POLICY NOTES THE WASHINGTON INSTITUTE FOR NEAR EAST POLICY ■ 2018 ■ PN52

T URKEY, A NATO MEMBER, sits A TALE OF SIX TRIBES Securing the Middle River Valley

 ANDREW J. TABLER, Editor

THE ISLAMIC STATE is now largely defeated militarily, with the U.S.-backed having taken the eastern bank of the Euphrates River and a of largely Iran- and Russia- supported Assad-regime forces taking areas west of the river. As anti-IS operations wind down and the Trump administration considers its options in eastern , the challenge of how to win over the settled Arab tribes of the Middle Euphrates River Valley remains vital to ensuring that the Islamic State is ultimately defeated and that Iran does not fill the vacuum, thereby setting off a greater Middle East conflict.

Photo: Euphrates River, between and Deir al-Zour. ©2010 Greg Sixt, all rights reserved. Reprinted with permission.

©2018 THE WASHINGTON INSTITUTE FOR NEAR EAST POLICY. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.

THE WASHINGTON INSTITUTE FOR NEAR EAST POLICY ■ NO. 30 ■ JANUARY 2017 ANDREW TABLER, Editor

A recent visitor to eastern Syria, who will remain anon- While not reflecting a formal poll of all tribes in the ymous for security reasons, conducted interviews with a , the answers, as well as the interviewer’s impres- number of tribal figures from six of the MERV’s largest sions, indicate that the United States and its allies extended tribal confederations: Walda, Afadla, Sabkha, can win sympathy from the tribes by showing consis- Busaraya, Baggara, and Ougaidat.1 The interviews were tency and committing to stabilization and reconstruc- aimed at determining tribal goals as well as attitudes tion with U.S. allies. The United States also has some toward the IS, the United States, , the Syrian Kurdish room to capitalize on anti-Iran sentiment among the Democratic Union Party (PYD) and its militia, the People’s settled tribes, although the regime continues to hold Defense Units (YPG), and the Assad regime, with its Iran- many cards for enticing tribes away from the U.S.- backed militias and associated forces. supported SDF.

THE TRIBES AT A GLANCE

WALDA AFADLA The Walda tribe predomi- of fertile lands, among other Following the Walda dis- and Maazellah, 40 km from nates in the western rural factors, had strong effects on placement several decades the city. areas of Raqqa province. the Walda’s social, economic, ago, the Afadla emerged To the northwest: areas Members, numbering about and political status. as the largest tribe in Raqqa from the village of al-Jazira to 150,000, also live in Hasaka The Walda tribe is divided province. According to tribal Kubash (east and west) and and provinces. into two branches: sources, some 300,000 Afadla Awja, 40 km from Raqqa city. now live in Raqqa province In this last village, in 1941, In the early 1970s, about • The JAZIRA, whose terri- in the locales surrounding the Afadla and the Bed- 40% of Walda tribespeople tory stretches from the vil- Raqqa city. ouin clan al-Fadan, from the were forced to leave their lage of Sweida in western To the east, where they Anaza confederation, ended home villages and towns Raqqa, to al-Jaber, Ramel, are most concentrated: the their conflict and established when the Syrian govern- and al-Din, a village village of al-Mishlab, about borders. ment built the al-Thawra east of the , 5 km from downtown; and To the south: on the south- Dam, the largest in Syria on north of the Euphrates. then from Raqqa Samra to ern banks of the Euphrates, Most al-Maghmurin previ- the Euphrates River. These Tawi Ruman, al-Hamrat, in villages within the al-Kasrat ously lived in these villages. evacuees, known as “al- al-Karameh, al-Hawis, and village districts: Kasra Maghmurin” (lit. submerged) • The SHAMIYA, who live Khas Ajeel, the last of which al-Jumaa, Kasra Afnan, Kasra because their lands had been on the southern banks is located on the northern Farajah, and Kasra Muham- flooded by the creation of of the Euphrates, from banks of the Euphrates 72 mad Ali. nearby , were Mansoura, 30 km west km from the city. The tribe’s presence on moved to Kurdish-majority of Raqqa, to , To the northeast: the vil- all sides of the city gives it areas near and the , al-Khafsa, lages of al-Rihayat and al- political and social influence, border with Turkey. The loss and . Yarmouk, ranging to Hazima including over other tribes.

SABKHA OUGAIDAT Sabkha tribespeople live on Deir al-Zour province, about The Ougaidat is the largest helped forge the borders of the southern banks of the 70 km south of Raqqa on the tribe in Deir al-Zour prov- Syria and through their Euphrates, in villages from Euphrates. The last location, ince and in all of Syria, as bloody conflicts with the Kasra Agha (7 at the 70-km mark, is known well as the strongest tribe al-Khirsan clan, a branch km east of Raqqa) to al-Akirshi, as the “Sabkha line.” in eastern Syria. One tribal of the al-Rahabi, al-Sharida (east and According to a tribal leader, leader estimates the total tribal confederation. west), and then on to al- the Sabkha numbered about number of Ougaidat in The Ougaidat tribe lives Gabli, al-Ghanim Ali, Muqlah 80,000 in 2011, making it the the country at 1.5 million, on both banks of Euphra- (Saghirah and Kabira), al- second largest tribe in eastern with about a third living in tes, spanning an area from Jaber, al-Khamisah, Maadan, Raqqa, after the Afadla. Deir al-Zour province. In Deir al-Zour city up to Abu Sweida, and finally al-Tabni, in the 1940s, the Ougaidat Kamal. They also live in Iraq.

2 THE WASHINGTON INSTITUTE FOR NEAR EAST POLICY A TALE OF SIX TRIBES: SECURING THE MIDDLE EUPHRATES RIVER VALLEY

BAGGARA BUSARAYA Baggara tribespeople mainly are not available, a large num- Busaraya tribespeople live in Approximately 56 km east live west of Deir al-Zour city, ber of people of Baggara lin- rural western Deir al-Zour of Deir al-Zour, tribe mem- ranging from the northern eage have integrated into Deir province, along the southern bers live in Buqrus, a town banks of the Euphrates to al-Zour city—in fact, some say a banks of the Euphrates, in that boasts a high number of the Raqqa provincial border; full one-third of the city’s resi- the village of Ayyash and the university graduates. Accord- in villages from al-Husseini- dents have roots in the tribe. towns of Kharita and Shme- ing to residents, some 150 yah to Mahamidah, where One prominent Baggara fam- itiyeh, the tribal capital and physicians and 450 engineers the Baggara’s chiefdom fam- ily there is the al-Ayyash. home to the al-Fayyad chief- live there. ily lives; to al-Kasrat, al-Kubar, Other regions where the dom family, 20 km west of Deir Busaraya sources say and Jazra al-Milaj, spanning Baggara live include Hasaka al-Zour city. They also live in about 50,000 tribespeople a distance of some 80 km. province, in an area known the villages of al-Tarif, al-Bouti, live in Raqqa province, tens East of Deir al-Zour, the Bag- as Baggara al-Jabal (Bag- and al-Masrab. About 220,000 of thousands of them in the gara live in smaller numbers gara Mountain); Raqqa (e.g., Busaraya tribespeople are said city and about 10,000 in its in the villages of Meratt, the al-Ojeili and al-Mashhour to live in Raqqa and Hasaka Busaraya district, around the Khusham, and Jadid Bag- families); the city of Aleppo provinces, Deir al-Zour city, al-Hani Mosque and North al- gara. Sources suggest a total and other northern towns; and the surrounding villages. Mansour Street. of approximately 100,000 and . Baggara live in these areas Some Baggara tribespeople east and west of the city. report their numbers in Syria as Although accurate figures now exceeding one million.

ISLAMIC STATE IN RAQQA vs. DEIR AL-ZOUR

RAQQA TRIBES No sustained confrontation took place various reasons.The first entailed the con- to Armenian families, with their Christian in Raqqa between the Islamic State and centration of Syria’s oil and gas resources houses of worship, and Muslim Chechen Jabhat al-Nusra, along with the various within the province, making it an obvious and Circassian families. According to one associated militias. Indeed, over a few prize for all anti-Assad groups. tribal figure, IS and JN employed a carrot- days in early 2014, IS defeated JN and The second reason involved the loca- and-stick approach in trying to secure loy- Ahrar al-Sham and kicked them out tion of chiefdom families for the Busaraya, alty, the carrot being shares of oil income, of Raqqa, making the city the de facto Baggara, and Ougaidat tribes in this the stick being force. Islamic State capital. province. Since these tribes also have a For the Islamic State in particular, sei- presence in Aleppo, Raqqa, and Hasaka zure of Deir al-Zour province would allow provinces, control of Deir al-Zour would for a link from its de facto capital, Raqqa,

DEIR AL-ZOUR TRIBES grant the winners implicit leverage in to Anbar province in Iraq, where the In contrast, the fighting in Deir al-Zour these other areas. Moreover, the popula- group also held power. No such link was between jihadist groups was bloody and tion of Deir al-Zour is almost exclusively available otherwise. bitter. Both the Islamic State and Jabhat Arab, with low numbers of Kurds and al-Nusra sought to hold the province for Assyrians. Deir al-Zour city is also home

ACRONYMS IS Islamic State JN Jabhat al-Nusra, MERV Middle Euphrates River Valley PYD Kurdish Democratic Union Party SDF Syrian Democratic Forces YPG People’s Defense Units

POLICY NOTE 52 3 ANDREW TABLER, Editor

Islamic State Rule hundreds of Walda tribespeople joined JN in its fight against IS, strengthening JN in western Raqqa. The and the Eastern Syrian Tribes tribesman Nasser al-Faraj personally recruited dozens of his relatives for JN in Mazrat al-Safsafeh; Ibrahim al- Raqqa Tribes Faraj did the same in Mansoura. Other western Raqqa villages in which Nasser tribespeople strengthened JN As contrasted with the events in Deir al-Zour, no sustained include al-Jarniya and Dibsi Faraj. confrontation occurred between the Islamic State and After the Islamic State seized Raqqa in January Jabhat al-Nusra in Raqqa. Indeed, over just a few days * 2014, the Walda in general and the Nasser clansmen in early 2014, IS vanquished JN and the Islamist Ahrar in particular did not fall in line behind the jihadist group, al-Sham coalition, kicking these rivals out of Raqqa and although small numbers did join. Among the exceptions, establishing the capital of its Islamist caliphate. evidently, is Sheikh Khamri Shawakh al-Bursan, who WALDA hails from the village of Shams al-Din and is rumored to have “secretly” expressed his support for IS and joined The Walda tribe consists of some 150,000 members. the group’s Council of Tribes. In general, during the Syrian war, Walda tribespeople demonstrated support for the Free (FSA) AFADLA and later its rival, JN. In contrast to the Afadla and Sab- Members of the Afadla live along the northern banks of kha tribes, the Walda did not join IS in large numbers or the Euphrates. As contrasted with the Sabkha, who live show strong support for the group. on the southern banks and are Wahhabi and Salafi, the The chiefdom seat within the Walda tribe belongs Afadla tend not to be religious. Those who are follow to the Nasser clan, which consists of two subfamilies: Sufi or other moderate forms of faith. the al-Bursan, in Jazira (mostly displaced from Hasaka After the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003, hundreds province), and al-Faraj al-Salamah, in the Shamiya of Afadla tribesmen, mostly from the al-Breij clan, area, along the southern Euphrates River. These families infiltrated Iraq to defend the regime of Saddam Hus- played a key role in pushing Assad-regime forces out of sein. Their reasons were tribal and religious rather than rural and urban areas around Raqqa. political enmity toward the United States, such as the The Nasser clan’s strong anti-Assad sentiments date Hussein regime’s hosting of an al-Breij sheikh after he to the early 1960s, when the government appropriated left Syria. A few months after peaceful demonstrations thousands of acres of tribal land for nationalization began against Syria’s Assad regime eight years later, and dam projects. Between the two subfamilies, the al- hundreds of Afadla tribesmen joined FSA rebel units Faraj al-Salamah holds a stronger anti-Assad position after learning that their tribal leaders no longer backed than the al-Bursan, who moved to the village of Bahira the regime. Unlike the Walda, the Afadla did not back near Qamishli. JN. But Afadla leaders and members did support the In April 2013, weeks after the March 4 seizure by Islamic State, with the al-Breij, in particular, providing rebels of Raqqa city, regime forces killed Sheikh Abdul the jihadists with significant forces in Raqqa. Indeed, Rahman Muhammad Faraj al-Salamah in the village of the first three names on the IS-led Raqqa Council of Mazrat al-Safsafeh. The sheikh’s son Hamid had been Tribes are from Afadla: instrumental in encouraging military activities targeting Assad forces, and likewise in urging greater anti-regime „„ Tobad Breij al-Abdulhadi al-Hajo (al-Breij clan), activity from Walda tribespeople. who is said to have been killed in an April 2018 Indeed, the al-Faraj al-Salamah sponsored the first U.S.-led airstrike in Deir al-Zour. armed FSA group established in Raqqa province. In „„ Bashir Faisal al-Huwaidi, who is based in Raqqa and around al-Thawra, the group waged deadly attacks and supportive of the Syrian Democratic Forces. against regime security checkpoints and patrols. Later, His brother Muhammad, high chief of the Afadla, currently lives in and has very good *. This text refers to Jabhat al-Nusra, the early Syrian affiliate of al-Qaeda, ties with the Assad government. The Syrian parlia- rather than its later incarnations Jabhat Fatah al-Sham and Harakat Tahrir al-Sham. ment member Hussam al-Katerji, who has helped

4 THE WASHINGTON INSTITUTE FOR NEAR EAST POLICY A TALE OF SIX TRIBES: SECURING THE MIDDLE EUPHRATES RIVER VALLEY

transport oil, wheat, and cotton from IS- and now The first explanation for this involves Syria’s oil and SDF-held areas, set Muhammad up with a fancy gas resources, most of which are located in Deir al-Zour. apartment in Damascus and has facilitated ties for Second, Deir al-Zour is home to the Syrian Arab him with regime security officials. Muhammad’s tribes of Busaraya, Baggara, and Ougaidat, all of support for Assad, versus Bashir’s for the SDF, has which have family connections in Aleppo, Raqqa, and surprised the people of Raqqa. Hasaka. Tribal losses across Deir al-Zour could thus empower other tribes and clans, in the province and „„ Shalash al-Mujahim al-Huwaidi, a cousin of Sheikh elsewhere. Deir al-Zour, moreover, is almost exclu- Muhammad Faisal al-Huwaidi. sively Arab, with only a smattering of Kurds and Assyr- SABKHA ians. According to one tribal leader, both IS and JN employed a carrot-and-stick approach in seeking the The base of Wahhabi and Salafi adherence in Raqqa loyalty of tribal chiefs, with oil income often the carrot, province consists of Sabkha tribespeople living in the and force often the stick. villages of Muqlah Saghirah and Muqlah Kabira and Third, IS was keen to seize Deir al-Zour province to the town of Maadan. Muhammad al-Arfi and link Raqqa, its de facto capital, with the Iraqi province Taha al-Tai originally disseminated Salafi ideology in of Anbar, thus validating its claims to “Iraq” and “al- Maadan. Later, Salim al-Hilo, a sharia teacher, Rama- Sham.” Without Deir al-Zour, IS could achieve have no dan Ramadan, and Sheikh Muhammad al-Khidr spread such connection. the doctrine of . The roots of Wahhabism among the al-Sabkha lie BUSARAYA in the participation by many as foreign workers in Saudi Along with the surrounding oil fields and fertile agri- Arabia. There, they were exposed to radical ideas and cultural lands, villages inhabited by the Busaraya have practices such as women’s wearing of the niqab (veil), strategic value for their proximity to the regime-held which the returnees propagated in their home villages. Ayyash checkpoint, where its Division 137 is based. The Previously, Raqqa tribeswomen donned a simple head regime has attacked villages and towns in western Deir covering rather than the full veil preferred in . al-Zour from these positions. Not all IS adherents had traveled to the Saudi king- In contrast with the Ougaidat and Baggara, the dom. For example, a Sabkha tribesman named Ibra- Busaraya tribespeople have mainly stayed true to their him Muhammad al-Khalifa, known as Ibn Laden, hails local identity and have not lent support to either IS or from al-Naamat, a Syrian village, but was working as a JN. In April 2013, however, a so-called gang of thieves shepherd in . With the outbreak of the 2011 Syr- from the Busaraya’s Assaf clan clashed with JN forces ian crisis, he returned to his village to lead anti-Assad in the village of al-Masrab, revealing fault lines within activities with support from the al-Rumih family, from the Busaraya. After the gang stole a fuel-filled truck, Muqlah, and from a man identified only as Suleiman, a JN sent an armed group to seek the plunderers’ arrest. resident of al-Jaber village whose family was tied to the But the Assaf group struck back and killed JN’s Baath Party leadership. He and his family first expressed of western Deir al-Zour, Abu Abdul Rahman al-Aqaisi, support for Jabhat al-Nusra before changing their alle- whose family hails from the Busaraya. This evidence giance to the Islamic State. Khalifah, who became emir of infighting stoked tensions among cousins. The Aqa- of Maadan, was considered a hardliner even by IS mem- isat clan thereafter received support from JN members bers. This switch from JN to the Islamic State is illustrative from the Ougaidat’s clan. Operating from of the move by hundreds of Sabkha tribespeople, who their village of al-Shahil, some forty-five miles east of emerged as the second strongest backers of the jihadist Deir al-Zour city, they seized al-Masrab from the Assaf group in Raqqa province, after the Afadla. combatants. Deir al-Zour Tribes In early 2014, IS strengthened its military position by seizing the salt mine in the village of al-Tibni, as well The Islamic State, as already noted, fought bloodily as by attacking positions held by the Islamist Ahrar al- against al-Qaeda-linked groups to seize the province of Sham in Busaraya-inhabited villages. Later, the group Deir al-Zour, much more so than in Raqqa. began its attacks against JN.

POLICY NOTE 52 5 ANDREW TABLER, Editor

In April 2014, IS killed JN military leader Abu al- OUGAIDAT Yaman and other figures. By July 2014, the jihad- The Ougaidat tribe exemplifies how radical Islamist ide- ist group had taken full control of most of Deir al- ology can divide an extended family. The tribe holds Zour province, including the western rural villages of the strongest anti-Assad views among its fellow tribes the Busaraya. in Deir al-Zour and, in the early months of 2012, was Although, as noted, Busaraya tribespeople have instrumental in booting regime forces from Deir al-Zour generally adopted an anti-IS stance, several dozen city and the rural areas. have joined the group for the salary or the sense of In early 2012, Ougaidat tribesmen joined brigades empowerment. Yet the dominant hostile view was within the FSA. But a few months later, Jabhat al-Nusra exemplified in a September 2016 incident in which bolstered its position among the tribespeople of al-Sha- tribesmen attacked IS gunmen, who responded by hil, a village east of Deir al-Zour city populated mainly arresting the perpetrators. by the Abu Kamal clan, which has a strong Salafi bent and sends many of its youths to work in Saudi Arabia BAGGARA and . Some reports speculated that JN leader Baggara tribespeople and leaders have adopted no Abu Muhammad al-Julani was living in Shahil and lead- clear-cut attitude toward the radical Islamist groups in ing his al-Qaeda-linked group from the village. Syria. This lack of resistance has created a weak link JN gave al-Shahil families—e.g., al-Sayyad, al- exploited by the Islamic State in its quest for power in Mizal, al-Fayyad, and al-Farhan—the right to invest in Deir al-Zour province. Yet Baggara tribespeople have the 10,000 barrels per day produced by the al-Omar not been entirely neutral, reflecting their bid to stay oil field (vs. the 30,000 bpd prewar output), the largest relevant. In response to Ougaidat members joining in Deir al-Zour province. Through this offer, as well as Jabhat al-Nusra, some Baggara leaders have jumped proceeds from the Conoco gas plant in the village of on the Islamic State bandwagon to maintain leverage. Khusham, 24 km east of Deir al-Zour city, JN could buy Hundreds of others have indeed joined JN, as well as the allegiance of al-Shahil tribespeople. Ahrar al-Sham and other rebel groups. Baggara sheikh Members of the Ougaidat’s al-Baqir clan—in Nawaf Ragheb al-Bashir has expressed his support for Khusham and Jadid Ougaidat—were aggrieved by this “all anti-Assad groups,” including JN. According to development because these villages host the oil and gas an educated anti-Assad member of the Baggara, the fields, in addition to the Conoco gas plant. One clans- sheikh has since reversed this position: “Sheikh Nawaf man, a simple taxi driver named Amir al-Rafdan, traced was supporting everyone against the government of his origins to Jadid Ougaidat and drove a cab in the Bashar al-Assad, including IS and JN, but now he sup- al-Jura district of Deir al-Zour. Viewing the JN interven- ports everyone who stands and fights alongside Assad, tion as unfair, he sided with the Islamic State and urged including the Shia sectarian gangs. Sheikh Nawaf has his kinfolk to do the same. He pledged allegiance to the no principles, and he looks out for his personal and group and its military leader Omar al-Shishani, help- family interests, not those of his tribesmen.” ing clear the path for IS entry into Jadid Ougaidat and In seeking loyalty from the Baggara, IS has applied Khusham. Rafdan subsequently rose to become wali pressure in various forms. In December 2014, for (governor) of what IS called the “al-Kheir estate” (Deir example, the group captured three of Sheikh Nawaf’s al-Zour province), similar to the role held by Ali Moussa sons, Assad, Laith, and Mashal, although later freeing al-Shawakh (aka Abu Luqman) in Raqqa. them. Nawaf and his sons, around then, had been shift- Internal Ougaidat frictions came to a head in May ing their political loyalties, making them difficult to pin 2014 when JN gunmen, mainly from al-Shahil, attacked down. Some reported the sheikh’s loyalty to IS, but he Jadid Ougaidat and burned homes belonging to the denied this. Assad, the eldest, pledged allegiance to IS al-Rafdan family. during a public meeting in the village of Mahamidah, The Islamic State’s June 2014 seizure of , ending the conflict, at least temporarily. Indeed, Assad Iraq, granted the group preeminent “moral and military was the first leader of a major Deir al-Zour tribe to power” across eastern Syria and western Iraq. Amid this pledge allegiance to IS. climate, forces loyal to Amir al-Rafdan seized al-Shahil

6 THE WASHINGTON INSTITUTE FOR NEAR EAST POLICY A TALE OF SIX TRIBES: SECURING THE MIDDLE EUPHRATES RIVER VALLEY

the next month. Worried that they would lose their oil „„ Islamic State gunmen and radical Salafi scholars revenues facilitated by JN, the al-Shaitat, another tribe have publicly expressed their hostile attitude toward within the Ougaidat confederation, sought support in the U.S.-led coalition against the jihadist group in the form of weapons and fighters from their fellow Abu Syria and Iraq. They believe the collapse of IS in Kamal clansmen. Within the al-Shaitat, the al-Bahar, al- both countries will weaken Sunni Arab tribes and Zalan, and al-Nahar families all ran oil fields, produc- strengthen Iran’s Shia political, economic, and mili- ing 4,000, 2,500, and 1,500 bpd, respectively, in the tary program in the region. Also at risk, in this per- villages of and Kishkeh. ception, are Sunni interests in Iraq and , Thus, three Ougaidat families—the al-Baqir, Abu as well as typically U.S.-aligned Sunni countries Kamal, and al-Shaitat—were all drawn into the JN-IS such as Turkey, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and the Gulf struggle, even as their true interests centered on keep- states. ing their oil proceeds. That same month, July 2014, the „„ Leftist and secular tribespeople blame the United Islamic State completed its takeover of all towns and States for the weakness of the as villages inhabited by the Ougaidat, and kicked Jabhat well as civil society groups advocating an equitable al-Nusra out of the area. resolution to the war. Radical Islamists, they say, have easy access to cash and media platforms (and Indirect U.S. Opportunities weapons), while civil society forces enjoy no such with the Eastern Syrian Tribes access.

WALDA „„ Pro-Assad tribespeople, unsurprisingly, fault the United States for its support to anti-Assad rebels The Walda tribe has no history of direct hostility toward and for encouraging them to oppose the regime. the United States, although dozens of its members trav- eled to Iraq in 2003 to take part in jihad against the „„ Liberal, staunchly anti-Assad tribespeople, an U.S. invasion. Those jihadists, however, failed upon exception, welcome U.S. military and political activ- their return to convert their fellow tribespeople at large ity in Syria. to the anti-U.S. cause. According to interviews with Walda tribespeople SABKHA conducted prior to the U.S.-backed 2017 liberation Like the Afadla, Sabkha tribespeople are split among of Raqqa from the Islamic State, most agreed that various factions regarding the war. Whereas ordinary the United States should not rely solely on Kurds and members hold no particularly hostile attitude toward the Kurdish-led militias in seizing the Arab-majority prov- United States, pro-Assad and Salafi-Wahhabi tribes- ince. In turn, interviewees expressed a desire for the people oppose U.S. intervention for various reasons. United States to protect Arab representation in the post- For its part, the pro-Assad bloc claims the United States liberation Raqqa city council electionsin order to avert wants to reenact its cooptation of Iraq, creating a sat- Arab marginalization. ellite regime led by liberalizing Sunnis and, ironically, Reflecting such concerns, an influential Walda figure Muslim Brotherhood elements. The Salafi-Wahhabi who lives in al-Thawra estimated the city’s population bloc is strongly anti-U.S. and has engaged in military of 150,000 to be 85 percent Arab. Yet despite this lop- action against U.S.-backed forces in both Syria and sided proportion, he said, most decisionmakers within Iraq, including after the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq, the Civil Council are Kurds, a clear inequity. when Sabkha members traveled stealthily to Iraq and fought in “Iraqi resistance groups.” AFADLA Afadla tribespeople span a range of persuasions, from BUSARAYA moderate to radical, anti- to pro-Assad. The Afadla Like the Sabkha, dozens of Busaraya tribesmen snuck generally did not welcome direct U.S. military opera- into Iraq to fight coalition forces after the 2003 U.S. tions in their areas, but neither did they resist them. The invasion. Returning to Syria, they brought with them spectrum of Afadla reactions follows: radical ideas, which later fueled their involvement with

POLICY NOTE 52 7 ANDREW TABLER, Editor the Islamic State and Jabhat al-Nusra. Since the Syrian Ougaidat dislike for the United States could intensify war began in 2011, the Busaraya have not coalesced further should U.S. forces back the entry of YPG-led around a unified stance toward U.S. forces. Most, how- and Bedouin Shammar armed groups into Deir al-Zour ever, have preferred that their territory be liberated province. Such hostility could find expression in attacks from IS by U.S.-backed Arab tribesmen fighting with the or “resistance groups” targeting U.S. forces as well as rebels than by the Kurdish YPG. Some Busaraya tribal Kurdish and Shammar fighters. The Ougaidat may even members hold pro-regime, pro-Iran views, and they activate sleeper cells affiliated with Jabhat al-Nusra and therefore oppose the U.S. position, although “without the Islamic State. offering a clear solution to the Syrian war,” according A less incendiary message from the Ougaidat calls to a tribe member. The few communists within Busaraya on the United States to support Arab rebel groups in criticize the United States as an enabler of Turkish and liberating their areas from IS, thus eliminating the radi- Saudi Arabian “imperialism.” cal presence, and to allow for self-rule.

BAGGARA Conflict Between YPG/SDF Some Baggara tribespeople are pro-U.S., some anti- and the Eastern Syrian Tribes U.S., but as with other tribes, no single view prevails among them. Also like the other tribes, Baggara mem- bers traveled to Iraq in 2003, expressly to support the WALDA Hussein regime. Most ultimately returned to their home- According to interviews with Walda members, the tribe towns in Deir al-Zour province. Today, most Baggara mostly welcomed the Syrian Democratic Forces, led by tribespeople fear the Assad regime and Iran’s Shia mili- elements of the Kurdish Democratic Union Party, when tias, and they prefer U.S.-backed Arab rebel liberators they arrived in Raqqa province in 2017. The PYD-run to Kurdish YPG-associated elements. Civil Council of Raqqa is headed by Mahmoud Sha- Baggara sheik Nawaf Ragheb al-Bashir, who has wakh al-Bursan, sheikh of the Walda’s Jazira clan, who disavowed the regime only to reembrace it and who now lives in Qamishli. lives in Damascus, has criticized the United States for The modern history of the Shawakh clan is illumi- empowering the Syrian Democratic Forces, which are nating. Through the agricultural reform (nationaliza- led by the Kurdish YPG. Sources suggest Bashir sought tion) laws enacted in 1965–67, the Baath regime seized to establish an “army of tribes” to retake Deir al-Zour some 50,000 acres from the family, which was forced to province from the Islamic State. He has also voiced sup- relocate to Hasaka when their village was flooded dur- port for Iran’s agenda in Syria against the United States. ing the creation of the reservoir known as Lake Assad. Some tribespeople, who live predominantly in regime- When, on April 18, 2017, Mahmoud was nominated to held areas, have adopted a similar view. serve as co-president of the Raqqa Civil Council, along with Lamia Mustafa, most of his fellow Walda tribes- OUGAIDAT people were persuaded to back the SDF and adopt a Members of the Ougaidat tribe hold a hostile attitude more anti-Assad stance. toward the United States dating to the 2003 invasion of Walda tribespeople who live in Hasaka province Iraq and overthrow of Saddam Hussein. This negative have poor ties with area Kurds, but do not express their perception was reinforced by reports from hundreds of hostile sentiments. The Kurds in Hasaka, for their part, Iraqi Sunni officers, as well as Baath and other govern- view the Walda as “strangers who took their historic ment officials, who were displaced to Ougaidat areas lands.” during the war. They offered similarly unflattering sto- Up to the present day, the PYD and its idara tha- ries about Iraqi Shia militias. During that same conflict, tia (local administration) do not allow participation or Ougaidat tribesmen traveled by the hundreds to Iraq’s voting from Walda tribespeople in the Qamishli and western provinces to fight against U.S. forces, with some Hasaka councils. The PYD has essentially demanded later joining al-Qaeda-linked groups and cells. On that the Walda “go back to your villages in Raqqa and returning home, they disseminated the anti-U.S. jihadist exercise your rights there.” To be sure, the Walda liv- ideology they had absorbed. ing in PYD-held areas worry seriously that the Kurdish

8 THE WASHINGTON INSTITUTE FOR NEAR EAST POLICY A TALE OF SIX TRIBES: SECURING THE MIDDLE EUPHRATES RIVER VALLEY group will evict them from their homes in Hasaka prov- and took the Kurds’ houses and shops in Raqqa ince and force their return to western Raqqa, where their city, and surely the Kurds will take the Daesh mem- ancestral lands remain submerged by Lake Assad, near bers’ houses and lands. In the end, the PYD will the al-Thawra Dam, Syria’s largest on the Euphrates. give Raqqa province back to the Syrian government An educated tribal leader in al-Walda explained: of President Bashar al-Assad. “The Baath regime rooted us out of our lands alongside As for the Sabkha who oppose Assad, they prefer the the Euphrates River, and today the PYD is going to do YPG to regime forces and militias but at the same time the same thing. The Baath Party and PYD—two faces of have called on the PYD to let Arab tribe members run the same coin.” their own cities and towns. In the words of an anti-Assad activist from Sabkha, “We got rid of the ruling Baath AFADLA Party—we don’t want a PYD ruling party. We want our Kurds do not inhabit the communities around the Afadla people to vote and elect their leaders.” tribe, and members have no direct hostile history with the Kurds. Even so, the chauvinist pan-Arabist Baath BUSARAYA regime succeeded over five decades in brainwashing Most Busaraya harbor strong anti-Kurdish sentiments Arab tribes, including the Afadla, to hate the Kurds and and therefore are deeply uncomfortable with the libera- stand against their “virtual state.” tion of their areas by largely Kurdish YPG militiamen. Recently, though, Afadla tribal heads who formerly Most Busaraya interviewees accordingly refused to allow wielded influence in their villages and in Raqqa city have any Kurdish militiamen whatsoever in their areas, with watched as Kurdish military leaders, with strong backing one suggesting, “It is better to keep Islamic State gun- from the United States, spearheaded their liberation from men than be occupied by the YPG.” the Islamic State. They sense this will lead to subjugation Busaraya members began fleeing their villages to the Kurds, as occurred in Tal Abyad in June 2015 and after learning that regime militias, including the Assad- al-Thawra in May 2017. The PYD ascendance in an area linked tribal confederation led by Turki Abu Hamad, with no previous Kurdish communities, save for a hand- had seized villages in eastern Raqqa, such as al-Sab- ful of tenant farmers, has infuriated tribe members. kha and Maadan. Afadla leaders and members have expressed a clear intention to resist PYD rule over Raqqa post-IS. BAGGARA The PYD and its YPG militia, they assert, should leave In general, Baggara tribespeople do not hold their Kurd- Raqqa city and all Arab areas and let the run ish neighbors in high regard. This is especially true of their cities, towns, and villages through freely elected tribespeople in Hasaka province (knows as Baggara al- local councils. Jabal, or Baggara of the Mountain, referring to nearby Mt. Abdulaziz), who live near Kurdish communities and SABKHA supported the Assad regime’s crackdown on the Kurd- Like the Afadla, the Sabkha has had no previous con- ish rebellion in 2004, which was sparked after a soccer tact with the Kurds, since no Kurdish settlements his- match between an Arab and a Kurdish-majority team. torically abutted theirs. But the Sabkha, too, have been In the event, among other developments, Kurdish pro- affected by decades of regime-directed propaganda testors used rhetoric targeting Arabs. Six decades ear- against the Kurds. lier, in 1944, Kurds had supported the Bedouin Sham- The Sabkha has pro-Assad members, who have not mar tribe in its attacks against area Arab tribes, and viewed the Kurds or SDF with particular hostility. They those tribes have never forgotten the Kurdish-Bedouin believe the SDF is cooperating with the Assad regime and coalition against them. thus do not worry much about the group’s ascendance. Likewise, the Baggara in Deir al-Zour object to Relatedly, a pro-Assad Sabkha tribal leader reflected: the liberation of their province from IS by the SDF. Kurds form about 5 percent of Raqqa province’s They cite the “Kurds’ opportunistic greed” in seeking residents. They are nothing and cannot rule and to overtake a province that is “100 percent Arab.” run the province. There are Arab tribesmen who On August 23, 2017, Baggara sheikh Nawaf Ragheb joined Daesh [another name for the Islamic State] al-Bashir relatedly issued this threat to the YPG on

POLICY NOTE 52 9 ANDREW TABLER, Editor

Facebook: “We will return to the glories of 2004 AFADLA [referring here specifically to the regime crackdown Even before the war, thousands of Afadla tribespeople in Qamishli] and the 4th Division’s victories. We will lived as Turkish nationals in the southeastern cities of arm the Arab tribes and kick the Kurdish gangs out Sanliurfa and Mardin. Some sources even suggest that of northern Syria.” Such sentiments indicate the deep the tribe’s name comes from the Turkish afadleh, which Kurdish-Arab divide in parts of Syria, and show why means “big snake.” some Baggara (and other) tribespeople would coop- While lacking a unified position toward the Turkey- erate with Assad against Kurdish interests. backed rebels, Afadla members generally prefer them to U.S.-supported Kurdish fighters. Moreover, inter- OUGAIDAT views with Afadla tribal leaders and other figures indi- The origins of Ougaidat hostility toward the Kurds date cate anxieties over U.S. marginalization of the Turkish to the 1930s–40s, when the Kurds backed the Sham- role in liberating Raqqa from the Islamic State, to the mar confederation against the Arab tribe. Before 2011, benefit of the Kurds. Still, some have switched their thousands of Ougaidat lived in the town of al-Shadadi, view, acknowledging Kurdish preeminence in post-IS as well as in Hasaka city, in both the southern section Raqqa. A very small number of the Afadla back the and the Arab district of Ghweiran. This figure has now Syrian regime, and have correspondingly criticized Tur- fallen into the hundreds. key’s destructive role in the national crisis. Among the Like the Baggara, Ougaidat members supported Afadla displaced to Turkey from their villages in eastern the Assad regime against the Kurds’ March 2004 upris- and northern Raqqa, hundreds have continued their ing, a development the regime exploited to recruit Arab migration into Europe. tribespeople. These recruits, who were serving in the military and other security apparatuses, along with sig- SABKHA nificant numbers of civilians, were armed by the regime In early March 2013, Sabkha tribespeople supported against the Kurdish protestors. The Kurds, in turn, have the FSA’s Suqur al-Sunna division, al-Nasser division, never forgotten this incident and the support given by and Ahfad al-Rasul Brigades. Early the next year, the Ougaidat and other Arab tribes to the regime. In the when the Islamic State took Raqqa province and sub- current scene, Ougaidat tribespeople blame the YPG sequently kicked out the FSA and Jabhat al-Nusra, for cooperating with Assad-regime forces and Iran’s tribespeople aligned with these groups fled to Turkey. Shia militias against Arab tribes in eastern Syria. They now await their prospective return home, with Turkish support, but the predominantly Kurdish SDF Prospects for Euphrates Shield controls half of the Sabkha’s villages and towns, from and the Eastern Syrian Tribes Ratlah to al-Akirshi, east of Raqqa. The stretch from al-Akirshi to Maadan, about thirty kilometers, is held WALDA by Assad’s forces and the allied tribal group led by Most Walda tribespeople have welcomed the Turkish Turki Abu Hamad. Overall, the Sabkha are frustrated role in liberating Raqqa province more than the Kurdish with both Turkish and Arab tribespeople who allowed role. But the United States relied heavily on the Kurds, the Sabkha hometowns to be seized by either Kurdish who pushed Turkey-backed forces, under Operation or regime forces. Euphrates Shield, from the area. Earlier, in 2013–14, after armed tribesmen helped liberate al-Thawra and its BUSARAYA air base from Assad’s forces, hundreds of Walda fami- Like the Sabkha, the Busaraya tribe includes thousands lies fled regime airstrikes to Turkey. But when Mahmoud who have been displaced to Turkey, where they are liv- Shawakh al-Bursan, a tribal sheikh, was nominated to ing with their families in general security and stability, co-lead the PYD-run local council, Walda tribespeople with Turkish government support. Most are anti-Assad expressed their approval. Meanwhile, in Hasaka prov- political or military figures, and most of these welcome ince, Walda residents are generally supportive of Tur- Turkish backing to Arab tribespeople in the liberation of key’s role in containing Kurdish power in northern Syria. Deir al-Zour.

10 THE WASHINGTON INSTITUTE FOR NEAR EAST POLICY A TALE OF SIX TRIBES: SECURING THE MIDDLE EUPHRATES RIVER VALLEY

In the view of one Busaraya tribal leader, Turkey History and Attitudes toward the Assad has no long-term plans or sectarian agenda for Syria, but Iran does have such an agenda, aimed at bol- Regime, Iran, and Shia Militias stering Shia militias and controlling Syria much as it does Iraq. Reasons for Busaraya support for Euphra- WALDA tes Shield include a perception of Turkey as a natural As noted in previous sections, the Walda tribe’s anti- ally against the Kurdish PYD and its consolidation of Baath attitude dates to the 1960s with the Syrian gov- self-rule through the People’s Council of Western Kurd- ernment’s nationalization program and seizure of tribal istan. They also look to Turkey as an ally against Iran- lands. Notably, the late Baathist figure Ibrahim Hinedi, ian ambitions. a member of the al-Ajeel clan (Jabbour tribe) who led Raqqa in the 1980s, viewed the Walda with great antipa- BAGGARA thy. Hindi was among many Baathists to serve the govern- Having largely joined up with anti-Assad rebels, many ment in Raqqa, where they suppressed the Walda. This Baggara fled to Turkey after the Islamic State took helps explain the strong anti-Assad stance taken by most Deir al-Zour province. These tribe members now live Walda tribespeople after the Syrian crisis began in 2011. with their families in cities such as Urfa, Gaziantep, Not just the Walda, but virtually every resident of Mersin, and Istanbul. Turkey also supports Usud al- Raqqa, even those supportive of Assad, oppose the Sharqiya (Lions of the East), a Baggara-majority rebel Iran-backed Shia militias. This harsh opposition stems in group whose fighters are seeking help from the Turk- large part from Shia militia actions against Arab Sunni ish government to liberate Deir al-Zour province. The tribespeople in Mosul, Iraq, in late 2016—actions that United States, however, favors the largely Kurdish SDF led to the displacement of many. and Arab rebel groups of al-Tanf. It is unsurprising that In July 2013, the Assad regime attempted to culti- Baggara tribespeople mostly prefer Turkey and its Arab vate tribal support through the nomination of Walda rebels to the SDF and Iran’s militias. member Khalaf al-Muftah (Salal family), then deputy Baggara tribespeople who back the Assad regime minister of information, to the Baath Party’s Regional and fault Turkey for opposing Assad constitute a minor- Command. However, Khalaf was unable to use this ity. Sheikh Nawaf Ragheb al-Bashir, for example, position to generate regime support among his fellow praised Turkish involvement during his exile in Istanbul, tribespeople. In April 2017, Assad removed Khalaf from but upon his return to Syria in early 2017, he changed his Regional Command post, with rumors suggesting course, attacking Turkey. the move had come because his relative Sheikh Mah- moud Shawakh al-Bursan had ascended to the co-pres- OUGAIDAT idency of the PYD-run Civil Council of Raqqa. The Ougaidat, too, generally have a sympathetic view of Turkey, where most tribal members and fighters have AFADLA sought refuge. As with other tribes discussed here, the Among Afadla interviewees both supportive of and Turkish government has welcomed the Ougaidat, offer- opposed to the Assad regime, all expressed consider- ing homes and protection for some of their leaders. able opposition to Iran’s sectarian project in Syria; some The Ougaidat consider Turkey a natural ally against suggested openness to a potential Russian role in rein- Kurdish, Bedouin Shammar, Assad regime, and Iran- ing in Assad and the Iran-supported militias. On the backed Shia militia influence in their home territory of pro-Assad side, a lawyer said he would welcome the eastern Syria. Most Ougaidat, in turn, prefer Euphrates arrival of the Syrian Arab Army but rejected strongly the Shield to the U.S.-backed SDF in liberating their areas notion of any Iranian, Afghan, or Iraqi Shia militiaman from IS control and cutting off the path for Assad- and serving with the Syrian force. Iran-supported militias toward Deir al-Zour province. Most Afadla tribespeople were initially open to both Indeed, hundreds of Ougaidat are fighting within Turkey- and U.S.-backed rebels liberating their villages. Euphrates Shield, and some of the tribe’s rebel lead- But after villages were taken by the largely Kurdish Syr- ers have close ties with Turkey’s military and intelli- ian Democratic Forces, the inhabitants were ultimately gence organizations. able to return home, where they lived peacefully under

POLICY NOTE 52 11 ANDREW TABLER, Editor the command of elite forces of the Shammar Bedouin Arab Army to rid their lands of the Islamic State will not confederation, led by Ahmed Jarba. They preferred tolerate the Iranian and Iraqi Shia militiamen. Another this arrangement to living under the Kurdish YPG-led tribesman expressed the concern that his thirty-five-year forces, and indeed showed warmth toward the Arab old son, Saddam, named for the late Iraqi leader, would Shammar tribesmen. This was a telling comparison with be killed for this name alone. the Sabkha, who fled their home villages on the south- ern banks of the Euphrates when regime forces and the BAGGARA allied tribal group led by Turki Abu Hamad neared. One tradition holds that the Baggara tribe descended The elite Shammar forces, for their part, traveled from Imam Ali ibn Hussein Zain al-Abidin (aka Iman to Raqqa city from the eastern suburb of al-Mishlab in Zain al-Abidin), the son of Imam Ali. For this reason, June 2017, where the al-Huwaidi family, chieftains of some tribespeople link themselves to Shia doctrine. Iran the Afadla, is based. exploited this purported connection to convert hundreds of Baggara to Shiism, especially in , a district in SABKHA northern Deir al-Zour. In June 2013, gunmen from Jab- Sabkha opposition to Bashar al-Assad and his allies was hat al-Nusra killed about fifty Shia tribespeople from reinforced when, in summer 2017, regime and Alawite- Baggara in this same district. led tribal forces, led by Suhail al-Hassan, raided villages When Sheikh Nawaf Ragheb al-Bashir returned from such as al-Akirshi, al-Rahabi, al-Sharida (eastern and exile in Istanbul in 2017, his move was coordinated with western), al-Gabli, al-Ghanim Ali, Muqlah, al-Jaber, both Iran and Liwa al-Imam al-Baqir, a Shia militia. Hav- al-Khamisah, and Maadan. The invaders engaged in ing expressed sharp criticism of Iran while in Turkey, the looting and rape, among other offenses. sheikh now praises the Popular Mobilization Forces, In fleeing the depredations, the Sabkha took with whose units operate under Iraqi and Iranian authority. them their tractors, trucks, cars, and livestock to areas held by the SDF and Islamic State alike. The migration OUGAIDAT showed that tribespeople preferred living under jihadists With exceptions—including pro-Assad tribal chiefs and or Kurds to control by regime-associated elements. hundreds of officers and staff in the regime’s military According to interviews and informal discussions and security organizations—most Ougaidat oppose the with Sabkha members, some 10–15 percent of tribe Assad regime. Indeed, dozens of interviews with tribe members did relocate to regime-held cities such as members confirm anti-Assad views and strong opposi- Damascus, , , and —but not out of tion to Iranian influence and Shia militias, with some support for Assad. Rather, they sought shelter and edu- even saying they’d prefer living under IS than under cation for their children. Assad and his allied militias. The Islamic State may have Supporters of Assad from within the tribe include committed crimes and killed hundreds of tribespeople, Eid al-Darwish, a senior Baath official and pro-regime they reason, but Assad and the Iran-backed militias will mouthpiece, and Muhammad Jamal al-Turki, who has kill them all or oust them from their homes and land. fallaciously identified himself to the media as the “tribal In particular, Ougaidat leaders express serious con- leader of the Sabkha”—a claim disavowed by his fellow cerns over the prospect that Iran-supported militias will tribe members. disturb their territories, including in eastern Deir al-Zour and Abu Kamal, while en route from Tadmur or Iraq, BUSARAYA with aims of establishing a link from Iran to Syria. Busaraya tribespeople have a strong anti-Iran bent and The Ougaidat also note fears relating to the estab- vehemently oppose the country’s Shia militias and its lishment by Baggara chief Nawaf Ragheb al-Bashir of “sectarian agenda.” According to one tribal leader, the Iran-sponsored al-Baqer Division in early 2017. most of his family members worry profoundly about Iran Bashir has indicated plans to direct his division and and the Syrian regime’s Alawite militiamen, who they other Shia units from the Baggara lands in western Deir fear will burn down their homes and drive them from al-Zour, along the northern bank of Euphrates, into the their communities. As with the Afadla, even pro-Assad eastern parts of Deir al-Zour. Within Deir al-Zour, how- Busaraya tribespeople who have called for the Syrian ever, the Ougaidat are stronger than the Baggara.

12 THE WASHINGTON INSTITUTE FOR NEAR EAST POLICY A TALE OF SIX TRIBES: SECURING THE MIDDLE EUPHRATES RIVER VALLEY

TRIBAL PROFILES

Walda Tribe ƒƒ Ridin, whose key family is al-Issa; members live in eastern Aleppo.

WALDA STRUCTURE 3. AL-JAABAT CLAN. This clan consists of the follow- The ten clans belonging to the Walda tribe are listed here ing lineages: roughly according to their membership and influence. ƒƒ al-Farat. The key family is al-Shana, whose mem- bers live in the villages of al-Usta, al-Jirneh, and 1. NASSER CLAN. Led today by Sheikh Nasser al- on the state-run farms west of Raqqa city. One Muhammad al-Faraj al-Salamah al-Dandal al- prominent figure from this lineage is Muhammad Nasser, this clan holds the Walda chiefdom in Ali al-Awad, who led the Baath Party in Raqqa Raqqa, Hasaka, and Aleppo provinces. The fore- from 1966 to 1968. father of the clan, Muhammad al-Faraj al-Sala- mah al-Dandal al-Nasser (1889–1972), had two ƒƒ al-Sebat. A central figure is Sheikh Faisal al-Sebat, sons: Dandal, the head of the Shamiya branch, who currently lives in Damascus with his wife, an based on the southern banks of the Euphrates; Alawite from Latakia. A Parliament member, he and Hamad, head of the Jazira branch, based resigned in early May 2018 saying that Assad’s on the river’s northern banks. The current sheikh government nominates “corrupted officials to run of the Jazira Walda, Mahmoud Shawakh al-Bur- the governmental positions for Raqqa province.“ san, serves as co-president of the PYD-run Civil An Assad supporter, Sebat is suspected of cor- Council of Raqqa. His father, Shawakh al-Ahmad ruption, and the regime refers to him as a “Sunni al-Bursan, was a preeminent figure within the tribe, Arab tribesman.” serving as leader of both the Shamiya and Jazira ƒƒ al-Abdullah. The main family is al-Balikh, whose branches. This sheikh accepted the offer by former members live in Mrabet village, Hasaka province. Syrian leader Hafiz al-Assad for his tribespeople to ƒƒ al-Moussa. The main family is al-Matar, which relocate from the eastern banks of Lake Assad to counts Abdulrahman Matar, a strongly anti- the northern city of al-Thawra, in Hasaka province, Assad activist and writer, as a member. where they lived alongside the area’s Kurdish resi- Homsi. The central family is Shawakh al-Ibrahim, dents. He died in the 1982 in the village of Bahira, ƒƒ whose members live in Raqqa city and on the near Qamishli. state-run farms in western Raqqa. 2. HUWAIT CLAN. The chiefdom belongs to the al-Ali ƒƒ Hiswa. The main family, al-Ghadban, are resi- al-Hussein lineage, currently led by Mihedi al-Saleh, dents of Dibsi Faraj. who resides in the village of Ghazalah Ghariba. ƒƒ Issa al-Ali. This lineage is in the village of Ishaq. Another member of this lineage, Ghassim al-Moussa, served from 1994 to 2000 as the Baath Party chief ƒƒ Quba. This lineage is located in Raqqa. from Raqqa province. Other lineages include: ƒƒ al-Hadid, residents of Raqqa and Hasaka (cities).

ƒƒ al-Kishur,  for which the al-Eid family holds the 4. AL-AMER CLAN. This group contains the following chiefdom; members reside in Ghazalah Sharqiya lineages: and al-Thawra. ƒƒ Abu Jrit. The key figure is Sheikh Ali Abdullah ƒƒ al-Kabir, whose members live in the villages of al- al-Gasham, who at sixty-five was killed by a Qajar, al-Namala, and al-Thawra city. coalition drone strike in June 2017, just a week ƒƒ al-Jabal, whose key family is Hijab al-Afnan; after his wife, Hasna Muhammad al-Arouda, members live in the villages of Dibsi Afnan and was killed in a similar strike, near Jarniya. Sheikh Maskanah Sharqiya. Ali came from the village of al-Salma, near al-

POLICY NOTE 52 13 ANDREW TABLER, Editor

Jarniya. He was vigorous in offering help to fami- ƒƒ Maneh al-Muhammad (aka al-Sinabilah), with the lies displaced from Raqqa, opposed the Islamic main family al-Ghabin; residents of Dibsi Faraj, State, and did not back the seizure of Raqqa by Maskanah, and al-Safsafeh. the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces. Until ƒƒ Rashid al-Muhammad, residents of Samumah, a his last day, he refused to leave the city of Raqqa. village near Maskanah. Members of his lineage live in Ras al-Ain, in Hasaka province. 7. AL-GHANIM CLAN. This group lives in and around al-Khafsa, in eastern Aleppo. The sons of Fasih al- ƒƒ al-Zako. The main family comprises the sons of Ghanim serve as chiefs. Khalaf al-Muhammad, residing in al-Jarniya, Raqqa, and Hasaka. 8. AL-FARES CLAN. This clan resides in al-Thawra city ƒƒ al-Mukhna. The key family is named eponymously and the villages of al-Safsafeh and al-Khafsa, and and is located in al-Jarniya, Raqqa, and Hasaka. contains the following lineages: ƒƒ al-Shaaban. The key family is Issa al-Obeid, resi- ƒƒ Shekhawi dent in of al-Jarniya and Raqqa city. ƒƒ al-Jabli

5. AL-ALI CLAN, with the following lineages: ƒƒ al-Sunna ƒƒ Abu Issa. This lineage counts Ahmad Aloush ƒƒ al-Hajat al-Othman, the forty-something leader of the ƒƒ al-Jarah Raqqa Revolutionaries Brigade (Liwa Thuwar al- 9. ABU MASIRA CLAN, with the following lineages: Raqqa), as a member. Abu Issa established the first anti-Assad armed group in western Raqqa ƒƒ al-Ghanam. The central family, al-Ajour, resides in province, eliciting support from al-Nasser chiefs the village of Tal Tharid. as well as his fellow al-Ali clansmen. ƒƒ al-Ali. The central family, al-Aliu, lives in al- ƒƒ Hassan al-Ali, with the core family being Hamid Thawra and the village of al-Babiri. al-Shihab al-Hamad, whose members live in ƒƒ al-Maajat. The main family, al-Marai is located in Ratlah, east of Raqqa city. (Whereas almost all the village of Qawas. Walda tribespeople live in western Raqqa, the ƒƒ Suabit. The central families, al-Hassan and al- exceptions dwell east of the city, mainly in Ratlah.) Tallas, are residents of al-Babiri and Qawas. ƒƒ Khaled al-Ali, residents of , with the 10. AL-MARADAT CLAN. The main family is Dakhil al- main family being Baalah. Murad, located in al-Jarniya. ƒƒ Milhem al-Ali, with the main family al-Assad, Note that other small clans have unconfirmed connec- whose members live in the towns of Mansoura, tions to the Walda, such as the al-Fardum, residents of 30 kilometers west of Raqqa city, and Deir Hafir, Deir Hafir, al-Bab, and Maskanah. east of Aleppo. ƒƒ Humran al-Ali, residents of Idlib and Hama. WALDA ECONOMY ƒƒ Razzaq al-Ali, whose central figure is Nouri al- After triumphing in clashes in 1941 with the al-Fadan Faisal; he currently lives in the city of Hama, and clan, which belongs to the Anaza Bedouin, the Walda his relatives live to its north, in the pro-Assad chiefs—led by the powerful al-Nasser and al-Bursan town of Qamhana. families—held thousands of acres of fertile land on both sides of the Euphrates. With the Baathist coup 6. AL-TARAN CLAN, with the following lineages: of 1963, however, the new regime redistributed some ƒƒ Hussein al-Muhammad. The main family is al- 80–90 percent of al-Nasser and al-Bursan lands, to the Taran, located in Maskanah and al-Safsafeh. benefit of Abu Jaber and al-Ajeel tribespeople. The lat- ƒƒ Hassan al-Muhammad, residents of Khirbet Shi- ter tribes thus developed a strong loyalty to the Baath hab, near Manbij, in eastern Aleppo. regime, whereas the Walda opposed it. This marked the

14 THE WASHINGTON INSTITUTE FOR NEAR EAST POLICY A TALE OF SIX TRIBES: SECURING THE MIDDLE EUPHRATES RIVER VALLEY

“original” rift between the Baath and the Walda tribe, commands no respect among his tribespeople. He whose members now owned less-valuable and alto- lives in Damascus. gether less land. The next rupture came in the 1970s with the construc- Afadla Tribe tion of the al-Thawra Dam, an event that displaced some 40 percent of Walda tribespeople, having submerged AFADLA STRUCTURE their fertile lands with flooding. These Walda were forced The Afadla tribe is divided into seven or eight clans, to move to Hasaka province, where they lived among depending on the source. The eighth clan, though, the Kurdish communities. Most of the displaced families al-Shabal, denies membership in the tribe, effectively encouraged their sons to immigrate to Saudi Arabia closing the debate. and other Gulf states for work to support their families. Among the Walda, thousands studied at the University of 1. AL-DIYAB CLAN. This clan holds the chiefdom posi- Aleppo, thereafter returning to the northern Raqqa sub- tion among the Afadla in Syria. Among its leading urbs, where they filled city and governmental jobs. members is Sheikh Muhammad Faisal al-Huwaidi, whose late father, Faisal al-Huwaidi (1922–82), WALDA POLITICS was married to a daughter of Magham bin Mahad, Historically, Walda tribespeople were apolitical. the sheikh of the al-Fadan, a clan belonging to the They instead focused on their agrarian livelihood, Anaza Bedouin. Muhammad Faisal, who has two tilling fertile lands and raising livestock. Their over- brothers, moved to Damascus in July 2017 with sig- all political aloofness contrasts with the more urban nificant help from parliament member Hussam al- clansmen of Raqqa province. Still, the Walda tribe Katerji and his brother Baraa al-Katerji, a business- includes small numbers of pan-Arabists in the Nas- man with a sketchy profile and close ties to military serist mold; communists; and members of the National intelligence. Another prominent tribal leader, Bashir Progressive Front, a ten-party coalition led by the Faisal al-Huwaidi, led the al-Muntasir division of ruling Baath. the Free Syrian Army, helping kick Assad’s forces Although displacing and angering many mem- out of Raqqa. He currently lives in Raqqa city. The bers of the Walda tribe, the nationalization plan in third brother, Omar Faisal al-Huwaidi, is living in the 1960s attracted others to the Baath Party. Among Turkey. The clan contains the following lineages: the Walda appointed to the party apparatus were ƒƒ Darwish al-Muhammad al-Diyab, with the al- Muhammad Ali al-Awad, from the Jaabat clan. As Huwaida serving in the chiefdom role; they live elaborated elsewhere in this paper, Awad failed dur- in al-Mishlab, just to east of Raqqa ing his tenure in 1966–68 as head of the Baath Party al-Assaf al-Mishlab, residents of Raqqa Samra, in Raqqa province to persuade his tribal chiefs to ƒƒ eight kilometers east of the city get behind the Baath Party. Still upset over the dis- placements caused by nationalization, they remained ƒƒ al-Mahinda al-Diyab, residents of the village of Tawi officially “neutral.” From 1994 to 2000, Ghassim ƒƒ Ajeel al-Diyab al-Moussa, a member of the Walda’s Huwait clan, served as chief of the Raqqa province Baath Party. 2. AL-BREIJ AL-DAHER CLAN. This clan, the most sup- And Khalaf al-Muftah, from the al-Salal family, is the portive of the Islamic State, contains three lineages: tribesman to have ascended highest in the regime. He ƒƒ al-Hassan al-Breij. The family of Yusuf al-Deeb served as deputy minister of information, having been al-Hajo plays the chief role in Fatisat al-Deeb nominated by President Bashar al-Assad in November village. This family has two prominent members: 2012. In July 2013, while his relatives fought against Ismail al-Hajo, a Communist parliamentarian in Assad’s forces, Khalaf was named to the Baath Party his early seventies, whom the Assad regime refers regional command, but was dismissed from this posi- to as “sheikh” of the al-Breij despite his Commu- tion by the president in July 2017. Known to have nist affiliation; and Tobad al-Breij al-Abdulhadi made significant money through corruption, Muftah al-Deeb al-Hajo. Now in his thirties, he was born

POLICY NOTE 52 15 ANDREW TABLER, Editor

in Iraq because his father had fled the regime of close to the regime and holding key govern Hafiz al-Assad. Having served in Saddam Hus- ment positions. sein’s Baath Party, he returned to Syria in 2003, 6. AL-AHUS AL-DAHER CLAN. The al-Ajeel family has after the outbreak of the Gulf war. Once home, the chief role in this clan. The current sheikh is Sulei- he initiated big construction projects in Raqqa, man al-Ajeel. The clansmen live some forty kilo- earning large sums of money for his efforts. The meters east of Raqqa in the villages of Khas Ajeel, al-Hassan al-Breij lineage also contains mem- bers in the village of Fatisah Lakson, led by Naj- Khas Habal, Khas Dakur and Khas Alej. This clan jam al-Fajjar; in Fatisah Biram, led by Fasih al-Ali includes members of parliament such as Mazluh al- al-Biram; in Maazellah, led by Mashog al-Balikh; Ali and Abdul Fattah al-Gumah, as well as the law- in Tal Saman, led by Muhammad al-Sarhan; and yer Ghassim al-Huwaidi. Historical leaders from the in al-Thamriah, led by Gumah al-Battha. clan include Hussein al-Khamri, a Baath Party leader in 1968–69, and Muhammad al-Amash, led the ƒƒ al-Hussein al-Breij. Members of this lineage live Baath and served in parliament from 1995 to 2000. in the villages of Jdeidat Kahett, Jdeidat Kha- bur, and Jdeidat Baldeh, led by Sheikh Mahmud 7. ISSA AL-DAHER CLAN. Members of this small clan al-Khabur. live in the village of Maazellah, in Raqqa city, and ƒƒ al-Jaber lineage. Located in Jdeidat Kahett, the in Kubash. Its key family is the al-Sultan. families include the al-Harir, al-Galo, al-Zeidat, and al-Sahin, led by Sheikh Mahmoud al-Mikhlif. AFADLA ECONOMY Historically, most Afadla tribespeople have been farm- AL-MOUSSA AL-DAHER CLAN, the largest within 3. ers who tend to livestock. In the last three decades, the Afadla, centers on the al-Hadi family, whose however, thousands of tribe members have taken gov- current sheikh is Haji Ahmad al-Hadi. The clans- ernment jobs in the administrative sector, as well as at men live in al-Kasrat village, on the southern banks sugar processing plants, brick kilns, and grain mills. of the Euphrates south of Raqqa city; north and This follows from an Assad policy whereby rural northwest of Raqqa, they inhabit the villages of received preference for these positions over urban Syr- Salahabiya, Rihayat, al-Hawi, al-Gayef, Kubash, ians, whom the regime suspected of sympathy for the and al-Khayala. Muslim Brotherhood. 4. AL-MEDLIJ AL-DAHER CLAN. Abu Hibal holds the Because the Afadla lived close to the city, many chief position in this clan. The current sheikh is opened shops in Raqqa, where they worked before Huwaidi al-Mishlab Darwish Hamad Abu Hilal, returning home in the evenings. University graduates whose grandfather was sheikh of the Afadla tribe. among the Afadla have moved to the city, where doc- Ultimately, the al-Huwaidi family, from the al- tors, pharmacists, engineers, and teachers carry out Diyab clan, took over this position from Abu Hibal. their careers. Another common option for the Afadla is Despite this power shift, Afadla tribespeople hold travel to the Gulf for work, from which they send remit- the Abu Hibal family in special esteem. Lineages tances home to their families. Altogether, a general within the tribe include the Diyab, Nasser, Bala- trend for tribe members entails moving to the city, where sim, Ghannam, and Ali. They live in namesake they can escape the poverty and limitations of rural life villages, some twenty kilometers east of Raqqa, and marry the daughters of urban families. such as Hamra Nasser, Hamra Ghannam, and Hamra Balasim. AFADLA POLITICS 5. GHANIM AL-DAHER CLAN. This clan is anchored Before the 1963 Baathist coup, the agrarian Afadla by the al-Milhem al-Jaber lineage; members live tribespeople did not engage in political activity. But in the villages of al-Rihayat, Awja, and Hazima, the seizure of thousands of acres of tribal land and in northern Raqqa, and in Raqqa city. Families the diminishment of tribal authority during the ensuing include the al-Kiswan, al-Salom, al-Shawkan, and nationalization program sowed bitterness between tribal al-Jaber, most of whose members were Baathists heads and the Assad government. Their long-held nega-

16 THE WASHINGTON INSTITUTE FOR NEAR EAST POLICY A TALE OF SIX TRIBES: SECURING THE MIDDLE EUPHRATES RIVER VALLEY

tivity only spilled into the open following the outbreak of ƒƒ Naamat al-Hussein. The key family, al-Sabti, resides anti-Assad demonstrations in Raqqa in 2011. Indeed, in in the village of al-Naamat, near Maadan. the 1980s and 1990s, thousands of poor, marginalized ƒƒ Ismail al-Hussein. The main family is al-Khider, Afadla tribespeople had joined the Baath Party in order located in Suweida village. to secure government jobs. But in just a few months, The chief family is al-Shuwayr, amid the protests, they had disavowed their loyalty, with ƒƒ Daher al-Hussein. located in Suweida village. most joining anti-Assad political and armed groups. A communist strain within the Afadla can be traced ƒƒ Abdullah al-Hussein. The key family al-Muhana, to the twentieth-century figure Ahmad al-Nouran, a located in Suweida village. lawyer from a prominent tribal family who encouraged ƒƒ Mashhad al-Hussein. The chief family is al-Askar, his fellow tribespeople to join the Communist Party as located in the village of al-Khamisah. a means of showing “lawful opposition” to the Baath. ƒƒ Hamad al-Hussein. The main family is al-Khamis, Both he and Ismael al-Hajo, another communist tribes- located in al-Khamisah. man in his early seventies, live in Damascus and have encouraged dozens of their relatives from the al-Breij ƒƒ Suleiman al-Hussein. The key family is al-Shabli, clan to join the Communist Party. located in Muqlah and al-Namisah; one mem- Among the many pan-Arab, Nasserist activists within ber is the Wahhabi teacher Salim al-Hilo. the family are Muhammad Minadi al-Huwaidi (Abu al- ƒƒ Jaber al-Hussein. The key families are al-Khalifa, Yazid), a participant in the anti-Assad National Coordi- al-Hamadat, and al-Issa, located in al-Jaber. nation Body for Democratic Change, founded in 2011 and led by Hassan Abdel Azim. 2. ABU SUBIYAH CLAN. This clan is held by the al- Safirah, whose people live in the village of Maadan Sabkha Tribe Atiq (Raqqa province) and the villages of al-Qasbi and al-Tabni (Deir al-Zour). Key families: al-Aloush al-Hamad, Muhammad al-Moussa, al-Agrawi (a SABKHA STRUCTURE figure known as Abdul al-Agrawi was a central The Sabkha tribe consists of three clans: figure in the Sabkha), Gawasmah, Suleiman al- 1. AL-SABKHA CLAN. This clan, which bears the Khattab, and al-Thalji. same name as the tribe, spans the eleven sons of 3. GHANIM AL-ALI CLAN. This clan is led by the the patriarch Hussein al-Ghannam, comprising al-Shabatt family, located in of the village of al- several lineages. Ghanim Ali. Known families include Kattaf, Hasham, ƒƒ al-Rakan. This is the chief family for the entire and al-Aklah. Sabkha tribe and lives in the village of al-Akir- shi, 30 km east of Raqqa. Anwar al-Rakan SABKHA ECONOMY formerly served as tribal sheikh, and his son Aided by their location along the Deir al-Zour–Raqqa– Abdul Mohsen al-Rakan now holds the posi- Aleppo highway, tribal leaders have encouraged their tion while living abroad in Saudi Arabia. Sheikh children, more often sons than daughters, to attend Abdulkarim al-Rakan, in his mid-eighties, for- school and university in the cities. This favorable loca- merly belonged to the IS-run Council of Tribes, tion also facilitates tribal purchase of goods in Aleppo, based in Raqqa. Despite his strong expressions along with sales of their agricultural products, such as of support for IS, rumors suggest that in 2017 he yogurt, butter, and cheese, along with livestock. Agri- traveled to Saudi Arabia via Damascus Interna- culture is the Sabkha’s primary means of livelihood, tional Airport with help from regime security. As and tribespeople own fertile lands along the Euphrates do his relatives, Abdulkarim holds a Saudi pass- River, allowing them to raise large numbers of sheep port, allowing him to travel as a Saudi citizen. and cattle. Compared to the Afadla, the Sabkha are ƒƒ Idris al-Hussein. The key family is al-Klib, located more educated. Furthermore, thousands of Sabkha in the town of al-Sabkha. have traveled to Saudi Arabia and the other Gulf states

POLICY NOTE 52 17 ANDREW TABLER, Editor for work, sending remittances back to their families in Busaraya Tribe the Raqqa area.

SABKHA POLITICS BUSARAYA STRUCTURE In contrast to the other tribes, the Sabkha do not have The Busaraya tribe, according to various members, cen- an adverse history with the Baath regime. The gov- ters on the al-Shalash family, whose members led the ernment did not, in the 1960s, nationalize Sabkha post–World War II resistance to British and French Man- lands. And even in 1975, when Syrian president Hafiz date forces. Ramadan Basha al-Shalash (1882–1961) al-Assad seized about a thousand acres from Sabkha was born in the village of al-Shemitah and died in Damas- sheikh Anwar al-Rakan, who was then living in Saudi cus. His brother Hammoud Shalash Abdullah Suleiman Arabia, he did not react negatively on returning to his al-Diyab served as sheikh until the French awarded the home village of al-Akirshi. Other such attempts to con- title to his cousin Fayyad al-Nasser Abdullah Suleiman tain al-Rakan power have occurred without diminish- al-Diyab in 1925, after Ramadan killed two French offi- ing the family’s warmth for the Assad leadership, both cers following the Battle of Ein Abu Gumah in 1925. Hafiz and Bashar. Leaders in the al-Rakan encouraged The current head of the Busaraya, Muhana Faisal their kin to join the Baath Party and serve in govern- Ahmad al-Fayyad, serves in parliament and is highly ment positions. Still, Sabkha tribespeople occupy fewer supportive of Assad. He does not, however, enjoy a government jobs than the Afadla. close rapport with his relatives, who in turn grant him Whereas no known Sabkha members hold Baath little respect. The al-Shalash family, by comparison, still leadership or high-ranking government positions, a earns high esteem from most Busaraya members, who tribesman named Suleiman Suleiman was leading a pro- consider it the true chief family. Assad militia and serving as Baath Party chief in Raqqa The Assad regime has sought to exploit the Shalash- when in March 2013 the city was seized by rebels, who Fayyad rift. One Shalash family member, Ahmad Shalash, kicked out government forces. Suleiman, whose father previously served in parliament and now splits his time was a well-known Salafi figure, distributed some four between Damascus and Beirut, maintaining good ties thousand guns to Baathist thugs; some of this arsenal with Hezbollah and Iranian elements, as well as Syr- came from his Sabkha peers. Still, pro-Assad officials ian security. He is staunchly pro-Assad and has issued blamed Suleiman for the fall of the city, in part to deflect strange statements against Lebanese parliament mem- blame from Alawite military and security officials who led bers and ministers who oppose the Syrian leader. Like about eight thousand forces in formations such as the Fayyad within his family, Ahmad Shalash does not have 17th division of the Syrian army. good relations with his kinspeople in Deir al-Zour. When Suleiman was captured by the rebels along with Shalash served, the Assad regime nominated him as an some forty-two of his relations. His fate remains MP for Damascus, not his home Deir al-Zour province. unknown; some reports suggest he was killed and others that he is jailed in Idlib by Jabhat al-Nusra. The The Busaraya tribe consists of the following clans: fate of Suleiman has evidently prevented tribespeople from rising within the Baath infrastructure. 1. AL-MOUSSA CLAN. Clans within the Busaraya In Maadan, the economic and political capital of begin with the al-Moussa, which counts both the eastern Raqqa, activists among mainly the Sabkha but al-Shalash and al-Fayyad families as members. It also other tribes include Mustafa Alawi (Abu Amir), a consists of these lineages: pan-Arabist political leader. He has successfully enlisted ƒƒ al-Hussein al-Moussa dozens of his fellow tribespeople to join his bloc. Also in Maadan, in past decades the late Muhammad al- ƒƒ al-Muhammad al-Moussa Arfi and Taha al-Tai spread Salafi ideology among ƒƒ al-Assaf al-Moussa residents. Later, Salim al-Hilo, who is in his seventies, ƒƒ al-Diyab al-Moussa served as an influential Salafi instructor, as did Rama- dan Ramadan, with both spreading the ideology within ƒƒ Abu Abdullah and east of Raqqa city. ƒƒ al-Hassan al-Ali

18 THE WASHINGTON INSTITUTE FOR NEAR EAST POLICY A TALE OF SIX TRIBES: SECURING THE MIDDLE EUPHRATES RIVER VALLEY

2. ABU AZAM CLAN. Members of this clan live in High numbers of Busaraya live and work in the Gulf southern Deir al-Zour areas such as the desert town states, from which they send money to support their fam- of al-Shulah. The key family is al-Hassoun. ilies. Among the tribespeople of Deir al-Zour province, the Busaraya have the highest rate of university gradua- 3. ABU IZZ AL-DIN CLAN. This clan lives in western tion, reflecting encouragement by the older generation. Deir al-Zour province and in the village of al-Gabli, east of Raqqa. The sheikh is Hussein Ali al-Shari- BUSARAYA POLITICS dah; his brother Hassan supported the Islamic State. Like other tribespeople in Deir al-Zour, the Busaraya 4. ABU SHAEB CLAN. Members live in the villages of are not politically involved. Many have joined the Baath al-Khrayta and Shemitah. Party for jobs in government, the party, or the military. The Assad regime, for its part, has encouraged tribes- 5. ABU HAMZA CLAN. This clan isocated in Raqqa city and the western villages of Deir al-Zour, the al- people to take government jobs in Deir al-Zour city in Hamzawi family holds the chiefdom. place of existing residents, who harbor anti-Assad, pro– Muslim Brotherhood, as well as communist sentiments. 6. AL-AFASHAT CLAN. The largest clan in the Busa- Indeed, hundreds of Busaraya, most of them university raya, al-Afashat is mostly spread among Raqqa’s graduates, have joined the Communist Party. Most of urban and rural areas. It consists of the following them oppose Assad. lineages: In early 2011, the Busaraya sheikh Muhana al-Fayyad ƒƒ al-Moussa. The key family is al-Mutlaq. called on his fellow tribespeople to avoid demonstrations. Eventually, though, some joined the peaceful actions, ƒƒ al-Damsah. The key family is al-Saleh. and others later engaged in anti-Assad military actions. ƒƒ al-Naasan Fayyad, who is strongly pro-Assad, lives in Damascus ƒƒ al-Aniyah. The key family is al-Nigras. but commands no loyalty from his co-tribespeople. ƒƒ al-Ahmad al-Shibli As already noted, hundreds of Busaraya tribespeople have moved to Damascus either for work, university, or ƒƒ al-Fehan refuge from the Islamic State. Their loyalty to the Assad ƒƒ al-Hussein (key family: al-Rashid) regime derives not from enthusiastic support but rather ƒƒ al-Sayyad (key families: al-Sayyad and al-Afash). from a desire for stability and security. Ahmad Shalash, introduced earlier, represents a kind of exception, given 7. ABU MATTAR CLAN. Its members live in western his pro-Assad, pro-Hezbollah, pro-Iran orientation, not Deir al-Zour villages and Raqqa city; al-Alaya is the to mention his vulgarity-laced press statements. key family 8. ABU DIYAB CLAN, residents of al-Shemitah. Baggara Tribe 9. ABU MUHAMMAD CLAN, with the key family al-Hamish. BAGGARA STRUCTURE According to sources within the Baggara, the tribe BUSARAYA ECONOMY encompasses the following thirty clans, mostly in Deir al- Known to be hardworking farmers, Busaraya tribespeo- Zour province but also in Hasaka, Raqqa, and Aleppo: ple supply Deir al-Zour city with vegetables as well as 1. ABU ARAB CLAN. This clan, for which the al-Bashir dairy products like cheese, butter, and yogurt. The tribe family is central, inhabits Mahamidah, the effective occupies good-quality land, but on small plots, prompt- capital of the Baggara tribe in Syria. ing many to move to Deir al-Zour for government jobs. Hundreds of others have relocated to Damascus for 2. AL-ABDULKARIM CLAN. This is the largest and government employment or to join the military. In seek- most influential Baggara clan and is divided into ing new agricultural land, thousands of other tribespeo- four lineages: al-Hawara (from which the famous ple have moved to rural eastern Raqqa. They own land figure Sheikh Rayash al-Jammus, d. 1945, is a part), in al-Kasrat, east of Raqqa city. al-Qataa, al-Maazat, and al-Sayyad. Decades

POLICY NOTE 52 19 ANDREW TABLER, Editor

ago, al-Abdulkarim clansmen lived in the Deir al- 21. AL-ABDULQADER CLAN Zour district known as al-Sayyad—an etymological 22. AL-KHANJAR CLAN. This clan resides in the village reference to the tribe’s purported genealogical link of Meratt. to Muhammad al-Baqir (the Fifth Imam), a descen- dant of the Prophet.Major families in Deir al-Zour 23. AL-MASHHOUR CLAN. This clan resides in Tal Abyad, city who belong to the al-Abdulkarim include Fadel near the Turkish border. The chief family, Balikh al- al-Aboud, al-Aish, al-Ayash, Fakoush, al-Talaa, Tahri, opposes Assad yet supported the Iraqi Baath Hattab, al-Harwal, and others. These families also Party formerly led by Saddam Hussein. Most clans- live in Jadid Baggara, the only village in Syria with men have backed anti-Assad activities, and most the namesake of the tribe. have ended up on the Turkish side of the border.

3. ABU MAESH CLAN. The al-Talaa family holds the 24. AL-RASHID CLAN chief position. 25. ABU SHAMMAS CLAN. This clan resides in Hawayij 4. AL-GHASSIM AL-OBEID CLAN. Chiefdom is held Shinan, in eastern Raqqa; the chief family is by the al-Ramadan family. al-Hayawi.

5. AL-HAMAD AL-OBEID CLAN 26. AL-HAMAD AL-ABED CLAN

6. ABU MASAAH CLAN. Chiefdom is held by the al- 27. AL-ALI CLAN Masawi family. 28. AL-MIKASIS CLAN

7. AL-KALIZAT CLAN. Residents of Umm Madifah and 29. AL-BAQIRAT CLAN Khawirah villages. 30. ABU SHEIKH CLAN 8. AL-GHARAJNEH CLAN. Chief family is Batran, located in Umm Eshbah. BAGGARA ECONOMY

9. ABU HAMDAN CLAN. Chiefdom is held by the: al- Baggara tribespeople are farmers who cultivate fruit Wakaa family. trees and vegetables, as contrasted with the Ougaidat, who, like the Bedouin, manage livestock and often work 10. ABU RAHMAH CLAN, lives in al-Tabeh and Dahla. in the Gulf states. The Baggara are not wealthy, but they are known for certain displays of material respect- 11. ABU BADRAN CLAN. This clan is located in the eponymous village near Abu Kamal. ability. For example, members of the al-Bashir chiefdom family boast fancy reception halls featuring marble and 12. AL-OJEILI CLAN. Located in Raqqa City, this clan fine carpeting and woven rugs. Ordinary tribespeople, includes the well-known writer Abdul-Salam Ojeili however, do not have fancy homes or farms. (1918 –2006). Many Baggara tribespeople work for the Syr- ian government, largely in Deir al-Zour, after which 13. ABU HASSAN CLAN they return home to their poor surrounding suburbs 14. AL-RAFIYAH CLAN or villages. Large numbers of Baggara also work in Lebanon and the Gulf states. They are neither wealthy 15. ABU ALA CLAN nor very educated, especially relative to Ougai- 16. AL-HAMAD AL-HUSSEIN CLAN. This clan resides in dat tribespeople. the villages of Jazira Abu Hamad. Quite separately from these matters, the Baggara have a reputation for being thieves of livestock, motor 17. AL-MREIKHAT CLAN vehicles, and tractors. According to Deir al-Zour resi- 18. ABU SALEH CLAN. Residing in al-Kasrat, the key dents, Assad and Laurence al-Bashir, the sons of the family is al-Abdullah. current Baggara sheikh Nawaf Ragheb al-Bashir, set up, at the outset of Free Syrian Army actions against 19. AL-HALAMIYAH CLAN the regime, an armed group that ran a checkpoint 20. ABU MISLIM CLAN near the al-Wafa Hotel, which was used to steal and

20 THE WASHINGTON INSTITUTE FOR NEAR EAST POLICY A TALE OF SIX TRIBES: SECURING THE MIDDLE EUPHRATES RIVER VALLEY loot travelers’ cars. The Baggara have also been Sheikh Khalil, was a member of parliament who died accused of stealing from the government-run paper in June 2016 in his hometown of Theban. The regime factory and from other public entities. From the didn’t support him for parliamentary reelection, so he Islamic State, the group accepted large sums of cash died enraged at Assad and his circle. His children and for helping smooth the group’s entry into Deir al-Zour other relatives were also angry, and supported peace- province via Raqqa. They did so in part to weaken able and military actions against the regime. Sheikh the Ougaidat, whose members mostly backed the FSA Khalil had played a central role in achieving reconcili- and Jabhat al-Nusra. ation between the Ougaidat and the Shammar Bed- ouin confederation. BAGGARA POLITICS Sheikh Khalil was the son of Sheikh Aboud Gadan Baggara tribespeople who live in Deir al-Zour city have al-Hifel (1917–87), an influential tribal leader in east- historically supported the Baath and Nasserist parties. ern Syria. In 1943, the father joined the first Syrian par- One tribesman from the Abdulkarim clan, Yassin al- liament, holding the position until his death. When his Hafiz (1930–78), noted for his intellectualism, served own father died in 1951, Aboud became sheikh of the as an architect of Baath Party ideology. A large number Ougaidat. Until 1962, he served as chairman of the of tribespeople belong to the Baath wings in both Syria National Federation of Deir al-Zour, which Egyptian and Iraq. president Gamal Abdul Nasser had established as the Originally, Sheikh Nawaf Ragheb al-Bashir joined the ruling party of the short-lived . The Party of Socialist Unitarians and called for pan-Arabism. party’s dissolution cleared the way for the creation of the Now he supports Iran’s Shia ideology and the Shia coali- Arab Socialist Union. Sheikh Nawaf Ragheb al-Bashir, tion in Syria. His frequent changes in ideological align- also of the Baggara, had served as deputy chairman of ment have cost him in loyalty among his tribespeople. the federation. As compared with their urban kin, Baggara tribes- The Abu Kamel branch comprises the following clans: people in rural areas refrain from political activity. They joined the Baath Party primarily for benefits and 1. ABU HASSAN CLAN. The chiefdom family is al- government employment. But many quickly turned Nigras, residents of the town of al-Ashara and the against the regime and joined the 2011 uprising. villages of Darnaj and Suweida—with the key family During this period of anti-Assad activism, Sheikh being al-Karhout in the latter. The al-Nigras fam- Nawaf delivered anti-regime speeches attended by ily in particular is highly respected within the tribe, tribespeople who traveled to Deir al-Zour from their serving as head of an intratribal coalition known nearby villages. as al-Thilth, and consisting of the Abu Hassan, al- The Baggara tribe also includes members of the- Qaraan, and Abu Rahman clans, members of the Communist Party. Abu Kamel branch. 2. AL-QARAAN CLAN. The chiefdom family is al- Ougaidat Tribe Minadi al-Khalil—residents of al-Tayana, where the key family is al-Farageh, and al-Quria, where the OUGAIDAT STRUCTURE key family is al-Haji. The al-Bayyattrah, the larg- Compared with the Busaraya and Baggara tribes, the est subclan in the city of Raqqa, is also part of Ougaidat has a clear structure that is easy to discern, al-Qaraan. consisting of three main branches: Abu Kamel, Abu 3. ABU RAHMAN CLAN. The chiefdom family is Kuwan Kamal, and Abu Zamil (aka the al-Shaitat clan). A fourth al-Jabarih; members live in the villages of al-Girthe part is linked to the name Abu Zamal, but a barren fore- and Diwar, where the key family is al-Khalaf. father evidently put an end to this line. Abu Kamel Branch. The strongest of the three 4. AL-BAQIR CLAN, which has the following lineages: Ougaidat branches is Abu Kamel because it includes ƒƒ al-Khalaf. This contains the al-Jarallah, al-Mishraf, the tribe’s chiefdom family, al-Hifel. The Ougai- and Anabeza families, the last of which includes dat tribe’s current sheikh, coming from this branch, Amer al-Rafdan, the former Islamic State emir of is Musab Khalil Abdoud Gadan al-Hifel. His father, the “al-Kheir estate” (Deir al-Zour province).

POLICY NOTE 52 21 ANDREW TABLER, Editor

ƒƒ al-Qabesah. 4. AL-MIREH CLAN, which has a chiefdom family ƒƒ al-Maraa, with the key family al-Farageh (different named al-Harsah. Members live in the villages of from the family named earlier). al-Sayyal al-Gharbiya (key family: al-Harzah), al- Sayyal al-Sharqiya (key family: al-Sayyal), and al- 5. AL-SHUWAIT CLAN. The chiefdom belongs to the Shaafah (key family: al-Hazaa). family of Nasser Hammoud al-Jijan al-Wakaa, who lives in the village of Sibekhan. Clan members also 5. AL-MARASHDA CLAN. Led by the al-Hassan al- reside in Abu Hardoub, Ghariba, al-Kishima, and Abdullah chiefdom family, clan members live in the . The key families are al-Mishlab, al-Dan- villages of al-Marashda; key families are al-Moussa dal, al-Khaled, and al-Azam. al-Abdullah, al-Wazara, al-Hassan al-Diyab, al- Thalji, and al-Shahatha. Abu Kamal Branch. The Abu Kamal branch of the Ougaidat consists of the following clans: 6. AL-JAALKAH CLAN. This clan is led by Sheikh Asi al-Ahoul; members live in the villages of al-Susah 1. AL-HASSOUN CLAN. The chiefdom belongs to the and al-Shaafa. al-Dandal family (different from the family named earlier), comprising these lineages: Abu Zamil (al-Shaitat) Branch. Before the 2011 war, the population of tribespeople from the Abu Zamil ƒƒ al-Ali al-Hassoun, comprising the families of al- (al-Shaitat) branch had reached 100,000 in Deir al- Assaf, al-Dandal, al-Nassef, al-Hammoudi, al- Zour province. During the war, however, most fled Hamad, al-Hamada, and al-Hussein, who reside the province, seeking refuge from the Islamic State in in the villages of al-Baghouz, at the Iraqi border, regime-held areas, rebel-held areas, and across the and al-Ghabra. border in Turkey. In August 2014, IS killed about eight ƒƒ al-Muhammad al-Hassoun, comprising the al- hundred al-Shaitat tribespeople. The al-Shaitat chief- Dagher (key family: al-Hadid), Abu Abdullah dom is held by Haji al-Abd al-Omar. The tribal branch (key family: al-Fares), and Abu Souilah extended the al-Shaitat consists of these lineages : families. They live in the village of al-Susah. ƒƒ al-Khanfour, residents of Abu Hamam; key fami- ƒƒ al-Hammoud al-Hassoun, of which the families are lies: al-Khanfour, al-Rifai. al-Shalal, al-Makhamish, and al-Hajaj, residents ƒƒ al-Shahab, residents of al-Gharajneh; key fami- of Hasrat. lies: al-Ghanash, al-Khalaf. 2. AL-DAMIM CLAN. The al-Jarrah family holds the ƒƒ al-Aliyat, residents of the village of al-Kish- central position in the al-Damim clan, whose current keh; families: al-Khalaf , al-Iraqiya, and sheikh is Aboud al-Fares al-Jarrah. He is the father al-Dajah. of former Syrian ambassador to Iraq Nawaf Aboud al-Fares al-Jarrah (familiarly known as Nawaf al- OUGAIDAT ECONOMY Fares), who defected in July 2012 to , where As compared to the agricultural lands of the Baggara he secretly backed the 1,500-member al-Jala Divi- and Busaraya, the holdings of the Ougaidat are poor. sion, named for his home village, in its anti-Assad Also relative to other tribes, the Ougaidat send the actions. The al-Damim consists of these lineages: highest number of their grown sons to live and work in ƒƒ al-Hussein, residents of the village of al-Maslahah. the Gulf states, especially Kuwait and Qatar. Accord- ƒƒ al-Hassan (aka al-Agargah), residents of the vil- ing to tribespeople living in Abu Kamal, a full third of lage of al-Salheh. the city’s tribe members are working in Kuwait, Qatar, and . The others rely on smuggling between ƒƒ al-Alawi (aka al-Athar), residents of the al-Bahra Iraq and Syria to avoid dependence on the official Syr- village. ian economy. Of the al-Shaitat branch, about a half of 3. AL-DALEEJ CLAN. This clan has a chiefdom family families have relatives living in Kuwait. These workers of the same name, with members residing in the vil- send money home to Deir al-Zour, where their families lages of al-Baghouz and al-Qataa. build showy villas and homes.

22 THE WASHINGTON INSTITUTE FOR NEAR EAST POLICY A TALE OF SIX TRIBES: SECURING THE MIDDLE EUPHRATES RIVER VALLEY

Before the 2011 crisis, thousands of Ougaidat officers and soldiers sold their weapons. To give an idea tribespeople had joined the Assad regime’s military and of the discounts available, a Kalashnikov would sell in security organizations, and were based in Damascus, Raqqa during this period for about $600, versus a mere Deraa, and Homs. $60 in Abu Kamal. Ougaidat tribespeople do not hold historically OUGAIDAT POLITICS warm relations with the Baath regime, although thou- The Ougaidat are the strongest tribe militarily in eastern sands have served in Assad’s military infrastructure. In Syria, overcoming the Baggara and Busaraya, largely addition, the late Hafiz al-Assad tried to establish good because of their arsenal, which includes Kalashnikovs ties with the tribe by offering its members seats in par- and pistols. They have enjoyed access to cheap arms liament. Some also say Manal al-Jaadan, the wife of through Iraq, especially after the collapse of the Sad- Maher al-Assad, brother to the current Syrian president, dam Hussein regime in 2003, when many former Iraqi belongs to the Ougaidat.

ANDREW J. TABLER is the Martin J. Gross Fellow in the Geduld Pro- gram on Arab Politics at The Washington Institute, where he focuses on Syria and U.S. policy in the .

POLICY NOTE 52 23 ARAB TRIBES IN SYRIA

N River TURKEY W E Kobane Qamishli Ras al-Ain Tay S Tal Abyad Adwan Afrin Manbij HASAKA Jabbour ALEPPO Fadan Walda al-Shadadi Shammar RAQQA Lake Assad Afadla HORAN, revised June 2018. . BALANCHE & HORAN, IDLIB Quayar Baggara Sabkha LATAKIA al-Washeb Haddadin Busaraya DEIR AL-ZOUR HAMA Fadan Mawali Ougaidat Salamiya HOMS al-Shour Sbaa

(BASED ON ABDALLA MASRI, 1964 ) Abu Kamal Euphrates River Fawaira

LEBANON Hassana Ruwala al-Swaileh al-Shaga DAMASCUS Ruwala IRAQ al-Abdullah Golan al-Ghiati Heights al-Hassan SUWAYDA ISRAEL al-Masaid

THE W ASHINGTON INSTITUTE FOR NEAR EAST POLICY DERAA al-Sherfat JORDAN 0 100 km 2017 ©

Sedentary area Sbaa Tribe Province border Province center Nomadic area Tribal territory International border City

1111 19TH STREET NW • WASHINGTON, DC 20036 • WWW.WASHINGTONINSTITUTE.ORG