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SYRIAN ARAB REPUBLIC IDP Spontaneous Returns February 2021 IDP (Wos) Task Force

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SYRIAN ARAB REPUBLIC IDP Spontaneous Returns February 2021 IDP (Wos) Task Force SYRIAN ARAB REPUBLIC IDP Spontaneous Returns February 2021 IDP (WoS) Task Force February 2021 updates Governorate summary 3.7K In February 2021, the humanitarian community recorded some 10,000 spontaneous IDP Aleppo 3.2K return movements across Syria, around 24 percent less than in January. Over 6,000 of these 3.5K (60 percent) occurred within and between Aleppo and Idleb governorates. 3.1K Idleb 2.8K At the sub-district level, the Jebel Saman sub-district in Aleppo governorate received the 3.0K highest number of spontaneous return movements in February, with around 2,800 returns, 702 Rural Damascus 702 while the Ehsem and Ariha sub-districts in Idleb governorate received some 1,000 and 900 1.1K spontaneous IDP return movements respectively. Over the same period, more than 300 692 Homs 457 spontaneous IDP return movements were received by the Homs sub-district in Homs 457 governorate and the Dayr Hafir sub-district in Aleppo governorate. 90 Damascus 0 At the community level, Aleppo city in the Aleppo governorate received around 2,700 943 returns, the highest number of spontaneous return movements in February, while the Homs 924 72% Deir-ez-Zor 78 community in Homs governorate and Dayr Hafir community in Aleppo governorate each 78 of IDP spontaneous received some 400 return movements. Madamiyet Elsham in Rural Damascus governorate, 369 returnee arrıvals Al-Hasakeh 22 Kafrlata in Idleb governorate and Al Mayadin community in Deir-Ez-Zor governorate each 513 occurred within received around 300 return movements this month. 506 governorate Notes: Hama 265 307 - The returns refer to IDP spontaneous returns and do not necessarily follow the global 215 definitions of ‘Returnees’ or durable solutions for IDPs. Dar'a 0 0 - The IDP spontaneous returns include IDPs returning to their homes or communities of IDPs return to governorate 0 n origin. As-Sweida 0 (includes return from locations within governorate 200 - The IDP spontaneous returns term used in this monthly report refers to the return and from outside) 0 movements occurred in the reported period only. Tartous 0 IDPs return within governorate n 126 - The process of verification is based on triangulation of verified IDP spontaneous returns (include return within the same governorate only) 60 reported by different mechanisms and further examined by the IDP TF through cross- Ar-Raqqa 0 checking population numbers from previous years. 0 IDPs return from governorate n 0 (includes return to locations within governorate and Lattakia 0 40 to outside) IDP spontaneous returns map (K: thousand) Spontaneous Returns 0.5K 10,277 Al-Hasakeh 0.3K Spontaneous returns Aleppo Ar-Raqqa 134 Communities Idleb 0.2K Hama Deir-ez-Zor Total IDP spontaneous returnee arrivals (by subdistrict) Homs l 1 - 1,000 l 1,001 - 5,000 0.8K l 5,001 - 10,000 l 10,001 - 20,000 l > 20,000 O No returnees arrival reported Rural Damascus Damascus Total number of returnees arrived 0.2K l Spontanoeus IDP return movements by governorate Dar'a Movements less than two hundred are not reflected on the map. The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations. Arrows on the map do not depict actual IDP movement paths.Source: Information as reported by CCCM, HNAP and OCHA Syria for Feb 2021. Creation Date: 01 Apr 2021 Feedback: [email protected].
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