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FOR THE DEFENSE Volume 43 No. 4 | May 2014 Are you ready for some Rusty?

John M. Economidy | Federal Supervised Release p. 22 Mark Ryan Thiessen | Eleven Essential DWI Trial Tactics p. 31 Randy Wilson | So You Want to Be a Criminal Defense Attorney p. 37 27th Annual

Advanced Criminal Law Course

Henry B. Gonzalez Convention Center San Antonio, June 12–14, 2014 Host Hotel: Keynote Speaker Hyatt Regency Michael Morton Course Directors Heather Barbieri (Plano) Jason Cassel (Longview) Michael Heiskell (Fort Worth)

www.tcdla.com EDITOR Michael Gross San Antonio, Texas 210-354-1919 27th Annual [email protected] ASSISTANT EDITOR Grant Scheiner , Texas 713-783-8998 [email protected] Contents SIGNIFICANT DECISIONS REPORT EDITOR Kathleen Nacozy 512-507-0115 [email protected] DESIGN, LAYOUT, EDITING Features Advanced Criminal Law Course Craig Hattersley TCDLA Home Office 512-646-2733 If You’re Going to Rusty Duncan [email protected] 20 What to remember and what’s TCDLA OFFICERS: new or different this year at Rusty President Bobby Mims | Tyler Federal Supervised Release President‑Elect Emmett Harris | Uvalde 22 John M. Economidy First Vice President Henry B. Gonzalez Convention Center Sam Bassett | Austin Eleven Essential DWI Trial Tactics Second Vice President Mark Ryan Thiessen San Antonio, Texas John Convery | San Antonio 31  Treasurer So You Want to Be a Criminal June 12–14, 2014 David Moore | Longview  Secretary Defense Attorney Mark Snodgrass | Lubbock 37 Randy Wilson General Counsel Host Hotel: Patricia J. Cummings | Austin [email protected] Hyatt Regency Executive Director Joseph A. Martinez 512-646-2726 Columns Course Directors [email protected] DIRECTORS 7 President’s Message Heather Barbieri (Plano) John Ackerman, Sunrise Beach Carole Powell, El Paso Susan Anderson, Dallas Bennie Ray, Austin 9 Ethics and the Law Jason Cassel (Longview) Marjorie Bachman, Austin Ray Rodriguez, Laredo Michael Heiskell (Fort Worth) Heather Barbieri, Plano Sarah Roland, Denton 12 Federal Corner Rick Berry, Marshall John Hunter Smith, Sherman Fred C. Brigman III, San Angelo Clay Steadman, Kerrville 19 Said & Done Clint Broden, Dallas George Taylor, San Antonio Jaime Carrillo, Kingsville Gary Alan Udashen, Dallas Jason Cassel, Longview Tony Vitz, McKinney Harold Danford, Kerrville Coby Waddill, Denton Departments Nicole DeBorde, Houston James Whalen, Plano Emily Detoto, Houston Jani Wood, Houston TCDLA Member Benefits Robert Fickman, Houston 4 Stephen Gordon, Haltom City Associate Directors CLE Seminars and Events Deandra Grant, Richardson Bobby Barrera, San Antonio 5 Michael Gross, San Antonio Curtis Barton, Huntsville 41 Significant Decisions Report Melissa Hannah, Lufkin Donald Flanary III, San Antonio Theodore “Tip” Hargrove, San Angelo Steve Keathley, Corsicana Jo Ann Jacinto, El Paso Brad Lollar, Dallas Laurie Key, Lubbock Louis Lopez Jr., El Paso Jeanette Kinard, Austin Hiram McBeth, Dallas Adam Kobs, San Antonio Michael McCrum, San Antonio Michael McDougal, Conroe George Milner III, Dallas Patrick Metze, Lubbock Angela Moore, Boerne Anthony Odiorne, Burnet Simon Purnell, Corpus Christi David O’Neil, Huntsville Jeremy Rosenthal, McKinney Shawn Paschall, Fort Worth David Ryan, Houston Volume 43 No. 4 • May 2014 Stephanie Patten, Fort Worth Edward Stapleton III, Brownsville Oscar O. Peña, Laredo John Stickels, Arlington Bruce Ponder, El Paso Oscar Vega, Pharr

Voice for the Defense (ISSN 0364‑2232) is published monthly, except for January/February and July/August, which CONTRIBUTORS: Send all feature articles in electronic format to Voice for the Defense, 6808 Hill Meadow Drive, are bi-monthly, by the Texas Criminal Defense Association Inc., 6808 Hill Meadow Drive, Austin, Texas Austin, Texas 78736, 512-478-2514, fax 512-469-9107, c/o [email protected]. 78736. Printed in the USA. Basic subscription rate is $40 per year when received as a TCDLA member benefit. Non‑member subscription is $75 per year. Periodicals postage paid in Austin, Texas. Dues to TCDLA are not de‑ Statements and opinions published in the Voice for the Defense are those of the author and do not necessarily ductible as a charitable contribution. As an ordinary business expense the non-deductible portion of membership rep­re­sent the position of TCDLA. No material may be reprinted without prior approval and proper credit to the dues is 25% in accordance with IRC sec. 6033. mag­a­zine. © 2014 Texas Criminal Defense Lawyers Association. www.tcdla.com POSTMASTER: Send address changes to Voice for the Defense, 6808 Hill Meadow Drive, Austin, Texas 78736. Voice for the Defense is published to educate, train, and support attorneys in the practice of criminal defense law. 4 Membership Benefits 4

Strike Force (assistance to aid lawyers threatened with or incarcerated for contempt of court) Chair Darlina Crowder Gary Udashen David Botsford Oscar Peña Reagan Wynn Matthew Goeller David Frank Sheldon Weisfeld Co-Chair Nicole DeBorde Rick Hagen District 7 Keith Hampton Richard Weaver Buck Files District 13 District 1 Don Wilson Craig Henry District 10 Mike Aduddell Jim Darnell Randy Wilson Scrappy Holmes Don Flannery Travis Kitchens Mike R. Gibson Tim James Gerry Goldstein James Makin Mary Stillinger District 5 Frank Long Michael Gross Larry McDougal Scott Brown Bobby Mims Michael McCrum District 2 Mark Daniel David E. Moore Cynthia Orr District 14 Tip Hargrove Michael Heiskell Barney Sawyer Danny Easterling H. W. Leverett Larry Moore District 11 Robert Fickman Greg Westfall District 8 Harold Danford JoAnne Musick District 3 Kerri Anderson-Donica Emmett Harris Katherine Scardino Jeff Blackburn District 6 Michelle Esparza Angela Moore Grant Scheiner Dan Hurley Richard Anderson Steve Keathley Clay Steadman Stan Schneider Chuck Lanehart Clint Broden Michelle J. Latray George Secrest Bill Wischkaemper Ron Goranson District 12 Bob Hinton District 9 George Altgelt District 4 George Milner III Sam Bassett Joe Connors Heather Barbieri Kevin Ross Betty Blackwell Bobby Lerma

 State Motions CD—Newly updated!  TCDLA Discounts New members will receive a comprehensive CD of state forms and Receive significant discounts on CLE seminars and TCDLA publica‑ motions, including DWI, post-trial, pretrial, and sexual assault mo‑ tions. Discounted liability insurance with Joe Pratt Insurance. tions.  TCDLA Logo for Member Use  Brief, Motion, and Memo Bank Camera-ready art of the TCDLA logo is now available for use on A library of the collected tools of the trade from some of the top business cards, websites, etc. criminal defense lawyers in the state.  Membership Certificate  Listserves Display your TCDLA membership with pride! New members will re‑ A partnership to engage community members in areas of significant ceive a personalized certificate by mail. Members of 25 years receive decisions, legislative and capital issues/updates, upcoming seminars a special certificate. and events, and more . . .   Legislature Sprint Discount A team of lobbyists involved in the legislative effort and keeping Sprint has changed the process in how to receive their 15% discount. members up to date. Please fill out the verification form and fax to TCDLA at 512.469.0512 or email to [email protected] and TCDLA will have it submitted to  Ethics Hotline Sprint. If you have a question about ethics in criminal defense law, call the hotline at 512-646-2734 and leave a message. You will receive a call  Enterprise Car Rental or several calls within 24 hours. Ten percent discount for members. Enterprise is the largest rental­ car company in North America in terms of locations and number of cars,  Updated iPhone/iPad/Droid/Windows 7 App while providing the highest level of customer service. The corporate An entire library of criminal codes and statutes in the palm of your account number for TCDLA members is 65TCDLA. You may contact hand. your local office directly or visit www.enterprise.com. When booking  Voice for the Defense magazine—print and online online, enter your location, date, time, & the corporate account number. A subscription to the only statewide magazine written specifically for You will then be asked for your discount ID, which is the first three let‑ defense lawyers, published 10 times a year. ters of TCDLA (TCD). Make your reservation at Enterprise Rent-a-Car.  Membership Directory (printed or online)  Subscription Services Inc. Comprehensive listing of current TCDLA members, print or PDF Fifty percent discount off the cover price of more than 1,000 maga‑ version, updated yearly. Online directory updated daily. zines, including Newsweek, New Yorker, Texas Monthly, etc. Visit  Locator www.buymags.com/attorneys. Online directory providing members an opportunity to list up to  three areas of practice for public advertising. State Motions CD New members will receive a comprehensive CD of state forms and mo‑  Expert List tions, including DWI, post-trial, pretrial, and sexual assault motions. Extensive list of experts for all types of criminal cases, including investigation, mitigation, and forensics specialists.  Resources Expansive library of research papers from renowned criminal de‑  Significant Decisions Report fense lawyers and other valuable information and sites. Professional reports summarizing state and federal cases, emailed weekly. 4 CLE and Events 4 Register online at www.tcdla.com

 June 2014 July 25 October 9–10 June 11 CDLP | Criminal Law Basics CDLP | 12th Annual Forensics CDLP | Public Defender Training Austin, TX Dallas, TX San Antonio, TX  August 2014 October 22–26 June 12 August 1 TCDLA | Round Top IV: Advanced CDLP | Capital Update CDLP | Nuts ’n’ Bolts | co-sponsored Skills Training—Cross-Examination San Antonio, TX with San Antonio Criminal Defense Round Top, TX Lawyers Association June 12–14 San Antonio, TX October 24 TCDLA | 27th Annual Rusty Duncan CDLP | Training Your Defense Advanced Criminal Law Seminar August 7–8 Team to Win (*open to all) CDLP | Innocence for Attorneys Abilene, TX San Antonio, TX Austin, TX  November 2014 June 13 August 15 November 6–7 TCDLEI Board, TCDLA Executive, CDLP | Crimes of Violence TCDLA | 10th Annual Stuart Kinard and CDLP Committee Meetings Advanced Seminar Memorial Advanced DWI Seminar San Antonio, TX Austin, TX San Antonio, TX

June 14 August 22 November 14 43rd TCDLA Annual Board TCDLA | 12th Annual Top Gun DWI CDLP | Training Your Defense Meeting** Houston, TX Team to Win San Antonio, TX Galveston, TX  September 2014  July 2014 September 11–12 November 14 July 11 TCDLA | Cross-Examination CDLP | Nuts ’n’ Bolts | co-sponsored TCDLA | Lone Star DWI: Blood 101 Dallas, TX with San Antonio Criminal Defense Austin, TX Lawyers Association September 13 San Antonio, TX July 16–20 TCDLA Board and CDLP and TCDLA | Members Retreat Executive Committee Meetings November 18 South Padre Island, TX Dallas, TX CDLP | Training Your Defense Team to Win July 16 September 19 McAllen, TX CDLP | Trainer of Trainers CDLP | Forensics/Evidence & Expert South Padre Island, TX Witnesses El Paso, TX Seminars spon­sored by CDLP are funded by the Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas. Seminars July 17–18 are open to criminal defense attorneys; CDLP | Trial Strategies That Work September 26 other pro­fessionals who support the defense of criminal cases may attend at cost. Law South Padre Island, TX CDLP | Training Your Defense enforcement personnel and prosecutors are not Team to Win eligible to attend. July 19 Fredericksburg, TX TCDLA seminars are open only to criminal defense attor­neys, mitigation specialists, TCDLA/CDLP/TCDLEI | Orientation defense investigators, or other professionals­ South Padre Island, TX  October 2014 who support the defense of criminal cases. Law October 8–9 enforcement personnel and prosecutors are not eligible to attend unless noted “*open to all.” CDLP | Innocence for Students **Open to all members Dallas, TX

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Reflections of 43 Years and Challenges Ahead

ore than 43 years ago a group of lawyers decided that a separate organization devoted Mto the training, education and support of criminal defense attorneys was needed. These lawyers literally drove all over Texas collecting money to start the Texas Criminal Defense Lawyers Association. For years this small band of brothers and sisters worked and fought to prevent the erosion of the rule of law. From that small group the TCDLA has emerged as the largest and most effective state association of criminal defense lawyers in the United States. Among the members of this association are some of the finest lawyers in the nation. Some are nationally known superstars, but all are courageous fighters for justice. Every day in every court in Texas TCDLA lawyers confront power and advocate for the defendant. Every TCDLA member stands shoulder to shoulder with criminal defense lawyers as they walk into the courtrooms of Texas. There are few more cohesive groups than the members of this association. I am reminded of past victories and challenges of TCDLA lawyers. The great lawyers of the past are benchmarks for the lawyers of today. Today criminal defense lawyers are challenged like never before. The erosion of the 4th Amendment, invasion of privacy, attack on the judiciary and the jury system by forces inside and outside of the legal profession are faced daily by TCDLA lawyers. The Patriot Act, NSA surveillance, parallel investigations and out right perjury by government agents in the name of national security are the known challenges facing criminal defense attorneys. We are fortunate to live in a time when the country needs criminal defense lawyers as never before. TCDLA is on the cutting edge of legal training and provides the best criminal defense training in the nation. As forensic science evolves, TCDLA will continue to be at the fore‑ front in training the criminal defense bar. TCDLA and its members will continue to set the standard of practice for criminal defense representation during the 21st century. There has been progress in educating the public and the judiciary about the perils of junk science. Texas has made significant progress in protection of the accused by reform of eyewitness testimony, arson science, DNA exonerations, lineups,and compensation for the wrongfully convicted. President’s The Indigent Defense Commission and the Innocence Project of Texas are led by TCDLA Message lawyers. The Forensic Science Commission has been depoliticized, and its chairperson is a scientist. There have been improvements in the investigation and correction of crime labs, and incompetent analysts have been exposed and dismissed. There is a need for an independent Forensic Science Lab under the Forensic Science Commission. This should be a priority for the next legislature. This independent lab should be created immediately by the Legislature and forensic evidence testing removed from the Department of Public Safety. The avoided cost of exoneree compensation alone might justify the investment. interests. TCDLA will resist all efforts to roll back Morton but rather will seek to improve the Act to give even more protection. As we go forward with an excellent group of Officers and Directors, supported by the best professional staff in the busi‑ ness, TCDLA members can be confident that they have the support of the organization. TCDLA will have increased chal‑ lenges and obligations, and members may be asked to provide more resources since the association has taken on more ob‑ ligations in service to the membership, to the public, and to the legislature. TCDLA is dedicated to assisting legislators as they consider new legislation to resist any further erosion of individual rights. TCDLA will be very active at the legislature, ready to provide assistance to leaders as they formulate laws affecting our members and clients. Recently, the nation observed Memorial Day by honor‑ ing those who made the ultimate sacrifice for America and the Constitution. As this organization was being formed more than 43 years ago this nation was embroiled in the Vietnam War. America was more divided than at anytime since the Civil War. Those founders saw the need to bring warriors for justice to‑ Paula Gowen and Bobby Mims take a well-deserved break gether to defend the Constitution and formed the TCDLA. We before the events of Rusty Duncan. honor our veterans, as we should, but you, the TCDLA criminal defense lawyer who goes to court every day armed with nothing The Morton Act appears to be having a positive effect on more than the law and your skill, do as much to defend freedom prosecutors, as evidenced by the recent spate of voluntary dis‑ and the Constitution as I ever did when I wore the uniform in closures of crime lab errors. Many prosecutors are requiring that that war more than 43 years ago. the police provide statements that they have fully complied with It has been an honor to have served as the 43rd President of delivering Brady and other materials favorable to the defense the Texas Criminal Defense Lawyers Association. Of the things to the prosecutor along with the case file. Many in the law en‑ in this life that I am most proud, besides my family, it’s that I forcement and prosecution communities appear to be mindful am a member of the TCDLA and a criminal defense attorney. of the events of Williamson County. There will likely be calls to modify the Morton Act in the next legislature by some of these Bobby Mims

TCDLA members will If you’re interested in leading again organize Readings a Reading, please contact of the Declaration Robb Fickman at of Independence (713)655-7400. on July 3, 2014. 4th of July Readings Robert Pelton

hese as we all know are the last words to the Pledge of Allegiance to the Flag of the United TStates of America. Those who deny freedom to others do not deserve it for themselves. Lawyers continue to get into trouble. One former lawyer in Houston was sentenced to 40 years for stealing $9 million from his employer, and a lawyer in San Antonio was sentenced to 10 years for padding her pay vouchers. The DA investigator in the Houston case was caught selling the contraband involved and was prosecuted. The fox was guarding the henhouse. Prosecutors continue to hide evidence, as evidenced by a Harris County case involving a prosecutor who failed to disclose evidence. If police and prosecutors do their jobs honestly, they can get a majority of convictions, but they continue to lie. A recent former member of the Harris County Criminal Lawyers Association and Texas Criminal Defense Lawyers Association stayed on the listserves after he went to work as an Assistant DA in Liberty County. On the listserves, he read emails about a pending case. Robb Fickman gathered a volunteer group and went to Liberty, Texas, to seek liberty for the unfortunate soul in that criminal case. Lawyer Fickman took about 15 lawyers, and their presence in the courtroom was noticed by the judge and prosecutor in question. Paul Looney, the Houston/Hempstead lawyer, won a Franks hearing where a search warrant affidavit was filled with lies. Do not trust the prosecutors. Do your own investiga‑ tion. Remember that your client is the most important person. Do not play grab-ass with the judge and prosecutor. Do not disclose your case to the prosecutors. It is amazing how fast they can correct the problem if you tell them what is wrong with their case. Running your mouth can cause many problems and end up hurting your client. Unfortunately, many lawyers—to get favor with their pals in the DA’s office—run and tell the prosecutors what is on the listserve. Bragging about what you can do will have disastrous results if your client goes away for a long time. DO NOT LET YOU ALLIGATOR MOUTH OVERRIDE YOUR HUMMINGBIRD ASS. Be realistic with the client. Show all documents to your clients so that they know you are working on the case. You can be brilliant and do brilliant work, but Ethics & you must send copies to your client so that he will know. This will avoid many grievances. The Law After meeting and talking to Michael Morton and Anthony Graves several times, I have to wonder about what goes wrong in our JUSTICE system. A crooked prosecutor who be‑ came a judge and crooked law enforcement is what goes wrong. Experienced honest police officers will tell you that if they and prosecutors do their job right, then the system will work like it should; when a judge looks at a prosecutor before he makes a ruling or decision, the system is not working right. This happens every day in courtrooms in Texas and other states. Be prepared, know your client, and be professional when in court. If you see bad behavior, be like Charles Goodnight, the man on whom the book and movie “Lonesome Dove” was based. He said that he did not like rude behavior in a man and paragraphs (a) and (b). would not tolerate it. He didn’t and we shouldn’t. File a com‑ (d) This rule does not require disclosure of knowledge or in‑ plaint as described below. If you need help call Robb Fickman formation otherwise protected as confidential information: in Houston. He knows how to get it done. If you see a lawyer (1) by Rule 1.05 or doing wrong, report it as prescribed below. (2) by any statutory or regulatory provisions applicable to Lawyer Anne Ritchie, who is on my legal team, followed the counseling activities of the approved peer assistance her oath while in the Navy and is following it now as a lawyer. program. She is one of the smart lawyers in our group, and she has set Tex. Disciplinary R. Prof’l Conduct 8.03 (1994), out below the rules to follow. Lawyers across the state continue reprinted in Tex. Gov’t Code Ann., tit. 2, subtit. G app. A to complain about bad treatment by judiciary. If the complaints (West 2013) (State Bar Rules art. X, § 9). are legitimate, then this article may help you get some relief. Make sure you are doing your job properly. Be on time, file your The appropriate authority mentioned in Rule 8.03(b) is the motions on time, have your client to court on time. Prepare a State Commission on Judicial Conduct. The Commission has memo that tells your client’s life history so that when the judge jurisdiction over almost 4,000 judges across the state of Texas. asks you about your client you will be able to do something State Comm’n on Judicial Conduct, Fiscal Year 2013 Annual besides just stand there and scratch. Many judges do try to do Report, at 15 (2014) (available at http://www.scjc.state.tx.us/pdf the right thing, and the info about your client can be helpful. /rpts/AR-FY13.pdf) (hereinafter FY13 Report). The Commission When the prosecutor says that defendants all have excuses, they is not governed by the Texas Public Information Act, the Texas are all the same, be prepared to show that, no, they are not the Open Meetings Act, or the Texas Administrative Procedures same—MY CLIENT IS DIFFERENT. Get photos, school re‑ Act. Id. at 2. cords, any awards, and other things. Get releases signed by the One peer review program, as referred to in Rule 8.03(c), client to get all records. You will be amazed at the results when is the Amicus Curiae Program, which is available to all judges, you show the prosecutor a well-written memo about your client. whether or not they are attorneys. The program “helps locate Then, if after all your proper behavior, you get bad behavior, resources and identify and treat impairments that may be af‑ file a complaint. fecting . . . judges’ personal lives and their performance on the Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 8.03 bench.” Id. at 13. The Amicus Curiae Program was originally (Reporting Professional Misconduct) provides the following: funded by the , then the Court of Criminal Ap­peals, but since 2005 has had no funding. Id. at 13. It would (a) Except as permitted in paragraphs (c) or (d), a lawyer having be in the best interests of the members of the knowledge that another lawyer has committed a violation for that organization to provide some funding for the Amicus of applicable rules of professional conduct that raises a sub‑ program since having mentally healthy judges on the bench is stantial question as to that lawyer’s honesty, trustworthiness of benefit to all attorneys. or fitness as a lawyer in other respects, shall inform the Should a lawyer know that a judge has violated a rule of ju­ appropriate disciplinary authority. di­cial conduct “that raises a substantial question as to the judge’s (b) Except as permitted in paragraphs (c) or (d), a lawyer hav‑ fitness for office,” the lawyer has a duty to report that judge to the ing knowledge that a judge has committed a violation of Commission. Tex. Disciplinary R. Prof’l Conduct 8.03(b). applicable rules of judicial conduct that raises a substantial A complaint must be in writing; fax and email complaints are question as to the judge’s fitness for office shall inform the not accepted, but it may be made anonymously. A form for the appropriate authority. complaint is available at www.scjc.texas.gov. The Commission (c) A lawyer having knowledge or suspecting that another law­ may also initiate its own complaint based on media, court docu‑ yer or judge whose conduct the lawyer is required to report ments, the internet, or other sources. FY13 Report at 7. After pursuant to paragraphs (a) or (b) of this Rule is impaired its investigation, the Commission may make a decision of one by chemical dependency on alcohol or drugs or by mental of the following types: ill­ness may report that person to an approved peer assis‑ tance program rather than to an appropriate disciplinary l Administrative Dismissal Report: This happens when the authority. If a lawyer elects that option, the lawyer’s report complaint fails to state an appropriate allegation. to the approved peer assistance program shall disclose any l Dismissal: This includes cases of insufficient or no evidence disciplinary violations that the reporting lawyer would of misconduct, cases where the judge took appropriate re‑ otherwise have to disclose to the authorities referred to in medial actions, and cases where there may be a problem, but it is not sanctionable. hear­ing or ask the of Texas to appoint a l Order of Additional Education: This may be ordered alone Spe­cial Master to hear the matter. or as part of a sanction. Id. at 9–10. Any order of additional education, public or private l Private or Public Sanction: This happens when sufficient sanction, or public censure may be appealed to a Special Court of evidence supports a finding of judicial misconduct. Review specially created by the Supreme Court of Texas. Id. at 10. l Suspension: A judge may be suspended after being indicted by a grand jury for a felony, or if charged with a misde‑ As attorneys, we do not want to cast aspersions on the meanor involving official misconduct. ju­di­cial system on which we all rely, but sometimes, for the l Voluntary Agreement to Resign: The judge may decide to good of that same system, a complaint of judicial misconduct re­sign in lieu of disciplinary action. is necessary. l Formal Proceedings: These are reserved for particularly The complaint process is graphically illustrated by the fol‑ egre­gious complaints. The Commission may conduct a lowing chart, provided by the Commission:

FY13 Report at 12. Buck Files

Part Two: The Supreme Court’s Decision in Paroline Introduction

In Part One, I discussed Paroline’s journey from the United States District Court for the East‑ ern District of Texas to the Supreme Court of the United States, and how Stanley Schneider, Casie Gotro, and I became Paroline’s Team. Now, we continue with the Supreme Court’s resolution of his case.

We Win the Causation Issue

On April 23, 2014, Stanley, Casie, and I had reason to celebrate—and we did. A divided Supreme Court held that restitution is proper under 18 USC § 2259 only to the extent the defendant’s offense proximately caused a victim’s losses. Paroline v. United States, et al., 134 S.Ct. 1710 (2014). The Court vacated the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remanded the case to the Court of Appeals. The restitution award of $3.4 million against Paroline was no more. We had won.

Who Is Going to Pay Restitution and in What Amount?

Justice Kennedy delivered the opinion of the Court and was joined by Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, Alito, and Kagan. In addition to the causation issue, the opinion addresses these other issues:

! When must a district court order restitution under § 2259? ! How are district courts to determine the proper amount of restitution? ! What factors should the district courts consider in determining the proper amount of Federal restitution? Unfortunately, district judges and prosecutors and defense lawyers will take little comfort Corner in the guidance—or lack thereof—that Justice Kennedy gives us. It is that portion of the opinion that deals with these issues that I’m going to focus on in this column.

The Court’s Opinion

The Court’s opinion, reads, in part, as follows: [What This Case is About] being abused over and over and over again.” Id., at 60–61. This case presents the question of how to determine the *** amount of restitution a possessor of child pornography [At the District Court] must pay to the victim whose childhood abuse appears Petitioner Paroline is one of the individuals who pos‑ in the pornographic materials possessed. The relevant sessed this victim’s images. In 2009, he pleaded guilty in stat­utory provisions are set forth at 18 U.S.C. § 2259. federal court to one count of possession of material in‑ Enacted as a component of the Violence Against Women volving the sexual exploitation of children in violation of Act of 1994, § 2259 requires district courts to award res‑ 18 U.S.C. § 2252. 672 F.Supp.2d 781, 783 (E.D.Tex.2009). titution for certain federal criminal offenses, including Paroline admitted to knowing possession of between child-pornography possession. 150 and 300 images of child pornography, two of which [Paroline’s Offense Conduct] depicted the respondent victim. Ibid. The victim sought Petitioner Doyle Randall Paroline pleaded guilty to such restitution under § 2259, asking for close to $3.4 mil‑ an offense. He admitted to possessing between 150 and lion, consisting of nearly $3 million in lost income and 300 images of child pornography, which included two about $500,000 in future treatment and counseling costs. that depicted the sexual exploitation of a young girl, now App. 52, 104. She also sought attorney’s fees and costs. a young woman, who goes by the pseudonym “Amy” for 672 F.Supp.2d, at 783. The parties submitted competing this litigation. expert reports. They stipulated that the victim did not *** know who Paroline was and that none of her claimed losses flowed from any specific knowledge about him or his offense [Possession of Child Pornography conduct. Id., at 792, and n. 11; App. 230 [emphasis added]. Is Not a Victimless Crime] After briefing and hearings, the District Court de‑ Three decades ago, this Court observed that “the exploi‑ clined to award restitution. 672 F.Supp.2d, at 793. The tive use of children in the production of pornography has District Court observed that “everyone involved with become a serious national problem.” New York v. Ferber, child pornography—from the abusers and producers 458 U.S. 747, 749, 102 S.Ct. 3348, 73 L.Ed.2d 1113 (1982). to the end-users and possessors—contribute[s] to [the *** victim’s] ongoing harm.” Id., at 792. But it concluded that [Amy’s Story] the Government had the burden of proving the amount One person whose story illustrates the devastating harm of the victim’s losses “directly produced by Paroline that caused by child pornography is the respondent victim would not have occurred without his possession of her in this case. When she was eight and nine years old, she images.” Id., at 791. The District Court found that, under was sexually abused by her uncle in order to produce this standard, the Government had failed to meet its child pornography. burden of proving what losses, if any, were proximately *** caused by Paroline’s offense. It thus held that “an award The digital images were available nationwide and no of restitution is not appropriate in this case.” Id., at 793. doubt worldwide. Though the exact scale of the trade [At the Fifth Circuit] in her images is unknown, the possessors to date easily The victim sought a writ of mandamus, asking the United number in the thousands. The knowledge that her im‑ States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit to direct ages were circulated far and wide renewed the victim’s the District Court to order Paroline to pay restitution trauma and made it difficult for her to recover from her in the amount requested. In re Amy, 591 F.3d 792, 793 abuse. As she explained in a victim impact statement (2009). The Court of Appeals denied relief. Id., at 795. submitted to the District Court in this case: The victim sought rehearing. Her rehearing request was “Every day of my life I live in constant fear that some‑ granted, as was her petition for a writ of mandamus. In one will see my pictures and recognize me and that I re Amy Unknown, 636 F.3d 190, 201 (2011). will be humiliated all over again. It hurts me to know The Fifth Circuit reheard the case en banc along with someone is looking at them—at me—when I was just a another case, in which the defendant, Michael Wright, little girl being abused for the camera. I did not choose had raised similar issues in appealing an order of restitu‑ to be there, but now I am there forever in pictures that tion under § 2259, see United States v. Wright, 639 F.3d people are using to do sick things. I want it all erased. 679, 681 (2011) (per curiam ). As relevant, the Court of I want it all stopped. But I am powerless to stop it just Appeals set out to determine the level of proof required like I was powerless to stop my uncle. . . . My life and to award restitution to victims in cases like this. It held my feelings are worse now because the crime has never that § 2259 did not limit restitution to losses proximately really stopped and will never really stop. . . . It’s like I am caused by the defendant, and each defendant who pos‑ sessed the victim’s images should be made liable for the combined acts of all other relevant offenders, and in com- victim’s entire losses from the trade in her images, even parison to the contributions of other individual offenders, though other offenders played a role in causing those particularly distributors (who may have caused hundreds losses. In re Amy Unknown, 701 F.3d 749, 772–774 (2012) or thousands of further viewings) and the initial producer (en banc). of the child pornography [emphasis added]. [At the Supreme Court] *** [The Remedial and Penological Purposes of § 2259] Paroline sought review here. was granted to The cause of the victim’s general losses is the trade in resolve a conflict in the Courts of Appeals over the proper her images. And Paroline is a part of that cause, for he is causation inquiry for purposes of determining the en­ti­tle­ one of those who viewed her images. While it is not pos‑ ment to and amount of restitution under § 2259. 570 U.S. sible to identify a discrete, readily definable incremental __, 133 S.Ct. 2886, 186 L.Ed.2d 932 (2013). For the reasons loss he caused, it is indisputable that he was a part of set forth, the decision of the Court of Appeals is vacated. the overall phenomenon that caused her general losses. [§ 2259(a) Provides for Mandatory Restitution] Just as it undermines the purposes of tort law to turn Title 18 U.S.C. § 2259(a) provides that a district court away plaintiffs harmed by several wrongdoers, it would “shall order restitution for any offense” under Chapter 110 undermine the remedial and penological purposes of of Title 18, which covers a number of offenses involving § 2259 to turn away victims in cases like this. the sexual exploitation of children and child pornogra‑ With respect to the statute’s remedial purpose, there phy in particular. Paroline was convicted of knowingly can be no question that it would produce anomalous re­ possessing child pornography under § 2252, a Chapter sults to say that no restitution is appropriate in these cir­ 110 offense. cum­stances. It is common ground that the victim suffers *** continuing and grievous harm as a result of her knowl‑ edge that a large, indeterminate number of individuals [The District Court’s Findings] have viewed and will in the future view images of the The District Court found that the Government failed to sexual abuse she endured. Brief for Petitioner 50; Brief prove specific losses caused by Paroline in a but-for sense for Respondent Wright 4; Brief for United States 23; Brief and recognized that it would be “incredibly difficult” for Respondent Amy 60. Harms of this sort are a major to do so in a case like this. 672 F.Supp.2d, at 791–793. reason why child pornography is outlawed. See Ferber, That finding has a solid foundation in the record, and it 458 U.S., at 759, 102 S.Ct. 3348. The unlawful conduct of is all but unchallenged in this Court. See Brief for Re‑ everyone who reproduces, distributes, or possesses the spondent 1723 Amy 63; Brief for United States 19, 25. images of the victim’s abuse—including Paroline—plays But see Supp. Brief for United States 8–10. From the a part in sustaining and aggravating this tragedy. And victim’s perspective, Paroline was just one of thousands there can be no doubt Congress wanted victims to receive of anonymous possessors. To be sure, the victim’s pre‑ restitution for harms like this. The law makes restitution cise degree of trauma likely bears a relation to the total “mandatory,” § 2259(b)(4), for child-pornography of‑ number of offenders; it would probably be less if only fenses under Chapter 110, language that indicates Con‑ 10 rather than thousands had seen her images. But it is gress’ clear intent that victims of child pornography be not possible to prove that her losses would be less (and compensated by the perpetrators who contributed to by how much) but for one possessor’s individual role in their anguish. It would undermine this intent to apply the large, loosely connected network through which her the statute in a way that would render it a dead letter in images circulate. See Sentencing Comm’n Report, at ii, child-pornography prosecutions of this type. xx [emphasis added]. Denying restitution in cases like this would also be [Paroline’s Conduct in Context] at odds with the penological purposes of § 2259’s man‑ Even without Paroline’s offense, thousands would have datory restitution scheme. In a sense, every viewing of viewed and would in the future view the victim’s images, child pornography is a repetition of the victim’s abuse. so it cannot be shown that her trauma and attendant losses One reason to make restitution mandatory for crimes would have been any different but for Paroline’s offense. like this is to impress upon offenders that their conduct That is especially so given the parties’ stipulation that produces concrete and devastating harms for real, iden‑ the victim had no knowledge of Paroline. See supra, at tifiable victims. See Kelly, supra, at 49, n. 10, 107 S.Ct. 1736–1737 [emphasis added]. 353 (“Restitution is an effective rehabilitative penalty *** because it forces the defendant to confront, in concrete Paroline’s contribution to the causal process underlying terms, the harm his actions have caused”). It would be the victim’s losses was very minor, both compared to the inconsistent with this purpose to apply the statute in a way that leaves offenders with the mistaken impression [Factors for the District Courts to Consider] that child-pornography possession (at least where the There are a variety of factors district courts might con‑ images are in wide circulation) is a victimless crime. sider in determining a proper amount of restitution, *** and it is neither necessary nor appropriate to prescribe a precise algorithm for determining the proper restitution [When Must District Courts Order amount at this point in the law’s development. Doing so Restitution Under § 2259] would unduly constrain the decisionmakers closest to [W]here it can be shown both that a defendant possessed the facts of any given case. But district courts might, as a victim’s images and that a victim has outstanding losses a starting point, determine the amount of the victim’s caused by the continuing traffic in those images but where losses caused by the continuing traffic in the victim’s it is impossible to trace a particular amount of those losses images (excluding, of course, any remote losses like the to the individual defendant by recourse to a more tradi- hypothetical car accident described above, see supra, at tional causal inquiry, a court applying § 2259 should order 1721), then set an award of restitution in consideration restitution in an amount that comports with the defen- of factors that bear on the relative causal significance of dant’s relative role in the causal process that underlies the the defendant’s conduct in producing those losses. These victim’s general losses. The amount would not be severe in could include the number of past criminal defendants a case like this, given the nature of the causal connection found to have contributed to the victim’s general losses; between the conduct of a possessor like Paroline and the reasonable predictions of the number of future offenders entirety of the victim’s general losses from the trade in her likely to be caught and convicted for crimes contributing images, which are the product of the acts of thousands of to the victim’s general losses; any available and reason‑ offenders. It would not, however, be a token or nominal ably reliable estimate of the broader number of offenders amount. The required restitution would be a reasonable involved (most of whom will, of course, never be caught and circumscribed award imposed in recognition of the or convicted); whether the defendant reproduced or dis‑ indisputable role of the offender in the causal process tributed images of the victim; whether the defendant had underlying the victim’s losses and suited to the relative any connection to the initial production of the images; size of that causal role. This would serve the twin goals how many images of the victim the defendant possessed; of helping the victim achieve eventual restitution for all and other facts relevant to the defendant’s relative causal her child-pornography losses and impressing upon of‑ role. See Brief for United States 49. fenders the fact that child-pornography crimes, even These factors need not be converted into a rigid simple possession, affect real victims [emphasis added]. for­mula, especially if doing so would result in trivial [How Are District Courts to Determine restitution orders. They should rather serve as rough the Proper Amount of Restitution?] guideposts for determining an amount that fits the of‑ There remains the question of how district courts should fense. The resulting amount fixed by the court would be go about determining the proper amount of restitution. deemed the amount of the victim’s general losses that At a general level of abstraction, a court must assess as were the “proximate result of the offense” for purposes best it can from available evidence the significance of the of § 2259, and thus the “full amount” of such losses that individual defendant’s conduct in light of the broader should be awarded. The court could then set an appropri‑ causal process that produced the victim’s losses. This can‑ ate payment schedule in consideration of the defendant’s not be a precise mathematical inquiry and involves the financial means. See § 3664(f)(2). use of discretion and sound judgment. But that is neither *** unusual nor novel, either in the wider context of criminal [How Doyle Randall Paroline Is to Be Viewed] sentencing or in the more specific domain of restitution. Treating [Paroline] as a cause of a smaller amount of It is well recognized that district courts by necessity “ex‑ the victim’s general losses, taking account of his role in ercise . . . discretion in fashioning a restitution order.” the overall causal process behind those losses, effects § 3664(a). Indeed, a district court is expressly authorized the statute’s purposes; avoids the nonsensical result of to conduct a similar inquiry where multiple defendants turning away victims emptyhanded; and does so without who have “contributed to the loss of a victim” appear sacrificing the need for proportionality in sentencing. before it. § 3664(h). In that case it may “apportion liability among the defendants to reflect the level of contribution *** to the victim’s loss . . . of each defendant.” Ibid. Assessing [The Court’s Acknowledged Difficulties an individual defendant’s role in the causal process behind with Its Approach] a child-pornography victim’s losses does not involve a This approach is not without its difficulties. Restitution substantially different or greater exercise of discretion. orders should represent “an application of law,” not “a decisionmaker’s caprice,” Philip Morris USA v. Williams, under the Victim and Witness Protection Act is authorized only 549 U.S. 346, 352, 127 S.Ct. 1057, 166 L.Ed.2d 940 (2007) for loss caused by the specific conduct which forms the basis (internal quotation marks omitted), and the approach for the offense of conviction. Hughey v. United States, 110 S.Ct. articulated above involves discretion and estimation. 1979 (1990). The following year, Congress enacted 18 U.S.C. But courts can only do their best to apply the statute as § 3664(e), which is simply a codification of Hughey. Stanley did written in a workable manner, faithful to the competing an eleventh hour amendment to his argument and the Chief principles at stake: that victims should be compensated Justice and Justices Thomas and Scalia found it persuasive. and that defendants should be held to account for the In his dissent, Roberts is critical of the Court’s impact of their conduct on those victims, but also that suggested methodology for determining restitution; e.g., defendants should be made liable for the consequences According to the Government’s lodging in this case, Dis‑ and gravity of their own conduct, not the conduct of trict Courts awarding less than Amy’s full losses have others. District courts routinely exercise wide discretion imposed restitution orders varying from $50 to $530,000. both in sentencing as a general matter and more specifi‑ Restitution Awards for Amy Through December 11, 2013, cally in fashioning restitution orders. There is no reason Lodging of United States. How is a court supposed to use to believe they cannot apply the causal standard defined those figures as any sort of guidance? Pick the median above in a reasonable manner without further detailed figure? The mean? Something else [emphasis added]? guidance at this stage in the law’s elaboration. Based on its experience in prior cases of this kind, the Government— *** [T]o the extent it is possible to project the total number which, as noted above, see supra, at 1718–1719, bears of persons who have viewed Amy’s images, that number the burden of proving the amount of the victim’s losses, is tragically large, which means that restitution awards § 3664(e)—could also inform district courts of restitution tied to it will lead to a pitiful recovery in every case. See sought and ordered in other cases [emphasis added]. Brief for Respondent Amy 65 (estimating Paroline’s “market [Conclusion] share” of Amy’s harm at 1/71,000, or $47). The majority The Fifth Circuit’s interpretation of the requirements of says that courts should not impose “trivial restitution or‑ § 2259 was incorrect. The District Court likewise erred ders,” ante, at 1728, but it is hard to see how a court fairly in requiring a strict showing of but-for causation. The assessing this defendant’s relative contribution could do judgment of the Court of Appeals is vacated, and the anything else [emphasis added]. case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with That dissent ends with this paragraph: this opinion. It is so ordered. The Court’s decision today means that Amy will not go home with nothing. But it would be a mistake for that Chief Justice Roberts’ Dissent salutary outcome to lead readers to conclude that Amy has prevailed or that Congress has done justice for victims of Chief Justice Roberts, joined by Justices Scalia and Thomas, dis‑ child pornography. The statute as written allows no recov‑ sented. His dissent virtually adopts the argument that Stanley ery; we ought to say so, and give Congress a chance to fix it. presented to the Court concerning the importance of 18 U.S.C. § 3664(e), which reads: Judge Sotomayor’s Dissent Any dispute as to the proper amount or type of restitution Justice Sotomayor also dissented. She would have affirmed the shall be resolved by the court by the preponderance of Fifth Circuit’s holding that the district court “must enter a res‑ the evidence. The burden of demonstrating the amount titution order reflecting the ‘full amount of [Amy’s] losses.’” of the loss sustained by a victim as a result of the offense shall be on the attorney for the Government. The burden of demonstrating the financial resources of the defendant My Thoughts and the financial needs of the defendant’s dependents, 6 During an in-chambers conference, I argued that granting shall be on the defendant. The burden of demonstrat‑ Amy the relief she sought would violate the Excessive Fines ing such other matters as the court deems appropriate Clause of the Eighth Amendment. To my argument, an shall be upon the party designated by the court as justice As­sistant United States Attorney replied, “You can’t hide be‑ requires [emphasis added]. hind the Eighth Amendment in a child pornography case.” It was Adele Hedges, former Chief Justice of the Fourteenth Justice Kennedy was not so flippant. He wrote, “The Court of Appeals, who suggested this argument during a moot reality is that the [Amy’s] suggested approach would court session at Susman Godfrey’s office in Houston in January. amount to holding each possessor of her images liable In 1990, the Supreme Court held that an award of restitution for the conduct of thousands of other independently act‑ ing possessors and distributors, with no legal or practi‑ in­terested in settling the case. He wanted an opinion. After cal avenue for seeking contribution. That approach is so the Fifth Circuit’s en banc opinion, which gave Amy all the severe it might raise questions under the Excessive Fines relief that she had requested, Paul Cassell actually gave some Clause of the Eighth Amendment” [emphasis added]. helpful suggestions to Stanley on what our petition for writ Before Paroline, if you had run the Westlaw query resti- of certiorari might contain. He also wanted an opinion. tution /p “Eighth Amendment,” you would have gotten no During Cassell’s argument before the Supreme Court, cases. Run it now, and you’ll pick up Paroline. it was obvious to everyone in attendance that most of the 6 AfterParoline, every defendant in a child pornography Justices were not buying what he had to sell—and his de‑ case—when there is an identifiable victim—is going to be meanor began to change. In the Lawyer’s Lounge after ar‑ required to pay restitution. The Court has interpreted § 2259 guments, he was, at best, aloof. That gave us great comfort. to be a strict liability statute. My concern is that there is I believe that Amy’s lawyers underestimated the strength going to be no consistency in these restitution awards. of our position and Stanley’s ability to articulate that posi‑ 6 Every defendant in every restitution case should be con‑ tion. The lesson is there. Be careful what you ask for. cerned about holding the Government to its burden under 6 The surprise: When Justice Scalia was at the Fifth Circuit 18 U.S.C. § 3664(e). con­ference in May, he barely mentioned Paroline. Could 6 Our case is still some months away from being over. Paroline he actually have been concerned about embarrassing the will be ordered to pay some amount of restitution, but it won’t former Chief Judge of the Circuit for her opinion? We’ll be $3.4 million. never know the answer to that question. 6 Amy’s lawyers wanted this case to go to the Supreme Court, 6 Bye, bye Supreme Court. It was a great adventure for the but I never understood why they would choose a defendant Team! who possessed only two images of Amy as their target. Between the first and second hearings that were held in Buck Files, a member of TCDLA’s Hall of Fame and past president the district court, I attempted to enter into settlement ne­ of the State Bar of Texas, practices in Tyler, Texas, with the law firm go­tiations with James Marsh. He told me that he was not Bain, Files, Jarrett, Bain & Harrison, PC.

Richard “Racehorse” Haynes Lifetime Achievement

Lawyers of the Year

Torch of Liberty Award

Sharon Levine Unsung Heroes

Mentor of the Year

President’s Award

Member of the Year

*Highlight your local bar’s achievements. Contact TCDLA. 2014–2015 Membership Directory Order Form/Information Update—Due by 8/15/14 In a contin­uing effort to “go green,” the TCDLA board voted in 2011 to to send everyone a link with the electronic version in the form of a PDF. If you need a CD, a complimentary one will be sent to you. 4 Remember, you can access the directory online in the “Members Only” section. This is updated daily and is the most current and accurate version. Directories are esti­ mated to ship by October 30th. 4 Market yourself online: X Add your photo to the online directory (email photo to [email protected]); X List yourself in Lawyer Locator, which is visible to the public seeking attorneys; X Add a bio; X Add website. 4 Update information or order online (publications), fax to 512-469-9107, or mail to 6808 Hill Meadow Drive | Austin, TX 78736.

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For statistical purposes only: Member of a local criminal defense bar association ______Date of Birth* ______Sex ____ Ethnicity ______Law School ______*to get a birthday coupon Simon Purnell tried two federal jury trials, in two con- outcry. The SANE examination revealed an acute tear in secutive weeks in April, and walked his clients in both the oldest complainant’s genitalia. The accused testified at cases. The first, in Victoria, Texas, involved the alleged trial, so his priors were revealed. All extraneous allega- smuggling of marijuana into FCI Three Rivers, a medium- tions came into evidence. It was also revealed that the security facility, by Ms. Phillips, a female visitor. The accused’s girlfriend had been asking her children for years government presented video of the visit, theorizing a kiss whether “anyone had touched them.” The first accuser at the end of the visit as the delivery vehicle. The jury was having progressively worse discipline problems and found for the defendant after hearing about the alternative blamed the accused for her punishments over these issues. ways drugs get into prisons—namely, the guards, other The jury deliberated for two days and came back with the visitors, and the inmates themselves. It also helped that the correct verdict of not guilty. Congratulations, Nicole, on a guards were not consistent in their testimony . . . and that tough win. the inmate testified it was another inmate who passed it to TCDLA Board member Oscar Vega won a not guilty on all him in the strip-search room while one of the guards sat four counts of a federal conspiracy indictment in Judge Ri- surfing the internet. cardo Hinojosa’s court in McAllen. His client was charged The second case, in Corpus Christi, involved a spin- with having made false statements to, and committed off case from the DEA and FBI investigation of the “silk fraud against, the Department of Education. The charges road” website. The DEA office in Indonesia tracked a alleged employees and students made false statements on purchase of sassafras oil (one of the precursors for MDMA financial statements for Pell Loans. The jury deliberated and meth) on the website to Corpus. Despite having the for an hour before returning a verdict of not guilty on all technology to track the purchase, package, and delivery counts. Kudos to Oscar for such a quick win. (which was videotaped), finding an adult chemistry set and various alternative chemistry texts with recipes for the TCDLA Board member Sarah Roland would like to pass production of MDMA and meth, the agents followed DEA out a couple kudos as well, the first to Patty Tress. Sarah policy and did not record the interview and alleged con- tells us that Patty recently got three verdicts of not guilty fession. The jury found the defendant not guilty after hear- after a jury trial in Denton County on aggravated kidnap- ing about the coercive techniques used by the DEA in this ping, felony assault, and felony evading. And this despite case, including threatening to arrest my client’s disabled the fact that her guy had been to the pen before, too. Way mother for marijuana and pills she had in her room. to go, Patty. All in all, a hectic couple of weeks for Simon, but the results definitely made the effort worth it. Way to go, Sarah, no slouch herself (she joins Lance Evans and Lau- counselor. rie Key as next year’s Rusty course directors), would also like to commend CDLP committee chairs Kelly Pace and Nicole DeBorde got some good news in one tough case Michael Gross for putting together marvelous seminars. in the 262nd District Court in Harris County. Accused, Michael, who is also the Voice editor, presided over the who had been to the penitentiary for credit card abuse Trial Strategies That Work series wending its way around and burglary on concurrent charges, was charged with Aggravated Sexual Assault of a Child. He was living with the state. Look for more details coming soon on Kelly’s se- his girlfriend and her extended family, and the 13-year- ries, titled Training Your Defense Team to Win, a compre- old niece of his girlfriend told another aunt he had been hensive approach that promises to involve your entire law sexually assaulting her. Other children in the home were office in winning cases. A big thanks to Michael and Kelly questioned, and an 8-year-old and 10-year-old also made for their hard work putting these together. If you’re going to Rusty Duncan...

What to remember and what’s new or different this year at Rusty

This year we have an exciting Members Party, from 8:00 to 11:00 pm, Friday, June 13, in the Hyatt Regency Ballroom. The theme is Casino Night—“Viva la San Antonio”—an evening of hors d’oeuvres and casino games like blackjack and roulette (cocktail dress). Tickets are $20, and you can sign up on the registration form. Money raised will fund scholarships. No children under 18 are allowed. Childcare, for an economical $10 a night, is available in the Hyatt Regency. Childcare cannot be purchased onsite.

The Hall of Fame Luncheon will once again take place during the Friday-afternoon lunch break. Box lunches are available for $15 (less than half the cost to TCDLA), but you should book in advance to ensure you won’t be lunch-less in this event honoring those superstars of Texas criminal defense law elected to the Hall this year.

Also new this year is your passport to Rusty (pick it up at registration). Visit our exhibitors and get yours stamped, then enter it in a drawing for two tablets, an iPad, a Galaxy Tab 3 cell phone, a TCDLA membership, and a Rusty Duncan registration. The winners will be drawn from those entries with a complete set of stamps. Early check-in, beginning at 2:30 pm, and the Members Reception (5:30 to 7:30 pm) will once again be held in Exhibit Hall B on Wednesday, June 11th. Come and catch up with friends and graze on hors d’oeuvres while checking out the wares of our supporters. Use the time to get your Rusty passport stamped. Once again, TCDLA shuttle buses will run a regular schedule from our hotels—Menger, Hyatt Regency, and La Quinta—to the convention center. During seminar hours, air-conditioned buses will run every 10 to 15 minutes. Special assistance transportation is also available by calling 800-256-2757.

Keep in mind that the air conditioning is set to accommodate some 800 people at any given time. For those who might have an issue with the temperature, we suggest bringing an extra layer, just in case. Of course, we’re happy to sell you one of our stylish TCDLEI items of clothing, with all proceeds used for the education of new lawyers.

Once again, there’ll be a silent auction to raise money for scholarships. Last year, our members and sponsors donated an incredible array of goodies. The action all ends on Friday afternoon, so don’t miss out on your chance to bid on the Hog Hunt or on the rare opportunity to abuse Robb Fickman. All money raised will go for scholarships for deserving attorneys.

Christine and Gerry Goldstein will once again host the social event of the season from 6:30 to 9:00 p.m. on Thursday, June 12—the Pachanga, paying tribute to outgoing President Bobby Mims and honoring incoming President Emmett Harris. You are reminded that casual attire is required.

And for those so inclined, Gerry Goldstein and Tony Vitz will be leading the pack on a Hill Country Bike Ride from 5:30 to 7:00 p.m. on Friday, June 13th, designed not to conflict with any of the other festivities. Spandex is not required.

Coffee-holics should note that because of increasing costs, coffee will only be served at the two breaks. Several other areas in the convention center do sell coffee throughout the day. John M. Economidy

upervised Release (“SR”) is supervision of a federal defen‑ make timely objections to protect the client. Sdant after a prison term and is part of the total sentence.1 SR Since November 1, 2011, amended USSG § 5D1.1(c) states has three primary legal sources: 18 U.S.C. § 3583;2 Fed. R. Crim. that a court should not ordinarily impose SR in a case not re‑ P. 32.1;3 and U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual [hereinafter quired by statute when the defendant is a deportable alien who USSG] §§ 5D1.1–5D1.3; 7B1.1-7B1.4.4 The court is required to likely will be deported after imprisonment.7 Failure to object impose a term of supervised release to follow imprisonment if does not lead to plain error reversal.8 a sentence of imprisonment of more than one year is imposed or if a term of SR is required by a specific statute.5 Supervised Duration of SR release is also required if the defendant has been convicted for the first time of a domestic relations crime, as defined in 18 The duration of SR depends on the nature of the crime for which U.S.C. § 3561(b).6 Defense attorneys should counsel their federal the defendant is convicted. SR for terrorism crimes under 18 felony client on SR, its duration, its potential conditions, and the U.S.C. § 2332b(g)(5)(B)9 has any term to life.10 SR will carry a implications of revocation. Counsel also should be prepared to term of a minimum three years to life for child kidnapping, sex trafficking, sex crimes, Sex Offender Registration and Notifi‑ violence crime has been committed for the first time; cation Act (SORNA), child sex exploitation, buying or selling ? Sex offenders must register under SORNA;18 children, child pornography, sexual depictions of minors, in‑ ? Defendants must provide a DNA sample;19 ternet traveling with minors, and use of interstate facilities to ? Defendants may be subjected to urinalysis testing unless transmit information on minors.11 ameliorated under domestic violence rehabilitation under The duration of SR in drug offenses generally is variable 18 U.S.C. § 3563(a)(4). based upon the type of drug, its quantity, and the existence of prior convictions,12 as follows: Special Terms. Most problems arise on special terms and conditions ordered by a district judge. SR special conditions ? At least one kilogram of heroin, five kilograms of cocaine, may be imposed under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d)(1)–(3) if the court 50 grams of crack, 100 kilograms of marijuana, or 50 grams considers three factors. of methamphetamine: 5 years SR without prior convictions The first factor is that the special SR condition must be and 10 years SR with prior convictions; reasonably related to the sentencing factors in § 3553, which ? 100 grams or more of heroin, 500 grams or more of cocaine, cover these areas: 5 grams of crack of more, 100 kilograms of marijuana, or 5 grams or more of methamphetamine: 4 years SR without ? The nature and circumstances of the offense and the history prior convictions and 8 years SR with prior convictions. and characteristics of the defendant;20 ? The need for the sentence imposed to afford adequate Class A felonies13 (those carrying a penalty or life or death) deterrence to the criminal conduct;21 and Class B felonies (those carrying a penalty or 25 years or ? The ability to protect the public from further crimes of more) can have no more than 5 years of SR.14 the defendant;22 and Class C felonies (those carrying a penalty of 10 or more ? To provide the defendant with needed educational and years but less than 25 years) and Class D felonies (those carrying vocational training, medical care, or other correctional a penalty of 5 or more years but less than 10 years) can have no treatment.23 more than 3 years of SR.15 A Class E Felony (those carrying a penalty of more than 1 The second and, from a view point of objections, most year but less than 5 years) or a misdemeanor other than a petty important factor is that the SR condition involves no greater offense can have SR of not more than 1 year. deprivation of liberty than is reasonably necessary for these When a district judge automatically imposes a lifetime SR purposes. without engaging in an analysis of the circumstances surround‑ The third factor is that the SR special term and condition ing the crime, plain error occurs.16 be consistent with the USSG policy statements. Inquiry of the conditions before sentencing with the U.S. Probation Officer and in court with the district judge can bring Conditions of Supervised Release problems to light before sentencing. A sample canned objection The area that produces most attorney errors in SR proceedings is is noted in a box on the following page. the lack of awareness of the conditions of supervised release. It is Problem Special Conditions. Especially problematic are not uncommon for an attorney to be unaware of the conditions special terms and conditions related to assessing sex offender that can be imposed. If the attorney fails to timely object, then registration and counseling, computers, phones, family mem‑ review on appeal on the imposed conditions is for plain error bers, and required counseling. only.17 The standardized conditions of SR are detailed in USSG Conviction for sex offenses draws the special conditions in § 5D1.3. The court can impose the recommended conditions, USSG § 5D1.3(d)(7). This section mandates participation in a statutory conditions, and special conditions. Defense counsel treatment and monitoring program, limiting use of a computer should bring these conditions to the attention of the defendant or interactive computer service “in cases in which the defen‑ before sentencing and anticipate problems. dant used such items,” and nonconsensual search of one’s home, Federal law, 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d), and USSG § 3D1.3(a) re‑ computer, computer, and electronic devices.24 quire the following mandatory conditions: Sex offender counseling has been upheld as a condition under plain error review when counsel failed to object when ? The defendant shall commit no new crimes or use drugs; the defendant was never convicted of a sexual offense.25 Such ? A rehabilitation program is mandatory when a domestic conditions have been imposed in a non-sex-offense case when a “sex offense,” a limitation on the “use of a computer or an in‑ Objection Points to Unexpected teractive computer service in cases in which the defendant used Special Conditions of SR such items.” Instant offense for which Tang was sentenced is his Defendant objects to the special supervised release failure to register. Tang’s prior offense—assault with intent to condition of (_____) because it is not a statutorily mandated commit sexual abuse, not causing bodily injury—did not involve condition under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d) and fails to satisfy the a computer or the internet. The Fifth Circuit held there was no permissible criteria in that section, specifically: evidence that Tang has ever used the internet to commit an offense • The first factor is that the special SR condition must of any sort. The Fifth Circuit agreed with Tang that this condition be reasonably related to the sentencing factors in could not be based on § 5D1.3(d)(7). The court reasoned that the § 3553, which cover these areas: internet ban was not “reasonably relate[d] to the factors set forth ■ The nature and circumstances of the offense and in” § 3553(a) and involved a greater deprivation of liberty than the history and characteristics of the defendant reasonably necessary under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d)(1)–(2). The ban (§ 3553(a)(1)); on computers did not relate to the “nature and circumstances” of ■ The need for the sentence imposed to afford Tang’s offense, the failure to register as a sex offender. ade­quate deterrence to the criminal conduct (§ 3553(a)(2)(B)); On March 31, 2014, part of the Tang case was limited by 33 ■ The ability to protect the public from further United States v. Segura. Segura pleaded guilty to failure to regis‑ crimes of the defendant (§ 3552(a)(2)(C)); and ter as a sex offender (“failure to register”) under the Sex Offender ■ To provide the defendant with needed educational Registration and Notification Act (“SORNA”). In a footnote, and vocational training, medical care, or other the Court said that under USSG § 5D1.2 cmt. n.1, “failure to correctional treatment (§ 3552(a)(2)(D)). register [as a sex offender] qualifies as a sex offense.” 34 Tang, 718 • The second and, from a viewpoint of objections, F.3d at 483 n.3. As a result, Segura was placed on lifetime SR. most important factor is that the SR condition involve Segura held that the footnote was mere dictum, and that failure no greater deprivation of liberty than is reasonably to register did not qualify as a sex offense for the purposes of necessary for these purposes. USSG § 5D1.2(b)(2). Because defense counsel did not object at • The third factor is that the SR special term and condi- sentencing, Sergura’s lifetime SR was held not to be plain error tion be consistent with the USSG policy statements. that required reversal. Cite case law. SR conditions barring internet access have been upheld.35 The SR condition barring access to computers has also been extended to apply to cell phones with internet connection ca‑ there is evidence of a sexual misconduct.26 pability.36 Sexual offender registration as a condition has been at‑ District courts have also upheld testing by penile plethys‑ tempted when no sex crime was involved. Sexual offender reg‑ mograph as an SR condition even though the procedure is a istration cannot be based on a bare arrest record.27 Sex offender mentally and physically intrusive procedure of disputed scien‑ registration has been upheld when there was some evidence tific validity.37 Until the device is actually used, objections to of sexual misconduct when defense counsel failed to object.28 such testing are often dismissed as being unripe.38 But sexual offender registration as a condition has been held in District courts have imposed SR conditions to prohibit error where defense counsel objected that there was no sexual a de­fen­dant from having access to his/her own children39 or offense.29 Sex offender registration as a condition of SR has been his/her own spouse in an abusive relationship.40 However, the voided in a drug offender case when the condition was not ver­ Fifth Circuit has struck down an SR condition that required the bally pronounced at sentencing.30 defendant in a drug case to live only with his/her spouse or a Barring access to computers has also been upheld as an SR blood relative, as the condition imposed a greater deprivation condition.31 United States v. Tang 32 marked a change to this re‑ of liberty than was necessary.41 quirement when computers were not part of the original offense. Court-ordered mental health treatment has been upheld Tang was convicted for failing to register as a sex offender. A as a permissible condition of SR. A condition barring use of computer was not involved in his offense. The sentencing judge alcohol has been held as an abuse of discretion in a non-alcohol imposed an SR condition that Tang not use a computer. The Fifth offense42 but not plain error.43 However, religious-based treat‑ Circuit held that USSG § 5D1.3(d)(7)(B)(2012) recommends, ment in Alcoholics Anonymous as a condition has been struck as a special condition of release for an individual convicted of down as violative of a Buddhist’s religious beliefs.44 The Fifth Circuit has held that conditions may deprive a course of one year. Urinalysis results must be confirmed by defendant of constitutional rights and still survive.45 mass spectrometer testing.58 In United States v. Tapia, 564 U.S. __, 131 S. Ct. 2382, 2393 (2011), the U.S. Supreme Court held that a court may not impose Revocation can be based on a non-criminal act.59 or lengthen a prison sentence to enable an offender to complete a Revocation normally starts when a U.S. Probation Officer treatment program or otherwise to promote rehabilitation. Tapia sends written reasons for revocation based on violations of the has been extended to sentences on revocation of supervised release.46 conditions of SR to the U.S. District Clerk on a Petition for Problems also have focused on whether or not the con‑ Warrant for Offender under Supervision.60 This petition does ditions were announced at sentencing. Oral pronouncement not have to be sworn.61 An indictment is not required.62 The of the terms of SR controls overwritten terms of SR.47 Other warrant must issue before the SR terms expires, but the hearing problems arise when the conditions of supervision were not can be heard after the SR term expires.63 stated at sentencing and achieve the opposite result when the The defendant is arraigned on the revocation petition.64 unpronounced conditions are mandatory, standard, and recom‑ The Defendant can waive the arraignment. mended by the U.S. Sentencing Manual.48 But, “if the district A defendant may seek bond pending revocation.65 A defen‑ court fails to mention a special condition at sentencing, its sub‑ dant has no right to a jury trial for revocation.66 An attorney may sequent inclusion in the written judgment creates a conflict that be appointed for a defendant in a revocation action.67 Defendant requires amendment of the written judgment to conform with can waive counsel in a revocation action.68 A defendant does not the oral pronouncement.”49 have a constitutional right to represent himself at a revocation hearing, but the U.S. District Judge has discretion to allow a defendant to proceed pro se.69 Accordingly, a waiver of the right Time Issues to counsel in the revocation context need not meet the formal Time can be an issue on supervised release. Supervised release requirements of the Sixth Amendment.70 starts on the day released from the Bureau of Prisons and runs If the defendant demands a hearing, the hearing has limi‑ concurrently with any other state or federal probation, parole, tations. The Federal Rules of Evidence do not apply.71 In the or SR. Supervised release does not run when person is impris‑ absence of police harassment, the exclusionary rule does not oned for other state or federal confinement unless that period apply to SR revocation hearings.72 An SR hearing cannot col‑ is less than 30 days.50 laterally attack the original conviction.73 After the time of SR has run, the defendant cannot be re‑ A defendant has an allocution right to speak at the revoca‑ voked for subsequent misconduct.51 Escape tolls the clock for tion hearing.74 SR.52 A defendant in an SR revocation hearing has limited con‑ A U.S. District Judge has the authority to terminate SR frontation rights.75 While due process provides the defendant in early;53 however, defense counsel better have the support of the a revocation proceeding the right to confront and cross-examine U.S. Probation Officer and the Assistant U.S. Attorney before adverse witnesses, the district judge may deny such right if there filing the motion.54 Once SR has been vacated, the U.S. District is good cause to do so.76 The limited confrontation right does not Court lacks jurisdiction to revoke SR.55 A U.S. District Judge extend beyond revocation to the sentencing context upon the also has authority to increase the duration of SR.56 fact of revocation.77 Police reports can be considered as reliable evidence in the sentencing context.78 The evidentiary standard for finding a violation of SR is Revocation of SR preponderance of the evidence.79 Supervised release can be revoked. The legal authority for re‑ Defendant can also plead true and sign a plea agreement. If vocation is set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e), USSG §§ 7B1.1 to this is done, client and counsel usually do not have further court 7B1.4,57 and Fed. R. Crim. P. 32.1. proceedings. Counsel should carefully scrutinize such a plea Revocation is mandatory under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(g) for agreement as miscalculation on revocation is not plain error.80 defendants with the following circumstances: A U.S. District Court is not required, by Fed. R. Crim. P. 32.1 or the Due Process Clause,81 to provide the defendant ? Possessing drugs or firearm; with pre-sentencing notice of all points raised in the revoca‑ ? Failing to comply with drug testing; tion sentencing colloquy.82 Where there is an adequate basis for ? Testing positive for illegal drugs more than three times over the district court’s discretionary action or revocation action, a reviewing court need not decide a claim of error as to other tion of [SR] [emphasis added]. grounds that had been advanced as a cause for revocation.83 This formula has a two-step process. First, the district court must identify the term of SR authorized for the defendant’s Consequences Upon Revocation original offense. Revocation carries two main consequences: a revocation sen‑ In determining the SR authorized for the defendant’s origi‑ tence to prison and assessment of additional SR. nal offense, remember that the SR statute, 18 U.S.C. § 3583(b), Revocation sentencing is evolving. Initially, counsel de‑ states its provisions apply “except as otherwise provided.” These termines the grade of supervised release violations in USSG last four words are a worm hole into a different dimension. § 7B1.1. Violations are Grade A,84 B,85 or C.86 Recall that certain statutes, especially statutes involving sex or When multiple violations occur, the violation with the high‑ drugs, set their own SR term. When a statute, such as amended est grade controls.87 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(C),97 sets a lower limit on the SR term but Upon a finding of a Grade A or B violation, the district court no maximum limit, then the outer limit is life.98 shall revoke SR.88 A Grade C violation may draw an extension The second step is to subtract from the originally authorized of the SR or modification of the SR terms.89 SR term “any term of imprisonment that was imposed upon The range of punishment applicable upon revocation is revocation of [SR].” The courts of appeal have concluded that found in the table at USSG § 7B1.4. The top line of the table the term “any term of imprisonment” includes all prior SR terms details the defendant’s criminal history category. Use the crimi‑ when there have been multiple revocations.99 nal history category from the defendant’s original sentence to Revoking a sentence and adding a new SR term can create the term of supervision.90 Defense counsel should verify the a variety of issues. defendant’s criminal history category by reading the judgment on PACER or by phoning the U.S. Probation Officer assigned ? Revocation of SR and prosecution for a new crime is not to the case. double jeopardy or collateral estoppel;100 The left column of the table gives the grade of violation. ? Issues arise with respect to concurrent and consecu‑ Where the defendant’s criminal history intersects with the grade tive sentences. USSG § 7B1.3(f) urges consecutive time. of violation, a range of imprisonment is months is displayed. But concurrent sentencing is permissible with 18 U.S.C. Consulting the table does not end the quest for a revocation § 3553(a) reasonableness.101 Concurrent sentencing is sentence. The Fifth Circuit holds that 18 U.S.C. § 358291 applies available to a new federal offense, a new state offense, to the revocation sentence.92 This reference permits the district and even an anticipated new state offense.102 Still, federal judge to apply a reasonable sentence rather than be stuck to the courts can articulate reasons and make SR terms run revocation table. However, the Fifth Circuit has gone further consecutively.103 and held that 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(A)93 does not apply to re‑ 94 vocation sentences. Appeals If the district court imposes a revocation sentence outside the range recommended by the USSG policy statements, the Within 14 days of sentencing, counsel can file a motion under Court must give an explanation.95 Fed. R. Crim. P. 35(a) to correct an SR sentence from arith‑ Also, the district courts have had statutory authority to metical, technical, or other clear error.104 Failing that, the next impose a new term of SR after revocation since the 1994 Crimes step is an appeal. Act added 18 U.S.C. § 3585(h). Adding an additional term of SR Federal appeal courts have jurisdiction to hear an appeal after revocation has passed constitutional challenge.96 in a criminal case under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742. Computing the duration of the new term of SR can be com­ A criminal appellant must file a notice of appeal with the plex. The statute that authorizes a new term of SR, 18 U.S.C. U.S. District Clerk within 14 days of judgment.105 Federal appel‑ § 3583(h), calculates the maximum term of SR upon revocation late rules have certain requirements for the notice of appeal.106 by the following formula: In non-indigent cases in the Fifth Circuit in 2013, a filing fee of $455 must be paid upon filing the notice of appeal.107 The length of such a term of [SR] shall not exceed Within 10 days of the filing of the notice of appeal, appellate the term of supervised release authorized for the of‑ counsel should file a variety of forms to enter one’s appearance fense that resulted in the original term of [SR], less any with the applicable court of appeals and order the transcript. term of imprisonment that was imposed upon revoca‑ Such forms are usually available off the court’s webpage. Court- appointed counsel also needs to file an attorney tax identification or requirements.123 Unpublished Fifth Circuit cases issued before form with the applicable court of appeals. This form is available January 1, 1996, are precedent in the Fifth Circuit.124 off the court of appeals’ webpage. Waiver of the right to an appeal in a plea bargain is enforce‑ Endnotes able on SR issues.108 However, the standard appeal waiver in the original appeal agreement may not waive the right to appeal a 1. United States v. Gonzalez, 250 F.3d 923, 928 (5th Cir. 2001). 2. Section 3583 is the statutory authority for SR and its operation. subsequent revocation of SR.109 Fifth Circuit case law requires 3. This rule covers revocation and modification of SR. defense counsel to ascertain and certify in the appellate brief 4. A defendant must be sentenced under the version of the Guidelines in whether the Government will rely on the defendant’s appeal effect at sentencing, unless doing so would violate the Ex Post Facto Clause of waiver.110 If the Government does not invoke the appeal waiver the Constitution. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(4)(A)(ii); USSG § 1B1.11; United States v. Martin, 596 F.3d 284, 286 (5th Cir. 2010). Typically, the guidelines are updated provision of a plea agreement, the waiver provision does not bar each November.The latest annual edition of the Guidelines Manual can be found 111 112 an appeal. Validity of an appeal waiver is reviewed de novo. on the internet: , click , click or . peals involving supervised release. The standard of review for 5. USSG § 5D1.1. Examples of statutes mandating a term of SR include certain sexual crimes, 18 U.S.C. § 3583(k), and drug offenses, 21 U.S.C. § 841(b) 113 jurisdictional issues is de novo. Jurisdiction is lacking when (1)(A)(viii), (B)(viii), (C), and (D). appellant appeals a supervised release issue after the supervised 6. 18 U.S.C. § 3583(a). This statute identifies the victims as spouse, former release has been served, as there is no case or controversy as spouse, intimate partner, former intimate partner, child or former child of the defendant, or any other relative of the defendant. required by Article III, § 2 of the Constitution of the United 7. United States v. Cancino-Trinidad, 710 F.3d 601, 607 (5th Cir. 2013). 114 States. 8. The amendments still give a district judge authority to impose terms of A federal prisoner can use 28 U.S.C. § 2255 to be released SR for deportable aliens when no statutory minimum SR terms exists if SR is from custody on a claim the sentence was imposed in violation needed as “an additional measure of deterrence and protection.” United States v. Dominguez-Alvarado, 695 F.3d 324, 329-10 (5th Cir. 2012). See also United of the Constitutional and laws of the United States or the Court States v. Bercerril-Pena, 714 F.3d 347, 351 (5th Cir. 2013)(SR for deportable lacked jurisdiction to impose the sentence or was in excess of the alien upheld on case facts). maximum allowed by law. In this regards, a defendant on super‑ 9. The list of terrorism crimes is massive. The list covers crimes that may vised release is in custody for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 2255.115 be considered definitional crimes of terrorism (destruction of aircraft, use of chemical or biological weapons) plus acts that might be not be so considered Appellate briefs are required to give the appropriate stan‑ (murder of foreign officials, homicide of U.S. nationals outside the United States, dard of review. Supervised release issues have the following financing terrorism). standards of review. 10. 18 U.S.C. § 3583(j). 11. 18 U.S.C. § 3583(k). This provision was added in 2003 by the Prosecuto‑ rial Remedies and Other Tools to End the Exploitation of Children Today Act ? Regular conditions of SR are viewed for abuse of discre‑ [PROTECT Act, Pub. L. 108–21, § 101, 117 Stat. 650, 651]. The PROTECT Act tion;116 is not retroactive. United States v. Thomas, 600 F.3d 387, 389 (5th Cir. 2010) ? Special conditions of SR are reviewed for abuse of discre‑ (ap­plication violated Ex Post Facto Clause). 117 12. 21 U.S.C. § 841. tion; 13. Felonies are classified by 18 U.S.C. § 3559(a). ? Decisions to revoke SR are reviewed for abuse of discre‑ 14. 18 U.S.C. § 3583(a). tion;118 15. 18 U.S.C. § 3583(a). ? A sentence that exceeds the statutory maximum is plain 16. United States v. Alvarado, 690 F.3d 592, 598 (5th Cir. 2012)(“I’ve never given, never not given, since it was authorized, a lifetime, a lifetime supervision 119 error; in child pornography.”). ? Revocation sentences are reviewed under 18 U.S.C. 17. United States v. Talbert, 501 F.3d 449, 452 (5th Cir. 2007). § 3472(a)’s plainly unreasonable standard.120 If counsel fails 18. 42 U.S.C. §§ 16901–962. 19. See standards in DNA—Sample Collection and Biological Evidence to object, then the standard is plain error review.121 Pres­ervation in the Federal Jurisdiction, 73 Fed. Reg. 74932 (Dec. 10, 2008), and 28 C.F.R. § 28.12. DNA collection statutes have withstood constitutional Occasionally, a defendant will have a count set aside on challenge. Groceman v. United States Dep’t of Justice, 354 F.3d 411 (5th Cir. 2004). appeal or have his sentence reduced under crack cocaine re- The U.S. Supreme Court has recently approved collection of DNA samples when a defendant is booked. Maryland v. King, 569 U.S. __, 133 S. Ct. 1958 (2013). sentencing and will have served more time in confinement upon 20. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1). remand than was due after re-sentencing. In such a case, the 21. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(B). defendant is not entitled, as a matter of law, to a reduction of 22. 18 U.S.C. § 3552(a)(2)(C). his term of supervised release.122 23. 18 U.S.C. § 3552(a)(2)(D). 24. For an excellent review of these conditions, see United States v. Ellis, 720 This article cites a number of unpublished cases. Such cases F.3d 220, 224–28 (5th Cir. 2013). after 2007 may be cited in appeals briefs with certain limitations 25. United States v. Ybarra, 289 F. App’x. 726, 733–34 (5th Cir. 2008)(origi‑ nally a drug case; conditions imposed upon revocation of SR); United States v. 274 F.3d 155, 165–66 (5th Cir. 2001) (prohibition where children congregate Deleon, 280 F. App’x 348, 351 (5th Cir. 2008)(felon with firearm). for photographer who plead guilty to possession of child pornography). The 26. United States v. Weatherton, 567 F.3d 149 (5th Cir. 2009)(fraud case). Court said the defendant was not, however, ineluctably barred from contact 27. District court may not rely on bare arrest record for sentencing. United with his children. The term of supervised release allowed such contact with States v. Harris, 702 F.3d 226, 229 (5th Cir. 2012); United States v. Windless, 719 the probation officer’s permission. If such permission is unfairly denied, the F.3d 415, 417 (5th Cir. 2013). An arrest record is “bare” when it refers “to the mere district court could modify the term under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(2) and Fed. fact of an arrest—i.e.[,] the date, charge, jurisdiction & disposition—without R. Crim. P. 32.1(c). See United States v. Phipps, 319 F.3d 177, 193–94 (5th Cir. corresponding information about the underlying facts or circumstances regard‑ 2003)(upholding condition of supervised release and suggesting modification ing the defendant’s conduct that led to the arrest.” Id. Due process requires “that as a possible remedy). But see United States v. Windless, 719 F.3d 415 (5th Cir. sentencing facts . . . be established by a preponderance of the evidence. United 2013)(prohibiting all contact with children was unreasonable). State. v. Johnson, 648 F.3d 273, 277–78 (5th Cir. 2011). 40. United States v. Balderas, 358 F. App’x 575, 578–81 (5th Cir. 2009)(no 28. Ybarra, 289 F. App’x at 733 (suggesting result would have differed if objection by counsel). counsel had properly objected and developed a record). 41. United States v. Wood, 547 F.3d 515, 518–19 (5th Cir. 2008)(creates greater 29. United States v. Jimenez, 275 F. App’x 433, 439–41 (5th Cir. 2008). deprivation of liberty than is necessary to meet goals of SR). 30. United States v. Diaz, 413 F. App’x 704, 710 (5th Cir. 2011). 42. United States v. Bass, 121 F.3d 1218, 1223–25 (8th Cir. 1997)(drug case 31. United States v. Brigham, 569 F.3d 220, 234 (5th Cir. 2009)(also cov‑ without evidence of excessive use of alcohol). ers prohibitions on pornographic materials, sexually phone services, sexually 43. United States v. Carrillo, 660 F.3d 914, 930 (5th Cir. 2011). stimulating materials); United States v. Paul, 274 F.3d 155, 167–70 (5th Cir. 44. Inouye v. Kemna, 504 F.3d 705, 712 (9th Cir. 2007)(parole condition, 2001); United States v. Ellis, 720 F.3d 220, 225 (5th Cir. 2013) (upholding lifetime not SR). ban). See also United States v. Miller, 665 F.3d 114, 126, 133–34 (5th Cir. 2011) 45. United States v. Woods, 547 F.3d 515, 519 (5th Cir. 2008); see also 18 (upholding 25-year ban on computer use, subject to approval by the probation U.S.C. § 3583(d)(listing standard conditions that inherently infringe a defen‑ officer). Paul and Miller were indorsed in United States v. Esler, 531 F. App’x dant’s liberty and requiring that other conditions involve “no greater depriva‑ 502 (5th Cir. 2013). tion of liberty than is reasonably necessary”). See also Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 32. 718 F.3d 476, 483–84 (5th Cir. 2013). U.S. 868, 874, 107 S. Ct. 3164)(1987) (citing Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 33. (No. 12-11262), 2014 WL 1282759*4 (5th Cir. Mar. 31, 2014). 480, 92 S. Ct. 2593 (1972)); United States v. Stafford, 983 F.2d 25, 28 (5th Cir. 34. Under a proposed amendment to USSG § 2D1.2, application note 1, set 1993)(holding that a condition is “not necessarily invalidated merely because to go into effect on November 1, 2014, failure to register as a sex offender under it impairs” enjoyment of constitutional rights). United States v. Brown, 235 F.3d 18 U.S.C. § 2250 will not be a sex offense. Amendments to Sentencing Guidelines 2, 7 (1st Cir. 2000). (Preliminary), April 10, 2014. 46. United States v. Garza, 706 F.3d 655, 656–58 (5th Cir. 2013). Footnote 5 35. United States v. Paul, 274 F.3d 155, 169 (5th Cir. 2001)(3 years); United of Garza states that Tapia casts doubt on the continuing validity; United States States v. Thielemann, 575 F.3d 265, 270, 278 (3d Cir. 2009)(10 years); United v. Giddings, 37 F.3d 1091 (5th Cir. 1994), in which a panel heard an appeal from States v. Fortenberry, 350 F. App’x 906, 911 (5th Cir. 2009)(for life in child a sentence of imprisonment that was imposed following mandatory revocation pornography case; deemed harsh but upheld under plain error since defense of supervised release pursuant to a prior version of § 3583(g). As a result, the counsel did not object). Fifth Circuit joins the majority of Circuits, cited in Garza, applying Tapia to 36. United States v. Craig, 383 Fed. App’x 445, 447 (5th Cir. 2010). Such a revocation actions. Extended SR for rehabilitation purposes is now plain error. restriction may seem quite impracticable as various phone services, such as United States v. Meza, No. 11-10565, 2013 WL 3227272, at *2 (5th Cir. Feb. 7, AT&T, abandon hard-line phones and go only to cell phones. 2013). However, rehabilitation can be considered as a secondary factor rather 37. United States v. Christian, 344 F. App’x 53, 56 (5th Cir. 2009). than as the dominant factor. United States v. Walker, 742 F.3d 614 (5th Cir. 2014). 38. See United States v. Carmichael, 343 F.3d 756, 761–62 (5th Cir. 2003). 47. United States v. Bigelow, 462 F.3d 378, 381 (5th Cir. 2006); United States This challenge to a condition of supervised release is, unlike restriction, not v. Torres-Aguilar, 352 F.3d 934, 935 (5th Cir. 2003). The remedy is to reform contingent on future events or decisions. See, e.g., United States v. Paul, 274 the judgment to the oral pronouncement. United States v. Martinez, 250 F.3d F.3d 155, 164–55 (5th Cir. 2001) (addressing the appeal of several restrictions 941, 942 (5th Cir. 2001). including no contact with minors). The Fifth Circuit agrees with circuits that 48. United States v. Torres-Aguilar, 352 F.3d 934, 938 (5th Cir. 2003). dismissed similar challenges to penile plethsymograph testing for lack of ripe‑ 49. Id. at 936 (emphasis in original). ness. See United States v. Rhodes, 552 F.3d 624, 628 (7th Cir. 2009); United States 50. 18 U.S.C. § 3624(e). Sometimes this works to a defendant’s benefit. In v. Lee, 502 F.3d 447, 449–451 (6th Cir. 2007). But see United States v. Weber, 451 United States v. Garcia-Rodriguez, 640 F.3d 129, 133–34 (5th Cir. May 2, 2011), F.3d 552, 556–57 (9th Cir. 2006)(need not await violation of SR for appellant defendant was transferred from the Bureau of Prisons (BOP) to Immigration review of plethsymograph testing requirement). and Customs Enforcement (ICE). The Fifth Circuit held that administrative 39. Christian, 344 F. App’x at 56. The court prohibited “any form of unsu‑ detention by ICE did not qualify as imprisonment, and that for purposes of pervised contact with minors under the age of 18 at any location . . . without § 3624(e), defendant was “released from imprisonment” the moment he was prior permission of the probation officer.” Counsel objected, but the court ruled transferred from BOP to ICE custody to await deportation. Under immigration that the record justified these conditions. When counsel objects to special con‑ law, administrative detention of an alien is not the same as imprisonment for a ditions, review of the district court’s decision is for an abuse of discretion. crime. See e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1); Accord: United States v. Perez, 251 F. App’x United States v. Rodriguez, 558 F.3d 408, 412 (5th Cir. 2009). A district court 523, 524 (10th Cir. 2007)(defendant’s period of supervised release began once has wide discretion to impose any condition of supervised release it deems he was transferred to ICE custody). appropriate, but the conditions must be reasonably related to three criteria. 51. United States v. Lynch, 114 F.3d 61, 63–64 (5th Cir. 1997). Id. at 412–13. The Court in Christian noted that similar restrictions have been 52. United States v. Alvarado, 201 F.3d 379, 381 (5th Cir. 2000). upheld in cases involving child pornography or sexual contact with minors. 53. 18 U.S.C. § 3582(e)(1). United States v. Rodriguez, 558 F.3d 408 (5th Cir. 2009) (pending state charge 54. The defense motion should include the position of the U.S. Probation for sexual assault of a minor); United States v. Buchanan, 485 F.3d 274, 288 (5th Officer and the U.S. Attorney. Cir. 2007) (convicted of receipt of child pornography); United States v. Paul, 55. United States v. Naranjo, 259 F.3d 379, 382–83 (5th Cir. 2001). 56. 18 U.S.C. § 3582(e)(2). Defense counsel can propose such an extension 84. Grade A violations are conduct constituting (A) a federal, state, or local as an alternative to revocation. offense punishable by a term of imprisonment exceeding one year that (i) is a 57. Remember that policy statements under USSG Chapter 7 are advisory crime of violence, (ii) is a controlled substance offense, or (iii) involves possession only and not mandatory. United States v. Escamilla, 70 F.3d 835, 835 (5th Cir. of a firearm or destructive device, or (b) any other federal, state, or local offense 1995), adopting reasoning in United States v. West, 59 F.3d 32 (6th Cir. 1995). punishable by a term of imprisonment exceeding 20 years. USSG § 7B1.1 (a)(1). 58. 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d)(buried at end of text). There is no right to confront lab 85. Grade B violations are conduct constituting any other federal, state, personnel when the government via affidavit showed good cause for the denial of or local offense punishable by a term of imprisonment exceeding one year. confrontation. United States v. McCormick, 54 F.3d 214, 220–21 (5th Cir. 1995). USSG 7B1.1(a)(2). 59. Johnson v. United States, 529 U.S. 695, 697, 700 120 S. Ct. 1795 (2000) 86. Grade C violations are conduct constituting (a) a federal, state, or local (case also discusses Ex Post Facto implications of a second term of SR after offense punishable by any term of imprisonment of one year or less; or (b) a revocation of the first term of SR). violation of any other condition of supervision. USSG § 7B1.1(a)(3). The latter 60. 18 U.S.C. § 3583(f). provision covers non-criminal violations of supervision. 61. United States v. Garcia-Avalino, 444 F.3d 444, 446 (5th Cir. 2006). 87. USSG § 7B1.1(b). 62. United States v. Williams, 919 F.2d 266, 271 (5th Cir. 1990)(citing United 88. USSG § 7B1.3(a)(1). States v. Celestine, 905 F.2d 59, 60–61 (5th Cir. 1990)). 89. USSG § 7B1.3(a)(2). 63. United States v. Jimenez-Martinez, 179 F.3d 980, 981 (5th Cir. 1999). 90. USSG § 7B1.4 Application Note 1. 64. A U.S. Magistrate Judge can and usually does hold the preliminary 91. 18 U.S.C. § 3583 states that in determining whether to impose impris‑ hearing, but only a U.S. District Judge can hold the revocation hearing. Fed. R. onment or the length of imprisonment, the Court shall consider the factors in Crim. P. 32.1(b). Williams, 919 F.2d at 269. A U.S. District Judge has jurisdic‑ 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). tion to reverse a U.S. Magistrate Judge who holds there was no probable cause 92. United States v. Garza, 706 F.3d 655, 656–58 (2013). for SR revocation. United States v. Brigham, 569 F.3d 220, 229 (5th Cir. 2009). 93. This subsection that is now excluded from consideration states that in 65. Fed. R. Crim. P. 32.1(a)(5). Use 18 U.S.C. § 3143. determining the particular sentence to be imposed, the Court shall consider the 66. United States v. Hinson, 429 F.3d 114, 118–19 (5th Cir. 2005)(Booker need for the sentence to be imposed “to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to restrictions do not apply). promote respect for the law, and to provide for just punishment of the offense.” 67. Fed. R. Crim. P. 32.1(a)(3)(B). Appointment is under 18 U.S.C. § 3006A. 94. United States v. Miller, 634 F.3d 841, 844 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 132 S. 68. United States v. Moore, 116 F.App’x 544, 545 (5th Cir. 2004). Ct. 496 (2011). 69. United States v. Hodges, 460 F.3d 646, 650 (5th Cir. 2006); see Fed. R. 95. United States v. Whitelaw, 580 F.3d 256, 261–62 (5th Cir. 2009)(citing Crim. P. 32.1(b). Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 356–57, 127 S. Ct. 2456 (2007). 70. Hodges, 460 F.3d at 648. 96. Johnson v. United States, 529 U.S. 694 passim, 120 S. Ct. 1795 (2000). 71. Fed. R. Evid.1101(d)(3). 97. This particular subsection involves controlled substances like gamma 72. United States v. Montez, 952 F.2d 854, 857 (5th Cir. 1992). hydroxybuytric acid and flunitrazepam. 73. United States v. Moody, 277 F.3d 719, 721 (5th Cir. 2001). A defendant 98. United States v. Jackson, 559 F.3d 368 370–71 (5th Cir. 2009). The Jackson cannot use the appeal of a revocation of SR to challenge an underlying convic‑ court noted that defense counsel had failed to object that the new term of SR tion or original sentence either. United States v. Hinson, 429 F.3d 114, 116 (5th was unreasonable. Thus, only plain error review was conducted. Cir. 2005) (may not challenge original sentence); United States v. Moody, 277 99. United States v. Vera, 542 F.3d 457, 460–61 (5th Cir. 2008); United F.3d 719, 721 (5th Cir. 2001) (may not challenge indictment or drug quantity States v. Marzarky, 499 F.3d 1246, 1250 (11th Cir. 2007); United States v. used at sentencing); United States v. Francischine, 512 F.2d 827, 828 (5th Cir. Maxwell, 285 F.3d 336, 341 (4th Cir. 2002); United States v. Brings Plenty, 1975) (may not challenge underlying conviction). 188 F.3d 1051, 1054 (8th Cir. 1999). The Vera court cautioned against con‑ 74. Fed. R. Crim. P. 32.1 (b)(2)(E). sideration of other case law in this area prior to 2003, when § 3583(h) was 75. Apply parole case of Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 489, 92 S. Ct. 2593 amended. 542 F.3d at 461. (1972)(limited right to confront on decision to revoke unless hearing officer finds 100. United States v. Fleming, 364 F. App’x 915, 915 (5th Cir. 2010). A revo‑ good cause for not allowing); United States v. McCormick, 54 F.3d 214, 219 (5th cation sentence is not punishment for the charged offenses, but for the offense Cir. 1995). In a revocation hearing, the Sixth Amendment right to confronta‑ for which supervised release had been imposed. Thus, a revocation sentence tion does not apply. In such a hearing , the defendant has the right to confront does not involve being punished twice for the same offense. See United States witnesses under Fed. R. Crim. P. 32.1 and the Fifth Amendment (procedural v. Carlton, 534 F.3d 97, 101 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 613 (2008); United due process). See United States v. Grandlund, 71 F.3d 507, 510 (5th Cir. 1996). States v. Wyatt, 102 F.3d 241, 245 (7th Cir. 1996). Revocation proceedings are 76. Morrissey, Id., n.72, at 489; United States v. Grandlund, 71 F.3d 507, not “essentially criminal.” See Stringer v. Williams, 161 F.3d 259, 262 (5th Cir. 510 (5th Cir. 1995); United States v. Minnitt, 617 F.3d 327, 334 (5th Cir. 2010) 1998); United States v. Whitney, 649 F.2d 296, 298 (5th Cir. 1981). Accordingly, (Court asserts defendant did not exercise his options: request urinalysis retest, the doctrine of collateral estoppel is inapplicable. See Ashe v. Swenson, 397 subpoena lab technicians, or present evidence rather than speculation that his U.S. 436, 445, 90 S. Ct. 1189 (1970); Showery v. Samaniego, 814 F.2d 200, 203 medications created false positive). (5th Cir. 1987). 77. United States v. Beydoun, 469 F.3d 102, 108 (5th Cir. 2006). 101. United States v. Reyna, No. 12-10415, 2013 WL 5274470 (5th Cir. Sept. 78. United State v. Posado-Rios, 158 F.3d 832, 881 (5th Cir. 1998). 19, 2013)(failure to object results in plain error review, though). All federal cir‑ 79. Johnson v. United States, 529 U.S. at 700; 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3). cuits agree that the sentencing court has discretion to order concurrent sentences. 80. United States v. Jimenez, 364 F. App’x 907, 908 (5th Cir. 2010). United States v. Schaefer, 107 F.3d 1280, 1285 (7th Cir. 1997). 81. U.S. CONST. amend. V. 102. United States v. Setser, 566 U.S. __, 132 S. Ct. 1463 (2012). 82. United States v. Warren, 720 F.3d 321, 328 (5th Cir. 2013)(noting invalid 103. United States v. Gonzalez, 250 F.3d 923 (5th Cir. 2001); United States urine samples). Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 480 (1972), a parole revoca‑ v. Dees, 467 F.3d 847 (3d Cir. 2006)(Court sentenced defendant consecutively tion case, held that a defendant facing revocation is not owed “the full panoply upon SR revocation even though initial sentences ran concurrently). of rights due a defendant in” a criminal prosecution. 104. Vera, 542 F.3d at 459. 83. United States v. Turner, 741 F.2d 696, 698 (5th Cir. 1984). 105. FED. R. APP. P. 4(b). Counsels who fail to met the deadline may be able to get an extension for an excusable neglect or good cause. Fed. R. Crim. 121. United States v. Whitelaw, 580 F.3d 256, 259–60 (5th Cir. 2009). Plain P. 4(b)(4). error review has three steps. The appellant must show (1) an error, (2) that 106. FED. R. APP. P. 3(c). was plain (e.g., clear or obvious), and (3) that affected his substantial rights. 107. 5th Cir. R. 3. United States v. Peltier, 505 F.3d 389, 392 (5th Cir. 2007). If appellant makes this 108. United States v. Joyce, 357 F.3d 921, 923 (9th Cir. 2004)(plea agreement showing, the appeals court has discretion to correct the error, but only if the barring appeal of “any aspect of sentencing” barred appeal of SR); United States error seriously affects the fairness, integrity, and public reputation of judicial v. Walters, 732 F.3d 489, 491 (5th Cir. 2013)(waivers in pure sentencing agree‑ pro­ceedings. Puckett v. United States, 556 U.S. 129, 135, 129 S. Ct. 1423 (2009). ments are enforceable). 122. United States v. Johnson, 529 U.S. 53, 59, 120 S. Ct. 1114 (2000). The 109. United States v. Carruth, 528 F.3d 845, 846 (11th Cir. 2008)(per curiam). remedy is to seek to modify release conditions under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(2) 110. United States v. Acquaye, 452 F.3d 380, 382 (5th Cir. 2006). or to terminate supervised release at any time after the expiration of one year 111. United States v. Story, 439 F.3d 226, 231 (5th Cir. 2006). under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(1). 112. See United States v. Baymon, 312 F.3d 725, 727 (5th Cir. 2002); United 123. Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 5th Cir. R. 28.7. States v. Burns, 433 F.3d 442, 445 (5th Cir. 2005). 124. 5th Cir. R. 47.5.3. 113. United States v. Lynch, 114 F.3d 61, 63 (5th Cir. 1997); United States v. Garcia-Avalino, 444 F.3d 444, 445 (5th Cir. 2006). 114. Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 7, 14, 118 S. Ct. 978 (1998)(parole case). John M. Economidy is a San Antonio 115. United States v. Scruggs, 691 F.3d 660, 662 n.1 (5th Cir. 2012); Johnson sole practitioner. He graduated with v. Pettiford, 442 F.3d 917, 918 (5th Cir. 2006). See also Maleng v. Cook, 490 U.S. a Bachelor of Journalism degree in 488, 491, 109 S. Ct. 1923 (1989)(per curiam)(“Our interpretation of the ‘in 1966 and a Bachelor of Arts degree custody’ language has not required that a prisoner be physically confined in order to challenge his sentence on habeas corpus.”). in Government in 1967 from the 116. United States v. Talbert, 501 F.3d 449 (5th Cir. 2007). University of Texas at Austin, where he 117. United States v. Rodriguez, 558 F.3d 408, 412 (5th Cir. 2009). was editor-in-chief of The Daily Texan in 118. United States v. McCormick, 54 F.3d 214 (5th Cir. 1996); United States v. Grandlund, 71 F.3d 507, 509 (5th Cir. 1995). 1966–67. He served in the Vietnam War 119. United States v. Williams, 602 F.3d 313, 319–20 (8th Cir. 2010); United with the 8th Tactical Fighter Wing. John got his law degree in States v. Rojas-Luna, 522 F.3d 502, 506–07 (5th Cir. 2008); United States v. December 1973 from Texas Tech University School of Law. The Moreci, 283 F.3d 293, 300 (5th Cir. 2002). Texas Board of Criminal Specialization has certified John in 120. United States v. Miller, 634 F.3d 841, 843 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 496 (2011). Miller creates a two-step test. First, did the district court commit criminal law since 1986. He has been a TCDLA member for significant procedural error. Second, if there is no procedural error, the court over 25 years. considers the substantive reasonableness of the sentence.

Regular Members Cody Cleveland, Waco Elysiana J. Strotkamp, Katy Anita Jo Barrett, Marshall Tracy A. Hale, Dallas Brian Christopher Tyrone, North William Gregory Bonilla, Corpus Elizabeth Anne Howard, Lampasas Richland Hills Christi Christopher L. King, Waco Harley O. Wagner, Martinsburg Cassandra Marie Bonilla, Corpus Carly Ray Kitchens, San Antonio Christi Christopher T. Lyerla, Seguin Sustaining Member Alfonso Cabanas Jr., San Antonio Alan H. Schreiber, Round Rock Elliott Clark Crawford, Oklahoma James Reese Campbell, League Aaron Setliff, El Paso City City Shelly Sitton, Livingston Teresa Marie Christian, San William Cody Stapp, Waco Get a colleague to join! Antonio Special new member rate Eleven Essential DWI Trial Tactics Mark Ryan Thiessen

e, the Jury, find the defendant not guilty.” Makes your 1. Be Real, Be You Whair stand on end, drops the weight from your shoulders, and weakens your knees. No sweeter words are ever heard by As Gerry Spence says, “If you’re trying a case on the facts, you’ll “criminal defense attorneys standing shoulder to shoulder with lose every time.” Remember, the State chooses which cases they their clients. Not guilty verdicts are difficult to attain in Driving want to try because they think they can and should win. If the While Intoxicated (DWI) cases due to anti-DWI propaganda, facts were on the client’s side and the client should win the case, tragic DWI consequences, and a cultural bias against alcoholism the State will dismiss or reduce the case. Every case that goes to and DWI. This article shares eleven effective trial tactics for a trial, the State believes the facts are so overwhelmingly in their variety of DWI cases. favor that they can prove the case beyond a reasonable doubt. So, what do we as defense lawyers have? We have passion, we Can the jury presume the breath or blood test is credible or represent a human being, we have a heart, and people like us. reliable? Can the jury presume that the client can perform any Imagine the jury, you, and the State are lost in the desert.1 of the standard field sobriety tests better than he did? NO. The The State stands up and says: “I was a Boy Scout, the sun rises jury may not presume anything other than that the client is in‑ in the East and sets in the West, home is this way, follow me.” nocent. The presumption of innocence is so powerful the State And then you stand up and say: “I was Boy Scout too, and I must prove their case beyond a reasonable doubt. And if just a also know that as well. My son’s name is Baron and my wife is doubt remains, the presumption of innocence prevails. Kendra. I love them both dearly and I will see them again. And Think of the presumption of innocence as a compass. Give when I do, I am going to wrap them both up and hug and kiss each juror an imaginary compass to keep with them throughout them.” Who are you going to follow out of that desert? the entirety of trial. If the juror is ever lost, doesn’t know what “Voir dire” is derived from Latin and means “to tell the to believe, doesn’t know who is telling the truth—the compass t r ut h .” 2 Voir dire is an opportunity to really and truly know will point them home: not guilty. America errs on the side of who your jurors are and how they feel about certain issues. By freedom. The jury must never convict a human being when a the time the defense attorney gets to speak, the judge and the doubt/question/hesitation exists. When in doubt, when con‑ State have already told them about the laws they must follow fused, the compass points you home: not guilty. and that this case is a DWI. The defense attorney needs to know some very personal information in order to effectively make 3. Beyond a Reasonable Doubt strikes for cause—i.e., each juror’s own drinking pattern, who has been affected by alcoholism, whether anyone lost a loved The legislature refuses to define beyond a reasonable doubt.5 one or friend to DWI, any good or bad experiences with police However, the legislature allows counsel to compare that burden officers, any biases, etc. Before jurors will open up and share against other burdens of proof.6 Trial lawyers effectively demon‑ their true feelings, they need to trust you. strate that beyond a reasonable doubt is the highest burden in How can that happen instantly? Show them yours, and they the land and the top of any stair chart.7 The skilled trial lawyer will show you theirs.3 Be vulnerable. Be genuine with the jury. will not only educate a jury on how high the burden is, but also Tell the juror something true about yourself. Tell them about simplify this cold legal phrase. you before you start asking about them. What should you share? While the legislature may not provide a definition of beyond You can start by sharing: (1) the worst thing going on in your a reasonable doubt, the skilled trial attorney may provide an life at the moment; and (2) the best thing. Also, promise the “example” of a similar phrase.8 Break the phrase down to the jury that you won’t ask them any questions that you won’t also words and what those words actually mean. What’s a synonym answer. Tell the jury your personal drinking pattern, whether of each word? Write the synonym next to each word of “beyond you have been affected by alcoholism or DWI, and any fears or a reasonable doubt” on your display board. Start with your first biases you may have in the case. This allows the juror to feel juror and go down the row. If needed, help the jury discover the comfortable sharing with you since you are sharing with them, synonym. For example: If you went beyond your exit, where did being exposed and vulnerable. If you tell me, I’ll tell you; show you go? If you have a pineapple, how many pineapples do you me yours, I’ll show you mine. In the end, it’s only fair. have? Stress the “A”; it’s the shortest but most powerful word in the phrase. How much is less than A? If my wife is acting 2. Presumption of Innocence reasonable, how is she behaving? If you doubt there is water in a pool, what are you going to do at the edge before you run “Innocent until proven guilty” is a phrase every American knows and jump in? by heart, but do humans truly understand the presumption of Finally, ask the jury: If you have just A reasonable doubt innocence? Jurors are often asked: “How many of y’all wonder at the end of this case, what must your verdict be? Prepare for what [s]he did to get here? Where there’s smoke there’s fire. . . .” objections from the State by clearly stating this is not a definition Every juror wonders. It’s unnatural not to. So, the skilled trial and just an example. Plan on revisiting this example in closing attorney needs to educate the jury on the strength of the pre‑ when stressing the enormity of the State’s burden. Couple be‑ sumption of innocence. yond a reasonable doubt with the presumption of innocence for There is only one presumption in a criminal case: inno‑ an overwhelming case the State must prove. In the end, the jury cence.4 If there is only one presumption and that’s innocence, should follow the law and return a verdict of “not guilty” because can the jury presume the police performed the tests correctly? the State could not prove the case beyond a reasonable doubt. 4. The Rest of the Story favor. “So you mean, if we as citizens prove no alcohol in our system, you automatically think drugs?” Align yourself with the Eighty to ninety percent of jurors make up their mind after jury and help them realize there is no way out. 9 opening statement. After a compelling and real voir dire, the “Yes.” Make sure you repeat the answer, so the jury remem‑ jurors are anxiously waiting to hear the client’s version. Open‑ bers it. Revisit this answer at the end of your cross. In the end, ing statement is when the lawyer gets to tell the jury what they after the officer has stated he chose to arrest based on a “totality anticipate the evidence will show. It is not evidence. Most routine of the circumstances,” remind him of that first question and trial lawyers start their opening off : “May it please the court, answer. Ask the officer how, if he truly saw a loss of mental or your Honor, opposing counsel. The evidence will show . . .” physical faculties, could he let them go? Stop there. Don’t ask You’ve just lost the jury. Unless the Court is formal and requires that final question. Save it for closing argument and empower this, don’t do it. It is an unnecessary safety blanket better left for the jury to deliver the conclusion: The mental and physical were law school mock trial competitions. Rather, stand up and tell normal enough to let the client go had they blown a 0.000. them your theory of the case, followed by every good quality After your power question, proceed with cross examina‑ about your client, and tell them the rest of the client’s story that tion as usual. the State conveniently left out.10 However, do not tell the jury anything that is untrue or that you cannot prove. Credibility with the jury must never falter. 6. Standardized Field Sobriety How the defense attorney delivers an opening is just as Tests Are Easy . . . to Fail important as what is said. A crafty trial attorney may attempt No doubt the State will argue and the trained officer will testify 11 to deliver opening by “crawling in the skin” of his client and about the simplicity of the Standardized Field Sobriety Tests giving the jury a first-hand account of the rest of the story. Be (SFSTs). The trained officer almost always testifies that these tests prepared for objections, and let the judge and jury know that are developed by “scientists” for every person and are very easy you anticipate “the evidence will show” all of this to be true. to pass. That same well-trained officer will also testify that people Lastly, since whether the client testifies is a last-minute decision routinely pass the SFSTs and are allowed to go home. Sure. after analyzing the need at the close of the State’s case, all of the It’s important to note how the officer was trained and how client’s relevant background (military history, family, injuries, “easy” the tests actually are. Make the officer commit to the religion, awards, etc.) can and should be disclosed in opening facts: He took a 40-hour course to be certified by the National statement. The jury must absolutely recognize how wonderful Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) to administer your client is and why they need to fight for his freedom. Hope‑ SFSTs. Additionally, the NHTSA student manual is authorita‑ fully, 80 to 90 percent just made up their mind for “not guilty.” tive on the administration of these tests. The officer was only Now the jury is ready to listen, see, and determine what weight graded at the end of this course. The officer was not graded on to give all the evidence. the first day after hearing how to administer the test only one time. And, if the officer missed three questions on the certifica‑ 5. The First Cross-Examination Question tion test, he didn’t fail. He got credit for every correct answer. In fact, the officer has never taken a test where he didn’t get credit The jury just listened to hours of monotonous, form-read direct for correct answers. If you have a 100-question test and miss 3, examination. Finally, the witness is yours. Don’t start out: “Good what’s your score? Would you ever take a test where you didn’t afternoon, Officer. How are you?” or “This is the first time we’ve get credit for the answers you got right? Most seasoned officers ever had the chance to speak about this case.” Hit him with a will volunteer that NHTSA requires this type of grading and power question, grab everyone’s attention.12 “Officer, if my client “scientists” developed the grading system. The jury should still would have blown a 0.000 would you have let him go home?” realize the unfairness of the unique NHTSA grading method. Now the officer has two possible answers, each terrible. The jury should also truly understand these tests in case “No.” Look at the jury and recognize this answer. Even if they wanted to try them, after the trial is over. Start with either everyday citizens are wrongfully arrested and blow a 0.000, they test and walk through the exact instructions and break down do not get to go home. Hope is lost. There is no way out of the how many actual instructions each test requires (15 for walk web. Let the State attempt to explain the charging process. If and turn, 13 for one leg stand).13 How many times did the of‑ the State or officer attempts to go into drugs, the quick attorney ficer give the client the instructions? How many times does must capitalize by objecting or spinning this in the defense’s the officer demonstrate the test for the client? Does the officer allow the client to practice before being graded? Was the officer 0.0120 of the reference predicted, which is usually 0.08. Third, the allowed to practice for 40 hours and then some before he was third digit of the breath result is completely random and should graded on his administration of these tests? Is the client told be truncated.21 This means that the machine could read 0.00 as the clues the officer is looking for? Did the officer tell the client anything up to a 0.009 acceptable range of error.22 Fourth, the it only takes two clues to indicate intoxication? Did the officer client’s temperature can affect the results of the breath test.23 For tell the client that injuries, age, or weight may affect the results? every one degree Celsius the client’s body is above 98.6 degrees Make sure to write these answers on your display board for Fahrenheit or 37 degrees Celsius, the breath test is 8.62% high.24 each test. Next, walk through each clue and show the jury the And the temperature of the simulator solution is already allowed meticulousness and subjectivity of each clue. Most jurors will to be plus or minus 0.2 degrees from 34 degrees Celsius.25 Breath appreciate the defense attorney showing them just how easy test scores of 0.13 and below should be vigorously scrutinized these tests are . . . to fail. due to the inherent unreliabilities in the Intoxilyzer 5000EN and the Texas Breath Alcohol Testing Program. 7. Breath Test–Fifteen-Minute Violation 9. Blood Test–McNeely and Bullcoming The third prong of Kelly states that the technique applying the theory must have been properly applied on the occasion in ques‑ In April 2013, the Supreme Court effectively established “no-re‑ tion.14 In order for a breath test to be valid, the officer must ob­ fusal” weekends every day of the year.26 McNeely recognized the serve the client for at least 15 minutes prior to the breath test.15 ease in obtaining a blood search warrant in most metropolitan The Department of Public Safety produced what is known as areas—henceforth, barring warrantless blood draws without an the “21 Minute Video.”16 The video shows examples of invalid exigent circumstance.27 The State has fought back by declaring 15-minute waiting periods.17 The first example is when the officer year-round “no refusal.”28 However, in the case where no war‑ parks his car at the station and opens his door to get out and rant exists, the totality of circumstances of the particular case is retrieve the suspect in the back seat.18 The Department of Public necessary to determine whether exigent circumstances existed Safety clearly recognizes that the officer cannot see through the making the obtaining of a blood warrant impractical. The State roof of his car and temporarily loses line of site with the suspect must show the impracticability of obtaining the search warrant as the officer gets out to remove the suspect. Always request the justifying the exigency exception to the warrant requirement.29 dispatch records and mobile data terminal (MDT) records to Here, any argument made by a prosecutor regarding the incon‑ ascertain the precise time the officer arrived at the station and venience or impracticability of obtaining a search warrant prior possibly started the 15-minute observation period after getting to an involuntary blood draw should be attacked with Clay. 30 the client out of the back of the car. Many times officers just rush In Clay, the arresting officer swore to a blood warrant probable the client right in to the station to provide a sample. The well- cause affidavit over the telephone and then faxed the signed prepared defense attorney may have indisputable evidence that affidavit to the judge.31 Arguably, it doesn’t get much easier to a proper 15-minute waiting period was not observed. Couple obtain a blood search warrant. this violation with Kelly and Texas Code of Criminal Procedure Additionally, any phlebotomist must be properly qualified § 38.23 to suppress the breath test. as a “qualified technician” for warrantless blood draws.32 In all blood cases, remember that Bullcoming is still good law, requir‑ 8. Breath Test–Walking Down the Number ing the actual analyst to testify before the blood results may be admissible, regardless of warrant issues.33 No machine is infallible. The Intoxilyzer 5000EN and Texas Breath Testing have certain acceptable ranges of error. Depending on the 10. Disconnect Defense particular facts, the skilled DWI defense attorney may walk down the client’s breath test result using the machine’s own acceptable Whether dealing with a blood or breath test, all high tests (0.16 ranges of error. First, the client’s first breath sample must read and higher) are ripe for the Disconnect Defense (“DD”). The within 0.02 of his second breath sample.19 Hypothetically, if a cli‑ disconnect lies in the science not adding up to the machine re‑ ent blows a 0.09 on the first sample, his next breath sample must sults. The foundation of the DD is sobriety evidence or common­ measure between 0.07 and 0.11 in order to be valid. Additionally, sense reasons for mistaken intoxicated behavior. In most cases Texas Department of Public Safety uses the lower number of the where the DD is applicable, the client’s video is exculpatory for two breath samples in order to give the benefit of the doubt to the client. Additionally, obtain the client’s medical records or the client. Second, the reference sample must measure within other evidence needed to demonstrate normality for the client and not intoxication. steal the case from the grasps of a dry prosecutor. By closing, In breath test cases, you can highlight Intoxilyzer defi‑ the jury has been sitting quietly for days, listening to the State ciencies by analogizing it to hypothetical or other measuring continue ad nauseam about the facts. The last thing the jury de­vices—i.e., thermometer, Taxalyzer 5000EN, Doppler 5000. wants to hear is a recap of all the facts. After all, the jury is Whatever machine you invent for jury use, use it to demonstrate human. They want Atticus Finch, Vincent “Vinny” Gambini, the obvious error the machine made when contrasted with what Erin Brockovich, Lt. Daniel Kaffee, Franklin and Bash, Denny you see, i.e., common sense. For example, the importance of Crain, or the Lincoln Lawyer. Tell them a story. Put on a show in embracing common sense by relating it to a dire consequence of closing. Sit and think about the theory of the case and how you being wrong—i.e., brain surgery if a thermometer reads 110°F, can relate that theory into an experience that elicits the desired jail time for failing to pay taxes, or a natural disaster. Analogize human reaction from the jury. Whatever story you relate to the your hypothetical machine with deficiencies in the Intoxilyzer: case, make sure it’s genuine. The jury can tell when you are lying, (1) 20% acceptable range of error; (2) self-checking for accuracy; or if you don’t believe your own argument. Again, like in voir (3) no warranty for merchantability or accuracy; (4) recalled dire, be vulnerable, show them yours.34 Whatever you choose, in multiple states; (5) newer model available; (6) citizen cannot the closing should be so raw and powerful that you give the purchase from manufacturer; (7) manufacturer refuses to pro­ jury the righteous indignation to find your client “not guilty.” vide source code; (8) not available for independent scientific DWI consequences include prison, loss of driver’s license, test­ing; (9) destroys the only direct evidence of sobriety/intoxi‑ fines, and foreign travel restrictions. Accordingly, DWI trials cation when the State had the ability to save that evidence; (10) are prevalent in every courthouse. All criminal lawyers will operator has no idea how the machine works; (11) “scientist” represent DWI clients at one point in their careers. DWI cases who checks it rarely does it in person; (12) any inconsistencies are numerous throughout the State. Mothers Against Drunk or strange occurrences found in test records; etc. Driving (MADD) lobbies vigorously against DWI cases. We In blood test cases, make sure to walk the jury from cleaning as defense lawyers must break through the bias and hatred the client’s blood draw site through the chromatogram. Depend‑ for DWI and human­ ­ize our clients and their stories. The jury ing on the laboratory and people involved you may find: (1) should return a “not guilty” verdict because they are follow‑ contamination in the blood draw room; (2) expired materials; ing the law and making the State prove their case beyond A (3) improper site cleansing; (4) improper blood draw technique; reasonable doubt. (5) mishandling of the evidence; (6) break in the chain of cus‑ tody; (7) human error in the laboratory; (8) pipette problems; Endnotes (9) sample expiration, contamination, or other problems; (10) 1. Thanks to the one and only Gerry Spence for this example. contamination in the injector port, y-splitter, columns, flame 2. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Voir_dire. ionization detector; (11) source code issue; (12) sloppy chroma‑ 3. Thank you, Gerry Spence. tography; etc. Each step of the way, educate the jury on possibili‑ 4. Thanks to J. Gary Trichter and his wonderful tutelage on the presump‑ tion of innocence. ties of contamination, carry over, or switching vials. Inspect all 5. Geesa v. State, 820 S.W.2d 154 (Tex.Crim.App. 1991). the chromatograms in the run to further validate your theory. 6. Contreras v. State, 2012 WL 5285917 (Tex. App.—Waco, Oct. 25, 2012); Regardless whether dealing with a blood or breath test, Fuller v. State, 363 S.W.3d 583 (Tex.Crim.App. 2012). each is susceptible to the DD. The skilled attorney must sew 7. Stair chart from the National College of DUI Defense: http://ncdd.com /ncddstore.php?type=Trial-Graphics. the DD through the entire case, from voir dire to closing. The 8. Thanks to trial warrior Steve Gonzalez for this example. verdict should be an obvious decision that the machine or those 9. Johnson, James, “Jury Arguments, Winning Techniques,” Michigan running the machine made a crucial mistake, rather than your Bar Journal, page 36 (March 2011); http://vinsoncompany.com/pdf/How_to _Persuade_Jurors.pdf. client’s body defying the laws of science. Use the totality of the 10. Thanks to my officemate and trial warrior Jed Silverman. circumstances against the State by arguing the totality of sober 11. See Gerry Spence and the Trial Lawyer’s College. circumstances. Intelligent human beings believe what they know 12. Thanks to the amazing Kent Schaffer for his cross-examination tech‑ with their own senses to be true instead of blindly relying on a niques. 13. See NHTSA Standardized Field Sobriety Testing Student Manual, August machine result that defies common sense. 2006, pg. X-3–5. 14. Kelly v. State, 824 S.W.2d 568 (Tex.Crim.App. 1992). 15. See Texas Breath Alcohol Testing Program Operator Manual, pg. 49, 11. Storytelling Closing Argument and Texas Administrative Code Section 19.3(a) and (c)(1). 16. See Department of Public Safety 21 Minute Video. Call me for a copy. Closing argument gives the skilled trial attorney the opportunity 17. Id. to seal the case and the client’s acquittal or one last chance to 18. Id. 19. See Texas Breath Alcohol Testing Program Operator Manual, pg. 13. WL 3231504 (Tex.App.—El Paso Oct. 7, 2009). 20. See Texas Breath Alcohol Testing Program Operator Manual, pg. 13 33. Bullcoming v. New Mexico, __ U.S. __, 131 S.Ct. 2705, 180 L.Ed.2d 610 21. See Gullberg, R. G., Statistical Evaluation of Truncated Breath-Alcohol (2011). Test Measurements, Journal of Forensic Sciences, JFSCA, Vol. 33, No. 22, March 34. Gerry Spence. 1988, pp 507–510; Gullberg, R. G., Distribution of Third Digit in Breath Alco- hol Analysis, Journal of Forensic Sciences, Letters to Editor, Date and Volume Unknown, pp. 976–978. Mark Thiessen, a criminal trial lawyer 22. Id. and Chairman/CEO of the Thiessen 23. See Fox, G. R. and Hayward, J. S., Effect of Hyperthermia on Breath- Law Firm in Houston, Texas, obtained Alcohol Analysis, Journal of Forensic Sciences, JFSCA, Vol. 34, No. 4, July 1989, pp. 836–841. a BBA from Texas Christian University 24. Id. before attending South Texas College of 25. See Texas Breath Alcohol Testing Program Operator Manual, pg. 9. Law. He is a frequent legal seminar lec- 26. Missouri v. McNeely, 569 U.S. ___, 133 S.Ct. 1552, 1555 (2013). 27. Id. turer, author of numerous published legal 28. http://abclocal.go.com/ktrk/story?section=news/local&id=9176628. articles, and a LawLine faculty member. Mark is also the 2014 29. McNeely, 133 S.Ct. at 1557–60. chair of the DWI Resource Committee with the Texas Criminal 30. Clay v. State, 382 S.W.3d 465 (Tex.App.—Waco 2012), review granted, Defense Lawyers Association (TCDLA), a board member of (June 27, 2012). 31. Id. at 465–466. Harris County Criminal Lawyers Association (HCCLA), and a 32. Cavazos v. State, 969 S.W.2d 454, 456–57 (Tex.App.—Corpus Christi Super Lawyer in Texas Monthly magazine. 1998, pet. ref’d); Tex. Transp. Code § 724.017(a); see also Cordero v. State, 2009

Texas Criminal Defense Lawyers Educational Institute

TCDLEI Memorializes Fallen But Not Forgotten . . . Charles Baldwin C. David Evans Hal Jackson Rusty O’Shea Quinn Brackett Elaine Ferguson Knox Jones Charles Rittenberry Peter Bright C. Anthony Friloux Jr. Joe Kegans George Roland Jack H. Bryant Richard W. Harris George F. Luquette Travis Shelton Phil Burleson Odis Ray Hill Ken Mclean Robert William Tarrant Ward Casey Weldon Holcomb Kathy McDonald Charles Tessmer Byron Chappell Floyd Holder Harry Nass Doug Tinker Emmett Colvin W. B. “Bennie” House Anthony Nicholas Don R. Wilson Jr. Rusty Duncan David Isern David A. Nix

Memorialize a fellow member. Contact: [email protected] So You Want to Be a Criminal Defense Attorney Randy Wilson

or the past 43-plus years, each morning I have gone to work courts were governed by the law and not by political influence F as an attorney licensed by the State Bar of Texas. For the or the judge’s concerns about being re-elected. It was a time first 5 or so years, I worked for law firms, trying cases of many when judges were judges because they either just wanted to different types both criminal and civil. I was fortunate to have be a judge or they felt an obligation to serve. But not only has practiced during a time when the Constitutions of the both Texas the attitude of judges changed; so have the attitudes of a large and the United States protected our fellow citizens, both under portion of attorneys. With the proliferation of attorneys having criminal and civil jurisdictions. This was back in the time when come into the practice of law, the costs of operating a law office or law firm, the costs of advertising, and the lack of compassion them idealists; I call them “heroes.” have all crept into the practice of law—it appears that being a They believe in the system and do not fear the court’s at‑ lawyer has degenerated from a profession to a business. Many titudes or rulings or public disfavor. If you have never tried a attorneys today are more concerned with these matters than controversial case in a small jurisdiction where the public in with providing the services that we all have sworn to do when that jurisdiction dislike, hate, and oftentimes chastise your cli‑ we received our licenses. ent and you as well, it would be difficult for you to understand. I have been just as guilty as any of them in these areas, If you have never represented a client where you and/or your and even today often struggle within myself to “take up the family have received death threats, it would be difficult for you sword” to defend or attack the injustices that many people face to understand. If you have never been involved in the defense of from the government or their fellow man. Having tried more a client, where even your own family questions your representa‑ cases than I can count in my career, I have noticed that today tion and the effect it may have upon your family and friends, it is not about justice but about winning or losing. Seeing two it would be difficult for you to understand. Your dedication to prosecutors do a “high five” when the jury answered the three your client can, in some instances, place major stress on you, questions in the affirmative in a death penalty case, prosecutors your family, your relationship with your family, your financial who conceal exculpatory or mitigating evidence in a criminal status, and your acceptance within your community. Often there case, and the attitude of “winning at all costs” have become the is a feeling of isolation in your efforts to represent your client. norm in today’s courts. This goes even beyond the attorneys It may be you and your client against the entire government, representing the government. Law enforcement officers who are the general public, the media, and even sometimes your own untruthful or who lie to a suspect in order to gain a confession family and friends. On the prosecution side, the prosecutors under the guise of “acceptable police procedures” are also very generally today have the general populace, media, and even commonplace today. sometimes your own family members questioning what you This is not what our system of jurisprudence was founded are doing and why. upon or what it should be. The American system of justice is Laymen in our society have difficulty understanding that unique in the world both in the past and present. Our court sys‑ just because you defend a person charged with a specific crime, tem was founded as the “great leveler” of all claims. Each person that you don’t necessarily condone the commission or omission is to be treated equally under our law, regardless of race, creed, alleged against him or her. After almost 48 years of marriage, I gender, or economic status. This is the only human institution have personally been subjected to all of these, and it is a miracle that is supposed to treat a voter the same as the President, the that I am still married. I attribute the longevity to my wife’s banker the same as a welfare recipient, or an illiterate the same understanding of the commitment an attorney must make to as a PhD. However, we all know that is not the case today in represent the “citizen accused.” If you are going to call yourself the sense that people would have us believe. Some people are a “criminal defense attorney,” you have to be willing to put these more intelligent than others, some have better opportunities concerns aside and go forward without regard to same. You because of birthright or economic status, some people make need to speak with your family, friends, and acquaintances, better products than others, some lawyers are better lawyers when confronted by them, from the standpoint of your duty than others, and some are born gifted beyond others in many and oath, and try to get them to understand but not to ac‑ respects as a musician, writer, or athlete. cept the responsibility which you have chosen to take up in I have found that within the ranks of criminal defense law‑ the case. Don’t try to convince them, only try to get them to yers, you discover more attorneys who are concerned about “walk in your shoes” and understand where you are coming their clients than among civil attorneys. You find attorneys from. Most times you will be unsuccessful in doing so. You who defend their client and his or her rights without regard to are not trying to change the world. Your responsibility is to profit, “bottom line,” or public disfavor. They believe in zeal‑ zealously defend your client to the best of your ability. And, in ously defending their and our system of jurisprudence. They are doing so, you must keep a high regard for all things moral and not infected by bias, prejudice, or social status and oftentimes ethical regardless of the actions of the government attorney or financial gain. These lawyers are even willing to risk career in the government’s agents and the pressures you may feel from pursuit of justice—not being concerned about retribution from family and friends. the court or society. Each of these individuals has the courage You must also understand the stress that can be put not to proceed in a case, oftentimes knowing they are beaten, but only upon you, but also upon your family and friends as a result begin anyway and see it through to the end. Some would call of your actions in defending your client. I have had moderate success in telling them: “Look, my responsibility as an attorney criminal defense attorney. representing my client is to present every legal defense available to my client, as well as require the government to meet their THE ADVOCATE burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. I will present any With head held high viable defense regardless of my personal feelings about its true Armed with wit and knowledge merit. I will never knowingly present testimony that is false, but He attempts to defend will use true testimony to any benefit I can for my client. I was His fellow man without regard not put on this earth to assess judgment on the moral guilt or To the consequences of his actions. innocence of my client. I only deal with legal guilt under the law.” He receives little appreciation There should never be any moral dilemma once you as‑ From those around him, sume the duty to defend your client. I have defended people But continues his fight during my career that have committed crimes that go beyond Against intolerance and the unscrupulous. description, without any remorse on my part, as I do not con‑ Often he sacrifices his personal goals and desires sider the issue of moral guilt. This is what each of us must do in To protect his client every criminal case. If you possess such a dilemma, you should From those trying to deprive his liberty. withdraw from the case or from the practice of handling the His beleaguered figure defense in criminal cases. Oft marred from previous battles, I learned a long time ago that being an idealist is perfectly But nevertheless ever striving acceptable, as long as you are a confirmed realist about your To protect the rights of the citizen accused case. I have tried many cases that I had little or no chance of From the injustices of mankind, winning. But as long as my client knew the risks involved and The government and its impersonal edicts. accepted those risks, I gave it everything that I had in his or her His weapons, defense. Not one of us likes losing, but it is not about winning His word, his ingenuity, wit and intelligence and losing. It is about justice. What is just is not always right, Always armed, and conversely what is right is not always just. We as criminal Ever ready defense lawyers must strive for justice in every case. We must For the defense of his clients. communicate the good and the bad facts to our clients. We should advise the client of the risks involved and satisfy ourselves that the client understands and accepts those risks when he or Randy Wilson has been a sole practitio- she makes the decision concerning trial or plea bargain. It is the ner in Abilene for more than 43 years, client’s decision. Just make sure your client understands the risks handling cases ranging from capital involved and the consequences of his or her decision. It is his murder to DWI. He has handled or her liberty that is in jeopardy—not yours. If your client has eight capital cases during his years of knowledge of and understands these risks and consequences, practice, and none of his clients have his decision should not affect you or his defense. received the death penalty. He was a You must be willing to accept and deal with the foregoing defense attorney for several members of the discussion in order to be a criminal defense attorney. It is not Fundamentalist Church of Latter Day Saints subsequent to easy, and at times the stress may seem unbearable. But I have the State of Texas raid on the YFZ Ranch in Schleicher County discovered, by doing so, I am able to look in the mirror at myself when over 400 children were seized and removed by CPS. He without reservation and devote my personal beliefs and desires is a former chair of Texas Criminal Defense Lawyers Educa- to my family and friends. I would not trade it for any amount tional Institute and present Board Member. Other offices held of social status, money, or public admiration. I am a criminal by Randy Wilson include president of Texas Criminal Defense defense attorney, the last bastion of protection for the citizen Lawyers Association and chair of the Criminal Justice Section accused against the onslaught of government persecution, in‑ of the State Bar of Texas. Randy is an “AV” Rated Attorney justice, bias, prejudice, and ignorance faced by my client. by Martindale Hubble. Randy has been married to Jo Ann for A number of years ago, I wrote the following, which may 48 years and has two children and two grandchildren. He has or may not mean anything to anyone but me. However, I pass been Course Director for numerous seminars and is a frequent it on hoping that it may assist you in your pursuit of being a presenter as well. Register online at www.tcdla.com

John Ackerman & Tony Vitz Roundtop Festival Institute October 22–26, 2014

A Wealth of Experience John Ackerman spent 11 years working at the International Criminal Tribunal in The Hague. Past president of NACDL and former dean of the National College for Criminal Defense, John served as a district court judge in Houston and has taught in CLE programs around the world. Recipient of the HCCLA Lifetime Achievement Award, John has also been inducted in the TCDLA Hall of Fame. John Ackerman has been a gift to us all. While dean of the National College for Criminal Defense, John began searching for a way to help lawyers become more creative in dealing with courtroom turmoil, not satisfied with the lecture style of teaching students. With social worker John Johnson and Gerry Spence, he adapted the use of psychodrama to shape an understanding or empathy between the lawyer and other significant players in the courtroom. From the first trial run in 1978, the psychodrama experience applied to law has blossomed into the Spence Trial Lawyers College and now TCDLA’s Round Top—the association’s highest-rated training program. Significant Decisions Report

Please do not rely solely on the summaries set forth below. The reader is advised to read the full text of each opinion in addition to the brief synopses provided. The Significant Decisions Report is published in Voice for the Defense thanks to a state grant from the Judicial and Court Personnel Training Fund, administered by the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals. Back issues online. Weekly updates are emailed.

Supreme Court

D had a viable ineffective assistance claim because counsel failed to seek funds to replace an expert who counsel knew was inadequate when that failure was not based on a strat- John Ackerman & Tony Vitz egy but on a mistake of law. Hinton v. Alabama, 134 S. Ct. 1081 (2014). D was charged with two murders in 1985. The case hinged on ballistics evidence. Mistakenly believing he could pay only $1,000 for an expert ballistics witness, D’s attorney hired someone who Roundtop Festival Institute was inexperienced and blind in one eye. After the prosecution discredited the expert on the stand, D was convicted and received two death sentences. October 22–26, 2014 The Supreme Court summarily vacated the Court of Criminal Appeals of Alabama’s judgment and remanded for reconsideration of the prejudice prong of Strickland v. Washington, 466 U. S. 668 (1984). “[D]’s attorney knew that he needed more funding to present an effective defense, yet he failed to make even the cursory investigation of the state statute providing for defense funding for indigent defendants that would have revealed to him that he could receive reimbursement not just for $1,000 but for ‘any expenses reasonably incurred.’ An attorney’s ignorance of a point of law that is fundamental to his case combined with his failure to perform basic research on that point is a quintessential example of unreasonable performance under Strickland. . . . The only inadequate as‑ sistance of counsel here was the inexcusable mistake of law—the unreasonable failure to understand the resources that state law made available to him—that caused counsel to employ an expert that he himself deemed inadequate.”

Fifth Circuit

Even though USSG § 5D1.1(c) states that supervised release ordinarily should not be im- posed on a deportable alien defendant, the court did not err in imposing a two-year su- pervised-release term on such a defendant because it supplied a sufficiently particularized explanation. United States v. Becerril-Peña, 714 F.3d 347 (5th Cir. 2013). The district court sufficiently explained that it found D’s supervised release sentence appropri‑ ate under the factors listed in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) and those applicable to sentencing generally; the imposition of supervised release was also supported by D’s extensive criminal history. Furthermore, even though the district court did not specifically address D’s arguments for a downward variance from the Guideline range, that did not constitute significant procedural error where the record shows that the district court considered D’s mitigation arguments, weighed the § 3553(a) factors, and explicitly found that the sentence “adequately and appropriately addresse[d]” those factors and others appropriate to consider in sentencing.

Texas state prisoner was not entitled to federal habeas relief on his claim that the court denied him a fair trial by not sua sponte dismissing an allegedly biased juror; no U.S. Su- preme Court decision clearly establishes that state trial courts have a duty to sua sponte dismiss a purportedly biased juror when no party ob- plea to conspiracy to transport illegal aliens causing serious jects. Washington v. Thaler, 714 F.3d 352 (5th Cir. 2013). bodily injury (8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(B)(ii)) notwithstanding his Moreover, to recognize such a new rule of criminal pro‑ unconditional appeal waiver; but because he raised the issue cedure on collateral review would run afoul of Teague v. Lane, for the first time on appeal, the Fifth Circuit reviewed only for 489 U.S. 288 (1989). plain error. The district court did commit plain error by advising D, The court’s wholesale exclusion of the testimony of D’s at his guilty plea, that he faced a statutory maximum prison expert was error, but that error did not affect the trial term of only 10 years, when the correct statutory maximum outcome. United States v. Liu, 716 F.3d 159 (5th Cir. was 20 years; however, D did not carry his burden of showing 2013). a reasonable probability that, but for the error, he would not In prosecution for conspiracy to steal trade secrets and have pleaded guilty. Even though the 190-month prison sen‑ perjury, the district court erred in precluding D’s expert from tence imposed greatly exceeded the 10-year maximum of which testifying; as an initial matter, there was no warrant for ex‑ D was advised, D received a number of benefits from his plea cluding the portion of the expert’s testimony to which the and would have faced a higher sentence if he had gone to trial. government did not object. It was also error to exclude the Moreover, even after the presentence report set out the correct other parts of the expert’s testimony; a lack of personal experi‑ statutory maximum, D never moved to withdraw his plea. ence—the district court’s concern here—should not ordinarily disqualify an expert, so long as the expert is qualified based Because the ultimate decision of the Louisiana governor on some other factor provided by Fed. R. Evid. 702. A lack of to grant or deny commutation remains entirely discre- specialization should generally go to the weight of the evidence tionary, prisoner failed to demonstrate a significant risk rather than its admissibility. However, even though it was er‑ that he would endure a longer period of incarceration ror for the district court to exclude D’s expert, the error was as a result of the amendments to Louisiana’s commuta- harmless; especially in the absence of a proffer as to what the tion process. Howard v. Clark, 719 F.3d 350 (5th Cir. substance of the expert’s testimony would have been, nothing 2013). in the record indicates that the expert’s testimony would have Where Louisiana state prisoner had unsuccessfully sought been helpful to D. Given the overwhelming evidence of guilt, commutation of his sentence as a preliminary step to seeking the Fifth Circuit was persuaded that the excluded testimony release on parole, prisoner failed to establish an ex post facto would have been or little or no benefit to D. violation in alterations to Louisiana’s commutation procedures (increasing the amount of time before a subsequent application Even though under Dorsey v. United States, 132 S. Ct. can be filed and granting the Board of Pardons authority to 2321 (2012), defendants sentenced after the effective deny an applicant a full hearing). date of the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 are entitled to benefit from the more lenient penalties of that act, Speedy Trial Act’s 70-day period for bringing a case to Dorsey does not apply to persons who simply have their trial was not exceeded; the time attributable to defense- pre-FSA sentence modified under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c) requested continuances (based on defense counsel’s (2) (based on a retroactively applicable ameliorative surgery and recovery) was excludable. United States v. Guideline amendment). United States v. Kelly, 716 F.3d Dignam, 716 F.3d 915 (5th Cir. 2013). 180 (5th Cir. 2013). Even though the reasons for a predecessor judge grant‑ Nothing in Dorsey purports to change Supreme Court and ing two “ends of justice” continuances were not set forth on Fifth Circuit precedent that § 3582(c)(2) proceedings are not the record, it was sufficient that the successor judge later ‑ar plenary resentencings; the Fifth Circuit joined its sister circuits ticulated the first judge’s reasoning on the record; that record in declining to treat a § 3582(c)(2) modification proceeding as could be fairly understood as being the reasons that were in the equivalent of an original sentencing hearing under Dorsey. the defense’s unopposed motions for continuance. Nor was the second continuance period countable simply because the The district court did not plainly err in finding a fac- district court granted an open-ended continuance; because it tual basis for D’s plea; D’s statutory interpretation (he was unclear how much time defense counsel would need to claimed the statute required a showing that he person- recover, and because the seven-month delay was not extreme ally and directly caused serious bodily injury) was not and did not prejudice D, the grant of an open-ended continu‑ “plain” under the language of the statute or any binding ance was reasonable. judicial construction of it. United States v. Alvarado- Finally, a further period of time, during which D had signed Casas, 715 F.3d 945 (5th Cir. 2013). a plea agreement and indicated intent to plead guilty pursuant D could challenge the factual basis underlying his guilty to the agreement, was also excludable under the STA. The time was not excludable under 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(1)(G) because the offense committed by a co-conspirator was “reasonably fore‑ plea agreement was in fact never submitted to the district court seeable” within the scope of the unlawful agreement. for its consideration; the time was excludable under § 3161(h) Considering the circumstances here, CCA affirmed COA (1)(D), dealing with delay attributable to pretrial motions. The and the trial court and concluded that D and his co-conspira‑ notice of intent to plead guilty was effectively a motion to set a tor were acting together in a criminal business to sell moderate rearraignment date, so the time period between the notice of amounts of methamphetamine and that, given the volume of intent to plead guilty until the scheduled rearraignment date drugs involved, the co-conspirator’s assault of the officer was (when D stated she did not wish to plead guilty) was excludable one that should have been anticipated as a result of carrying under the STA. With all these periods of excludable time, the out the conspiracy. length of the non-excludable time did not exceed 70 days to violate the STA in this mail-fraud prosecution. D was not entitled to an instruction on the lesser- included offense of criminal trespass with his burglary In Hobbs Act robbery conspiracy/firearms case, dis- charge; the entry element of criminal trespass did not trict court did not err in refusing to give an entrapment require the same or less proof than entry for burglary, instruction because D failed to make a prima facie and there were no alleged facts that would allow the show­ing that he lacked a predisposition to commit the entry element of criminal trespass to be deduced. State offenses. United States v. Stephens, 717 F.3d 440 (5th v. Meru, 414 S.W.3d 159 (Tex.Crim.App. 2013). Cir. 2013). Appellee was convicted of burglary of a habitation. He (2) Under USSG § 2B3.1, the Guideline applicable to rob‑ filed a motion for new trial, complaining that the court erred bery, it is error to use intended loss, rather than actual loss. in refusing to give his requested jury instruction on the lesser- However, the district court’s error in using intended loss under included offense of criminal trespass. The trial court granted USSG § 2B3.1 did not affect D’s substantial rights because the his motion. COA affirmed the trial court. CCA reversed. proper Guideline for a Hobbs Act robbery conspiracy is USSG COA improperly concluded that criminal trespass was a § 2X1.1, which does use intended loss. Nor did the court err lesser-included offense of burglary of a habitation in this case. in refusing to exclude, on the grounds of sentencing enhance‑ D failed to demonstrate that criminal trespass is “established ment, any intended loss figure over $250,000. by proof of the same or less than all the facts required to es‑ (3) District court did not err in denying D a reduction for tablish the commission of the offense charged,” as required acceptance of responsibility under USSG § 3E1.1. Defendants by Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. § 37.09(1). The entry element of who deny guilt on the basis of an entrapment defense are not criminal trespass did not require the same or less proof than entitled to a reduction under USSG § 3E1.1. entry for burglary, and there were no facts alleged in the indict‑ ment that would allow the entry element of criminal trespass to be deduced. In other words, a burglary under Tex. Penal Court of Criminal Appeals Code § 30.02(b) could be complete upon only a partial intru‑ sion onto the property, whereas the definition of “entry” in the The evidence was sufficient to convict D of aggravated criminal trespass statute, § 30.05(b), made the showing of only assault of a public servant under the conspiracy theory a partial entry by the defendant insufficient for a conviction of of the law of parties; a jury could have found beyond a criminal trespass. reasonable doubt that D should have anticipated his co- Alcala concurred: “This case has serious implications for conspirator committing aggravated assault of a public both the State and defendants in all future burglary cases. Al‑ servant in their conspiracy to deliver meth. Anderson v. though historically considered to be two peas in a pod, after State, 416 S.W.3d 884 (Tex.Crim.App. 2013). today, trespass is no longer a lesser-included offense of bur‑ The conspiracy theory of the law of parties, Tex. Penal glary under an indictment that generally pleads the element of Code § 7.02(b), states that “if, in the attempt to carry out a entry. This decision turns the two peas into pea soup, a dense conspiracy to commit one felony, another felony is committed fog that will obscure the law for judges who must determine by one of the conspirators, all conspirators are guilty . . . if the whether the State has manipulated pleadings in an indictment offense was committed in furtherance of the unlawful purpose to conform to the anticipated evidence in the case.” and was one that should have been anticipated as a result of the carrying out of the conspiracy.” Because this is similar to The facts and reasonable inferences were sufficient to the federal rule of co-conspirator liability under Pinkerton v. lead an officer to conclude D was engaged in criminal United States, 328 U.S. 640 (1946), CCA adopted the approach activity, giving reasonable suspicion for a traffic stop. used by federal courts, which focuses on an examination of the Delafuente v. State, 414 S.W.3d 173 (Tex.Crim.App. 2013). totality of the circumstances to determine whether a particular D was convicted of misdemeanor marijuana possession. On appeal, he challenged the denial of his suppression motion, Officer using a loud authoritative voice to speak with arguing that the officer lacked reasonable suspicion to stop the D, asking “what’s going on,” and demanding identifi- vehicle in which he was traveling. COA reversed, ruling that cation, manifested a detention that implicated Fourth there were no specific facts in the record to support suspicion Amendment protections. Johnson v. State, 414 S.W.3d for the stop. CCA vacated COA’s judgment and remanded for 184 (Tex.Crim.App. 2013). COA to consider State v. Mendoza, 365 S.W.3d 666 (Tex.Crim. In reviewing the denial of D’s motion to suppress evidence App. 2012). COA again reversed, and CCA granted review and that led to his marijuana conviction, COA erred in holding found that COA erred on this ground: “Did the Court of Ap‑ that the officer did not detain D. Under the totality of the cir‑ peals’ determination that the traffic stop was illegal ignore cumstances, as properly reviewed de novo, a reasonable person relevant facts and rational inferences, require the state to re‑ would not have felt free to leave. Officer shining a “pretty darn but innocent explanations, and misconstrue Ford v. State, 158 bright” high-beam spotlight on a person sitting in a parked S.W.3d 488 (Tex.Crim.App. 2005)?” CCA reversed COA and vehicle, parking the police car in such a way as to at least par‑ reinstated the denial of the motion to suppress. tially block the vehicle such that the person would have had The trial court’s explicit language made it clear that the to “maneuver” around the police car to drive away, using a court found the officer’s offense report credible, and that the “loud authoritative voice” in speaking with the person, asking court supported the reasonable inference that the vehicle’s slow “what’s going on,” and demanding identification manifests a pace in the inside lane caused the traffic congestion that the detention. CCA remanded for COA to consider the trial court’s officer observed; the facts and inferences were sufficient to lead determination that officer had reasonable suspicion to detain a reasonable officer to conclude that D was engaged in criminal D and to decide whether that detention was valid. activity in violation of Tex. Transp. Code § 545.363(a). D suffered egregious harm when the court failed to in­ Counsel was not ineffective in forfeiting a statute of struct the jury that it must find certain predicate facts limitations challenge to D’s assault indictment because true beyond a reasonable doubt before relying on a the legal basis of such a challenge was unsettled. State statutory presumption to convict him. Hollander v. v. Bennett, 415 S.W.3d 867 (Tex.Crim.App. 2013). State, 414 S.W.3d 746 (Tex.Crim.App. 2013). D alleged he received ineffective assistance for counsel CCA reversed COA and remanded for a new trial. The jury failing to challenge D’s indictment on statute-of-limitation was not told that to convict D of criminal mischief, it had to grounds. The judge granted D a new trial, stating that while believe beyond a reasonable doubt, as required by Tex. Penal he would have denied such a statute of limitations challenge Code § 2.05, the evidence substantiating the presumption that because superior courts have held the statute of limitations to D engaged in the prohibited conduct because he benefited from be three years, counsel should have preserved the issue for ap‑ the rigged meter on his house. Neither the balance of the jury peal. COA and CCA reversed, finding that counsel was not in‑ charge nor the conduct of the parties corrected this deficiency. effective because the legal basis of such a statute-of-limitation Moreover, the facts giving rise to the presumption were hotly challenge was unsettled. contested; CCA therefore rejected both COA’s finding that the The preliminary issue was to determine which statute ap‑ great weight of the evidence established the predicate facts and plied. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 12.01’s catch-all provision its implicit conclusion that the jury probably would have found provides that all felonies not listed have a three-year statute of those predicate facts to be true to the requisite level of confi‑ limitations; article 12.03(d) states “[e]xcept as otherwise pro‑ dence—beyond a reasonable doubt—had it been required to vided by this chapter, any offense that bears the title ‘aggra‑ do so. CCA considered all these Almanza v. State, 686 S.W.2d vated’ shall carry the same limitations period as the primary 157 (Tex.Crim.App. 1985), factors and held that the jury charge crime.” In this case, the statute of limitations for aggravated error both affected the very basis of the case and deprived D assault under article 12.01 would be three years; under article of the right to a fair trial. 12.03(d), it would be two. D supplemented his new trial mo‑ tion with an affidavit in which counsel claimed he did not The affidavit detailing a controlled purchase and the challenge on statute-of-limitation grounds because, based on reasonable inferences therefrom supported prob­a­ article 12.01(6), he believed the statute of limitations was three ble cause that cocaine would be found in D’s house. years. COA found conflicting CCA holdings on the matter and Moreno v. State, 415 S.W.3d 284 (Tex.Crim.App. 2013). therefore that “the trial court did not have discretion to grant A magistrate issued a warrant to search D’s house for crack a new trial based on failure to preserve that claim for appellate cocaine based on an affidavit detailing a controlled purchase in purposes.” CCA likewise found this question was unsettled which police used a reliable confidential informant to purchase and has “repeatedly declined to find counsel ineffective for narcotics through an unknown third party. The third party failing to take a specific action on an unsettled issue.” was not aware of the police operation. Because there was no information on the credibility or reliability of the unknowing inadvertent accident. third party, appellant argued that the magistrate could not have concluded that there was probable cause to believe the The trial court did not clearly err in accepting the pros- cocaine came from his house. COA and CCA concluded that ecutor’s race-neutral reasons for striking a juror. Black- the affidavit provided a substantial basis for probable cause. man v. State, 414 S.W.3d 757 (Tex.Crim.App. 2013). The affidavit stated that a reliable source told officers that A jury convicted D of felony possession with intent to D was distributing narcotics from his residence, the officers deliver cocaine. D appealed that the trial court erred in over‑ used a confidential informant to conduct a controlled pur‑ ruling his objection that the State used a peremptory challenge chase of cocaine from D, the informant made contact with to strike an African-American prospective juror from his petit an unknowing participant (who told him he would go to D’s jury in violation of Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986). COA house to pick up the cocaine), and the officers saw the par‑ agreed, finding that at least one of the prosecutor’s explana‑ ticipant enter D’s house and then deliver the cocaine to the tions for the challenge was a pretext for racial discrimination, informant. and reversed D’s conviction on authority of Snyder v. Louisi- ana, 552 U.S. 472 (2008). CCA reversed COA: The evidence was sufficient for D’s criminal mischief conviction; the judge properly resolved conflicting evi- “the court of appeals erred to conclude that Snyder dence to conclude that D intentionally damaged prop- governs the facts of this case. In our view, the court of erty by throwing screws and nails in the road, causing appeals’ analysis went wrong in three respects. First, flat tires. Carrizales v. State, 414 S.W.3d 737 (Tex.Crim. it misinterpreted the prosecutor’s proffer of racially App. 2013). neutral explanations for striking Fortune to include D appealed that the evidence was insufficient to establish two non-demeanor-based reasons, namely: that the the corpus delicti of the offense of criminal mischief—i.e., that jury on which she had previously served had neither 1) the damage to the tires was the result of criminal activity. COA reached a verdict, nor 2) assessed punishment. Because disagreed, stating that proof of D’s motive and the physical the prosecutor never offered either of these as explana‑ evidence combined allowed a fact finder to conclude that the tions for his peremptory strike in the first place, they State had established the corpus delicti of criminal mischief. can hardly be deemed a cover-up for a discriminatory CCA affirmed. intent. Second—and as a consequence of its first mis‑ “The corpus delicti rule is a common law, judicially cre‑ take—the court of appeals erred to conclude that the ated, doctrine—the purpose of which was to ensure that a trial court made no ruling with respect to the prosecu‑ person would not be convicted based solely on his own false tor’s demeanor-based explanations for his peremptory confession to a crime that never occurred. . . . The old cor‑ challenge. Finally, in the absence of an inference of pus-delicti ‘usability’ rule has . . . been superceded by the discriminatory intent arising from a pretextual explana‑ due-process ‘sufficiency of the evidence’ model set out in tion, the court of appeals erred in shifting the burden of Jackson v. Virginia[, 443 U.S. 307 (1979)]. Jackson is the only proof to the State, à la Snyder, to rebut an inference that constitutional standard of review for assessing the legal suf‑ these purported explanations conclusively established ficiency of evidence in a criminal case. Under that standard, discrimination.” we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the ver‑ dict and determine whether any rational trier of fact could The independent source doctrine does not circumvent have found the essential elements of the offense beyond a rea‑ the Texas statutory requirement to suppress unlawfully sonable doubt. . . . If the State proves each element beyond a obtained evidence and was a proper basis to deny D’s reasonable doubt, there is no doubt that the crime has been suppression motion. Wehrenberg v. State, 416 S.W.3d committed by someone, namely the defendant. Because this 458 (Tex.Crim.App. 2013). case does not involve a defendant’s extrajudicial confession, The trial court applied the independent source doctrine there is neither need nor purpose to refer to the corpus-delicti and denied D’s motion to suppress, and D was convicted of doctrine. Mention of the corpus-delicti doctrine in a Jackson two felony drug offenses. COA reversed, holding that the sufficiency review when the case does not involve a confes‑ independent source doctrine is inconsistent with Texas’s ex‑ sion is, at best, just short hand for ‘evidence that the crime clusionary rule and thus inapplicable in this state. The State has been committed,’ and, at worst, confusing.” CCA agreed petitioned CCA with this question: Is the federal independent with the State that the victims, the investigators, and the trial source doctrine, which excepts from the exclusionary rule evi‑ judge could all reasonably apply the “doctrine of chances” to dence initially observed during an unlawful search but later these facts to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the tire obtained lawfully through independent means, applicable in damage was caused by D’s intentional act rather than by an Texas? CCA agreed with the State that the independent source resentation, and alleged jury charge error. We affirm.” doctrine is wholly consistent with Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 38.23, the statutory exclusionary rule in Texas that requires Evidence was legally insufficient to support the convic- suppression of unlawfully obtained evidence. CCA further tion of tampering with a governmental record because observed that its prior rejection of the inevitable discovery the State failed to prove that D presented his claim to doctrine does not imply or necessitate its rejection of the inde‑ the city with knowledge of its falsity or with intent that pendent source doctrine here. CCA reversed and remanded to it be relied on as a government document. Fox v. State, COA for further consideration of D’s argument that the court 418 S.W.3d 365 (Tex.App.—Texarkana 2013). erroneously denied his motion to suppress. “The foregoing evidence is insufficient to prove Fox knew the allegations of discrimination, religious persecution, re‑ Habeas relief granted based on ineffective assistance of taliation, and torture were false. Fox’s allegations are merely counsel, but D did not show actual innocence. Ex parte that—allegations—to be accepted or rejected in a civil pro‑ Villegas, 415 S.W.3d 885 (Tex.Crim.App. 2013). ceeding. . . . Further, the State alleged in its indictment that D was convicted of capital murder and sentenced to life Fox presented the notice of claim ‘with intent that it be taken imprisonment. COA affirmed. In this habeas writ, D alleged as a genuine governmental record, by presenting or using a he received ineffective assistance of counsel and is actually in‑ document filed with the Smith County Clerk. . . .’ In its case, nocent. The trial court held hearings, made findings of fact and the State produced no evidence that Fox had the intention that conclusions of law, and determined that counsel was ineffec‑ the claim be taken as a genuine governmental record due to tive and D is innocent under Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298 (1995). its previous filing in Smith County. In contravention of that CCA granted relief, set aside the conviction, and remanded D charge, Fox himself presented a somewhat paranoid explana‑ to custody to answer the charges in the indictment. tion for causing it to be filed—he wanted it to be copied by CCA agreed that D was entitled to relief because he showed some credible agency so he could prove its original content if that counsel was ineffective for not presenting evidence of someone subsequently altered it.” pos­sible alternative perpetrators and for not discovering and presenting evidence that would have allowed the jury to give D failed to rebut the presumption that requiring him effect to the voluntary confession jury instruction. However, to submit to polygraph and plethysmograph exams is CCA disagreed that D showed he is innocent. “In a Schlup a reasonable condition of his community supervision. actual-innocence claim, evidence demonstrating innocence is Mitchell v. State, 420 S.W.3d 448 (Tex.App.—Houston a prerequisite the applicant must satisfy to have an otherwise [14th Dist] 2014). barred constitutional claim considered on the merits. In this Appellant pleaded guilty to promotion of child pornogra‑ case, the trial court found that Sixth Amendment ineffective phy. The trial court deferred adjudication and placed appellant assistance of counsel violations, combined with the cumulative on community supervision for ten years. Appellant was or‑ evidence of innocence, showed that D was actually innocent. dered to submit to a program of psychological and physiologi‑ Because D’s ineffective assistance claims were not procedurally cal assessment on the direction of his community supervision barred as subsequent, a Schlup innocence claim dependent on officer. “The legislature has prescribed a nonexclusive list of them is improper.” Furthermore, D did not show that new facts valid conditions of community supervision. See Tex. Code “unquestionably establish” his innocence. Crim. Proc. art. 42.12, § 11(a). Currently, the list consists of twenty-four separate conditions, but polygraph and plethys‑ mograph examinations are not enumerated among them. De‑ Court of Appeals spite this omission, the examinations are addressed elsewhere in the code of criminal procedure in a manner that evidences Felony murder conviction was not void because felony their legislative endorsement. . . . If the legislature had wholly deadly conduct under Tex. Penal Code § 22.05(b)(2), (e) intended to reject polygraph examinations from the scope was not a lesser included offense of manslaughter un- of permissible conditions, it could have said so directly. . . . der § 19.04(a) and could serve as the underlying felony Many courts have determined that the results of polygraph in a felony murder prosecution under § 19.02(b)(3). and plethysmograph examinations are unreliable as items of Wash­ington v. State, 417 S.W.3d 713 (Tex.App.—Hous- evidence, but these decisions do not control the outcome in ton [14th Dist] 2013). this case. . . . With respect to the treatment of sex offenders, “Appellant challenges his conviction and sentence in six the legislature has already determined that both polygraph issues concerning the underlying felony for felony murder, the and plethysmograph examinations offer some value at the sufficiency of the evidence, the effectiveness of counsel’s rep‑ diagnostic level.” 55 Register online at www.tcdla.com

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