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BREAD and BAKERY DASHBOARD Northwest Syria Bread and Bakery Assistance 12 MARCH 2021

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BREAD AND BAKERY DASHBOARD Northwest Syria Bread and Bakery Assistance 12 MARCH 2021 ISSUE #7 • PAGE 1 Reporting Period: DECEMBER 2020 Lower Shyookh Turkey Turkey Ain Al Arab Raju 92% 100% Jarablus Syrian Arab Sharan Republic Bulbul 100% Jarablus Lebanon Iraq 100% 100% Ghandorah Suran Jordan A'zaz 100% 53% 100% 55% Aghtrin Ar-Ra'ee Ma'btali 52% 100% Afrin A'zaz Mare' 100% of the Population Sheikh Menbij El-Hadid 37% 52% in NWS (including Tell 85% Tall Refaat A'rima Abiad district) don’t meet the Afrin 76% minimum daily need of bread Jandairis Abu Qalqal based on the 5Ws data. Nabul Al Bab Al Bab Ain al Arab Turkey Daret Azza Haritan Tadaf Tell Abiad 59% Harim 71% 100% Aleppo Rasm Haram 73% Qourqeena Dana AleppoEl-Imam Suluk Jebel Saman Kafr 50% Eastern Tell Abiad 100% Takharim Atareb 73% Kwaires Ain Al Ar-Raqqa Salqin 52% Dayr Hafir Menbij Maaret Arab Harim Tamsrin Sarin 100% Ar-Raqqa 71% 56% 25% Ein Issa Jebel Saman As-Safira Maskana 45% Armanaz Teftnaz Ar-Raqqa Zarbah Hadher Ar-Raqqa 73% Al-Khafsa Banan 0 7.5 15 30 Km Darkosh Bennsh Janudiyeh 57% 36% Idleb 100% % Bread Production vs Population # of Total Bread / Flour Sarmin As-Safira Minimum Needs of Bread Q4 2020* Beneficiaries Assisted Idleb including WFP Programmes 76% Jisr-Ash-Shugur Ariha Hajeb in December 2020 0 - 99 % Mhambal Saraqab 1 - 50,000 77% 61% Tall Ed-daman 50,001 - 100,000 Badama 72% Equal or More than 100% 100,001 - 200,000 Jisr-Ash-Shugur Idleb Ariha Abul Thohur Monthly Bread Production in MT More than 200,000 81% Khanaser Q4 2020 Ehsem Not reported to 4W’s 1 cm 3720 MT Subsidized Bread Al Ma'ra Data Source: FSL Cluster & iMMAP *The represented percentages in circles on the map refer to the availability of bread by calculating Unsubsidized Bread** Disclaimer: The Boundaries and names shown Ma'arrat 0.50 cm 1860 MT the gap between currently produced bread and bread needs of the population at sub-district level. (Regular and Tourist) and the designation used on this map do not An Nu'man 0 12.5 25 50 Km imply official endorsement and acceptance The used figure for daily bread needs per person was 330g. Sanjar by the United Nations. 0 cm 0 MT Free Bread (NGO) ** The price of un-subsidized bread is considered as un-affordable price BREAD AND BAKERY DASHBOARD Northwest Syria Bread and Bakery Assistance 12 MARCH 2021 ISSUE #7 • PAGE 2 Reporting Period: DECEMBER 2020 BENEFICIARIES POPULATION GAP 1 SUB- # OF Gap Traffic # ASSISTED WFP INTERVENTION (as of August (30% WFP intervention DISTRICTS PARTNERS Lights (without WFP ) 2020) added) SITUATION UPDATE 1 Sheikh El-Hadid 0 0 12,021 0 12,021 0% • 2.25M people received bread in 40 sub-districts in 2 Sarmin 0 0 13,546 0 13,546 0% FSL partners scaled 3 Ras Al Ain 0 0 26,849 0 26,849 0% NW Syria during December 2020. 4 Suluk 0 0 26,965 0 26,965 0% up bread production & distribution, however significant 5 Tell Abiad 0 0 29,809 0 29,809 0% gaps were reported in 26 subdistricts where 6 Ein Issa 0 0 37,426 0 37,426 0% bread need is met by less than half the population 7 Arima 0 0 41,327 0 41,327 0% (highlighted in green and yellow colors). 8 Raju 0 3,880 43,503 1 42,339 3% 9 Bennsh 0 5,900 43,448 1 41,678 4% • Bread production is not evenly distributed across NW 10 Mhambal 0 9,755 44,892 1 41,966 7% Syria; some critical areas remain with high number of 11 Teftnaz 0 5,015 20,786 1 19,282 7% IDPs (as in Dana, Idleb, Salqin, and Atareb sub-districts) 12 Atareb 5,000 28,680 156,898 3 143,294 9% that were partly assisted by local bread production. 13 Salqin 24,941 0 249,901 4 224,960 10% Improvements in bread production capacity are 14 Ehsem 0 9,560 24,126 1 21,258 12% reported in sub-districts in North Aleppo Governorate 15 Darkosh 12,998 0 87,315 1 74,317 15% (Afrin district, Jarablus, Ghandorah) where the majority 16 Qourqeena 20,378 0 103,580 2 83,202 20% of population meet the daily minimum requirement. 17 Jandairis 6,000 46,990 97,369 2 77,272 21% 18 Sharan 8,648 8,750 54,408 3 43,135 21% • Further assessments are required to figure out the 19 Harim 21,527 0 66,084 2 44,557 33% bread distribution linkages amongst sub-districts 20 Idleb 80,839 50,420 291,445 4 195,480 33% with surplus and deficit production in NW Syria. 21 Badama 18,740 0 55,245 2 36,505 34% 22 Janudiyeh 21,671 0 62,488 2 40,817 35% *The represented percentages in circles on the map (page 1) 23 Dana 133,704 873,975 1,013,939 15 618,043 39% refer to the availability of bread by calculating the gap between 24 Afrin 63,213 53,055 185,408 4 106,279 43% the actual bread production against the daily bread needs of the 25 Ariha 41,482 7,360 100,218 2 56,528 44% population at the sub-district level, which is 330 grams per person 26 Daret Azza 24,926 17,525 63,576 2 33,393 47% per day as minimum daily bread quantity. 27 Maaret Tamsrin 179,955 46,390 286,899 4 93,027 68% 28 Jisr-Ash-Shugur 67,869 21,695 97,817 3 23,440 76% **Columns on the map refer to the type of produced bread: subsidized, unsubsidized, and free bread which distributed by 29 Kafr Takharim 28,300 0 35,264 3 6,964 80% NGOs. 30 Azaz 248,604 91,610 297,497 3 21,410 93% 31 Suran - Aleppo 95,340 6,615 95,477 2 -1,848 102% ***The price of un-subsidized bread is considered an unaffordable 32 Mabtali 21,262 11,950 23,150 4 -1,697 107% price. 33 Mare 86,670 7,695 72,446 2 -16,533 123% 34 Armanaz 102,012 0 75,466 3 -26,546 135% 35 Al Bab 260,825 0 184,179 5 -76,646 142% Traffic lights thresholds (Click here for traffic 36 Aghtrin 140,790 19,890 103,199 4 -43,558 142% lights analysis guide): 37 Bulbul 28,556 8,860 20,167 2 -11,047 155% 38 Ghandorah 57,087 0 34,232 2 -22,855 167% 39 Jarablus 282,508 0 72,445 4 -210,063 390% 0% - 25% 51% - 75% 40 Ar-Raee 171,986 0 22,309 2 -149,677 771% +100% Total 2,255,831 1,335,570 4,373,119 29 2,277,086 26% - 50% 76% - 100% 1 WFP Partners distributed 15 kg of flour (equivalent to 100 grams bread per person/day) to 1,335,570 people. The number of WFP beneficiaries is calculated at 30% of WFP beneficiaries in the gaps analysis, as the amount of bread meets 30% minimum daily requirement. BREAD AND BAKERY DASHBOARD Northwest Syria Bread and Bakery Assistance 12 MARCH 2021 ISSUE #7 • PAGE 3 Reporting Period: DECEMBER 2020 2020 Trend Analysis on Bread and Bakery Assistance by FSL Cluster Partners February 2021 plans show a number of bread versus a reduction of bread distribution in the • Planned # Of Beneficiaries by FSL Partners in the Upcoming 3 Months beneficiaries close to the caseload of December same period. 2020. Sharp reduction in bread production in March and April are pointed out by FSL • Both imported and local procured amount of February 1319K 721K partners. flour remained steady from April to October March 194K 546K 2020, despite the closure of the cross-border April 194K 546K • The daily bread production indicates an point of Bab Al Salam in 2020 for UN assistance. increase from April to October 2020 in NW 0.0M 0.5M 1.0M 1.5M 2.0M Syria, at 524MT and 480 MT in Idleb and • Unsubsidized bread prices have risen sharply in Aleppo Governorates respectively. 2020, from 188 SYP in January to 858 SYP in Aleppo Governorate Idleb Governorate October, which is also reflected by an increase • Wheat flour distribution to bakeries for bread of subsidized price that went up to 528 SYP production hiked in the last 2020 quarter, over the same reporting period. Daily ProductionDaily Production of Bread of Bread (MT) Source of FlourSource in NWSof Flour in NWS reaching out 1.82M beneficiaries in December, 550 0.8 0.80 524.00 0.69 500 # Of Total Beneficiaries Assisted By Bread / Flour Distribution 480.00 0.68 2/25/2021 # of Total Beneficiaries Assisted by Bread/Flour distribution Trend 0.6 b 447.40 2.0M 450 415.20 435.00 1.82M 0.4 400 1.8M 0.33 Aleppo and Idle Imported and Local 0.32 350 1.6M 349.00 0.2 1.53M 0.20 300 Jan 2020 Apr 2020 Jul 2020 Oct 2020 Jan 2020 Apr 2020 Jul 2020 Oct 2020 1.4M Month Month Aleppo Idleb Imported Local 1.2M 1.15M PricePrice of 1 of MT 1 MTof Flour of Flour in NWS in NWS (USD) Price of BreadBread in Price NWS in NWS (SYP) 300 1,000 296.50 1.01M 858.50 1.0M 294.50 800 290 0.83M 0.84M 0.80M # of Total Beneficiaries Assisted # of Total 0.8M 0.74M 600 570.50 0.71M 0.71M 0.78M 528.50 0.65M 280 279.00 0.59M 0.6M 0.56M 0.65M 0.52M 400 338.00 0.53M 0.55M 0.53M 0.52M 270 0.44M 0.39M 0.40M 0.40M 0.34M 0.39M 0.40M 0.40M 200 0.4M 0.45M 0.34M Subsidized and UnSubsidized 188.50 0.39M 0.39M 0.40M 0.36M Price Local Flour and Imported 101.50 0.30M 260 260.50 0 0.27M 0.2M May 2020 Jul 2020 Sep 2020 Nov 2020 Jan 2020 Apr 2020 Jul 2020 Oct 2020 January February March April May June July August September October November December Month Month Month Price Local Flour Imported Flour Subsidized UnSubsidized Type of activity Bread Distribution Wheat Flour Distribution / Bakeries 30% of World Food Programme (WFP) Intervention 1/1.
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  • WEEKLY CONFLICT SUMMARY | 31 May - 6 June 2021

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    WEEKLY CONFLICT SUMMARY | 31 May - 6 June 2021 SYRIA SUMMARY • The predominantly Kurdish Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) cracks down on anti-conscription protests in Manbij, Aleppo Governorate. • The Government of Syria (GoS) offers to defer military service for people wanted in southern Syria. • ISIS assassinates a prominent religious leader in Deir-ez-Zor city. Figure 1: Dominant actors’ area of control and influence in Syria as of 6 June 2021. NSOAG stands for Non-state Organized Armed Groups. Also, please see footnote 1. Page 1 of 5 WEEKLY CONFLICT SUMMARY | 31 May - 6 June 2021 NORTHWEST SYRIA1 Figure 2: Anti-conscription protests and related events in Manbij, Aleppo Governorate between 31 May – 6 June. Data from The Carter Center and ACLED. Conscription in Northwest Syria In 2019, the Kurdish Autonomous Administration (KAA) issued a controversial conscription law for territories under its control.2 in February, the Syrian Network For Human Rights claimed that the conscription of teachers deprived half a million students of a proper education. 3 People in the region argue that the forcible recruitment and arrests by SDF have disrupted economic life.4 In late May, the SDF escalated its recruitment effort.5 31 May 1 Figure 1 depicts areas of the dominant actors’ control and influence. While “control” is a relative term in a complex, dynamic conflict, territorial control is defined as an entity having power over use of force as well as civil/administrative functions in an area. Russia, Iran, and Hezbollah maintain a presence in Syrian government-controlled territory. Non-state organized armed groups (NSOAG), including the Kurdish-dominated SDF and Turkish-backed opposition groups operate in areas not under GoS control.