DOCSLIB.ORG

Syria Actors

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Syria Actors European Asylum Support Office Syria Actors Country of Origin Information Report December 2019 SUPPORT IS OUR MISSION European Asylum Support Office Syria Actors Country of Origin Information Report December 2019 More information on the European Union is available on the Internet (http://europa.eu). ISBN: 978-92-9485-079-9 doi: 10.2847/608683 © European Asylum Support Office (EASO) 2019 Reproduction is authorised, provided the source is acknowledged, unless otherwise stated. For third-party materials reproduced in this publication, reference is made to the copyrights statements of the respective third parties. Cover photo: © Kurdishstruggle, Kurdish YPG Fighters, 16 December 2017, Flickr, url Acknowledgements This report was drafted by the EASO COI sector with research contributions from the COI unit of the Romanian General Inspectorate for Immigration, Ministry of Internal Affairs. The following departments and organisations have reviewed the report: Austria, Federal Office for Immigration and Asylum, Country of Origin Information Department ACCORD, the Austrian Centre for Country of Origin and Asylum Research and Documentation Additionally, the following expert reviewed this report: Aron Lund, fellow at the Century Foundation and guest researcher at the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI). Mr. Lund is a writer on Middle Eastern affairs and has written extensively on Syrian politics. Between 2013 and 2016, he edited the site Syria in Crisis for the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, where he was also a non-resident associate in 2016. He is a fellow of the Centre for Syrian Studies at St. Andrew’s University. His publications include two Swedish-language books on Syrian politics, Drömmen om Damaskus (Stockholm, 2010) and Syrien brinner (Stockholm, 2014), the English-language Divided They Stand (Brussels, 2012) and, as co-author, Hybrid Actors: Armed Groups and State Fragmentation in the Middle East (New York, 2019), as well as reports and book chapters published by, among others, the Carnegie Endowment, the Swedish Institute for International Affairs, and SIPRI. It must be noted that the review carried out by the mentioned departments, experts or organisations contributes to the overall quality of the report but does not necessarily imply their formal endorsement of the final report, which is the full responsibility of EASO. Contents Acknowledgements ........................................................................................................................... 5 Contents ............................................................................................................................................ 6 Disclaimer .......................................................................................................................................... 8 Glossary and Abbreviations ............................................................................................................... 9 Introduction ..................................................................................................................................... 10 Methodology ............................................................................................................................... 10 Structure and use of the report .................................................................................................. 10 Map ................................................................................................................................................... 3 1. Context and international actors overview ................................................................................... 4 1.1 Conflict background ................................................................................................................ 4 1.2 International involvement ...................................................................................................... 4 1.2.1 Iran ................................................................................................................................... 4 1.2.2 US-led coalition ................................................................................................................ 6 1.2.3 Turkey .............................................................................................................................. 8 1.2.4 Russia ............................................................................................................................... 9 1.2.5 Israel .............................................................................................................................. 11 2. The Government of Syria............................................................................................................. 12 2.1 State structure and governance ............................................................................................ 12 2.1.1 Territorial control .......................................................................................................... 12 2.1.2 Executive branch............................................................................................................ 14 2.1.3 Legislative branch .......................................................................................................... 15 2.1.4 Judicial branch ............................................................................................................... 15 2.2 Judiciary and penal system ................................................................................................... 16 2.2.1 Court structure .............................................................................................................. 16 2.2.2 Criminal trial procedures ............................................................................................... 17 2.2.3 Death penalty ................................................................................................................ 19 2.2.4 Capacity ......................................................................................................................... 20 2.2.5 Effectiveness and integrity ............................................................................................ 21 2.2.6 Prison conditions ........................................................................................................... 23 2.3 Security institutions .............................................................................................................. 24 2.3.1 The Syrian Arab Army .................................................................................................... 24 2.3.2 Intelligence agencies ..................................................................................................... 28 2.3.3 Police ............................................................................................................................. 32 2.3.4 Associated armed groups .............................................................................................. 32 2.4 Overview of abuses committed by government security forces and associated armed groups .................................................................................................................................................... 37 3. Kurdish-controlled areas of North and East Syria ....................................................................... 39 3.1 Structures and institutions .................................................................................................... 39 3.1.1 Kurdish Self Administration status ................................................................................ 39 3.1.2 Presence and territorial control .................................................................................... 40 3.1.3 Political leadership ........................................................................................................ 42 3.1.4. Judiciary and penal system ........................................................................................... 43 3.2 Security forces....................................................................................................................... 45 3.2.1 Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and People’s Protection Units (YPG) .......................... 45 3.2.2 Asayish ........................................................................................................................... 46 3.2.3 Integrity issues ............................................................................................................... 47 3.3 Overview of abuses committed by Kurdish political actors (PYD) and security forces (SDF, YPG, Asayish) ............................................................................................................................... 48 4. Anti-government armed groups in the Idlib area ....................................................................... 49 4.1 Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) ................................................................................................... 49 4.1.1 Structure and objectives ................................................................................................ 49 4.1.2 Presence and territorial control .................................................................................... 50 4.1.3 Strength ......................................................................................................................... 51 4.1.4 Modus operandi and profiles targeted
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Oral Update of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic
    Distr.: General 18 March 2014 Original: English Human Rights Council Twenty-fifth session Agenda item 4 Human rights situations that require the Council’s attention Oral Update of the independent international commission of inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic 1 I. Introduction 1. The harrowing violence in the Syrian Arab Republic has entered its fourth year, with no signs of abating. The lives of over one hundred thousand people have been extinguished. Thousands have been the victims of torture. The indiscriminate and disproportionate shelling and aerial bombardment of civilian-inhabited areas has intensified in the last six months, as has the use of suicide and car bombs. Civilians in besieged areas have been reduced to scavenging. In this conflict’s most recent low, people, including young children, have starved to death. 2. Save for the efforts of humanitarian agencies operating inside Syria and along its borders, the international community has done little but bear witness to the plight of those caught in the maelstrom. Syrians feel abandoned and hopeless. The overwhelming imperative is for the parties, influential states and the international community to work to ensure the protection of civilians. In particular, as set out in Security Council resolution 2139, parties must lift the sieges and allow unimpeded and safe humanitarian access. 3. Compassion does not and should not suffice. A negotiated political solution, which the commission has consistently held to be the only solution to this conflict, must be pursued with renewed vigour both by the parties and by influential states. Among victims, the need for accountability is deeply-rooted in the desire for peace.
    [Show full text]
  • Offensive Against the Syrian City of Manbij May Be the Beginning of a Campaign to Liberate the Area Near the Syrian-Turkish Border from ISIS
    June 23, 2016 Offensive against the Syrian City of Manbij May Be the Beginning of a Campaign to Liberate the Area near the Syrian-Turkish Border from ISIS Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) fighters at the western entrance to the city of Manbij (Fars, June 18, 2016). Overview 1. On May 31, 2016, the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), a Kurdish-dominated military alliance supported by the United States, initiated a campaign to liberate the northern Syrian city of Manbij from ISIS. Manbij lies west of the Euphrates, about 35 kilometers (about 22 miles) south of the Syrian-Turkish border. In the three weeks since the offensive began, the SDF forces, which number several thousand, captured the rural regions around Manbij, encircled the city and invaded it. According to reports, on June 19, 2016, an SDF force entered Manbij and occupied one of the key squares at the western entrance to the city. 2. The declared objective of the ground offensive is to occupy Manbij. However, the objective of the entire campaign may be to liberate the cities of Manbij, Jarabulus, Al-Bab and Al-Rai, which lie to the west of the Euphrates and are ISIS strongholds near the Turkish border. For ISIS, the loss of the area is liable to be a severe blow to its logistic links between the outside world and the centers of its control in eastern Syria (Al-Raqqah), Iraq (Mosul). Moreover, the loss of the region will further 112-16 112-16 2 2 weaken ISIS's standing in northern Syria and strengthen the military-political position and image of the Kurdish forces leading the anti-ISIS ground offensive.
    [Show full text]
  • The United States and Russian Governments Involvement in the Syrian Crisis and the United Nations’ Kofi Annan Peace Process
    ISSN 2039-2117 (online) Mediterranean Journal of Social Sciences Vol 5 No 27 ISSN 2039-9340 (print) MCSER Publishing, Rome-Italy December 2014 The United States and Russian Governments Involvement in the Syrian Crisis and the United Nations’ Kofi Annan Peace Process Ken Ifesinachi Ph.D Professor of Political Science, University of Nigeria [email protected] Raymond Adibe Department of Political Science, University of Nigeria [email protected] Doi:10.5901/mjss.2014.v5n27p1154 Abstract The inability of the Syrian government to internally manage the popular uprising in the country have increased international pressure on Syria as well as deepen international efforts to resolve the crisis that has developed into a full scale civil war. It was the need to end the violent conflict in Syria that informed the appointment of Kofi Annan as the U.N-Arab League Special Envoy to Syria on February 23, 2012. This study investigates the U.S and Russian governments’ involvement in the Syrian crisis and the UN Kofi Annan peace process. The two persons’ Zero-sum model of the game theory is used as our framework of analysis. Our findings showed that the divergence on financial and military support by the U.S and Russian governments to the rival parties in the Syrian conflict contradicted the mandate of the U.N Security Council that sanctioned the Annan plan and compromised the ceasefire agreement contained in the plan which resulted in the escalation of violent conflict in Syria during the period the peace deal was supposed to be in effect. The implication of the study is that the success of any U.N brokered peace deal is highly dependent on the ability of its key members to have a consensus, hence, there is need to galvanize a comprehensive international consensus on how to tackle the Syrian crisis that would accommodate all crucial international actors.
    [Show full text]
  • Télécharger Le COI Focus
    COMMISSARIAT GÉNÉRAL AUX RÉFUGIÉS ET AUX APATRIDES COI Focus LIBAN La situation sécuritaire 7 août 2018 (Mise à jour) Cedoca Langue du document original : néerlandais DISCLAIMER: Ce document COI a été rédigé par le Centre de documentation et de This COI-product has been written by Cedoca, the Documentation and recherches (Cedoca) du CGRA en vue de fournir des informations pour le Research Department of the CGRS, and it provides information for the traitement des demandes d’asile individuelles. Il ne traduit aucune politique processing of individual asylum applications. The document does not contain ni n’exprime aucune opinion et ne prétend pas apporter de réponse définitive policy guidelines or opinions and does not pass judgment on the merits of quant à la valeur d’une demande d’asile. Il a été rédigé conformément aux the asylum application. It follows the Common EU Guidelines for processing lignes directrices de l’Union européenne pour le traitement de l’information country of origin information (April 2008). sur le pays d’origine (avril 2008) et il a été rédigé conformément aux The author has based the text on a wide range of public information selected dispositions légales en vigueur. with care and with a permanent concern for crosschecking sources. Even Ce document a été élaboré sur la base d’un large éventail d’informations though the document tries to Even though the document tries to cover all the publiques soigneusement sélectionnées dans un souci permanent de relevant aspects of the subject, the text is not necessarily exhaustive. If recoupement des sources. L’auteur s’est efforcé de traiter la totalité des certain events, people or organisations are not mentioned, this does not aspects pertinents du sujet mais les analyses proposées ne visent pas mean that they did not exist.
    [Show full text]
  • The Potential for an Assad Statelet in Syria
    THE POTENTIAL FOR AN ASSAD STATELET IN SYRIA Nicholas A. Heras THE POTENTIAL FOR AN ASSAD STATELET IN SYRIA Nicholas A. Heras policy focus 132 | december 2013 the washington institute for near east policy www.washingtoninstitute.org The opinions expressed in this Policy Focus are those of the author and not necessar- ily those of The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, its Board of Trustees, or its Board of Advisors. MAPS Fig. 1 based on map designed by W.D. Langeraar of Michael Moran & Associates that incorporates data from National Geographic, Esri, DeLorme, NAVTEQ, UNEP- WCMC, USGS, NASA, ESA, METI, NRCAN, GEBCO, NOAA, and iPC. Figs. 2, 3, and 4: detail from The Tourist Atlas of Syria, Syria Ministry of Tourism, Directorate of Tourist Relations, Damascus. All rights reserved. Printed in the United States of America. No part of this publica- tion may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopy, recording, or any information storage and retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publisher. © 2013 by The Washington Institute for Near East Policy The Washington Institute for Near East Policy 1828 L Street NW, Suite 1050 Washington, DC 20036 Cover: Digitally rendered montage incorporating an interior photo of the tomb of Hafez al-Assad and a partial view of the wheel tapestry found in the Sheikh Daher Shrine—a 500-year-old Alawite place of worship situated in an ancient grove of wild oak; both are situated in al-Qurdaha, Syria. Photographs by Andrew Tabler/TWI; design and montage by 1000colors.
    [Show full text]
  • Policy Notes for the Trump Notes Administration the Washington Institute for Near East Policy ■ 2018 ■ Pn55
    TRANSITION 2017 POLICYPOLICY NOTES FOR THE TRUMP NOTES ADMINISTRATION THE WASHINGTON INSTITUTE FOR NEAR EAST POLICY ■ 2018 ■ PN55 TUNISIAN FOREIGN FIGHTERS IN IRAQ AND SYRIA AARON Y. ZELIN Tunisia should really open its embassy in Raqqa, not Damascus. That’s where its people are. —ABU KHALED, AN ISLAMIC STATE SPY1 THE PAST FEW YEARS have seen rising interest in foreign fighting as a general phenomenon and in fighters joining jihadist groups in particular. Tunisians figure disproportionately among the foreign jihadist cohort, yet their ubiquity is somewhat confounding. Why Tunisians? This study aims to bring clarity to this question by examining Tunisia’s foreign fighter networks mobilized to Syria and Iraq since 2011, when insurgencies shook those two countries amid the broader Arab Spring uprisings. ©2018 THE WASHINGTON INSTITUTE FOR NEAR EAST POLICY. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. THE WASHINGTON INSTITUTE FOR NEAR EAST POLICY ■ NO. 30 ■ JANUARY 2017 AARON Y. ZELIN Along with seeking to determine what motivated Evolution of Tunisian Participation these individuals, it endeavors to reconcile estimated in the Iraq Jihad numbers of Tunisians who actually traveled, who were killed in theater, and who returned home. The find- Although the involvement of Tunisians in foreign jihad ings are based on a wide range of sources in multiple campaigns predates the 2003 Iraq war, that conflict languages as well as data sets created by the author inspired a new generation of recruits whose effects since 2011. Another way of framing the discussion will lasted into the aftermath of the Tunisian revolution. center on Tunisians who participated in the jihad fol- These individuals fought in groups such as Abu Musab lowing the 2003 U.S.
    [Show full text]
  • 45 the RESURRECTION of SYRIAN KURDISH POLITICS by Ro
    THE RESURRECTION OF SYRIAN KURDISH POLITICS By Rodi Hevian* This article examines the current political landscape of the Kurdish region in Syria, the role the Kurds have played in the ongoing Syrian civil war, and intra-Kurdish relations. For many years, the Kurds in Syria were Iraqi Kurdistan to Afrin in the northwest on subjected to discrimination at the hands of the the Turkish border. This article examines the Ba’th regime and were stripped of their basic current political landscape of the Kurdish rights.1 During the 1960s and 1970s, some region in Syria, the role the Kurds have played Syrian Kurds were deprived of citizenship, in the ongoing conflict, and intra-Kurdish leaving them with no legal status in the relations. country.2 Although Syria was a key player in the modern Kurdish struggle against Turkey and Iraq, its policies toward the Kurds there THE KURDS IN SYRIA were in many cases worse than those in the neighboring countries. On the one hand, the It is estimated that there are some 3 million Asad regime provided safe haven for the Kurds in Syria, constituting 13 percent of Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) and the Syria’s 23 million inhabitants. They mostly Kurdish movements in Iraq fighting Saddam’s occupy the northern part of the country, a regime. On the other hand, it cracked down on region that borders with Iraqi Kurdistan to the its own Kurds in the northern part of the east and Turkey to the north and west. There country. Kurdish parties, Kurdish language, are also some major districts in Aleppo and Kurdish culture and Kurdish names were Damascus that are populated by the Kurds.
    [Show full text]
  • Iraq: Opposition to the Government in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI)
    Country Policy and Information Note Iraq: Opposition to the government in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI) Version 2.0 June 2021 Preface Purpose This note provides country of origin information (COI) and analysis of COI for use by Home Office decision makers handling particular types of protection and human rights claims (as set out in the Introduction section). It is not intended to be an exhaustive survey of a particular subject or theme. It is split into two main sections: (1) analysis and assessment of COI and other evidence; and (2) COI. These are explained in more detail below. Assessment This section analyses the evidence relevant to this note – i.e. the COI section; refugee/human rights laws and policies; and applicable caselaw – by describing this and its inter-relationships, and provides an assessment of, in general, whether one or more of the following applies: • A person is reasonably likely to face a real risk of persecution or serious harm • The general humanitarian situation is so severe as to breach Article 15(b) of European Council Directive 2004/83/EC (the Qualification Directive) / Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights as transposed in paragraph 339C and 339CA(iii) of the Immigration Rules • The security situation presents a real risk to a civilian’s life or person such that it would breach Article 15(c) of the Qualification Directive as transposed in paragraph 339C and 339CA(iv) of the Immigration Rules • A person is able to obtain protection from the state (or quasi state bodies) • A person is reasonably able to relocate within a country or territory • A claim is likely to justify granting asylum, humanitarian protection or other form of leave, and • If a claim is refused, it is likely or unlikely to be certifiable as ‘clearly unfounded’ under section 94 of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002.
    [Show full text]
  • Volume XIII, Issue 21 October 30, 2015
    VOLUME XIII, ISSUE 21 u OCTOBER 30, 2015 IN THIS ISSUE: BRIEFS ............................................................................................................................1 THE SWARM: TERRORIST INCIDENTS IN FRANCE By Timothy Holman .........................................................................................................3 CAUGHT BETWEEN RUSSIA, THE UNITED STATES AND TURKEY, Cars continue to burn SYRIAN KURDS FACE DILEMMA after a suicide attack By Wladimir van Wilgenburg .........................................................................................5 by the Islamic State in Beirut. THE EVOLUTION OF SUNNI JIHADISM IN LEBANON SINCE 2011 By Patrick Hoover .............................................................................................................8 Terrorism Monitor is a publication of The Jamestown Foundation. BANGLADESH ATTACKS SHOW INCREASING ISLAMIC STATE The Terrorism Monitor is INFLUENCE designed to be read by policy- makers and other specialists James Brandon yet be accessible to the general public. The opinions expressed within are solely those of the In the last six weeks, Bangladesh has been hit by a near-unprecedented series of Islamist authors and do not necessarily militant attacks targeting foreigners and local Shi’a Muslims. On September 28, an reflect those of The Jamestown Italian NGO worker, who was residing in the country, was shot and killed by attackers Foundation. on a moped as he was jogging near the diplomatic area of capital city Dhaka (Daily Star [Dhaka], September
    [Show full text]
  • Iraq 2019 Human Rights Report
    IRAQ 2019 HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Iraq is a constitutional parliamentary republic. The 2018 parliamentary elections, while imperfect, generally met international standards of free and fair elections and led to the peaceful transition of power from Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi to Adil Abd al-Mahdi. On December 1, in response to protesters’ demands for significant changes to the political system, Abd al-Mahdi submitted his resignation, which the Iraqi Council of Representatives (COR) accepted. As of December 17, Abd al-Mahdi continued to serve in a caretaker capacity while the COR worked to identify a replacement in accordance with the Iraqi constitution. Numerous domestic security forces operated throughout the country. The regular armed forces and domestic law enforcement bodies generally maintained order within the country, although some armed groups operated outside of government control. Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) consist of administratively organized forces within the Ministries of Interior and Defense, and the Counterterrorism Service. The Ministry of Interior is responsible for domestic law enforcement and maintenance of order; it oversees the Federal Police, Provincial Police, Facilities Protection Service, Civil Defense, and Department of Border Enforcement. Energy police, under the Ministry of Oil, are responsible for providing infrastructure protection. Conventional military forces under the Ministry of Defense are responsible for the defense of the country but also carry out counterterrorism and internal security operations in conjunction with the Ministry of Interior. The Counterterrorism Service reports directly to the prime minister and oversees the Counterterrorism Command, an organization that includes three brigades of special operations forces. The National Security Service (NSS) intelligence agency reports directly to the prime minister.
    [Show full text]
  • The Jihadi Threat: ISIS, Al-Qaeda, and Beyond
    THE JIHADI THREAT ISIS, AL QAEDA, AND BEYOND The Jihadi Threat ISIS, al- Qaeda, and Beyond Robin Wright William McCants United States Institute of Peace Brookings Institution Woodrow Wilson Center Garrett Nada J. M. Berger United States Institute of Peace International Centre for Counter- Terrorism Jacob Olidort The Hague Washington Institute for Near East Policy William Braniff Alexander Thurston START Consortium, University of Mary land Georgetown University Cole Bunzel Clinton Watts Prince ton University Foreign Policy Research Institute Daniel Byman Frederic Wehrey Brookings Institution and Georgetown University Car ne gie Endowment for International Peace Jennifer Cafarella Craig Whiteside Institute for the Study of War Naval War College Harleen Gambhir Graeme Wood Institute for the Study of War Yale University Daveed Gartenstein- Ross Aaron Y. Zelin Foundation for the Defense of Democracies Washington Institute for Near East Policy Hassan Hassan Katherine Zimmerman Tahrir Institute for Middle East Policy American Enterprise Institute Charles Lister Middle East Institute Making Peace Possible December 2016/January 2017 CONTENTS Source: Image by Peter Hermes Furian, www . iStockphoto. com. The West failed to predict the emergence of al- Qaeda in new forms across the Middle East and North Africa. It was blindsided by the ISIS sweep across Syria and Iraq, which at least temporarily changed the map of the Middle East. Both movements have skillfully continued to evolve and proliferate— and surprise. What’s next? Twenty experts from think tanks and universities across the United States explore the world’s deadliest movements, their strate- gies, the future scenarios, and policy considerations. This report reflects their analy sis and diverse views.
    [Show full text]
  • Syrian Armed Opposition Powerbrokers
    March 2016 Jennifer Cafarella and Genevieve Casagrande MIDDLE EAST SECURITY REPORT 29 SYRIAN ARMED OPPOSITION POWERBROKERS Cover: A rebel fighter of the Southern Front of the Free Syrian Army gestures while standing with his fellow fighter near their weapons at the front line in the north-west countryside of Deraa March 3, 2015. Syrian government forces have taken control of villages in southern Syria, state media said on Saturday, part of a campaign they started this month against insurgents posing one of the biggest remaining threats to Damascus. Picture taken March 3, 2015. REUTERS/Stringer All rights reserved. Printed in the United States of America. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopy, recording, or any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publisher. ©2016 by the Institute for the Study of War. Published in 2016 in the United States of America by the Institute for the Study of War. 1400 16th Street NW, Suite 515 | Washington, DC 20036 www.understandingwar.org Jennifer Cafarella and Genevieve Casagrande MIDDLE EAST SECURITY REPORT 29 SYRIAN ARMED OPPOSITION POWERBROKERS ABOUT THE AUTHORS Jennifer Cafarella is the Evans Hanson Fellow at the Institute for the Study of War where she focuses on the Syrian Civil War and opposition groups. Her research focuses particularly on the al Qaeda affiliate Jabhat al Nusra and their military capabilities, modes of governance, and long-term strategic vision. She is the author of Likely Courses of Action in the Syrian Civil War: June-December 2015, and Jabhat al-Nusra in Syria: An Islamic Emirate for al-Qaeda.
    [Show full text]