Group Identity and Civil-Military Relations in India and Pakistan By
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Group identity and civil-military relations in India and Pakistan by Brent Scott Williams B.S., United States Military Academy, 2003 M.A., Kansas State University, 2010 M.M.A., Command and General Staff College, 2015 AN ABSTRACT OF A DISSERTATION submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY Security Studies College of Arts and Sciences KANSAS STATE UNIVERSITY Manhattan, Kansas 2019 Abstract This dissertation asks why a military gives up power or never takes power when conditions favor a coup d’état in the cases of Pakistan and India. In most cases, civil-military relations literature focuses on civilian control in a democracy or the breakdown of that control. The focus of this research is the opposite: either the returning of civilian control or maintaining civilian control. Moreover, the approach taken in this dissertation is different because it assumes group identity, and the military’s inherent connection to society, determines the civil-military relationship. This dissertation provides a qualitative examination of two states, Pakistan and India, which have significant similarities, and attempts to discern if a group theory of civil-military relations helps to explain the actions of the militaries in both states. Both Pakistan and India inherited their military from the former British Raj. The British divided the British-Indian military into two militaries when Pakistan and India gained Independence. These events provide a solid foundation for a comparative study because both Pakistan’s and India’s militaries came from the same source. Second, the domestic events faced by both states are similar and range from famines to significant defeats in wars, ongoing insurgencies, and various other events. In short, the theory developed suggests that Pakistan’s military has repeatedly given up power because domestic cleavages caused a perception among the civilian population that the military leader should transfer power or meet other political demands. Because the military’s leadership originates from the population, that leadership identifies with the perception of the group or groups that produce the leadership. Moreover, because the military leadership is homogenous, there is limited diversity in the military leadership’s perception of a domestic cleavage and there are no other security organizations preventing the military’s actions. Conversely, in India, a more diversified military leadership and a non-unified security apparatus serve to prevent action. This dissertation examines the historical record in both states’ timelines to determine if a group theory of civil-military relations explains the actions or non-actions of both militaries. The findings largely fit the developed theory. Group identity and civil-military relations in India and Pakistan by Brent Scott Williams B.S., United States Military Academy, 2003 M.A., Kansas State University, 2010 M.M.A., Command and General Staff College, 2015 A DISSERTATION submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY Security Studies College of Arts and Sciences KANSAS STATE UNIVERSITY Manhattan, Kansas 2019 Approved by: Co-Major Professor Dr. David Stone Approved by: Co-Major Professor Dr. Sam Bell Copyright © Brent Williams 2019. Abstract This dissertation asks why a military gives up power or never takes power when conditions favor a coup d’état in the cases of Pakistan and India. In most cases, civil-military relations literature focuses on civilian control in a democracy or the breakdown of that control. The focus of this research is the opposite: either the returning of civilian control or maintaining civilian control. Moreover, the approach taken in this dissertation is different because it assumes group identity, and the military’s inherent connection to society, determines the civil-military relationship. This dissertation provides a qualitative examination of two states, Pakistan and India, which have significant similarities, and attempts to discern if a group theory of civil-military relations helps to explain the actions of the militaries in both states. Both Pakistan and India inherited their military from the former British Raj. The British divided the British-Indian military into two militaries when Pakistan and India gained Independence. These events provide a solid foundation for a comparative study because both Pakistan’s and India’s militaries came from the same source. Second, the domestic events faced by both states are similar and range from famines to significant defeats in wars, ongoing insurgencies, and various other events. In short, the theory developed suggests that Pakistan’s military has repeatedly given up power because domestic cleavages caused a perception among the civilian population that the military leader should transfer power or meet other political demands. Because the military’s leadership originates from the population, that leadership identifies with the perception of the group or groups that produce the leadership. Moreover, because the military leadership is homogenous, there is limited diversity in the military leadership’s perception of a domestic cleavage and there are no other security organizations preventing the military’s actions. Conversely, in India, a more diversified military leadership and a non-unified security apparatus serve to prevent action. This dissertation examines the historical record in both states’ timelines to determine if a group theory of civil-military relations explains the actions or non-actions of both militaries. The findings largely fit the developed theory. Table of Contents List of Figures ................................................................................................................................ xi List of Tables ................................................................................................................................ xii Chapter 1 - Introduction .................................................................................................................. 1 Civil-Military Relations Literature Review ................................................................................ 3 Pakistan and India Civil-Military Relations ............................................................................. 10 Policy Consequences ................................................................................................................ 13 Methodology ............................................................................................................................. 15 Outline ...................................................................................................................................... 17 Chapter 2 - Theory – Identity and Civil-Military Relations ......................................................... 18 Defining Terms and Actors ....................................................................................................... 18 Dominant Groups’ Reaction to a Domestic Cleavage .............................................................. 26 Heterogeneous Dominant Groups ............................................................................................. 30 Unified Versus Non-unified Security Apparatus ...................................................................... 32 Chapter 3 - Defining Actors and Variables for Pakistan and India .............................................. 35 Pakistan and India Civil Society Comparison .......................................................................... 37 Pakistan and India Military Comparison .................................................................................. 42 Defining the Dominant Group in Pakistan and India ............................................................... 50 Homogenous Versus Heterogeneous Dominant Group ............................................................ 60 Unified Versus Dis-unified Security Apparatus ....................................................................... 61 What Behavior Should the Theory Predict ............................................................................... 63 Chapter 4 - Pakistan ...................................................................................................................... 66 President Yahya Khan Replacing Ayub Khan .......................................................................... 67 Pakistan’s Early Governance ................................................................................................ 70 Governance under Ayub Khan .............................................................................................. 73 Domestic Policy ................................................................................................................ 74 Foreign Policy and the 1965 War ..................................................................................... 76 Zulfikar Ali Bhutto ........................................................................................................... 78 Relationship with Military ................................................................................................ 82 Domestic Cleavage and Transition to Yahya Khan .............................................................. 86 viii Conclusion ............................................................................................................................ 90 Zulfikar Bhutto Replacing Yahya Khan ..................................................................................