics288. Indian integration in CPEC through Wagha- Torkham- Afghanistan is probably the most economical and viable option yet, the big if is the normalization of relations between India and Pakistan which is not foreseeable without reaching a mutually agreed solution to Kashmir dispute289. Mr IK Gujral had cautioned both India and Pakistan in 2003 that pursuance of terrorism as an instrument of national policy must be checked before it becomes a nuisance for both the countries290. India can no longer claim moral high ground in blaming Pakistan for supporting terrorism in Indian occupied Kashmir (IoK). The demand of international community urging Pakistan to cooperate on Afghanistan, while giving India a free hand to undermine Pakistan’s sovereignty and territorial integrity is irrational. The allegations of terrorism may be mutually

284 Whenever an incident of terrorism takes place in India or Pakistan, the media frenzy is manifested with hostile coverage of events and analyses, inciting punitive strikes by India and Pakistani media accusing Pakistani Government for being soft on India. 285 Dr Hassan Ashari Rizvi, Can India and Pakistan Become Normal Neighbours? The express Tribune with International New York Times, 29 December 2013. 286 Hafiz Saeed of JuD and Chief of Jamat-e- Islami openly reiterate that unless we wage jihad and violent struggle, India will continue killing Muslims on both side of the Line of Control besides, persecution of Muslim minority at the hands of chauvinistic Hindu terrorists’ gangs inside Indian Territory. 287 Harbans Singh, The Heritage of the Sikhs (New Delhi: Manohar Publishers & Distributors, 1984), p.342. Also, see Subhash Chander Arora, Strategies to Combat Terrorisms A Study of Punjab (New Delhi: Har- Anand Publications Pvt Ltd, 1999), pp. 140-141. 288 The News, 24 May 2016. 289 Sultan Hafeez Rahman, Sridhar Khatri and Hans-Peter Brunner, Regional Integration and Economic Development in South Asia (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing Limited, 2012), p.167. 290 Ik Gujral, Continuity and Change: India’s Foreign Policy (New Delhi: Macmillan India Ltd, 2003), p.79.

105 verified to address the concerns on both sides291. Regrettably, diametrically opposed positions on regional terrorism are a major stumbling block towards joint strategy of combating terrorism in South Asia292. The biggest challenge in South Asia is to establish politico-diplomatic relations based on sovereign equality, mutual interest and mutual respect. Unless outstanding political disputes like Kashmir are resolved, the menace of terrorism may not be defeated in the region293. Understandably, Kashmir being the most contentious issue may be deferred to second stage however; less antagonistic issues like Siachin, Sir Creek and Water share may be tackled on priority294. Any tangible progress would create conducive environment for a meaningful dialogue on Kashmir dispute. The increased goodwill may encourage India and Pakistan to cooperate and jointly fight terrorism in the region. Terrorism, undeniably, is a regional issue due to linkages among terrorist groups fighting in various countries- especially Pakistan, India and Afghanistan. Without tangible concessions and progress from Indian side Pakistan cannot not control Kashmiri fighters voluntarily crossing into Indian occupied Kashmir. The domestic sentiment is too charged, and no political government could imagine abandoning Kashmir cause295. Both the countries will have to realize that single point agenda is counterproductive and will lead nowhere close to bilateral rapprochement296. After tangle progress on Kashmir dispute, the softer issues like most favoured nation (MFN) status to India, bilateral trade especially through CPEC and broader regional integration could be resolved amicably. Pakistan may have to emulate Chinese –Indian relations by freezing the Kashmir dispute for

291 Indian National Investigation Agency Chief gave a clean chit to Pakistan as a state for not being involved in planning of attack against Indian Air base of Pathankot, but NIA did not rule role of a non-state actors from JeM, online available at https://www.thenews.com.pk/latest/124769-Pathankot-attack-Indias-NIA-chief-gives- clean-chit-to-Pakistan (accessed on 10 January 2017). 292Suman Sharma, India and SAARC (New Delhi: Gyam Publishing House, 2001), p.169. 293 The enthusiasm by Mr Nawaz Sharif to develop better relations with India is criticised by Pakistan’s emerging popular party led by Mr Imran Khan on media and public gatherings, who accuses the ruling party especially its head for being soft on India due to business interests. 294 Sudha Ramachandran, “Does India Really Need to Defend the Siachen Glacier “? The Diplomat, 23 February 2016 295 By Aparna Pande, “Secular India vs. Hindu Nationalism”, Huffington post, online available at http://www..com/aparna-pande/secular-india-v-hindu-nat_b_6397778.html (accessed on 10 April) 2017. 296 Wilkinson though applauded civilian control over Indian Army yet, the institution exerts its weight over the issue of Siachin Glacier, which as per statement of Khursheed Mahmood Kasuri, former Foreign Minister of Pakistan was close to resolution and both sides had agreed to pull back forces, dying of harsh weather since decades. However, Wilkinson too, cited that Indian Army is reluctant to recruitment from underprivileged areas, possible to maintain its influence within the institution. Steven I. Wilkinson, Reviewed by Anew J. Nathan, “Army and Nation: The Military and Indian Democracy since Independence” Foreign Affairs, Capsule Review, September/October2015 Issue.

106 some time and promoting need – oriented trade and economic relations297. The fields like education (especially medical), information technology and agriculture offer great prospects of cooperation298. While Pakistan has to review its foreign policy choice with India including strategy to pursue Kashmir cause, India, too, has to rethink its imperialistic approach and revisionist mind-set. Dictations and threats to sovereign nation of Pakistan are proving counterproductive299. Paradoxically due to Chinese and Russian factor, US conflicting strategic interests in Central and South Asia further complicate the trilateral relations, among Pakistan-India-Afghanistan. 4.2 Afghanistan Factor and Pakistan’s CT Policy Relations with Afghanistan have been characterized by mutual mistrust and hostility for most of the time in the history of country’s existence. The bone of contention is a border dispute dating back to an agreement between British Empire and then Afghan King in 1893, known as “Durand Line”. Afghanistan is a country which directly or indirectly impacted security of Pakistan. Most of the times, Afghanistan added into Pakistan’s security predicaments however, it contributed towards security maximization of Pakistan during wars with India in 1965 and 1971. Except for decade of détente (1963-1973), the relations with Afghanistan aggravated threat to Pakistan’s security, agitated domestic concerns under ethnic slogan of Pashtunistan, an Afghanistan claimed territorial dispute on international border between two countries300. The internal vulnerabilities and periodic disturbance in tribal areas bordering Afghanistan, believed to have been instigated by Afghan Government, forced Pakistan to improve its defence capabilities by entering into military alliance with the US. Pakistan was granted military assistance after becoming member of South East Asian Treaty Organisation

297 Sultan Hafeez Rahman, Sridhar Khatri and Hans-Peter Brunner, Regional Integration and Economic Development in South Asia (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing Limited, 2012), p.168. 298 Huma Sattar , “ India-Pakistan: The Curious Case of the MFN Status”, The Diplomat, 14 February 2015. 299 After arrest of Ehsanullah Ehsan former spokesperson of TTP and member consultative body of Jamat ul Ahrar (JuA) and strong proxy of IS-K revealed all connections with Indian and Afghan Intelligence services. . The leader of JuA, Khalid Khurasani is known Khurasani due to the same affiliation. Ehsanuulah Ehsan was live on Geo TV of Pakistan with Mr Safi anchor person Programme on 26April 2017. Wherein, he confessed that Indian and Afghan intelligence services provided them with Afghan identity documents, SIMs for cell phones, finances, training and weapons for terrorism in FATA, major cities and Balochistan. These agencies used to pay heavy sums for every act of terror. Ehsan also divulged that Sajna leader of Hakimullah Mehsud chapter of TTP visited India for treatment on forged Afghan documents because he was injured during a NATO raid in Afghanistan. 300 Sadika Hameed, Prospects for India- Pakistan Cooperation in Afghanistan a Report by Centre for Strategic & International Studies, August 2012. Because of ethnic issue of Pashtunistan and border dispute (from Afghan perspective only), Afghanistan was the only country which opposed Pakistan’s entry into United Nation in 1949.

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(SEATO) and Central Treaty Organisation (CENTO) whereas; Afghanistan had to join the Communist block for military hardware301. The journey started as ill-fated to say the least and regrettably, Afghanistan was the only country which opposed creation of an independent state of Pakistan in 1947 and the phases of mistrust and suspicion continued to haunt the bilateral relations. The seeds of ethnicity and parochialism spoiled the bilateral relations, influenced with vested interests. Afghans also drew inspiration that since Hindus and Muslims are being offered an option to live in respective majority areas similarly area comprising majority of population (though Muslims by faith) be given a choice to consolidate into one country known as “Pashtunistan”302. This situation was particularly harmful to Pakistan, because of its transition into statehood and existential threat from a powerful neighbour on the east – India. Afghanistan encouraged armed tribal incursion into Pakistan’s territory, particularly the tribal areas, to not only weaken the state of Pakistan in infancy but to reassert her territorial claim over tribal agencies of former Federally Administered Tribal Agencies (FATA). The second largest Tajik community had been running important state institutions and somehow was more poised towards maintaining good relations with India and had always been blaming Pakistan for all the trouble in Afghanistan. In 1949, during border skirmishes with Pakistan, the Afghan Loya Jirga adopted a resolution unilaterally repudiating all nineteenth century treaties with British India. Understandably, the most important of these was the Durand line agreement of 1893 with the British Empire that demarcated the international border between Afghanistan and Pakistan, being enforced retrospectively. The arrangement validated all agreements between British Empire and the king of Afghanistan, after creation of two independent states out of united British India. No government in Kabul ever since recognized the validity of the Durand line, not even the pro-Pakistan Taliban regime, thus straining the bilateral relations. Afghanistan though, escaped the ill effects of World War II but could not remain unaffected after partition of Subcontinent, creating border dispute with Pakistan (which Pakistan categorically rejects)303.

301 Amin Saikal, Modern Afghanistan a History of Struggle and Survival (London: I.B. Tauris& Co Ltd, 2004), p.118. “Washington now seemed determined to extend its policy of containment to West Asia. The objective was to deny the Soviet Union any opportunity to take advantage of the end of British colonial rule to gain a strategic and ‘subversive’ foothold in the region.” 302 Meredith L. Runion, The History of Afghanistan (London: The Greenwood Press, 2007), pp.94-95. Afghans possess the history of infighting and ousting the successive kings and regimes. Three Anglo-Afghan Wars bear testimony to the fact that Afghans never accepted the British rule and fought back to throw away the clutches of foreign occupation. 303 John K. Cooley, Unholy Wars Afghanistan, America and International Terrorism (Lahore: Vanguard Books (Pvt) Ltd, 2001), p.10.

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The lingering disputes with Afghanistan are source of regional instability and sporadic border skirmishes304. Except for relatively peaceful relations, after resignation of Sardar Daud (1963-1973), there had been attempts by Afghanistan to forcibly occupy tribal agencies of Pakistan. Certain nationalist parties in Pakistan had also been championing the cause of Pashtunistan alongside Afghan authorities. Grave of Sarhadi (frontier) Gandhi, Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan aka (Bacha Khan) at Jalalabad speaks volumes about old rhetoric of Pashtunistan- comprising almost entire KPK and part of Balochistan Province. Afghan authorities take refuge of renouncement by then Afghan ruler Amir Abdur Rehman of bordering regions which were placed under British Empire after 1893 accord. The same areas were transferred to Pakistan as per partition plan. The excuse of agreement being signed under duress lacks credibility after lapse of a century plus timeframe305. Another dichotomy in Pakistan’s foreign policy towards Afghanistan is the apparent disconnect between thinking of military and political elite. The political parties especially nationalist parties are of the view that Pakistan should adopt hands off policy and Afghan’s sovereignty should be respected. Whereas military circle contend that independence and sovereignty of Afghanistan is unquestionable yet presence of over three million Afghan refugees at Pakistani soil and anti-Pakistan activities by Afghan and Indian intelligence cannot be condoned. Pakistan is conscious of security environment and the threat spectre from India after Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979. Rasanayagam highlighted the gravity of threat while asserting that “the invasion (Soviet invasion of Afghanistan) coincided with Mrs Indira Gandhi's sweeping victory in the Indian elections. When Gromyko publicly declared shortly afterwards in New Delhi that if Pakistan continues to serve as a puppet of imperialism in future, it will jeopardize its existence and its integrity as an independent state. Pakistan's worst fears of a Moscow-Kabul-New Delhi axis seemed to have been confirmed” (1971 dismemberment)306. Some analysts believe that Pakistan’s rivalry with India is the primary driving force behind its Afghan policy. The perception may be partially true because besides Indian factor, presence of Afghan Taliban in FATA, before operation Zarb-e- Azb of 2014, movement of foreign fighters especially affiliated with Al-Qaida and Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan

304 Angelo Rasanayagam, Afghanistan A Modern History Monarchy, Despotism or Democracy? The problem of Governance in the Muslim Tradition (London: I.B. Tauris & Co Ltd, 2002), p.28-29. Khrushchev personally visited Kabul in 1955 and announced a hefty package of military and economic assistance in addition to supporting Kabul’s stand on the issue of Pashtunistan with Pakistan. 305 Scott Seward Smit, Afghanistan’s Troubled Transition Politics, Peace keeping and the 2004 Presidential Elections (New Delhi: Viva Books Private Limited, 2012), p.138. 306Rasanayagam, Afghanistan A Modern History, p.104.

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(IMU) and irritants between US and Pakistan override all other considerations307. The latest saga of US demands (5 January 2017) and sanctions over security assistance to Pakistan vindicated simmering differences between Pakistani and US security departments over presence and handling of Afghan Taliban and Haqqani network (HQN) at Pakistani soil308. The increasing Indian influence in Afghanistan and resultant destabilization in Pakistan is a matter of great concern. After de-hyphenation of relations, the US relations with India and Pakistan is not a zero-sum game yet, accepting increased Indian role in Afghanistan and forcing Pakistan to pull back and permit space for India is counterproductive. It is a major detractor which is well known to US military, CIA and State department in addition to academia at large. Therefore, there is larger asymmetry of interests between Afghanistan and Pakistan. The bilateral issues between two countries go much beyond the Pakistan question or the border irritants for Islamabad. For Pakistan, Afghanistan is an element of calculation which is critical for regional connectivity/ economic interests but also vital to some extent as a component of its global standing. Sardar Muhammad Daud, a first cousin of King Zahir Shah had been strong opponent of Pakistan over border dispute and known for supporting ethnic groups of FATA to rise against the state of Pakistan, at least twice during his stint of rule- in 1950s and 1960/61. Daud, even resented Pakistan internal decision of declaring one unit, comprising West Pakistan’s all four provinces and East Pakistan consisting of eastern wing districts309. Provinces like former NFWP and Balochistan resented the move. Afghanistan took it as move to neutralize the claim of Pashtunistan, by drawing areas closely to one wing which were otherwise claimed by Afghan Government. Riots broke out in Kabul leading to ransacking of Pakistan’s embassy in Kabul and consulate in Jalalabad while police stood like

307 Pervez Musharraf, In the Line of Fire a Memoir (London: Simon and Schuster, 2006), p. 218. Dr Abdullah Azzam, a Palestinian spiritual leader established a centre known as Maktaba al Khidmat for coordination of finances and logistics at Peshawar during Afghan jihad, and information sharing among mujahideen engaged in Afghan jihad against Soviet Union besides, letting their families know about their whereabouts and wellbeing. Osama Bin laden was deputy of Abdullah Azzam and it is enough to prove that Osama had been a devout Muslim believing in philosophy of Jihad and per Musharraf assessment he utilized dollars by Saudi Arabia and USA for actually raising of strong jihadi force, with ultimate objective of challenging the super power- USA at an opportune moment. 308 Felicia Schwartz and Nancy A. Youssef, “US to Withhold all Security Assistance to Pakistan”, , updated 4 January 2018. Online available at https://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-to-withhold-all-security-assistance-to-pakistan-1515105054 (accessed on 8 December 2018). The total aid could amount to the tune of US $ 1. 3 Billion. “ U.S. officials said the suspension of funds was motivated in part by frustration that Pakistan wouldn’t grant Washington access to a member of the Haqqani network captured by Pakistani forces late last year when they freed a Canadian-American family held hostage by militants, and was also denying the U.S. access to other people of interest.” 309 Sisson et al, War and Secession: Pakistan, India and Creation of Bangladesh (California: University of California Press, 1990), p.8.

110 a spectator. The issue of US spy plane U2 flying from Pakistani Base, Peshawar and its pilot being captured after shooting down of the plane further strained the relations not only with Afghanistan, but former USSR was also antagonized after the incident310. Daud had to resign and the decade (1963-1973) may be termed as the ideal period of Pakistan-Afghanistan relations. The relations further improved after revoking of one unit in 1970 by Pakistan and upon resumption of reorientation of the provinces and 7 agencies of FATA. In 1973 King Zahir Shah was overthrown, Daud seized power after leftist inspired military coup that abolished monarchy from Afghanistan and established Republic of Afghanistan. Living to his reputation of anti-Pakistan ruler, he claimed that king had not sufficiently exploited Pakistan’s military and political weakness to its advantage, particularly after 1971 war and loss of East Pakistan. In Pakistan, it was government of a liberal leader Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, a strong believer in Socialist economy and ideology. Bhutto’s government was battling the nationalist tribal insurgency in Balochistan. He recognized Daud’s government with the hope that Kabul may give up its suspected support to Baloch nationalist, challenging writ of the government. Despite Pakistan’s goodwill gesture, Daud supported the insurgency in Balochistan, sheltering rebels and establishing training camps on Afghan territory. It may be characterized as an era of resumption of Afghanistan’s proxy intervention in Pakistan. The deteriorated relations led to frequent border clashes. In 1976, there was sharp escalation, prompting a deployment of Afghan forces in anticipation of a Pakistani attack. Harrison revelation that “US $ 32 per person were paid monthly to Mir Hazar as subvention” is intriguing and speaks volumes about interference by successive Afghan Governments in the internal affairs of Balochistan by supporting separatists311. As regards strategic significance of the region, people like Masti khan- a tycoon owning rubber plants and rice business in Burma, cautioned General Zia-ul- Haq in 1980s, that due to strategic location of Balochistan, both the super powers are sharing interests in the region312. While interference continued during the era of Daud, on pursuance of Shah of Iran, Daud did not grant asylum to Baloch separatists however, after his assassination, Khalq Government promptly granted that status313. Incidentally, even in 2017, Tajik elite is

310 Cooley, Unholy Wars Afghanistan, America and International Terrorism, p.51. US spy plane, flown by Francis Gary Powers was shot down by the Soviets in 1960, operating from Pakistan Air Base at Badaber/ Peshawar. 311 Selig S. Harrison, In Afghanistan’s Shadow: Baluch Nationalism and Soviet Temptations (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1981), p.81. Since establishment of Baloch camps in 1975 during Daud Regime, “Mir Hazar received a subvention of US $ 32 monthly per person from successive Afghan Governments, totalling some US $ 875000 per year in mid 1980s”. 312 Ibid., pp. 90-95. 313 Ibid., pp.81-82.

111 repeating the history by patronizing the Baloch separatists. The Baloch nationalists had been travelling on fake Afghan and Indian passports and using Indian SIMs in while speaking to fighters in Balochistan and Afghanistan. This information was corroborated through various interactions with security and intelligence officials and revelations by TTP representative, Ehsanullah Ehsan, arrested in 2016 by Pakistani intelligence314. Though Bhutto was great proponent of Socialist values yet, he went along with advisors to support Islamists in Kabul to not only relieve pressure on Pakistan’s Balochistan province but to exploit the possible power vacuum, likely to be created after death of ailing/ aging Daud. Thus, in 1975, Pakistan started to support Islamic groups of Gul Badin Hikmat Yar, Burhanuddin Rabbani and Ahmed Shah Masood and turned the tables on Daud. The Islamic insurgency started to take routes and PDPA government was upset with the development and started to handle those groups with Iron fists. This was a readymade strategic policy initiative launched by Pakistan, expanded and exploited by the US against USSR invasion of Afghanistan in 1979. Pakistan’s reciprocal intervention under a compulsion put pressure on Daud to reconsider the issue of Pashtunistan and return to negotiation table, to iron out issues pending bilateral deliberations. Consequently, the struggle between nationalists in Kabul and Islamist fighters intensified especially after Soviet invasion, its roots stretch back to 1973 and the power struggle continues even today. The only difference is that, heroes (especially of the US/ Western world and Islamic countries) of yester years have become villains of today. Death of Afghan Taliban chief Mullah Mansour with US drone is the testimony of new US strategy in the region. Zia’s policies of supporting Mujahidin resistance in Afghanistan had exacted a disastrous toll on the people of Pakistan and Afghanistan. Though Afghans had to suffer due to Jihad and invasion by USSR, Pakistan faced civilian casualties with remotely controlled explosive devices, often planted at public places for maximum casualties and for discrediting the government of General Zia-ul- Haq. Mushrooming of Madrassas to indoctrinate holly warriors led to opening of vicious sectarian fissures. The whole society was desensitized and brutalized and various Jihadi groups started constructing their fiefdoms to pursue their agendas. Weapons, drugs and societal ills shattered the fabric of population in former NWFP and todays KPK, FATA and Balochistan. Though other cities like Karachi and bordering

314 Ehsanullah Ehsan former TTP spokesperson revealed during interrogation (video released by ISPR/Army) and his revelation during a live interview on Geo TV on 26 April 2017 that Indian Intelligence facilitated their forged Afghan travel documents, Mobile phone SIMs and every support in terror training and money to perpetrate terrorist attack in Pakistan’s FATA, major cities and Balochistan Province. TTP had constituted liaison teams to remain in contact with RAW and NDS officials, to not only receive funding but execute terrorist attacks on the orders of their masters. Also, see Dawn Newspaper of 29 April 2017, p.8.

112 districts of Punjab could not remain unaffected. Out of 5 million plus Afghan refugees, more than 3 million refugees are still living in Pakistan. It remain a daunting challenge of repatriating them to Afghanistan with the assistance of international agencies. Afghanistan is a fragmented society and has lost at least two generations of its people to war and desolation. Its climb out of oblivion remains a slippery slope yet, considered critical for regional security and prosperity. After death of General Zia (1988), in 1989 during Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, Benazir Bhutto was sworn in as the Prime Minister of Pakistan. She was advised by retired General Naseerullah Bahar, as Interior Minister of Pakistan to support Afghan Taliban with a view to protecting Pakistan’s legitimate security and economic interests. Taliban may be described as neo-fundamentalist because the world they created, never existed on ground. They were product of desolate refugee camps, or return of pristine life in Afghanistan, rather it was religious interpretation of life and traditions of their own. The obscurantist ideology and discrimination and brutal treatment of women folk gained notoriety across the world during Taliban regime. Taliban were heroes of Afghanistan however, after Soviet withdrawal, the tone changed and the image of mujahideen became one of the “revolutionaries” or “reactionaries” fighting among themselves and unable to form a government in Kabul315. The UN and EU had been urging Taliban by passing resolutions to accept the rights of girls to education and cessation of discrimination against women and forcible indoctrination of people in the country316. Pakistan was the first country to have recognized Taliban regime. Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and also recognized the Taliban Government. Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif was reportedly impressed with the Taliban style of rapid justice system and wanted to emulate the same in Pakistan, during his second stint in 1990s317. In addition to Pakistan, Afghan jihad was funded by affluent Sheikhdoms of Middle East and Egypt. Egypt had sent Soviet origin weapons to Mujahideen through Pakistan, with coordination and funding of CIA. Peshawar was the principal conduit for Egyptian and other external weapon sources. “Shipments were ferried by the CIA via Oman to Baluchi Coast. Such arms were going through Iran and Pakistan”318. The 9/11 was marked with the US policy of Unilateralism and Pre-emption strategies, threatening any country which was reluctant to cooperate with the US led war on terror in

315 Peter Marsden, The Taliban War, Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan (London: Zee Books Ltd, 1998), p.114. 316 Ibid., p. 116. 317 M.J. Gohari, The Taliban Ascent to Power (New York: The Oxford University Press, 2000), pp.116-117. 318 Grant M. Farr and John G. Merriam eds., Afghan Resistance the Politics of Survival (Lahore: Vanguard Books (Pvt) Ltd 1988), pp.72-73.

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Afghanistan. Independent researchers challenge the official story of 9/11, but hardly anyone attempts to connect the dots to see the whole saga of bloody drama of 9/11, ostensibly to oust Osama bin Laden (OBL) from Afghanistan. It was no different than the lies about Saddam’s Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD). “The lies about Iraq’s WMD and the official story of 9/11 are mere ruses used to wage wars which were planned well in advance”319. Pakistan being a neighbour of Afghanistan was presented with no choice but to render unconditional support to US operation in Afghanistan. It was display of brute power politics by the super power which was bruised and was in the process of maximizing its security with massive show of force. Musharraf in the Line of Fire accepted that he received a telephone call from his Director General ISI, conveying US threat in a rather barefaced threatening tone320. Since 2006 onwards Taliban resistance picked up momentum causing concerns in Afghanistan and blame squarely coming to Pakistan’s military / Intelligence Agency (ISI). President Karzai, guest of ISI in Quetta city for a long time, had been hyper critical of Government of Pakistan and its security agencies. Pakistan had to endure the brunt of terrorist attacks, mainly being permeated from Afghan soil, generally accepted as quid pro- quo against Haqqanis. Afghan Government alleges that Haqqani Network (HQN) is enjoying safe havens in Pakistan whereas Pakistani authorities contend that Fazlullah (till his death on 14 June 2018) and majority of Tehrik-e- Taliban Pakistan (TTP) operatives are being harboured in Eastern Afghanistan and Nangarhar Province. The linkages of all high-profile terrorist attacks have been traced back to safe havens in Afghanistan, with active support of Afghan Security and Intelligence agencies. Role of Indian Intelligence, Research and Analysis Wing (RAW) has also been confirmed by Pakistani Intelligence agencies. Can all powerful CIA say that it has no information about the sabotage activities and terrorism being planned and directed in Pakistan from Afghan soil, in concert with Afghan and Indian intelligence agencies? It is either looking the other way or intentionally hiding the irrefutable fact of involvement of Afghan and Indian intelligence agencies in destabilization of Pakistan. CIA being ill-informed is simply untenable proposition and security and intelligence agencies corroborate this impression. Pakistan’s former Minister of Interior, Chaudhry Nisar Ai Khan explained on State media as to how 332 houses were threatened to be sealed off and the relevant embassies either shifted their staff to diplomatic enclave Islamabad or provided

319 Abid Ullah Jan, Afghanistan: The Genesis of the Final Crusade (Ottawa: Pragmatic Publishing, Canada, 2006), p.10. “The co-opted media and other vested interests played a pivotal role in indoctrinating minds which now consider the occupation of Afghanistan as a benevolent exercise.” 320 Musharraf, In the Line of Fire, p. 201.

114 the requisite information to police and relevant agencies (April 2017)321. Killing of Mullah Mansour only in Pakistan while he had been travelling to Iran and UAE speaks volumes about the conspiracies to malign Pakistan and coerce the country to budge on certain principled stands, either on account of policy on Afghanistan or wider regional security architecture. Therefore, Pakistan is walking tight rope and mixed signals of respecting Pakistan’s sovereignty yet vowing to violate at will if some target is a threat to US security are perplexing. The latest US sanctions (January 2017) to block security assistance to Pakistan remind 1989 Pressler amendment era after withdrawal of Soviet Union from Afghanistan. Albeit, US has much to gain from Pakistan while in Afghanistan or during withdrawal. Pakistan is confronted with multiple narratives with regards to its Afghan policy. Pakistan military is also criticized for being duplicitous by Western think tanks and media despite military’s clarification and actions on ground to the contrary. Pakistan’s interest in Afghanistan is linked with historical facts, according to Gohari “the interest in Afghanistan is not merely of political and circumstantial events--- Pakistani interest is deeply rooted in the ethnic, cultural, and religious structures, shared by the two countries”322. The impression till 2014, had been mixed and military had been conducting selective operations against TTP hideouts. It is believed that Afghan Taliban were ignored for not opening another front and possibly preventing alliance between TTP and Afghan Taliban323. However, since June 2014, Operation Zarb-e-Azb had been launched in all the agencies of FATA, especially Khyber and North Waziristan. North Waziristan has been purged of foreign militants and Haqqanis too, have been pushed to Afghanistan. Possibility of some elements still hiding in the jungles/ mountains of FATA cannot be ruled out. The US and the western world and above all Afghan Government will have to understand that Pakistan had been hosting more than 5 million Afghan refugees for decades and even today about 3 million refugees are residing in Pakistan. With such a large density of refugees and average 50,000 Afghans crossing every day from Chamman and Torkham crossings, the possibility of hundreds of Afghan Taliban sneaking to either side of border cannot be ruled out. The Haqqanis had been residing in FATA for decades while

321 Omer Waraich, “The CIA and ISI: Are Pakistan ad US Spy Agencies Starting to Get Along” ?, World Time, 7 August 2012. 322 Gohari, The Taliban Ascent to Power, p.118. 323 Gen Kayani’s doctrine is known to have been advocating that the gains in Swat and South Waziristan must be consolidated before embarking upon further operations in North Waziristan and Khyber Agencies.

115 fighting against Soviets and were conferred with the awards of “US Heroes”324 Hillary Clinton while visiting Pakistan as US Secretary of State in October 2009, categorically accepted that US shares the blame for today’s terrorism. The ruling government of Nawaz Sharif till 31 May 2018, in Pakistan is also considered a right-wing party. Jamiat Ulema-e- Islam of Maulana Fazlur Rehman, responsible for the largest network of Deobandi madrassa system is a political ally of Nawaz Sharif’s government therefore, role of religion cannot be overlooked in Pakistani politics325. The question is how to balance national interest within overall context of regional dictates and systemic pressures. Therefore, entire discourse of Pakistani nation’s ideology merits re- orientation and re-definition. However, the legitimacy of discourse resting on its Islamic credentials can be retained by balancing out domestic compulsions vis-à-vis, regional and international obligations. It is a complex web of terrorism and can only be unravelled if regional counties realize their responsibility. If Pakistan continues to face attack either by TTP operatives, abetted by Afghan sympathizers and supported by foreign intelligence agencies, it may not be able to unilaterally take decision which is acceptable to neighbours, international community and equally popular at home. Like any nation Pakistan would like to see its neighbourhood as friendly, posing no threat to its legitimate interests. It has been amply explained that Pakistan had been and still faces a potent Indian threat especially after India being deeply entrenched in Afghanistan. The Tajik elite, Afghan Army and security establishment is pro- India and Pakistan generally feels that its security dilemma is exacerbated with two front scenario. Indian growing influence and Kabul Government increasingly going hostile will certainly obfuscate Pakistan’s counter terrorism fight. Indeed, Indian ties with Afghanistan partly aimed at disrupting Pakistan’s security calculations; force Pakistan to continue pursuing a proxy war against India in Afghanistan. The fight in Afghanistan cannot disassociate itself from a struggle in Jammu and Kashmir. As India is supporting TTP for tying down Pakistan Army troops in FATA and not be able to respond to provocative Indian military strategy on Line of Control (LoC). In the same way Pakistan is sympathizing with Kashmir freedom movement

324 Zia Mian and Iftikhar Ahmed, eds., Making Enemies, Creating Conflicts: Pakistan’s Crises of State and Society (Lahore: Mashal Pakistan, 1997), p.14. US also invested in this jihad for the legitimacy of enormous power, and the lustre of their media glory. On one occasion when Taliban commander (Jalalud Din Haqqani) visited USA and met President Reagan he described them as “the Muslim world’s moral equivalent to our founding fathers.” 325 Jaswant Singh, Jinnah, India-Pakistan-Independence (New Delhi: Kekh Printers Pvt Ltd, 2009), p.34. According to Jaswant Singh the leading edge of Islamic reforms was Deoband, founded in 1867 by ulema imbued with the tradition of Shah Waliullah.

116 so that bulk of Indian army remains tied down and it is not able to implement its aggressive doctrine under Cold Start strategy. The race for courting proxies in Afghanistan, especially after Soviet pull-out also continued and Iran-India- Pakistan were courting respective ethnic groups. Having accomplished her objectives, US also stopped its assistance since 31 December 1991, and USAID suspended all its programmes in early 1993326. Rashid alluded that, Pakistan’s role as a master or victim of Taliban is debatable. Pakistan’s military establishment was deeply entrenched in training Taliban and the Government of Pakistan had been paying salaries of Afghan Taliban rulers. “Despite rivalry between Benazir Bhutto and ISI, Naseerullah Babar, a retired Pakistan Army General and her Interior Minister supported Taliban to diminish ISI’s role in Afghanistan”327. The stakes in Afghanistan are numerous and co-shared by Afghanistan and Pakistani authorities. The life and security of common citizen living on both sides of the divide and their generations are at a loss. The prevalent insecurity inhibits development works and Afghans are forced to live in refugee camps in Pakistan for earning their livelihood. Whereas, people in FATA complain that their share in agriculture, water resources, labour market has been taken away by Afghan refugees. The influx of refugees upset the demographic equilibrium and ecological balance in KPK. The vicious cycle in Afghanistan and FATA is increasingly taking a dangerous downward spiral. The possibility of Afghanistan becoming sanctuary of dangerous terrorist groups like Islamic State (IS) etcetera and endangering global peace and security is a risky issue, causing concerns among regional countries and the US/ international community alike. Pakistan also has legitimate concerns of its own, understandably Pakistan feels threatened with increasing presence of India and its allies. The increasing incidents of supporting TTP and Baloch nationalist elements cause serious concerns among Pakistan’s security and intelligence agencies. Hostile Afghan regime, former Karzai government unsupportive of controlling Pakistani Taliban hiding in Afghanistan and equally non- cooperative Ghani regime has not done enough to mend ties with Pakistan. Seemingly, both were manipulated by foreign masters, perceptibly controlled by Indian and US Intelligence agencies328. Though Karzai had been throwing blame to Pakistan, its military and intelligence

326 Peter Marsden, The Taliban War, Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan (London: Zee Books Ltd, 1998), p. 127. 327 , Taliban, Oil and the New Great Game in Central Asia (London: I.B. Taurus & Co Ltd, 2000), p.187. 328 Amin Saikal, Modern Afghanistan a History of Struggle and Survival (London: I.B. Tauris& Co Ltd, 2004), p. 233. “Karzai was brought in by external powers this time by a Capitalist Super Power- USA, juxtaposing Marxism, Leninism and theocracy with democracy. Karzai model too, was flawed tainted with corruption, cronyism and nepotism, paving way for sustained strength of Taliban.”

117 agency for every terrorist attack in his country yet, he did little to restore the credibility at home. His regime will be remembered for the charges of corruption and accommodating cronies including his real brother in money minting projects329. The strategic objective of Pakistan to expand China- Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) to Central Asian Republics also clashes with US-Indian strategic cooperation. Indian determination to develop Iranian Chahbahar port through land access to Afghanistan and Central Asian Republic is taken as a counter move to neutralize Pak-China strategic cooperation. US as a strategic stake holder in Afghanistan and region should play a role by accepting stakes of all countries including China. Because Indo-US cooperation is not only circumventing Pakistan’s strategic interest, it also runs counter to Chinese regional stakes. Chinese energy corridor linking Central Asian republics and Caucuses region is jeopardized if US-India cooperation is realized with stabilized Afghanistan. President Obama explained US policy of eliminating those who were blocking peace process and were involved in planning to harm US forces in Afghanistan. While speaking in the backdrop of killing of Mullah Akhtar Mansour in a drone strike in Balochistan Province of Pakistan on 21 May 2016, he further mentioned that he was reluctant to involve US troops in ground targets. US believed that by eliminating opponents of peace, the negotiated settlement of Afghan dispute will be facilitated yet, it may not be true because Taliban have no dearth of Amirs (Chiefs/Commanders) nor fighters. Killing Taliban top leadership would alienate Taliban further and US desire of seeking a negotiated settlement with participation of Taliban may be complicated beyond irreparable extent. The point is substantiated because newly appointed Afghan Taliban commander, Haibatullah Akhundzada opposed the dialogue process with the Afghan Government330. Afghanistan cannot afford alienating almost 50 percent of its population- the Pashtuns. The US and Afghan Government should realize the legitimate share of Pashtuns and integrate them into power sharing mechanism, mutually acceptable to all stakeholders in Afghanistan. 4.3 The Relevance of Neoclassical Realism In order to grasp the regional complexities and bilateral sensitivities between Pakistan and Afghanistan, a few important principles of neoclassical realism, the theoretical framework of the study, have been identified and included in a table format: Table 4.1: Co-relation of neoclassical realist variables with post 9/11 CT policy of Pakistan

329 Scott Seward Smit, Afghanistan’s Troubled Transition Politics, Peace keeping and the 2004 Presidential Elections (New Delhi: Viva Books Private Limited, 2012), p.256. 330 The News, 24 May 2016.

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Level Variables Relationship with Post 9/11 CT Policy Regional Perception of Elite  Political elite divided. Security institutions  Political elite convinced that Indo-Afghan nexus is  Security Institutions destabilizing Pakistan.  US tacit approval is a common perception.  Conflicting interest of US, Pakistan, Afghanistan and India hindering a cohesive regional CT approach to fight terrorism Contentious Issues/ CT cooperation with India contingent upon Indian Progress on Kashmir concessions on Kashmir dispute. Domestic Dispute sentiment on Kashmir is too strong to ignore TTP Factor TTP is being sponsored by Afghan and Indian intelligence, with sanctuaries at Afghan soil. Bridging the perception  Unless the trio of regional countries and the US gaps work closely, the regional dispute resolution mechanism is not insight.  Pakistan security dilemma aggravated with two front scenarios needs to be addressed. Source: Author’s personal interpretation. After exploring the regional dynamics of Pakistan’s CT responses, the next chapter unveils domestic variables which had been shaping Pakistan’s CT strategy in concert with systemic and regional strands.

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Chapter 5 Impact of Domestic Variables in Shaping Pakistan’s CT Policy This chapter deals with domestic variables which shaped Pakistan’s CT strategy and foreign policy. These factors though, exclusively focus upon domestic orientation of the masses and its ruling elite yet, are not delinked from regional nuances and systemic pressures. Since foreign policy is generally extension of domestic factors therefore, these are intrinsic part of analysis in each chapter. The horrific terrorist attack of 9/11 not only triggered enormous international pressure on Pakistan but influenced Pakistan’s actions at home and cooperation with the US, and review of relations with Afghanistan and India as well. Thus, debate of domestic factors shaping Pakistan’s CT Strategy would also encompass reference to regional and international constraints where applicable. This chapter comprises of six sections: section 5.1 Ideological moorings, 5.2 Psyche of leadership, 5.3 Domestic sentiment - internal polarization, 5.4 Capacity issues of civilian security/ law enforcing institutions, 5.5 Counterterrorism state structures: administrative and judicial, and 5.6 Interplay of domestic with regional and systemic factors. 5.1 Ideological Moorings Ideology is constructed and reconstructed by the people who normally share a common position in the political or ruling hierarchy. However, ideology is a structural position and is not shaped or tempered by social actors. The social and political actors could use ideology for furtherance of their social or political objectives. People or ruling groups who form part of power structure enjoy the benefit of either propagating certain ideology or getting their viewpoint included because of authority. This group of people can approach educational institutions, media, and religious clergy. All these institutions present ideological identity in one form or the other. Perdue defined ideology as “a collective phenomenon that cannot be reduced to the level of the attitudes of the individual group members”331. He further alluded that social actors and political elite “disseminate ideas and ideals of the existing order”. In Pakistan social actors had little say in ideological interpretation especially after independence in 1947. It was mainly ruling politico-military elite which had been calling the shots. It is not only military regimes which exploited the ideology to perpetuate their rule, but democratically elected leadership too, had been aligning themselves with religious forces for political gains.

331 William D. Perdue, Terrorism and the State A Critique of Domination through Fear (New York: Greenwood Publishing group, Inc. 1989), p.7.

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Muslims had been living in Indian subcontinent since centuries either under Hindu rulers or Muslim emperors. Despite amalgamation with local communities in many aspects, Muslims maintained their socio-cultural and religious identity. There had been various phases wherein attempts were made by the non-Muslim rulers to either subdue Muslims’ ideological identity or ideological moorings were strengthened by certain Muslim emperors. The Muslims of subcontinent had been struggling to achieve their distinct ideological state to enjoy freedom and unique ideological identity. Religious parties and clergy had been advocating distinct identity of Pakistan with Islamic moorings yet, did not favour a separate homeland. Whereas, the secular political elite had been struggling for creation of a separate homeland by advocating two nations’ theory and distinction between Hindus and Muslims communities as two separate entities when evaluated on the touchstone of socio-cultural and religious traditions and beliefs. The ideological moorings of the Muslims of the subcontinent were not identical but they represented different schools of thought. Muslims of Indian subcontinent had been divided between two sub sects of Sunni Islam – Deobandi and Brelvi sects. Deo-bandi identify themselves as the custodian of teachings by Prophet Muhammad (peace be upon him). Whereas, Brelvis are the followers of mystic Islamic teaching – Sufism, albeit possess extra ordinary reverence for the Prophet. These ideological differences did create fissures yet united struggle for independent country, a place to worship Allah and practice Islamic virtues continued. Two nations theory presented by Jinnah, the founder of Pakistan was a testament of an ideological identity- Muslims and Hindus being two distinct nations. It is also a reality that major religious parties like Jamat-e-Islami (JI) of Maulana Maududi and Ulema-e-Hind were against creation of an independent country for the Muslims. They were convinced that powers of Muslims of India will be divided and Muslims of Indian Subcontinent would be rendered as worthless minority in face of belligerent Hindu dominated majority population. Despite all opposition, Pakistan was created and religious parties too, accepted the reality and started working towards converting this newly created ideological country into a bastion of Islam. The compromise was ostensibly meant to promote respective sectarian beliefs in addition to power politics. Islam as a religious was used as a symbol of unity for Muslims of Pakistan, spanned over two distant wings – East and West. The other realities like ethnicity, language and socio- cultural diversities among Muslims from both the regions were ignored by accepting religion alone as the single most bondage of unity and nationhood. Though the leaders of Pakistan movement were liberal in their vision yet, did not openly oppose the idea of accepting

121 religion as the ideological bondage. The religious parties which had been opposing creation of Pakistan tooth and nail finally co-existed with the reality. The united religious platform emerged as a political entity to be reckoned. The ideology which was supposed to be a symbol of unity regrettably did not hold two communities together. Because other factors like ethnicity and language dominated the ideological similarities between two wings. The population, which belonged to different set of cultural, ethnicity and linguistic background, though merged as one entity but the cracks did exit right from the inception. The discriminations and administrative deprivations widened the gulf further and precipitated the fissures of ideological differences. Though both the communities were overwhelmingly Muslims yet, other facets predominantly language, culture and ethnic affiliations proved to be too strong to be diluted with religious ideology alone. The religious forces in both wings of Pakistan especially JI pressured the liberal ruling elite of Pakistan including first Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan to enforce Islamic Sharia. The government of Liaquat Ali Khan bowed before the pressure and inserted an ‘Objective Resolution’ in 1949, declaring Pakistan as an Islamic Republic and vowing that no laws repugnant to Islamic injunctions will be enacted by legislative assembly of the country. The ideology was promoted and propagated in various phases by Politico-Military rulers to gain legitimacy and perpetuate their rule. The regions which are less developed with lower social and educational strata are considered fertile land for recruitment by terrorist organisations. The areas like FATA, Swat/Malakand, Southern Punjab and some parts of Sind and Balochistan provinces are major contributors towards madrassa population and anti- Soviet Afghan jihad in 1980s. These ideological leanings acted as incentive for promotion of violence in society and the cumulative effect was worst kind of terrorism in Pakistan since 2005. Using religion as uniting factor was a compulsion because Muslims of former East Pakistan had distinct ethno-linguistic traits when compared with their fellow Muslims residing in former Western Pakistan. Additionally, religion as an ideology was above cultural, social and ethnic discriminations. The sectarian biases were localized and did not impact national cohesion. Though religion is a strong bondage yet could not withstand pressures of ethno-nationalistic fissiparous tendencies. Pakistan was dismembered after Indian aggression in 1971, with tacit approval of two super powers – USA and former Soviet Union. Religion did play its role and Jamaat-i-Islami groups opposed emergence of Bangla nationalist leadership, yet was over powered. In today’s Pakistan religious parties blamed

122 political and military leadership for the debacle and downplayed any voices against religious ideology failing to keep various ethno-linguistic groups intact. Religion was used to radicalize various sectarian entities to build ideological power base. Political parties entered into alliance with religious parties to capitalize on right wing vote bank. The religious forces versus liberal and secular ones witnessed a distinct divide in 1970s during Bhutto’s rule. Bhutto, being a liberal and progressive leader too, budged and accepted demands of religious forces by declaring Ahmadis as Non-Muslims in 1974, and tolerating development of strong religious cadre. Religion as an ideological appeal was used for accomplishment of political objective by Bhutto government as well in 1970s. Bhutto supported religious forces in Afghanistan to pressure Daud regime which was sponsoring Baloch sub nationalist leaders pursuing a separatist movement in Balochistan Province of Pakistan. Besides Balochistan, ethno-ideological orientation was exploited by successive Afghan governments to foment unrest in agencies of former Federally Administered Tribal Areas of Pakistan. The ideological and religious affiliations by various religious groups were channelized by General Zia-ul-Haq as anti-Bhutto and anti-secularism sentiment to defame Bhutto legacy. Concomitantly, Zia perpetuated his dictatorial rule, ostensibly aimed at enforcement of Sharia enshrined in Objective Resolution with the noble cause of introducing an Islamic egalitarian society in Pakistan. Zia’s regime was true nexus of religious forces and military Junta to supposedly protect the great religion of Islam. Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 and US sponsoring global jihad against Soviet occupation acted as catalyst for use of religious ideology as appeal for holy war and galvanizing support for holy warriors from across the Muslim world. Pakistani society was radicalized with mushrooming of Deo-bandi madrassas and Deo-bandi school of Islamic Jurisprudence emerged as a dominant sect in Pakistan. This trend promoted sectarian rivalry with Shiite sect and a bloody sectarian terrorism erupted for decades, starting in 1980s. The minority Muslim Sect – Shiite felt threatened with the development. Incidentally Iranian Revolution during the same timeframe exported Shiite Islam to Pakistan. Pakistan witnessed worst kind of sectarian clashes in Pakistan during General Zia-ul- Haq rule in 1980s. The sectarian hatred was demonstrated in all forms and manifestations. The sectarian affiliation dragged in Iran and Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) in Afghan jihad, and sectarian clashes inside Pakistan. Support to radical Afghan Taliban further compounded the sectarian balance in Pakistan and Afghanistan. Animosity between Deobandi and Shiite sectarian militant wings worsened by claiming lives of dozens of established religious

123 scholars and top of the line professionals including medical doctors from either side. The majority Shiite regions like Gilgit - Baltistan witnessed pouring in of Iranian donations for construction of Shiite and seminaries (Imambargah). There are discernable signs of Iranian culture and ideology in Skardu, the capital city of Baltistan part of the region. The local population takes pride by celebrating “nauroz” a cultural traditional Iranian feast besides arranging religious congregations on Shiite religious days including death anniversary of Iranian religious leader; Imam Khomeini. Violent struggle by Afghan Taliban in 1990s and Pakistani extremist forces joining hands broadened the scope of extremism and terrorism in the region. Pakistan being immediate neighbour with Afghanistan had to face the backlash of ultra-extremist Taliban government in Afghanistan since 1996. Various non-state actors representing Sunni (Deobandi/ Wahhabi) and Shiite sects nurtured by KSA and Iran respectively played havoc with sectarian harmony in the country. The Zia government patronized Sunni extremist groups not only inside Pakistan but in Afghanistan as well. After death of Zia-ul-Haque, two stints of democratic governments of Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif could not reverse the tide of sectarian extremism and terrorism. Thus, the decade of 1989 – 1999 is known for a worst spate of regional terrorism. Religion was exploited by non- state actors for political gains in South Asia, causing bitterness between India and Pakistan. After 1999, Musharraf introduced the concept of enlightened moderation and discouraged use of religious ideology as a tool for national unity. He rather focused on a nationalistic-patriotism i.e. “Pakistan First” not “Islam First”. Though he did not oppose religious ideology because Pakistanis are devout Muslims and no government could openly talk of secularism or introduction of so called Western values. Musharraf’s era of rule is remembered for transformation from religious orientation to pragmatism. He reminded Pakistani nation to follow the great religion of Islam yet stay away from sectarian hatred and discrimination. The religious forces rejected Musharraf’s doctrine and declared jihad against his regime. Musharraf and Pakistan military were declared as apostate. Pakistan witnessed bloody internal war. The complexion of sectarian terrorism engulfed entire Pakistan. The sufferers were common Pakistanis, security forces personnel and prominent religious scholars with opposite sectarian affiliations. After Musharraf rule, Zardari and Nawaz Sharif governments did not bring about any tangible changes, though refrained from promoting any religious cause. The religious radicalism continued with full vigour during their tenure, from 2008 to 2018. These religious forces were high jacked by anti-Pakistan forces and the country was destabilized to alarming

124 levels. Though there had been hundreds of terrorist incident but gruesome massacre of school children in Army Public School (APS) Peshawar in December 2014 shook the conscience of Pakistani nation. The national consensus emerged to fight the terrorists who were black mailing fellow compatriots and abusing the religion. The religious forces were isolated and nation supported the forces of virtue. Today, ideology as a uniting force is questionable albeit, Pakistani nation reveres the religion of Islam and the prophet, Muhammad peace be upon him. Therefore, it is easy to conclude that People imbued with either Pakistani nationalism or true Islamic values; do not endorse religion as an ideology to pursue violence. It is only perverted and illiterate self –professed religious forces that abuse religion and use it for extremism and terrorism. The leaders, who had been encouraging violence in the name of religion in Afghanistan for decades and supporting the fighters, actually proliferated ideological and sectarian terrorism. People in Pakistan practice their religion with devotion, purely as divine obligation. Role of religion as ideology cannot be mitigated in Pakistan however, after exposure of political objectives of Al-Qaida and domestic terrorist organisations, the extremist narrative was weakened. The sectarian seminaries and their patrons in the form of religious-political parties keep stressing the role of religion but with much less intensity. The terrorist entities claiming to have been waging jihad are exposed as criminal gangs using religion as a tool to broaden their base of recruitment. There is a dire need of a new national counter-ideological narrative to separate our great religion from the clutches of criminal gangs. The golden principles of Islam need to be capitalized for pursuance of equal rights for all without any discrimination on caste, colour and creed. 5.2 Psyche of Leadership Leadership and its role is the key to success either in crisis or peacetime prosperity. Leadership cannot be compared with day to day management, decision-making or entrepreneurship. Leaders really move the nations and their countries. They make the difference by winning hearts and mind of the people. Psyche is persona or make up of a leader which is ingrained in his personality. The psyche of the leadership would reflect the kind of decision he/she is going to take or impose on others and his own people. In recent history, Saddam Hussain had peculiar psyche of dictatorial mind-set who would not tolerate any resistance even it amounted to genocide by using chemical weapons against Kurdish population of Iraq. Similarly, post 9/11 timeframe was dominated by psyche of President Bush and his cabinet of neocons having strong conviction in bulldozing their will and annihilating either

125 terrorists or regimes with pre-emption. Pakistani leadership during 9/11, General Musharraf and his coterie of loyalists had to face tremendous pressure from the US side. Therefore, leadership is not simply about getting people to do things but it is rather motivating them to go along with the leadership in crisis. General Musharraf could not win the support of major political parties and religious forces while deciding to side with the US and international coalition operating against Al-Qaida. A key issue here is that the leadership and society are mutually inclusive, “as mutually constitutive—each made by, and each transformed by the other”332. Musharraf’s decision of siding with the US was justified in line with supreme national interests and majority of Pakistanis endorsed it. The backlash and ensuing terrorism was expected and people and security forces had to endure the brunt of appalling terrorist attacks. After Musharraf, Zardari’s political party which is considered progressive and secular opposed terrorism in any form and vowed to fight the menace with full force. It was Zardari government which sanctioned military operation in Swat and South Waziristan in 2009 and 2010 respectively. Though terrorism could not be controlled during Zardari tenure yet, the government’s vision was absolutely clear. After 2013 general elections, Nawaz Sharif was elected as the Prime Minister of the country. His party is generally considered soft on religious forces and traditionally major religious parties had been their coalition partners. He did give TTP a chance to negotiate a peaceful settlement however, after violent spate of terrorism including attacks on strategic installations of the country (2014), he too, endorsed major military campaign to purge FATA of terrorist groups. Operation Zarb-e-Azb (launched since June 2014) thought to be instrumental in elimination of domestic terrorism, was endorsed after national consensus in December 2014. Reluctantly, Sharif’s (Muslim League Nawaz party), under premiership of Khaqan Abbasi finally passed the bill of FATA merger and enacted merger bill of FATA, declaring the territory under federal control being part of KPK province on 24 May 2018, during last week of its rule. The religious-political parties like Jamiat Ulema-e- Islam (JUI), Fazlur Rehman group and Jamaat-e- Islami (JI) had been exerting pressure as coalition partners either with federal government or provincial government in KPK. The psyche of the leadership had precisely been not to antagonise extremist forces to an extent that they destabilize political set up to unmanageable limits. Though, military operation and consequent purging of FATA from terrorist elements is a significant step by political

332 S Alexander Haslam, Stephen Reicher and Michael J. Platow, The New Psychology of Leadership Identity, Influence and Power (East Sussex: Taylor and Francis Group, 2011), p. 18.

126 leadership. Yet, actions under NAP, envisaging monitoring and regulation of madrassas were observed as a weak link in implementation strategy. The incumbent government since September 2018 is determined to pursue policy of zero tolerance towards terrorism. Post Pulwama (February 2019 tension with India) stance by the Prime Minister Imran Khan speaks volumes about seriousness of the government to quell the menace of terrorism. Set of actions suggested by FATF have also contributed toward crackdown on suspected militant outfits. Former pro-Kashmir freedom struggle religious groups- Lashkar- Tayaba (LeT) and Jaish-e- Muhammad (JeM) were subjected to major clampdown by the law enforcing agencies. LeT’s philanthropic services have been taken over by provincial governments and administrators have been designated to oversee their activities. Similarly headquarters of JeM at Bahawalpur has also been placed under an administrator. It is a step in the right direction because Pakistan can ill- afford any militia operating from its soil and risking war with India and invoking international repercussions. However, Indian arrogance and intransigence on core issue of Kashmir amidst brutalities against unarmed Kashmiris render the whole atmosphere hostage to any future terrorist act. The leadership comprising elite and affluent middle class of Pakistan represents mix of secular, nationalist and religious right mind-set. The secular and nationalist elements are averse to extremism in the country in any form and manifestation. Albeit, they have little say in national policy framework especially on CT strategy. They support robust economic ties with neighbours including India and promote the idea of expanding Afghan transit trade to CARs and India via land route of Pakistan – Lahore- Wagah Road. This class and civil society at large believe in zero tolerance towards perceived interference into internal affairs of the neighbours and expect similar response from India and Afghanistan. These groups pressure government to not only eliminate domestic terrorism across the board but also cooperate in eradication of regional terrorism. Pakistan’s ruling elite has declared zero tolerance against extremism and terrorism in any form. The right wing parties have generally supported the move whiles stressing corresponding goodwill from Indian side. In Pakistan, the hardliner advocate tough stance toward India and demand violent struggle for liberation of Kashmiri brethren, citing atrocities by Indian occupation forces and indifference on part of the UN and international community. The centre right political parties generally align with the idea of hardliners and are not willing to grant any significant concessions to India till resolution of Kashmir dispute. CT strategy in vogue is generally in conformity with the perception of politico-military leadership because NAP was formulated as national consensus with participation of all political parties irrespective of their

127 background. The problem lies with Hindu extremist leadership of India which promotes war hysteria against Pakistan and propagate expulsion of Muslims residing in India as Indian nationals. Therefore, for greater regional peace and tranquillity, Indian ruling elite will have to soften their stance and realize the importance of relations between two sovereign states based on equality and mutual interests. There is visible contrast in approach of Pakistani elite and society towards Kashmir dispute and Afghan conflict due to understandable domestic optics. There exists a consensus on settlement of Afghan dispute as Afghan led and Afghan owned peace process. A peaceful settlement of Afghan dispute is accepted for having salutary effects on Pakistani side of the border. However, with regards to India even secular voices cannot afford favouring any pro- Indian move till resolution of Kashmir issue. Pakistani government and its military since 2014, vowed to pursue across the board CT strategy and declared that soil of Pakistan will not be allowed to be misused by any terrorist entities. Pakistani military claims to have purged FATA of all foreign terrorist organisations including much talked Haqqanis. The action against suspected extremist forces continues without discrimination inside Pakistan The nexus between political parties and hardliner religious forces is a complex phenomenon because of election strategy and ultimate government formation. The religious forces have limited vote bank in the traditional conservative belts thus, they are constrained to strike a coalition with major and winning political parties. Being part of coalition governments, they have their say in legislation and could pursue their interests, for example protecting their power base- madrassas and collection of donations. Under such circumstances political elite is indecisive and is found reluctant to lose their vote bank, especially those with right wing tilt. The dominant Sunni sect i.e. Deobandi organisations had been in coalition with ruling party of Muslim League (Nawaz Sharif group). The other faction of Ahle Hadith or Wahhabism is also coalition partners. True implementation of National Action Plan in Punjab province is hampered due to varying perceptions between political elite and law enforcing agencies. Previously military elite, too, had a different viewpoint towards strategy to combat domestic terrorism. Till 9/11, 2001, military elite viewed former Jihadi elements as force multipliers especially on Line of Control and Pakistani part of Jammu and Kashmir and Afghan border. It is because of the fact that military expected matching actions by Indian and Afghan sides before reining in of Kashmiri fighters and Afghan Taliban. It is only after 2007/8 when domestic terrorism spiralled upwards and US too, criticized the Government of Pakistan for not doing enough on fighting terrorism, Pakistan military was under tremendous pressure to

128 fight the terrorism in Swat region and South Waziristan. Zardari government during this timeframe garnered national consensus and decided to launch military operations in Swat and South Waziristan in 2009 and 2010 respectively. Pakistan Military fought back and its operation in Swat was termed as a master piece of counterinsurgency operations. Not only millions of peoples were evacuated due to operation in Swat but were rehabilitated within months. Local support to military for pinpointing the terrorists’ hideouts and their networks was one of the major contributory factors in the success of CT campaign. Year 2014 is the timeframe when politico-military leadership started contemplating a comprehensive CT strategy. Pakistani government took almost four years after Swat and South Waziristan operations, before embarking upon a comprehensive CT strategy. A strategy aimed at evicting the terrorists from FATA, especially North Waziristan and Khyber agencies, infested with hardened criminals. The gruesome massacre of Schools children in Peshawar in December 2014 assisted in galvanizing national support to root out terrorists from FATA. Nawaz Sharif government vowed to fight with evil forces and reiterated its resolve to back the military operation which had already started in June 2014. Pakistan military, after tremendous sacrifices in terms of human losses, purged all agencies of FATA in 2017 and currently sanitization and consolidations operations are underway in FATA. The military action in 2014 was not only endorsed by the nation but hailed as well because it defeated the menace of terrorism, challenging writ of the government since a decade. There is noticeable decline in the incidents of terrorism in Pakistan and terror infrastructure in Swat and FATA has completely been dismantled. 5.3 Domestic Sentiment - Internal Polarization In Pakistan, the society is divided on the lines of secular elite, religious-political parties, left wing/nationalist parties, civil society and common Pakistanis. War on terror was taken as US war imposed on Pakistan to achieve Indo-US strategic objectives in the region by conservatives and right wing political parties. Pakistan’s support to US war on terror was declared as apostasy by religious forces, and those supporting the US as liable to be killed. Nationalist left-wing parties termed it as a major foreign policy failure and blamed the government for failing to adopt a neutral policy towards neighbouring Afghanistan and India. Support to former jihadi elements in Pakistan was pronounced as a fatal mistake by successive governments. On the contrary right wing political parties take pride in waging jihad against foreign occupation in Afghanistan and fighting against Indian occupation forces in Indian occupied Kashmir.

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The internal polarisation among various segments of society generated numerous narratives. Many of the narratives justified the existence of extremism in Pakistan and Pakistan-Afghan bordering regions. Some blamed Afghan jihad of 1980s and then military regime of General Zia-ul- Haq for promoting Deobandi sect at the cost of sectarian harmony in the country. Military and progressive groups had been contending that poverty and illiteracy are the result of poor governance by successive governments which are to blame for the extremism and terrorism in Pakistan. The anti-military select groups had been accusing military for hijacking India and Afghan related foreign policy, and promoting extremism and terrorism, and using terrorists as force multipliers to settle scores with arch rival India. The Afghan Taliban were also tolerated at Pakistan soil so that Pakistan could hedge her strategic interests in Afghanistan in face of Indian intrusion and her alliance with second largest and most influential ethnic group- Tajik. The secular elite was propagating Musharraf’s action of siding with the US as apt and extended full support. Civil society and academics also supported Musharraf government because extremism had done enough damage in Pakistan. The religious forces rather declared Musharraf as US protégé and blamed him for not enforcing Sharia and abandoning the holy warriors-Afghan Taliban. The security situation in Pakistan, especially after 2006/7, was so precarious that human rights activists like late Asma Jahangir openly blamed Pakistani Military for rearing the monster in its backyard, and now it turning to be Frankenstein and eating its mentor and civilians. The ambiguous policy on combating terrorism is linked with Kashmir dispute and Pakistan’s interests in Afghanistan. Besides security and intelligence agencies, the academia in Pakistan also realized that Indo-Afghan intelligence agencies are interfering in internal affairs of Pakistan and destabilizing the country, under watchful eyes of US military and CIA in Afghanistan. Under such a polarized political and religious environment, formulation of any consensus CT policy is difficult. Therefore, governments had been reluctant in taking a clear stance over terrorism in Kashmir or Afghanistan. Common Pakistanis endorse government’s bold policy of taking on terrorist organisations head on and dismantling their infrastructure from FATA since 2014. Pakistan’s military and political leadership claims that terrorist outfits have either been destroyed or pushed into Afghanistan. It is now Afghan authorities and the US forces to combat and eliminate the threat from Afghan soil. The internal polarization and blame game seems to have mellowed after military operation in FATA since June 2014. It is admired as a great sacrifice by Pakistani military to save the country from the scourge of terrorism. The informed segment of society supports government policy of conditional rapprochement with India provided India is willing to

130 reciprocate on Kashmir dispute and other outstanding issues like territorial border disputes or water resource. Pakistani People are concerned over prolonged presence of Afghan refugees who have depleted meagre resources of Pakistan and are constant drag on local economy. Their camps are potential sanctuaries for Afghan Taliban which complicate Pakistani contribution towards fighting regional and international terrorism. Therefore, repatriation of Afghan refugees is a high priority area that governments are expected to pursue with Afghan authorities and international organisations. The government and the people of Pakistan are convinced that it has become Pakistan’s war because Pakistan military is battling with terrorists operating from Afghan soil. However, there is strong perception that it is imposed war and anti-Pakistan forces are sponsoring the terrorist entities like TTP, to destabilise the country and demoralize civil armed forces by attacking security check posts along Afghanistan-Pakistan border. TTP leadership is permitted to operate from Afghan soil and Afghan authorities hide behind capacity issues for their inability to flush the militants from their territory. On the contrary, when US or Afghan forces decide to eliminate any terrorist including Fazlullah (slain TTP chief) he is traced and killed. Therefore, TTP core leadership cannot remain undetected for long if Afghan and the US forces are serious to eradicate the menace of regional terrorism. 5.4 Capacity Issues of civilian security/ Law Enforcing Institutions The first line of defence against terrorism is the provincial police force which is poorly equipped and ill-trained to tackle the monster of terrorism. The unprecedented sacrifices by police especially from KPK Province notwithstanding, provincial police could not deter determined and hardened terrorist groups operating in urban centres. Police and bureaucracy rather found an easy refuge in military control of counterterrorism fight. The sensitive regions of KPK were handed over to military and civilian administration had to wind up till eviction of hardened terrorists by the military. Entire FATA and bulk of Swat region is still under military control. Para military forces (Rangers and Frontier Corps) are combating urban terrorism and criminal gangs in cosmopolitan city of Karachi and Balochistan province respectively. Police in Swat and Levies in FATA were routed by TTP terrorists. Frontier Constabulary (FC/police force) is employed to enforce law in FATA agencies along border with Afghanistan. This force could not withstand the challenge of terrorism by TTP criminals and terrorists. Relatively FC (Frontier Corps) commanded by military officers, is better equipped and trained to confront the threat of terrorism. Yet, in FATA it failed to confront hardened criminals of TTP. Military was called in to flush the FATA agencies from TTP

131 terrorists after loss of thousands of lives of security personnel and civilians. In Balochistan, FC (military version) conducted successful operations against Baloch separatist leaders and defeated Baloch insurgency to a large extent. FC had been successfully fighting against TTP proxy – Lashkar-Jhangvi, an ultra-extremist sectarian organisation in Balochistan, who target Shiite Muslim minority of Hazara Tribes. Though capacity issues did hinder anti- terrorist operations by the police yet, Indian interference and patronage of terrorist organisation-TTP is a source of constant trouble in the region. The Baloch leaders are being patronized and their lieutenants are trained by RAW and NDS operatives at Afghan soil. The Baloch insurgents are extended logistics support by foreign masters for carrying out anti - state activities in the province of Balochistan. Though the situation has improved yet, FC is fighting with foreign sponsored Baloch insurgency every day. There has to be visible footprint of FC in Balochistan in urban areas to augment provincial police. In KPK, the areas of Swat and FATA are still under military control and full transition to civilian rule will take quite some time. The federal and KPK governments are now seized with herculean task of rehabilitation efforts in FATA and Swat regions. Till such time major restructuring is undertaken in police and civil armed forces, the transition to civil rule and law enforcement may never be complete and police will remain handicapped in fighting the local extremist groups. Except smaller areas being transferred to civil administration in Swat, military is still in FATA and Swat for want of civilian component of CT strategy to relieve it and take over control. Pakistan can ill-afford terrorist return and re-establishment of their strongholds in cleared areas. Therefore, military presence in the form of permanent cantonments is being contemplated by the military. FATA merger with KPK is a welcome step for restoring writ of the state, administrative convenience and mainstreaming of trouble stricken region. Howver, KPK Government is confronted with massive challenge of lifting the FATA region and bringing it at par with other settled districts of the province. Security situation and socio- economic state in areas of Afghanistan adjacent to seven district of FATA (former FATA agencies) have direct linkage with regional security and socio-economic prosperity of the region. Unless Afghan government assisted by international community invests for socio- economic uplift of the region, FATA will remain under stress due to refugees and trans- border movement from Afghan side. 5.5 Counterterrorism State Structures: Administrative and Judicial Since Afghan Jihad and Kashmir intifada (1989-1999), religious-political parties influenced all anti-terrorist actions by the governments. Though anti-terrorism laws (Anti-Terrorism

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Act- 1997) were enacted by Nawaz Sharif government in 1997333 Yet, were confined to curbing sectarian terrorism alone in late 1990s (Taliban era in Afghanistan). In Post 9/11 timeframe, the antiterrorism laws were selectively implemented, and even National Action Plan (20015) is partially enforced. Its partial enforcement is because of the capacity issues of civilian institutions and partly political interests and divergence among political parties and religious- political parties. The Protection of Pakistan ACT (POPA) 2014334 is a robust CT instrument to arrest, prosecute and get the terrorists convicted through anti-terrorist courts. The legal and technical lacunae like admissibility of “E” evidence and legality of statement of the accused before an officer of law enforcing agency (superintendent of police or equivalent seniority) have been addressed to facilitate conviction. It was a significant step towards fighting terrorism at home through legal framework. However, the execution part by the police is still a discernible weakness. Police is politicised and acts in accordance with directions by the political masters. It possesses limited capacity to combat hardened terrorists and its much desired local intelligence networks are non-existent. Stations House Officers were famous to have constituted local intelligence committees to identify suspected personnel loitering in the jurisdiction of respective police stations, but that system of local intelligence somehow has weakened with the passage of time. Weak and outdated criminal justice system failed to deter terrorist entities in the country and most of the terrorists were set free due to lack of evidence. Faulty investigation and lack of expertise in forensics of crime scenes are also to blame for lower conviction rates. As a last resort the Government decided to establish military courts for secure trial of hardened criminals besides overcoming the fears of security of prosecution and the judges. Punishment handed down by the military courts served as deterrent and the conviction rate by military courts is fairly high. However, it is an extraordinary response to extraordinary security challenge and cannot be replicated forever. The civilian security structures will have to be strengthened for true implementation of counterterrorism strategy in a sustained manner. In Pakistan it is believed that there is no dearth of counterterrorist laws but the governments shy away in accepting their responsibilities and strengthening civilian structures of governance, the ultimate pillars of democracy and civilian rule.

333 Online available at http://www.molaw.gov.pk/molaw/userfiles1/file/Anti-Terrorism%20Act.pdf (accessed on 26 March 2019). 334 Online available at http://www.na.gov.pk/uploads/documents/1404714927_922.pdf (accessed on 27 March 2019).

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5.6 Interplay of Domestic with the Regional and Systemic Factors As a reference to context, General Zia’s regime pursued a policy of supporting Jihad in Afghanistan and Indian occupied Kashmir (IOK) during the decade of 1980s, which promoted regional terrorism. The policy was motivated by Indian and Soviet interference in internal affairs of Pakistan. During this decade, Pakistan suffered turmoil on account of sectarian terrorism and losses through improvised explosive devices, planted at public places. FATA, bordering region with Afghanistan was subjected to intense shelling by former Soviet Union’s gunship helicopters. Soviet and Indian intelligence agencies had been colluding during1980s for sectarian killings and casualties through planted IEDs at public places. The divergence over strategy to defeat terrorism in South Asia was exploited by Pakistan’s neighbour and traditional rival-India. Zia’s policy on extremism was a mix of US dictated anti- Soviet Afghan jihad and a blend of domestic and regional factors to support Kashmiri freedom fighters for helping them clinch freedom with armed struggle. Post 9/11 CT strategy had to confront two decades old ’ holy fighters who had been fighting Soviet forces and later “apostate” Afghan forces. For them there was no difference between jihad against Soviet occupation forces and later on US forces operating in Afghanistan to defeat the “forces of evil”. Pakistan facilitated Afghan Taliban and ignored extremism being spread into FATA and Urban centres like Karachi, Quetta, Lahore, Peshawar and Rawalpindi. It was deemed in the best of national interests of Pakistan in 1980s, and major countries including the US, EU countries and KSA were fully backing the foreign policy of Pakistan against neighbouring Afghanistan. US, which spearheaded Afghan jihad to accomplish her strategic objective in South and Central Asia by forcing withdrawal of the former Soviet Union from Afghanistan in 1989, changed her policy of tolerating terrorist groups operation in Afghanistan in post 9/11 scenario. After massive mobilization of Indian and Pakistani forces along international border in 2002, Musharraf was pressured to rein in pro- Kashmir Jihadi outfits and order removal of their infrastructure from Pakistani part of Kashmir. It was beginning of a counterterrorism policy and controlling the activities of non-state actors. Yet, the backlash resulted in a massive wave of infighting from 2003 onwards. Pakistan’s counterterrorism policy was unilateral including banning of Jihadi organizations, whereas India continued with her anti- Pakistan activities and colluded with Afghan proxies to destabilize Pakistan. No worthwhile progress was made towards contentious Kashmir issue. Much desired US facilitation on Kashmir serving as possible incentive to Kashmiri freedom fighters to give up armed struggle

134 and wait for the international effort aimed at peaceful resolution of the dispute, proved to be mere election rhetoric of Obama administration. Growing Indian influence in Afghanistan after 9/11, 2001, aggravated terrorism and destabilization of Pakistan. Indo-Afghan intelligence agencies turned the tables on Pakistani security and intelligence agencies by sponsoring terrorism into FATA and major cities by TTP and its affiliates. US-Indian strategic partnership in Afghanistan further compounded Pakistan’s security challenges and strategic balance in South Asia. US-Indian demands on regional terrorism are viewed with scepticism in Pakistan. US demands are termed as coercive diplomacy to serve Indo-US strategic interests, disregarding Pakistan’s legitimate interests in the region. Pakistan’s repeated concerns over presence of TTP terrorist groups at Afghan soil and attacking Pakistani border posts are ignored. Pakistan is rather demanded to act and push Haqqani network out of its FATA region, who are allegedly attacking US forces in Afghanistan. Therefore, TTP and Haqqanis are informally taken as quid-pro-quo by the Afghan and Indian authorities under tacit US endorsement. On the contrary Pakistan claims to have flushed FATA of all foreign terrorist groups including Haqqanis since mid-20018. 9/11 was a new-found opportunity for India to force Pakistan for reversing its policy towards Kashmir dispute. Kargil episode provided an opportunity to partially delegitimize Kashmir freedom struggle because the World was not willing to tolerate non- state actors interfering into any sovereign state. Most of Kashmiri organisations waging freedom struggle in IoK have been declared as specifically designated terrorist entities by the US. Capitalising on favourable international environment, Modi government in India has stepped up brutalities in IoK to suppress the freedom struggle by unarmed Kashmir youth. Owing to special national sentiment towards Kashmir cause, no domestic CT strategy could stop Kashmiris who are determined to cross Line of Control and fight along with their brethren in IoK. The reality has been explained by Pakistani leadership at multiple fora. Albeit Pakistan has stressed that there is no state sponsorship of violence in IoK from Pakistani side. Modi government is pursuing two pronged policy against Pakistan one; mobilizing international opinion and blaming the country for sponsoring terrorism and secondly, upping the ante of escalation along Line of Control forcing Pakistani authorities to rethink its policy of support to Kashmiri freedom fighters. Responsible officials of Indian government vowed to support terrorism by Baloch separatists and other terrorist entities. Due to strategic partnership with the US, India is now in a position to violate all UN Resolutions on Kashmir and continue denying Kashmiris their inalienable right of self-determination. Concomitantly, she is pursuing policy of unprovoked escalation along line of control to pressure Government

135 of Pakistan, by inflicting civilian casualties through deliberate artillery shelling. Such a bellicose Indian policy complicates Pakistani governments’ desire of cooperation and normalization of relations with India. Without tangible progress on Kashmir dispute, relations with India cannot be normalized. The US demanding Pakistan to help in resolution of Afghan dispute should not lose sight of situation in Indian occupied Kashmir and impact on domestic factors in Pakistan. Under such hostile activities from Indian side Pakistan cannot be expected to implement its counterterrorism policy unilaterally. The state reserves the right to protect its vital national interests first before contributing towards regional and global peace. National sentiment towards Kashmir cause is too strong to be ignored. Constant threats of aggression and surgical strikes along Line of control and destabilization through covert intelligence operations impacted domestic factors in Pakistan which favour India-centric security policy and CT strategy. After killing of TTP Chief Mullah Fazlullah, presence of TTP operatives in Afghan sanctuaries is substantiated. They attack Pakistani security check posts and flee back to their hideouts in Afghanistan. Afghan and Indian intelligence agencies support TTP’s terrorism in Pakistan, and Pakistani Government claims to have possessed an irrefutable evidence of their involvement. Pakistan’s leadership, politicians and military combined in the person of General Pervez Musharraf came under tremendous pressure to cooperate with the US after 9/11 terrorist attacks. Pakistani government opted for a paradigm shift in its CT policy inside Pakistan and attempted to improve cooperation with Afghanistan and India at regional level. The policy shift earned Pakistan timely relief from the US- financial and military assistance, but at tremendous internal cost. The extremist forces turned their guns towards state of Pakistan and declared open war with Pakistani military and intelligence. Cooperation with the US lasted for about five years thereafter since 2007, cracks started to appear in bilateral cooperation and perception on CT policy. The bad blood only worsened with the passage of time. Even after June 2014 military operation against TTP, zero tolerance toward any terrorist group at Pakistani soil including Haqqanis, Pakistan’s CT policy is viewed with suspicion by the US, India and Afghanistan. It is divergence of interests in Afghanistan which drives CT policies either by Pakistan or the US and other countries. War on terror was perceived as a crusade against Muslims and extremist forces blamed secular elite of Muslim countries as abetters of Crusade against fellow Muslim brethren. Muslim societies witnessed a clear divide between moderate ad extremist forces. Pakistan was under sharp focus due to US presence in Afghanistan ad unending demands of

136 doing more to defeat terrorism. Domestically, Musharraf’s policy of “enlightened moderation” was ridiculed as an initiative to appease the US and an act of apostasy. US war on terror was clearly termed as a war against Islam by extremist forces. Musharraf’s somersault triggered a severe backlash and the ruling elite along with Military were labelled as non- believers – apostate. The militant forces declared state of Pakistan and its security forces as legitimate targets of Jihad. Due to domestic backlash and systemic pressure, Pakistan was visibly on defensive with regards to Kashmir cause, and assured the US that Jihadi infrastructure from Pakistani part of Kashmir will be dismantled. The domestic CT policy was facing number of contradictions and resistance internally. Intransigence on part of India over Kashmir dispute alienated Musharraf government for being too soft on Kashmir issue and conceding extra space to India without corresponding goodwill from their side. The retribution in the form of terrorist attacks on military installations and personnel began to unravel, demonstrating attempts by terrorists on the life of President Musharraf in 2003. In 2003/ 2004, Pakistan started to implement its CT policy to discourage extremism and terrorism at home and assured the US, that Pakistan will not allow militia of non-state actors to operate in Pakistan and conduct cross border operations. Musharraf announced a policy to demolish bases of Kashmiri militants operating from Pakistani part of Kashmir. This policy casted Pakistan dearly because extremist forces interpreted it as an act of apostasy and turned their guns to Pakistani military. Their grievances were true only in one instance wherein India failed to demonstrate corresponding goodwill in Jammu and Kashmir and Pakistan ceded enough space to India, without demanding reciprocity on the deployment of Indian forces in IoK and resultant atrocities being committed against civilians. Besides regional security threats, Pakistan’s political leadership and its security institutions were maligned by the US Administration (Bush) for double cross and threatened for dire consequence if whole hearted support to the US war on terror was not extended (2007/8). Pakistan was facing a “double jeopardy” being an apostate for supporting Crusaders against fellow Muslims at home and on the contrary, it was dubbed as a state which was facilitating regional terrorism and not doing enough for elimination of terrorists’ sanctuaries at its soil by the US and international community. The regional countries (India and Afghanistan) exploited anti-Pakistan international environment and stepped up interference into its internal matters. Violence in FATA, Karachi and Balochistan witnessed an upward spiral from 2007 till 2015, and law enforcing agencies especially police and civil armed forces suffered major losses.

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Pakistani security forces and its military are battling terrorism on multiple fronts especially after 2006/7. The country failed to formulate its counter narrative to project its CT policy and contribution towards regional and global security and peace. Western media had initially been blaming Pakistani establishment for double game and after 2014 comprehensive military operation, the CT campaign was termed as selective against TTP operatives only and Haqqanis not being touched. The US, Afghan and Indian allegations further strengthened the international chorus against Pakistan for being selective in counterterrorist operations. A comprehensive narrative and its projection through appropriate means is the necessity which should be embedded in Pakistan’s CT strategy. Needless to mention that allegations of exceptions ad selectivity must be addressed to make the CT strategy as credible a possible. A thaw (June 2018) among US, Pakistan and Afghanistan tense relations over intra Afghan dialogue and perceptibly Pakistan facilitating Taliban participation is a step in the right direction. Elimination of TTP supremo, Mullah Fazlullah too, contributed towards enhanced goodwill among three protagonist countries. Effort by other regional and Muslim countries merit recognition for assisting intra Afghan dialogue. A round of Talks among Afghan Taliban, Afghan Government officials in the presence of regional countries was a welcome step. Series of dialogue among Afghan Taliban, the US and regional countries since December 2018, was probably the concrete step towards finding a lasting peace in Afghanistan through negotiations. The development brought US and Pakistani governments closer with the prospects of helping to allay misperceptions on future political dispensation in Afghanistan by both sides. Chinese engagement with Afghan counterparts in concert with Pakistani officials further substantiated the argument of regional dispute resolution approach. Due to conflicting interests of international players and the regional countries, Afghan dispute warrants a comprehensive regional approach of finding solution. So that not only peace returns to Afghanistan but legitimate security and economic interests of regional countries are also safeguarded. Even a semblance of Afghanistan being used as proxy against any of the regional countries would render entire process of negotiated settlement meaningless. Pakistani authorities had been harping upon intra Afghan dialogue and cessation of interference from Indo-Afghan nexus, which were often shrugged off. Instead Pakistan was lambasted for supporting regional terrorism. However, since last quarter 2018, Pakistani viewpoint has been hailed by the US and Afghan authorities too, expressed better understanding of Pakistani standpoint on Afghan crisis. Role by two other regional countries- Iran and India cannot be ignored due to ethno-sectarian affiliation and political convergence

138 of certain ethnic Afghan groups respectively. US special envoy on Afghanistan has included Iran and India in his Afghan peace mission parleys, signalling a regional approach to find a solution to protracted Afghan dispute. This new initiative should be wholeheartedly supported by the all the regional countries including Pakistan. While concluding role of domestic factors in combating terrorism, there are numerous actions that successive governments will have to undertake. Pakistan’s ideology as an Islamic republic which is undisputed however, all stakeholders should rise above petty political or financial gains. Right wing parties though have equal right to participate in elections and strive to rule the country through majority vote yet, they should be discouraged from using madrassa card, using millions of students as bayonet power to pressure the state and society. The psyche of the leadership should shun politics of dynasties, clans, ethnicity and sectarian affiliations; they should only work for collective good of the country. A balanced and tolerant approach will help prevent internal polarization and extremism in the society. To combat terrorism internally by enforcing rule of law and good governance, the capacity of civilian administrative and law enforcement institutions must be built on priority. Deterrent and expeditious punishment to terrorists will help control extremism and terrorism. Review of relevant laws and establishment of secure judicial complexes may be expedited. Till such time civilian anti-terrorism structures are fully geared up, extension to military courts through constitutional amendment may be lobbied by the incumbent government. Specific recommendations on combating terrorism in Pakistan are covered in Chapter-6, envisioned policy framework to combat terrorism in Pakistan. Having explained systemic realities, regional dynamics and domestic variables in shaping Pakistan’s CT strategy, the succeeding chapter uncovers envisioned framework for CT strategy of Pakistan.

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Chapter 6 A Framework for Combating Terrorism in Pakistan The preceding chapters afforded an opportunity of evaluating Pakistan’s post 9/11 CT strategy, its domestic policies/ sentiment, regional nuances and systemic pressures shaping the domestic CT policy of Pakistan, with close linkage to regional and global fight against terrorism. The suggested framework encompasses policy recommendations at domestic level in the form of cognitive variables of CT strategy, structural and institutional reforms, and relations with regional countries and a fresh look on international dimension of CT strategy. Neoclassical realism when read in conjunction with fundamentals of structural realism, unveils the goals of major powers, serving national interests and maintaining balance in international system. Pakistan suffered due to asymmetric relations with the super power, and major regional power India joining the coalition to fight terrorism in Afghanistan further complicated the CT strategy of Pakistan. The envisioned framework for combating terrorism in Pakistan consists of four sections: Section 6.1 The systemic Realities and domestic constraints, 6.2 Weaknesses in the existing CT strategy, 6.3 Lessons derived from selected CT case studies, 6.4 Policy recommendations, covering systemic level- foreign policy choices with the US and regional countries, whereas certain specific actions and structural reform have been suggested on domestic front. 6.1 An Appraisal of Systemic Realities and Domestic Constraints Paradoxes in the policies of US, major EU countries and important nations of Muslim world lay bare when post 9/11 global counter terrorism campaign is analysed on the same touchstone, set as benchmark to achieve their strategic objectives during the decade of 1980s by sponsoring violent struggle (jihad) in Afghanistan against former Soviet Union. Neoclassical realism when read in conjunction with fundamentals of structural realism, unveils the subtleties between national interests and international power politics, and the outcome of decisions by the governments may not necessarily support popular domestic sentiment. In case of Pakistan post 9/11 domestic sentiment opposed Musharraf’s decision of siding with the US but vital national interests of Pakistan reigned supreme and popular decision was rejected. Similarly, in case of the US, heroes of yester years i.e. Afghan Taliban for the US became terrorists and number one enemy when their agenda contradicted US national security interests. Pakistan too, adjusted to new strategic realities in the region and reviewed its CT policy since Afghan jihad of 1980s. Support to Afghan Taliban and Kashmiri freedom fighters was gradually scaled down and ultimately withdrawn. However, emotional

140 attachment to Kashmir cause cannot be separated from Pakistan’s foreign policy which would always reflect the domestic sentiment of support to Kashmiri brethren. Post 9/11 security environment impacted freedom movements in the Muslim world, for example Palestinians are subjected to brute forces by Israeli army and no eyebrows are raised at the UN level or in major capitals of the world. In Kashmir, too, Indian occupation forces resorted to brutalities, by blinding and maiming Kashmiri youth with pellet guns yet, except concern by UN humans rights organisations no worthwhile criticism was heard from the US and major EU countries. It is because of the fact that post 9/11 security dominated foreign policy of major powers shrouded atrocities and human rights violations by the occupation forces. Role of another regional player (India) and major international actor- the US is critical in total stabilization of the region and defeating the terrorism in a comprehensive manner. Growing consensus over engaging Taliban and working for a peaceful Afghanistan is a good omen and it is hoped that Pakistan along with regional countries and USA will be able to find a negotiated settlement of Afghan dispute. However, killing Taliban Chief Mullah Mansour in a US drone attack was a major jolt to the efforts of negotiated settlement of Afghan conflict. Series of dialogue between US special representative and Taliban leadership had been signalling positive developments though, stopped short of announcing any peace deal. The positive outcome will have salutary effects on Pakistani side of the border as well. Other regional countries like China, Iran and Russia will have to play their role in regional dispute resolution mechanism. Afghanistan should not be allowed to become a proxy battle ground of regional countries and major powers at the cost of lasting peace in the region. Historically, US strategic interests in South Asian region have been contingent upon expansionist moves by the former Soviet Union except the incident of 9/11, 2001. Since independence in 1947, Pakistan’s relevance in South Asian security calculus especially in case of Afghanistan figured out prominently. Pakistani leadership also projected Pakistan’s strategic location and vowed to work with the US for containment of Communism in South Asia and Middle East. US also acknowledged the importance of Pakistan’s geographical location and started assessing the possibility of military bases in Pakistan, one of the largest Muslim countries with standing army335. Pakistan’s national security had been a challenge in face of bigger neighbour on the east and a hostile neighbour with inseparable ethno- religious linkages on the west. CT strategy of Pakistan is constrained by regional and international obligations vis-à-vis legitimate national security interests.

335 Abdul Sattar, Pakistan’s Foreign Policy-2009 a Concise History (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2010), pp.46-47.

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The paradox in national interest and systemic pressures has been explained by Walter Lippmann who said that “a nation has security when it does not have to sacrifice its legitimate interests to avoid war and is able if challenged to maintain them by war”336. Thus relations with the US had been voluntary to bolster Pakistan’s security and seek economic benefits. However, Pakistan in turn had to pay the price in the form of domestic and foreign policies running cross grained to national aspirations and geo-political interests of the country. After 9/11 Pakistan was pressured to review it Afghan and Kashmir policies whereas, India and Afghanistan had a free hand to destabilize Pakistan by sponsoring Pakistani origin terrorist groups like TTP. Understanding on regional dispute resolution mechanism, is the key to defeat the monster of terrorism in South Asian region. The requisite warmth and urge to resolve the challenge of regional terrorism is shrouded under the mystery of domestic suspicion, allegations of covert operations and internal interference. The US presence and connected interests too, failed to bring the regional countries at a unified forum. Rhetoric by the US President Trump to implicate Pakistan in complicity and deceit will only obfuscate the much- desired cooperation among neighbours and the USA as a stake holder in Afghanistan337. The regional linkages and fallouts of role by systemic forces will continue to cast deep shadows over Pakistan- Afghanistan region and the challenge of extremism and terrorism is likely to persist. After military operation in FATA, the terrorist groups have either diffused in the society or fled to Afghanistan, warranting action by Afghan and US forces. The hardened groups like Fazlullah faction of TTP are hiding in Afghanistan, reportedly eastern parts of Afghanistan in Kunar and Nuristan areas. The sporadic raids on Pakistani security forces’ check posts in FATA from across Afghan border and terrorists fleeing back to bases in Afghanistan speak volumes about urgency of action by Afghan and US forces to eliminate their sanctuaries. The complexities of US-Pakistan relations and enforcement of mutually agreed CT strategy is evident with the remarks of the former US Secretary of State, Rex Tillerson while speaking at a seminar organised by Atlantic Council- Korea Foundation Forum “Meeting Foreign Policy Challenges of 2017 and Beyond”. He

336 Walter Lippmann, US Foreign Policy Shield of the Republic (Boston: Mass Pub, 1943), P.5. 337 “The United States has foolishly given Pakistan more than 33 billion dollars in aid over the last 15 years, and they have given us nothing but lies & deceit, thinking of our leaders as fools. They give safe haven to the terrorists we hunt in Afghanistan, with little help. No more! 4:12 AM - 1 Jan 2018”. Online available at https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/952888691944550401 (accessed on 16 January 2017).

142 emphasised that Pakistan could lose territory to the terrorists of Haqqani network. These terrorists may decide that “Pakistan is a best target”338. Pakistan may be at a disadvantage as for as regional and systemic level efforts to fight terrorism are concerned. Seemingly fight against terrorism in Afghanistan has entered into a critical phase wherein US is striving to pull out after reaching an agreement with Afghan Taliban. The outcome of any negotiated settlement if finally reached, either some portion of US forces will stay at Afghan soil or Taliban will stick to total withdrawal remains to be seen. This shift in priority and possible resource crunch in view of cut in coalition support fund will adversely affect Pakistan’s fight against terrorism in FATA and elsewhere. Covert asymmetric wars by regional countries will only be a recipe of disaster for regional peace and security. It is in this context that Government of Pakistan expects US to only withdraw after ensuring a sustainable Afghan Government, backed up with strong Afghan National Security Forces. If the US and its coalition partners leave Afghanistan without political dispensation which is acceptable to all stakeholders and its security forces are able to withstand Taliban’s anticipated resistance, Afghanistan may slide into civil war and the outcome might be unpredictable. Unstable Afghanistan will not only have consequences for regional countries but the international community may not remain unaffected as well. A fragile peace in Afghanistan and threat of Taliban take over will certainly embolden TTP and its affiliates in Pakistan at the cost of unending conflict in FATA and Pakistan-Afghan region. The discourse by Chaudhry is intriguing wherein he strongly rejected Musharraf’s policy of joining US war on terror and stated that the real struggle lies in people and “not a few stooges who wag their tail on the whistles of their masters”. He hoped that people will prevail in the end339. Chaudhry actually termed terror as a tool by imperialist powers. It is rather awakening for the people of victim countries to understand and stand up he asserted. Donald Trump while unveiling his new National Security Strategy 2017, directly naming Pakistan, demanding to do more on war on terror and reminding of financial assistance to the country, may serve as an awakening call for Pakistani nation340.

338 Anwar Iqbql, Pakistan May Lose Territory to Terrorists, Dawn, 15 December 2017. 339 Rab Nawaz Chaudhry, Terrorism or Awakening (Islamabad: The Army Press), p.149. 340 National Security Strategy of the United States of America, December 2017. Online available at https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/NSS-Final-12-18-2017-0905.pdf (accessed on 20 December 2017). On page 50 allegations against Pakistan on supporting terrorism in Afghanistan have been repeated and Pakistan has been impressed upon to cooperate with the US and fight terrorism. Concerns about security of Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal has also been raised. Indian role in Afghanistan and Indo- Pacific Asia has

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Internally, Pakistan’s 20-point National Action Plan (NAP) or CT strategy approved by the parliament in December 2014, culminated at expansion of Operation Zarb-e Azb in entire FATA, a conclusive war against TTP and its affiliates. The military operation dismantled terror infrastructure and made FATA inhospitable for TTP and other terrorist entities. The Pakistani nation is rejuvenated and is fully backing Pakistani Military in fighting terrorism and completely eradicating the scourge of terrorism. Given the historical lessons, violent extremism will continue to haunt Pakistan for many years warranting a comprehensive counter terrorism strategy and all-encompassing de-radicalization programme in the country. Zahid Hussain is critical of Pakistan’s National Security Paradigm which is peculiar in complexion. He further dilates that “the infusion of radical Islamic ideology into civil and military institutions has also been a major constraint in the fight against extremist militancy”341. It is strongly believed and historically proven that the final political dispensation and security situation in Afghanistan cannot be disassociated from success of fight against terrorism in FATA and elsewhere in Pakistan. It is felt that there is no reason of complacency and Pakistan will have to evolve short, medium and long-term strategies to pre-empt radicalization of uneducated/unemployed youth to completely purge the country from the menace of sectarianism and terrorism. Selective action against seminaries, religious parties suspected of supporting extremist elements, and insufficient effort to plug the hole of domestic and foreign funding are counterproductive. It is inclusive and a comprehensive counter terrorism strategy which can guarantee total elimination of the threat of terrorism. The caveat of regional peace and comfortable relations among India- Pakistan- Afghanistan are considered pre- requisite for achieving sustainable peace in South Asia. Therefore, total defeat of extremism and terrorism from FATA and other regions of Pakistan as a result of operation Zarb-e- Azb, and lately Ruddul Fasad (RuF) since 2017 is critical for lasting peace and tranquillity in Pakistan. The institutions like NACTA and connected criminal laws will have to be revisited with a view to making them robust and biting. 6.2 Weaknesses in the Existing CT Strategy of Pakistan The existing CT legislation is fairly elaborate and robust; the only impediment is implementation across the board. Prior to Suppression of Terrorist Activities Act 1975, various governments in Pakistan used the British crafted Criminal Procedure Code, its

been accepted and reiterated. Ironically, in case of conflict between India and Pakistan a nuclear showdown has been feared. 341 Zahid Hussain, The Scorpion Tail (New York: Free Press, 2010), P.42.

144 notorious Section 144 was used to control various political activities and suppress anti-state activities. District magistrate was empowered under British system of governance. Incidentally after short stint of District Nazims (governors), the Nawaz Sharif government reverted to old system of district magistrates- Deputy Commissioner since 2017. The Security of Pakistan Act (1952), the Defence of Pakistan Ordinance (1955), and the Defence of Pakistan Rules (1965), were also frequently used for political objectives342. Suppression of Terrorist Activities Act (1975) was replaced by Anti-Terrorism Act (ATA) of 1997. It was brain child of Nawaz Sharif and in 2015, his government again enacted a new law which was much tougher and biting, that is Protection of Pakistan Act (POPA) 2015. The act authorizes military courts and shifting of burden of proof of innocence on the accused, beside admissibility of “e” evidence and statement of the terrorists before the officials of law enforcing agencies not below the rank of superintendent of Police or equivalent. POPA has been utilized to convict and execute many terrorists after operation Zarb-e- Azb since June 2014 and it is still operative. Before suggesting a framework for combating terrorism in Pakistan, some of the weaknesses and issues identified that had been hampering true implantation of NAP or CT strategy in vogue are covered in succeeding paragraphs. These encompass systemic compulsions, regional dynamics and domestic sentiment while fighting terrorism. US interference and dictation prevented Pakistan from engaging Afghan Taliban in a meaningful manner. Pakistan as a country was not allowed to pursue an independent CT policy due to US pressure. The weakness has lately been realized (December 2018) when US Administration officially approached Pakistan and sought help in negotiated settlement of Afghan dispute. Indian alliance with Tajik elite of Afghanistan was another impediment in arranging a comprehensive intra- Afghan dialogue. Foreign support to TTP, its affiliated terrorist groups and Baloch sub nationalists constrain Pakistan’s CT responses. US declaration of accepting India as a strategic partner in Afghanistan emboldened India which refused to engage Pakistan in any of the outstanding issues; either bilateral or pertaining to Afghanistan. Indian intelligence in concert with Afghan counterparts rather incited terrorism in FATA and Balochistan, further hindering Pakistan’s CT operations.

342 Fayyaz, Responding to Terrorism: Pakistan’s Anti-Terrorism Laws, Pakistan Institute for peace Studies, 2008 pp.3-4, available at http://pgil.pk/wp-con tent/uploads/2014/04/Responding-to-terrorism.pdf (accessed on 5 December 2017).

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Inter and intra security and intelligence agencies coordination in Pakistan is a major weakness in timely dissemination of actionable intelligence to concerned agencies. The civilian law enforcements agencies lack capacity to independently plan and execute CT operations. Political interference and lack of merit is plaguing the institution of bureaucracy and police. Weak civilian law enforcing institutions look towards military in every CT operation which ideally falls in the realm of civilian law enforcement. Militaries too, are not trained for asymmetric operations; their operations and equipment are cumbersome and often result into avoidable collateral damages. Coordination and operational synchronization when operating in conjunction with police or civilian law enforcing agencies is another area of concern. Military having executed the kinetic part of CT strategy, is now urging civilian authorities to expedite transition of security to civilian institutions, backed up with solid rehabilitation programme in terrorism affected regions. Army Chief along with Director General Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) on 19 December 2017, while briefing Senate committee on national security highlighted the weaknesses in civilian prong of the CT strategy. Over involvement of military in law enforcement operations causes discomfort in civilian governance spectacles as was evident in Dawn Leaks (2017) revealing differences between military and political leadership over strategy to control former jihadi elements. Pakistan, like most developing countries of the world lacks national integration and economic development. This was a route cause for social divisions along more than one lines- racial, ethnic, linguistic, and religious in the absence of political traditions and values, the structures that transcend parochial loyalties. In multi ethnic and pluralistic countries like Pakistan, minor incidents on political and economic grounds could snowball in major conflagrations. Pakistan’s cosmopolitan city- Karachi, witnessed worst kind of infighting and killings among various ethnic and sectarian groups. Sectarian differences in Pakistan are another volatile fault line which could be ignited either due to domestic sensitivities or external developments in countries like KSA and Iran. Though national action plan, the de-facto CT strategy of Pakistan is a consensus document encompassing almost all conceivable actions to eliminate extremism and terrorism from Pakistan yet; its implementation is being hindered due to multiple factors. Religious- political parties are major drag in implementation of measures meant to regulate and monitor madrassa activities, their funding and syllabi etcetera. Therefore, transparent and across the board implementation is needed at the earliest. Comprehensive and well thought out actions to control activities of former jihadi entities are another constraint in execution of NAP.

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The terrorist networks supported by local facilitators and foreign financiers and supporters are a major challenge at home which nullifies great sacrifices by Pakistani nation and its security agencies. Besides domestic weakness to identify trouble spots for action by concerned security agencies, a cohesive foreign policy of firmly taking up the issue of external support to Pakistani terrorists at appropriate fora is a missing link. Illicit financial transactions compound CT strategy and warrant a comprehensive response to plug all loopholes which may be exploited for terror financing. The ongoing swoop by government agencies against fake account holders and money launderers is a step in the right direction. It will not only discourage terror financing but satisfy the FATF as well which is engaged with Pakistan over multiple issues of illicit financial transactions. Socio-economic disparity in society and discrimination on caste and ethnicity is vulnerable to be exploited by terrorist organizations. Needless to mention that unemployment, poverty and illiteracy are one of the major contributory factors towards radicalization in Pakistan. There are neglected regions from socio-economic development point of view like former FATA, southern Punjab and some parts of Sind and Balochistan provinces which are considered fertile land for recruitment by terrorist organisations. NACTA not assuming its perceived role as a supra counterterrorism agency, coordinating and directing actions by concerned intelligence and law enforcement agencies is a drag towards effective CT strategy. The intelligence sharing among federal and provincial intelligence agencies is critical in preventing acts of terrorism. Inordinate delay in full operationalization of joint intelligence directorate under NACTA has hamstrung the very concept of joint operations under one body. Identification of all sources of extremism and radicalization in the society is key to craft a holistic national CT policy. Currently NACTA has not been able to comprehensively identify trouble spots or if identified corrective measures are awaited. Laws like Pakistan Penal Code, Criminal Procedure Code, and Evidence Act warrant constant updating to cater for modern tools of evidence and prosecution. Protection of Pakistan Act 2014 (POPA) has equipped investigating agencies and the courts sufficiently yet, its implementation in letter and spirit is a grey area. Intimidation and life threats to investigating officers and key witnesses are a common feature hindering impartial investigation and deterrent punishments to terrorists. Lack of institutional synergy and misinterpretation of Islamic ideology are exploited by terrorist entities. Lack of coordination among security and law enforcement institutions exposes the weakness in strict implementation of CT laws.

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Similarly, true interpretation of Islamic teachings like jihad and obligations towards Muslim Ummah by credible religious scholars is a deficiency. The spirit of Muslim Ummah is misquoted and exploited by terrorist organizations like Al-Qaida and ISIS. Major sectarian organizations pledge allegiance to foreign terrorist organizations rather than rejecting their extremist ideology. Misconstrued interpretation of religious ideology results into internal polarization and terrorism against fellow countrymen and law enforcement agencies. 6.3 Lessons Derived from Selected CT Case Studies Globally, UN, under Kufi Annan, issued CT strategy in 2002 by stressing dissuading terrorists from carrying out their attacks, denying would be perpetrators the chances to commit their crimes, and fostering international cooperation in fighting terrorism. Beyer specifically quoted Millar saying that US had been exerting pressure on the UN after 2001343. United Nations Secretary General (UNSG) and United Nations Security Council (UNSC) had been on the forefront to caution the member states to deny safe havens, prevent incitement and support to other member states by sharing timely information through bilateral and multilateral channels of communication. UNSC Resolutions like 1267, 1373, 1540, 1566 and 1624 are noteworthy which provide a framework not only for host of activities at UN headquarters and respective UNSC committees but also afford a collaborative platform to the member states for sharing information and coordinate punitive actions against the terrorist entities344. 1540 resolution specifically deals with the issues of terrorism by non-state actors, role of member states to rein them in besides ensuring that weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) do not fall into hands of non-state actors. UNSC Resolution (1540) on WMDs has specifically been quoted to have brought about pressure on Pakistan to cooperate and support the resolution. Because they (Pakistan) were sceptical that fingers were being pointed towards Pakistan after AQ Khan Episode345. Pakistan, like other member states owes its obligation towards UNSC and submits annual implementation report as per obligation under various clauses of 1540346.

343 Beyer, Counterterrorism and International Power Relations, p.160. 344 UNSC Subsidiary Organs, Sanction List. Online available at https://www.un.org/sc/suborg/en/sanctions/1267/aq_sanctions_list (accessed on 15 November 2018). 345 UN Resolution 1267 was adopted in 1999 to impose travel ban and sanction on sale of arms to the terrorists including banning of certain terrorist entities, online available at https://www.un.org/sc/suborg/en/sanctions/ (accessed on 26 December 2017). Whereas UNSC 1540 covered protection of WMDs and preventing them falling into wrong hands. 346 UNSC Resolution 1540 was adopted in 2004. It specifically deals with proliferation of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons and stipulates actions for the member nations to prevent their proliferation and denying access to non-state actors. Online available at http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/naruhodo/data/pdf/data2- 3.pdf (accessed on 21 December 2017). Pakistan is under obligation to furnish annual implementation report to

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Pakistan had been voluntarily participating in UN related conferences and assuring cooperation without signing any treaty. With regards to CT strategies of selected countries; Sri Lanka has a success story to its credit for having defeated insurgency and terrorism yet, it was a long haul for Sri Lankan military and huge sacrifices in terms of precious lives. Sri Lanka sought help from regional countries in terms of weapons and equipment, especially Pakistan. She had been requesting India to turn the tap off on financial and equipment conduits to Tamil fighters, being supported by the Indian military and Indian Tamil community. The sacrifices by Sri Lankan military and the nation apart, the insurgency could only be defeated when popular support from Indian Tamil community and foreign funding dried up. It was India whose leadership finally decided to withdraw the support to Tamil guerrillas and indirectly helped Sri Lankan government to eliminate the insurgency spread over three decades. The aspects like national will to wage protracted counterinsurgency campaign and dialogue with neighbouring countries to help eliminate the menace of terrorism, are of immense value for countries like Pakistan to suitably replicate these in local environment. India is still grappling with the situation amidst dozens of insurgencies besides a freedom struggle by the Kashmiris in Jammu and Kashmir. Situation in 7 states of north east and Jammu and Kashmir worsened because of excessive force used by the security forces. Indian policies of socio-economic deprivation, political discrimination and draconian laws to suppress the local communities are to blame for the ongoing trouble in affected regions347. Acrimonious relation with Pakistan and sympathy of people residing in Pakistani part of Kashmir is keeping the insurgency alive- insurgency or terrorism as per Indian reckoning and freedom struggle from Pakistani perspective. Indian involvement in FATA and Balochistan as a quid- pro- quo for alleged Pakistani interference in Jammu and Kashmir has added fuel to the fire of local disturbances. Both the cases cannot be compared purely on legal and technical grounds because Balochistan is a legitimate part of State of Pakistan whereas, Jammu and Kashmir is a disputed territory whose status is to be decided in line with UN resolutions. Therefore, drawing parallels and justifying interference as a response to asymmetric war by Pakistan is not relevant. However, Indian governments enacting robust anti-terrorism laws, dialogue with local communities especially in north east, and granting the UNSC committee on number of actions as a member state. Every member nation is obliged to implement actions under 1540, this being a mandatory resolution of the UNSC. 347 TADA was a departure from established right of the accused to face trial under due process of law. TADA afforded instead that confessions to police officers could be admitted as substantive evidence as long as the officer’s rank was superintendent of police or higher. Online available at https://www.quora.com/Why-is-the- Terrorist-and-Disruptive-Activities-Act-TADA-now-extinct (accessed on 23 December 2017).

149 greater autonomy to various ethnic communities in the form of additional provinces or through delegation of power to the state governments are useful lessons to be considered while crafting Pakistani CT strategy. UK though, finally settled its Irish insurgency politically yet, is confronting threat of ideological terrorism masterminded by the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS). The Contest Strategy of UK was published in 2009, identifying threat to UK interests gradually transforming from indigenous resistance to global terrorist threat from Al Qaida and its associate terrorist outfits operating from FATA region of Pakistan and Afghanistan348. The recent spate of violence in UK by Muslim youth substantiated the assessment by UK’s Joint Intelligence Committee (JIT) and Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre (JTAC)349. ISIS, through its sleeper cells organises terrorism in cities by employing unorthodox means of affliction. The lesson to learn from UK experience is to engage communities through dialogue and grant political rights to aggrieved party, in tandem with sophisticated and robust law enforcement measures at home. Superior intelligence synchronized with civilian law enforcement agencies is the crux of UK model of fighting insurgency. Given the large percentage of Pakistani diaspora in UK, Pakistani security agencies and especially National Counter Terrorism Authority (NACTA) can emulate various models of reforms. These could be judicial reforms, up gradation of criminal justice system, expertise in forensics, CT equipment and capacity building of police and other allied agencies in post incident coverage to investigations and professional prosecution of the terrorists for exemplary punishment, so as to serve as deterrent350. Terrorism in USA was unprecedented and the reaction too, was unparalleled, shaking the entire world. US presence in Afghanistan since 2001 and growing strategic cooperation with India has added into Pakistan’s security predicaments. US with immense national power enforced strict CT operations at home and in regions of interest. It coerced the states to cooperate and implement CT actions suiting long term US interests. Where required, US did not hesitate to invade nations like Iraq and Afghanistan with massive conventional assault by

348 Policy paper by UK Government, Counter-terrorism Strategy (CONTEST), published on 12 July 2011. Online available at https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/counter-terrorism-strategy-contest (accessed on 20 December 2017). 349 Contest The United Kingdom’s Strategy for Countering Terrorism, Presented to Parliament by the Secretary of the State for the Home Department by command of her majesty, July 2011. Online available at https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/97995/strategy-contest.pdf (accessed on 25 October 2017). 350 UK police and MI-5 swiftly identified terrorist network and prosecuted the culprits. The government report on the incident is available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/shared/bsp/hi/pdfs/11_05_06_narrative.pdf (accessed on 21 December 2017).

150 overthrowing the regimes and installing puppet governments to serve the US interests in the region. US CT model did earn the US partial success in Iraq and Afghanistan, but it antagonized local communities with excessive use of force and drone strikes, thus broadening base of recruitment of Islamic militant organisations. CT measures are essentially civilian law enforcement measures by respective countries and where required regional courtiers or the US may help bolster the capacity. However, direct US intervention proved to be a recipe of disaster given the current political and security situation in Afghanistan and Iraq. The latest move by Trump administration to shift US embassy to Jerusalem by accepting it as capital of Israel will further infuriate the Muslims and the extremist forces would exploit it as an Evangelical Christians’ agenda of helping Jews to occupy the holy site of Islam - Al-Quds. Dr Maliha Lodhi, Pakistan’s Permanent representative to the UN, while delivering a keynote address at the Institute of Regional Studies Islamabad outlined her (9Cs CT Strategy which may be universally acceptable. Howver, interpretation and application of each element could be tailored by respective nations suiting their local environment351: 1. Comprehensive- policy should be comprehensive. 2. Consensus- based on national and where applicable international consensus. 3. Causes – identification of causes of domestic, regional or international terrorism. 4. Confusion- should be above any political or legal and ideological confusion. 5. Capabilities- national capabilities to tackle including its law enforcement agencies. 6. Cooperative- The response should be cooperative in execution. 7. Civil Liberties- should be respected not usurped by the CT strategy. 8. Civilization and Cultural dialogue- good understanding of and dialogue to accommodate cultural and civilization sensitivities. 9. Conference at the summit level- the conception and implementation at the highest level of governance by respective nations. 6.4 Policy Recommendations Pakistan’s policy towards religious extremism and ethno-sectarian terrorism had been at best ambiguous and dominated by security dilemma posed by a powerful neighbour on the east and perpetually hostile Afghanistan on the west. The US sponsored anti-Soviet jihad promoted religious extremism and terrorism with state sponsorship. Successive Pakistani

351 Keynote address by Dr Maliha Lodhi on Global Terrorism Genesis, Implications, Remedial and Counter Measures (Islamabad: Institute of Regional Studies Islamabad, 2005). The explanation of each C has been imagined by the author for the sake of clarity to help future readers. The interpretation is neither of Dr Lodhi nor may necessarily subscribe to her imagination.

151 governments had been struggling to reset the strategic orientation of religious forces and former jihadi elements by banning their extremist activities since 2002/3 and initiating many administrative actions to ensure writ of the government. Almost all former jihadi elements are banned in Pakistan and law enforcing agencies are monitoring their activities with punitive actions where required. Post 9/11 security environment triggered a paradigm shift in traditional policy of tolerating extremist forces, or non-sate actors violating sovereignty of any other state. Paradoxically, despite unprecedented cooperation from Pakistan, certain countries are interfering into Pakistan’s internal affairs and magnifying threat spectrum of the country. The policy recommendations offer systemic dimension of CT strategy with reference to US presence in Afghanistan and her influence over global fight against international terrorism being systemic strand of CT strategy impacting all three - domestic, regional and global tiers of proposed CT strategy of Pakistan. Terrorism in South Asia is a regional phenomenon with global overtones; therefore, relations with regional countries especially India and Afghanistan are critical in evolving any strategy to fight regional terrorism. Domestic reforms include cognitive variables generating anti-Pakistan narratives abroad and promoting extremism and terrorism at home as intrinsic part of strategy in addition to certain domestic reforms to address the structural weaknesses. The recommendations encompass fundamentals of classical and neorealism, because the adopted framework i.e. neoclassical realism is an outgrowth of neo or structural realism. Thus recommendations catering for systemic and regional dynamics are aptly supported. Since neoclassical realism contains features of post structuralism and constructivism debate therefore, inclusion of variables like ideational powers, specific narratives, norms, values and traditions besides characteristics of states’ leadership and it institutions are logically embedded. 6.4.1 Systemic Dimension of CT Strategy Relations with the US had been transactional and security dominated. Pakistan emerged as vital US ally whenever US interests so warranted and was rendered most sanctioned ally when US accomplished its strategic objectives in the region. Anti-Soviet alliance in 1980s and US abandonment in 1991, and post 9/11 strategic partnership being diluted to mere diplomatic interactions after US drawdown from Afghanistan in 2014 are historical pointers in bilateral relations. Given the US importance in international system and relevance in South Asian region, US should be engaged to amicably resolve bilateral perceptive biases on approach to tackle the menace of terrorism in Pakistan and the region.

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Misperceptions with regards to sanctuaries of Afghan Taliban at Pakistani soil should be addressed for lasting peace in the region. Pakistan maintains multiple channels of communication with the US-diplomatic, military and intelligence; these may be revitalized for explaining Pakistan’s principled stand on fighting terrorism and its legitimate concerns over interference from Afghanistan and India. US role as an honest broker of peace is viewed with scepticism in Pakistan when anti –Pakistan activities continue unabated from Afghan soil under watchful eyes of CIA and US military. Pakistan has learnt through hard ways that dependence on US for economic and military aid is counterproductive because US as an ally proved to be untrustworthy in crises. US sanctions during 1965 and 1971 wars with India could be cited to substantiate the argument. Even in post 9/11 scenario, US switched its priorities to India and abandoned Pakistan after accomplishing its strategic objectives of defeating Al-Qaida in Afghanistan. Therefore, Pakistan should diversify its relations and foreign policy priorities by reaching out to other important countries like Russia, and major EU countries. Good and brotherly relations with KSA, UAE and Turkey should be further built upon. China has proven to be a trusted all weather friend therefore, Pakistan should deepen further its, political, diplomatic, defence, strategic and economic ties with China. The idea of signing some kind of security and defence pact may sound farfetched and Chinese may not be ready to ink one in early timeframe yet, Pakistan must considerer given strategic challenges that the country is facing today. 6.4.2 Regional Strand of CT Strategy Pakistan’s foreign policy is criticized for being excessively dominated by domestic sentiment on Kashmir therefore; it is criticised as India centric regional foreign policy. The stumbling block is lingering Kashmir dispute in the face of Indian intransigence. No government in Pakistan could ignore strong national sentiment on Kashmiri cause. Therefore, without resolving core issue of Kashmir, neither relations with India could be normalized nor Pakistani nation could abandon their Kashmiri brethren in their just struggle for freedom. Despite tremendous sacrifices by Pakistani nation and its security forces, terrorist forces are enjoying safe havens at Afghan soil with the patronage of Indo-Afghan intelligence. Therefore, the issue of external support to terrorist outfits, operating from Afghanistan, need to be taken up firmly with Afghanistan, India and the US. Understanding on regional dispute resolution mechanism, is the key to defeat the monster of terrorism in South Asian region. A comprehensive regional dispute resolution mechanism, consisting of all regional stakeholders (including China, Russia and Iran) will help achieve the desired

153 goals. The regional economic cooperation fora like SAARC and SCO should be utilized in fostering better relations between India and Pakistan. The major impediments towards dispute resolution are the relations among India, Pakistan and Afghanistan. These should be mended, and the three nations should be encouraged to resolve differences through the regional dispute resolution mechanism. The sticking point like Kashmir dispute should also be taken up concomitantly so that the government of Pakistan could satisfy its masses on prospects of rapprochement with India. Post Pulwama confrontation between India and Pakistan, February 2019 necessitated a fresh look on India - Pakistan relations and urgency of multiple channels of communication between two countries. Given the presence of nuclear weapons and missiles, minor border skirmishes on Line of Control could spiral out of control and risk use of nuclear weapons triggered by strategic miscalculation by either side. The only channel of communication between two militaries (director general military operations) is not sufficient and is often marred with mistrust and animosity. There is a need to institute a parallel civilian channel of communication preferably between two Foreign Ministers and Foreign Secretaries so that serious crisis situation is averted352. India and Pakistan after overt nuclearization should act like responsible nuclear weapon states by ensuring a crisis management system. As part of nuclear confidence building measures (CBMs), India and Pakistan may consider sharing of increased number of nuclear installations annually to avoid targeting of the same in crisis situation. Anti-ballistic missile defence system was sparingly deployed by two super powers in Cold War; to ensure validity of mutually assured destruction by deterring either side not to draw false sense of security and initiate nuclear exchanges. Therefore, India and Pakistan should seriously consider non deployment of ABM system in South Asia, especially after India acquiring S-400 system from Russia. Conventional balance is another issue of concern which forces the weaker side to go for tactical nuclear weapons and risk greater chances of nuclear war fighting. Therefore, massive modernization of Indian military is counterproductive for strategic balance in South Asia. Both countries should consider raising of balanced strategic dialogue structures to review entire ambit of nuclear weapons in South Asia as part of nuclear CBMs. Afghanistan and Pakistan have complex interdependence in many fields which should be capitalized and Afghan elite should be persuaded to give up patronizing TTP and other

352 Dr Shireen Mazari, Pakistan’s Federal Minister for Human Rights while speaking at the occasion of a national conference organized by Centre for International Strategic Studies (CISS) Islamabad on 10 April 2019, suggested certain nuclear CBMS. She proffered multiple channels of communication, strategic balance by reducing conventional arms, strategic dialogue and arms freeze between two countries.

154 terrorist groups at Afghan soil, who are attacking Pakistani security forces on this side of the border. Both countries should mutually resolve the trust deficit and allegations of interfering into each other’s internal affairs. Issues like repatriation of Afghan refugees, drug trafficking and refugee camps being used as hide outs by terrorist groups should be taken up resolutely with Afghan authorities. 6.4.3 Domestic Reforms to Augment CT Strategy 6.4.3.1 Address Cognitive Variables Strategic Reorientation (Ideological and National Obligations) While maintaining good relations with Islamic countries, the credible religious scholars, established academics and popular politicians must educate the society on religious and political obligations towards Muslim community at large in line with genuine religious obligation vis-à-vis mere political rhetoric. The reality of nation states forming Muslim Ummah and each country safeguarding its national interests should be highlighted in true perspective. Dismal role of Islamic countries in resolving Palestine and Kashmir disputes and murky diplomacy during foreign aggression against countries of Muslim block that is Iraq and Afghanistan should be highlighted to substantiate the argument of Pakistan first. This approach does not negate Pakistan’s due role in projection of political rights of Islamic countries. For example, Pakistan’s political, moral and humanitarian assistance to Kashmir and Palestine cause must continue, as a building block of seeking rights through political and non-violent struggle. Interfaith Harmony Al-Qaida and ISIS exploit anti-Islam narrative by the West and build upon counter narrative of Pan-Islamic agenda of uniting against Crusaders who are usurping resources of Muslim countries and persecuting fellow Muslims. Extremist elements in Pakistan, especially TTP and its affiliates are proponent of the same narrative. Post 9/11 politics and nationals security objectives of the US divided the world on the basis of faith- Christian world and Islamic world. Neocons openly propagated crusade against “violent political Islam and Islamist jihadist”. This gulf between two great faiths has to be bridged for defeating extremist ideology irrespective of faith. Pope Francis visiting UAE in February 2019 and preaching humanity rather than religious belief will go a long way in healing the wounds inflicted by extremists of both the religions. While addressing congregation of Christians and Muslims in presence of religious leaders of almost all major religions he resented war in Syria, Libya and

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Iraq. He stressed that “every form of violence must be condemned without hesitation... no violence can be justified in the name of religion”353. Though 9/11 aggravated animosity between Christians and Muslims yet, any global initiative to enhance interfaith harmony may include major religions so that persecution of any community anywhere in the world ceases. Pakistan has already initiated certain actions against former jihadi elements yet a cohesive national counter extremism plan including monitoring of madrassas for cultivation of culture of tolerance and co-existence among various sectarian groups and other religions is the need of the hour. Such an approach will help in curbing extremism at home and contribute toward global interfaith harmony positively. A consensus fatwa (Islamic ruling) by Pakistani religious scholars of all sects on 17 January 2018 at Islamabad, unanimously declaring that jihad can only be ordered by the state and no individual or group could declare jihad in an Islamic country should be propagated to neutralize extremist tendencies in the society354. The Prime Minister of New Zealand rising above politico-ideological considerations in wake of terrorist killing 50 Muslims and injuring many in Christchurch mosques, by extending a shoulder to Muslim males and females to wipe their tears amidst sobs and sorrow is a beacon of light for leaders of the world irrespective of their faith, cost or race. Promote Fight against Terrorism as National Cause in Pakistan In tandem with kinetic actions, efforts must be made to harness national consensus to accept terrorism as a threat to Pakistan’s national security and motivate the nation to relentlessly pursue the fight, irrespective of political, religious, and ethnic affiliations. In order to capitalize on the gains of military operations since 2014, Pakistan military, police, paramilitary forces and intelligence agencies must pursue their CT operations vigorously. Distraction by US threat and Indo-Afghan interference should not affect the momentum of operations. The ongoing war on terrorism has become Pakistan’s war by default and should be prosecuted with full energy. It is crucial to not only deny space to the terrorists but to improve Pakistan’s overall position in the region as a stable country and a confident/ responsible nation. Presence of non-state actors in the form of lashkars (militia) must be discouraged and eliminated with full force. Latest crackdown by incumbent Pakistani

353 Pope in UAE: Reject Wars in Yemen, Syria, Iraq and Libya, online available at https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/02/pope-uae-reject-wars-yemen-syria-iraq-libya-190204155801553.html (accessed on 11 March 2019). 354 1,800 clerics issue fatwa against suicide bombing, online available at https://dailytimes.com.pk/182719/1800-clerics-issue-fatwa-suicide-bombing/ (accessed on 11 march 2019).

156 government is an encouraging step which will hopefully set new trends in CT policy of the country. National Counter Ideological Narrative The international terrorist organisations like Al-Qaida and ISIS propagate pan-Islamic agenda of fight against Crusade and purging the holy lands from Jewish and Christian armies. They label it as global jihad against forces demonizing religion of Islam. The local terrorist entities like TTP and its affiliates including Lashkar-e- Jhangvi al Aalmi not only support the cause but radicalize unemployed and less educate youth of the country. They target underdeveloped regions of Pakistan for recruitment. Most of the suicide bombers belong to FATA agencies and are young boys of teen age. Some percentage of bombers is represented by young Afghans and Central Asian Republics residents (IMU operatives) as well. Pakistan’s national institutions like NACTA, under Ministry of Interior and experts from military, intelligence agencies, police, religious scholars and academics of the subjects should undertake the exercise of formulating national counter ideological narrative to neutralize and defeat terrorist ideology. NACTA is mandated under National Internal Security Policy to formulate such a narrative. The draft narrative by NACTA may be widely circulated in coordination with Ministry of Information and Technology and Media. Its effectiveness should be reviewed on quarterly basis by national coordinator NACTA who should apprise Prime Minister in periodic apex meeting of NACTA. Changed International Realities versus Ideological Obligations Former jihadi organisations of Afghan jihad have been rendered irrelevant in the post 9/11 counterterrorism environment. The new reality is well known by Pakistani diplomatic and security departments. The elements of pro Kashmir organisations like lashkar-e- Tayaba (LeT) and Jaish-e- Muhammad (JeM) should be engaged and educated on changed international environment and zero tolerance towards non- state actors. Federal and provincial governments should absorb their manpower in suitable departments as part of national integration plan. Deriving lessons from de-radicalization plan of other countries, for example KSA, families of radicalized individuals should also be integrated so that their activities are monitored. Their families could also exert moral and social pressure on individuals to shun violence and mainstream them into common law abiding Pakistanis. As ideological incentive their leadership should be assured that Pakistan will never give up political and moral support to Kashmir cause, however, Pakistan’s international obligations prohibit any support to terrorism across the border.

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The international obligations under UN resolutions notwithstanding, the charity wings of these organisations, as directed by Pakistani courts, may be allowed to function under strict surveillance of the state apparatus so that they do not indulge in any illegal activity. While reiterating national resolve to continue supporting just resolution of Kashmir dispute, the militancy should be discouraged in any form and manifestation. Concomitantly, India and international community should be stressed for reciprocity - resolving Kashmir dispute in accordance with peoples’ wishes and UN resolutions, and ceasing Indian interference into Pakistan’s internal affairs. 6.4.3.2 Structural Reforms Craft a Pragmatic National Security Policy Pakistan’s foreign policy is criticized for many shortcomings; like security dominated and lack of institutionalized input in policy formulation. Pakistan as a state should formulate a pragmatic national security policy, strategizing foreign policy which encompasses domestic sentiment, promotes relations with neighbours and major international powers, based on sovereign equality and mutual interests. Taking due cognizance of all factors, Pakistan’s legitimate regional interests and concerns on nuclear proliferation should also be part of new national security policy elements. Such a policy should steer the country at domestic front, direct foreign policy priorities with neighbours and guide a role in international political order. In the evolving security milieu in South and Central Asia, importance of role by countries like Iran, China, and Russia cannot be overlooked, thus must be included in proposed policy of regional engagement. Revisit National Action Plan (NAP) as Part of Coherent Domestic Policy NAP is currently de-facto CT strategy of Pakistan; it was promulgated in 2015, after massacre of 140 school children in Army Public School Peshawar. The nation was united to launch a comprehensive military operation to root out terrorism from FATA and take certain administrative actions in major cities to prosecute facilitators of terrorist entities. Some of the actions proposed under NAP are highlighted in succeeding paragraphs. 20 points NAP is a comprehensive CT strategy to address all impediments in smooth execution of CT strategy. Across the board implementation of NAP is not only vital for international optics but considered critical towards formulation of a coherent domestic CT policy. The political elite should overcome their differences and rise above party politics in the larger interest of national security and craft policy based on national consensus, which addresses internal weaknesses and bolsters the foreign policy being reflection of domestic sentiment. Institutional harmony and capacity, and augmentation of anti-terrorism laws and

158 judicial structures are considered critical towards accomplishment of successful execution of NAP. Pakistan has endorsed all UN proscribed terrorist entities and listed all such entities as proscribed under domestic laws as well. Therefore, any former jihadi organisation registered as proscribe entity must not be allowed to work under any new name or designation. No militia under any pretext should be allowed to brandish weapons and terrorise masses. All such organisations should be disarmed and their weapons should be seized forthwith if not done already. The charities and social service programme may be allowed to function under strict scrutiny of the federal and provincial governments’ departments. Where absolutely essential due to security threats, home department(s) may permit minimum essential licensed weapons for protection of designated compounds only. Foreign donations through legal and illegal channels is reportedly the largest source of their funding which must be brought under government control. Any foreign transaction should be regulated through State Bank of Pakistan and SECP. Donations and charity collection at home is sizeable and merits due diligence by concerned government departments. Charity and donations may be permitted to registered departments running social service like ambulance through government control. No individual or group of people should be permitted to collect donations under any pretext. Seminaries should be registered and monitored by concerned government departments for execution of all actions envisaged under NAP. All 20 points under NAP must be thoroughly debated in an apex forum of NACTA which is chaired by the Prime Minister of Pakistan so that grey areas are identified and executive order to implement these are passed simultaneously to concerned departments. It is generally accepted by politicians and security officials that actions required to be executed by military under kinetic part have been implemented. It is now the civilian prong to include relieving military from cleared areas, putting civilian governance structures in place and build and transfer part of CT strategy. Besides, madrassas regulation and controlling activities of former jihadi organisations through police and concerned provincial governments’ departments are high on the agenda of non-kinetic actions under NAP. Where required military may continue to stay to completely stabilize the security situation and then transfer the control. Improve Institutional Synergy Criticism of any national institution especially judiciary and armed forces is counterproductive and exploited by anti-Pakistan forces. The political elite should garner

159 national consensus and promote institutional synergy by rejecting undue bashing. Since 2008, two successive democratic governments ruled the country and civilian and military elite readjusted their constitutional positions. Given the history of military rule, politicians belonging to opposition parties resort to military bashing rather than focussing on the performance of ruling party(s). Military demonstrated its respect to the civilian rule when Army Chief along with Director General Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) on 19 December 2017, briefed Senate committee on national security during an in-camera meeting and heralded a new era in the chequered history of civil-military relations in Pakistan. A day prior to briefing by the Army Chief, “the country’s top national security body conceded that progress on key elements of the NAP to counter terrorism was still found wanting, and ordered the finalisation of the long-delayed National Security Policy”355. The military stood tall before nation after valiantly pursuing fight against terrorism and purging decades old terrorist’s hideouts from FATA. National Security Committee (NSC) is a forum where all issues could be discussed in closed doors and the consensus policy directions issued to concerned national departments for implementation. NSC recommendations may be presented before cabinet for final approval as part of endorsement by peoples’ representatives. The reluctance on part of politicians to seek NSC endorsement may be dispelled through appropriate constitutional and administrative actions. Strengthen NACTA as Supra CT Coordination Body National Counter Terrorism Authority (NACTA) is one of the priority institutions which must be revitalized. The Whelans’ prescription of network analysis and using as highest coordinating agency and terror assessment centre is worth emulating. He categorically mentioned US National Counter Terrorism Centre for acting as highest national coordinating agency for counter terrorism efforts356. The operationalization of joint intelligence directorate under NACTA to collect, collate and disseminate intelligence to all the law enforcement agencies is vital to realize benefits of CT coordination at national level. A dedicated, agile and helicopter-borne CT force at centre and provinces is another vital component of CT strategy for rapid responses against the threat. The implementation under NACTA act is slow and often becomes victim of political expediencies. To coordinate national CT efforts, NACTA must assume its perceived role as a supra CT coordination agency, coordinating and directing actions by concerned intelligence and

355 Baqir Sajjad Syed, “Civil-Military Heads Agree NAP Needs more Work”, Dawn, 19 December 2017. 356 Chad Whelan, Networks and National Security Dynamics, Effectiveness and Organisation (Burlington: Ash gate Publishing Company, 2012) pp.50-51.

160 law enforcement agencies. The intelligence sharing among federal and provincial intelligence agencies is critical in preventing acts of terrorism. All operational complements of NACTA especially dedicated CT force, detention cells, investigation apparatus and aviation assets etcetera should be completed. Its dependence on other federal or provincial departments will be a drag on its much-desired operational efficiency. Build Capacity of Civilian Law Enforcing Institutions Through stringent introduction of merit in recruitment, and appointment of senior officials in bureaucracy and police, major reforms must be introduced as part of inclusive policy. Rampant corruption, interest driven loyalty to political masters and indifference towards profession are some of the complaints plaguing bureaucracy in Pakistan. Whereas, major structural reforms in police especially in recruitment process, professional grooming and appointment on senior slots on merit are critical to prevent the system from being completely wrecked. In keeping with prerequisites of contemporary policing and host of activities to deter crimes and terrorism, capacity of provincial police force should be augmented on priority. It is vital to beef up police force because it is the first line of defence against religious extremism and terrorism. Neutral and professionally competent bureaucracy will help political ruler in good governance and afford equal opportunities to youth- susceptible to extremist outfits. Remodel General and Madrassa Education System in Pakistan The prevalent education system is discriminatory and plagued with sectoral discrimination causing sense of deprivation and resentment; the biggest sources of extremism in society. The children of affluent class study in elite schools by paying hefty fee and undergo Oxford and Cambridge syllabi. Whereas, bulk of poor youth studies in government schools with negligible access to modern tools of knowledge and research. Army of graduates in humanities is being added into pool of millions of unemployed youth every year. Unless uniform system of education for all is introduced, the country will not be able to achieve the desired quality and literacy rate. The emphasis should shift to vocational training and knowledge-based education in keeping with domestic and international markets’ demands. It is critical in FATA and other less developed regions to deny terrorists their pool of foot soldiers. A comprehensive board, comprising members from different walks of life including religious scholars may re-evaluate the madrassa curricula threadbare and suggest a syllabi for all seminaries. Ideally one for all sects yet, given the ground realities a syllabus for each of four Sunni sects (Ahle Hadith/ Salafi, Wahhabi, Deobandi and Brelvi) and Shiite sect will

161 have to be formulated. The emphasis should be laid on commonalities by downplaying controversial issues. A suitable board to monitor their whole ambit of activities, especially financing, hate speeches and literature, sectarian and radical trends with link to any terrorist entity should be an integral part of madrassa reforms package. While madrassas are the biggest philanthropic institution in the country yet, these cannot be allowed to continue functioning independently if Pakistan has to progress and defeat the monster of extremism and terrorism. Madrassas should be gradually absorbed into mainstream education system of the country, under education department for oversight and funding etcetera. The madrassa graduates should be equipped with balanced education so that they can apply for job in any government department rather than becoming a cleric only. Socio-Economic Uplift in Vulnerable Regions Poverty and illiteracy in vulnerable regions- FATA, Southern Punjab, certain areas in Sindh and Balochistan provinces merit attention to implement high impact projects so that unemployed youth which is mainly uneducated is absorbed into some kind of self- employment. Most of the foot soldiers of terrorist organisations and madrassa students represent this segment of society. The parents voluntarily send their children to madrassas or terrorist organisations with the purpose to earn some compensation or at least the child will grow up free of cost. The economic prong of NAP should cater for this anomaly which is exploited by terrorist outfits. Though much delayed yet, approval of merger bill by the outgoing parliament in May 2018 paved the way for integration of FATA into KPK. People of FATA suffered a great deal, initially, at the hands of Arab fighters and later due to military bombardment. The losses should be compensated, and approved merger/ mainstreaming of FATA should be expedited by removing the constitutional and administrative impediments at province level. A systematic integration of FATA and absorption of youth into provincial job market will help dissuade youth from the recruitment by terrorist organisations. These organisations abuse illiteracy and poverty for their nefarious designs. Post operation rehabilitation of millions of tribals and mainstreaming the region into political and socio-economic system of the country will serve as incentive to the locals to deny safe havens to any intruders. 6.4.3.3 Constitutional and Judicial Reforms Constitutional Reforms Social and political deprivations create resentment which are prone to exploitation by anti- state elements. Without tempering with very federal and Islamic structure of Constitution of Pakistan, introduce constitutional reforms to strengthen the federation, empower provinces,

162 and grant politico-religious freedom with no space for ethno-sectarian radicalization, extremism and terrorism. Pakistan’s major provinces may be slashed in size for better governance and delegation of rights to the people. This exercise may be undertaken on technical/administrative grounds rather than ethno-nationalistic composition of the region (s). Because Pakistan can ill-afford division on ethnic and linguistic lines. Bette governance and devolution of politico-financial power will help wean away potential terrorists from recruitment by umbrella terrorist organisations. Judicial Reforms Zero tolerance to corruption, appointments on merit and some system of oversight by civil society members on the line of US jury system may be introduced in Pakistani judiciary. The superior judiciary of Pakistan must take the onus of structural reforms by appointing a judicial reforms commission and urging the government to affect constitutional reforms at centre and provincial level. Lower judiciary often blamed for incidents of corruption and inefficiency may be upgraded by provincial government as part of federal judicial reforms package. Bolster Anti-Terrorism Laws and Allied Organisational Structures Laws like Penal Code, Criminal Procedure Code, Anti Money laundering Act and Evidence Act may be reviewed in the context of anomalies observed during the trial of terrorists since 9/11, 2001. Protection of Pakistan Act 2015 (POPA) has equipped investigating agencies and the court sufficiently. The loop holes observed during implementation may be periodically reviewed and the weaknesses observed should be eradicated. Intimidation and life threats to investigating officers and key witnesses are a common feature and terrorist organisations remain on the lookouts to eliminate them. The judges are also threatened, and their families are not safe. Therefore, trial of terrorists under POPA should be ensured in secure compounds specifically designated for the trials. Resolute pursuance of cases and exemplary punishment to the enemies of humanity is the answer. While judicial review is the privilege of superior judiciary which cannot be challenged however, hardened terrorists once convicted by military courts should be sent to gallows as soon as possible for deterrence. Unless the capacity of police and judiciary is enhanced, the arrangement of military courts may continue under legal and constitutional cover. A deterrent and robust system of criminal justice system is the key to bringing terrorists to justice. Use of modern technology should be encouraged in forensics and investigations by the police so that crime scenes are covered in a professional manner and the perpetrators are tracked promptly. National Data Base and Registration Authority (NADRA) has done a

163 tremendous job and is facilitating police in identification of terrorists. Their role should be further streamlined through better coordination among relevant law enforcement and investigation departments. Admissibility of “E” evidence is a qualitative leap forward under POPA for tracking and then arresting terrorists for prosecution before the competent courts. After suggesting a framework for envisioned CT strategy for Pakistan, the study has been concluded in the ensuing chapter.

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Findings and Recommendations This study offers insights of post 9/11 CT policy of Pakistan being impacted with multiple factors like asymmetric relationship with the US, role of regional countries- India and Afghanistan and domestic factors shaping Pakistan’s post 9/11 CT responses. The uneven relations with the US and post 9/11 traumatized super power coercing Pakistan to extend unprecedented support to the US military and Intelligence is validated. In order to protect its vital national security interests including internal stability, averting threat of aggression, protect nuclear assets and Kashmir cause, Pakistan supported the US War on terror- attack on Afghanistan. 9/11 proved to be blessing in disguise for India to exploit Pakistan’s internal and external vulnerabilities with a view to strengthening its hold in Afghanistan besides seeking concession from Pakistan with regards to its support to Kashmiri freedom fighters, without any reciprocal conciliatory actions. Hostile Post-Taliban Karzai regime accommodated Indian intelligence and Pakistan was confronted with two front scenario and its security dilemma was intensified exponentially. Thus hostile regional milieu impacting Pakistan’s CT strategy is also confirmed. The domestic factors determining Pakistan CT policy like psyche of leadership, perception of elite, internal polarization and weak civilian law enforcement and judicial institutions are also authenticated. In this study four research questions were raised: 1) Why Pakistan’s regional security environment affect the design of its counterterrorism policy? 2) How weak capacity of Pakistan’s civilian institutions responsible to enforce law and coordinate national CT effort under internal polarization impacted its CT response? 3) How neoclassical realism helps in understanding Pakistan’s counterterrorism policy since 9/11? 4) What is the effect of asymmetric Pakistan-US equation on Islamabad’s CT Policy? Three variables have been set forth; dependent variable: counterterrorism policy of Pakistan since 9/11; independent variable: asymmetric relationship with the US and intervening variable: Pakistan’s regional security environment and weak institutional capacity of civilian law enforcing agencies. In order to contextualize, before commenting on the outcome under each chapter the hypothesis tested was : Pakistan’s hostile regional security milieu, and weak civilian law enforcing and CT coordination agencies amidst domestic polarization coupled with asymmetric relationship with the US have been shaping Pakistan’s CT policy since 9/11. Before proffering recommendations, certain insights are presented in the shape of major findings in ensuing paragraphs.

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Major Findings Systemic US War on Terror; brought about a paradigm shift in South Asian security calculus, pressuring Pakistan to review its security policy and CT strategy. Shift in Pakistan's policy and US over reliance on kinetic actions rendered cooperation with the US as suspect stirring fight with Al-Qaida and its affiliates. Indian factor further exacerbated Pakistan's legitimate security concerns emanating from Afghanistan - Pakistan's role as partner in war against terror was downplayed with allegation of sponsoring cross border terrorism. A strategic construct through ideational power was orchestrated to malign Pakistan for not doing enough to fight terrorism. Kashmir freedom struggle also suffered as US declared former jihadi entities as terrorists and placed them on entity control list. Regional India capitalized on international concerns over the role of non-state actors and tried to equate freedom struggle in Kashmir with terrorism. Indo-US regional security maximization policy acted as a tool to alter South Asia security landscape by accepting India as a major player of the region. Indian presence in Afghanistan causing internal destabilization of Pakistan remains a source of concern. Shift of US strategic focus to Asia Pacific further enhanced India’s role in rebalancing in Asia that affected balance of power in South Asia. The overwhelming post 9/11 counterterrorism sentiment eclipsed the legitimate struggle by Kashmiri freedom fighters. The Indian move of lumping terrorism with freedom struggle succeeded to a large extent. Capitalizing on growing trust deficit between US and Pakistan, Indian occupation forces unleashed brutal counterinsurgency campaign inside Indian occupied Kashmir, by killing tens of thousands Kashmiris and committing flagrant human rights violations with impunity. India upped the ante of cross LoC violations and targeted civilian population in Pakistani part of Kashmir. Indo – Afghan nexus grew stronger with the passage of time. It not only sponsored Pakistani terrorist organisation - TTP at Afghan soil but supported anti-state activities by Baloch nationalist elements as well. The continuous animosity between India and Pakistan undermined all efforts of revitalizing the regional forum of economic cooperation – South Asian Association of Regional Cooperation (SAARC). India mobilized its influence over other smaller SAARC nations and foiled all efforts by Pakistan to call the SAARC meeting.

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Regionalism if correctly channelized could have contributed towards resolution of outstanding disputes among SAARC countries. The regional dimension of terrorism could have been resolved with better relations among member countries yet, Indian intransigence scuttled all efforts by Pakistan and SAARC summit could not be convened since 2016. Domestic Ideology Post 9/11 Musharraf’s decision to support US war on terror triggered intense internal polarization and religious-political forces sided with conservatives. TTP/affiliates propagated Pan-Islamic obligations of supporting jihad by Al-Qaida with deeper internal ramifications. Lack of shared national narrative on US war on terror further complicated prosecution of CT operations in FATA and elsewhere. Various religious groups and seminaries directly or indirectly abetted extremism and terrorism. Beside violence, terrorism is manifestation of an ideology, though perverted. The terror ideology could only be defeated with matching counter ideological narrative. Such narrative (s) need to be carefully formulated by credible religious scholars, jurists of international repute, experts on terrorism and representatives of civil society. Perception of Elite/Psyche of leadership Pakistan’s support to US War on Terrorism divided political elite and various religious- political parties/groups in particular did not endorse Musharraf’s CT policy. Shift in Kashmir policy also estranged various religious-political parties/groups as well as non-state actors. This charged domestic sentiment was exploited by anti - Pakistan forces and the state witnesses horrific spate of terrorism. After declaration of TTP as umbrella organisation of domestic terrorist entities in 2007- Pakistan witnessed unprecedented upward spiral in violence. Capacity Constraints LEAs lacked capacity to withstand the terror onslaught especially in Swat and FATA – Military had to be called in. Military took time to adjust to this new found asymmetric warfare challenge. Having suffered losses till 2007, military transformed its doctrine of counterterrorism from conventional operations to low intensity or asymmetric operations with commendable success ratio. National CT coordination agency- NACTA faced structural deficiencies at critical time of coordinating national CT efforts. Similarly prosecution and judicial institutions lacked capacity to convict hardened criminals.

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Lack of resources to bridge socio-economic gaps in vulnerable regions and remodel general and madrassa education systems are major capacity constraints contributing towards disparity and extremism in Pakistan. Foreign Support to terrorist Entities Foreign support and TTP sanctuaries at Afghan soil are critical factors in defeating terrorism in Pakistan and areas adjacent to Afghan border. Pakistan had to pay heavy price in terms of 70,000 precious lives, cumulative effect of economic/infrastructure losses to the tune of US$ 130 billion. Constant threat of attack from across the Afghan border terrorise civilian population in bordering region and undermines tremendous sacrifices by the people and security forces of Pakistan. Without officially accepting, the US and Afghan authorities are tolerating TTP operatives at Afghan soil as quid-pro-quo to alleged hide outs of Haqqani network at Pakistani soil. Albeit the perception seems to have mellowed down after Pakistani facilitation in arranging series of dialogue between the US and Afghan Taliban since late 2018. De-radicalization and Rehabilitation Plans The process of de- radicalization and rehabilitation are though capital intensive and long term yet, Pakistan will have to evolve its own process. The terrorists who genuinely renounce violence need to be concentrated in rehabilitation centres for psycho-social therapies in first place so that they are de-radicalized. Thereafter some kind of skill training through vocational training may be arranged so that they could earn the livelihood after some time. It is a complex process involving phases of surrender, disengagement, de- radicalization and rehabilitation. Without a comprehensive process of monitoring activities of rehabilitated individuals integrating families, the possibility of individuals re-joining their outfits cannot be ruled out. Recommendations The preceding chapter-6 “A framework for combating terrorism in Pakistan” offers comprehensive recommendations on systemic plane, regional forum and domestic reforms with a view to making Pakistan CT policy effective with the support of regional stakeholders. Only major recommendations are summarized below:- Systemic Balancing Asymmetric Relationship with the US The state of Pakistan should pragmatically readjust to asymmetric relation with the US amid new systemic realities and shifting US strategic interests to Indo-Pacific regions. Given the

168 history of relations and significance of the US in international system, Pakistan should follow a path of pragmatic engagement with clearly drawn lines of mutual interest and mutual respect on the basis of sovereign equality. Besides improving cooperation in security and terrorism matters, Pakistan should endeavour to promote cooperation with the US in the fields of economic, energy and education. Improving negative perception about Pakistan’s role in fighting terrorism is critical for mending relations with the US. To achieve this objective all available means and resources should be utilized. Pakistan should continue to engage the US persuasively to find solution to Afghan conflict; however, unachievable commitments/assurances must be avoided. The muted response from the US notwithstanding, Pakistan should continue sensitizing US on India’s misuse of Afghan soil against Pakistan. Fixing Regional Security Environment Through diplomatic efforts, the government should concentrate on regional economic integration and cultural exchanges where possible to heal the deep wounds of mistrust among India, Afghanistan and Pakistan. The menace of regional terrorism could only be defeated with regional conflict resolution mechanism and cooperation in joint fight to eliminate the scourge of terrorism from the region. Improved politico-diplomatic relations with India are considered critical to resolution of outstanding disputes including core issue of Kashmir and prospective benefits of regional economic integration and prosperity. To exert pressure and dilute Indian influence in the region, Pakistan should manage relations with Afghanistan and Iran well. Continue pursuing P-5 over current lockdown in Kashmir and for deconstructing Indian narrative on Pakistan’s fight against terrorism, Kashmir and Afghanistan. While keeping channel of dialogue open with India, Pakistan should stress relations based on sovereign equality, justice and mutual respect. Finding creative ways in dealing with the issue of terrorism with India using SCO and SAARC platform to promote counterterrorism cooperation within larger regional framework is of paramount importance. To reinforce regional support, international assistance especially EU support in the resolution of Kashmir dispute may also be sought to maintain regional stability which is dangerously undermining deterrence stability in the region as well.

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Looking After Domestic Front Internally, Pakistan should craft a comprehensive national security policy for cohesive national response against all vulnerabilities and guiding a framework to combat terrorism in the country. In order to achieve institutional synergy, institutions like National Security Committee (NSC) should be strengthened for unified response against violent extremism and terrorism. Implement National Internal Security Policy (NISP) and National Action Plan (NAP) in true letter and spirit as part of coherent internal security policy and CT strategy to fight terrorism. For national response, NACTA as supra national agency for coordination and implementation of national CT efforts with allied institutions should be restructured and strengthened on priority. Enhance capacity of civilian law enforcing, prosecution and judicial institutions with a view to handing down deterrent punishment to the terrorists. Address cognitive variables; sectarian and pan-Islamic drivers through counter ideological narrative that would both defuse internal unrest and deflate the terrorists’ ideological appeal as well. Address enabling conditions; socio-economic disparities and deprivations in vulnerable regions of the country that attract youth to terrorists’ recruitment. Also devise an inclusive de-radicalization and rehabilitation plan as part of long term strategy to tackle violent extremism. Long awaited madrassa reforms as part of NAP along with reforms in national education curricula should be expedited.

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Conclusion Having offered major findings and recommendations of the study, it is intended to focus on the insights of the study in the form of conclusions. The conclusions are the outcome of a comprehensive analysis of factors under each chapter catering for research questions set forth. The entire study has been conducted within framework of neoclassical realism. It encompasses domestic sentiment; motivation and behaviour of the State of Pakistan, perception of elite, religious-political divide and role of national institutions in implementation of foreign policy priorities and fighting terrorism at home. Security dilemma of Pakistan precipitated by threat of use of force on eastern and western borders, amidst weak civilian institutional capacity to cope with the challenge of unprecedented magnitude is authenticated. US as an external force and an independent variable had been an intrinsic part of security calculus in South Asia especially after partition of Subcontinent and creation of two independent states i.e. India and Pakistan. Pakistan’s domestic factors had been unique; either they forced Pakistan to seek US help for maximizing its security against bigger neighbour on the east or hostile neighbour on the western border, or the US interests in the region dictated Pakistan a particular model of foreign policy with regional countries. Pakistan joined US military alliances of SEATO and CENTO in 1950s to not only strengthen its military against Indian threat but served the US objective of blocking spread of Communism in South and West Asia as well. The relations with the US had been mostly inconsistent with domestic sentiment thus were asymmetric lacking public support. These were driven by civilian or military elite either for political and economic assistance or to legitimize the dictatorial regimes. Pakistan was projected as duplicitous by the US in US led war on terror especially after 2006/ 2007, with a view to extract cooperation and concessions of choice. This approach not only imperilled Pakistan’s internal security but anti-Pakistan narrative maligning the country for harbouring terrorist groups in FATA, was a finer blend of ideational power employed in tandem with low intensity operations. Such operations were unleashed through interference by Indian and Afghan intelligence agencies to foment terrorism in Pakistan. In addition to security dilemma from Indian side, US threat of force and employment of drones to violate Pakistan’s sovereignty at will was colossal challenge. It was gross disregard to international norms of mutual cooperation and respect to the sovereignty of independent nations. The external pressure and internal destabilization constrained Pakistani counterterrorism policy and capacity of its security institutions. Ironically the internationally

171 acknowledged right of sovereignty, self-help and survival when partially exercised by Pakistan were dubbed as national policy tool to provide sanctuaries to terrorists at its soil (FATA). The South Asian emerging power- India jumping on the bandwagon of demonizing Pakistan and its institutions, to grind its own axe, magnified Pakistan’s threat spectrum in South Asian security calculus. Paradoxically, accepting India as a US strategic partner in Afghanistan tantamount rubbing salt on Pakistani wounds. The systemic pressure i.e. relations with the US in isolation or in the context of regional policies, had always been issue based necessitating transactional relations at best. When viewed in the perspective of domestic sentiment- perception of elite, ideational power, leadership and relationship between domestic policies and foreign policy of Pakistan, the US diktat on all critical issues is proven. While analysing various phases and timeframe of relations with the US, the Pakistani Governments were put in such a dilemma that they were unable to adopt an independent foreign policy or may be the political elite was not willing to pay the price of annoying the super power. The systemic pressure had been effective because it was wrapped over with certain incentives to the ruling elite for not only perpetuating their rule but to modernize armed forces and build their empires, with little effect on people’s life. The much-needed bale out packages by International Monetary Fund (IMF) are linked with systemic pressures and coercion for the nations sunk in economic crises. USA cannot be expected to remain engaged with Pakistan, unless her national interests so warrant, and she again declares Pakistan as strategic ally “an ally for accomplishment of US interests in any given crisis”. This approach being part of pure transitionary relations yet, Pakistan’s geostrategic location is established which cannot be ignored in the larger context of South Asian security architecture for long. Alienation of a nuclear weapon state, Pakistan does not augur well for global strategic stability and non-proliferation as well. The other prong of US involvement is Indo- US strategic partnership which is magnifying the spectrum of Pakistan’s strategic threat. The enhanced Indian stature as strategic partner of the US, and nuclear deterrence, has seemingly provoked low intensity conflict in South Asia especially between India and Pakistan. Pakistan can ill afford arms race in the region and she has to devote meagre resources towards socio-economic uplift of the down trodden. However, Indo-US strategic partnership at the cost of strategic stability in South Asia, posed the challenges of strategic weapon systems to Pakistan, in addition to tying down country’s security forces in asymmetric warfare in FATA and Balochistan. The current Indo-US strategic cooperation is aimed at catapulting India as an Asia- Pacific power, to augment US interests in the region and prepare India as a bulwark against rising China. This

172 partnership is bound to affect strategic stability in South Asia especially after India acquiring sophisticated naval platforms, high-tech aircrafts and Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD) technology. Pakistan’s cooperation with the US either during Cold War, or in Afghan jihad of 1979, and post 9/11 unprecedented support, have lost their utility and US is rather weakening Pakistan by supporting Indian entry into nuclear and missile technology transfer and control regimes. The policy of arm twisting and destabilization of Pakistan to stabilize Afghanistan will backfire and the fragile gains since 9/11 are at the risk of being reversed. Any effort to achieve political stabilization in Afghanistan, alienating Pakistan at this critical juncture is considered counterproductive. Pakistan’s legitimate security interests must be heeded to and Indian role may be confined to socio-economic development alone. Other important regional countries; Russia, Iran and China will pursue their interests, and will not supplement US- India nexus in Afghanistan. Any amount of Indian economic support will not be able to undo Pakistan’s influence being a neighbour and a country which had been part of regional dispute for almost four decades. There is a dire need of forging broader consensus over role by regional countries for bringing about peace in Afghanistan. The new great game will only destabilize the entire region. The extremist forces may broaden and expand their networks to Central Asian Republics, India, China and Russia. In such an eventuality, the war on terror will actually act as a stimulus to regional terrorism and an opportunity of settling political scores among the regional countries. Afghan owned, and Afghan led broader negotiated settlement of dispute assisted by the US and regional countries especially by Russia, China and Iran, seems a viable option to defuse tension in Afghanistan and pursue a lasting peace in the region. Positive outcome of the initiative will certainly have a salutary effect on terrorism in Pakistan. Post 9/11 change in Pakistan’s policy (dismantling jihadi infrastructure in Pakistani part of Kashmir) should have been reciprocated by the Indian side rather than inciting terrorism in Pakistan and forcing the country to possibly revive its old policy under pressure. India is wilfully sponsoring terrorism by nurturing TTP terrorists through Afghan proxies and had been cultivating operatives of some ethnic political parties for terrorism in Karachi, and supporting Baloch separatist movement for terrorism in Balochistan. Indian senior officials and ministers have publicly boasted to have adopted a strategy of bleeding Pakistan. Ironically, Afghanistan has become an Indian proxy and is facilitating all anti -Pakistan activities by Indian intelligence agency, Research and Analysis Wing (RAW). The Government of Pakistan and its intelligence agencies claims to have possessed an irrefutable

173 evidence of both the countries colluding and promoting terrorism in Pakistan. Therefore, the strong linkage of regional nexus is proven and unless reversed, the menace of terrorism cannot be defeated comprehensively. The phenomenon of terrorism in South Asian region is the outcome of overt nuclearization since 1998, and the only viable option under nuclear overhang remains the proxy war or low intensity conflict being waged by India is validated. Through diplomacy India is largely successful in exploiting global anti-terrorism sentiment to discredit freedom struggle by Kashmiris and malign Pakistan for sponsoring terrorism. Pakistan’s unique national sentiment towards Kashmir cause and sympathy for the freedom struggle is also proven in the study. Pakistan’s paramount concern; existence of security dilemma, a constant threat of aggression and intimidation from India is established and substantiated especially after aerial conflict along LoC on 27 February 2019. People in Pakistan are concerned over meaningful silence by the international community over by India in Kashmir, after maiming and blinding tens of thousands of Kashmiri youth with pellet guns. After corroborating information extracted through various sources, it has been established that in order to bleed Pakistan military and destabilize the State of Pakistan, Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) was sponsored by Afghan and Indian intelligence agencies, with tacit US approval. TTP was desperate to seek sanctuaries in Afghanistan under pressure from Pakistani military and proved to be a useful proxy towards fulfilment of Indian objective of weakening Pakistan and settling the score of Pakistani support to Kashmiri fighters. TTP was blood thirty of Pakistani Military/ISI after killing of its top leaders and middle ranking lieutenants. Battle hardened former Al-Qaida elements joining TTP and assisted with state of the art intelligence by RAW and NDS heralded in spectacular attacks on army headquarters (GHQ), air force and naval bases, almost with impunity. TTP operatives killed during these attacks were found carrying satellite maps with exact location of targets, this facility could be acquired either with the courtesy of RAW or CIA. Pakistan paid the price by losing top of the line air surveillance SAAB aircrafts of and P3 Orion maritime surveillance aircrafts of Pakistan Navy. These two assets were essentially meant to surveil any intrusion from Indian side therefore; targeted attacks to destroy these strategic assets expose the professional planning to select targets and verification through satellite imageries and flawless execution. Pakistan’s counterterrorism strategy and the cumulative impact on the country’s foreign policy was shaped with domestic sentiment, security dilemma and systemic pressures during various phases of power play and fighting war on terrorism in South Asia. The power

174 of ideas, knowledge and language orchestrated through sophisticated media tools at the disposal of the west and India played their part in projecting a particular narrative on the war on terror to build international coalition, and pressuring Pakistan to join the US led coalition fighting terrorism in Afghanistan. War on terror being pushed into FATA region of Pakistan, major urban centres and reenergizing the ethno- sectarian fault lines in Balochistan was a dangerous foreign policy move by Afghanistan and India. US, being the neighbour of Pakistan since 9/11 2001, looked the other way and let it happen. The Indo-US nexus was aimed at constructing a new security paradigm of South Asia with India in the lead and other countries including Pakistan being the subservient nations. Given the history of animosity due to lingering Kashmir dispute, Pakistan raised the question of Indian involvement into her internal affairs at the UN and with the US. The lukewarm response by the US and international community frustrated the informed circles in Pakistan. Albeit the outcome was not a surprise due to enhanced Indian relevance in international system and complementary geo- economic interests of India and major powers. Internally, Pakistan’s CT policy was influenced with the outcome of Afghan jihad and installation of ultra- extremist Taliban government in Afghanistan. During 1980s and 1990s, Pakistan had been pursuing the policy of global jihad and nurturing the extremist forces along with the US and major countries of the Muslim World. Mushrooming of seminaries representing Deobandi school of thought flourished at the cost of sectarian harmony in the country. General Zia-ul-Haque’s policy of institutionalized Islamization also promoted extremism and terrorism in the country. However, it may be pointed out that peculiar security environment of South Asia and US interference dictated Pakistan to undertake certain actions which not only harmed the country internally but proved to be Frankenstein monster for the US as well. Post 9/11 CT strategy was dictated by the US and Pakistan had to review its policy and initiate actions which were at tangent to pre 9/11 CT strategy. It casted Pakistan dearly in terms of 70,000 plus human casualties, including 7000 sacrifices of military personnel and colossal loss to economy, infrastructure and the social fabric of Pakistani society. The anti -Soviet fight did succeed in defeating Red Army yet, Pakistan opened the flood gates of extremism and terrorism in the country. US fight against Soviet Union encouraged jihadists flocking from all over the world, being indoctrinated and launched into Afghanistan. It resulted into mushrooming of Deobandi madrassas in Pakistan especially FATA, preaching Wahhabism and extreme interpretation of Sunni sect thus, triggering sectarian war inside Pakistan. Saudi Arabian and Iranian ideological differences and Iranian

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Revolution added fuel to the fire of sectarian extremism in Afghanistan and Pakistan. The sectarian extremism and terrorism is the single largest threat to Pakistan’s internal cohesion which was by-product of Afghan jihad. From 1990s till 2001, jihad and freedom struggle were at its peak in Afghanistan and Jammu Kashmir respectively. The neoclassical realism as an approach being an outgrowth of structural realism catered for external relations and international structures causing effects on Pakistan internally and externally. The theoretical framework as proven in Chapter 1, a midpoint between structural realism and constructivism, afforded the flexibility of three tiers analysis- Pakistan’s domestic sentiment towards terrorism and institutional capacity to fight terrorism, divergent views over CT strategy and relations with neighbours and balancing relations with systemic forces i.e. relations with the US. The partial flavour of constructivism explored the effects of ideational power to project specific narrative on Pakistan’s role and pressure the country to deliver in war on terror on US and Indian terms. The perceptual biases of politico-military elite are another dominant factor which had been hampering smooth implementation of National Action Plan (NAP) to comprehensively defeating terrorism. The religious parties being part of mainstream politics of the country influence government policies and prevent curbs over seminaries (madrassas) or propagation of extremist ideology. Therefore, political expediencies too, are to blame for half-hearted implementation of national action plan (NAP) or counterterrorism strategy in vogue. In most cases the facilitators, handlers and people responsible for logistics to suicide bombers were found to be affiliated with any of the madrassas. As per government estimates there are 38,000 madrassas in Pakistan with approximate 3.5 million students. Thus, connected sensitivity to channelize the effort towards right direction is a challenge for any government in Pakistan. The legislation like Protection of Pakistan Act (POPA) 2014 and Cyber Crimes Bill 2016 proved to be exceptionally helpful in tracking the misuse of electronic gadgetries for illicit usage and for admissibility of “E” evidence in the court of law. After 9/11, when the country was confronted with horrific spate of terrorism, the civilian structures crumbled, and the government had to call in military for enforcement of law and order. The counterterrorism strategy in vogue, commonly known as 20 points NAP could not be enforced with transparency and across the board due to political expediencies. Its implementation with regards to madrassa reforms and monitoring of hate speeches and material proved to be an Achilles heel of the counterterrorism policy. The role of national agency to coordinate counterterrorism measures across the country- National Counterterrorism Authority (NACTA) remained much below than desired. The protection of

176 investigation officers and judges is another issue of serious concern, meriting attention of the executive arm of the state. The political rhetoric and accusations in the aftermath of removal of former Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif by the Supreme Court of Pakistan (2017) exposed cracks between Executive and the Judiciary- both being vital pillars of the state to fight terrorism and punish terrorists. For in-depth analysis of terrorism as a phenomena in the context of Pakistan its facets like socio-cultural-religious and anthropological factors, helping in making of a suicide bomber and motivating terrorist organisations may be studied by the scholars. Extremism and terrorism can only be defeated with long term de-radicalization and rehabilitation plans. Developing a Pakistani model of de-radicalization based on comparative learning of various de-radicalization models in practice across the world.

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