THE REVIVAL OF ISIS IN DEIR-EZ-ZOR SITUATION REPORT 18 June 2020
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KEY POINTS
Since the beginning of 2020, the Islamic State (ISIS) has conducted a total of 451 attacks in Syria, 343 of which occurred in Deir-ez-Zor governorate. ISIS has increased attacks in recent months; the period April–May 2020 saw 83 attacks against the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), in comparison to 110 attacks against Syrian government forces over the one- year period beginning Q2 2019–Q2 2020. ISIS sleeper cells in Deir-ez-Zor government are threatening Arab civilian workers in self-administration areas, including members of local councils, municipalities, and unions, forcing them to quit their posts or face execution. ISIS sleeper cells in the Deir-ez-Zor governorate are imposing a 2.5% tax on local farmers and a 2% tax on prominent traders under the pretext of zakat and reportedly using these funds to release alleged ISIS members and families from the Al Hol IDP camp. The exploitation of growing Arab-Kurdish and inter-tribal tensions, poor economic conditions and the presence of former ISIS members has enabled ISIS to renew social and political alliances with Arab groups in Deir-ez-Zor governorate. Although ISIS has not carried out any direct attacks on humanitarian convoys, the closure of the Al- Yarubiya border crossing with Iraq has placed them in striking distance of ISIS hideouts in the Syrian Desert.
METHODOLOGY
The research methodology for this paper includes primary and secondary data, using both quantitative and qualitative methods. This includes available data from International NGO Safety Organization (INSO), local field researchers, and international organizations such as UNOCHA. The Humanitarian Access Team (HAT) conducted key informant interviews with local stakeholders including tribal leaders in Deir-ez-Zor, heads of local councils, administrative personnel within the self-administration, and individuals who have faced threats and extortion from ISIS, on strict condition of confidentiality.
Cover Photo by Thomas Apunziata from Pexels
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CURRENT SITUATION
Council (DCC), as well as local farmers and traders in In March 2019, ISIS lost its last territorial stronghold the area. in Al Bagouz, Susat subdistrict, Deir-ez-Zor governorate, after a thirty day battle with the US- “515 Government of Syria (GoS) backed Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) forces, including two Russians and and the International Coalition (IC).1 ISIS has since established itself in the Syrian Desert and the Jazira 127 Iranian and Iranian-backed region along the Iraqi–Syrian border. From there, it forces, have been killed by ISIS amasses arms and perpetrates guerrilla attacks sleeper cell attacks since March against local forces as part of a ‘war of attrition’, as 2019.” ordered by former Caliph Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi in The Syrian Observatory for Human Rights (SOHR), 7 MAY 2020 May 2019. The war of attrition has been unaffected The Syrian Observatory for Human Rights (SOHR) by the death of Baghdadi in October 2019, while the has documented more than 110 attacks by ISIS intensity of attacks has been steadily increasing in against Syrian government forces in Deir-ez-Zor the northwest in 2020.2 It is thought that ISIS is between March 2019 and May 2020. The attacks attempting to restore its networks east and west of included kidnapping, execution, infiltration and the the Euphrates River and to rebuild the movement’s targeting of commercial trucks and fuel tankers with territorial strength.3,4 explosive devices. Specifically, since April 2020, According to data collected from the International attacks against government targets in Deir-ez-Zor NGO Safety Organization (INSO), a total of 451 include several on fuel tankers belonging to the attacks have been carried out by the Islamic State government-affiliated Qaterji group travelling from (ISIS) since the beginning of 2020. Data indicate that self-administration areas to government-held areas, 76% of these attacks were concentrated in Deir-ez- the infiltration of a Syrian government locations Zor, 11% in Al-Hasakah, 8% in Ar-Raqqa and 3% in resulting in the killing of 30 government soldiers in the Eastern Homs governorate. ISIS attacks in Deir- Abu Hayat village, Deir-ez-Zor subdistrict, and the ez-Zor are mainly focused on targeting Syrian ambush of several Syrian government military government forces, Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), vehicles resulting in the death of 11 government Deir-ez-Zor Military Council (DMC), civilian workers soldiers including Brigadier General Jaafar Al-Saqer, of the self-administration and the Deir-ez-Zor Civil head of the Syrian Arab Army’s Operations Room in rural Deir-ez-Zor.5
1 Al Jazeera, ‘US-backed SDF says fight against ISIL enters 'final moments'’, March 2019 2 BBC, ‘Baghdadi death: What now for IS?’, October 2019 3 Time, ‘What to Know About the Threat of ISIS During Coronavirus | Time’, April 2020 4 New Yorker, ‘Baghdadi Is Back—and Vows the Islamic State Will Be, Too’, April 2019 5 According to local sources, the bus was attacked at a location approximately 135km east of Palmyra. At the beginning of the operation, an IED was detonated near the bus and the ISIS soldiers began shooting the vehicle resulting in the death of six SAA officers and four soldiers, while 15 soldiers were wounded.
MERCY CORPS The revival of ISIS In Deir-ez-Zor > 3 According to INSO, ISIS conducted 83 attacks against Alshikh, the head of Al Jurdi local council, Thiban SDF forces in Deir-ez-Zor governorate between April subdistrict, and the head of the DCC's Petroleum and May 2020. These included direct shooting on Committee, was shot and killed near Shiheil town. SDF-manned checkpoints, and IED attacks against The attack came after Alshikh received a threatening SDF forces and military vehicles. text message.6 On 26 April, an IED targeted the house of Mohamad Al-Thwani Al-Radi, head of the Sosa “327 Syrian Democratic Forces municipality, Sosa subdistrict, and wounded several (SDF) and 4 International Coalition members of his family. The attack came only weeks members have been killed by ISIS after Radi received a text message requesting his sleeper cell attacks since March resignation from his post and to repent, or face 2019.” consequences. On 30 April, a note signed by the ISIS security brigade was found at the door of the The Syrian Observatory for Human Rights (SOHR), 12 MAY 2020 municipality building in Hssein city municipality, Sur Direct shooting is usually carried out by a group of subdistrict. The message carried a warning to all 4–6 ISIS members on semi-isolated SDF military members of the municipality to resign or face checkpoints in the outskirts of villages, towns, and execution. Local sources report while some cities. Local sources reported that these have been members resigned, others ignored ISIS’ warnings. No concentrated in areas of Breiha, Basira subdistrict, retaliation by the group has been reported so far. Hawayej, Thiban subdistrict and Al Bagouz, Susat On 7 May, INSO reported that several teachers and subdistrict all in northern Deir-ez-Zor governorate; employees with the DCC in Shiheil, Basira subdistrict Sweidan Jazira, Thiban subdistrict in eastern Deir- have resigned their posts after receiving similar ez-Zor governorate; and in Shahabat in western threatening text messages. Deir-ez-Zor governorate. IED attacks target small groups of SDF members and military vehicles en- “I received a text by phone with the route between villages and towns in the countryside instructions, I was blindfolded and of Deir-ez-Zor. Local sources reported that these have been concentrated in areas Hawayej and driven to the Badia [Syrian Desert], I Thiban, Thiban subdistrict, Shiheil in Basira believe to a location near Al-Omar subdistrict, and to a lesser extent in areas of Breiha, oilfield, where I gave the money to a Sabha, and Basira in Basira subdistrict, Eastern Jarda foreign fighter.” and Sweidan Jazira, Thiban subdistrict. A.S, a trader in Shiheil who was subject to extortion by ISIS.
Local sources confirmed employees of local Additionally, local sources confirm that ISIS is councils, municipalities, and unions working for the collecting a 2.5% tax on crops from local farmers and self-administration have faced threats of execution a 2% tax on commerce from prominent traders in the from ISIS should they continue their work. In April 2020, ISIS claimed responsibility for three specific incidents targeting civil servants in the eastern Deir- ez-Zor countryside. The first, on 23 April, Ahmad
.April 2020 ,' ’اغتيال رئيس المجلس المحلي بالجردي' (JES Press, (Arabic 6
MERCY CORPS The revival of ISIS In Deir-ez-Zor > 4 Deir-ez-Zor governorate under the pretext of zakat.7,8 investors of the Al-Azraq oil-well as they continued Local sources report that traders who refused to pay to refuse paying the required zakat.9 Last September, the tax have been executed after their properties two local livestock traders were executed in the have been destroyed as warning. town of Hawayej as they refused to pay the 2.5% tax after receiving multiple death threats from ISIS. On 4 June, ISIS members attacked workers of the Al- Local sources reported that such incidents have Azraq oil-well and set an unspecified number of oil been increasing in a number of areas in Deir-ez-Zor tankers on fire. The attack came as a warning to the governorate.10
ANALYSIS OF THE CURRENT SITUATION
A primary factor contributing to the revival of ISIS in against the Syrian Democratic Council (SDC) Deir-ez-Zor governorate is the large number of governance model, particularly in relation to the former ISIS members present in the area. This control of self-administration’s civil, military, and includes ISIS fighters who managed to flee the battle financial resources. Repeated protests against the of Al-Bagouz, and settled in Al-Sour subdistrict, Deir- SDC and the SDF have been held in several villages ez-Zor governorate, and ISIS fighters who were and towns of Deir-ez-Zor.13 ISIS has also exploited released from SDF prisons under kafala (tribal pre-existing inter-tribal conflicts between Deir-ez- sponsorship) or on bail and settled in Basira Zor tribes. A good example of this is the ongoing subdistrict.11 The significance of these desert-like disputes between the Albukamil and Al-Shaitat areas lies in their proximity to the Iraqi border as tribes against the Al-Bakirand Albu Izz Al-Din tribes well as in their mountainous geographic nature, over land ownership, control of oil wells, and allowing the smuggling of ISIS personnel and previous differing alliances (for instance, Albukamil military equipment to and from Iraq.12 and Al-Shaitat allied with Jabhat Al-Nusra in 2014 while Al-Bakir and Albu Izz Al-Din allied with ISIS).14 Second, the complex local social dynamics in Deir- Recent incidents show that the vast majority of ISIS ez-Zor governorate have led to a resurgence of attacks targeting members in the Al-bukamil and Al- support for ISIS. The growing Arab–Kurdish tension Shaitat tribes occurred in Al-Bakir and Albu Izz Al- has been used to promote ISIS social and political Din tribal strongholds, and vice versa. This could alliances with the Arab groups in the area. This has indicate that some tribes, especially those with been possible as some of the Arab population are
7 Zakat is an Islamic finance term referring to the obligation that an individual has to donate a certain proportion of wealth each year to charity. 8 Local sources reported that ISIS imposed a 5,000 SYP (approximately $10 at the official rate, and around $1.72 at the unofficial rate) as tax for each livestock the farmers owned. .April 2020 ’داعش يشعل آبار النفط ببادية دير الزور وقوات الحكومة السورية تحرق المحاصيل الزراعية‘ ,(Erem News, (Arabic 9 10 This is specific to the following areas of Hawayej, Thiban, Tayyana, Shinan, Sweidan Jazira, Darnaj, and Abu Hardoub in Thiban subdistrict; Basira, Mashekh, Tib Elfal, and Shiheil in Basira subdistrict; Dahleh and Sabha in Khasham subdistrict; Hssein, and Moeijel in Sur subdistrict, all in Deir-ez-Zor governorate. 11 In March 2019, ISIS lost its last territorial stronghold in Al Bagouz, after a thirty-day battle with the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and the International Coalition (IC). 12 The tribal sponsorship program was launched by the SDF in cooperation with tribal leaders whereby those leaving Al Hol camp must receive tribal sponsorship in order to do so, as those leaving the camp must not pose a security risk or “have blood on their hands”. 13 Humanitarian Access Team Tribal Protests against Kurdish Governance in Deir-ez-Zor Governorate_June 17, 2019. 14 Inter-tribal tensions persist. In 2014, members of the Qaraan and al-Bakir tribes aligned with ISIS against the Al-Shaitat tribe, resulting in the massacre of 300 AL-Shaitat tribesmen and the killing of 400 more in subsequent fighting.
MERCY CORPS The revival of ISIS In Deir-ez-Zor > 5 previous loyalties to ISIS, have resorted to using ISIS local stores, confiscated and burned cigarette boxes, sleeper cells to settle their differences with other destroyed hookahs in local cafes, and threatened clans. severe consequences if shops did not close during prayer time.15 Additional reports indicate that ISIS It appears that ISIS is focusing on exploiting these has carried out execution sentences against civilians dynamics to undermine the authority of the self- in the area accused of crimes including ‘witchcraft’, administration and discourage Arabs from joining its or providing information to the intelligence civil and military sectors in the Deir-ez-Zor apparatus of the SDF.16,17 governorate. ISIS attacks against self-administration and DCC employees were focused exclusively on Although it is difficult to determine the amount of Arab employees, and there have been no reports of funds ISIS collects from farmers and traders in Deir- Kurdish civilian workers being forced to resign from ez-Zor governorate, reports indicate that the group their posts due to ISIS threats. Additionally, ISIS uses these funds to recruit new members and to attacks against SDF military members targeted release its detained members and families from SDF prominent Arab military figures in the area, custody. The poor economic conditions and lack of including Ismail al-Abdullah (the head of the DMC), employment in a highly populated area such as Bassam Al-Khater (the Chief Commander of Hajin Deir-ez-Zor governorate have significantly Regiment of the DMC), and Abu Hatisha (the Chief contributed to locals' cooperation with ISIS – the Commander of Khabat Al-Shuaiti Regiment of the group allegedly pays between $100–150 to recruit DMC). informants to report the movement of SDF forces, while it pays $400–500 for an individual to plant an ISIS also sought to further undermine the self- explosive device in a specific location.18 Reports also administration authority in Deir-ez-Zor through indicate that funds are used to release alleged interfering with the lives of local civilians in the area. members of ISIS from Al Hol camp in Deir-ez-Zor, Local reports indicate that after the SDF military and from SDF intelligence department (Asayish). patrols withdraw from the roads at night, ISIS 19,20,21 sleeper cells often carry out raids, kidnappings, assassinations, and sometimes establish checkpoints to search cars and conduct arrests. Other reports indicate that ISIS members raided
15 In December 2019, ISIS members raided several coffee shops in Basira, targeting hookahs and the selling of them. In January 2020, ISIS members visited several shops in the town Basira, Basira subdistrict and warned their owners to close their shops during prayer times. In April 2020, ISIS members confiscated and burned quantities of cigarette packs from the shops in the village of Eastern Gharibeh. 16 On 22 March, ISIS executed a civilian in Sabha, Khasham subdistrict, reportedly for ‘practicing witchcraft’, killing him and wounding his wife. In May 2020, ISIS executed two civilians in Sweidan Jazira on charges of witchcraft. 17 In March 2020, ISIS carried out an execution in Hawayej of an individual accused of handing over two ISIS members to the General Security Service of SDF. In May 2020, ISIS kidnapped and killed the son and brother of the mukhtar (mayor) of Mashekh village, Basira subdistrict and dumped their bodies. ISIS claimed that the victims informed the SDF General Security Service about the location of two ISIS members. 18 According to UN Operational Partners, as of December 2019, the population of Deir-ez-Zor governorate is 754,597, with 168,980 IDPs and 66,985 returnees. 19 According UNOCHA’s Humanitarian Response, as of January 2020, the population of Al Hole camp is 66,101 individuals; 30,724 Iraqis; 25,780 Syrians and 9,597 third country nationals. 20 Between November 2019 and March 2020, 725 ISIS-affiliated individuals and families were released from Al Hol IDP camp through tribal sponsorship. 21 Local sources reported the occurrence of several incidents where Shikh Khalaf Al-Asaad, deputy speaker of the Legislative Council in Deir-ez- Zor received a payment of $4,000–10,000 to provide sponsorship in order to release alleged ISIS-affiliated members from SDF custody.
MERCY CORPS The revival of ISIS In Deir-ez-Zor > 6 FORECAST
Although attacks by ISIS have not had a direct Conversely, the SDF and the IC are expected to impact on humanitarian operations so far, the accelerate their effort in combating ISIS sleeper cells closure of the Al-Yarubiya border crossing with Iraq in Deir-ez-Zor governorate in the near future. On 4 has placed humanitarian convoys in striking June, SDF forces launched a new security campaign distance of the ISIS hideouts in the Syrian Desert. targeting former and new suspected ISIS members Due to the closure of Al-Yarubiya, humanitarian aid in the towns falling between Shaddadah, Shaddadah trucks coming from the Syrian government- subdistrict, Al Hasakeh governorate and Abu Kamal, controlled to SDF-controlled areas go through two Abu Kamal subdistrict, Deir-ez-Zor governorate, as main roads in the Syrian Desert: the Maskana-Ar- well as setting up checkpoints across different Raqqa road, and the Ithriya-Ar-Raqqa Road, both of towns located between Eastern Gharibeh, Sur which have been subject to 14 ISIS attacks in the subdistrict, to Theeka, Basira subdistrict.22 On 7 June, recent months. Most of these attacks have been the SDF, the IC, and Iraqi forces combed the desert targeting commercial trucks and fuel tankers, region between Deir-ez-Zor governorate and the however the fact that ISIS sleeper cells are Iraqi border, reportedly arresting 50 suspected ISIS concentrated in the Syrian Desert, particularly in members.23 Similar operations, as well as increased Jabal Abū Rujmayn, 31km northeast of Palmyra security presence and the manning of checkpoints, (Tadmor) city, and Jabal Al Bishri, 51km west of Deir- are likely to continue in the short-to-medium term ez-Zor city, has made humanitarian convoys given the increase in ISIS attacks against the SDF. vulnerable to attack, and raises concerns over the These will likely particularly be concentrated in the safety of humanitarian aid workers. This is likely to Basira subdistrict given the high presence of sleeper continue in the short term. cells in the area.
.April 2020’.حملة جديدة للتحالف و”قسد” ضد خاليا تنظيم “الدولة” في بادية دير الزور‘ ,(Enab Baladi, (Arabic 22 .April 2020’ في يومها الرابع.. حملة التحالف و”قسد” األمنية تتوسع في سوريا‘ ,(Enab Baladi, (Arabic 23
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Recommendations
1 Humanitarian agencies are advised to conduct comprehensive conflict sensitivity assessment in the Deir- ez-Zor governorate in general, and in the eastern parts of Deir-ez-Zor in particular, to better understand the local and tribal dynamics in the area.
2 Humanitarian agencies are advised to conduct extensive research and background checks before engaging in financial transactions with local traders and contractors in the area.
3 Humanitarian agencies are advised to diversify and divide large financial contracts instead of signing a single large contract with one vendor which could increase the likelihood of becoming a target for extortion by ISIS.
4 Humanitarian organizations and local partners with staff members inside Basira, Thiban Susat, Sur, and
Khasham subdistricts are advised to avoid publishing any media statements or engaging in any advocacy activity against ISIS or the SDF.
5 Humanitarian organizations and local partners that have assets stored in the eastern subdistricts of
Deir-ez-Zor including Basira, Thiban Susat, Sur, and Khasham subdistricts are advised to relocate to different locations in the north and northwest of Deir-ez-Zor governorate.
6 International humanitarian organizations and donors are advised to increase livelihood projects to reduce the level of poverty and unemployment exploited by ISIS sleeper cells.
7 Humanitarian organizations are advised to stay vigilant during SDF and IC search and raid operations to avoid clashes should they occur, given road access limitations and security issues.
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CONTACT
Nicholas Bodanac Humanitarian Access Team [email protected]
The Humanitarian Access Team (HAT) was established in Beirut in March 2015 in response to the collective challenges facing the remote humanitarian response in Syria. Successful humanitarian and development interventions require a nuanced and objective understanding of the human ecosystems in which these interventions occur. To this end, the HAT’s most important function is to collect, triangulate, synthesize, analyze and operationalize disparate data and information. Since 2015, HAT analysis has provided a forward-looking template for international interventions in Syria, and facilitated an increasingly nimble, adaptive, integrated, and ultimately impactful international response to the Syrian conflict.
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